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
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
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Map of  
PARTHIA PROPER  
and the  
ADJACENT COUNTRIES



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OXUS

MARGIANA

MARGIANA

SAGARTIA

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Old Course of Oxus

Damanliq or Salt of the Kardo

Parohang (ruks)

Labut

Danaghah

Torkhan

Pylor Caspico

Abdus

# A HISTORY OF PARTHIA.

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## CHAPTER I.

*Geography of Parthia Proper. Character of the Region.  
Climate. Character of the Surrounding Countries.*

THE broad tract of desert which, eastward of the Caspian Sea, extends from the Moughojar hills to the Indian Ocean, a distance of above 1500 miles, is interrupted about midway by a strip of territory possessing features of much beauty and attraction. This strip, narrow compared to the desert on either side of it, is yet, looked at by itself, a region of no inconsiderable dimensions, extending, as it does from east to west,<sup>1</sup> a distance of 320, and from north to south of nearly 200 miles. The mountain chain, which running southward of the Caspian, skirts the great plateau of Iran, or Persia, on the north, broadens out, after it passes the south-eastern corner of the sea, into a valuable and productive mountain-region. Four or five distinct ranges<sup>2</sup> here run parallel to one another, having between them latitudinal valleys, with glens transverse to their courses. The sides of the valleys are often well wooded;<sup>3</sup> the flat ground at the foot of the hills is fertile; water abounds; and the streams gradually collect into rivers of a considerable size.

The fertile territory in this quarter is further increased by the extension of cultivation to a considerable distance from the base of the most southern of the ranges, in the direction of the Great Iranic desert. The mountains send down a number of small streams towards the south; and the water of these, judiciously husbanded by means of reservoirs and *kanats*, is capable of spreading fertility over a broad belt at the foot of the hills;<sup>4</sup> which, left to nature, would be almost as barren as the desert itself, into which it would, in fact, be absorbed.

It was undoubtedly in the region which has been thus briefly

described that the ancient home of the Parthians lay. In this neighborhood alone are found the geographic names which the most ancient writers who mention the Parthians connect with them.<sup>5</sup> Here evidently the Parthians were settled<sup>6</sup> at the time when Alexander the Great overran the East, and first made the Greeks thoroughly familiar with the Parthian name and territory. Here, lastly, in the time of the highest Parthian splendor and prosperity, did a province of the Empire retain the name of Parthyêné, or Parthia Proper;<sup>7</sup> and here, also, in their palmiest days, did the Parthian kings continue to have a capital and a residence.<sup>8</sup>

Parthia Proper, however, was at no time coextensive with the region described. A portion of that region formed the district called Hyrcania; and it is not altogether easy to determine what were the limits between the two. The evidence goes, on the whole, to show that, while Hyrcania lay towards the west and north, the Parthian country was that towards the south and east,<sup>9</sup> the valleys of the Etrek and Gurghan constituting the main portions of the former, while the tracts east and south of those valleys, as far as the sixty-first degree of E. longitude, constituted the latter.

If the limits of Parthia Proper be thus defined, it will have nearly corresponded to the modern Persian province of Khorasan. It will have extended from about Damaghan (long. 54° 10') upon the west,<sup>10</sup> to the Heri-rud upon the east, and have comprised the modern districts of Damaghan, Shah-rud, Sebzawar, Nishapur, Meshed, Shebri-No, and Tersheez. Its length from east to west will have been about 300 miles, and its average width about 100 or 120. It will have contained an area of about 33,000 square miles, being thus about equal in size to Ireland, Bavaria, or St. Domingo.

The character of the district has been already stated in general terms; but some further particulars may now be added. It consists, in the first place, of a mountain and a plain region—the mountain region lying towards the north and the plain region towards the south. The mountain region is composed of three main ranges, the Daman-i-Koh, or Hills of the Kurds,<sup>11</sup> upon the north, skirting the great desert of Kharesm, the Alatagh and Meerabee mountains in the centre; and the Jaghetai or Djuvein range, upon the south, which may be regarded as continued in the hills above Tersheez and Khaff. The three ranges are parallel, running east and west, but with an inclination, more or less strong, to the north of

west and the south of east. The northern and central ranges are connected by a water-shed, which runs nearly east and west, a little to the south of Kooshan, and separates the head streams of the Ettrek from those of the Meshed river. The central and southern ranges are connected by a more decided mountain line, a transverse ridge which runs nearly north and south, dividing between the waters that flow westward into the Gurghan, and those which form the river of Nishapur. This conformation of the mountains leaves between the ranges three principal valleys, the valley of Meshed towards the south-east, between the Kurdish range and the Alatagh and Meerabee; that of Miyanabad towards the west, between the Alatagh and the Jaghetai; and that of Nishapur towards the south, between the eastern end of the Jaghetai and the western flank of the Meerabee. As the valleys are three in number, so likewise are the rivers, which are known respectively as the Tejend, or river of Meshed, the river of Nishapur, and the river of Miyanabad.<sup>12</sup>

The Tejend, which is the principal stream of the three, rises from several sources in the hills south of Kooshan, and flows with a south-easterly course down the valley of Meshed, receiving numerous tributaries from both sides,<sup>13</sup> until it reaches that city, when it bends eastward, and, finding a way through the Kurdish range, joins the course of the Heri-rud, about long.  $61^{\circ} 10'$ . Here its direction is completely changed. Turning at an angle, which is slightly acute, it proceeds to flow to the west of north, along the northern base of the Kurdish range, from which it receives numerous small streams, till it ends finally in a large swamp or marsh, in lat.  $39^{\circ}$ , long.  $57^{\circ}$ , nearly.<sup>14</sup> The entire length of the stream, including only main windings, is about 475 miles. In its later course, however, it is often almost dry, the greater portion of the water being consumed in irrigation in the neighborhood of Meshed.

The river of Nishapur is formed by numerous small streams, which descend from the mountains that on three sides inclose that city. Its water is at times wholly consumed in the cultivation of the plain; but the natural course may be traced, running in a southerly and south-westerly direction, until it debouches from the hills in the vicinity of Tersheez.

The Miyanabad stream is believed to be a tributary of the Gurghan. It rises from several sources in the transverse range joining the Alatagh to the Jaghetai, the streams from which all flow westward in narrow valleys, uniting about

long. 57° 35'. The course of the river from this point to Piperne has not been traced, but it is believed to run in a general westerly direction along the southern base of the Alatagh, and to form a junction with the Gurghan a little below the ruins of the same name. Its length to this point is probably about 200 miles.

The elevation of the mountain chains is not great. No very remarkable peaks occur in them; and it may be doubted whether they anywhere attain a height of above 6000 feet. They are for the most part barren and rugged, very scantily supplied with timber,<sup>15</sup> and only in places capable of furnishing a tolerable pasturage to flocks and herds. The valleys, on the other hand, are rich and fertile in the extreme; that of Meshed, which extends a distance of above a hundred miles from north-west to south-east, and is from twenty to thirty miles broad, has almost everywhere a good and deep soil,<sup>16</sup> is abundantly supplied with water, and yields a plentiful return even to the simplest and most primitive cultivation. The plain about Nishapur, which is in length from eighty to ninety miles, and in width from forty to sixty, boasts a still greater fertility.<sup>17</sup>

The flat country along the southern base of the mountains, which ancient writers regard as Parthia, *par excellence*,<sup>18</sup> is a strip of territory about 300 miles long, varying in width according to the labor and the skill applied by its inhabitants to the perfecting of a system of irrigation. At present the *kanats*, or underground water-courses, are seldom carried to a distance of more than a mile or two from the foot of the hills; but it is thought that anciently the cultivation was extended considerably further. Ruined cities dispersed throughout the tract<sup>19</sup> sufficiently indicate its capabilities, and in a few places where much attention is paid to agriculture the results are such as to imply that the soil is more than ordinarily productive.<sup>20</sup> The salt desert lies, however, in most places within ten or fifteen miles of the hills; and beyond this distance it is obviously impossible that the "Atak" or "Skirt" should at any time have been inhabited.<sup>21</sup>

It is evident that the entire tract above described must have been at all times a valuable and much coveted region. Compared with the arid and inhospitable deserts which adjoin it upon the north and south, Khorasan, the ancient Parthia and Hyrcania, is a terrestrial Paradise. Parthia, though scantily wooded,<sup>22</sup> still produces in places the pine, the walnut, the

sycamore, the ash, the poplar, the willow, the vine, the mulberry, the apricot, and numerous other fruit trees.<sup>23</sup> Saffron, asafoetida, and the gum ammoniac plant, are indigenous in parts of it.<sup>24</sup> Much of the soil is suited for the cultivation of wheat, barley, and cotton.<sup>25</sup> The ordinary return upon wheat and barley is reckoned at ten for one.<sup>26</sup> Game abounds in the mountains, and fish in the underground water-courses.<sup>27</sup> Among the mineral treasures of the region may be enumerated copper, lead, iron, salt,<sup>28</sup> and one of the most exquisite of gems, the turquoise.<sup>29</sup> This gem does not appear to be mentioned by ancient writers; but it is so easily obtainable that we can scarcely suppose it was not known from very ancient times.

The severity of the climate of Parthia is strongly stated by Justin.<sup>30</sup> According to modern travellers, the winters, though protracted, are not very inclement, the thermometer rarely sinking below ten or eleven degrees of Fahrenheit during the nights,<sup>31</sup> and during the daytime rising, even in December and January,<sup>32</sup> to 40° or 50°. The cold weather, however, which commences about October, continues till nearly the end of March, when storms of sleet and hail are common.<sup>33</sup> Much snow falls in the earlier portion of the winter, and the valleys are scarcely clear of it till March. On the mountains it remains much longer, and forms the chief source of supply to the rivers during the spring and the early summer time. In summer the heat is considerable, more especially in the region known as the "Atak;" and here, too, the unwholesome wind, which blows from the southern desert, is felt from time to time as a terrible scourge.<sup>34</sup> But in the upland country the heat is at no time very intense, and the natives boast that they are not compelled by it to sleep on their house-tops during more than one month in the year.<sup>35</sup>

The countries by which Parthia Proper was bounded were the following: Chorasmia, Margiana, Aria, Sarangia, Sagartia, and Hyrcania.

Chorasmia lay upon the north, consisting of the low tract between the most northerly of the Parthian mountain chains and the old course of the Oxus. This region, which is for the most part an arid and inhospitable desert,<sup>36</sup> can at no time have maintained more than a sparse and scanty population. The Turkoman tribes which at the present day roam over the waste, feeding their flocks and herds alternately on the banks of the Oxus and the Tejend, or finding a bare subsistence for them about the ponds and pools left by the winter rains, represent, it

is probable, with sufficient faithfulness, the ancient inhabitants, who, whatever their race, must always have been nomads, and can never have exceeded a few hundred thousands.<sup>37</sup> On this side Parthia must always have been tolerably safe from attacks, unless the Cis-Oxianian tribes were reinforced, as they sometimes were, by hordes from beyond the river.

On the north-east was Margiana, sometimes regarded as a country by itself, sometimes reckoned a mere district of Bactria.<sup>38</sup> This was the tract of fertile land upon the Murg-ab, or ancient Margus river, which is known among moderns as the district of Merv. The Murg-ab is a stream flowing from the range of the Paropamisus, in a direction which is a little east of north; it debouches from the mountains in about lat.  $36^{\circ} 25'$ , and thence makes its way through the desert. Before it reaches Merv, it is eighty yards wide and five feet deep,<sup>39</sup> thus carrying a vast body of water. By a judicious use of dykes and canals, this fertilizing fluid was in ancient times carried to a distance of more than twenty-five miles from the natural course of the river; and by these means an oasis was created with a circumference of above 170, and consequently a diameter of above fifty miles.<sup>40</sup> This tract, inclosed on every side by deserts, was among the most fertile of all known regions; it was especially famous for its vines, which grew to such a size that a single man could not encircle their stems with his two arms, and bore clusters that were a yard long.<sup>41</sup> Margiana possessed, however, as a separate country, little military strength, and it was only as a portion of some larger and more populous territory that it could become formidable to the Parthians.

South of Margiana, and adjoining upon Parthia toward the east, was Aria, the tract which lies about the modern Herat. This was for the most part a mountain region, very similar in its general character to the mountainous portion of Parthia,<sup>42</sup> but of much smaller dimensions.<sup>43</sup> Its people were fairly warlike; but the Parthian population was probably double or triple their number, and Parthia consequently had but little to fear in this quarter.

Upon the south-east Parthia was bordered by Sarangia, the country of the Sarangæ, or Drangæ. This appears to have been the district south of the Herat valley, reaching thence as far as the Hamoon, or Sea of Seistan. It is a country of hills and downs,<sup>44</sup> watered by a number of somewhat scanty streams, which flow south-westward from the Paropamisus to

the Hamoon. Its population can never have been great, and they were at no time aggressive or enterprising, so that on this side also the Parthians were secure, and had to deal with no formidable neighbor.

Sagartia succeeded to Sarangia towards the west, and bordered Parthia along almost the whole of its southern frontier. Excepting in the vicinity of Tebbes and Toun<sup>45</sup> (lat. 34°, long. 56° to 58°), this district is an absolute desert, the haunt of the gazelle and the wild ass,<sup>46</sup> dry, saline, and totally devoid of vegetation. The wild nomads, who wandered over its wastes, obtaining a scanty subsistence by means of the lasso,<sup>47</sup> were few in number,<sup>48</sup> scattered, and probably divided by feuds. Southern Parthia might occasionally suffer from their raids; but they were far too weak to constitute a serious danger to the mountain country.

Lastly, towards the west and the north-west, Parthia was bordered by Hyrcania, a region geographically in the closest connection with it, very similar in general character, but richer, warmer, and altogether more desirable. Hyrcania was, as already observed,<sup>49</sup> the western and north-western portion of that broad mountain region which has been described as intervening between the eastern shores of the Caspian and the river Arius, or Heri-rud. It consisted mainly of the two rich valleys of the Gurghan and Ettrek, with the mountain chains inclosing or dividing them. Here on the slopes of the hills grow the oak, the beech, the elm, the alder, the wild cherry; here luxuriant vines spring from the soil on every side, raising themselves aloft by the aid of their stronger sisters, and hanging in wild festoons from tree to tree; beneath their shade the ground is covered with flowers of various kinds, primroses, violets, lilies, hyacinths, and others of unknown species; while in the flat land at the bottom of the valleys are meadows of the softest and the tenderest grass, capable of affording to numerous flocks and herds an excellent and unfailing pasture.<sup>50</sup> Abundant game finds shelter in the forests,<sup>51</sup> while towards the mouths of the rivers, where the ground is for the most part marshy, large herds of wild boars are frequent; a single herd sometimes containing hundreds.<sup>52</sup> Altogether Hyrcania was a most productive and desirable country, capable of sustaining a dense population, and well deserving Strabo's description of it as "highly favored of Heaven."<sup>53</sup> The area of the country was, however, small;<sup>54</sup> probably not much exceeding one half

that of Parthia Proper; and thus the people were not sufficiently numerous to cause the Parthians much apprehension.

The situation and character of Parthia thus, on the whole, favored her becoming an imperial power. She had abundant resources within herself; she had a territory apt for the production of a hardy race of men; and she had no neighbors of sufficient strength to keep her down, when she once developed the desire to become dominant. Surprise has been expressed at her rise.<sup>55</sup> But it is perhaps more astonishing that she passed so many centuries in obscurity before she became an important state, than that she raised herself at last to the first position among the Oriental nations. Her ambition and her material strength were plants of slow growth; it took several hundreds of years for them to attain maturity: when, however, this point was reached, the circumstances of her geographical position stood her in good stead, and enabled her rapidly to extend her way over the greater portion of Western Asia.

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## CHAPTER II.

*Early notices of the Parthians. Their Ethnic character and connections. Their position under the Persian Monarchs, from Cyrus the Great to Darius III. (Codomannus.)*

Πάρθων γένος Σκυθικόν.—Arrian, Fr. 1.

THE Parthians do not appear in history until a comparatively recent period. Their name occurs nowhere in the Old Testament Scriptures. They obtain no mention in the Zendavesta. The Assyrian Inscriptions are wholly silent concerning them. It is not until the time of Darius Hystaspis that we have trustworthy evidence of their existence as a distinct people.<sup>1</sup> In the inscriptions of this king we find their country included under the name of *Parthva* or *Parthwa* among the provinces of the Persian Empire, joined in two places with Sarangia, Aria, Chorasmia, Bactria, and Sogdiana,<sup>2</sup> and in a third with these same countries and Sagartia.<sup>3</sup> We find, moreover, an account of a rebellion in which the Parthians took part. In the troubles which broke out upon the death of the Pseudo-

Smerdis, B.C. 521, Parthia revolted, in conjunction (as it would seem) with Hyrcania, espousing the cause of that Median pretender, who, declaring himself a descendant of the old Median monarchs, set himself up as a rival to Darius. Hytaspes, the father of Darius, held at this time the Parthian satrapy. In two battles within the limits of his province he defeated the rebels, who must have brought into the field a considerable force, since in one of the two engagements they lost in killed and prisoners between 10,000 and 11,000 men. After their second defeat the Parthians made their submission, and once more acknowledged Darius for their sovereign.<sup>4</sup>

With these earliest Oriental notices of the Parthians agree entirely such passages as contain any mention of them in the more ancient literature of the Greeks. Hecataeus of Miletus, who was contemporary with Darius Hystaspis, made the Parthians adjoin upon the Chorasmians in the account which he gave of the geography of Asia.<sup>5</sup> Herodotus spoke of them as a people subject to the Persians in the reign of Darius, and assigned them to the sixteenth satrapy, which comprised also the Arians, the Sogdians, and the Chorasmians.<sup>6</sup> He said that they took part in the expedition of Xerxes against Greece (B.C. 480), serving in the army on foot under the same commander as the Chorasmians, and equipped like them with bows and arrows, and with spears of no great length.<sup>7</sup> In another passage he mentioned their being compelled to pay the Persian water tax, and spoke of the great need which they had of water for the irrigation of their millet and sesamé crops.<sup>8</sup>

It is evident that these notices agree with the Persian accounts, both as to the locality of the Parthians and as to the fact of their subjection to the Persian government. They further agree in assigning to the Parthians a respectable military character, yet one of no very special eminency. On the ethnology of the nation, and the circumstances under which the country became an integral part of the Persian dominions, they throw no light. We have still to seek an answer to the questions, "Who were the Parthians?" and "How did they become Persian subjects?"

Who were the Parthians? It is not until the Parthians have emerged from obscurity and become a great people that ancient authors trouble themselves with inquiries as to their ethnic character and remote antecedents. Of the first writers who take the subject into their consideration, some are content to say that the Parthians were a race of Scyths, who at a

remote date had separated from the rest of the nation, and had occupied the southern portion of the Chorasmanian desert, whence they had gradually made themselves masters of the mountain region adjoining it.<sup>9</sup> Others added to this that the Scythic tribe to which they belonged was called the Dahæ; that their own proper name was Parni, or Aparni; and that they had migrated originally from the country to the north of the Palus Mæotis, where they had left the great mass of their fellow tribesmen.<sup>10</sup> Subsequently, in the time of the Antonines, the theory was started that the Parthians were Scyths, whom Sesostriis, on his return from his Scythian expedition, brought into Asia and settled in the mountain-tract lying east of the Caspian.<sup>11</sup>

It can scarcely be thought that these notices have very much historical value. Moderns are generally agreed that the Scythian conquests of Sesostriis are an invention of the Egyptian priests, which they palmed on Herodotus<sup>12</sup> and Diodorus.<sup>13</sup> Could they be regarded as having really taken place, still the march back from Scythia to Egypt round the north and east of the Caspian Sea would be in the highest degree improbable. The settlement of the Parthians in Parthia by the returning conqueror is, in fact, a mere duplicate of the tale commonly told of his having settled the Colchians in Colchis,<sup>14</sup> and is equally worthless. The earlier authors, moreover, know nothing of the story, which first appears in the second century after our era, and as time goes on becomes more circumstantial.<sup>15</sup>

Even the special connection of the Parthians with the Dahæ, and their migration from the shores of the Palus Mæotis, may be doubted. Strabo admits it to be uncertain whether there were any Dahæ at all about the Mæotis;<sup>16</sup> and, if there were, it would be open to question whether they were of the same race with the Dahæ of the Caspian.<sup>17</sup> As the settlement of the Parthians in the country called after their name dated from a time anterior to Darius Hystaspis, and the Greeks certainly did not set on foot any inquiries into their origin till at least two centuries later,<sup>18</sup> it would be unlikely that the Parthians could give them a true account. The real groundwork of the stories told seems to have been twofold. First, there was a strong conviction on the part of those who came in contact with the Parthians that they were Scyths; and secondly, it was believed that their name meant "exile."<sup>19</sup> Hence it was necessary to suppose that they had migrated into their country from some portion of the tract known as Scythia to the Greeks,

and it was natural to invent stories as to the particular circumstances of the migration.

The residuum of the truth, or at any rate the important conviction of the ancient writers, which remains after their stories are sifted, is the Scythic character of the Parthian people. On this point, Strabo, Justin, and Arrian are agreed. The manners of the Parthians had, they tell us, much that was Scythic in them.<sup>20</sup> Their language was half Scythic, half Median.<sup>21</sup> They armed themselves in the Scythic fashion.<sup>22</sup> They were, in fact, Scyths in descent, in habits, in character.

But what are we to understand by this? May we assume at once that they were a Turanian people, in race, habits, and language akin to the various tribes of Turkomans who are at present dominant over the entire region between the Oxus and the Parthian mountain-tract, and within that tract have many settlements? May we assume that they stood in an attitude of natural hostility to the Arian nations by which they were surrounded, and that their revolt was the assertion of independence by a down-trodden people after centuries of subjection to the yoke of a stranger? Did TURAN, in their persons, rise against IRAN after perhaps a thousand years of oppression, and renew the struggle for predominance in regions where the war had been waged before, and where it still continues to be waged at the present day?

Such conclusions cannot safely be drawn from the mere fact that the Scythic character of the Parthians is asserted in the strongest terms by the ancient writers. The term "Scythic" is not, strictly speaking, ethnical. It designates a life rather a descent, habits rather than blood. It is applied by the Greeks and Romans to Indo-European and Turanian races indifferently,<sup>23</sup> provided that they are nomads, dwelling in tents or carts, living on the produce of their flocks and herds, uncivilized, and, perhaps it may be added, accustomed to pass their lives on horseback. We cannot, therefore, assume that a nation is Turanian simply because it is pronounced "Scythic." Still, as in fact the bulk of those races which have remained content with the nomadic condition, and which from the earliest times to the present day have led the life above described in the broad steppes of Europe and Asia, appear to have been of the Turian type, a presumption is raised in favor of a people being Turanian by decided and concordant statements that it is Scythic. The presumption may of course be re-

moved by evidence to the contrary ; but, until such evidence is produced it has weight, and constitutes an argument, the force of which is considerable.

In the present instance the presumption raised is met by no argument of any great weight; while on the other hand it receives important confirmation from several different quarters. It is said, indeed, that as all, or almost all, the other nations of these parts were confessedly Arians (e.g. the Bactrians, the Sogdians, the Chorasmians, the Margians, the Arians of Herat, the Sagartians, the Sarangians, and the Hyrcanians), it would be strange if the Parthians belonged to a wholly different ethnic family.<sup>24</sup> But, in the first place, the existence of isolated nationalities, detached fragments of some greater ethnic mass, embodied amid alien material, is a fact familiar to ethnologists;<sup>25</sup> and, further, it is not at all certain that there were not other Turanian races in these parts, as, for instance, the Thamanæans. Again, it is said that the Parthians show their Arian extraction by their names; but this argument may be turned against those who adduce it. It is true that among the Parthian names a considerable number are not only Arian, but distinctly Persian—e.g., Mithridates, Tiridates, Artabanus, Orobazus, Rhodaspes—but the bulk of the names have an entirely different character. There is nothing Arian in such appellations as Amminapes, Bacasis, Pacorus, Vonones, Sinnaces, Abdus, Abdageses, Gotarzes, Vologeses, Mnasciras, Sanatroeces; nor anything markedly Arian in Priapatius,<sup>26</sup> Himerus, Orodes, Aprætæus, Ornospades, Parrhaces, Vasaces, Monesis, Exedares. If the Parthians were Arians, what account is to be given of these words? That they employed a certain number of Persian names is sufficiently explained by their subjection during more than two centuries to the Persian rule. We are also distinctly told that they affected Persian habits, and desired to be looked upon as Persians.<sup>27</sup> The Arian names borne by Parthians no more show them to be Arians in race than the Norman names adopted so widely by the Welsh show them to be Northmen. On the other hand, the non-Arian names in the former case are like the non-Norman names in the latter, and equally indicate a second source of nomenclature, in which should be contained the key to the true ethnology of the people.

The non-Arian character of the Parthians is signified, if not proved, by the absence of their name from the Zendavesta. The Zendavesta enumerates among Arian nations the Bac-

trians, the Sogdians, the Margians, the Hyrcanians, the Arians of Herat, and the Chorasmians, or ALL the important nations of these parts except the Parthians. The Parthian country it mentions under the name of *Nisaya*<sup>28</sup> or *Nisæa*, implying apparently that the Parthians were not yet settled in it. The only ready way of reconciling the geography of the Zendavesta with that of later ages is to suppose the Parthians a non-Arian nation who intruded themselves among the early Arian settlements, coming probably from the north, the great home of the Turanians.

Some positive arguments in favor of the Turanian origin of the Parthians may be based upon their names. The Parthians affect, in their names, the termination *-ac* or *-ak*, as, for instance, in *Arsac-es*, *Sinnac-es*, *Parrhaces*, *Vesaces*, *Sanatræces*, *Phraataces*, etc.—a termination which characterizes the primitive Babylonian, the Basque, and most of the Turanian tongues. The termination *-geses*, found in such names as *Volo-geses*, *Abda-geses*, and the like, may be compared with the *-ghiz* of *Yenghiz*. The Turanian root *annap*, “God,” is perhaps traceable in *Amm-inap-es*. If the Parthian “*Chosrões*” represents the Persian “*Kurush*” or *Cyrus*, the corruption which the word has undergone is such as to suggest a Tatar articulation.

The remains of the Parthian language, which we possess, beyond their names, are too scanty and too little to be depended on to afford us any real assistance in settling the question of their ethnic character. Besides the words *surena*, “Commander-in-chief,” and *karta* or *kerta*, “city,” “fort,” there is scarcely one of which we can be assured that it was really understood by the Parthians in the sense assigned to it.<sup>29</sup> Of these two, the latter, which is undoubtedly Arian, may have been adopted from the Persians:<sup>30</sup> the former is non-Arian, but has no known Turanian congeners.

If, however, the consideration of the Parthian language does not help us to determine their race, a consideration of their manners and customs strengthens much the presumption that they were Turanians. Like the Turkoman and Tatar tribes generally, they passed almost their whole lives on horseback, conversing, transacting business, buying and selling, even eating on their horses.<sup>31</sup> They practised polygamy, secluded their women from the sight of men, punished unfaithfulness with extreme severity, delighted in hunting, and rarely ate any flesh but that which they obtained in this way, were

moderate eaters<sup>32</sup> but great drinkers,<sup>33</sup> did not speak much, but yet were very unquiet, being constantly engaged in stirring up trouble either at home or abroad.<sup>34</sup> A small portion of the nation alone was free; the remainder were the slaves of the privileged few.<sup>35</sup> Nomadic habits continued to prevail among a portion of those who remained in their primitive seats, even in the time of their greatest national prosperity;<sup>36</sup> and a coarse, rude, and semi-barbarous character attached always even to the most advanced part of the nation, to the king, the court, and the nobles generally, a character which, despite a certain varnish of civilization, was constantly showing itself in their dealings with each other and with foreign nations. "The Parthian monarchs," as Gibbon justly observes,<sup>37</sup> "like the Mogul (Mongol) sovereigns of Hindostan, delighted in the pastoral life of their Scythian ancestors, and the imperial camp was frequently pitched in the plain of Ctesiphon, on the eastern bank of the Tigris." Niebuhr seems even to doubt whether the Parthians dwelt in cities at all.<sup>38</sup> He represents them as maintaining from first to last their nomadic habits, and regards the insurrection by which their empire was brought to an end as a rising of the inhabitants of towns—the Tadjiks<sup>39</sup> of those times—against the Ilyats or wanderers, who had oppressed them for centuries. This is, no doubt, an over statement; but it has a foundation in fact, since wandering habits and even tent-life were affected by the Parthians during the most flourishing period of their empire.

On the whole, the Turanian character of the Parthians, though not absolutely proved, appears to be in the highest degree probable. If it be accepted, we must regard them as in race closely allied to the vast hordes which from a remote antiquity have roamed over the steppe region of upper Asia, from time to time bursting upon the south, and harassing or subjugating the comparatively unwarlike inhabitants of the warmer countries. We must view them as the congeners of the Huns, Bulgarians, and Comans of the ancient world; of the Kalmucks, Ouigurs, Usbegs, Eleuts, etc., of the present day. Perhaps their nearest representatives will be, if we look to their primitive condition at the founding of their empire, the modern Turkomans, who occupy nearly the same districts; if we regard them in the period of their great prosperity, the Osmanli Turks. Like the Turks, they combined great military prowess and vigor with a capacity for organization and government not very usual among Asiatics. Like them, they

remained at heart barbarians, though they put on an external appearance of civilization and refinement. Like them, they never to any extent amalgamated with the conquered races, but continued for centuries an exclusive dominant race, *encamped* in the countries which they had overrun.

The circumstances under which the Parthians became subjects of the Persian empire may readily be conjectured, but cannot be laid down positively. According to Diodorus, who probably followed Ctesias, they passed from the dominion of the Assyrians to that of the Medes, and from dependence upon the Medes to a similar position under the Persians.<sup>40</sup> But the balance of evidence is against these views. It is, on the whole, most probable that neither the Assyrian nor the Median empire extended so far eastward as the country of the Parthians.<sup>41</sup> The Parthians probably maintained their independence from the time of their settlement in the district called after their name until the sudden arrival in their country of the great Persian conqueror, Cyrus. This prince, as Herodotus tells us, subdued the whole of Western Asia, proceeding from nation to nation, and subjugating one people after another. The order of his conquests is not traceable; but it is clear that after his conquest of the Lydian empire (about B.C. 554) he proceeded eastward, with the special object of subduing Bactria.<sup>42</sup> To reach Bactria, he would have to pass through, or close by, Parthia. Since, as Herodotus says,<sup>43</sup> "he conquered the whole way, as he went," we may fairly conclude that on his road to Bactria he subjugated the Parthians. It was thus, almost certainly, that they lost their independence and became Persian subjects. Competent enough to maintain themselves against the comparatively small tribes in their near neighborhood, the Chorasmians, Hyrcanians, Arians of Herat, Bactrians, and Sagartians, it was not possible for them to make an effectual resistance to a monarch who brought against them the entire force of a mighty empire. Cyrus had, it is probable, little difficulty in obtaining their submission. It is possible that they resisted; but perhaps it is more probable that their course on this occasion was similar to that which they pursued when the Macedonian conqueror swept across these same regions. The Parthians at that period submitted without striking a blow.<sup>44</sup> There is no reason to believe that they caused any greater trouble to Cyrus.

When the Persian empire was organized by Darius Hystas-

pis into satrapies, Parthia was at first united in the same government with Chorasmia, Sogdiana, and Aria.<sup>45</sup> Subsequently, however, when satrapies were made more numerous, it was detached from these extensive countries and made to form a distinct government, with the mere addition of the comparatively small district of Hyrcania.<sup>46</sup> It formed, apparently, one of the most tractable and submissive of the Persian provinces. Except on the single occasion already noticed,<sup>47</sup> when it took part in a revolt that extended to nearly one-half the empire,<sup>48</sup> it gave its rulers no trouble; no second attempt was made to shake off the alien yoke, which may indeed have galled, but which was felt to be inevitable. In the final struggle of Persia against Alexander, the Parthians were faithful to their masters. They fought on the Persian side at Arbela;<sup>49</sup> and though they submitted to Alexander somewhat tamely when he invaded their country, yet, as Darius was then dead, and no successor had declared himself, they cannot be taxed with desertion. Probably they felt little interest in the event of the struggle. Habit and circumstance caused them to send their contingent to Arbela at the call of the Great King; but when the Persian cause was evidently lost, they felt it needless to make further sacrifices. Having no hope of establishing their independence, they thought it unnecessary to prolong the contest. They might not gain, but they could scarcely lose, by a change of masters.

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### CHAPTER III.

*Condition of Western Asia under the earlier Seleucidæ. Revolts of Bactria and Parthia. Conflicting accounts of the establishment of the Parthian Kingdom. First War with Syria.*

Τὸ ἔθνος Μακεδόνων ἀπέστησαν, καὶ καθ' ἑαυτοὺς ἤρξαν, καὶ ἐπὶ μέγα δυνάμειος ἤλασαν.—  
Arrian, Fr. 1.

THE attempt of Alexander the Great to unite the whole civilized world in a single vast empire might perhaps have been a success if the mind which conceived the end, and which had to a considerable extent elaborated the means, had been spared to watch over its own work, and conduct it past the perilous

period of infancy and adolescence. But the premature decease of the great Macedonian in the thirty-third year of his age, when his plans of fusion and amalgamation were only just beginning to develop themselves, and the unfortunate fact that among his "Successors" there was not one who inherited either his grandeur of conception or his powers of execution, caused his scheme at once to collapse; and the effort to unite and consolidate led only to division and disintegration. In lieu of Europe being fused with Asia, Asia itself was split up. For nearly a thousand years, from the formation of the great Assyrian empire to the death of Darius Codomannus, Western Asia, from the Mediterranean to Afghanistan, or even to India, had been united under one head, had acknowledged one sovereign. Assyria, Media, Persia, had successively held the position of dominant power; and the last of the three had given union, and consequently peace, to a wider stretch of country and a vaster diversity of peoples than either of her predecessors. Under the mild yoke of the Achæmænian princes had been held together for two centuries, not only all the nations of Western Asia, from the Indian and Thibetan deserts to the Ægean and the Mediterranean, but a great part of Africa also, that is to say, Egypt, north-eastern Libya, and the Greek settlements of Cyrene and Barca. The practical effect of the conquests of Alexander was to break up this unity, to introduce in the place of a single consolidated empire a multitude of separate and contending kingdoms. The result was thus the direct opposite of the great conqueror's design, and forms a remarkable instance of the contradiction which so often subsists between the propositions of man and the dispositions of an overruling Providence.

The struggle for power which broke out almost immediately after his death among the successors of Alexander may be regarded as having been brought to a close by the battle of Ipsus. The period of fermentation was then concluded, and something like a settled condition of things brought about. A quadripartite division of Alexander's dominions was recognized, Macedonia, Egypt, Asia Minor, and Syria (or south-western Asia) becoming thenceforth distinct political entities. Asia Minor, the kingdom of Lysimachus, had indeed less of unity than the other three states. It was already disintegrated, the kingdoms of Bithynia, Pontus, and Cappadocia, subsisting side by side with that of Lysimachus, which was thus limited to western and south-western Asia Minor. After the death of

Lysimachus, further changes occurred; but the state of Pergamus, which sprang up this time, may be regarded as the continuation of Lysimachus's kingdom, and as constituting from the time of Eumenes I. (B.C. 263) a fourth power in the various political movements and combinations of the Græco-Oriental world.

Of the four powers thus established, the most important, and that with which we are here especially concerned, was the kingdom of Syria (as it was called), or that ruled for 247 years by the Seleucidæ. Seleucus Nicator, the founder of this kingdom, was one of Alexander's officers, but served without much distinction through the various campaigns by which the conquest of the East was effected.<sup>1</sup> At the first distribution of provinces (B.C. 323) among Alexander's generals after his death, he received no share;<sup>2</sup> and it was not until B.C. 320, when upon the death of Perdicas a fresh distribution was made at Triparadisus, that his merits were recognized, and he was given the satrapy of Babylon.<sup>3</sup> In this position he acquired a character for mildness and liberality, and made himself generally beloved, both by his soldiers and by those who were under his government.<sup>4</sup> In the struggle between Antigonus and Eumenes (B.C. 317—316), he embraced the side of the former, and did him some good service; but this, instead of evoking gratitude, appears to have only roused in Antigonus a spirit of jealousy. The ambitious aspirant after universal dominion, seeing in the popular satrap a possible, and far from a contemptible, rival, thought it politic to sweep him out of his way; and the career of Seleucus would have been cut short had he not perceived his peril in time, and by a precipitate flight secured his safety. Accompanied by a body of no more than fifty horsemen, he took the road for Egypt, escaped the pursuit of a detachment sent to overtake him, and threw himself on the protection of Ptolemy.

This event, untoward in appearance, proved the turning-point in Seleucus's fortunes. It threw him into irreconcilable hostility with Antigonus, while it brought him forward before the eyes of men as one whom Antigonus feared. It gave him an opportunity of showing his military talents in the West, and of obtaining favor with Ptolemy, and with all those by whom Antigonus was dreaded. When the great struggle came between the confederate monarchs and the aspirant after universal dominion, it placed him on the side of the allies. Having recovered Babylon (B.C. 312), Seleucus led the flower

of the eastern provinces to the field of Ipsus (B.C. 301), and contributed largely to the victory, thus winning himself a position among the foremost potentates of the day. By the terms of the agreement made after Ipsus, Seleucus was recognized as monarch of all the Greek conquests in Asia, with the sole exceptions of Lower Syria and Asia Minor.<sup>5</sup>

The monarchy thus established extended from the Holy Land and the Mediterranean on the west, to the Indus valley and the Bolor mountain-chain upon the east, and from the Caspian and Jaxartes towards the north, to the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean towards the south. It comprised Upper Syria, Mesopotamia, parts of Cappadocia and Phrygia, Armenia,<sup>6</sup> Assyria, Media, Babylonia, Susiana, Persia, Carmania, Sagartia, Hyrcania, Parthia, Bactria, Sogdiana, Aria, Zarangia, Arachosia, Sacastana, Gedrosia, and probably some part of India.<sup>7</sup> Its entire area could not have been much less than 1,200,000 square miles. Of these, some 300,000 or 400,000 may have been desert; but the remainder was generally fertile, and comprised within its limits some of the very most productive regions in the whole world. The Mesopotamian lowland, the Orontes valley, the tract between the Caspian and the mountains, the regions about Merv and Balkh, were among the richest in Asia, and produced grain and fruits in incredible abundance. The rich pastures of Media and Armenia furnished excellent horses. Bactria gave an inexhaustible supply of camels. Elephants in large numbers were readily procurable from India.<sup>8</sup> Gold, silver, copper, iron, lead, tin, were furnished by several of the provinces, and precious stones of various kinds abounded.<sup>9</sup> Moreover, for above ten centuries, the precious metals and the most valuable kinds of merchandise had flowed from every quarter into the region; and though the Macedonians may have carried off, or wasted, a considerable quantity of both, yet the accumulations of ages withstood the drain, and the hoarded wealth which had come down from Assyrian, Babylonian, and Median times was to be found in the days of Seleucus chiefly within the limits of his Empire.

The situation which nature pointed out as most suitable for the capital of a kingdom having the extension that has been here indicated was some portion of the Mesopotamian valley, which was at once central and fertile. The empire of Seleucus might have been conveniently ruled from the site of the ancient Nineveh, or from either of the two still existing and still flourishing cities of Susa and Babylon. The impetus given to com-

merce by the circumstances of the time<sup>10</sup> rendered a site near the sea preferable to one so remote as that of Nineveh, and the same consideration made a position on the Tigris or Euphrates more advantageous than one upon a smaller river. So far, ~~it~~<sup>he</sup> pointed to Babylon as the natural and best metropolis; and it was further in favor of that place that its merits had struck the Great Conqueror, who had designed to make it the capital of his own still vaster Empire.<sup>11</sup> Accordingly Babylon was Seleucus's first choice; and there his Court was held for some years previously to his march against Antigonus. But either certain disadvantages were found to attach to Babylon as a residence, or the mere love of variety and change caused him very shortly to repent of his selection, and to transfer his capital to another site. He founded, and built with great rapidity, the city of Seleucia upon the Tigris<sup>12</sup>, at the distance of about forty miles from Babylon, and had transferred thither the seat of government even before B.C. 301. Thus far, however, no fault had been committed. The second capital was at least as conveniently placed as the first, and would have served equally well as a centre from which to govern the Empire. But after Ipsus a further change was made—a change that was injudicious in the extreme. Either setting undue store by his newly-acquired western provinces, or over-anxious to keep close watch on his powerful neighbors in those parts, Lysimachus and Ptolemy, Seleucus once more transferred the seat of empire, exchanging this time the valley of the Tigris for that of the Orontes, and the central position of Lower Mesopotamia for almost the extreme western point of his vast territories. Antioch arose in extraordinary beauty and magnificence during the first few years that succeeded Ipsus, and Seleucus in a short time made it his ordinary residence.<sup>13</sup> The change weakened the ties which bound the Empire together, offended the bulk of the Asiatics, who saw their monarch withdraw from them into a remote region, and particularly loosened the grasp of the government on those more eastern districts which were at once furthest from the new metropolis and least assimilated to the Hellenic character. Among the causes which led to the disintegration of the Seleucid kingdom, there is none that deserves so well to be considered the main cause as this. It was calculated at once to produce the desire to revolt, and to render the reduction of revolted provinces difficult, if not impossible.

The evil day, however, might have been indefinitely delayed

had the Seleucid princes either established and maintained through their Empire a vigorous and effective administration, or abstained from entangling themselves in wars with their neighbors in the West, the Ptolemies and the princes of Asia Minor.

But the organization of the Empire was unsatisfactory. Instead of pursuing the system inaugurated by Alexander and seeking to weld the heterogeneous elements of which his kingdom was composed into a homogeneous whole, instead of at once conciliating and elevating the Asiatics by uniting them with the Macedonians and the Greeks, by promoting intermarriage and social intercourse between the two classes of his subjects, educating the Asiatics in Greek ideas and Greek schools, opening his court to them, promoting them to high employments, making them feel that they were as much valued and as well cared for as the people of the conquering race,<sup>14</sup> the first Seleucus, and after him his successors, fell back upon the old simpler, ruder system, the system pursued before Alexander's time by the Persians, and before them perhaps by the Medes—the system most congenial to human laziness and human pride—that of governing a nation of slaves by means of a class of victorious aliens. Seleucus divided his empire into satrapies, seventy-two in number. He bestowed the office of satrap on none but Macedonians and Greeks. The standing army, by which he maintained his authority, was indeed composed in the main of Asiatics, disciplined after the Greek model; but it was officered entirely by men of Greek or Macedonian parentage. Nothing was done to keep up the self-respect of Asiatics, or to soften the unpleasantness that must always attach to being governed by foreigners. Even the superintendence over the satraps seems to have been insufficient. According to some writers, it was a gross outrage offered by a satrap to an Asiatic subject that stirred up the Parthians to their revolt.<sup>15</sup> The story may not be true; but its currency shows of what conduct towards those under their government the satraps of the Seleucidæ were thought, by such as lived near the time, to have been capable.

It would, perhaps, have been difficult for the Seleucid princes, even had they desired it, to pursue a policy of absolute abstention in the wars of their western neighbors. So long as they were resolute to maintain their footing on the right bank of the Euphrates, in Phrygia, Cappadocia, and upper Syria, they were of necessity mixed up with the quarrels

of the west. Could they have been content to withdraw within the Euphrates, they might have remained for the most part clear of such entanglements; but even then there would have been occasions when they must have taken the field in defence. As it was, however, the idea of abstention seems never to have occurred to them. It was the fond dream of each "Successor" of Alexander that in his person might, perhaps, be one day united all the territories of the great Conqueror. Seleucus would have felt that he sacrificed his most cherished hopes if he had allowed the west to go its own way, and had contented himself with consolidating a great power in the regions east of the Euphrates.

And the policy of the founder of the house was followed by his successors. The three Seleucid sovereigns who reigned prior to the Parthian revolt were, one and all, engaged in frequent, if not continual, wars with the monarchs of Egypt and Asia Minor. The first Seleucus, by his claim to the sovereignty of Lower Syria, established a ground of constant contention with the Ptolemies;<sup>16</sup> and though he did not prosecute the claim to the extent of actual hostility, yet in the reign of his son, Antiochus I., called Soter, the smothered quarrel broke out. Soter fomented the discontent of Cyrene with its subjection to Egypt,<sup>17</sup> and made at least one expedition against Ptolemy Philadelphus in person (B.C. 264). His efforts did not meet with much success; but they were renewed by his son, Antiochus II., surnamed "the God" (*θεός*), who warred with Philadelphus from B.C. 260 to B.C. 250, contending with him chiefly in Asia Minor.<sup>18</sup> These wars were complicated with others. The first Antiochus aimed at adding the kingdom of Bithynia to his dominions, and attacked successively the Bythynian monarchs, Zipcetas<sup>19</sup> and Nicomedes I. (B.C. 280—278).<sup>20</sup> This aggression brought him into collision with the Gauls, whom Nicomedes called to his aid, and with whom Antiochus had several struggles, some successful and some disastrous.<sup>21</sup> He also attacked Eumenes of Pergamus (B.C. 263), but was defeated in a pitched battle near Sardis.<sup>22</sup> The second Antiochus was not engaged in so great a multiplicity of contests; but we hear of his taking a part in the internal affairs of Miletus,<sup>23</sup> and expelling a certain Timachus, who had made himself tyrant of that city. There is also some ground for thinking that he had a standing quarrel with the king of Media Atropatene.<sup>24</sup> Altogether it is evident that from B.C. 280 to B.C. 250 the Seleucid princes were incessantly occupied with wars

in the west, in Asia Minor and in Syria Proper, wars which so constantly engaged them that they had neither time nor attention to spare for the affairs of the far east. So long as the Bactrian and Parthian satraps paid their tributes, and supplied the requisite quotas of troops for service in the western wars, the Antiochi were content. The satraps were left to manage affairs at their own discretion; and it is not surprising that the absence of a controlling hand led to various complications and disorders.

Moreover, the personal character of the second Antiochus must be taken into account. The vanity and impiety, which could accept the name of "Theus" for a service that fifty other Greeks had rendered to oppressed towns without regarding themselves as having done anything very remarkable,<sup>25</sup> would alone indicate a weak and contemptible *morale*, and might justify us, did we know no more, in regarding the calamities of his reign as the fruit of his own unfitness to rule an empire. But there is sufficient evidence that he had other, and worse, vices. He was noted, even among Asiatic sovereigns, for luxury and debauchery; he neglected all state affairs in the pursuit of pleasure; his wives and male favorites were allowed to rule his kingdom at their will; and their most flagrant crimes were neither restrained nor punished.<sup>26</sup> Such a character could have inspired neither respect nor fear. The satraps, to whom the conduct of their sovereign could not but become known, would be partly encouraged to follow the bad example, partly provoked by it to shake themselves free of so hateful and yet contemptible a master.

It was, probably, about the year B.C. 256, the fifth of the second Antiochus, when that prince, hard pressed by Philadelphus in the west, was also, perhaps, engaged in a war with the king of Atropatene in the north, that the standard of revolt was first actually raised in the eastern provinces, and a Syrian satrap ventured to declare himself an independent sovereign. This was Diodotus,<sup>27</sup> satrap of Bactria a Greek, as his name shows. Suddenly assuming the state and style of king he issued coins stamped with his own name, and established himself without difficulty as sovereign over the large and flourishing province of Bactria,<sup>28</sup> or the tract of fertile land about the upper and middle Oxus. This district had from a remote antiquity been one with special pretensions. The country was fertile, and much of it strong; the people were hardy and valiant;<sup>29</sup> they were generally treated with exceptional favor

by the Persian monarchs;<sup>30</sup> and they seem to have had traditions which assigned them a pre-eminence among the Arian tribes at some indefinitely distant period.<sup>31</sup> We may presume that they would gladly support the bold enterprise of their new monarch; they would feel their vanity flattered by the establishment of an independent Bactria, even though it were under Greek kings; and they would energetically second him in an enterprise which gratified their pride, while it held out to them hopes of a career of conquest, with its concomitants of plunder and glory. The settled quiet which they had enjoyed under the Achæmenide and the Seleucidæ was probably not much to their taste; and they would gladly exchange so tame and dull a life for the pleasures of independence and the chances of empire.

It would seem that Antiochus, sunk in luxury at his capital, could not bring himself to make even an effort to check the spirit of rebellion, and recover his revolted subjects. Bactria was allowed to establish itself as an independent monarchy, without having to undergo the ordeal of a bloody struggle. Antiochus neither marched against Diodotus in person, nor sent a general to contend with him. The authority of Diodotus was confirmed and riveted on his subjects by an undisturbed reign of eighteen years before a Syrian army even showed itself in his neighborhood.

The precedent of successful revolt thus set could not well be barren of consequences. If one province might throw off the yoke of its feudal lord with impunity, why might not others? Accordingly, within a few years the example set by Bactria was followed in the neighboring country of Parthia, but with certain very important differences. In Bactria the Greek satrap took the lead, and the Bactrian kingdom was, at any rate at its commencement, as thoroughly Greek as that of the Seleucidæ. But in Parthia Greek rule was from the first cast aside. The natives rebelled against their masters. An Asiatic race of a rude and uncivilized type, coarse and savage, but brave and freedom-loving, rose up against the polished but effeminate Greeks who held them in subjection, and claimed and established their independence. The Parthian kingdom was thoroughly anti-Hellenic.<sup>32</sup> It appealed to patriotic feelings, and to the hate universally felt towards the stranger. It set itself to undo the work of Alexander, to cast out the Greeks, to recover to the Asiatics the possession of Asia. It was naturally almost as hostile to Bactria as to Syria, altho'

danger from a common enemy might cause it sometimes to make a temporary alliance with that kingdom. It had, no doubt, the general sympathy of the populations in the adjacent countries, and represented to them the cause of freedom and autonomy.

The exact circumstances under which the Parthian revolt took place are involved in much obscurity. According to one account the leader of the revolt, Arsaces, was a Bactrian, to whom the success of Diodotus was disagreeable, and who therefore quitted the newly-founded kingdom, and betook himself to Parthia, where he induced the natives to revolt and to accept him for their monarch.<sup>33</sup> Another account, which is attractive from the minute details into which it enters, is the following:—"Arsaces and Tiridates were brothers, descendants of Phriapites, the son of Arsaces. Pherecles, who had been made satrap of their country by Antiochus Theus, offered a gross insult to one of them, whereupon, as they could not brook the indignity, they took five men into counsel, and with their aid slew the insolent one. They then induced their nation to revolt from the Macedonians, and set up a government of their own, which attained to great power."<sup>34</sup> A third version says that the Arsaces, whom all represent as the first king, was in reality a Scythian, who at the head of a body of Parnian Dahæ, nomads inhabiting the valley of the Attrek (Ochus), invaded Parthia, soon after the establishment of Bactrian independence, and succeeded in making himself master of it.<sup>35</sup> With this account, which Strabo seems to prefer, agrees tolerably well that of Justin, who says<sup>36</sup> that "Arsaces, having been long accustomed to live by robbery and rapine, attacked the Parthians with a predatory band, killed their satrap, Andragoras, and seized the supreme authority." As there was in all probability a close ethnic connection between the Dahæ and the Parthians,<sup>37</sup> it would be likely enough that the latter might accept for a king a chieftain of the former who had boldly entered their country, challenged the Greek satrap to an encounter, and by defeating and killing him freed them—at any rate for the time—from the Greek yoke. An oppressed people gladly adopts as chief the head of an allied tribe if he has shown skill and daring, and offers to protect them from their oppressors.

The revolt of Arsaces has been placed by some as early as the year B.C. 256.<sup>38</sup> The Bactrian revolt is assigned by most historians to that year;<sup>39</sup> and the Parthian, according to some,<sup>40</sup> was

contemporary. The best authorities, however, give a short interval between the two insurrections;<sup>41</sup> and, on the whole, there is perhaps reason to regard the Parthian independence as dating from about B.C. 250.<sup>42</sup> This year was the eleventh of Antiochus Theus, and fell into the time when he was still engaged in his war with Ptolemy Philadelphus. It might have been expected that when he concluded a peace with the Egyptian monarch in B.C. 249, he would have turned his arms at once towards the east, and have attempted at any rate the recovery of his lost dominions. But, as already stated,<sup>43</sup> his personal character was weak, and he preferred the pleasures of repose at Antioch to the hardships of a campaign in the Caspian region. So far as we hear, he took no steps to re-establish his authority; and Arsaces, like Diodotus, was left undisturbed to consolidate his power at his leisure.

Arsaces lived, however, but a short time after obtaining the crown. His authority was disputed within the limits of Parthia itself; and he had to engage in hostilities with a portion of his own subjects.<sup>44</sup> We may suspect that the malcontents were chiefly, if not solely, those of Greek race, who may have been tolerably numerous, and whose strength would lie in the towns. Hecatompylos, the chief city of Parthia, was among the colonies founded by Alexander;<sup>45</sup> and its inhabitants would naturally be disinclined to acquiesce in the rule of a "barbarian." Within little more than two years of his coronation, Arsaces, who had never been able to give his kingdom peace, was killed in battle by a spear-thrust in the side;<sup>46</sup> and was succeeded (B.C. 247) by his brother, having left, it is probable, no sons, or none of mature age.

Tiridates, the successor of Arsaces, took upon his accession his brother's name, and is known in history as Arsaces II. The practice thus begun passed into a custom,<sup>47</sup> each Parthian monarch from henceforth bearing *as king* the name of Arsaces in addition to his own real appellation, whatever that might be. In the native remains the assumed name almost supersedes the other;<sup>48</sup> but, fortunately, the Greek and Roman writers who treat of Parthian affairs, have preserved the distinctive appellations, and thus saved the Parthian history from inextricable confusion. It is not easy to see from what quarter this practice was adopted;<sup>49</sup> perhaps we should regard it as one previously existing among the Dahan Scyths.

If the Parthian monarchy owed its origin to Arsaces I., it owed its consolidation, and settled establishment to Arsaces

II., or Tiridates. This prince, who had the good fortune to reign for above thirty years,<sup>50</sup> and who is confused by many writers<sup>51</sup> with the actual founder of the monarchy, having received Parthia from his brother, in the weak and unsettled condition above described, left it a united and powerful kingdom, enlarged in its boundaries, strengthened in its defences, in alliance with its nearest and most formidable neighbor, and triumphant over the great power of Syria, which had hoped to bring it once more into subjection. He ascended the throne, it is probable, early in B.C. 247, and had scarcely been monarch a couple of years when he witnessed one of those vast but transient revolutions to which Asia is subject, but which are of rare occurrence in Europe. Ptolemy Euergetes, the son of Philadelphus, having succeeded to his father's kingdom in the same year with Tiridates, marched (in B.C. 245) a huge expedition into Asia, defeated Seleucus II. (Callinicus) in Syria, took Antioch, and then, having crossed the Euphrates, proceeded to bring the greater part of Western Asia under his sway. Mesopotamia, Assyria, Babylonia, Susiana, Persia, Media, submitted to him. He went in person as far as Babylon, and, according to his own account,<sup>52</sup> was acknowledged as master by all the Eastern provinces to the very borders of Bactria. The Parthian and Bactrian kingdoms cannot but have trembled for their newly won independence. Here was a young warrior who, in a single campaign, had marched the distance of a thousand miles, from the banks of the Nile to those of the Lower Euphrates, without so much as receiving a check, and who was threatening to repeat the career of Alexander. What resistance could the little Parthian state hope to offer to such an enemy? It must have rejoiced Tiridates to hear that while the new conqueror was gathering somewhat too hastily the fruits of victory, collecting and despatching to Egypt the most valuable works of art that he could find in the cities which he had taken, and levying heavy contributions on the submitted countries, a revolt had broken out in his own land, to quell which he was compelled to retire suddenly and to relinquish the greater part of his acquisitions. Thus the threatened conquest proved a mere inroad, and instead of a power of greater strength replacing Syria in these regions, Syria practically retained her hold of them, but with enfeebled grasp, her strength crippled, her prestige lost, and her honor tarnished. Ptolemy had, it is probable, not retired very long, when, encouraged by what he had seen of Syria's weakness, Tiridates took the

aggressive, and invading the neighboring district of Hyrcania, succeeded in detaching it from the Syrian state, and adding it to his own territory.<sup>53</sup> This was throwing out a challenge which the Syrian monarch, Callinicus, could scarcely decline to meet, unless he was prepared to lose, one by one, all the outlying provinces of his empire.

Accordingly in B.C. 237, having patched up a peace with his brother, Antiochus Hierax, the Syrian monarch made an expedition against Parthia. Not feeling, however, altogether confident of success if he trusted wholly to his own unaided efforts, he prudently entered into an alliance with Diodotus the Bactrian king,<sup>54</sup> and the two agreed to combine their forces against Tiridates. Hereupon that monarch, impressed with a deep sense of the impending danger, quitted Parthia, and, proceeding northwards, took refuge with the Aspasiacæ,<sup>55</sup> a Scythian tribe which dwelt between the Oxus and the Jaxartes.<sup>56</sup> The Aspasiacæ probably lent him troops; at any rate, he did not remain long in retirement, but, hearing that the Bactrian king, whom he especially feared, was dead, he contrived to detach his son and successor from the Syrian alliance, and to draw him over to his own side. Having made this important stroke, he met Callinicus in battle, and completely defeated his army.<sup>57</sup>

This victory was with reason regarded by the Parthians as a sort of second beginning of their independence.<sup>58</sup> Hitherto their kingdom had existed precariously, and as it were by sufferance. It could not but be that the power from which they had revolted would one day seek to reclaim its lost territory; and, until the new monarchy had measured its strength against that of its former mistress, none could feel secure that it would be able to maintain its existence. The victory gained by Tiridates over Callinicus put an end to these doubts. It proved to the world at large, and also to the Parthians themselves, that they had nothing to fear—that they were strong enough to preserve their freedom. Considering the enormous disproportion between the military strength and resources of the narrow Parthian State and the vast Syrian Empire—considering that the one comprised about fifty thousand and the other above a million of square miles;<sup>59</sup> that the one had inherited the wealth of ages and the other was probably as poor as any province in Asia; that the one possessed the Macedonian arms, training, and tactics, while the other knew only the rude warfare of the Steppes—the result of the struggle cannot but be re-

garded as surprising. Still it was not without precedent, and it has not been without repetition. It adds another to the many instances where a small but brave people, bent on resisting foreign domination, have, when standing on their defence, in their own territory, proved more than a match for the utmost force that a foe of overwhelming strength could bring against them. It reminds us of Marathon, of Bannockburn, of Morgarten. We may not sympathize wholly with the victors, for Greek civilization, even of the type introduced by Alexander into Asia, was ill replaced by Tatar coarseness and barbarism; but we cannot refuse our admiration to the spectacle of a handful of gallant men determinedly resisting in the fastness of their native land a host of aliens, and triumphing over their would-be oppressors.

The Parthians themselves, deeply impressed with the importance of the contest, preserved the memory of it by a solemn festival on the anniversary of their victory, which they still celebrated in the time of Trogus.<sup>60</sup>

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#### CHAPTER IV.

*Consolidation of the Parthian Kingdom. Death of Tiridates and accession of Arsaces III. Attack on Media. War of Artabanus (Arsaces III.) with Antiochus the Great. Period of inaction. Great development of Bactrian power. Reigns of Priapatius (Arsaces IV.) and Phraates I. (Arsaces V.)*

Κατ' ἀρχὰς ἀσθενὴς ἦν καὶ αὐτὸς (sc. Ἀρσάκης) καὶ οἱ διαδεξάμενοι ἐκείνον.—Strab. xi. 9, § 2.

SELEUCUS might perhaps not have accepted his defeat as final had he been altogether free to choose whether he would continue the Parthian war or no. The resources of his Empire were so vast, his command of men and money so unbounded, that he could easily have replaced one army by another, and so have prolonged the struggle. But renewed troubles had broken out in the western portion of his dominions,<sup>1</sup> where his brother, Antiochus Hierax, was still in arms against his authority. Seleucus felt it necessary to turn his attention to this quarter, and having once retired from the Parthian contest, he never afterwards renewed it.<sup>2</sup> Tiridates was left unmolested,

to act as he thought fit, and either to attempt further conquests, or to devote himself to securing those which he had effected. He chose the latter course, and during the remainder of his reign—a space of above twenty years—he employed himself wholly in strengthening and adorning his small kingdom. Having built a number of forts in various strong positions, and placed garrisons in them, he carefully selected a site for a new city, which he probably intended to make his capital. The spot chosen combined the advantages of being at once delightful and easily defensible. It was surrounded with precipitous rocks, which enclosed a plain of extraordinary fertility. Abundant wood and copious streams of water were in the neighborhood. The soil was so rich that it scarcely required cultivation, and the woods were so full of game as to afford endless amusement to hunters.<sup>3</sup> To the town which he built in this locality Tiridates gave the name of Dara, a word which the Greeks and Romans elongated into Dareium.<sup>4</sup> Unfortunately, modern travellers have not yet succeeded in identifying the site, which should, however, lie towards the East,<sup>5</sup> perhaps in the vicinity of Meshed.

We may presume that Tiridates, when he built this remarkable city, intended to make it the seat of government. Hecatompylos, as a Greek town, had the same disadvantages, which were considered in later times to render Seleucia unfit for the residence of the Parthian Court and monarch. Dara, like Ctesiphon, was to be wholly Parthian. Its strong situation would render it easy of defence; its vicinity to forests abounding in game would give it special charms in the eyes of persons so much devoted, as the Parthian princes were, to the chase. But the intention of Tiridates, if we have truly defined it, failed of taking permanent effect. He may himself have fixed his abode at Dara, but his successors did not inherit his predilections; and Hecatompylos remained, after his reign, as before it, the head-quarters of the government, and the recognized metropolis of Parthia Proper.<sup>6</sup>

After passing in peace and prosperity the last twenty years of his reign, Tiridates died in a good old age, leaving his crown to a son, whose special name is a little uncertain, but who is called by most moderns<sup>7</sup> Artabanus I.


Artabanus, having ascended the Parthian throne about B.C. 214, and being anxious to distinguish himself, took advantage of the war raging between Antiochus III., the second son of Seleucus Callinicus, and Achæus, one of his rebel satraps, to

advance into Media, and to add to his dominions the entire tract between Hyrcania and the Zagros mountains. Of the manner in which he effected his conquests we have no account; but they seem to have been the fruit of a single campaign, which must have been conducted with great vigor and military skill. The Parthian prince appears to have occupied Ecbatana,<sup>8</sup> the ancient capital of the Median Empire, and to have thence threatened the Mesopotamian countries. Upon receiving intelligence of his invasion, Antiochus levied a vast army,<sup>9</sup> and set out towards the East, with a determination to subjugate all the revolted provinces, and to recover the limits of the old Empire of Nicator. Passing the Zagros chain, probably by way of Behistun and Kermanshaw,<sup>10</sup> he easily retook Ecbatana, which was an open town,<sup>11</sup> and undefended by the Parthians, and proceeded to prepare for a further advance eastward. The route from Ecbatana to the Caspian Gates crosses, of necessity, unless a considerable circuit be taken, some large tracts of barren ground, inlets or bays of the Great Salt Desert of Iran. Artabanus cherished the hope that here the difficulties of the way would effectually bar his enemy's progress, more especially as his troops were so numerous, and as water was scanty throughout the whole region. The streams which flow from Zagros towards the East are few and scanty; they mostly fail in summer, which, even in Asia, is the campaigning season; and those who cross the desert at this time must depend on the wells wherewith the more western part of the region is supplied by means of *kanats* or underground conduits,<sup>12</sup> which are sometimes carried many miles from the foot of the mountains. The position of the wells, which were few in number, was known only to the natives;<sup>13</sup> and Artabanus hoped that the Syrian monarch would be afraid to place the lives of his soldiers in such doubtful keeping. When, however, he found that Antiochus was not to be deterred by any fears of this kind, but was bent on crossing the desert, he had recourse to the barbaric expedients of filling in, or poisoning, the wells along the line of route which the Syrian prince was likely to follow.<sup>14</sup> But these steps seem to have been taken too late. Antiochus, advancing suddenly, caught some of the Parthian troops at their barbarous work, and dispersed them without difficulty.<sup>15</sup> He then rapidly effected the transit, and, pressing forward, was soon in the enemy's country, where he occupied the chief city, Hecatompylos.<sup>16</sup>

Up to this point the Parthian monarch had declined an en-

gagement. No information has come down to us as to his motives ; but they may be readily enough conjectured. To draw an enemy far away from his resources, while retiring upon one's own ; to entangle a numerous host among narrow passes and defiles ; to decline battle when he offers it, and then to set upon him unawares, has always been the practice of weak mountain races when attacked by a more numerous foe. It is often good policy in such a case even to yield the capital without a blow, and to retreat into a more difficult situation. The assailant must follow whithersoever his foe retires, or quit the country, leaving him unsubdued. Antiochus, aware of this necessity, and rendered confident of success by the evacuation of a situation so strong, and so suitable for the Parthian tactics as Hecatompylos,<sup>17</sup> after giving his army a short rest at the captured capital, set out in pursuit of Artabanus, who had withdrawn his forces towards Hyrcania. To reach the rich Hyrcanian valleys, he was forced to cross the main chain of the Elburz, which here attains an elevation of 7000 or 8000 feet. The route which his army had to follow was the channel of a winter-torrent,<sup>18</sup> obstructed with stones and trunks of trees, partly by nature, partly by the efforts of the inhabitants. The long and difficult ascent was disputed by the enemy the whole way, and something like a pitched battle was fought at the top ; but Antiochus persevered, and, though his army must have suffered severely, descended into Hyrcanian and captured several of the towns.<sup>19</sup> Here our main authority, Polybius, suddenly deserts us, and we can give no further account of the war beyond its general result—Artabanus and the Parthians remained unsubdued after a struggle which seems to have lasted some years ; Artabanus himself displayed great valor ;<sup>20</sup> and at length the Syrian monarch thought it best to conclude a peace with him, in which he acknowledged the Parthian independence. It is probable that he exacted in return a pledge that the Parthian monarch should lend him his assistance in the expedition which he was bent on conducting against Bactria ;<sup>21</sup> but there is no actual proof that the conditions of peace contained this clause. We are left in doubt whether Artabanus stood aloof in the war which Antiochus waged with Euthydemus of Bactria immediately after the close of his Parthian campaigns, or whether he lent his aid to the attempt made to crush his neighbor. Perhaps, on the whole, it is most probable that, nominally, he was Anti-

Fig. 1.



Coin of Diodotus I.

Fig. 2.



Coin of Phraates I.



Phraates I. (Obverse.)

Fig. 3.



Coin of Mithridates I. (Native.)



Coin of Mithridates I. (Greek.)

Fig. 4



Arsaces I.



Mithridates I.




Artabanus I.

Fig. 1.




Coin of Labienus.

Fig 2.



COIN OF PHRAATACES AND MOUSA.

Fig 3



COIN OF VONONES I.

Fig 4.



COIN OF ARTABANUS III.

Fig. 5.



COIN OF VARDANES I.

ochus's ally in the war, but that, practically, he gave him little help, having no wish to see Syria aggrandized.

At any rate, whether Euthydemus had to meet the attack of Syria only, or of Syria and Parthia in combination, the result was, that Bactria, like Parthia, proved strong enough to maintain her ground, and that the Syrian King, after a while, grew tired of the struggle, and consented to terms of accommodation.<sup>22</sup> The Bactrian monarchy, like the Parthian, came out of the contest unscathed—indeed we may go further, and say that the position of the two kingdoms was improved by the attacks made upon them. If a prince possessing the personal qualities that distinguished the third Antiochus, and justified the title of "Great" which he derived from his oriental expedition<sup>23</sup>—if such a prince, enjoying profound peace at home, and directing the whole force of his empire against them, could not succeed in reducing to subjection the revolted provinces of the northeast, but, whatever military advantages he might gain, found conquest impossible, and returned home, having acknowledged as independent kings those whom he went out to chastise as rebellious satraps, it was evident that the kingdoms might look upon themselves as firmly established, or, at least, as secure from the danger of re-absorption into the Syrian State. The repulse of Callinicus was a probable indication of the fate of all future efforts on the part of Syria to reduce Parthia; the conditions of peace granted by Antiochus to both countries, after a series of military successes, constituted almost a proof that the yoke of Syria would never be re-imposed on either the Parthian or the Bactrian nation.

With the departure of Antiochus from the East, about B.C. 206, we enter upon a period when Parthian history is, for a quarter of a century, almost a blank. Nothing more is known of Arsaces III. after Antiochus retired; and nothing at all is known of his successor, Priapatius, beyond his name and the length of his reign, which lasted for fifteen years<sup>24</sup> (from about B.C. 196 to 181). The reigns of these princes coincide with those of Euthydemus and his son, Demetrius, in Bactria; and perhaps the most probable solution of the problem of Parthian inactivity at this time is to be found in the great development of Bactrian power which now took place, and the influence which the two neighboring kingdoms naturally exercised upon each other. When Parthia was strong and aggressive, Bactria was, for the most part, quiet; and when Bactria shows signs

of vigorous and active life, Parthia languishes and retires into the shade.

The Bactrian Kingdom, founded (as we have seen <sup>25</sup>) a little before the Parthian, sought from the first its aggrandizement in the East rather than in the West. The Empire of Alexander had included all the countries between the Caspian Sea and the Sutlej; and these tracts, which constitute the modern Khorasan, Afghanistan, and Punjaub, had all been to a certain extent Hellenized by means of Greek settlements <sup>26</sup> and Greek government. But Alexander was no sooner dead than a tendency displayed itself in these regions, and particularly in the more eastern ones, towards a relapse into barbarism, or, if this expression be too strong, <sup>27</sup> at any rate towards a rejection of Hellenism. During the early wars of the "Successors" the natives of the Punjaub generally seized the opportunity to revolt; the governors placed over the various districts by Alexander were murdered; and the tribes everywhere declared themselves free. Among the leaders of the revolt was a certain Chandragupta (or Sandracottus), who contrived to turn the circumstances of the time to his own special advantage, and built up a considerable kingdom in the far East out of the fragments which had detached themselves from what was still called the Macedonian Empire. <sup>28</sup> When Seleucus Nicator, about B.C. 305, conducted an expedition across the Indus, he found this monarch established in the tract between the Indus and the Ganges, <sup>29</sup> ruling over extensive dominions and at the head of a vast force. <sup>30</sup> It is uncertain whether the two rivals engaged in hostilities or no. <sup>31</sup> At any rate, a peace was soon made; and Seleucus, in return for five hundred elephants, ceded to Sandracottus certain lands on the west bank of the Indus, which had hitherto been regarded as Macedonian. <sup>32</sup> These probably consisted of the low grounds between the Indus and the foot of the mountains—the districts of Peshawur, Bunnoo, Murwut, Shikarpoor, and Kurrachee—which are now in British occupation. Thus Hellenism in these parts receded more and more, the Sanskritic Indians recovering by degrees the power and independence of which they had been deprived by Alexander.

This state of things could not have been pleasing to the Greek princes of Bactria, who must have felt that the reaction towards barbarism in these parts tended to isolate them, and that there was a danger of their being crushed between the Parthians on the one hand and the perpetually advancing In-

dians on the other. When Antiochus the Great, after concluding his treaty with Euthydemus, marched eastward, the Bactrian monarch probably indulged in hopes that the Indians would receive a check, and that the Greek frontier would be again carried to the Indus, if not to the Sutlej. But, if so, he was disappointed. Antiochus, instead of making war upon the Indians, contented himself with renewing the old alliance of the Seleucidæ with the *Maurja* princes,<sup>33</sup> and obtaining a number of elephants from Sophagesenus, the grandson of Sandracottus.<sup>34</sup> It is even possible that he went further, and made cessions of territory in return for this last gift,<sup>35</sup> which brought the Indian frontier still nearer than before to that of Bactria. At any rate, the result of the Indian expedition of Antiochus seems to have been unsatisfactory to Euthydemus, who shortly afterwards commenced what are called "Indian Wars"<sup>36</sup> on his south-eastern frontier, employing in them chiefly the arms of his son, Demetrius. During the latter years of Euthydemus and the earlier ones of Demetrius, the Bactrian rule was rapidly extended over the greater portion of the modern Afghanistan;<sup>37</sup> nor did it even stop there. The arms of Demetrius were carried across the Indus into the Punjaub region;<sup>38</sup> and the city of Euthymedeia upon the Hydaspes remained to later times an evidence of the extent of his conquests.<sup>39</sup> From B.C. 206 to about B.C. 185 was the most flourishing period of the Bactrian monarchy, which expanded during that space from a small kingdom into a considerable empire.<sup>40</sup>

The power and successes of the Bactrian princes at this time account sufficiently for the fact that the contemporary Parthian monarchs stood upon their guard, and undertook no great expeditions. Arsaces III., who continued on the throne for about ten or twelve years after his peace with Antiochus, and Priapatus, or Arsaces IV., his son, who succeeded him, and had a reign of fifteen years, were content, as already observed,<sup>41</sup> to watch over their own State, husbanding its resources, and living at peace with all their neighbors. It was not till Phraates I. (Arsaces V.), the son of Priapatus, had mounted the throne, B.C. 181, that this policy was departed from, and Parthia, which had remained tranquil for a quarter of a century, once more aroused herself, and assumed an attitude of aggression.

The quarter to which Phraates I. directed his arms was the country of the Mardians, a poor but warlike people,<sup>42</sup> who appear to have occupied a portion of the Elburz range, probabl.

that immediately south of Mazanderan and Asterabad.<sup>43</sup> The reduction of these fierce mountaineers is likely to have occupied him for some years, since their country was exceedingly strong and difficult.<sup>44</sup> Though the Mardi were (nominally, at any rate) subjects of the Seleucidæ, we do not hear of any assistance being rendered them, or, indeed, of any remonstrance being made against the unprovoked aggression of the Parthian monarch. The reign of Phraates I. in Parthia coincides with that of Seleucus IV. (Philopator) in Syria; and we may account for the inactivity of this prince, in part by his personal character, which was weak and pacific,<sup>45</sup> in part by the exhaustion of Syria at the time, in consequence of his father's great war with Rome (B.C. 197-190), and of the heavy contribution which was imposed upon him at the close of it. Syria may scarcely have yet recovered sufficient strength to enter upon a new struggle, especially one with a distant and powerful enemy. The material interests of the Empire may also have seemed to be but little touched by the war, since the Mardi were too poor to furnish much tribute; and it is possible, if not even probable, that their subjection to Syria had long been rather formal than real.<sup>46</sup> Seleucus therefore allowed the Mardians to be reduced, conceiving, probably, that their transfer to the dominion of the Arsacidæ neither increased the Parthian power nor diminished his own.

But the nation which submits to be robbed of a province, however unproductive and valueless, must look to having the process repeated at intervals, until it bestirs itself and offers resistance. There is reason to believe that Phraates had no sooner conquered the Mardians than he cast his eyes on an adjacent district, and resolved to add it to his territories. This was the tract lying immediately to the West of the Caspian Gates, which was always reckoned to Media, forming, however, a distinct district, known as Media Rhagiana.<sup>47</sup> It was a region of much natural fertility, being watered by numerous streams from the Elburz range, and possessing a soil of remarkable productiveness.<sup>48</sup> Its breadth was not great, since it consisted of a mere strip between the mountains and the Salt Desert which occupies the whole centre of the Iranian tableland; but it extended in length at least a hundred and fifty miles, from the Caspian Gates to the vicinity of Kasvin. Its capital city, from a remote antiquity, was Rhages,<sup>49</sup> situated near the eastern extremity of the strip, probably at the spot now called *Kaleh Erij*,<sup>50</sup> about twenty-three miles from the

“Gates.” On this region it is clear that Phraates cast a covetous eye. How much of it he actually occupied is doubtful; but it is at least certain that he effected a lodgment in its eastern extremity,<sup>51</sup> which must have put the whole region in jeopardy. Nature has set a remarkable barrier between the more eastern and the more western portions of Occidental Asia, about midway in the tract which lies due south of the Caspian Sea. The Elburz range in this part is one of so tremendous a character, and northward abuts so closely on the Caspian, that all communication between the east and the west necessarily passes to the south of it. In this quarter the Great Desert offering an insuperable obstacle to transit, the line of communication has to cling to the flanks of the mountain chain, the narrow strip between the mountains and the desert—rarely ten miles in width—being alone traversable. But about long. 52° 20' this strip itself fails. A rocky spur runs due south from the Elburz into the desert for a distance of some twenty or thirty miles, breaking the line of communication, and seeming at first sight to obstruct it completely.<sup>52</sup> This, however, is not the case absolutely. The spur itself is penetrable by two passes, one where it joins the Elburz, which is the more difficult of the two, and another, further to the south, which is easier.<sup>53</sup> The latter now known as the *Girduni Sudurrah* pass, constitutes the famous “Pylæ Caspiæ.” Through this pass alone can armies proceed from Armenia, Media, and Persia eastward, or from Turkestan, Khorasan, and Afghanistan into the more western parts of Asia. The position is therefore one of primary importance. It was to guard it that Rhages was built so near the eastern end of its territory. So long as it remained in the possession of Syria, Parthian aggression was checked. Rhagiana, the rest of Media, and the other provinces were safe, or nearly so. On the other hand, the loss of it to Parthia laid the eastern provinces open to her, and was at once almost equivalent to the loss of all Rhagiana, which had no other natural protection. Now we find that Phraates surmounted the “Gates,” and effected a lodgment in the plain country beyond them. He removed a portion of the conquered Mardians from their mountain homes to the city of Charax, which was on the western side of the Gates,<sup>54</sup> probably on the site now occupied by the ruins known as *Uewanikif*.<sup>55</sup> Their location in this strong post<sup>56</sup> was a menace to the neighboring town of Rhages, which can scarcely have maintained itself long against an enemy encamped at its doors. We are

not informed, however, of any results which followed on the occupation of Charax during the lifetime of Phraates. His reign lasted only seven years—from B.C. 181 to B.C. 174—and it is thus probable that he died before there was time for his second important conquest to have any further consequences.

Phraates had sufficient warning of his coming decease to make preparations with respect to a successor. Though he had several sons, some of whom were (we must suppose) of sufficient age to have ascended the throne,<sup>57</sup> he left his crown to his brother, Mithridates. He felt, probably, that the State required the direction of a firm hand, that war might at any time break out with either Syria or Bactria; while, if the career of conquest on which he had made Parthia enter were to be pursued, he could trust his brother better than any of his sons to conduct aggressive expeditions with combined vigor and prudence. We shall see, as the history proceeds, how Mithridates justified his choice. Phraates would also appear to have borne his brother especial affection, since he takes the name of “Philadelphus” (brother-loving) upon his coins.<sup>58</sup> It must have been a satisfaction to him that he was able by his last act at once to consult for the good of his country, and to gratify a sentiment on which it is evident that he prided himself.

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## CHAPTER V.

*Reign of Mithridates I. Position of Bactria and Syria at his accession. His first war with Bactria. His great Expedition against the Eastern Syrian provinces, and its results. His second war with Bactria, terminating in its conquest. Extent of his Empire. Attempt of Demetrius Nicator to recover the lost Provinces fails. Captivity of Demetrius. Death of Mithridates.*

“Mithridati, insignis virtutis viro, reliquit imperium (Phraates).”

Justin, xli. 5.

THE reign of Mithridates I. is the most important in the Parthian history. [Pl. 1. Fig. 3.] Receiving from his brother Phraates a kingdom of but narrow dimensions, confined (as it would seem) between the city of Charax on the one side, and the river Arius, or Hcri-rud, on the other, he transformed it,

within the space of thirty-seven years (which was the time that his reign lasted), into a great and flourishing Empire. It is not too much to say that, but for him, Parthia might have remained a mere petty State on the outskirts of the Syrian kingdom, and, instead of becoming a rival to Rome, might have sunk shortly into obscurity and insignificance.

As commonly happens in the grand changes which constitute the turning-points of history, the way for Mithridates's vast successes was prepared by a long train of antecedent circumstances. To show how the rise of the Parthians to greatness in the middle of the second century before our era was rendered possible, we must turn aside once more from our proper subject and cast a glance at the condition of the two kingdoms between which Parthia stood, at the time when Mithridates ascended the throne.

The Bactrian monarchs in their ambitious struggles to possess themselves of the tracts south of the Paropamisus,<sup>1</sup> and extending from the Heri-rud to the Sutlej and the mouths of the Indus, overstrained the strength of their State, and by shifting the centre of its power injured irretrievably its principle of cohesion. As early as the reign of Demetrius<sup>2</sup> a tendency to disruption showed itself, Eucratidas having held the supreme power for many years in Bactria itself, while Demetrius exercised authority on the southern side of the mountains.<sup>3</sup> It is true that at the death of Demetrius this tendency was to a certain extent checked, since Eucratidas was then able to extend his sway over almost the whole of the Bactrian territory.<sup>4</sup> But the old evil recurred shortly, though in a less pronounced form. Eucratidas, without being actually supplanted in the north by a rival, found that he could devote to that portion of the Empire but a small part of his attention. The southern countries and the prospect of southern and eastern conquests engrossed him. While he carried on successful wars with the Arachotians, the Drangians, and the Indians of the Punjaub region, his hold on the more northern countries was relaxed, and they began to slip from his grasp.<sup>5</sup> Incursions of the nomad Scyths from the Steppes carried fire and sword over portions of these provinces, some of which were even, it is probable, seized and occupied by the invaders.<sup>6</sup>

Such was, it would seem, the condition of Bactria under Eucratidas, the contemporary of Mithridates. In Syria, Antiochus Epiphanes had succeeded his brother Seleucus IV. (Philopator) about a year before Mithridates ascended the

Parthian throne.<sup>7</sup> He was a prince of courage and energy; but his hands were fully occupied with wars in Egypt, Palestine, and Armenia, and the distant East could attract but a small share of his thought or attention. The claim put forward by Egypt to the possession of Coele-Syria and Palestine, promised to Ptolemy V. (it was affirmed) as a dowry with Cleopatra, the daughter of Antiochus the Great, led to hostilities in the south-west which lasted continuously for four years (B.C. 171 to B.C. 168), and were complicated during two of them with troubles in Judæa, rashly provoked by the Syrian monarch, who, unaware of the stubborn temper of the Jews, goaded them into insurrection.<sup>8</sup> The war with Egypt came to an end in B.C. 168; it brought Syria no advantage, since Rome interposed, and required the restitution of all conquests. The war with the Jews had no such rapid termination. Antiochus, having not only plundered and desecrated the Temple, but having set himself to eradicate utterly the Jewish religion, and completely Hellenize the people, was met with the most determined resistance on the part of a moiety of the nation. A patriotic party rose up under devoted leaders,<sup>9</sup> who asserted, and in the end secured, the independence of their country. Not alone during the remaining years of Epiphanes, but for half a century after his death, throughout seven reigns, the struggle continued; Judæa taking advantage of every trouble and difficulty in Syria to detach herself more and more completely from her oppressor; being a continual thorn in her side, a constant source of weakness, preventing more than anything else the recovery of her power. The triumph which Epiphanes obtained in the distant Armenia (B.C. 166-5), where he defeated and captured the king, Artaxias,<sup>10</sup> was a poor set-off against the foe which he had created to himself at his doors through his cruelty and intolerance.

In another quarter, too, the Syrian power received a severe shake through the injudicious violence of Epiphanes. The Oriental temples had, in some instances, escaped the rapacity of Alexander's generals and "Successors;" their treasures remained unviolated, and contained large hoards of the precious metals. Epiphanes, having exhausted his own exchequer by his wars and his lavish gifts, saw in these un plundered stores a means of replenishing it, and made a journey into his south-eastern provinces for the purpose. The natives of Elymaïs, however, resisted his attempt, and proved

strong enough to defeat it;<sup>11</sup> the baffled monarch retired to Tabæ, where he shortly afterward fell sick and died. In the popular belief his death was a judgment upon him for his attempted sacrilege;<sup>12</sup> and in the exultation caused by the event the bands which joined these provinces to the Empire must undoubtedly have been loosened.

Nor did the removal of Epiphanes (B.C. 164) improve the condition of affairs in Syria. The throne fell to his son, Antiochus Eupator, a boy of nine, according to Appian,<sup>13</sup> or, according to another authority,<sup>14</sup> of twelve years of age. The regent, Lysias, exercised the chief power, and was soon engaged in a war with the Jews,<sup>15</sup> whom the death of Epiphanes had encouraged to fresh efforts. The authority of Lysias was further disputed by a certain Philip, whom Epiphanes, shortly before his death, had made tutor to the young king.<sup>16</sup> The claims of this tutor to the regent's office being supported by a considerable portion of the army, a civil war arose between him and Lysias, which raged for the greater part of two years (B.C. 163-2), terminating in the defeat and death of Philip. But Syrian affairs did not even then settle down into tranquillity. A prince of the Seleucid house, Demetrius by name, the son of Seleucus IV., and consequently the first cousin of Eupator, was at this time detained in Rome as a hostage, having been sent there during his father's lifetime as a security for his fidelity. Demetrius, with some reason, regarded his claim to the Syrian throne as better than that of his cousin, the son of the younger brother, and being in the full vigor of early youth,<sup>17</sup> he determined to assert his pretensions in Syria, and to make a bold stroke for the crown. Having failed to obtain the Senate's consent to his quitting Italy, he took his departure secretly,<sup>18</sup> crossed the Mediterranean in a Carthaginian vessel, and, landing in Asia, succeeded within a few months in establishing himself as Syrian monarch.

From this review it sufficiently appears that the condition of things, both in Syria and Bactria, was favorable to any aspirations which the power that lay between them might entertain after dominion and self-aggrandizement. The Syrian and Bactrian kings, at the time of Mithridates's accession, were, both of them, men of talent and energy; but the Syrian monarch was soon involved in difficulties at home, while the Bactrian had his attention attracted to prospects of advantage in a remote quarter. Mithridates might, perhaps, have at-

tacked the territory of either with an equal chance of victory; and as his predecessor had set him the example of successful warfare on his western frontier, we might have expected his first efforts to have been in this direction, against the dependencies of Syria. But circumstances which we cannot exactly trace determined his choice differently. While Eucratidas was entangled in his Indian wars, Mithridates invaded the Bactrian territory where it adjoined Parthia, and added to his Empire, after a short struggle, two provinces, called respectively Turiûa and that of Aspionus.<sup>19</sup> It is conjectured that these provinces lay towards the north and the north-west, the one being that of the Turanians proper, and the other that of the Aspasiacæ,<sup>20</sup> who dwelt between the Jaxartes and the Oxus.<sup>21</sup> But there is scarcely sufficient ground for forming even a conjecture on the subject, since speculation has nothing but the names themselves to rest upon.<sup>22</sup>

Successful in this quarter, Mithridates, a few years later, having waited until the Syrian throne was occupied by the boy Eupator, and the two claimants of the regency, Lysias and Philip, were contending in arms for the supreme power, made suddenly an expedition towards the west, falling upon Media, which, though claimed by the Syrian kings as a province of their Empire, was perhaps at this time almost, if not quite, independent.<sup>23</sup> The Medes offered a vigorous resistance to his attack; and, in the war which followed, each side had in turn the advantage;<sup>24</sup> but eventually the Parthian prince proved victorious, and the great and valuable province of Media Magna was added to the dominions of the Arsacidæ. A certain Bacasis was appointed to govern it, whether as satrap or as tributary monarch is not apparent;<sup>25</sup> while the Parthian king, recalled towards home by a revolt, proceeded to crush rebellion before resuming his career of conquest.

The revolt which now occupied for a time the attention of Mithridates was that of Hyrcania.<sup>26</sup> The Hyrcanians were Arians in race; they were brave and high-spirited,<sup>27</sup> and under the Persian monarchs had enjoyed some exceptional privileges<sup>28</sup> which placed them above the great mass of the conquered nations. It was natural that they should dislike the yoke of a Turanian people; and it was wise of them to make their effort to obtain their freedom before Parthia grew into a power against which revolt would be utterly hopeless. Hyrcania might now expect to be joined by the Medes, and even the Mardi, who were Arians like themselves,<sup>29</sup> and could

not yet have forgotten the pleasures of independence. But though the effort does not seem to have been ill-timed, it was unsuccessful. No aid was given to the rebels, so far as we hear, by any of their neighbors. Mithridates's prompt return nipped the insurrection in the bud; Hyrcania at once submitted, and became for centuries the obedient vassal of her powerful neighbor.

The conquest of Media had brought the Parthians into contact with the rich country of Susiana or Elymaïs; and it was not long before Mithridates, having crushed the Hyrcanian revolt, again advanced westward, and invaded this important province. Elymaïs appears to have had a king of its own,<sup>30</sup> who must either have been a vassal of the Seleucidæ, or have acquired an independent position by revolt after the death of Epiphanes. In the war which followed between this monarch and Mithridates, the Elymæans proved wholly unsuccessful, and Mithridates rapidly overran the country and added it to his dominions. After this he appears to have received the submission of the Persians on the one hand and the Babylonians on the other,<sup>31</sup> and to have rested on his laurels for some years,<sup>32</sup> having extended the Parthian sway from the Hindoo Koosh to the Euphrates.

The chronological data which have come down to us for this period are too scanty to allow of any exact statement of the number of years occupied by Mithridates in effecting these conquests. All that can be said is that he appears to have commenced them about B.C. 163 and to have concluded them some time before B.C. 140, when he was in his turn attacked by the Syrians. Probably they had been all effected by the year B.C. 150; since there is reason to believe that about that time<sup>33</sup> Mithridates found his power sufficiently established in the west to allow of his once more turning his attention eastward, and renewing his aggressions upon the Bactrian kingdom, which had passed from the rule of Eucratidas under that of his son and successor, Heliocles.<sup>34</sup>

Heliocles, who was allowed by his father a quasi-royal position,<sup>35</sup> obtained the full possession of the Bactrian throne by the crime of parricide. It is conjectured that he regarded with disapproval his father's tame submission to Parthian ascendancy, and desired the recovery of the provinces which Eucratidas had been content to cede for the sake of peace.<sup>36</sup> We are told that he justified his crime on the ground that his father was a public enemy;<sup>37</sup> which is best explained by sup-

posing that he considered him the friend of Bactria's great enemy, Parthia. If this be the true account of the circumstances under which he became king, his accession would have been a species of challenge to the Parthian monarch, whose ally he had assassinated. Mithridates accordingly marched against him with all speed, and, easily defeating his troops, took possession of the greater part of his dominion.<sup>38</sup> Elated by this success, he is said to have pressed eastward, to have invaded India, and overrun the country as far as the river Hydaspes,<sup>39</sup> but, if it be true that his arms penetrated so far, it is, at any rate, certain that he did not here effect any conquest. Greek monarchs<sup>40</sup> of the Bactrian series continued masters of Cabul and Western India till about B.C. 126; no Parthian coins are found in this region; nor do the best authorities claim for Mithridates any dominion beyond the mountains which enclose on the west the valley of the Indus.

By his war with Heliocles the empire of Mithridates reached its greatest extension. It comprised now, besides Parthia Proper, Bactria, Aria, Drangiana, Arachosia, Margiana, Hyrcania, the country of the Mardi, Media Magna, Susiana, Persia and Babylonia. Very probably its limits were still wider. The power which possessed Parthia, Hyrcania, and Bactria, would rule almost of necessity over the whole tract between the Elburz range and the Oxus, if not even over the region between the Oxus and the Jaxartes; that which held the Caspian mountains and eastern Media could not fail to have influence over the tribes of the Iranian desert; while Assyria Proper would naturally follow the fortunes of Babylonia and Susiana.<sup>41</sup> Still the extent of territory thus indicated rests only on conjecture. If we confine ourselves to what is known by positive evidence, we can only say that the Parthian Kingdom of this period contained, at least, twelve provinces above enumerated. It thus stretched from east to west a distance of fifteen hundred miles between the Suleiman mountains and the Euphrates, varying in width from three or four hundred miles—or even more—towards the west and east, to a narrow strip of less than a hundred miles toward the centre. It probably comprised an area of about 450,000 square miles; which is somewhat less than that of the modern Persia.

Unlike the modern Persia, however, the territory consisted almost entirely of productive regions. The excellent quality of the soil in Parthia Proper, Hyrcania, and Margiana, has been already noticed.<sup>42</sup> Bactria, the next province to Margiana

towards the east, was less uniformly fertile; but still it contained a considerable proportion of good land along the course of the Oxus and its tributaries, which was cultivated in vineyards and cornfields, or else pastured large herds of cattle.<sup>43</sup> The Mardian mountain territory was well wooded;<sup>44</sup> and the plain between the mountains and the Caspian was rich in the extreme.<sup>45</sup> Media, where it adjoined on the desert, was comparatively sterile; but still even here an elaborate system of artificial irrigation brought a belt of land under culture.<sup>46</sup> Further west, in the Zagros chain, Media comprised some excellent pasture lands,<sup>47</sup> together with numerous valleys as productive as any in Asia.<sup>48</sup> Elymais was, in part, of the same character with the mountainous portion of Media, while beyond the mountain it sank down into a rich alluvium, not much inferior to the Babylonian.<sup>49</sup> Babylonia itself was confessedly the most fertile country in Asia. It produced wheat, barley, millet, sesame, vetches, dates, and fruits of all kinds.<sup>50</sup> The return of the wheat crop was from fifty to a hundred-and-fifty-fold;<sup>51</sup> while that of the barley crop was three hundred-fold.<sup>52</sup> The dates were of unusual size and superior flavor;<sup>53</sup> and the palm, which abounded throughout the region, furnished an inexhaustible supply both of fruit and timber.<sup>54</sup>

The great increase of power which Mithridates had obtained by his conquests could not be a matter of indifference to the Syrian monarchs. Their domestic troubles—the contentions between Philip and Lysias, between Lysias and Demetrius Soter, Soter and Alexander Balas, Balas and Demetrius II., Demetrius II. and Tryphon, had so engrossed them for the space of twenty years (from B.C. 162 to B.C. 142) that they had felt it impossible, or hopeless, to attempt any expedition towards the East, for the protection or recovery of their provinces. Mithridates had been allowed to pursue his career of conquest unopposed, so far as the Syrians were concerned, and to establish his sway from the Hindoo Koosh to the Euphrates. But a time at last came when home dangers were less pressing, and a prospect of engaging the terrible Parthians with success seemed to present itself. The second Demetrius had not, indeed, wholly overcome his domestic enemy, Tryphon; but he had so far brought him into difficulties as to believe that he might safely be left to be dealt with by his wife, Cleopatra, and by his captains.<sup>55</sup> At the same time the condition of affairs in the East seemed to invite his interference. Mithridates ruled his new conquests with some strict-

ness,<sup>56</sup> suspecting, probably, their fidelity, and determined that he would not by any remissness allow them to escape from his grasp. The native inhabitants could scarcely be much attached to the Syro-Macedonians, who had certainly not treated them very tenderly;<sup>57</sup> but a possession of 170 years' duration confers prestige in the East, and a strange yoke may have galled more than one to whose pressure they had become accustomed. Moreover, all the provinces which Parthia took from Syria contained Greek towns, and their inhabitants might at all times be depended on to side with their countrymen against the Asiatics. At the present conjuncture, too, the number of the malcontents was swelled by the addition of the recently subdued Bactrians, who hated the Parthian yoke, and longed earnestly for a chance of recovering their freedom.

Thus when Demetrius II., anxious to escape the reproach of inertness,<sup>58</sup> determined to make an expedition against the great Parthian monarch, he found himself welcomed as a deliverer by a considerable number of his enemy's subjects, whom the harshness, or the novelty, of the Parthian rule had offended.<sup>59</sup> The malcontents joined his standard as he advanced; and supported, as he thus was, by Persian, Elymæan, and Bactrian contingents, he engaged and defeated the Parthians in several battles.<sup>60</sup> Upon this, Mithridates, finding himself inferior in strength, had recourse to stratagem, and having put Demetrius off his guard by proposals of peace,<sup>61</sup> attacked him, defeated him, and took him prisoner.<sup>62</sup> The invading army appears to have been destroyed.<sup>63</sup> The captive monarch was, in the first instance, conveyed about to the several nations which had revolted, and paraded before each in turn, as a proof to them of their folly in lending him aid,<sup>64</sup> but afterwards he was treated in a manner befitting his rank and the high character of his captor.<sup>65</sup> Assigned a residence in Hyrcania, he was maintained in princely state, and was even promised by Mithridates the hand of his daughter, Rhodoguné.<sup>66</sup> The Parthian monarch, it is probable, had the design of conquering Syria, and thought it possible that he might find it of advantage to have a Syrian prince in his camp, well disposed towards him, connected by marriage, and thus fitted for the position of tributary monarch. But the schemes of Mithridates proved abortive. His career had now reached its close. Attacked by illness<sup>67</sup> not very long after his capture of Demetrius, his strength proved insufficient to bear up against the malady, and he died after a glorious reign of about thirty-eight years, B.C. 136.

## CHAPTER VI.

*System of government established by Mithridates I. Constitution of the Parthians. Government of the Provinces. Laws and Institutions. Character of Mithridates I.*

“Rex, magno et regio animo.”—Justin, xxxviii. 9, § 3.

THE Parthian institutions possessed great simplicity; and it is probable that they took a shape in the reign of Arsaces I., or, at any rate, of Tiridates, which was not greatly altered afterwards. Permanency is the law of Oriental governments; and in a monarchy which lasted less than five hundred years, it is not likely that many changes occurred. The Parthian institutions are referred to Mithridates I., rather than to Tiridates, because in the reign of Mithridates Parthia entered upon a new phase of her existence—became an empire instead of a mere monarchy; and the sovereign of the time could not but have reviewed the circumstances of his State, and have determined either to adopt the previous institutions of his country, or to reject them. Mithridates I. had attained a position which entitled and enabled him to settle the Parthian constitution as he thought best; and, if he maintained an earlier arrangement, which is uncertain, he must have done so of his own free will, simply because he preferred the existing Parthian institutions to any other. Thus the institutions may be regarded as starting from him, since he approved them, and made them those of the Parthian EMPIRE.

Like most sovereignties which have arisen out of an association of chiefs banding themselves together for warlike purposes under a single head, the Parthian monarchy was limited. The king was permanently advised by two councils, consisting of persons not of his own nomination, whom rights, conferred by birth or office, entitled to their seats. One of these was a family conclave (*concilium domesticum*), or assembly of the full-grown males of the Royal House; the other was a Senate comprising both the spiritual and the temporal chiefs of the nation, the Sophi, or “Wise Men,” and the Magi, or “Priests.”<sup>1</sup> Together these two bodies constituted the Megistanes, the

“Nobles” or “Great Men”—the privileged class which to a considerable extent checked and controlled the monarch. The monarchy was elective, but only in the house of the Arsacidæ; and the concurrent vote of both councils was necessary in the appointment of a new king. Practically, the ordinary law of hereditary descent appears to have been followed, unless in the case where a king left no son of sufficient age to exercise the royal office. Under such circumstances, the Megistanes usually nominated the late king's next brother to succeed him,<sup>2</sup> or, if he had left behind him no brother, went back to an uncle.<sup>3</sup> When the line of succession had once been changed, the right of the elder branch was lost, and did not revive unless the branch preferred died out or possessed no member qualified to rule. When a king had been duly nominated by the two councils, the right of placing the diadem upon his head belonged to the Surena,<sup>4</sup> the “Field-Marshal,” or “Commander in Chief of the Parthian armies.” The Megistanes further claimed and sometimes exercised the right of deposing a monarch whose conduct displeased them; but an attempt to exercise this privilege was sure to be followed by a civil war, no monarch accepting his deposition without a struggle; and force, not right, practically determining whether he should remain king or no.

After a king was once elected and firmly fixed upon the throne, his power appears to have been nearly despotic. At any rate he could put to death without trial whomsoever he chose; and adult members of the Royal House, who provoked the reigning monarch's jealousy, were constantly so treated.<sup>5</sup> Probably it would have been more dangerous to arouse the fears of the “Sophi” and “Magi.” The latter especially were a powerful body, consisting of an organized hierarchy, which had come down from ancient times, and was feared and venerated by all classes of the people.<sup>6</sup> Their numbers at the close of the Empire, counting adult males only, are reckoned at eighty thousand;<sup>7</sup> they possessed considerable tracts of fertile land,<sup>8</sup> and were the sole inhabitants of many large towns or villages, which they were permitted to govern as they pleased.<sup>9</sup> The arbitrary power of the monarchs must, in practice, have been largely checked by the privileges of this numerous priestly caste, of which it would seem that in later times they became jealous, thereby preparing the way for their own downfall.<sup>10</sup>

The dominion of the Parthians over the conquered provinces was maintained by reverting to the system which had pre-





vailed generally through the East before the accession of the Persians to power, and establishing in the various countries either viceroys, holding office for life, or sometimes dependent dynasties of kings.<sup>11</sup> In either case, the rulers, so long as they paid tribute regularly to the Parthian monarchs and aided them in their wars, were allowed to govern the people beneath their sway at their pleasure. Among monarchs, in the higher sense of the term, may be enumerated the kings of Persia,<sup>12</sup> Elymais,<sup>13</sup> Adiabêné,<sup>14</sup> Osrhoêné,<sup>15</sup> and of Armenia and Media Atropatêné, when they formed, as they sometimes did, portions of the Parthian Empire. The viceroys, who governed the other provinces, bore the title of *Vitaxæ* (*βίτρακες*), and were fourteen or fifteen in number.<sup>16</sup> The remark has been made by the historian Gibbon<sup>17</sup> that the system thus established "exhibited under other names a lively image of the feudal system which has since prevailed in Europe." The comparison is of some value, but, like most historical parallels, it is inexact, the points of difference between the Parthian and the feudal system being probably more numerous than those of resemblance, but the points of resemblance being very main points, not fewer in number, and striking.

It was with special reference to the system thus established that the Parthian monarchs took the title of "King of Kings" (*βασιλεὺς βασιλέων*), so frequent upon their coins,<sup>18</sup> which seems sometimes to have been exchanged for what was regarded as an equivalent phrase,<sup>19</sup> "Satrap of Satraps" (*σατράπης τῶν σατραπῶν*). This title seems to appear first on the coins of Mithridates I.

In the Parthian system there was one anomaly of a very curious character. The Greek towns, which were scattered in large numbers throughout the Empire,<sup>20</sup> enjoyed a municipal government of their own, and in some cases were almost independent communities, the Parthian kings exercising over them little or no control. The great city of Seleucia on the Tigris was the most important of all these: its population was estimated in the first century after Christ at six hundred thousand souls;<sup>21</sup> it had strong walls,<sup>22</sup> and was surrounded by a most fertile territory.<sup>23</sup> It had its own senate, or municipal council, of three hundred members, elected by the people to rule them from among the wealthiest and best educated of the citizens.<sup>24</sup> Under ordinary circumstances it enjoyed the blessing of complete self-government, and was entirely free from Parthian interference, paying no doubt its tribute, but

otherwise holding the position of a "free city." It was only in the case of internal dissensions that these advantages were lost, and the Parthian soldiery, invited within the walls, arranged the quarrels of parties, and settled the constitution of the State at its pleasure. Privileges of a similar character, though, probably, less extensive, belonged (it would seem) to most of the other Greek cities of the Empire. The Parthian monarchs thought it polite to favor them; and their practice justified the title of "Phil-Hellene," which they were fond of assuming upon their coins. On the whole, the policy may have been wise, but it diminished the unity of the Empire; and there were times when serious danger arose from it. The Syro-Macedonian monarchs could always count with certainty on having powerful friends in Parthia, whatever portion of it they invaded; and even the Romans, though their ethnic connection with the cities was not so close, were sometimes indebted to them for very important assistance.<sup>25</sup>

We are told that Mithridates I., after effecting his conquests, made a collection of the best laws which he found to prevail among the various subject peoples, and imposed them upon the Parthian nation.<sup>26</sup> This statement is, no doubt, an exaggeration; but we may attribute, with some reason, to Mithridates the introduction at this time of various practices and usages, whereby the Parthian Court was assimilated to those of the earlier Great Monarchies of Asia, and became in the eyes of foreigners the successor and representative of the old Assyrian and Persian Kingdoms. The assumption of new titles and of a new state—the organization of the Court on a new plan—the bestowal of a new character on the subordinate officers of the Empire, were suitable to the new phase of its life on which the monarchy had now entered, and may with the highest probability, if not with absolute certainty, be assigned to this period.

It has been already noticed that Mithridates appears to have been the first Parthian sovereign who took the title of "King of Kings."<sup>27</sup> The title had been a favorite one with the old Assyrian and Persian monarchs,<sup>28</sup> but was not adopted either by the Seleucidæ or by the Greek kings of Bactria.<sup>29</sup> Its revival implied a distinct pretension to that mastery of Western Asia which had belonged of old to the Assyrians and Persians, and which was, in later times, formally claimed by Artaxerxes,<sup>30</sup> the son of Sassan, the founder of the New Persian Kingdom. Previous Parthian monarchs had been content to

call themselves "the King," or "the Great King"—Mithridates is "the King of Kings, the great and illustrious Arsaces."

At the same time Mithridates appears to have assumed the tiara, or tall stiff crown, which, with certain modifications in its shape, had been the mark of sovereignty, both under the Assyrians and under the Persians. Previously the royal head-dress had been either a mere cap of a Scythic type, but lower than the Scyths commonly wore it;<sup>31</sup> or the ordinary diadem, which was a band round the head terminating in two long ribbons or ends, that hung down behind the head on the back. According to Herodian, the diadem, in the later times, was double;<sup>32</sup> but the coins of Parthia do not exhibit this peculiarity. [Pl. 1, Fig. 4.]

Ammianus says<sup>33</sup> that among the titles assumed by the Parthian monarchs was that of "Brother of the Sun and Moon." It appears that something of a divine character was regarded as attaching to the race. In the civil contentions, which occur so frequently throughout the later history, combatants abstained from lifting their hands knowingly against an Arsacid, to kill or wound one being looked upon as sacrilege.<sup>34</sup> The name of *Θεός* was occasionally assumed, as it was in Syria; and more frequently kings took the epithet of *θεοπάτωρ*, which implied the divinity of their father.<sup>35</sup> After his death a monarch seems generally to have been the object of a qualified worship; statues were erected to him in the temples, where (apparently) they were associated with the images of the great luminaries.<sup>36</sup>

Of the Parthian Court and its customs we have no account that is either complete or trustworthy. Some particulars, however, may be gathered of it on which we may place reliance. The best authorities are agreed that it was not stationary, but migrated at different times of the year to different cities of the Empire, in this resembling the Court of the Achæmenians. It is not quite clear, however, which were the cities thus honored. Ctesiphon was undoubtedly one of them. All writers agree that it was the chief city of the Empire, and the ordinary seat of the government.<sup>37</sup> Here, according to Strabo, the kings passed the winter months, delighting in the excellence of the air.<sup>38</sup> The town was situated on the left bank of the Tigris, opposite to Seleucia, twelve or thirteen miles below the modern Baghdad. Pliny says<sup>39</sup> that it was built by the Parthians in order to reduce Seleucia to insignificance, and that when it failed of its purpose they built another city.

Vologesocerta, in the same neighborhood with the same object; but the account of Strabo is more probable—viz., that it grew up gradually out of the wish of the Parthian kings to spare Seleucia the unpleasantness of having the rude soldiery, which followed the Court from place to place, quartered upon them.<sup>40</sup> The remainder of the year, Strabo tells us, was spent by the Parthian kings either at the Median city of Ecbatana, which is the modern Hamadan, or in the province of Hyrcania.<sup>41</sup> In Hyrcania, the palace, according to him, was at Tapé;<sup>42</sup> and between this place and Ecbatana he no doubt regarded the monarchs as spending the time which was not passed at Ctesiphon. Athenæus, however, declares that Rhages was the spring residence of the Parthian kings;<sup>43</sup> and it seems not unlikely that this famous city, which Isidore, writing in Parthian times, calls “the greatest in Media,”<sup>44</sup> was among the occasional residences of the Court. Parthia itself was, it would seem, deserted;<sup>45</sup> but still a city of that region preserved in one respect a royal character, being the place where all the earlier kings were interred.<sup>46</sup>

The pomp and grandeur of the Parthian monarchs are described only in the vaguest terms by the classical writers. No author of repute appears to have visited the Parthian Court. We may perhaps best obtain a true notion of the splendor of the sovereign from the accounts which have reached us of his relations and officers, who can have reflected only faintly the magnificence of the sovereign. Plutarch tells us that the general whom Orodes deputed to conduct the war against Crassus came into the field accompanied by two hundred litters wherein were contained his concubines, and by a thousand camels which carried his baggage.<sup>47</sup> His dress was fashioned after that of the Medes; he wore his hair parted in the middle and had his face painted with cosmetics.<sup>48</sup> A body of ten thousand horse, composed entirely of his clients and slaves, followed him in battle.<sup>49</sup> We may conclude from this picture, and from the general tenor of the classical notices, that the Arsacidæ revived and maintained very much such a Court as that of the old Achæmenian princes, falling probably somewhat below their model in politeness and refinement, but equalling it in luxury, in extravagant expenditure, and in display.

Such seems to have been the general character of those practices and institutions which distinguish the Parthians from the foundation of their Empire by Mithridates. Some of

them, it is probable, he rather adopted than invented; but there is no good reason for doubting that of many he was the originator. He appears to have been one of those rare individuals to whom it has been given to unite the powers which form the conqueror with those which constitute the successful organizer of a State. Brave and enterprising in war, prompt to seize an occasion and to turn it to the best advantage, not even averse to severities where they seemed to be required, he yet felt no acrimony towards those who had resisted his arms, but was ready to befriend them so soon as their resistance ceased. Mild, clement, philanthropic,<sup>50</sup> he conciliated those whom he subdued almost more easily than he subdued them, and by the efforts of a few years succeeded in welding together a dominion which lasted without suffering serious mutilation for nearly four centuries. Though not dignified with the epithet of "Great," he was beyond all question the greatest of the Parthian monarchs. Later times did him more justice than his contemporaries, and, when the names of almost all the other kings had sunk into oblivion, retained his in honor, and placed it on a par with that of the original founder of Parthian independence.<sup>51</sup>

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## CHAPTER VII.

*Reign of Phraates II. Expedition of Antiochus Sidetes against Parthia. Release of Demetrius. Defeat and Death of Sidetes. War of Phraates with the Northern Nomads. His death and character.*

"Post necem Mithridates, Parthorum regis, Phraates filius ejus rex constituitur."—Justin, xlii. 1, § 1.

MITHRIDATES was succeeded by his son, Phraates, the second monarch of the name, and the seventh Arsaces. This prince, entertaining, like his father, the design of invading Syria, and expecting to find some advantage from having in his camp the rightful occupant of the Syrian throne,<sup>1</sup> treated the captive Demetrius with even greater kindness than his father had done, not only maintaining him handsomely, but even giving him his sister Rhodoguné, in marriage.<sup>2</sup> Demetrius, however, was not to be reconciled to his captivity by any such blandish-

ments, and employed his thoughts chiefly in devising plans by which he might escape. By the help of a friend he twice managed to evade the vigilance of his guards, and to make his way from Hyrcania towards the frontiers of his own kingdom; but each time he was pursued and caught without effecting his purpose.<sup>3</sup> The Parthian monarch was no doubt vexed at his pertinacity, and on the second occasion thought it prudent to feign, if he did not even really feel, offence: he banished his ungrateful brother-in-law from his presence,<sup>4</sup> but otherwise visited his crime with no severer penalty than ridicule. Choosing to see in his attempts to change the place of his abode no serious design, but only the wayward conduct of a child, he sent him a present of some golden dice, implying thereby that it was only for lack of amusement he had grown discontented with his Hyrcanian residence.<sup>5</sup>

Antiochus Sidetes, the brother of Demetrius, had been generally accepted by the Syrians as their monarch, at the time when the news reached them of that prince's defeat and capture by Mithridates. He was an active and enterprising sovereign, though fond of luxury and display. For some years (B.C. 140-137) the pretensions of Tryphon to the throne gave him full occupation;<sup>6</sup> but, having finally established his authority after a short war, and punished the pretender with death, he found himself, in B.C. 137, at liberty to turn his arms against foreign enemies. He would probably have at once attacked Parthia, but for the attitude of a nearer neighbor, which he regarded as menacing, and as requiring his immediate attention. Demetrius, before his departure for the East, had rewarded the Jews for services rendered him in his war with Tryphon by an open acknowledgment of their independence.<sup>7</sup> Sidetes, though indebted to the Jewish High Priest, Simon, for offers of aid against the same adversary,<sup>8</sup> could not bring himself to pay the price for it which Demetrius had thought reasonable—an independent Palestine appeared to him a danger close to his doors, and one that imperilled the very existence of the Syrian State. Accordingly, he had no sooner put down Tryphon than he resolved to pick a quarrel with the Jews, and to force them to resume their old position of vassalage to Syria.<sup>9</sup> His general, Cendebæus, invaded their country, but was defeated near Azotus.<sup>10</sup> Antiochus had to take the field in person.<sup>11</sup> During two years, John Hyrcanus, who had succeeded his father, Simon (B.C. 135), baffled all his efforts; but at last, in B.C. 133, he was forced to submit, to acknowl-

edge the authority of Syria, to dismantle Jerusalem, and to resume the payment of tribute. Sidetes then considered the time come for a Parthian expedition, and, having made great preparations, he set out for the East in the spring of B.C. 129.

It is impossible to accept without considerable reserve the accounts that have come down to us of the force which Antiochus collected. According to Justin,<sup>12</sup> it consisted of no more than 80,000 fighting men, to which was attached the incredible number of 300,000 camp-followers, the majority being composed of cooks, bakers, and actors. As in other extreme cases the camp-followers do but equal or a little exceed the number of men fit for service,<sup>13</sup> this estimate, which makes them nearly four times as numerous, is entitled to but little credit. The late writer, Orosius,<sup>14</sup> corrects the error here indicated; but his account seems to err in rating the supernumeraries too low. According to him, the armed force amounted to 300,000, while the camp-followers, including grooms, sutlers, courtesans, and actors, were no more than a third of the number. From the two accounts, taken together, we are perhaps entitled to conclude that the entire host did not fall much short of 400,000 men. This estimate receives confirmation from an independent statement made by Diodorus, with respect to the number who fell in the campaign—a statement of which we shall have to speak later.<sup>15</sup>

The army of Phraates, according to two accounts of it<sup>16</sup> (which, however, seem to represent a single original authority), numbered no more than 120,000. An attempt which he made to enlist in his service a body of Scythian mercenaries failed, the Scyths being willing to lend their aid, but arriving too late to be of any use.<sup>17</sup> At the same time a defection of the subject princes<sup>18</sup> deprived the Parthian monarch of contingents which usually swelled his numbers, and threw him upon the support of his own countrymen, chiefly or solely. Under these circumstances it is more surprising that he was able to collect 120,000 men than that he did not bring into the field a larger number.

The Syrian troops, magnificently appointed<sup>19</sup> and supported by a body of Jews under John Hyrcanus,<sup>20</sup> advanced upon Babylon, receiving on their way the adhesion of many of the Parthian tributaries, who professed themselves disgusted by the arrogance and pride of their masters.<sup>21</sup> Phraates, on his part, advanced to meet his enemies, and in person or by his generals engaged Antiochus in three battles, but without suc-

cess. Antiochus was three times a conqueror. In a battle fought upon the river Lycus (Zab) in further Assyria he defeated the Parthian general, Indates, and raised a trophy in honor of his victory.<sup>22</sup> The exact scene of the other combats is unknown, but they were probably in the same neighborhood. The result of them was the conquest of Babylonia, and the general revolt of the remaining Parthian provinces,<sup>23</sup> which followed the common practice of deserting a falling house, and drew off or declared for the enemy.

Under these circumstances Phraates, considering that the time was come when it was necessary for him to submit or to create a diversion by raising troubles in the enemy's territory, released Demetrius from his confinement, and sent him, supported by a body of Parthian troops, to reclaim his kingdom.<sup>24</sup> He thought it probable that Antiochus, when the intelligence reached him, would retrace his steps, and return from Babylon to his own capital. At any rate his efforts would be distracted; he would be able to draw fewer reinforcements from home; and he would be less inclined to proceed to any great distance from his own country.

Antiochus, however, was either uninformed of the impending danger or did not regard it as very pressing. The winter was approaching; and, instead of withdrawing his troops from the occupied provinces and marching them back into Syria, he resolved to keep them where they were, merely dividing them, on account of their numbers, among the various cities which he had taken, and making them go into winter quarters.<sup>25</sup> It was, no doubt, his intention to remain quiet during the two or three winter months, after which he would have resumed the war, and have endeavored to penetrate through Media into Parthia Proper, where he might expect his adversary to make his last stand.

But Phraates saw that the position of affairs was favorable for striking a blow before the spring came. The dispersion of his enemy's troops deprived him of all advantage from the superiority of their numbers. The circumstance of their being quartered in towns newly reduced, and unaccustomed to the rudeness and rapacity of soldiers and camp-followers, made it almost certain that complications would arise, and that it would not be long before in some places the Parthians, so lately declared to be oppressors, would be hailed as liberators. Moreover, the Parthians were, probably, better able than their adversaries to endure the hardships and severities of a cam-

paign in the cold season.<sup>26</sup> Parthia is a cold country, and the winters, both of the great plateau of Iran and of all the mountain tracts adjoining it, are severe. The climate of Syria is far milder. Moreover, the troops of Antiochus had, we are informed, been enervated by an excessive indulgence on the part of their leader during the marches and halts of the preceding summer.<sup>27</sup> Their appetites had been pampered; their habits had become unmanly; their general tone was relaxed; and they were likely to deteriorate still more in the wealthy and luxurious cities where they were bidden to pass the winter.

These various circumstances raised the spirits of Phraates, and made him hold himself in readiness to resume hostilities at a moment's notice. Nor was it long before the complications which he had foreseen began to occur. The insolence of the soldiers<sup>28</sup> quartered upon them exasperated the inhabitants of the Mesopotamian towns, and caused them to look back with regret to the time when they were Parthian subjects. The requisitions made on them for stores of all kinds was a further grievance.<sup>29</sup> After a while they opened communications with Phraates, and offered to return to their allegiance if he would assist them against their oppressors. Phraates gladly listened to these overtures. At his instigation a plot was formed like that which has given so terrible a significance to the phrase "Sicilian vespers." It was agreed that on an appointed day all the cities should break out in revolt: the natives should take arms, rise against the soldiers quartered upon them, and kill all, or as many as possible. Phraates promised to be at hand with his army, to prevent the scattered detachments from giving help to each other. It was calculated that in this way the invaders might be cut off almost to a man without the trouble of even fighting a battle.

But, before he proceeded to extremities, the Parthian prince determined to give his adversary a chance of escaping the fate prepared for him by timely concessions. The winter was not over; but the snow was beginning to melt through the increasing warmth of the sun's rays,<sup>30</sup> and the day appointed for the general rising was probably drawing near. Phraates felt that no time was to be lost. Accordingly, he sent ambassadors to Antiochus to propose peace, and to inquire on what conditions it would be granted him. The reply of Antiochus, according to Diodotus, was as follows: "If Phraates would release his prisoner, Demetrius, from captivity, and deliver him up without ransom,<sup>31</sup> at the same time restoring all the provinces

which had been taken from Syria, and consenting to pay a tribute for Parthia itself, peace might be had; but not otherwise." To such terms it was, of course, impossible that Phraates should listen; and his ambassadors, therefore, returned without further parley.

Soon afterwards the day appointed for the outbreak arrived. Apparently, no suspicion had been excited. The Syrian troops were everywhere quietly enjoying themselves in their winter quarters, when, suddenly and without warning, they found themselves attacked by the natives.<sup>32</sup> Taken at disadvantage, it was impossible for them to make a successful resistance; and it would seem that the great bulk of them were massacred in their quarters. Antiochus, and the detachment stationed with him, alone, so far as we hear, escaped into the open field and contended for their lives in just warfare.<sup>33</sup> It had been the intention of the Syrian monarch, when he took the field, to hasten to the protection of the troops quartered nearest to him; but he no sooner commenced his march than he found himself confronted by Phraates, who was at the head of his entire army, having, no doubt, anticipated Antiochus's design and resolved to frustrate it. The Parthian prince was anxious to engage at once, as his force far outnumbered that commanded by his adversary; but the latter might have declined the battle, if he had so willed, and have, at any rate, greatly protracted the struggle. He had a mountain region—Mount Zagros, probably—within a short distance of him, and might have fallen back upon it, so placing the Parthian horse at great disadvantage; but he was still at an age when caution is apt to be considered cowardice, and temerity to pass for true courage. Despite the advice of one of his captains, he determined to accept the battle which the enemy offered, and not to fly before a foe whom he had three times defeated.<sup>34</sup> But the determination of the commander was ill seconded by his army. Though Antiochus fought strenuously,<sup>35</sup> he was defeated, since his troops were without heart and offered but a poor resistance.<sup>36</sup> Antiochus himself perished, either slain by the enemy or by his own hand.<sup>37</sup> His son, Seleucus, a boy of tender age,<sup>38</sup> and his niece, a daughter of Demetrius,<sup>39</sup> who had accompanied him in his expedition, were captured. His troops were either cut to pieces or made prisoners. The entire number of those slain in the battle, and in the previous massacre, was reckoned at 300,000.<sup>40</sup>

Such was the issue of this great expedition. It was the last

which any Seleucid monarch conducted into these countries—the final attempt made by Syria to repossess herself of her lost Eastern provinces. Henceforth Parthia was no further troubled by the power that had hitherto been her most dangerous enemy, but was allowed to enjoy without molestation from Syria the conquests which she had effected. Syria, in fact, had from this time a difficulty in preserving her own existence. The immediate result of the destruction of Antiochus and his host was the revolt of Judæa,<sup>41</sup> which henceforth maintained its independence uninterruptedly. The dominions of the Seleucidæ were reduced to Cilicia and Syria Proper,<sup>42</sup> or the tract west of the Euphrates, between Amanus and Palestine. Internally, the state was agitated by constant commotions from the claims of various pretenders to the sovereignty: externally, it was kept in continual alarm by the Egyptians, Arabians, or Romans. During the sixty years<sup>43</sup> which elapsed between the return of Demetrius to his kingdom and the conversion of Syria into a Roman province, she ceased wholly to be formidable to her neighbors. Her flourishing period was gone by, and a rapid decline set in, from which there was no recovery. It is surprising that the Romans did not step in earlier and terminate a rule which was but a little removed from anarchy. Rome, however, had other work on her hands; and the Syrian kingdom continued to exist till B.C. 65, though in a feeble and moribund condition.

But Phraatès could not, without prophetic foresight, have counted on such utter prostration following as the result of a single—albeit a terrible—blow. Accordingly, we find him still exhibiting a dread of the Seleucid power even after his great victory. He had released Demetrius too late to obtain any benefit from the hostile feeling which that prince probably entertained towards his brother. Had he not released him too soon for his own safety? Was it not to be feared that the Syrians might rally under one who was their natural leader, might rapidly recover their strength, and renew the struggle for the mastery of Western Asia? The first thought of the dissatisfied monarch was to hinder the execution of his own project. Demetrius was on his way to Syria, but had not yet arrived there, or, at any rate, his arrival had not been as yet reported. Was it not possible to intercept him? The Parthian king hastily sent out a body of horse, with orders to pursue the Syrian prince at their best speed, and endeavor to capture him before he passed the frontier.<sup>44</sup> If they succeeded, they were to bring

him back to their master, who would probably have then committed his prisoner to close custody. The pursuit, however, failed. Demetrius had anticipated, or at least feared, a change of purpose, and, having prosecuted his journey with the greatest diligence, had reached his own territory before the emissaries of Phraates could overtake him.<sup>45</sup>

It is uncertain whether policy or inclination dictated the step which Phraates soon afterwards took of allaying himself by marriage with the Seleucidæ. He had formally given his sister, Rhodoguné, as a wife to Demetrius,<sup>46</sup> and the marriage had been fruitful, Rhodoguné having borne Demetrius several children.<sup>47</sup> The two houses of the Seleucidæ and Arsacidæ were thus already allied to some extent. Phraates resolved to strengthen the bond. The unmarried daughter of Demetrius whom he had captured after his victory over Antiochus took his fancy; and he determined to make her his wife.<sup>48</sup> At the same time he adopted other measures calculated to conciliate the Seleucid prince. He treated his captive, Seleucus, the son of Antiochus, with the greatest respect.<sup>49</sup> To the corpse of Antiochus he paid royal honors;<sup>50</sup> and, having placed it in a silver coffin, he transmitted it to the Syrians for sepulture.<sup>51</sup>

Still, if we may believe Justin,<sup>52</sup> he entertained the design of carrying his arms across the Euphrates and invading Syria, in order to avenge the attack of Antiochus upon his territories. But events occurred which forced him to relinquish this enterprise. The Scythians, whom he had called to his aid under the pressure of the Syrian invasion, and who had arrived too late to take part in the war, demanded the pay which they had been promised, and suggested that their arms should be employed against some other enemy.<sup>53</sup> Phraates was unwilling either to requite services not rendered, or to rush needlessly into a fresh war merely to gratify the avarice of his auxiliaries. He therefore peremptorily refused to comply with either suggestion. Upon this, the Scythians determined to take their payment into their own hands, and began to ravage Parthia and to carry off a rich booty. Phraates, who had removed the headquarters of his government to Babylonia, felt it necessary to entrust affairs there to an officer, and to take the field in person against this new enemy, which was certainly not less formidable than the Syrians. He selected for his representative at the seat of Empire a certain Himerus<sup>54</sup> (or Evemerus),<sup>55</sup> a youth with whom he had a disgraceful connection, and having established him as a sort of viceroy,<sup>56</sup> marched away to the north

east, and proceeded to encounter the Scythians in that remote region. Besides his native troops, he took with him a number of Greeks, whom he had made prisoners in his war with Antiochus.<sup>57</sup> Their fidelity could not but be doubtful; probably, however, he thought that at a distance from Syria they would not dare to fail him, and that with an enemy so barbarous as the Scythians they would have no temptation to fraternize. But the event proved him mistaken. The Greeks were sullen at their captivity, and exasperated by some cruel treatment which they had received when first captured. They bided their time; and when, in a battle with the Scythians, they saw the Parthian soldiery hard pressed and in danger of defeat, they decided matters by going over in a body to the enemy. The Parthian army was completely routed and destroyed, and Phraates himself was among the slain.<sup>58</sup> We are not told what became of the victorious Greeks; but it is to be presumed that, like the Ten Thousand, they fought their way across Asia, and rejoined their own countrymen.

Thus died Phraates I., after a reign of about eight or nine years.<sup>59</sup> Though not possessing the talents of his father, he was a brave and warlike prince, active, enterprising, fertile in resources, and bent on maintaining against all assailants the honor and integrity of the Empire. In natural temperament he was probably at once soft<sup>60</sup> and cruel.<sup>61</sup> But, when policy required it, he could throw his softness aside and show himself a hardy and intrepid warrior.<sup>62</sup> Similarly, he could control his natural harshness, and act upon occasion with clemency and leniency.<sup>63</sup> He was not, perhaps, without a grim humor, which led him to threaten more than he intended, in order to see how men would comport themselves when greatly alarmed.<sup>64</sup> There is some evidence that he aimed at saying good things; though it must be confessed that the wit is not of a high order.<sup>65</sup> Altogether he has more character than most Oriental monarchs; and the monotony of Arsacid biography is agreeably interrupted by the idiosyncrasy which his words and conduct indicate.

## CHAPTER VIII.

*Accession of Artabanus II. Position of Parthia. Growing pressure upon her, and general advance towards the south, of the Saka or Scyths. Causes and extent of the movement. Character and principal tribes of the Saka. Scythic war of Artabanus. His death.*

“Imperium Asiæ [Scythæ] ter quæsivere.”—Justin, ii. 3, § 1.

The successor of Phraates was his uncle, Artabanus,<sup>1</sup> a son of Priapatius. It is probable that the late king had either left no son, or none of sufficient age to be a fit occupant of the throne at a season of difficulty. The “Megistanes,” therefore, elected Artabanus in his nephew’s place,<sup>2</sup> a man of mature age,<sup>3</sup> and, probably, of some experience in war. The situation of Parthia, despite her recent triumph over the Syro-Macedonians, was critical; and it was of the greatest importance that the sceptre should be committed to one who would bring to the discharge of his office those qualities of wisdom, promptness, and vigor, which a crisis demands.

The difficulty of the situation was two-fold. In the first place, there was an immediate danger to be escaped. The combined Greeks and Scythians, who had defeated the Parthian army and slain the monarch, might have been expected to push their advantage to the utmost, and seek to establish themselves as conquerors in the country which lay apparently at their mercy. At any rate, the siege and sack of some of the chief towns was a probable contingency, if permanent occupation of the territory did not suit the views of the confederates. The new monarch had to rid Parthia of her invaders at as little cost as possible, before he could allow himself to turn his attention to any other matter whatsoever. Nor did this, under the circumstances, appear to be an easy task. The flower of the Parthian troops had been destroyed in the late battle, and it was not easy to replace them by another native army. The subject-nations were at no time to be depended upon when Parthia was reduced to straits, and at the present conjecture some of the most important were in a condition bordering upon rebellion.

Himerus, the viceroy left by Phraates in Babylonia, had first driven the Babylonians and Seleucians to desperation by his tyranny,<sup>4</sup> and then plunged into a war with the people of Méséné,<sup>5</sup> which must have made it difficult for him to send Artabanus any contingent. Fortunately for the Parthians, the folly or moderation of their enemies rendered any great effort on their part unnecessary. The Greeks, content with having revenged themselves, gave the new monarch no trouble at all: the Scythians were satisfied with plundering and wasting the open country, after which they returned quietly to their homes.<sup>6</sup> Artabanus found himself quit of the immediate danger which had threatened him almost without exertion of his own, and could now bend his thoughts to the position of his country generally, and the proper policy to pursue under the circumstances.

For there was a second and more formidable danger impending over the State—a danger not casual and temporary like the one just escaped, but arising out of a condition of things in neighboring regions which had come about slowly, and which promised to be permanent. To give the reader the means of estimating this danger aright, it will be necessary to take a somewhat wide view of the state of affairs on the northern and north-eastern frontiers of Parthia for some time previously to the accession of Artabanus, to trace out the causes which were at work, producing important changes in these regions, and to indicate the results which threatened, and those which were accomplished. The opportunity will also serve for giving such an account of the chief races which here bordered the empire as will show the nature of the peril to which Parthia was exposed at this period.

In the wide plains of Northern Asia, extending from the Arctic Ocean to the Thian Chan mountains and the Jaxartes, there had been nurtured from a remote antiquity a nomadic population, at no time very numerous in proportion to the area over which it was spread, but liable on occasions to accumulate, owing to a combination of circumstances. in this or that portion of the region occupied, and at such times causing trouble to its neighbors. From about the close of the third century B.C. symptoms of such an accumulation had begun to display themselves in the tract immediately north of the Jaxartes, and the inhabitants of the countries south of that river had suffered from a succession of raids and inroads, which were not regarded as dangerous. but which gave con-

stant annoyance. Crossing the great desert of Kharesm by forced marches, some of the hordes invaded the green valleys of Hyrcania and Parthia, and carried desolation over those fair and flourishing districts.<sup>7</sup> About the same time other tribes entered the Bactrian territory and caused alarm to the Greek kingdom recently established in that province.<sup>8</sup> It appears that the Parthian monarchs, unable to save their country from incursions, consented to pay a sort of black-mail to their invaders, by allowing them the use of their pasture grounds at certain fixed times—probably during some months of each year.<sup>9</sup> The Bactrian princes had to pay a heavier penalty. Province after province of their kingdom was swallowed up by the northern hordes,<sup>10</sup> who gradually occupied Sogdiana, or the tract between the lower Jaxartes and the lower Oxus, whence they proceeded to make inroads into Bactria itself. The rich land on the Polytimetus, or Ak Su, the river of Samarkand, and even the highlands between the upper Jaxartes and upper Oxus, were permanently occupied by the invaders; and if the Bactrians had not compensated themselves for their losses by acquisitions of territory in Afghanistan and India, they would soon have had no kingdom left. The hordes were always increasing in strength through the influx of fresh immigrants, and in lieu of Bactria a power now stood arrayed on the north-eastern frontier of the Parthians, which was reasonably regarded with the most serious alarm and suspicion.

The origin of the state of things here described is to be sought, according to the best authorities, in certain movements which took place about B.C. 200,<sup>11</sup> in a remote region of inner Asia. At that time a Turanian people called the Yue-chi were expelled from their territory on the west of Chen-si by the Hiong-nu, whom some identified with the Huns. “The Yue-chi separated into two bands; the smaller descended southwards into Thibet; the larger passed westwards, and after a hard struggle dispossessed a people called ‘Su’ of the plains west of the river of Ili. These latter advanced to Ferghana and the Jaxartes; and the Yue-chi not long afterwards retreating from the U-siun, another nomadic race, passed the ‘Su’ on the north and occupied the tracts between the Oxus and the Caspian. The Su were thus in the vicinity of the Bactrian Greeks; the Yue-chi in the neighborhood of the Parthians.”<sup>12</sup> On the particulars of this account, which comes from the Chinese historians, we cannot perhaps altogether de-

Fig. 1.



COIN OF VARDANES II.

Fig. 2.



Coin of Pacorus II.

Fig. 3.



Early Coin of Volagases, II.



Coin of Mithridates IV.

Fig. 4



Volagases II.

Fig. 1.





Fig. 2

Plan of Hatra (after Ross).




Traces of Wall:

Fig. 3. Plan of Palace-Temple at Hatra (after Fergusson and Ross).



Fig. 4.



Cornice and quasi-capital, Hatra (after Ross).

pend; but there is no reason to doubt the main fact, attested by a writer who visited the Yue-chi in B.C. 139,<sup>13</sup> that they had migrated about the period mentioned from the interior of Asia, and had established themselves sixty years later in the Caspian region. Such a movement would necessarily have thrown the entire previous population of those parts into commotion, and would probably have precipitated them upon their neighbors. It accounts satisfactorily for the pressure of the northern hordes at this period on the Parthians, Bactrians, and even the Indians; and it completely explains the crisis in Parthian history, which we have now reached, and the necessity which lay upon the nation of meeting and, if possible, overcoming, an entirely new danger.

In fact, one of those occasions of peril had arisen, to which in ancient times the civilized world was always liable from an outburst of northern barbarism. Whether the peril has altogether passed away or not, we need not here inquire; but certainly in the old world there was always a chance that civilization, art, refinement, luxury, might suddenly and almost without warning be swept away by an overwhelming influx of savage hordes from the unpolished North. From the reign of Cyaxares, when the evil first snowed itself,<sup>14</sup> the danger was patent to all wise and far-seeing governors both in Europe and Asia, and was from time to time guarded against. The expeditions of Cyrus against the Massagetæ, of Darius Hystaspis against the European Scyths, of Alexander against the Getæ, of Trajan and Probus across the Danube, were designed to check and intimidate the northern nations, to break their power, and diminish the likelihood of their taking the offensive. It was now more than four centuries since in this part of Asia any such effort had been made;<sup>15</sup> and the northern barbarians might naturally have ceased to fear the arms and discipline of the South. Moreover the circumstances of the time scarcely left them a choice. Pressed on continually more and more by the newly-arrived Su and Yue-chi, the old inhabitants of the Transoxianian regions were under the necessity of seeking new settlements, and could only attempt to find them in the quarter towards which they were driven by the new-comers. Strengthened, probably, by daring spirits from among their conquerors themselves<sup>16</sup> they crossed the rivers and the deserts by which they had been hitherto confined, and advancing against the Parthians, Bactrians, and Arians, threatened to carry all before them. We have seen

how successful they were against the Bactrians.<sup>17</sup> In Ariana, they passed the mountains, and, proceeding southwards, occupied the tract below the great lake wherein the Helmand terminates, which took from them the name of Sacastan<sup>18</sup> ("land of the Saka," or Scyths)—a name still to be traced in the modern "Seistan." Further to the east they effected a lodgment in Kabul, and another in the the southern portion of the Indus valley, which for a time bore the name of Indo-Scythia.<sup>19</sup> They even crossed the Indus and attempted to penetrate into the interior of India, but here they were met and repulsed by a native monarch, about the year B.C. 56.<sup>20</sup>

The people engaged in this great movement are called, in a general way, by the classical writers, Sacæ, or Scythæ—i.e. Scyths. They consisted of a number of tribes, similar for the most part in language, habits, and mode of life, and allied more or less closely to the other nomadic races of Central and Northern Asia. Of these tribes the principal were the Massagetæ ("great Jits, or Jats"), who occupied the country on both sides of the lower course of the Oxus;<sup>21</sup> the Dahæ, who bordered the Caspian above Hyrcania, and extended thence to the latitude of Herat;<sup>22</sup> the Tochari,<sup>23</sup> who settled in the mountains between the upper Jaxartes and the upper Oxus, where they gave name to the tract known as Tokharistan; the Asii, or Asiani, who were closely connected with the Tochari;<sup>24</sup> and the Sakarauli (Saracucæ?), who are found connected with both the Tochari and the Asiani.<sup>25</sup> Some of these tribes contained within them further sub-divisions; e.g. the Dahæ, who comprised the Parni (or Aparni), the Pissuri, and the Xanthii;<sup>26</sup> and the Massagetæ, who included among them Chorasmii, Attasii, and others.<sup>27</sup>

The general character of the barbarism in which these various races were involved may be best learnt from the description given of one of them, the Massagetæ, with but few differences, by Herodotus<sup>28</sup> and Strabo.<sup>29</sup> According to this description, the Massagetæ were nomads, who moved about in wagons or carts, accompanied by their flocks and herds, on whose milk they chiefly sustained themselves. Each man had only one wife, but all the wives were held in common. They were good riders and excellent archers, but fought both on horseback and on foot, and used, besides their bows and arrows, lances, knives, and battle-axes. They had little or no iron, but made their spear and arrow-heads, and their other weapons, of bronze. They had also bronze breast-plates; but otherwise the

metal with which they adorned and protected their own persons, and the heads of their horses, was gold. To a certain extent they were cannibals.<sup>30</sup> It was their custom not to let the aged among them die a natural death, but, when life seemed approaching its natural term, to offer them up in sacrifice, and then boil the flesh and feast on it. This mode of ending life was regarded as the best and most honorable; such as died of disease were not eaten but buried, and their friends bewailed their misfortune.

It may be added to this that we have sufficient reason to believe that the Massagetæ and the other nomads of these parts regarded the use of poisoned arrows as legitimate in warfare, and employed the venom of serpents, and the corrupted blood of man, to make the wounds which they inflicted more deadly.<sup>31</sup>

Thus, what was threatened was not merely the conquest of one race by another cognate to it, like that of the Medes by the Persians, or of the Greeks by Rome, but the obliteration of such art, civilization, and refinement as Western Asia had attained to in course of ages by the successive efforts of Babylonians, Assyrians, Medes, Persians, and Greeks—the spread over some of the fairest regions of the earth of a low type of savagery—a type which in religion went no further than the worship of the sun;<sup>32</sup> in art knew but the easier forms of metallurgy and the construction of carts; in manners and customs, included cannibalism, the use of poisoned weapons, and a relation between the sexes destructive alike of all delicacy and of all family affection. The Parthians were, no doubt, rude and coarse in their character as compared with the Persians; but they had been civilized to a certain extent by three centuries of subjection to the Persians and the Greco-Macedonians before they rose to power; they affected Persian manners; they patronized Greek art, they appreciated the advantages of having in their midst a number of Greek states. Had the Massagetæ and their kindred tribes of Sakas, Tochari, Dahæ, Yue-chi, and Su, which now menaced the Parthian power, succeeded in sweeping it away, the general declension of all which is lovely or excellent in human life would have been marked. Scythicism would have overspread Western Asia. No doubt the conquerors would have learned something from those whom they subjected; but it cannot be supposed that they would have learned much. The change would have been like that which passed over the Empire of the West, when Goths, Vandals,

Burgundians, Alans, Heruli, depopulated its fairest provinces and laid its civilization in the dust. The East would have been barbarized; the gains of centuries would have been lost; the work of Cyrus, Darius, Alexander, and other great benefactors of Asiatic humanity, have been undone; Western Asia would have sunk back into a condition not very much above that from which it was raised two thousand years earlier by the primitive Chaldæans and the Assyrians.

Artabanus II., the Parthian monarch who succeeded Phraates II., appears to have appreciated aright the perils of his position. He was not content, when the particular body of barbarians which had defeated and slain his predecessor, having ravaged Parthia Proper, returned home, to fold his arms and wait until he was again attacked. According to the brief, but expressive words of Justin,<sup>33</sup> he assumed the aggressive, and invaded the country of the Tochari, one of the most powerful of the Scythic tribes, which was now settled in a portion of the region that had, till lately, belonged to the Bactrian kingdom.<sup>34</sup> Artabanus evidently felt that what was needed was to roll back the flood of invasion which had advanced so near to the sacred home of his nation; that the barbarians required to be taught a lesson; that they must at least be made to understand that Parthia was to be respected; or that, if this could not be done, the fate of the Empire was sealed. He therefore, with a gallantry and boldness that we cannot sufficiently admire—a boldness that seemed like rashness, but was in reality prudence—without calculating too closely the immediate chances of battle, led his troops against one of the most forward of the advancing tribes. But fortune, unhappily, was adverse. How the battle was progressing we are not told; but it appears that in the thick of an engagement Artabanus received a wound in the fore-arm, from the effects of which he died almost immediately.<sup>35</sup> The death of the leader decides in the East, almost to a certainty, the issue of a contest. We cannot doubt that the Parthians, having lost their monarch, were repulsed; that the expedition failed; and that the situation of affairs became once more at least as threatening as it had been before Artabanus made his attempt. Two Parthian monarchs had now fallen within the space of a few years in combat with the aggressive Scyths—two Parthian armies had suffered defeat. Was this to be always so? If it was, then Parthia had only to make up her mind to fall, and, like the great Roman, to let it be her care that she should fall grandly and with dignity.

## CHAPTER IX.

*Accession of Mithridates II. Termination of the Scythic Wars. Commencement of the struggle with Armenia. Previous history of Armenia. Result of the first Armenian War. First contact of Rome with Parthia. Attitude of Rome towards the East at this time. Second Armenian War. Death of Mithridates.*

“ Mithridati res gestæ Magni cognomen dedere.”—Justin, xlii. 2, § 3.

ON the death of Artabanus II., about B.C. 124, his son, Mithridates II., was proclaimed king. Of this monarch, whose achievements (according to Justin<sup>1</sup>) procured him the epithet of “the Great,” the accounts which have come down to us are extremely scanty and unsatisfactory. Justin, who is our principal informant on the subject of the early Parthian history, has unfortunately confounded him with the third monarch of the name,<sup>2</sup> who ascended the throne more than sixty years later, and has left us only the slightest and most meagre outline of his actions. The other classical writers, only to a very small extent, supplement Justin’s narrative; and the result is that of a reign which was one of the most important in the early Parthian series, the historical inquirer at the present day can form but a most incomplete conception.

It appears, however, from the account of Justin, and from such other notices as have reached us of the condition of things at this time in the regions lying east of the Caspian, that Mithridates was entirely successful where his father and his cousin had signally failed. He gained a number of victories over the Scythic hordes;<sup>3</sup> and effectually checked their direct progress towards the south, throwing them thereby upon the east and the south-east. Danger to Parthia from the Scyths seems after his reign to have passed away. They found a vent for their superabundant population in Seistan, Afghanistan, and India, and ceased to have any hopes of making an impression on the Arsacid kingdom. Mithridates, it is probable, even took territory from them. The acquisition of parts of Bactria by the Parthians *from the Scyths*, which is attested by Strabo,<sup>4</sup> belongs, in all likelihood, to his reign; and

the extension of the Parthian dominion to Seistan<sup>5</sup> may well date from the same period. Justin tells us that he added many nations to the Parthian Empire.<sup>6</sup> The statements made of the extent of Parthia on the side of Syria in the time of Mithridates the First render it impossible for us to discover these nations in the west: we are, therefore, compelled to regard them as consisting of races on the eastern frontier, who could at this period only be outlying tribes of the recent Scythic immigration.

The victories of Mithridates in the East encouraged him to turn his arms in the opposite direction, and to make an attack on the important country of Armenia, which bordered his north-western frontier. Armenia was at the time under the government of a certain Ortoadistus,<sup>7</sup> who seems to have been the predecessor, and was perhaps the father, of the great Tigranes.<sup>8</sup> Ortoadistus ruled the tract called by the Romans "Armenia Magna," which extended from the Euphrates on the west to the mouth of the Araxes on the east, and from the valley of the Kur northwards to Mount Niphates and the head streams of the Tigris towards the south. The people over which he ruled was one of the oldest in Asia and had on many occasions shown itself impatient of a conqueror. Justin, on reaching this point in his work, observes that he could not feel himself justified if, when his subject brought before him so mighty a kingdom, he did not enter at some length on its previous history.<sup>9</sup> The modern historian would be even less excusable than Justin if he omitted such a review, since, while he has less right to assume a knowledge of early Armenian history on the part of his readers, he has greater means of gratifying their curiosity, owing to the recent discovery of sources of information unknown to the ancients.

Armenia first comes before us in Genesis, where it is mentioned as the country on whose mountains the ark rested.<sup>10</sup> A recollection of it was thenceforth retained in the semi-mythic traditions of the Babylonians.<sup>11</sup> According to some,<sup>12</sup> the Egyptian monarchs of the eighteenth and nineteenth dynasties carried their arms into its remote valleys, and exacted tribute from the petty chiefs who then ruled there. At any rate, it is certain that from about the ninth century B.C. it was well known to the Assyrians, who were engaged from that time till about B.C. 640 in almost constant wars with its inhabitants.<sup>13</sup> At this period three principal races inhabited the country—the Nairi, who were spread from the mountains west of

Lake Van along both sides of the Tigris to Bir on the Euphrates, and even further; the Urarda (Alarodii, or people of Ararat), who dwelt north and east of the Naïri, on the upper Euphrates, about the lake of Van, and probably on the Araxes; and the Minni, whose country lay south-east of the Urarda, in the Urumiyeh basin and the adjoining parts of Zagros. Of these three races, the Urarda were the most powerful, and it was with them that the Assyrians waged their most bloody wars. The capital city of the Urarda was Van, on the eastern shores of the lake; and here it was that their kings set up the most remarkable of their inscriptions. Six monarchs, who apparently all belong to one dynasty, left inscriptions in this locality commemorative of their military expeditions or of their offerings to the gods.<sup>14</sup> The later names of the series can be identified with those of kings who contended with Assyrian monarchs belonging to the last, or Sargonid dynasty;<sup>15</sup> and hence we are entitled approximately to fix the series to the seventh and eighth centuries before our era. The Urarda must at this time have exercised a dominion over almost the whole of the region to which the name of Armenia commonly attaches.<sup>16</sup> They were worthy antagonists of the Assyrians, and, though occasionally worsted in fight, maintained their independence, at any rate, till the time of Asshur-bani-pal (about B.C. 640), when the last king of the Van series, whose name is read as Bilat-duri, succumbed to the Assyrian power, and consented to pay a tribute for his dominions.<sup>17</sup>

There is reason to believe that between the time when we obtain this view of the primitive Armenian peoples and that at which we next have any exact knowledge of the condition of the country—the time of the Persian monarchy—a great revolution had taken place in the region. The Naïri, Urarda, and Minni were Turanian, or, at any rate, non-Arian, races.<sup>18</sup> Their congeners in Western Asia were the early Babylonians and the Susianians, not the Medes, the Persians, or the Phrygians. But by the time of Herodotus the Arian character of the Armenians had become established. Their close connection with the Phrygians was recognized.<sup>19</sup> They had changed their national appellation; for while in the Assyrian period the terms Naïri and Urarda had preponderated, under the Persians they had come to be called Armenians and their country Armenia.<sup>20</sup> The personal names of individuals in the country, both men and women, had acquired a decidedly Arian cast.<sup>21</sup> Everything seems to indicate that a strange people

had immigrated into the land, bringing with them a new language, new manners and customs, and a new religious system.<sup>22</sup> From what quarter they had come, whether from Phrygia as Herodotus and Stephen<sup>23</sup> believed, or, as we should gather from their language and religion, from Media, is perhaps doubtful; but it seems certain that from one quarter or another Armenia had been Arianized; the old Turanian character had passed away from it; immigrants had flocked in, and a new people had been formed—the real Armenian of later times, and indeed of the present day—by the admixture of ruling Arian tribes with a primitive Turanian population, the descendants of the old inhabitants.

The new race, thus formed, though perhaps not less brave and warlike than the old, was less bent on maintaining its independence. Moses of Choréné, the Armenian historian, admits that from the time of the Median preponderance in Western Asia the Armenians held under them a subject position.<sup>24</sup> That such was their position under the Persians is abundantly evident;<sup>25</sup> and, so far as appears, there was only one occasion during the entire Achæmenian period (B.C. 559 to B.C. 331) when they exhibited any impatience of the Persian yoke, or made any attempt to free themselves from it. In the early portion of the reign of Darius Hystaspis they took part in a revolt raised by a Mede called Phraortes, and were not reduced to obedience without some difficulty.<sup>26</sup> But from henceforth their fidelity to the Achæmenian Kings was unbroken; they paid their tribute (apparently) without reluctance,<sup>27</sup> and furnished contingents of troops to the Persian armies when called upon.<sup>28</sup> After Arbela they submitted without a struggle to Alexander;<sup>29</sup> and when in the division of his dominions, which followed upon the battle of Ipsus, they fell naturally to Seleucus, they acquiesced in the arrangement.<sup>30</sup> It was not until Antiochus the Great suffered his great defeat at the hands of the Romans (B.C. 190) that Armenia bestirred itself, and, after probably four and a half centuries of subjection, became once more an independent power. Even then the movement seems to have originated rather in the ambition of a chief than in a desire for liberty on the part of the people. Artaxias had been governor of the Greater Armenia under Antiochus,<sup>31</sup> and seized the opportunity afforded by the battle of Magnesia to change his title of satrap into that of sovereign. No war followed. Antiochus was too much weakened by his reverses to make any attempt

to reduce Artaxias or recover Armenia; and the nation obtained autonomy without having to undergo the usual ordeal of a bloody struggle. When at the expiration of five-and-twenty years Epiphanes, the son of Antiochus the Great, determined on an effort to reconquer the lost province, no very stubborn resistance was offered to him. Artaxias was defeated and made prisoner in the very first year of the war (B.C. 165), and Armenia seems to have passed again under the sway of the Seleucidæ.<sup>32</sup>

It would seem that matters remained in this state for the space of about fifteen or sixteen years. When, however, Mithridates I. (Arsaces VI.), about B.C. 150, had overrun the eastern provinces of Syria, and made himself master in succession of Media, Elymaïs, and Babylonia, the revolutionary movement excited by his successes reached Armenia, and the standard of independence was once more raised in that country. According to the Armenian historians,<sup>33</sup> an Arsacid prince, Wagharshag or Valarsaces, was established as sovereign by the influence of the Parthian monarch, but was allowed to rule independently. A reign of twenty-two years is assigned to this prince, whose kingdom is declared to have reached from the Caucasus to Nisibis, and from the Caspian to the Mediterranean.<sup>34</sup> He was succeeded by his son, Arshag (Arsaces), who reigned thirteen years, and was, like his father, active and warlike, contending chiefly with the people of Pontus.<sup>35</sup> At his death the crown descended to his son, Ardashes,<sup>36</sup> who is probably the Ortoadistus of Justin.<sup>37</sup>

Such were the antecedents of Armenia when Mithridates II., having given an effectual check to the progress of the Scythians in the east, determined to direct his arms towards the west, and to attack the dominions of his relative, the third of the Armenian Arsacidæ. Of the circumstances of this war, and its results, we have scarcely any knowledge. Justin, who alone distinctly mentions it, gives us no details. A notice, however, in Strabo, which must refer to *about* this time, is thought to indicate with sufficient clearness the result of the struggle, which seems to have been unfavorable to the Armenians. Strabo says that Tigranes, before his accession to the throne, was for a time a hostage among the Parthians.<sup>38</sup> As hostages are only given by the vanquished party, we may assume that Ortoadistus (Ardashes) found himself unable to offer an effectual resistance to the Parthian king, and contented after a while to a disadvantageous peace, for his observance of which hostages were required by the victor.

It cannot have been more than a few years after the termination of this war, which must have taken place towards the close of the second, or soon after the beginning of the first century,<sup>39</sup> that Parthia was for the first time brought into contact with Rome.

The Great Republic, which after her complete victory over Antiochus III., B.C. 190, had declined to take possession of a single foot of ground in Asia, regarding the general state of affairs as not then ripe for an advance of *Terminus* in that quarter, had now for some time seen reason to alter its policy, and to aim at adding to its European an extensive Asiatic dominion. Macedonia and Greece having been absorbed, and Carthage destroyed (B.C. 148-146), the conditions of the political problem seemed to be so far changed as to render a further advance towards the east a safe measure; and accordingly, when it was seen that the line of the kings of Pergamus was coming to an end, the Senate set on foot intrigues which had for their object the devolution upon Rome of the sovereignty belonging to those monarchs. By clever management the third Attalus was induced, in repayment of his father's obligations to the Romans,<sup>40</sup> to bequeath his entire dominions as a legacy to the Republic. In vain did his illegitimate half-brother, Aristonicus, dispute the validity of so extraordinary a testament; the Romans, aided by Mithridates IV., then monarch of Pontus, easily triumphed over such resistance as this unfortunate prince could offer,<sup>41</sup> and having ceded to their ally the portion of Phrygia which had belonged to the Pergamene kingdom,<sup>42</sup> entered on the possession of the remainder. Having thus become an Asiatic power, the Great Republic was of necessity mixed up henceforth with the various movements and struggles which agitated Western Asia, and was naturally led to strengthen its position among the Asiatic kingdoms by such alliances as seemed at each conjuncture best fitted for its interests.

Hitherto no occasion had arisen for any direct dealings between Rome and Parthia. Their respective territories were still separated by considerable tracts, which were in the occupation of the Syrians, the Cappadocians, and the Armenians. Their interests had neither clashed, nor as yet sufficiently united them to give rise to any diplomatic intercourse. But the progress of the two Empires in opposite directions was continually bringing them nearer to each other; and events had

now reached a point at which the Empires began to have (or seem to have) such a community of interests as led naturally to an exchange of communications. A great power had been recently developed in these parts. In the rapid way so common in the East, Mithridates V., of Pontus, the son and successor of Rome's ally, had, between B.C. 112 and B.C. 93, built up an Empire of vast extent, numerous population, and almost inexhaustible resources. He had established his authority over Armenia Minor, Colchis, the entire east coast of the Black Sea, the Chersonesus Taurica, or kingdom of the Bosphorus, and even over the whole tract lying west of the Chersonese as far as the mouth of the Tyras, or Dniester.<sup>43</sup> Nor had these gains contented him. He had obtained half of Paphlagonia by an iniquitous compact with Nicomedes, King of Bithynia; he had occupied Galatia; and he was engaged in attempts to bring Cappadocia under his influence. In this last-named project he was assisted by the Armenians, with whose king, Tigranes, he had (about B.C. 96) formed a close alliance, at the same time giving him his daughter, Cleopatra, in marriage.<sup>44</sup> Rome, though she had not yet determined on war with Mithridates, was resolved to thwart his Cappadocian projects, and in B.C. 92 sent Sulla into Asia with orders to put down the puppet whom Mithridates and Tigranes were establishing, and to replace upon the Cappadocian throne a certain Ariobarzanes, whom they had driven from his kingdom.<sup>45</sup> In the execution of this commission, Sulla was brought into hostile collision with the Armenians, whom he defeated with great slaughter, and drove from Cappadocia together with their puppet king.<sup>46</sup> Thus, not only did the growing power of Mithridates of Pontus, by inspiring Rome and Parthia with a common fear, tend to draw them together, but the course of events had actually given them a common enemy in Tigranes of Armenia, who was equally obnoxious to both.

For Tigranes, who, during the time that he was a hostage in Parthia, had contracted engagements towards the Parthian monarch which involved a cession of territory, and who in consequence of his promises had been aided by the Parthians in seating himself on his father's throne<sup>47</sup> though he made the cession required of him in the first instance had soon afterwards repented of his good faith, had gone to war with his benefactors, recovered the ceded territory, and laid waste a considerable tract of country lying within the admitted limits of the Parthian kingdom.<sup>48</sup> These proceedings had, of course, alien-

ated Mithridates II.; and we may with much probability ascribe to them the step, which he now took, of sending an ambassador to Sulla. Orobazus, the individual selected, was charged to propose an alliance offensive and defensive between the two countries.<sup>49</sup> Sulla received the overture favorably, but probably considered that it transcended his powers to conclude a treaty; and thus nothing more was effected by the embassy than the establishment of a good understanding between the two States.<sup>50</sup>

Soon after this Tigranes appears to have renewed his attacks upon Parthia,<sup>51</sup> which in the interval between B.C. 92 and B.C. 83 he greatly humbled,<sup>52</sup> depriving it of the whole of Upper Mesopotamia, at this time called Gordyêné, and under rule of one of the Parthian tributary kings.<sup>53</sup> Of the details of this war we have no account; and it is even uncertain whether it fell within the reign of Mithridates II. or no. The unfortunate mistake of Justin,<sup>54</sup> whereby he confounded this monarch with Mithridates III., has thrown this portion of the Parthian history into confusion, and has made even the successor of Mithridates II. uncertain.

Mithridates II. probably died about B.C. 89, after a reign which must have exceeded thirty-five years. His great successes against the Scythians in the earlier portion of his reign were to some extent counterbalanced by his losses to Tigranes in his old age; but on the whole he must be regarded as one of the more vigorous and successful of the Parthian monarchs, and as combining courage with prudence. It is to his credit that he saw the advantage of establishing friendly relations with Rome at a time when an ordinary Oriental monarch might have despised the distant Republic, and have thought it beneath his dignity to make overtures to so strange and anomalous a power. Whether he definitely foresaw the part which Rome was about to play in the East, we may doubt; but at any rate he must have had a prevision that the part would not be trifling or insignificant. Of the private character of Mithridates we have no sufficient materials to judge. If it be true that he put his envoy, Orobazus, to death on account of his having allowed Sulla to assume a position at their conference derogatory to the dignity of the Parthian State,<sup>55</sup> we must pronounce him a harsh master; but the tale, which rests wholly on the weak authority of the gossip-loving Plutarch, is perhaps scarcely to be accepted.

## CHAPTER X.

*Dark period of Parthian History. Doubtful succession of the Monarchs. Accession of Sanatrœces, ab. B.C. 76. Position of Parthia during the Mithridatic Wars. Accession of Phraates III. His relations with Pompey. His death. Civil War between his two sons, Mithridates and Orodes. Death of Mithridates.*

“Varia complurium regum in Parthis successione imperium accepit Orodes.”

Trog. Pomp. Epit. lib. xlii.

THE successor of Mithridates II. is unknown. It has been argued, indeed, that the reigns of the known monarchs of this period would not be unduly long if we regarded them as strictly consecutive, and placed no blank between the death of Mithridates II. and the accession of the next Arsaces whose name has come down to us.<sup>1</sup> Sanatroœces, it has been said, may have been, and may, therefore, well be regarded as, the successor of Mithridates. But the words of the epitomizer of Trogus, placed at the head of this chapter, forbid the acceptance of this theory. The epitomizer would not have spoken of “many kings” as intervening between Mithridates II. and Orodes, if the number had been only three. The expression implies, *at least*, four or five monarchs; and thus we have no choice but to suppose that the succession of the kings is here imperfect,<sup>2</sup> and that at least one or two reigns were interposed between those of the second Mithridates and of the monarch known as Sanatrœces, Sinatroces, or Sintricus.

A casual notice of a Parthian monarch in a late writer may supply the gap, either wholly or in part. Lucian speaks of a certain Mnasciras as a Parthian king, who died at the advanced age of ninety-six.<sup>3</sup> As there is no other place in the Parthian history at which the succession is doubtful, and as no such name as Mnascris occurs elsewhere in the list, it seems necessary, unless we reject Lucian’s authority altogether, to insert this monarch here. We cannot say, however, how long he reigned, or ascribe to him any particular actions; nor can we say definitely what king he either succeeded or preceded. It is possible that his reign covered the entire interval between

Mithridates II. and Sanatroëces; it is possible, on the other hand, that he had successors and predecessors, whose names have altogether perished.

The expression used by the epitomizer of Trogus,<sup>4</sup> and a few words dropped by Plutarch,<sup>5</sup> render it probable that about this time there were contentions between various members of the Arsacid family which issued in actual civil war. Such contentions are a marked feature of the later history; and, according to Plutarch, they commenced at this period. We may suspect, from the great age of two of the monarchs chosen,<sup>6</sup> that the Arsacid stock was now very limited in number, that it offered no candidates for the throne whose claims were indisputable, and that consequently at each vacancy there was a division of opinion among the "Megistanes," which led to the claimants making appeal, if the election went against them, to the arbitrament of arms.

The dark time of Parthian history is terminated by the accession—probably in B.C. 76<sup>7</sup>—of the king above mentioned as known by the three names of Sanatroëces, Sinatroces, and Sintricus.<sup>8</sup> The form, Sanatroëces, which appears upon the Parthian coins, is on that account to be preferred. The king so called had reached when elected the advanced age of eighty.<sup>9</sup> It may be suspected that he was a son of the sixth Arsaces<sup>10</sup> (Mithridates I.), and consequently a brother of Phraates II. He had, perhaps, been made prisoner by that Scythians in the course of the disastrous war waged by that monarch, and had been retained in captivity for above fifty years. At any rate, he appears to have been indebted to the Scythians in some measure for the crown which he acquired so tardily, his enjoyment of it having been secured by the help of a contingent of troops furnished to him by the Scythian tribe of the Sacauracæ.<sup>11</sup>

The position of the Empire at the time of his accession was one of considerable difficulty. Parthia, during the period of her civil contentions, had lost much ground in the west, having been deprived by Tigranes of at least two important provinces.<sup>12</sup> At the same time she had been witness of the tremendous struggle between Rome and Pontus which commenced in B.C. 88, was still continuing, and still far from decided, when Sanatroëces came to the throne. An octogenarian monarch was unfit to engage in strife, and if Sanatroëces, notwithstanding this drawback, had been ambitious of military distinction, it would have been difficult for him to determine into which scale


the interests of his country required that he should cast the weight of his sword. On the one hand, Parthia had evidently much to fear from the military force and the covetous disposition of Tigranes, king of Armenia, the son-in-law of Mithridates, and at this time his chosen ally. Tigranes had hitherto been continually increasing in strength. By the defeat of Artanes,<sup>13</sup> king of Sophêné, or Armenia Minor, he had made himself master of Armenia in its widest extent; by his wars with Parthia herself he had acquired Gordyêné, or Northern Mesopotamia, and Adiabêné, or the entire rich tract east of the middle Tigris (including Assyria Proper and Arbelitis, as far, at any rate, as the course of the lower Zab;<sup>14</sup> by means which are not stated he had brought under subjection the king of the important country of Media Artropatêné, independent since the time of Alexander.<sup>15</sup> Invited into Syria, about B.C. 83, by the wretched inhabitants, wearied with the perpetual civil wars between the princes of the house of the Seleucidæ, he had found no difficulty in establishing himself as king over Cilicia, Syria, and most of Phœnicia.<sup>16</sup> About B.C. 80 he had determined on building himself a new capital in the province of Gordyêné<sup>17</sup>, a capital of a vast size,<sup>18</sup> provided with all the luxuries required by an Oriental court,<sup>19</sup> and fortified with walls which recalled the glories of the ancient cities of the Assyrians.<sup>20</sup> The position of this huge town on the very borders of the Parthian kingdom, in a province which had till very recently been Parthian, could be no otherwise understood that as a standing menace to Parthia itself, the proclamation of an intention to extend the Armenian dominion southwards, and to absorb at any rate all the rich and fertile country between Gordyêné and the sea. Thus threatened by Armenia,<sup>21</sup> it was impossible for Sanatroëces cordially to embrace the side of Mithridates,<sup>22</sup> with which Armenia and its king were so closely allied; it was impossible for him even to wish that the two allies should be free to work their will on the Asiatic continent unchecked by the power which alone had for the last twelve years obstructed their ambitious projects.

On the other hand, there was already among the Asiatic princes generally a deep distrust of Rome<sup>23</sup>—a fear that in the new people, which had crept so quietly into Asia, was to be found a power more permanently formidable than the Macedonians, a power which would make up for want of brilliancy and dash by a dogged perseverance in its aims, and a stealthy, crafty policy, sure in the end to achieve great and striking re-

sults. The acceptance of the kingdom of Attalus had not, perhaps, alarmed any one; but the seizure of Phrygia during the minority of Mithridates, without so much as a pretext,<sup>24</sup> and the practice, soon afterwards established, of setting up puppet kings,<sup>25</sup> bound to do the bidding of their Roman allies, had raised suspicions; the ease with which Mithridates notwithstanding his great power and long preparation, had been vanquished in the first war (B.C. 88—84) had aroused fears; and Sanatroeces could not but misdoubt the advisability of lending aid to the Romans, and so helping them to obtain a still firmer hold on Western Asia. Accordingly we find that when the final war broke out, in B.C. 74, his inclination was, in the first instance, to stand wholly aloof, and when that became impossible, then to temporize. To the application for assistance made by Mithridates in B.C. 72 a direct negative was returned;<sup>26</sup> and it was not until, in B.C. 69, the war had approached his own frontier, and both parties made the most earnest appeals to him for aid, that he departed from the line of pure abstention, and had recourse to the expedient of amusing both sides with promises, while he helped neither.<sup>27</sup> According to Plutarch, this line of procedure offended Lucullus, and had nearly induced him to defer the final struggle with Mithridates and Tigranes, and turn his arms against Parthia.<sup>28</sup> But the prolonged resistance of Nisibis, and the successes of Mithridates in Pontus, diverted the danger; and the war rolling northwards, Parthia was not yet driven to take a side, but was enabled to maintain her neutral position for some years longer.


Meanwhile the aged Sanatroeces died,<sup>29</sup> and was succeeded by his son, Phraates III. This prince followed at first his father's example, and abstained from mixing himself up in the Mithridatic war; but in B.C. 66, being courted by both sides, and promised the restoration of the provinces lost to Tigranes,<sup>30</sup> he made alliance with Pompey, and undertook, while the latter pressed the war against Mithridates, to find occupation for the Armenian monarch in his own land. This engagement he executed with fidelity. It had happened that the eldest living son of Tigranes, a prince bearing the same name as his father, having raised a rebellion in Armenia and been defeated, had taken refuge in Parthia with Phraates.<sup>31</sup> Phraates determined to take advantage of this circumstance. The young Tigranes was supported by a party among his countrymen who wished to see a youthful monarch upon the throne; and Phraates therefore considered that he would best

Fig. 1.




Frieze over Temple doorway, Hatra (after Ross).

Fig. 2.




Restoration of the Hatra Palace-Temple (after Ainsworth).

Fig. 3.



Parthian Capitals (after Loftus).

Fig. 4.



Parthian Diapering (after Loftus).





Figure on coffin (after Loftus).

Fig. 3.



Parthian statuette (after Loftus).


Fig. 4.



Parthian vases, jugs, and lamps (after Loftus).

Parthian ornamented coffin (after Loftus).

Fig 1



discharge his obligations to the Romans by fomenting this family quarrel, and lending a moderate support to the younger Tigranes against his father. He marched an army into Armenia in the interest of the young prince, overran the open country, and advanced on Artaxata, the capital. Tigranes, the king, fled at his approach, and betook himself to the neighboring mountains. Artaxata was invested; but as the siege promised to be long, the Parthian monarch after a time withdrew, leaving the pretender with as many troops as he thought necessary to press the siege to a successful issue. The result, however, disappointed his expectations. Scarcely was Phraates gone, when the old king fell upon his son, defeated him, and drove him beyond his borders.<sup>32</sup> He was forced, however, soon afterwards, to submit to Pompey,<sup>33</sup> who, while the civil war was raging in Armenia, had defeated Mithridates and driven him to take refuge in the Tauric Chersonese.

Phraates, now, naturally expected the due reward of his services, according to the stipulations of his agreement with Pompey. But that general was either dissatisfied with the mode in which the Parthian had discharged his obligations, or disinclined to strengthen the power which he saw to be the only one in these parts capable of disputing with Rome the headship of Asia. He could scarcely prevent, and he does not seem to have tried to prevent, the recovery of Adiabêné by the Parthians; but the nearer province of Gordyêné to which they had an equal claim, he would by no means consent to their occupying. At first he destined it for the younger Tigranes.<sup>34</sup> When the prince offended him, he made it over to Ariobarzanes, the Cappadocian monarch.<sup>35</sup> That arrangement not taking effect, and the tract being disputed between Phraates and the elder Tigranes, he sent his legate, Afranius, to drive the Parthians out of the country, and delivered it over into the hands of the Armenians.<sup>36</sup> At the same time he insulted the Parthian monarch by refusing him his generally recognized title of "King of Kings."<sup>37</sup> He thus entirely alienated his late ally, who remonstrated against the injustice with which he was treated,<sup>38</sup> and was only deterred from declaring war by the wholesome fear which he entertained of the Roman arms.

Pompey, on his side, no doubt took the question into consideration whether or no he should declare the Parthian prince a Roman enemy, and proceed to direct against him the available forces of the Empire. He had purposely made him hostile, and compelled him to take steps which might have

furnished a plausible *casus belli*. But, on the whole, he found that he was not prepared to venture on the encounter. The war had not been formally committed to him; and if he did not prosper in it, he dreaded the accusations of his enemies at Rome. He had seen, moreover, with his own eyes, that the Parthians were an enemy far from despicable, and his knowledge of campaigning told him that success against them was not certain. He feared to risk the loss of all the glory which he had obtained by grasping greedily at more, and preferred enjoying the fruits of the good luck which had hitherto attended him to tempting fortune on a new field.<sup>39</sup> He therefore determined that he would not allow himself to be provoked into hostilities by the reproaches, the dictatorial words, or even the daring acts of the Parthian King. When Phraates demanded his lost provinces he replied, that the question of borders was one which lay, not between Parthia and Rome, but between Parthia and Armenia.<sup>40</sup> When he laid it down that the Euphrates properly bounded the Roman territory, and charged Pompey not to cross it, the latter said he would keep to the just bounds, whatever they were.<sup>41</sup> When Tigranes complained that after having been received into the Roman alliance he was still attacked by the Parthian armies, the reply of Pompey was that he was willing to appoint arbitrators who should decide all the disputes between the two nations.<sup>42</sup> The moderation and caution of these answers proved contagious. The monarchs addressed resolved to compose their differences, or at any rate to defer the settlement of them to a more convenient time. They accepted Pompey's proposal of an arbitration; and in a short time an arrangement was effected by which relations of amity were re-established between the two countries.<sup>43</sup>

It would seem that not very long after the conclusion of this peace and the retirement of Pompey from Asia (B.C. 62), Phraates lost his life. He was assassinated by his two sons, Mithridates and Orodes;<sup>44</sup> for what cause we are not told. Mithridates, the elder of the two, succeeded him (about B.C. 60); and, as all fear of the Romans had now passed away in consequence of their apparently peaceful attitude, he returned soon after his accession to the policy of his namesake, Mithridates II., and resumed the struggle with Armenia from which his father had desisted.<sup>45</sup> The object of the war was probably the recovery of the lost province of Gordyêné, which, having been delivered to the elder Tigranes by Pompey, had remained

in the occupation of the Armenians. Mithridates seems to have succeeded in his enterprise. When we next obtain a distinct view of the boundary line which divides Parthia from her neighbors towards the north and the north-west, which is within five years of the probable date of Mithridates's accession, we find Gordyêné once more a Parthian province.<sup>46</sup> As the later years of this intermediate lustre are a time of civil strife, during which territorial gains can scarcely have been made, we are compelled to refer the conquest to about B.C. 59-57. But in this case it must have been due to Mithridates III., whose reign is fixed with much probability to the years B.C. 60-56.

The credit which Mithridates had acquired by his conduct of the Armenian war he lost soon afterwards by the severity of his home administration. There is reason to believe that he drove his brother, Orodes, into banishment.<sup>47</sup> At any rate, he ruled so harshly and cruelly that within a few years of his accession the Parthian nobles deposed him,<sup>48</sup> and, recalling Orodes from his place of exile, set him up as king in his brother's room. Mithridates was, it would seem, at first allowed to govern Media as a subject monarch; but after a while his brother grew jealous of him, and deprived him of this dignity.<sup>49</sup> Unwilling to acquiesce in his disgrace, Mithridates fled to the Romans, and being favorably received by Gabinius, then proconsul of Syria, endeavored to obtain his aid against his countrymen. Gabinius, who was at once weak and ambitious, lent a ready ear to his entreaties, and was upon the point of conducting an expedition into Parthia, when he received a still more tempting invitation from another quarter.<sup>50</sup> Ptolemy Auletes, expelled from Egypt by his rebellious subjects, asked his aid, and having recommendations from Pompey, and a fair sum of ready money to disburse, found little difficulty in persuading the Syrian proconsul to relinquish his Parthian plans and march the force at his disposal into Egypt. Mithridates, upon this, withdrew from Syria, and re-entering the Parthian territory, commenced a civil war against his brother, finding numerous partisans, especially in the region about Babylon.<sup>51</sup> It may be suspected that Seleucia, the second city in the Empire, embraced his cause.<sup>52</sup> Babylon, into which he had thrown himself, sustained a long siege on his behalf, and only yielded when compelled by famine.<sup>53</sup> Mithridates might again have become a fugitive; but he was weary of the disappointments and hardships which are the ordinary lot of a pretender, and

preferred to cast himself on the mercy and affection of his brother. Accordingly he surrendered himself unconditionally to Orodes; but this prince, professing to place the claims of patriotism above those of relationship,<sup>54</sup> caused the traitor who had sought aid from Rome to be instantly executed. Thus perished Mithridates III. after a reign which cannot have exceeded five years, in the winter of B.C. 56, or the early spring of B.C. 55. Orodes, on his death, was accepted as king by the whole nation.

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## CHAPTER XI.

*Accession of Orodes I. Expedition of Crassus. His fate. Retaliatory inroad of the Parthians into Syria under Pacorus, the son of Orodes. Defeat of Pacorus by Cassius. His recall. End of the first War with Rome.*

“Parthi . . . a Romanis, bellis per maximos duces florentissimis temporibus lacesiti, soli ex omnibus gentibus non pares solum, sed etiam victores fuere.”

Justin, xli. 1, § 7.

THE complete triumph of Orodes over Mithridates, and his full establishment in his kingdom, cannot be placed earlier than B.C. 56, and most probably fell in B.C. 55.<sup>1</sup> In this latter year Crassus obtained the consulship at Rome, and, being appointed at the same time to the command of the East,<sup>2</sup> made no secret of his intention to march the Roman legions across the Euphrates, and engage in hostilities with the great Parthian kingdom.<sup>3</sup> According to some writers, his views extended even further. He spoke of the wars which Lucullus had waged against Tigranes and Pompey against Mithridates of Pontus as mere child's play, and announced his intention of carrying the Roman arms to Bactria, India, and the Eastern Ocean.<sup>4</sup> The Parthian king was thus warned betimes of the impending danger, and enabled to make all such preparations against it as he deemed necessary. More than a year elapsed between the assignment to Crassus of Syria as his province, and his first overt act of hostility against Orodes.

It cannot be doubted that this breathing-time was well spent by the Parthian monarch. Besides forming his general plan of campaign at his leisure, and collecting, arming, and exer-

cising his native forces, he was enabled to gain over certain chiefs upon his borders, who had hitherto held a semi-dependent position, and might have been expected to welcome the Romans. One of these, Abgarus,<sup>5</sup> prince of Osrhoêné, or the tract east of the Euphrates about the city of Edessa, had been received into the Roman alliance by Pompey, but, with the fickleness common among Orientals, he now readily changed sides, and undertook to play a double part for the advantage of the Parthians.<sup>6</sup> Another, Alchaudonius, an Arab sheikh of these parts, had made his submission to Rome even earlier;<sup>7</sup> but having become convinced that Parthia was the stronger power of the two, he also went over to Orodes.<sup>8</sup> The importance of these adhesions would depend greatly on the line of march which Crassus might determine to follow in making his attack. Three plans were open to him. He might either throw himself on the support of Artavasdes, the Armenian monarch, who had recently succeeded his father Tigranes, and entering Armenia, take the safe but circuitous route through the mountains into Adiabêné, and so by the left bank of the Tigris to Ctesiphon; or he might, like the younger Cyrus, follow the course of the Euphrates to the latitude of Seleucia, and then cross the narrow tract of plain which there separates the two rivers; or, finally, he might attempt the shortest but most dangerous line across the Belik and Khabour, and directly through the Mesopotamian desert. If the Armenian route were preferred, neither Abgarus nor Alchaudonius would be able to do the Parthians much service; but if Crassus resolved on following either of the others, their alliance could not but be most valuable.

Crassus, however, on reaching his province, seemed in no haste to make a decision. He must have arrived in Syria tolerably early in the spring;<sup>9</sup> but his operations during the first year of his proconsulship were unimportant. He seems at once to have made up his mind to attempt nothing more than a reconnoissance. Crossing the Euphrates at Zeugma, the modern Bir or Bireh-jik, he proceeded to ravage the open country, and to receive the submission of the Greek cities, which were numerous throughout the region between the Euphrates and the Belik.<sup>10</sup> The country was defended by the Parthian satrap with a small force; but this was easily defeated, the satrap himself receiving a wound.<sup>11</sup> One Greek city only, Zenodotium, offered resistance to the invader; its inhabitants, having requested and received a Roman garrison of

one hundred men, rose upon them and put them barbarously to the sword; whereupon Crassus besieged and took the place, gave it up to his army to plunder, and sold the entire population for slaves.<sup>12</sup> He then, as winter drew near, determined to withdraw into Syria, leaving garrisons in the various towns. The entire force left behind is estimated at eight thousand men.<sup>13</sup>

It is probable that Orodes had expected a more determined attack, and had retained his army near his capital until it should become evident by which route the enemy would advance against him. Acting on an inner circle, he could readily have interposed his forces, on whichever line the assailants threw themselves. But the tardy proceedings of his antagonist made his caution superfluous. The first campaign was over, and there had scarcely been a collision between the troops of the two nations. Parthia had been insulted by a wanton attack, and had lost some disaffected cities; but no attempt had been made to fulfil the grand boasts with which the war had been undertaken.

It may be suspected that the Parthian monarch began now to despise his enemy. He would compare him with Lucullus and Pompey, and understand that a Roman army, like any other, was formidable, or the reverse, according as it was ably or feebly commanded. He would know that Crassus was a sexagenarian, and may have heard that he had never yet shown himself a captain or even a soldier. Perhaps he almost doubted whether the proconsul had any real intention of pressing the contest to a decision, and might not rather be expected, when he had enriched himself and his troops with Mesopotamian plunder, to withdraw his garrisons across the Euphrates. Crassus was at this time showing the worst side of his character in Syria, despoiling temples of their treasures,<sup>14</sup> and accepting money in lieu of contingents of troops from the dynasts of Syria and Palestine.<sup>15</sup> Orodes, under these circumstances, sent an embassy to him, which was well calculated to stir to action the most sluggish and poor-spirited of commanders. "If the war," said his envoys, "was really waged by Rome, it must be fought out to the bitter end. But if, as they had good reason to believe,<sup>16</sup> Crassus, against the wish of his country, had attacked Parthia and seized her territory for his own private gain, Arsaces would be moderate. *He would have pity on the advanced years of the proconsul*, and would give the Romans back those men of theirs, who were not so

much keeping watch in Mesopotamia as having watch kept on them." Crassus, stung with the taunt, exclaimed, "He would return the ambassadors an answer at Seléucia." Wagises, the chief ambassador, prepared for some such exhibition of feeling, and, glad to heap taunt on taunt, replied, striking the palm of one hand with the fingers of the other: "Hairs will grow here, Crassus, before you see Seleucia."<sup>17</sup>

Still further to quicken the action of the Romans, before the winter was well over, the offensive was taken against their adherents in Mesopotamia. The towns which held Roman garrisons were attacked by the Parthians in force; and, though we do not hear of any being captured, all of them were menaced, and all suffered considerably.<sup>18</sup>

If Crassus needed to be stimulated, these stimulants were effective; and he entered on his second campaign with a full determination to compel the Parthian monarch to an engagement, and, if possible, to dictate peace to him at his capital. He had not, however, in his second campaign, the same freedom with regard to his movements that he had enjoyed the year previous. The occupation of Western Mesopotamia cramped his choice. It had, in fact, compelled him before quitting Syria to decline, definitely and decidedly, the overtures of Artavasdes, who strongly urged on him to advance by way of Armenia, and promised him in that case an important addition to his forces.<sup>19</sup> Crassus felt himself compelled to support his garrisons, and therefore to make Mesopotamia, and not Armenia, the basis of his operations. He crossed the Euphrates a second time at the same point as before,<sup>20</sup> with an army composed of 35,000 heavy infantry, 4,000 light infantry, and 4,000 horse.<sup>21</sup> There was still open to him a certain choice of routes. The one preferred by his chief officers was the line of the Euphrates, known as that which the Ten Thousand had pursued in an expedition that would have been successful but for the death of its commander. Along this line water would be plentiful; forage and other supplies might be counted on to a certain extent; and the advancing army, resting on the river, could not be surrounded.<sup>22</sup> Another, but one that does not appear to have been suggested till too late,<sup>23</sup> was that which Alexander had taken against Darius;<sup>24</sup> the line along the foot of the Mons Masius, by Edéssa, and Nisibis, to Nineveh. Here too waters and supplies would have been readily procurable, and by clinging to the skirts of the hills the Roman infantry would have set the Parthian cavalry at

defiance. Between these two extreme courses to the right and to the left were numerous slightly divergent lines across the Mesopotamian plain, all shorter than either of the two above-mentioned, and none offering any great advantage over the remainder.

It is uncertain what choice the proconsul would have made, had the decision been left simply to his own judgment. Probably the Romans had a most dim and indistinct conception of the geographical character of the Mesopotamian region, and were ignorant of its great difficulties. They remained also, it must be remembered, up to this time, absolutely unacquainted with the Parthian tactics and accustomed as they were to triumph over every enemy against whom they fought, it would scarcely occur to them that in an open field they could suffer defeat. They were ready, like Alexander, to encounter any number of Asiatics, and only asked to be led against the foe as quickly as possible. When, therefore, Abgarus, the Osrhoëne prince, soon after Crassus had crossed the Euphrates, rode into his camp, and declared that the Parthians did not intend to make a stand, but were quitting Mesopotamia and flying with their treasure to the remote regions of Hyrcania and Scythia, leaving only a rear guard under a couple of generals to cover the retreat,<sup>25</sup> it is not surprising that the resolution was taken to give up the circuitous route of the Euphrates, and to march directly across Mesopotamia in the hope of crushing the covering detachment, and coming upon the flying multitude encumbered with baggage, which would furnish a rich spoil to the victors. In after times it was said that C. Cassius Longinus and some other officers were opposed to this movement,<sup>26</sup> and foresaw its danger; but it must be questioned whether the whole army did not readily obey its leader's order, and commence without any forebodings its march through Upper Mesopotamia. That region has not really the character which the apologists for Roman disaster in later times gave to it. It is a region of swelling hills, and somewhat dry gravelly plains. It possesses several streams and rivers, besides numerous springs.<sup>27</sup> At intervals of a few miles it was studded with cities and villages;<sup>28</sup> nor did the desert really begin until the Khabour was crossed. The army of Crassus had traversed it throughout its whole extent during the summer of the preceding year, and must have been well acquainted with both its advantages and drawbacks.

But it is time that we should consider what preparations the

Parthian monarch had made against the threatened attack. He had, as already stated, come to terms with his outlying vassals, the prince of Osrhoëné, and the sheikh of the Scenite Arabs, and had engaged especially the services of the former against his assailant. He had further, on considering the various possibilities of the campaign, come to the conclusion that it would be best to divide his forces, and, while himself attacking Artavasdes in the mountain fastnesses of his own country, to commit the task of meeting and coping with the Romans to a general of approved talents.<sup>29</sup> It was of the greatest importance to prevent the Armenians from effecting a junction with the Romans, and strengthening them in that arm in which they were especially deficient, the cavalry. Perhaps nothing short of an invasion of his country by the Parthian king in person would have prevented Artavasdes from detaching a portion of his troops to act in Mesopotamia. And no doubt it is also true that Orodes had great confidence in his general, whom he may even have felt to be a better commander than himself. Surenas, as we must call him, since his name has not been preserved to us,<sup>30</sup> was in all respects a person of the highest consideration. He was the second man in the kingdom for birth, wealth, and reputation. In courage and ability he excelled all his countrymen; and he had the physical advantages of commanding height and great personal beauty. When he went to battle, he was accompanied by a train of a thousand camels, which carried his baggage; and the concubines in attendance on him required for their conveyance two hundred chariots. A thousand horsemen clad in mail, and a still greater number of light-armed, formed his bodyguard. At the coronation of a Parthian monarch, it was his hereditary right to place the diadem on the brow of the new sovereign. When Orodes was driven into banishment it was he who brought him back to Parthia in triumph. When Seleucia revolted, it was he who at the assault first mounted the breach and, striking terror into the defenders, took the city. Though less than thirty years of age at the time when he was appointed commander, he was believed to possess, besides these various qualifications, consummate prudence and sagacity.<sup>31</sup>

The force which Orodes committed to his brave and skilful lieutenant consisted entirely of horse. This was not the ordinary character of a Parthian army, which often comprised four or five times as many infantry as cavalry. It was, perhaps, rather fortunate accident than profound calculation that

caused the sole employment against the Romans of this arm.<sup>32</sup> The foot soldiers were needed for the rough warfare of the Armenian mountains; the horse would, it was known, act with fair effect in the comparatively open and level Mesopotamia. As the king wanted the footmen he took them, and left to his general the troops which were not required for his own operations.

The Parthian horse, like the Persian,<sup>33</sup> was of two kinds, standing in strong contrast the one to the other. The bulk of their cavalry was of the lightest and most agile description. Fleet and active coursers, with scarcely any caparison but a headstall and a single rein, were mounted by riders clad only in a tunic and trousers,<sup>34</sup> and armed with nothing but a strong bow and a quiver full of arrows. A training begun in early boyhood made the rider almost one with his steed; and he could use his weapons with equal ease and effect whether his horse was stationary or at full gallop, and whether he was advancing towards or hurriedly retreating from his enemy.<sup>35</sup> His supply of missiles was almost inexhaustible, for when he found his quiver empty, he had only to retire a short distance and replenish his stock from magazines, borne on the backs of camels, in the rear.<sup>36</sup> It was his ordinary plan to keep constantly in motion when in the presence of an enemy, to gallop backwards and forwards, or round and round his square or column, never charging it, but at a moderate interval plying it with his keen and barbed shafts;<sup>37</sup> which were driven by a practised hand from a bow of unusual strength. Clouds of this light cavalry enveloped the advancing or the retreating foe, and inflicted grievous damage without, for the most part, suffering anything in return.

But this was not the whole. In addition to these light troops, a Parthian army comprised always a body of heavy cavalry,<sup>38</sup> armed on an entirely different system. The strong horses selected for this service were clad almost wholly in mail. Their head, neck, chest, even their sides and flanks, were protected by scale-armor of brass or iron, sewn, probably, upon leather.<sup>39</sup> Their riders had cuirasses and cuisses of the same materials, and helmets of burnished iron.<sup>40</sup> For an offensive weapon they carried a long and strong spear or pike.<sup>41</sup> They formed a serried line in battle, bearing down with great weight on the enemy whom they charged, and standing firm as an iron wall against the charges that were made upon them. A cavalry answering to this in some respects had been

employed by the later Persian monarchs,<sup>42</sup> and was in use also among the Armenians at this period; but the Parthian pike was apparently more formidable than the corresponding weapons of those nations, and the light spear carried at this time by the cavalry of a Roman army was no match for it.

The force entrusted to Surenas comprised troops of both these classes. No estimate is given us of their number, but it was probably considerable.<sup>43</sup> At any rate it was sufficient to induce him to make a movement in advance—to cross the Sinjar range and the river Khabour, and take up his position in the country between that stream and the Belik—instead of merely seeking to cover the capital. The presence of the traitor Abgarus in the camp of Crassus was now of the utmost importance to the Parthian commander. Abgarus, fully trusted, and at the head of a body of light horse, admirably adapted for outpost service, was allowed, upon his own request, to scour the country in front of the advancing Romans, and had thus the means of communicating freely with the Parthian chief. He kept Surenas informed of all the movements and intentions of Crassus,<sup>44</sup> while at the same time he suggested to Crassus such a line of route as suited the views and designs of his adversary. Our chief authority for the details of the expedition tells us<sup>45</sup> that he led the Roman troops through an arid and trackless desert, across plains without tree, or shrub, or even grass, where the soil was composed of a light shifting sand, which the wind raised into a succession of hillocks that resembled the waves of an interminable sea. The soldiers, he says, fainted with the heat and with the drought, while the audacious Osrhoène scoffed at their complaints and reproaches, asking them whether they expected to find the border-tract between Arabia and Assyria a country of cool streams and shady groves, of baths, and hostelries, like their own delicious Campania. But our knowledge of the geographical character of the region through which the march lay makes it impossible for us to accept this account as true.<sup>46</sup> The country between the Euphrates and the Belik, as already observed, is one of alternate hill and plain, neither destitute of trees nor ill-provided with water. The march through it could have presented no great difficulties. All that Abgarus could do to serve the Parthian cause was, first, to induce Crassus to trust himself to the open country, without clinging either to a river or to the mountains, and, secondly, to bring him, after a hasty march, and in the full heat of the day, into the pres-

ence of the enemy. Both these things he contrived to effect, and Surenas was, no doubt, so far beholden to him. But the notion that he enticed the Roman army into a trackless desert, and gave it over, when it was perishing through weariness, hunger, and thirst, into the hands of its enraged enemy,<sup>47</sup> is in contradiction with the topographical facts, and is not even maintained consistently by the classical writers.<sup>48</sup>

It was probably on the third or fourth day after he had quitted the Euphrates<sup>49</sup> that Crassus found himself approaching his enemy. After a hasty and hot march<sup>50</sup> he had approached the banks of the Belik, when his scouts brought him word that they had fallen in with the Parthian army, which was advancing in force and seemingly full of confidence. Abgarus had recently quitted him on the plea of doing him some undefined service, but really to range himself on the side of his real friends, the Parthians.<sup>51</sup> His officers now advised Crassus to encamp upon the river, and defer an engagement till the morrow; but he had no fears; his son, Publius, who had lately joined him with a body of Gallic horse sent by Julius Cæsar, was anxious for the fray; and accordingly the Roman commander gave the order to his troops to take some refreshment as they stood, and then to push forward rapidly.<sup>52</sup> Surenas, on his side, had taken up a position on wooded and hilly ground, which concealed his numbers,<sup>53</sup> and had even, we are told, made his troops cover their arms with cloths and skins,<sup>54</sup> that the glitter might not betray them. But, as the Romans drew near, all concealment was cast aside; the signal for battle was given; the clang of the kettledrums arose on every side; the squadrons came forward in their brilliant array; and it seemed at first as if the heavy cavalry was about to charge the Roman host,<sup>55</sup> which was formed in a hollow square with the light-armed in the middle, and with supporters of horse along the whole line, as well as upon the flanks.<sup>56</sup> But, if this intention was ever entertained, it was altered almost as soon as formed, and the better plan was adopted of halting at a convenient distance and assailing the legionaries with flight after flight of arrows, delivered without a pause and with extraordinary force. The Roman endeavored to meet this attack by throwing forward his own skirmishers; but they were quite unable to cope with the numbers and the superior weapons of the enemy, who forced them almost immediately to retreat, and take refuge behind the line of the heavy-armed.<sup>57</sup> These were then once more

exposed to the deadly missiles, which pierced alike through shield and breast-plate and greaves, and inflicted the most fearful wounds. More than once the legionaries dashed forward, and sought to close with their assailants, but in vain. The Parthian squadrons retired as the Roman infantry advanced, maintaining the distance which they thought best between themselves and their foe, whom they plied with their shafts as incessantly while they fell back as when they rode forward. For a while the Romans entertained the hope that the missiles would at last be all spent;<sup>58</sup> but when they found that each archer constantly obtained a fresh supply from the rear, this expectation deserted them. It became evident to Crassus that some new movement must be attempted; and, as a last resource, he commanded his son, Publius, whom the Parthians were threatening to outflank, to take such troops as he thought proper, and charge. The gallant youth was only too glad to receive the order. Selecting his Gallic cavalry, who numbered 1000, and adding to them 500 other horsemen, 500 archers, and about 4000 legionaries,<sup>59</sup> he advanced at speed against the nearest squadrons of the enemy. The Parthians pretended to be afraid, and beat a hasty retreat. Publius followed with all the impetuosity of youth, and was soon out of the sight of his friends, pressing the flying foe, whom he believed to be panic-stricken. But when they had drawn him on sufficiently, they suddenly made a stand, brought their heavy cavalry up against his line, and completely enveloped him and his detachment with their light-armed. Publius made a desperate resistance. His Gauls seized the Parthian pikes with their hands and dragged the encumbered horsemen to the ground; or dismounting, slipped beneath the horses of their opponents, and stabbing them in the belly, brought steed and rider down upon themselves. His legionaries occupied a slight hillock, and endeavored to make a wall of their shields, but the Parthian archers closed around them, and slew them almost to a man. Of the whole detachment, nearly six thousand strong, no more than 500 were taken prisoners,<sup>60</sup> and scarcely one escaped. The young Crassus might, possibly, had he chosen to make the attempt, have forced his way through the enemy to Ichnæ, a Greek town not far distant;<sup>61</sup> but he preferred to share the fate of his men. Rather than fall into the hands of the enemy, he caused his shield-bearer to dispatch him; and his example was followed by his principal officers. The victors struck off

his head, and elevating it on a pike, returned to resume their attack on the main body of the Roman army.

The main body, much relieved by the diminution of the pressure upon them, had waited patiently for Publius to return in triumph, regarding the battle as well-nigh over and success as certain. After a time the prolonged absence of the young captain aroused suspicions, which grew into alarms when messengers arrived telling of his extreme danger.<sup>62</sup> Crassus, almost beside himself with anxiety, had given the word to advance, and the army had moved forward a short distance, when the shouts of the returning enemy were heard, and the head of the unfortunate officer was seen displayed aloft, while the Parthian squadrons, closing in once more, renewed the assault on their remaining foes with increased vigor. The mailed horsemen approached close to the legionaries and thrust at them with the long pikes,<sup>63</sup> while the light-armed, galloping across the Roman front, discharged their unerring arrows over the heads of their own men. The Romans could neither successfully defend themselves nor effectively retaliate. Still time brought some relief. Bowstrings broke, spears were blunted or splintered, arrows began to fail, thews and sinews to relax;<sup>64</sup> and when night closed in both parties were almost equally glad of the cessation of arms which the darkness rendered compulsory.


It was the custom of the Parthians, as of the Persians,<sup>65</sup> to bivouac at a considerable distance from an enemy. Accordingly, at nightfall they drew off, having first shouted to the Romans that they would grant the general one night in which to bewail his son; on the morrow they would come and take him prisoner, unless he preferred the better course of surrendering himself to the mercy of Arsaces.<sup>66</sup> A short breathing-space was thus allowed the Romans, who took advantage of it to retire towards Carrhæ, leaving behind them the greater part of their wounded, to the number of 4,000. A small body of horse reached Carrhæ about midnight, and gave the commandant such information as led him to put his men under arms and issue forth to the succor of the proconsul. The Parthians, though the cries of the wounded made them well aware of the Roman retreat, adhered to their system of avoiding night combats, and attempted no pursuit till morning.<sup>67</sup> Even then they allowed themselves to be delayed by comparatively trivial matters—the capture of the Roman camp, the massacre of the wounded, and the slaughter of the numerous stragglers scattered

along the line of march—and made no haste to overtake the retreating army. The bulk of the troops were thus enabled to effect their retreat in safety to Carrhæ, where, having the protection of walls, they were, at any rate for a time secure.


It might have been expected that the Romans would here have made a stand. The siege of a fortified place by cavalry is ridiculous, if we understand by siege anything more than a very incomplete blockade. And the Parthians were notoriously inefficient against walls.<sup>68</sup> There was a chance, moreover, that Artavasdes might have been more successful than his ally, and, having repulsed the Parthian monarch, might march his troops to the relief of the Romans. But the soldiers were thoroughly dispirited, and would not listen to these suggestions.<sup>69</sup> Provisions no doubt ran short, since, as there had been no expectation of a disaster, no preparations had been made for standing a siege. The Greek inhabitants of the place could not be trusted to exhibit fidelity to a falling cause. Moreover, Armenia was near; and the Parthian system of abstaining from action during the night seemed to render escape tolerably easy. It was resolved, therefore, instead of clinging to the protection of the walls, to issue forth once more, and to endeavor by a rapid night march to reach the Armenian hills. The various officers seem to have been allowed to arrange matters for themselves. Cassius took his way towards the Euphrates, and succeeded in escaping with 500 horse. Octavius, with a division which is estimated at 5,000 men, reached the outskirts of the hills at a place called Sinnaca,<sup>70</sup> and found himself in comparative security. Crassus, misled by his guides, made but poor progress during the night; he had, however, arrived within little more than a mile of Octavius before the enemy, who would not stir till daybreak, overtook him. Pressed upon by their advancing squadrons, he, with his small band of 2,000 legionaries and a few horsemen, occupied a low hillock connected by a ridge of rising ground with the position of Sinnaca. Here the Parthian host beset him; and he would infallibly have been slain or captured at once, had not Octavius, deserting his place of safety, descended to the aid of his commander. The united 7,000 held their own against the enemy, having the advantage of the ground, and having perhaps by the experience of some days learnt the weak points of Parthian warfare.

Surenas was anxious, above all things, to secure the person of the Roman commander. In the East an excessive impor-

tance is attached to this proof of success; and there were reasons which made Crassus particularly obnoxious to his antagonists. He was believed to have originated, and not merely conducted, the war, incited thereto by simple greed of gold.<sup>71</sup> He had refused with the utmost haughtiness all discussion of terms, and had insulted the majesty of the Parthians by the declaration that he would treat nowhere but at their capital. If he escaped, he would be bound at some future time to repeat his attempt; if he were made prisoner, his fate would be a terrible warning to others. But now, as evening approached, it seemed to the Parthian that the prize which he so much desired was about to elude his grasp. The highlands of Armenia would be gained by the fugitives during the night, and further pursuit of them would be hopeless. It remained that he should effect by craft what he could no longer hope to gain by the employment of force; and to this point all his efforts were now directed. He drew off his troops and left the Romans without further molestation. He allowed some of his prisoners to escape and rejoin their friends, having first contrived that they should overhear a conversation among his men, of which the theme was the Parthian clemency, and the wish of Orodes to come to terms with the Romans. He then, having allowed time for the report of his pacific intentions to spread, rode with a few chiefs towards the Roman camp, carrying his bow unstrung and his right hand stretched out in token of amity. "Let the Roman General," he said, "come forward with an equal number of attendants, and confer with me in the open space between the armies on terms of peace." The aged proconsul was disinclined to trust these overtures; but his men clamored and threatened, upon which he yielded, and went down into the plain, accompanied by Octavius and a few others. Here he was received with apparent honor, and terms were arranged; but Surenas required that they should at once be reduced to writing, "since," he said, with pointed allusion to the bad faith of Pompey, "you Romans are not very apt to remember your engagements." A movement being requisite for the drawing up of the formal instruments, Crassus and his officers were induced to mount upon horses furnished by the Parthians, who had no sooner seated the proconsul on his steed, than he proceeded to hurry him forward, with the evident intention of carrying him off to their camp.<sup>72</sup> The Roman officers took the alarm and resisted. Octavius snatched a sword from a Parthian and killed one of the grooms who was hurrying Crassus



Bas-relief of Gotarzes (after Flandin and Coste).



Parthian bas-relief (after Flandin and Coste).

away. A blow from behind stretched him on the ground lifeless. A general *mêlée* followed, and in the confusion Crassus was killed, whether by one of his own side and with his own consent, or by the hand of a Parthian is uncertain.<sup>73</sup> The army, learning the fate of their general, with but few exceptions, surrendered. Such as sought to escape under cover of the approaching night were hunted down by the Bedouins who served under the Parthian standard, and killed almost to a man. Of the entire army which had crossed the Euphrates, consisting of above 40,000 men, not more than one fourth returned. One half of the whole number perished.<sup>74</sup> Nearly 10,000 prisoners were settled by the victors in the fertile oasis of Margiana,<sup>75</sup> near the northern frontier of the empire, where they intermarried with native wives,<sup>76</sup> and became submissive Parthian subjects.<sup>77</sup>

Such was the result of this great expedition, the first attempt of the grasping and ambitious Romans, not so much to conquer Parthia, as to strike terror into the heart of her people, and to degrade them to the condition of obsequious dependants on the will and pleasure of the "world's lords."<sup>78</sup> The expedition failed so utterly, not from any want of bravery on the part of the soldiers employed in it, nor from any absolute superiority of the Parthian over the Roman tactics, but partly from the incompetence of the commander, partly from the inexperience of the Romans, up to this date, in the nature of the Parthian warfare and in the best manner of meeting it. To attack an enemy whose main arm is the cavalry with a body of foot-soldiers, supported by an insignificant number of horse, must be at all times rash and dangerous. To direct such an attack on the more open part of the country, where cavalry could operate freely, was wantonly to aggravate the peril. After the first disaster, to quit the protection of walls, when it had been obtained, was a piece of reckless folly. Had Crassus taken care to obtain the support of some of the desert tribes,<sup>79</sup> if Armenia could not help him, and had he then advanced either by the way of the Mons Masius and the Tigris, or along the line of the Euphrates, the issue of his attack might have been different. He might have fought his way to Seleucia and Ctesiphon, as did Trajan, Avidius Cassius, and Septimius Severus, and might have taken and plundered those cities. He would no doubt have experienced difficulties in his retreat; but he might have come off no worse than Trajan, whose Parthian expedition has been generally regarded as rather aug-

menting than detracting from his reputation. But an ignorant and inexperienced commander, venturing on a trial of arms with an enemy of whom he knew little or nothing, in their own country, without support or allies, and then neglecting every precaution suggested by his officers, allowing himself to be deceived by a pretended friend, and marching straight into a net prepared for him, naturally suffered defeat. The credit of the Roman arms does not greatly suffer by the disaster, nor is that of the Parthians greatly enhanced. The latter showed, as they had shown in their wars against the Syro-Macedonians, that there somewhat loose and irregular array was capable of acting with effect against the solid masses and well-ordered movements of disciplined troops. They acquired by their use of the bow a fame like that which the English archers obtained for the employment of the same weapon at Crecy and Agincourt. They forced the arrogant Romans to respect them, and to allow that there was at least one nation in the world which could meet them on equal terms and not be worsted in the encounter.<sup>80</sup> They henceforth obtained recognition from Græco-Roman writers—albeit a grudging and covert recognition—as the second Power in the world, the admitted rival of Rome,<sup>81</sup> the only real counterpoise upon the earth to the power which ruled from the Euphrates to the Atlantic Ocean.

While the general of King Orodes was thus successful against the Romans in Mesopotamia, the king himself had in Armenia obtained advantages of almost equal value, though of a different kind. Instead of contending with Artavasdes, he had come to terms with him, and had concluded a close alliance, which he had sought to confirm and secure by uniting his son, Pacorus, in marriage with a sister of the Armenian monarch.<sup>82</sup> A series of festivities was being held to celebrate this auspicious event, when news came of Surenas's triumph, and of the fate of Crassus. According to the barbarous customs of the East, the head and hand of the slain proconsul accompanied the intelligence. We are told that at the moment of the messenger's arrival the two sovereigns, with their attendants, were amusing themselves with a dramatic entertainment. Both monarchs had a good knowledge of the Greek literature and language, in which Artavasdes had himself composed historical works and tragedies. The actors were representing the famous scene in the "Bacchæ" of Euripides,<sup>83</sup> where Agavé and the Bacchanals come upon the stage with the mutilated remains of the murdered Pentheus, when the

head of Crassus was thrown in among them. Instantly the player who personated Agavé seized the bloody trophy, and placing it on his thyrsus instead of the one he was carrying, paraded it before the delighted spectators, while he chanted the well-known lines:<sup>64</sup>

From the mountain to the hall  
New-cut tendrils, see, we bring—  
Blessed prey!

The horrible spectacle was one well suited to please an Eastern audience: it was followed by a proceeding of equal barbarity and still more thoroughly Oriental.<sup>65</sup> The Parthians, in derision of the motive which was supposed to have led Crassus to make his attack, had a quantity of gold melted and poured it into his mouth.<sup>66</sup>

Meanwhile Surenas was amusing his victorious troops, and seeking to annoy the disaffected Seleucians, by the performance of a farcical ceremony. He spread the report that Crassus was not killed but captured; and, selecting from among the prisoners the Roman most like him in appearance, he dressed the man in woman's clothes, mounted him upon a horse, and requiring him to answer to the names of "Crassus" and "Imperator," conducted him in triumph to the Grecian city. Before him went, mounted on camels, a band, arrayed as trumpeters and lictors, the lictors' rods having purses suspended to them, and the axes in their midst being crowned with the bleeding heads of Romans. In the rear followed a train of Seleucian music-girls, who sang songs derisive of the effeminacy and cowardice of the proconsul. After this pretended parade of his prisoner through the streets of the town, Surenas called a meeting of the Seleucian senate, and indignantly denounced to them the indecency of the literature which he had found in the Roman tents. The charge, it is said, was true;<sup>67</sup> but the Seleucians were not greatly impressed by the moral lesson read to them, when they remarked the train of concubines that had accompanied Surenas himself in the field, and thought of the loose crowd of dancers, singers, and prostitutes, that was commonly to be seen in the rear of a Parthian army.

The political consequences of the great triumph which the Parthians had achieved were less than might have been anticipated. Mesopotamia was, of course, recovered to its extremest limit, the Euphrates; Armenia was lost to the Roman alliance, and thrown for the time into complete dependence

upon Parthia. The whole East was, to some extent, excited; and the Jews, always impatient of a foreign yoke, and recently aggrieved by the unprovoked spoilation of their Temple by Crassus, flew to arms.<sup>88</sup> But no general movement of the Oriental races took place. It might have been expected that the Syrians, Phœnicians, Cilicians, Cappadocians, Phrygians, and other Asiatic peoples whose proclivities were altogether Oriental, would have seized the opportunity of rising against their Western lords and driving the Romans back upon Europe. It might have been thought that Parthia at least would have assumed the offensive in force, and have made a determined effort to rid herself of neighbors who had proved so troublesome. But though the conjuncture of circumstances was most favorable, the man was wanting. Had Mithridates or Tigranes been living, or had Surenas been king of Parthia, instead of a mere general, advantage would probably have been taken of the occasion, and Rome might have suffered seriously. But Orodes seems to have been neither ambitious as a prince nor skilful as a commander; he lacked at any rate the keen and all-embracing glance which could sweep the political horizon and, comprehending the exact character of the situation, see at the same time how to make the most of it. He allowed the opportunity to slip by without putting forth his strength or making any considerable effort; and the occasion once lost never returned.

In Parthia itself one immediate result of the expedition seems to have been the ruin of Surenas. His services to his sovereign had exceeded the measure which it is safe in the East for a subject to render to the crown. The jealousy of his royal master was aroused, and he had to pay the penalty of over-much success with his life.<sup>89</sup> Parthia was thus left without a general of approved merit, for Sillaces, the second in command during the war with Crassus,<sup>90</sup> had in no way distinguished himself through the campaign. This condition of things may account for the feebleness of the efforts made in B.C. 52 to retaliate on the Romans the damage done by their invasion. A few weak bands only passed the Euphrates, and began the work of plunder and ravage, in which they were speedily disturbed by Cassius, who easily drove them back over the river.<sup>91</sup> The next year, however, a more determined attempt was made. Orodes sent his son, Pacorus, the young bridegroom, to win his spurs in Syria, at the head of a considerable force, and supported by the experience and authority of

an officer of ripe age, named Osaces.<sup>92</sup> The army crossed the Euphrates unresisted, for Cassius, the governor, had with him only the broken remains of Crassus's army, consisting of about two legions, and, deeming himself too weak to meet the enemy in the open field, was content to defend the towns. The open country was consequently overrun; and a thrill of mingled alarm and excitement passed through all the Roman provinces in Asia.<sup>93</sup> The provinces were at the time most inadequately supplied with Roman troops,<sup>94</sup> through the desire of Cæsar and Pompey to maintain large armies about their own persons. The natives were for the most part disaffected and inclined to hail the Parthians as brethren and deliverers.<sup>95</sup> Excepting Deiotarus of Galatia, and Ariobarzanes of Cappadocia, Rome had, as Cicero (then proconsul of Cilicia) plaintively declared,<sup>96</sup> not a friend on the Asiatic continent. And Cappadocia was miserably weak,<sup>97</sup> and open to attack on the side of Armenia. Had Orodes and Artavasdes acted in concert, and had the latter, while Orodes sent his armies into Syria, poured the Armenian forces into Cappadocia and then into Cilicia (as it was expected that he would do),<sup>98</sup> there would have been the greatest danger to the Roman possessions. As it was, the excitement in Asia Minor was extreme. Cicero marched into Cappadocia with the bulk of the Roman troops, and summoned to his aid Deiotarus with his Galatians,<sup>99</sup> at the same time writing to the Roman Senate to implore reinforcements.<sup>100</sup> Cassius shut himself up in Antioch,<sup>101</sup> and allowed the Parthian cavalry to pass him by, and even to proceed beyond the bounds of Syria into Cilicia.<sup>102</sup> But the Parthians seem scarcely to have understood the situation of their adversaries, or to have been aware of their own advantages. Instead of spreading themselves wide, raising the natives, and leaving them to blockade the towns, while with their as yet unconquered squadrons they defied the enemy in the open country, we find them engaging in the siege and blockade of cities, for which they were wholly unfit, and confining themselves almost entirely to the narrow valley of the Orontes.<sup>103</sup> Under these circumstances we are not surprised to learn that Cassius, having first beat them back from Antioch,<sup>104</sup> contrived to lead them into an ambush on the banks of the river, and severely handled their troops, even killing the general Osaces.<sup>105</sup> The Parthians withdrew from the neighborhood of the Syrian capital after this defeat, which must have taken place about the end of September, and soon afterwards went into winter

quarters in Cyrrhestica,<sup>106</sup> or the part of Syria immediately east of Amanus. Here they remained during the winter months under Pacorus, and it was expected that the war would break out again with fresh fury in the spring;<sup>107</sup> but Bibulus, the new proconsul of Syria, conscious of his military deficiencies, contrived to sow dissensions among the Parthians themselves, and to turn the thoughts of Pacorus in another direction. He suggested to Ornodapantes, a Parthian noble, with whom he had managed to open a correspondence, that Pacorus would be a more worthy occupant of the Parthian throne than his father, and that he would consult well for his own interests if he were to proclaim the young prince, and lead the army of Syria against Orodes.<sup>108</sup> These intrigues seem to have first caused the war to languish, and then produced the recall of the expedition. Orodes summoned Pacorus to return to Parthia before the plot contrived between him and the Romans was ripe for execution; and Pacorus felt that no course was open to him but to obey.<sup>109</sup> The Parthian legions recrossed the Euphrates in July, B.C. 50; and the First Roman War, which had lasted a little more than four years, terminated without any real recovery by the Romans of the laurels that they had lost at Carrhæ.

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## CHAPTER XII.

*Relations of Orodes with Pompey, and with Brutus and Cassius. Second War with Rome. Great Parthian Expedition against Syria, Palestine, and Asia Minor. Defeat of Saxa. Occupation of Antioch and Jerusalem. Parthians driven out of Syria by Ventidius. Death of Pacorus. Death of Orodes.*

‘ Jam bis Monæses et Pacori manus  
Non auspicatos contudit impetus  
Nostròs, et adjecisse prædam  
Torquibus exiguis renidet.’—Hor. *Od.* iii. 6, 10-13.

THE civil troubles that had seemed to threaten Parthia from the ambition of the youthful Pacorus passed away without any explosion. The son showed his obedience by returning home submissively when he might have flown to arms; and the father accepted the act of obedience as a sufficient indica-

tion that no rebellion had been seriously meant. We find Pacorus not only allowed to live, but again entrusted a few years later with high office by the Parthian monarch;<sup>1</sup> and on this occasion we find him showing no signs of disaffection or discontent.

Nine years, however, elapsed between the recall of the young prince and his reappointment to the supreme command against the Romans. Of the internal condition of Parthia during this interval we have no account. Apparently, Orodes ruled quietly and peaceably, contenting himself with the glory which he had gained, and not anxious to tempt fortune by engaging in any fresh enterprise. It was no doubt a satisfaction to him to see the arms of the Romans, instead of being directed upon Asia, employed in intestine strife; and we can well understand that he might even deem it for his interest to foment and encourage the quarrels which, at any rate for the time, secured his own empire from attack. It appears that communications took place in the year B.C. 49 or 48 between him and Pompey, a request for alliance being made by the latter, and an answer being sent by Orodes, containing the terms upon which he would consent to give Pompey effective aid in the war.<sup>2</sup> If the Roman leader would deliver into his hands the province of Syria and make it wholly over to the Parthians, Orodes would conclude an alliance with him and send help; but not otherwise. It is to the credit of Pompey that he rejected these terms, and declined to secure his own private gain by depriving his country of a province. Notwithstanding the failure of these negotiations and the imprisonment of his envoy Hirrus,<sup>3</sup> when a few months later, having lost the battle of Pharsalia, the unhappy Roman was in need of a refuge from his great enemy, he is said to have proposed throwing himself on the friendship, or mercy, of Orodes.<sup>4</sup> He had hopes, perhaps, of enlisting the Parthian battalions in his cause, and of recovering power by means of this foreign aid. But his friends combated his design, and persuaded him that the risk, both to himself and to his wife, Cornelia, was too great to be compatible with prudence. Pompey yielded to their representations; and Orodes escaped the difficulty of having to elect between repulsing a suppliant, and provoking the hostility of the most powerful chieftain and the greatest general of the age.

Cæsar quitted the East in B. C. 47 without entering into any communication with Orodes. He had plenty of work upon

his hands; and whatever designs he may have even then entertained of punishing the Parthian inroad into Syria, or avenging the defeat of Carrhæ,<sup>5</sup> he was wise enough to keep his projects to himself and to leave Asia without exasperating by threats or hostile movements the Power on which the peace of the East principally depended. It was not until he had brought the African and Spanish wars to an end that he allowed his intention of leading an expedition against Parthia to be openly talked about. In B.C. 34, four years after Pharsalia, having put down all his domestic enemies, and arranged matters, as he thought, satisfactorily at Rome, he let a decree be passed formally assigning to him "the Parthian War,"<sup>6</sup> and sent the legions across the Adriatic on their way to Asia. What plan of campaign he may have contemplated is uncertain;<sup>7</sup> but there cannot be a doubt that an expedition under his auspices would have been a most serious danger to Parthia, and might have terminated in her subjection. The military talents of the Great Dictator were of the most splendid description; his powers of organization and consolidation enormous; his prudence and caution equal to his ambition and his courage. Once launched on a career of conquest in the East, it is impossible to say whither he might not have carried the Roman eagles, or what countries he might not have added to the Empire. But Parthia was saved from the imminent peril without any effort of her own. The daggers of "the Liberators" struck down on the 15th of March, B.C. 44, the only man whom she had seriously to fear; and with the removal of Julius passed away even from Roman thought for many a year<sup>8</sup> the design which he had entertained, and which he alone could have accomplished.

In the civil war that followed on the murder of Julius the Parthians are declared to have actually taken a part. It appears that—about B.C. 46—a small body of Parthian horse-archers had been sent to the assistance of a certain Bassus,<sup>9</sup> a Roman who amid the troubles of the times was seeking to obtain for himself something like an independent principality in Syria. The soldiers of Bassus, after a while (B.C. 43), went over in a body to Cassius, who was in the East collecting troops for his great struggle with Antony and Octavian; and thus a handful of Parthians came into his power.<sup>10</sup> Of this circumstance he determined to take advantage, in order to obtain, if possible, a considerable body of troops from Orodes. He presented each of the Parthian soldiers with a sum of

money, and dismissed them all to their homes, at the same time seizing the opportunity to send some of his own officers, as ambassadors, to Orodes, with a request for substantial aid.<sup>11</sup> On receiving this application the Parthian monarch appears to have come to the conclusion that it was to his interest to comply with it. Whether he made conditions, or no, is uncertain; but he seems to have sent a pretty numerous body of horse to the support of the "Liberators" against their antagonists.<sup>12</sup> Perhaps he trusted to obtain from the gratitude of Cassius what he had failed to extort from the fears of Pompey. Or, perhaps, he was only anxious to prolong the period of civil disturbance in the Roman State, which secured his own territory from attack, and might ultimately give him an opportunity of helping himself to some portion of the Roman dominions in Asia.

The opportunity seemed to him to have arrived in B.C. 40. Philippi had been fought and lost. The "Liberators" were crushed. The struggle between the Republicans and the Monarchists had come to an end. But, instead of being united, the Roman world was more than ever divided; and the chance of making an actual territorial gain at the expense of the tryant power appeared fairer than it had ever been before. Three rivals now held divided sway in the Roman State;<sup>13</sup> each of them jealous of the other two, and anxious for his own aggrandizement. The two chief pretenders to the first place were bitterly hostile; and while the one was detained in Italy by insurrection against his authority, the other was plunged in luxury and dissipation, enjoying the first delights of a lawless passion, at the Egyptian capital. The nations of the East were, moreover, alienated by the recent exactions of the profligate Triumvir,<sup>14</sup> who, to reward his parasites and favorites, had laid upon them a burden that they were scarcely able to bear. Further, the Parthians enjoyed at this time the advantage of having a Roman officer of good position in their service,<sup>15</sup> whose knowledge of the Roman tactics, and influence in Roman provinces, might be expected to turn to their advantage. Under these circumstances, when the spring of the year arrived, Antony being still in Egypt, and Octavian (as far as was known) occupied in the siege of Perusia,<sup>16</sup> the Parthian hordes, under Labienus and Pacorus, burst upon Syria in greater force than on any previous occasion. Over-running with their numerous cavalry the country between the Euphrates and Antioch, and thence the valley of the

Orontes, they had (as usual) some difficulty with the towns. From Apamæa, placed (like Durham) on a rocky peninsula almost surrounded by the river,<sup>17</sup> they were at first repulsed;<sup>18</sup> but, having shortly afterwards defeated Decidius Saxa, the governor of Syria, in the open field, they received the submission of Apamæa and Antioch, which latter city Saxa abandoned at their approach, flying precipitately into Cilicia.<sup>19</sup> Encouraged by these successes, Labienus and Pacorus agreed to divide their troops, and to engage simultaneously in two great expeditions. Pacorus undertook to carry the Parthian standard throughout the entire extent of Syria, Phœnicia, and Palestine, while Labienus determined to invade Asia Minor, and to see if he could not wrest some of its more fertile regions from the Romans. Both expeditions were crowned with success. Pacorus reduced all Syria, and all Phœnicia, except the single city of Tyre, which he was unable to capture for want of a naval force.<sup>20</sup> He then advanced into Palestine, which he found in its normal condition of intestine commotion.<sup>21</sup> Hyrcanus and Antigonus, two princes of the Asmonæan house, were rivals for the Jewish crown; and the latter, whom Hyrcanus had expelled, was content to make common cause with the invader, and to be indebted to a rude foreigner for the possession of the kingdom whereto he aspired. He offered Pacorus a thousand talents, and *five hundred Jewish women*, if he would espouse his cause and seat him upon his uncle's throne.<sup>22</sup> The offer was readily embraced, and by the irresistible help of the Parthians a revolution was effected at Jerusalem. Hyrcanus was deposed and mutilated. A new priest-king was set up in the person of Antigonus, the last Asmonæan prince, who held the capital for three years—B.C. 40–37—as a Parthian satrap, the creature and dependant of the great monarchy on the further side of the Euphrates. Meanwhile in Asia Minor Labienus carried all before him. Decidius Saxa, having once more (in Cilicia) ventured upon a battle, was not only defeated, but slain.<sup>23</sup> Pamphylia, Lycia, and Caria were overrun. Stratonicea was besieged; Mylasa and Alabanda were taken.<sup>24</sup> According to some writers the Parthians even pillaged Lydia and Ionia, and were in possession of Asia to the shores of the Hellespont.<sup>25</sup> It may be said that for a full year Western Asia changed masters; the rule and authority of Rome disappeared; and the Parthians were recognized as the dominant power.

But the fortune of war now began to turn. In the autumn

of B.C. 39 Antony, having set out from Italy to resume his command in the East, despatched his lieutenant, Publius Ventidius, into Asia, with orders to act against Labienus and the triumphant Parthians.<sup>26</sup> Ventidius landed unexpectedly on the coast of Asia Minor, and so alarmed Labienus, who had no Parthian troops with him, that the latter fell back hurriedly towards Cilicia, evacuating all the more western provinces, and at the same time sending urgent messages to Pacorus to implore succor. Pacorus sent a body of horse to his aid; but these troops, instead of putting themselves under his command, acted independently, and, in a rash attempt to surprise the Roman camp, were defeated by Ventidius, whereupon they fled hastily into Cilicia, leaving Labienus to his fate.<sup>27</sup> The self-styled "Imperator,"<sup>28</sup> upon this, deserted his men, and sought safety in flight; but his retreat was soon discovered, and he was pursued, captured, and put to death.<sup>29</sup>

The Parthians, meanwhile, alarmed at the turn which affairs had taken, left Antigonus to maintain their interests in Palestine, and concentrated themselves in Northern Syria and Commagêné, where they awaited the advance of the Romans. A strong detachment, under Pharnapates, was appointed to guard the Syrian Gates, or narrow pass over Mount Amanus, leading from Cilicia into Syria.<sup>30</sup> Here Ventidius gained another victory. He had sent forward an officer named Pompædus Silo with some cavalry to endeavor to seize this post, and Pompædus had found himself compelled to an engagement with Pharnapates, in which he was on the point of suffering defeat, when Ventidius himself, who had probably feared for his subordinate's safety, appeared on the scene, and turned the scale in favor of the Romans. The detachment under Pharnapates was overpowered, and Pharnapates himself was among the slain.<sup>31</sup> When news of this defeat reached Pacorus, he resolved to retreat, and withdrew his troops across the Euphrates. This movement he appears to have executed without being molested by Ventidius, who thus recovered Syria to the Romans towards the close of B.C. 39, or early in B.C. 38.

But Pacorus was far from intending to relinquish the contest. He had made himself popular among the Syrians by his mild and just administration,<sup>32</sup> and knew that they preferred his government to that of the Romans. He had many allies among the petty princes and dynasts,<sup>33</sup> who occupied a semi-independent position on the borders of the Parthian and Roman empires. Antigonus, whom he had established as king of the

Jews, still maintained himself in Judæa against the efforts of Herod,<sup>34</sup> to whom Augustus and Antony had assigned the throne. Pacorus therefore arranged during the remainder of the winter for a fresh invasion of Syria in the spring, and, taking the field earlier than his adversary expected, made ready to recross the Euphrates. We are told that if he had crossed at the usual point, he would have found the Romans unprepared, the legions being still in their winter quarters, some north and some south of the range of Taurus.<sup>35</sup> Ventidius, however, contrived by a stratagem to induce him to effect the passage at a different point, considerably lower down the stream, and in this way to waste some valuable time, which he himself employed in collecting his scattered forces. Thus, when the Parthians appeared on the right bank of the Euphrates, the Roman general was prepared to engage them, and was not even loath to decide the fate of the war by a single battle. He had taken care to provide himself with a strong force of slingers, and had entrenched himself in a position on high ground at some distance from the river.<sup>36</sup> The Parthians, finding their passage of the Euphrates unopposed, and, when they fell in with the enemy, seeing him entrenched, as though resolved to act only on the defensive, became overbold; they thought the force opposed to them must be weak or cowardly, and might yield its position without a blow, if briskly attacked. Accordingly, as on a former occasion,<sup>37</sup> they charged up the hill on which the Roman camp was placed, hoping to take it by sheer audacity. But the troops inside were held ready, and at the proper moment issued forth; the assailants found themselves in their turn assailed, and, fighting at a disadvantage on the slope, were soon driven down the declivity. The battle was renewed in plain below, where the mailed horse of the Parthians made a brave resistance; but the slingers galled them severely, and in the midst of the struggle it happened that by ill-fortune Pacorus was slain. The result followed which is almost invariable with an Oriental army: having lost their leader, the soldiers everywhere gave way; flight became universal, and the Romans gained a complete victory.<sup>38</sup> The Parthian army fled in two directions. Part made for the bridge of boats by which it had crossed the Euphrates, but was intercepted by the Romans and destroyed. Part turned northwards into Commagêné, and there took refuge with the king, Antiochus, who refused to surrender them to the demand of Ventidius, and no doubt allowed them to return to their own country.

Thus ended the great Parthian invasion of Syria, and with it ended the prospect of any further spread of the Arsacid dominion towards the west. When the two great powers, Rome and Parthia, first came into collision—when the first blow struck by the latter, the destruction of the army of Crassus, was followed up by the advance of their clouds of horse into Syria, Palestine, and Asia Minor—when Apamæa, Antioch, and Jerusalem fell into their hands, when Decidius Saxa was defeated and slain, Cilicia, Pamphylia, Caria, Lydia, and Ionia occupied—it seemed as if Rome had found, not so much an equal as a superior; it looked as if the power heretofore predominant would be compelled to contract her frontier, and as if Parthia would advance hers to the Egean or the Mediterranean. The history of the contest between the East and the West, between Asia and Europe, is a history of reactions. At one time one of the continents, at another time the other, is in the ascendant. The time appeared to have come when the Asiatics were once more to recover their own, and to beat back the European aggressor to his proper shores and islands. The triumphs achieved by the Seljukian Turks between the eleventh and the fifteenth centuries would in that case have been anticipated by above a thousand years through the efforts of a kindred, and not dissimilar people.<sup>39</sup> But it turned out that the effort made was premature. While the Parthian warfare was admirably adapted for the national defence on the broad plains of inner Asia, it was ill suited for conquest, and, comparatively speaking, ineffective in more contracted and difficult regions. The Parthian military system had not the elasticity of the Roman—it did not in the same way adapt itself to circumstances, or admit of the addition of new arms, or the indefinite expansion of an old one. However loose and seemingly flexible, it was rigid in its uniformity; it never altered; it remained under the thirtieth Arsaces such as it had been under the first, improved in details, perhaps, but essentially the same system. The Romans, on the contrary, were ever modifying their system, ever learning new combinations or new manœuvres or new modes of warfare from their enemies. They met the Parthian tactics of loose array, continuous distant missiles, and almost exclusive employment of cavalry, with an increase in the number of their own horse, a larger employment of auxiliary irregulars, and a greater use of the sling.<sup>40</sup> At the same time they learnt to take full advantage of the Parthian inefficiency against walls, and to practice against them the arts of pretended retreat and ambush. The result was, that

Parthia found she could make no impression upon the dominions of Rome, and, having become persuaded of this by the experience of a decade of years, thenceforth laid aside for ever the idea of attempting Western conquests. She took up, in fact, from this time, a new attitude, Hitherto she had been consistently aggressive. She had labored constantly to extend herself at the expense successively of the Bactrians, the Scythians, the Syro-Macedonians, and the Armenians. She had proceeded from one aggression to another, leaving only short intervals between her wars, and had always been looking out for some fresh enemy. Henceforth she became, comparatively speaking, pacific. She was content for the most part, to maintain her limits. She sought no new foe. Her contest with Rome degenerated into a struggle for influence over the kingdom of Armenia; and her hopes were limited to the reduction of that kingdom into a subject position.

The death of Pacorus is said to have caused Orodes intense grief.<sup>41</sup> For many days he would neither eat nor speak; then his sorrow took another turn. He imagined that his son had returned; he thought continually that he heard or saw him; he could do nothing but repeat his name. Every now and then, however, he awoke to a sense of the actual fact, and mourned the death of his favorite with tears. After a while this extreme grief wore itself out, and the aged king began to direct his attention once more to public affairs. He grew anxious about the succession.<sup>42</sup> Of the thirty sons who still remained to him there was not one who had made himself a name, or was in any way distinguished above the remainder. In the absence of any personal ground of preference, Orodes—who seems to have regarded himself as possessing a right to nominate the son who should succeed him—thought the claims of primogeniture deserved to be considered, and selected as his successor, Phraates, the eldest of the thirty.<sup>43</sup> Not content with nominating him, or perhaps doubtful whether the nomination would be accepted by the Megistanes, he proceeded further to abdicate in his favor, whereupon Phraates became king. The transaction proved a most unhappy one. Phraates, jealous of some of his brothers, who were the sons of a princess married to Orodes,<sup>44</sup> whereas his own mother was only a concubine, removed them by assassination, and when the ex-monarch ventured to express disapproval of the act added the crime of parricide to fratricide by putting to death his aged father.<sup>45</sup> Thus perished Orodes, after a reign of eighteen years—the most memorable in the Parthian annals.

## CHAPTER XIII.

*Reign of Phraates IV. His cruelties. Flight of Monæses to Antony. Antony's great Parthian Expedition, or Invasion of Media Atropaténé. Its Complete Failure. Subsequent Alliance of the Median King with Antony. War between Parthia and Media. Rebellion raised against Phraates by Tiridates. Phraates expelled. He recovers his Throne with the help of the Scythians. His dealings with Augustus. His death and Character.*

“ Redditum Cyri solio Phraatem  
Dissidens plebi numero beatorum  
Eximit Virtus.”—Hor. *Od.* ii. 2. 16-18.

THE shedding of blood is like “the letting out of water.” When it once begins, none can say where it will stop. The absolute monarch who, for his own fancied security, commences a system of executions, is led on step by step to wholesale atrocities from which he would have shrunk with horror at the outset. Phraates had removed brothers whose superior advantages of birth made them formidable rivals. He had punished with death a father who ventured to blame his act, and to forget that by abdication he had sunk himself to the position of a subject. Could he have stopped here, it might have seemed that his severities proceeded not so much from cruelty of disposition as from political necessity; and historians, always tender in the judgments which they pass on kings under such circumstances, would probably have condoned or justified his conduct. But the taste for bloodshed grows with the indulgence of it. In a short time the young king had killed all his remaining brothers,<sup>1</sup> although their birth was no better than his own, and there was no valid ground for his fearing them; and soon afterwards, not content with the murder of his own relations, he began to vent his fury upon the Parthian nobles. Many of these suffered death;<sup>2</sup> and such a panic seized the order that numbers quitted the country, and dispersed in different directions, content to remain in exile until the danger which threatened them should have passed by. There were others, however, who were not so patient. A body of chiefs had fled to Antony, among whom was a certain Monæses, a

nobleman of the highest rank,<sup>3</sup> who seems to have distinguished himself previously in the Syrian wars.<sup>4</sup> This person represented to Antony that Phraates had by his tyrannical and bloody conduct made himself hateful to his subjects, and that a revolution could easily be effected. If the Romans would support him, he offered to invade Parthia; and he made no doubt of wresting the greater portion of it from the hands of the tyrant, and of being himself accepted as king. In that case he would consent to hold his crown of the Romans, who might depend upon his fidelity and gratitude. Antony is said to have listened to these overtures, and to have been induced by them to turn his thoughts to an invasion of the Parthian kingdom.<sup>5</sup> He began to collect troops and to obtain allies with this object. He entered into negotiations with Artavasdes, the Armenian king,<sup>6</sup> who seems at this time to have been more afraid of Rome than of Parthia, and engaged him to take a part in his projected campaign. He spoke of employing Monæses in a separate expedition. Under these circumstances Phraates became alarmed. He sent a message to Monæses with promises of pardon and favor, which that chief thought worthy of acceptance. Hereupon Monæses represented to Antony that by a peaceful return he might perhaps do him as much service as by having recourse to arms; and though Antony was not persuaded, he thought it prudent to profess himself well satisfied, and to allow Monæses to quit him. His relations with Parthia, he said, might perhaps be placed on a proper footing without a war, and he was quite willing to try negotiation. His ambassadors should accompany Monæses. They would be instructed to demand nothing of Phraates but the restoration of the Roman standards taken from Crassus, and the liberation of such of the captive soldiers as were still living.<sup>7</sup>

But Antony had really determined on war. It may be doubted whether it had required the overtures of Monæses to put a Parthian expedition into his thoughts. He must have been either more or less than a man if the successes of his lieutenants had not stirred in his mind some feeling of jealousy, and some desire to throw their victories into the shade by a grand and noble achievement. Especially the glory of Ventidius, who had been allowed the much-coveted honor of a triumph at Rome on account of his defeats of the Parthians in Cilicia and Syria,<sup>8</sup> must have moved him to emulation, and have caused him to cast about for some means of exalting his own military reputation above that of his subordinates. For

this purpose nothing, he must have known, would be so effectual as a real Parthian success, the inflicting on this hated and dreaded foe of an unmistakable humiliation, the dictating to them terms of peace on their own soil after some crushing and overwhelming disaster. And, after the victories of Ventidius, this did not appear to be so very difficult. The prestige of the Parthian name was gone. Roman soldiers could be trusted to meet them without alarm, and to contend with them without undue excitement or flurry. The weakness, as well as the strength, of their military system had come to be known; and expedients had been devised by which its strong points were met and counterbalanced.<sup>9</sup> At the head of sixteen legions,<sup>10</sup> Antony might well think that he could invade Parthia successfully, and not only avoid the fate of Crassus, but gather laurels which might serve him in good stead in his contest with his great political rival.

Nor can the Roman general be taxed with undue precipitation or with attacking in insufficient force. He had begun, as already noticed, with securing the co-operation of the Armenian king, Artavasdes, who promised him a contingent of 7000 foot and 6000 horse. His Roman infantry is estimated at 60,000; besides which he had 10,000 Gallic and Iberian horse, and 30,000 light armed and cavalry of the Asiatic allies.<sup>11</sup> His own army thus amounted to 100,000 men; and, with the Armenian contingent, his entire force would have been 113,000. It seems that it was his original intention to cross the Euphrates into Mesopotamia, and thus to advance almost in the footsteps of Crassus:<sup>12</sup> but when he reached the banks of the river (about midsummer B.C. 37) he found such preparations made to resist him that he abandoned his first design, and, turning northwards, entered Armenia, determined to take advantage of his alliance with Artavasdes, and to attack Parthia with Armenia as the basis of his operations. Artavasdes gladly received him, and persuaded him, instead of penetrating into Parthia itself, to direct his arms against the territory of a Parthian subject-ally,<sup>13</sup> the king of Media Atropatêné, whose territories adjoined Armenia on the southeast. Artavasdes pointed out that the Median monarch was absent from his own country, having joined his troops to those which Phraates had collected for the defence of Parthia. His territory therefore would be open to ravage, and even Praaspa, his capital, might prove an easy prey. The prospect excited Antony, who at once divided his troops, and having given orders

to Oppius Stianus to follow him leisurely with the more unwarlike part of the army, the baggage-train, and the siege batteries, proceeded himself by forced marches to Praaspa with all the cavalry and the infantry of the better class.<sup>14</sup> This town was situated at the distance of nearly three hundred miles from the Armenian frontier;<sup>15</sup> but the way to it lay through well-cultivated plains, where food and water were abundant. Antony performed the march without difficulty and at once invested the place. The walls were strong, and the defenders numerous, so that he made little impression; and when the Median king returned, accompanied by his Parthian suzerain, to the defence of his country, the capital seemed in so little danger that it was resolved to direct the first attack on Stianus, who had not yet joined his chief. A most successful onslaught was made on this officer, who was surprised, defeated, and slain.<sup>16</sup> Ten thousand Romans fell in the battle,<sup>17</sup> and all the baggage-wagons and engines of war were taken. A still worse result of the defeat was the desertion of Artavasdes, who, regarding the case of the Romans as desperate, drew off his troops, and left Antony to his own resources.<sup>18</sup>

The Roman general now found himself in great difficulties. He had exhausted the immediate neighborhood of Praaspa, and was obliged to send his foraging-parties on distant expeditions, where, being beyond the reach of his protection, they were attacked and cut to pieces by the enemy.<sup>19</sup> He had lost his siege-train, and found it impossible to construct another. Such works as he attempted suffered through the sallies of the besieged; and in some of these his soldiers behaved so ill that he was forced to punish their cowardice by decimation.<sup>20</sup> His supplies failed, and he had to feed his troops on barley instead of wheat. Meantime the autumnal equinox was approaching, and the weather was becoming cold. The Medes and Parthians, under their respective monarchs, hung about him, impeded his movements, and cut off his stragglers, but carefully avoided engaging him in a pitched battle. If he could have forced the city to a surrender, he would have been in comparative safety, for he might have gone into winter quarters there and have renewed the war in the ensuing spring. But all his assaults, with whatever desperation they were made, failed; and it became necessary to relinquish the siege and retire into Armenia before the rigors of winter should set in. He could, however, with difficulty bring himself to make a confession of

failure, and flattered himself for a while that the Parthians would consent to purchase his retirement by the surrender of the Crassian captives and standards. Having lost some valuable time in negotiations, at which the Parthians laughed,<sup>21</sup> at length, when the equinox was passed, he broke up from before Praaspa, and commenced the work of retreat. There were two roads<sup>22</sup> by which he might reach the Araxes at the usual point of passage, One lay towards the left, through a plain and open country,<sup>23</sup> probably that through which he had come; the other, which was shorter, but more difficult, lay to the right, leading across a mountain-tract, but one fairly supplied with water, and in which there were inhabited villages. Antony was advised that the Parthians had occupied the easier route,<sup>24</sup> expecting that he would follow it, and intended to overwhelm him with their cavalry in the plains. He therefore took the road to the right through a rugged and inclement country—probably that between Tahkt-i-Suleïman and Tabriz<sup>25</sup>—and, guided by a Mardian who knew the region well, proceeded to make his way back to the Araxes. His decision took the Parthians by surprise, and for two days he was unmolested. But by the third day they had thrown themselves across his path; and thenceforward, for nineteen consecutive days, they disputed with Antony every inch of his retreat, and inflicted on him the most serious damage. The sufferings of the Roman army during this time, says a modern historian of Rome,<sup>26</sup> were unparalleled in their military annals. The intense cold, the blinding snow and driving sleet, the want sometimes of provisions, sometimes of water, the use of poisonous herbs, and the harassing attacks of the enemy's cavalry and bowmen, which could only be repelled by maintaining the dense array of the phalanx or the tortoise, reduced the retreating army by one-third of its numbers. At length, after a march of 300 Roman, or 277 British, miles, they reached the river Araxes, probably at the Julfa ferry, and, crossing it, found themselves in Armenia. But the calamities of the return were not yet ended. Though it was arranged with Artavasdes that the bulk of the army should winter in Armenia,<sup>27</sup> yet, before the various detachments could reach their quarters in different parts of the country, eight thousand more had perished through the effects of past sufferings or the severity of the weather.<sup>28</sup> Altogether, out of the hundred thousand men whom Antony led into Media Atropatêné, less than seventy thousand<sup>29</sup> remained to commence the campaign

which was threatened for the ensuing year. Well may the unfortunate commander have exclaimed as he compared his own heavy losses with the light ones of Xenophon and his Greeks in these same regions, "Oh, those Ten Thousand! those Ten Thousand!"<sup>30</sup>

On the withdrawal of Antony into Armenia a quarrel broke out between Phraates and his Median vassal. The latter regarded himself as wronged in the division made of the Roman spoils,<sup>31</sup> and expressed himself with so much freedom on the subject as to offend his suzerain. He then began to fear that he had gone too far, and that Phraates would punish him by depriving him of his sovereignty. Accordingly, he was anxious to obtain a powerful alliance, and on turning over in his mind all feasible political combinations it seems to have occurred to him that his late enemy, Antony, might be disposed to take him under his protection. He doubtless knew that Artavasdes of Armenia had offended the Roman leader by deserting him in the hour of his greatest peril, and felt that, if Antony was intending to revenge himself on the traitor, he would be glad to have a friend on the Armenian border. He therefore sent an ambassador of rank<sup>32</sup> to Alexandria, where Antony was passing the winter, and boldly proposed the alliance. Antony readily accepted it; he was intensely angered by the conduct of the Armenian monarch, and determined on punishing his defection; he viewed the Median alliance as of the utmost importance in connection with the design, which he still entertained, of invading Parthia itself;<sup>33</sup> and he saw in the powerful descendant of Atropates a prince whom it would be well worth his while to bind to his cause indissolubly. He therefore embraced the overtures made to him with joy, and even rewarded the messenger who had brought them with a principality.<sup>34</sup> After sundry efforts to entice Artavasdes into his power, which occupied him during most of B.C. 35, in the spring of B.C. 34 he suddenly appeared in Armenia. His army, which had remained there from the previous campaign, held all the more important positions, and, as he professed the most friendly feelings towards Artavasdes, even proposing an alliance between their families,<sup>35</sup> that prince, after some hesitation, at length ventured into his presence. He was immediately seized and put in chains.<sup>36</sup> Armenia was rapidly overrun. Artaxias, whom the Armenians made king in the room of his father, was defeated and forced to take refuge with the Parthians. Antony then arranged a marriage between the daughter of the

Median monarch<sup>37</sup> and his own son by Cleopatra, Alexander, and, leaving garrisons in Armenia, carried off Artavasdes and a rich booty into Egypt.

Phraates, during these transactions, stood wholly upon the defensive. It may not have been displeasing to him to see Artavasdes punished. It must have gratified him to observe how Antony was injuring his own cause by exasperating the Armenians, and teaching them to hate Rome even more than they hated Parthia.<sup>38</sup> But while Antony's troops held both Syria and Armenia, and the alliance between Media Atropatêné and Rome continued, he could not venture to take any aggressive step or do aught but protect his own frontier. He was obliged even to look on with patience, when, early in B.C. 33, Antony appeared once more in these parts,<sup>39</sup> and advancing to the Araxes, had a conference with the Median monarch, whereat their alliance was confirmed, troops exchanged, part of Armenia made over to the Median king, and Jotapa, his daughter, given as a bride to the young Alexander, whom Antony designed to make satrap of the East.<sup>40</sup> But no sooner had Antony withdrawn into Asia Minor in preparation for his contest with Octavian than Phraates took the offensive. In combination with Artaxias, the new Armenian king, he attacked Antony's ally; but the latter repulsed him by the help of his Roman troops. Soon afterwards, however, Antony recalled these troops without restoring to the Median king his own contingent; upon which the two confederates renewed their attack, and were successful. The Median prince was defeated and taken prisoner.<sup>41</sup> Artaxias recovered Armenia and massacred all the Roman garrisons which he found in it.<sup>42</sup> Both countries became once more wholly independent of Rome, and it is probable that Media returned to its old allegiance.

But the successes of Phraates abroad produced ill consequences at home. Elated by his victories, and regarding his position in Parthia as thereby secured, he resumed the series of cruelties towards his subjects which the Roman war had interrupted, and pushed them so far that an insurrection broke out against his authority (B.C. 33), and he was compelled to quit the country.<sup>43</sup> The revolt was headed by a certain Tirdates, who, upon its success, was made king by the insurgents. Phraates fled into Scythia, and persuaded the Scythians to embrace his cause. These nomads, nothing loth, took up arms, and without any great difficulty restored Phraates to the

throne from which his people had expelled him. Tiridates fled at their approach, and, having contrived to carry off in his flight the youngest son of Phraates, presented himself before Octavian, who was in Syria at the time on his return from Egypt (B.C. 30),<sup>44</sup> surrendered the young prince into his hands, and requested his aid against the tyrant.<sup>45</sup> Octavian accepted the valuable hostage, but with his usual caution, declined to pledge himself to furnish any help to the pretender; he might remain, he said, in Syria, if he so wished, and while he continued under Roman protection, a suitable provision should be made for his support, but, he must not expect armed resistance against the Parthian monarch. To that monarch, when some years afterwards (B.C. 23) he demanded the surrender of his subject and the restoration of his young son, Octavian answered<sup>46</sup> that he could not give Tiridates up to him, but he would restore him his son without a ransom. He should expect, however, that in return for this kindness the Parthian king would on his part deliver to the Romans the standards taken from Crassus and Antony, together with all who survived of the Roman captives. It does not appear that Phraates was much moved by the Emperor's generosity. He gladly received his son; but he took no steps towards the restoration of those proofs of Parthian victory which the Romans were so anxious to recover. It was not until B.C. 20, when Octavian (now become Augustus) visited the East, and war seemed the probable alternative if he continued obstinate, that the Parthian monarch brought himself to relinquish the trophies which were as much prized by the victors as the vanquished.<sup>47</sup> In extenuation of his act we must remember that he was unpopular with his subjects, and that Augustus could at any moment have produced a pretender, who had once occupied, and with Roman help might easily have mounted for a second time, the throne of the Arsacidæ.

The remaining years of Phraates—and he reigned for nearly twenty years after restoring the standards—are almost unbroken by any event of importance. The result of the twenty years' struggle between Rome and Parthia had been to impress either nation with a wholesome dread of the other. Both had triumphed on their own ground; both had failed when they ventured on sending expeditions into the enemy's territory. Each now stood on its guard, watching the movements of its adversary across the Euphrates. Both had become pacific. It is a well-known fact that Augustus left it as a principle of

policy to his successors that the Roman Empire had reached its proper limits, and could not with advantage be extended further.<sup>48</sup> This principle, followed with the utmost strictness by Tiberius, was accepted as a rule by all the earlier Cæsars, and only regarded as admitting of rare and slight exceptions. Trajan was the first who, a hundred and thirty years after the accession of Augustus, made light of it and set it at defiance. With him re-awoke the spirit of conquest, the aspiration after universal dominion. But in the meantime there was peace—peace indeed not absolutely unbroken, for border wars occurred, and Rome was tempted sometimes to interfere by arms in the internal quarrels of her neighbor<sup>49</sup>—but a general state of peace and amity prevailed—neither state made any grand attack on the other's dominions—no change occurred in the frontier, no great battle tested the relative strength of the two peoples. Such rivalry as remained was exhibited less in arms than in diplomacy and showed itself mainly in endeavors on either side to obtain a predominant influence in Armenia. There alone during the century and a half that intervened between Antony and Trajan did the interests of Rome and Parthia come into collision, and in connection with this kingdom alone did any struggle between the two countries continue.

Phraates, after yielding to Augustus in the matter of the standards and prisoners, appears for many years to have studiously cultivated his good graces. In the interval between B.C. 11 and B.C. 7,<sup>50</sup> distrustful of his subjects, and fearful of their removing him in order to place one of his sons upon the Parthian throne, he resolved to send these possible rivals out of the country; and on this occasion he paid Augustus the compliment of selecting Rome for his children's residence.<sup>51</sup> The youths were four in number, Vonones, Seraspades, Rhodaspes, and Phraates;<sup>52</sup> two of them were married and had children; they resided at Rome during the remainder of their father's lifetime, and were treated as became their rank, being supported at the public charge and in a magnificent manner.<sup>53</sup> The Roman writers speak of these as "hostages" given by Phraates to the Roman Emperor;<sup>54</sup> but this was certainly not the intention of the Parthian monarch; nor could the idea well be entertained by the Romans at the time of their residence.

These amicable relations between the two sovereigns would probably have continued undisturbed till the death of one or

the other, had not a revolution occurred in Armenia, which tempted the Parthian king beyond his powers of resistance. On the death of Artaxias (B.C. 20), Augustus, who was then in the East, had sent Tiberius into Armenia to arrange matters, and Tiberius had placed upon the throne a brother of Artaxias, named Tigranes.<sup>55</sup> Tigranes died in B.C. 6, and the Armenians, without waiting to know the will of the Roman Emperor, conferred the royal title on his sons, for whose succession he had before his death paved the way by associating them with him in the government.<sup>56</sup> Enraged at this assumption of independence, Augustus sent an expedition into Armenia (B.C. 5), deposed the sons of Tigranes, and established on the throne a certain Artavasdes, whose birth and parentage are not known to us.<sup>57</sup> But the Armenians were not now inclined to submit to foreign dictation; they rose in revolt against Artavasdes (ab. B.C. 2), defeated his Roman supporters, and expelled him from the kingdom.<sup>58</sup> Another Tigranes was made king;<sup>59</sup> and, as it was pretty certain that the Romans would interfere with this new display of the spirit of independence, the Parthians were called in to resist the Roman oppressors. Armenia, was, in fact, too weak to stand alone, and was obliged to lean upon one or other of the two great empires upon her borders. Her people had no clear political foresight, and allowed themselves to veer and fluctuate between the two influences according as the feelings of the hour dictated. Rome had now angered them beyond their very limited powers of endurance, and they flew to Parthia for help, just as on other occasions we shall find them flying to Rome. Phraates could not bring himself to reject the Armenian overtures. Ever since the time of the second Mithridates it had been a settled maxim of Parthian policy to make Armenia dependent; and, even at the cost of a rupture with Rome, it seemed to Phraates that he must respond to the appeal made to him. The rupture might not come. Augustus was now aged, and might submit to the affront without resenting it. He had lately lost the services of his best general, Tiberius, who, indignant at slights put upon him, had gone into retirement at Rhodes. He had no one that he could employ but his grandsons, youths who had not yet fleshed their maiden swords. Phraates probably hoped that Augustus would draw back before the terrors of a Parthian war under such circumstances, and would allow without remonstrance the passing of Armenia into the position of a subject-ally of Parthia.

But if these were his thoughts, he had miscalculated. Augustus, from the time that he heard of the Armenian troubles, and of the support given to them by Parthia, seems never to have wavered in his determination to vindicate the claims of Rome to paramount influence in Armenia, and to have only hesitated as to the person whose services he should employ in the business. He would have been glad to employ Tiberius; but that morose prince had deserted him and, declining public life, had betaken himself to Rhodes, where he was living in a self-chosen retirement. Caius, the eldest of his grandsons, was, in B.C. 2, only eighteen years of age; and, though the thoughts of Augustus at once turned in this direction, the extreme youth of the prince caused him to hesitate somewhat; and the consequence was that Caius did not start for the East till late in B.C. 1. Meanwhile a change had occurred in Parthia. Phraates, who had filled the throne for above thirty-five years, ceased to exist,<sup>60</sup> and was succeeded by a young son, Phraataces, who reigned in conjunction with the queen-mother, Thermusa, or Musa.<sup>61</sup>

The circumstances which brought about this change were the following. Phraates IV. had married, late in life, an Italian slave-girl, sent him as a present by Augustus; and she had borne him a son for whom she was naturally anxious to secure the succession. According to some, it was under her influence that the monarch had sent his four elder boys to Rome, there to receive their education.<sup>62</sup> At any rate, in the absence of these youths, Phraataces, the child of the slave-girl, became the chief support of Phraates in the administration of affairs, and obtained a position in Parthia which led him to regard himself as entitled to the throne so soon as it should become vacant. Doubtful, however, of his father's goodwill, or fearful of the rival claims of his brothers, if he waited till the throne was vacated in the natural course of events, Phraataces resolved to anticipate the hand of time, and, in conjunction with his mother, administered poison to the old monarch,<sup>63</sup> from the effects of which he died. A just Nemesis for once showed itself in that portion of human affairs which passes before our eyes. Phraates IV., the parricide and fratricide, was, after a reign of thirty-five years, himself assassinated (B. C. 2) by a wife whom he loved only too fondly and a son whom he esteemed and trusted.

Phraates cannot but be regarded as one of the ablest of the Parthian monarchs. His conduct of the campaign against

Antony—one of the best soldiers that Rome ever produced—was admirable, and showed him a master of guerilla warfare. His success in maintaining himself upon the throne for five and thirty years, in spite of rivals, and notwithstanding the character which he obtained for cruelty, implies, in such a state as Parthia, considerable powers of management. His dealings with Augustus indicate much suppleness and dexterity. If he did not in the course of his long reign advance the Parthian frontier, at any rate he was not obliged to retract it. Apparently, he ceded nothing to the Scyths as the price of their assistance. He maintained the Parthian supremacy over Northern Media. He lost no inch of territory to the Romans. It was undoubtedly a prudent step on his part to soothe the irritated vanity of Rome by a surrender of useless trophies, and scarcely more useful prisoners; and, we may doubt if this concession was not as effective as the dread of the Parthian arms in producing that peace between the two countries which continued unbroken for above ninety years from the campaign of Antony,<sup>64</sup> and without serious interruption for yet another half century.<sup>65</sup> If Phraates felt, as he might well feel after the campaigns of Pacorus, that on the whole Rome was a more powerful state than Parthia, and that consequently Parthia had nothing to gain but much to lose in the contest with her western neighbor, he did well to allow no sentiment of foolish pride to stand in the way of a concession that made a prolonged peace between the two countries possible. It is sometimes more honorable to yield to a demand than to meet it with defiance; and the prince who removed a cause of war arising out of mere national vanity, while at the same time he maintained in all essential points the interests and dignity of his kingdom, deserved well of his subjects, and merits the approval of the historian. As a man, Phraates has left behind him a bad name: he was cruel, selfish, and ungrateful, a fratricide and a parricide; but as a king he is worthy of respect, and, in certain points, of admiration.

## CHAPTER XIV.

*Short reigns of Phraataces, Orodes II., and Vonones I. Accession of Artabanus III. His relations with Germanicus and Tiberius. His War with Pharasmanes of Iberia. His First Expulsion from his Kingdom, and return to it. His peace with Rome. Internal troubles of the Parthian Kingdom. Second Expulsion and return of Artabanus. His Death.*

"Mota Orientis regna, provinciæque Romanæ, initio apud Parthos orto."

Tacit. *Ann.* ii. 1.

THE accession of Phraataces made no difference in the attitude of Parthia towards Armenia. The young prince was as anxious as his father had been to maintain the Parthian claims to that country, and at first perhaps as inclined to believe that Augustus would not dispute them. Immediately upon his accession he sent ambassadors to Rome announcing the fact, apologizing for the circumstances under which it had taken place, and proposing a renewal of the peace which had subsisted between Augustus and his father.<sup>1</sup> Apparently, he said nothing about Armenia, but preferred a demand for the surrender of his four brothers, whom no doubt he designed to destroy. The answer of Augustus was severe in the extreme. Addressing Phraataces by his bare name, without adding the title of king, he required him to lay aside the royal appellation, which he had arrogantly and without any warrant assumed, and at the same time to withdraw his forces from Armenia.<sup>2</sup> On the surrender of the Parthian princes he kept silence, ignoring a demand which he had no intention of acceding to. It was clearly his design to set up one of the elder brothers as a rival claimant to Phraataces, or at any rate to alarm him with the notion that, unless he made concessions, this policy would be adopted. But Phraataces was not to be frightened by a mere message. He responded to Augustus after his own fashion, dispatching to him a letter wherein he took to himself the favorite Parthian title of "king of kings," and addressed the Roman Emperor simply as "Cæsar."<sup>3</sup> The attitude of defiance would no doubt have been maintained, had Augustus confined himself to menaces; when, however, it

appeared that active measures would be taken, when Augustus, in B.C. 1, sent his grandson, Caius, to the East with orders to re-establish the Roman influence in Armenia even at the cost of a Parthian war, and that prince showed himself in Syria with all the magnificent surroundings of the Imperial dignity, the Parthian monarch became alarmed. He had an interview with Caius in the spring of A.D. 1, upon an island in the Euphrates;<sup>4</sup> where the terms of an arrangement between the two Empires were discussed and settled. The armies of the two chiefs were drawn up on the opposite banks of the river, facing one another; and the chiefs themselves, accompanied by an equal number of attendants, proceeded to deliberate in the sight of both hosts. Satisfactory pledges having been given by the Parthian monarch, the prince and king in turn entertained each other on the borders of their respective dominions;<sup>5</sup> and Caius returned into Syria, having obtained an engagement from the Parthians to abstain from any further interference with Armenian affairs.<sup>6</sup> The engagement appears to have been honorably kept; for when, shortly afterward, fresh complications occurred, and Caius in endeavoring to settle them received his death-wound before the walls of an Armenian tower,<sup>7</sup> we do not hear of Parthia as in any way involved in the unfortunate occurrence. The Romans and their partisans in the country were left to settle the Armenian succession as they pleased; and Parthia kept herself wholly aloof from the matters transacted upon her borders.

One cause—perhaps the main cause—of this abstinence, and of the engagement to abstain entered into by Phraataces, was doubtless the unsettled state of things in Parthia itself.<sup>8</sup> The circumstances under which that prince had made himself king, though not unparalleled in the Parthian annals, were such as naturally tended towards civil strife, and as were apt to produce in Parthia internal difficulties, if not disorders or commotions. Phraataces soon found that he would have a hard task to establish his rule. The nobles objected to him, not only for the murder of his father, but his descent from an Italian concubine, and the incestuous commerce which he was supposed to maintain with her.<sup>9</sup> They had perhaps grounds for this last charge. At any rate Phraataces provoked suspicion by the singular favors and honors which he granted to a woman whose origin was mean and extraction foreign. Not content with private marks of esteem and love, he departed from the practice of all former Parthian sovereigns<sup>10</sup> in placing

her effigy upon his coins; and he accompanied this act with fulsome and absurd titles. Musa was styled, not merely "Queen," but "Heavenly Goddess,"<sup>11</sup> as if the realities of slave origin and concubinage could be covered by the fiction of an apotheosis. It is not surprising that the proud Parthian nobles were offended by these proceedings, and determined to rid themselves of a monarch whom they at once hated and despised. Within a few years of his obtaining the throne an insurrection broke out against his authority; and after a brief struggle he was deprived of his crown and put to death.<sup>12</sup> The nobles then elected an Arsacid, named Orodes, whose residence at the time and relationship to the former monarchs are uncertain. It seems probable<sup>13</sup> that, like most princes of the blood royal, he had taken refuge in a foreign country from the suspicions and dangers that beset all possible pretenders to the royal dignity in Parthia, and was living in retirement, unexpectant of any such offer, when a deputation of Parthian nobles arrived and brought him the intelligence of his election. It might have been expected that, obtaining the crown under these circumstances, he would have ruled well; but, according to Josephus (who is here, unfortunately, our sole authority), he very soon displayed so much violence and cruelty of disposition that his rule was felt to be intolerable; and the Parthians, again breaking into insurrection, rid themselves of him, killing him either at a banquet or on a hunting excursion.<sup>14</sup> This done, they sent to Rome, and requested Augustus to allow Vonones, the eldest son of Phraates IV., to return to Parthia in order that he might receive his father's kingdom.<sup>15</sup> The Emperor complied readily enough, since he regarded his own dignity as advanced by the transaction; and the Parthians at first welcomed the object of their choice with rejoicings. But after a little time their sentiments altered. The young prince, bred up in Rome, and accustomed to the refinements of Western civilization, neglected the occupations which seemed to his subjects alone worthy of a monarch's regard, absented himself from the hunting-field, took small pleasure in riding, when he passed through the streets indulged in the foreign luxury of a litter, shrank with disgust from the rude and coarse feastings which formed a portion of the national manners. He had, moreover, brought with him from the place of his exile a number of Greek companions, whom the Parthians despised and ridiculed; and the favors bestowed on these foreign interlopers were seen with jealousy and rage. It

was in vain that he endeavored to conciliate his offended subjects by the openness of his manners and the facility with which he allowed access to his person. In their prejudiced eyes virtues and graces unknown to the nation hitherto were not merits but defects,<sup>16</sup> and rather increased than diminished their aversion. Having conceived a dislike for the monarch personally, they began to look back with dissatisfaction on their own act in sending for him. "Parthia," they said, "had indeed degenerated from her former self to have requested a king to be sent her who belonged to another world and had had a hostile civilization ingrained into him. All the glory gained by destroying Crassus and repulsing Antony was utterly lost and gone, if the country was to be ruled by Cæsar's bond-slave, and the throne of the Arsacidæ to be treated like a Roman province. It would have been bad enough to have had a prince imposed on them by the will of a superior, if they had been conquered; it was worse, in all respects worse, to suffer such an insult, when they had not even had war made on them." Under the influence of such feelings as these, the Parthians, after tolerating Vonones for a few years, rose against him (ab. A.D. 16), and summoned Artabanus, an Arsacid who had grown to manhood among the Dahæ of the Caspian region, but was at this time king of Media Atropatêné, to rule over them.<sup>17</sup>

It was seldom that a crown was declined in the ancient world; and Artabanus, on receiving the overture, at once expressed his willingness to accept the proffered dignity. He invaded Parthia at the head of an army consisting of his own subjects, and engaged Vonones, to whom in his difficulties the bulk of the Parthian people had rallied. The engagement resulted in the defeat of the Median monarch,<sup>18</sup> who returned to his own country, and, having collected a larger army, made a second invasion. This time he was successful. Vonones fled on horseback to Seleucia with a small body of followers; while his defeated army, following in his track, was pressed upon by the victorious Mede, and suffered great losses. Artabanus, having entered Ctesiphon in triumph, was immediately proclaimed king.<sup>19</sup> Vonones, escaping from Seleucia, took refuge among the Armenians; and, as it happened that just at this time the Armenian throne was vacant, not only was an asylum granted him, but he was made king of the country.<sup>20</sup> It was impossible that Artabanus should tamely submit to an arrangement which would have placed his deadly enemy in a position to cause him

constant annoyance. He, therefore, at once remonstrated, both in Armenia and at Rome. As Rome now claimed the investiture of the Armenian monarchs, he sent an embassy to Tiberius, and threatened war if Vonones were acknowledged; while at the same time he applied to Armenia and required the surrender of the refugee. An important section of the Armenian nation was inclined to grant his demand;<sup>21</sup> Tiberius, who would willingly have supported Vonones, drew back before the Parthian threats;<sup>22</sup> Vonones found himself in imminent danger, and, under the circumstances, determined on quitting Armenia and betaking himself to the protection of the Roman governor of Syria. This was Creticus Silanus, who received him gladly, gave him a guard, and allowed him the state and title of king.<sup>23</sup> Meanwhile Artabanus laid claim to Armenia, and suggested as a candidate for the throne one of his own sons, Orodes.<sup>24</sup>


Under these circumstances, the Roman Emperor, Tiberius, who had recently succeeded Augustus, resolved to despatch to the East a personage of importance, who should command the respect and attention of the Oriental powers by his dignity, and impose upon them by the pomp and splendor with which he was surrounded. He selected for this office Germanicus, his nephew, the eldest son of his deceased brother, Drusus, a prince of much promise, amiable in his disposition, courteous and affable in his manners, a good soldier, and a man generally popular. The more to strike the minds of the Orientals, he gave Germanicus no usual title or province, but invested him with an extraordinary command over all the Roman dominions to the east of the Hellespont,<sup>25</sup> thus rendering him a sort of monarch of Roman Asia. Full powers were granted him for making peace or war, for levying troops, annexing provinces, appointing subject kings, and performing other sovereign acts, without referring back to Rome for instructions. A train of unusual magnificence accompanied him to his charge, calculated to impress the Orientals with the conviction that this was no common negotiator. Germanicus arrived in Asia early in A.D. 18, and applied himself at once to his task. Entering Armenia at the head of his troops, he proceeded to the capital, Artaxata,<sup>26</sup> and, having ascertained the wishes of the Armenians themselves, determined on his course of conduct. To have insisted on the restoration of Vonones would have been grievously to offend the Armenians who had expelled him, and at the same time to provoke the Parthians, who could not have tolerated a pretender in a position of power upon their borders;

to have allowed the pretensions of the Parthian monarch, and accepted the candidature of his son, Orodes, would have lowered Rome in the opinion of all the surrounding nations, and been equivalent to an abdication of all influence in the affairs of Western Asia. Germanicus avoided either extreme, and found happily a middle course. It happened that there was a foreign prince settled in Armenia, who having grown up there had assimilated himself in all respects to the Armenian ideas and habits, and had thereby won golden opinions from both the nobles and the people. This was Zeno, the son of Polemo, once king of the curtailed Pontus, and afterwards of the Lesser Armenia,<sup>27</sup> an outlying Roman dependency. The Armenians themselves suggested that Zeno should be their monarch; and Germanicus saw a way out of his difficulties in the suggestion. At the seat of government, Artaxata, in the presence of a vast multitude of the people, with the consent and approval of the principal nobles, he placed with his own hand the diadem on the brow of the favored prince, and saluted him as king under the new name of "Artaxias."<sup>28</sup> He then returned into Syria, where he was shortly afterwards visited by ambassadors from the Parthian monarch.<sup>29</sup> Artabanus reminded him of the peace concluded between Rome and Parthia in the reign of Augustus, and assumed that the circumstances of his own appointment to the throne had in no way interfered with it. He would be glad, he said, to renew with Germanicus the interchange of friendly assurances which had passed between his predecessor, Phraataces, and Caius; and to accommodate the Roman general, he would willingly come to meet him as far as the Euphrates; meanwhile, until the meeting could take place, he must request that Vonones should be removed to a greater distance from the Parthian frontier, and that he should not be allowed to continue the correspondence in which he was engaged with many of the Parthian nobles for the purpose of raising fresh troubles. Germanicus replied politely, but indefinitely, to the proposal of an interview, which he may have thought unnecessary, and open to misconstruction. To the request for the removal of Vonones he consented.<sup>30</sup> Vonones was transferred from Syria to the neighboring province of Cilicia; and the city of Pompeiopolis, built by the great Pompey on the site of the ancient Soli, was assigned to him as his residence. With this arrangement the Parthian monarch appears to have been contented. Vonones on the other hand was so dissatisfied with the change that in the course of the next year (A.D. 19) he




Parthian bas relief of a Magus (after Flandin and Coste).

Fig. 2.




Parthian King, from a coin.

Fig. 3.



Parthian King, from an early coin.

Fig. 1



Parthian bas-relief (after Fiandin and Coste).

endeavored to make his escape; his flight was, however, discovered, and, pursuit being made, he was overtaken and slain on the banks of the Pyramus.<sup>31</sup> Thus perished ingloriously one of the least blamable and most unfortunate of the Parthian princes.

After the death of Germanicus, in A.D. 19, the details of the Parthian history are for some years unknown to us. It appears that during this interval Artabanus [Pl. II. Fig. 5.] was engaged in wars with several of the nations upon his borders,<sup>32</sup> and met with so much success that he came after a while to desire, rather than fear, a rupture with Rome. He knew that Tiberius was now an old man,<sup>33</sup> and that he was disinclined to engage in distant wars; he was aware that Germanicus was dead; and he was probably not much afraid of L. Vitellius, the governor of Syria, who had been recently deputed by Tiberius to administer that province.<sup>34</sup> Accordingly in A.D. 34, the Armenian throne being once more vacant by the death of Artaxias (Zeno), he suddenly seized the country, and appointed his eldest son, whom Dio and Tacitus call simply Arsaces,<sup>35</sup> to be king. At the same time he sent ambassadors to require the restoration of the treasure which Vonones had carried off from Parthia and had left behind him in Syria or Cilicia. To this plain and definite demand were added certain vague threats, or boasts, to the effect that he was the rightful master of all the territory that had belonged of old to Macedonia or Persia, and that it was his intention to resume possession of the provinces, whereto, as the representative of Cyrus and Alexander, he was entitled.<sup>36</sup> He is said to have even commenced operations against Cappadocia,<sup>37</sup> which was an actual portion of the Roman Empire, when he found that Tiberius, so far from resenting the seizure of Armenia, had sent instructions to Vitellius, that he was to cultivate peaceful relations with Parthia.<sup>38</sup> Apparently he thought that a good opportunity had arisen for picking a quarrel with his Western neighbor, and was determined to take advantage of it. The aged despot, hidden in his retreat of Capreæ, seemed to him a pure object of contempt; and he entertained the confident hope of defeating his armies and annexing portions of his territory.

But Tiberius was under no circumstances a man to be wholly despised. Simultaneously with the Parthian demands and threats intelligence reached him that the subjects of Artabanus were greatly dissatisfied with his rule, and that it would be easy by fomenting the discontent to bring about a

revolution.<sup>39</sup> Some of the nobles even went in person to Rome (A.D. 35), and suggested that if Phraates, one of the surviving sons of Phraates IV., were to appear under Roman protection upon the banks of the Euphrates, an insurrection would immediately break out. Artabanus, they said, among his other cruelties had put to death almost all the adult males of the Arsacid family; a successful revolution could not be hoped for without an Arsacid leader; if Tiberius, however, would deliver to them the prince for whom they asked, this difficulty would be removed, and there was then every reason to expect a happy issue to the rebellion. The Emperor was not hard to persuade; he no doubt argued that, whatever became of the attempt and those engaged in it, one result at least was certain—Artabanus would find plenty of work to occupy him at home, and would desist from his foreign aggressions. He therefore let Phraates take his departure and proceed to Syria, glad to meet the danger which had threatened him by craft and policy rather than by force of arms.<sup>40</sup>

Artabanus soon became aware of the intrigue. He found that the chief conspirators in Parthia were a certain Sinnaces, a nobleman distinguished alike for his high birth and his great riches, and a eunuch named Abdus, who held a position about the court, and was otherwise a personage of importance. It would have been easy to seize these two men, and execute them; but Artabanus was uncertain how far the conspiracy extended, and thought it most prudent to defer bringing matters to a crisis. He therefore dissembled, and was content to cause a delay, first by administering to Abdus a slow poison, and then by engaging Sinnaces so constantly in affairs of state that he had little or no time to devote to plotting. Successful thus far by his own cunning and dexterity, he was further helped by a stroke of good fortune, on which he could not have calculated. Phraates, who thought that after forty years of residence in Rome it was necessary to fit himself for the position of Parthian king by resuming the long-disused habits of his nation, was carried off, after a short residence in Syria, by a disease which he was supposed to have contracted through the change in his mode of life.<sup>41</sup> His death must for the time have paralyzed the conspirators, and have greatly relieved Artabanus. It was perhaps now, under the stimulus of a sudden change from feelings of extreme alarm to fancied security, that he wrote the famous letter to Tiberius, in which

he reproached him for his cruelty, cowardice, and luxuriousness of living, and recommended him to satisfy the just desires of the subjects who hated him by an immediate suicide.<sup>42</sup>

This letter, if genuine, must be pronounced under any circumstances a folly; and if really sent at this time, it may have had tragical consequences. It is remarkable that Tiberius, on learning the death of Phraates, instead of relaxing, intensified his efforts. Not only did he at once send out to Syria another pretender, Tiridates, a nephew of the deceased prince,<sup>43</sup> in order to replace him, but he made endeavors, such as we do not hear of before, to engage other nations in the struggle;<sup>44</sup> and further, he enlarged the commission of Vitellius, giving him a general superintendence over the affairs of the East. Thus Artabanus found himself in greater peril than ever, and if he had really indulged in the silly effusion ascribed to him was rightly punished. Pharasmanes, king of Iberia, a portion of the modern Georgia, incited by Tiberius, took the field (A.D. 35), and proclaimed his intention of placing his brother, Mithridates, on the Armenian throne.<sup>45</sup> Having by corruption succeeded in bringing about the murder of Arsaces by his attendants,<sup>46</sup> he marched into Armenia, and became master of the capital without meeting any resistance. Artabanus, upon this, sent his son Orodes to maintain the Parthian cause in the disputed province; but he proved no match for the Iberian, who was superior in numbers, in the variety of his troops, and in familiarity with the localities. Pharasmanes had obtained the assistance of his neighbors, the Albanians, and, opening the passes of the Caucasus, had admitted through them a number of the Scythic or Sarmatian hordes,<sup>47</sup> who were always ready, when their swords were hired, to take a part in the quarrels of the south. Orodes was unable to procure either mercenaries or allies,<sup>48</sup> and had to contend unassisted against the three enemies who had joined their forces to oppose him. For some time he prudently declined an engagement; but it was difficult to restrain the ardor of his troops, whom the enemy exasperated by their reproaches.<sup>49</sup> After a while he was compelled to accept the battle which Pharasmanes incessantly offered. His force consisted entirely of cavalry, while Pharasmanes had besides his horse a powerful body of infantry. The battle was nevertheless stoutly contested; and the victory might have been doubtful, had it not happened that in a hand-to-hand combat between the two

commanders Orodes was struck to the ground by his antagonist, and thought by most of his own men to be killed.<sup>50</sup> As usual under such circumstances in the East, a rout followed. If we may believe Josephus,<sup>51</sup> "many tens of thousands" were slain. Armenia was wholly lost; and Artabanus found himself left with diminished resources and tarnished fame to meet the intrigues of his domestic enemies.

Still, he would not succumb without an effort. In the spring of A.D. 36, having levied the whole force of the Empire, he took the field and marched northwards, determined, if possible, to revenge himself on the Iberians and recover his lost province.<sup>52</sup> But his first efforts were unsuccessful; and before he could renew them Vitellius put himself at the head of his legions, and marching towards the Euphrates threatened Mesopotamia with invasion. Placed thus between two fires, the Parthian monarch felt that he had no choice but to withdraw from Armenia and return to the defence of his own proper territories, which in his absence must have lain temptingly open to an enemy. His return caused Vitellius to change his tactics. Instead of measuring his strength against that which still remained to Artabanus, he resumed the weapon of intrigue so dear to his master, and proceeded by a lavish expenditure of money<sup>53</sup> to excite disaffection once more among the Parthian nobles. This time conspiracy was successful. The military disasters of the last two years had alienated from Artabanus the affections of those whom his previous cruelties had failed to disgust or alarm; and he found himself without any armed force whereon he could rely, beyond a small body of foreign guards which he maintained about his person. It seemed to him that his only safety was in flight; and accordingly he quitted his capital and removed himself hastily into Hyrcania, which was in the immediate vicinity of the Scythian Dahæ, among whom he had been brought up. Here the natives were friendly to him, and he lived a retired life, waiting (as he said) until the Parthians, who could judge an absent prince with equity, though they could not long continue faithful to a present one, should repent of their behavior to him.<sup>54</sup>

Upon learning the flight of Artabanus, Vitellius advanced to the banks of the Euphrates, and introduced Tiridates into his kingdom.<sup>55</sup> Fortunate omens were said to have accompanied the passage of the river; and these were followed by adhesions of greater importance. Ornospadès, satrap of Mesopotamia, was

the first to join the standard of the pretender with a large body of horse. He was followed by the conspirator Sinnaces, his father Abdageses, the keeper of the king's treasures, and other personages of high position. The Greek cities in Mesopotamia readily opened their gates to a monarch long domiciled at Rome, from whom they expected a politeness and refinement that would harmonize better with their feelings than the manners of the late king, bred up among the uncivilized Scyths. Parthian towns, like Halus and Artemita,<sup>56</sup> followed their example. Seleucia, the second city in the Empire, received the new monarch with an obsequiousness that bordered on adulation.<sup>57</sup> Not content with paying him all customary royal honors, they appended to their acclamations disparaging remarks upon his predecessor, whom they affected to regard as the issue of an adulterous intrigue, and as no true Arsacid. Tiridates was pleased to reward the unseemly flattery of these degenerate Greeks by a new arrangement of their constitution. Hitherto they had lived under the government of a Senate of Three Hundred members, the wisest and wealthiest of the citizens, a certain control being, however, secured to the people. Artabanus had recently modified the constitution in an aristocratic sense; and therefore Tiridates pursued the contrary course, and established an unbridled democracy in the place of a mixed government. He then entered Ctesiphon, the capital, and after waiting some days for certain noblemen, who had expressed a wish to attend his coronation but continually put off their coming, he was crowned in the ordinary manner by the Surena of the time being, in the sight and amid the acclamations of a vast multitude.

The pretender now regarded his work as completed, and forbore any further efforts. The example of the Western provinces would, he assumed, be followed by the Eastern, and the monarch approved by Mesopotamia, Babylonia, and the capital would carry, as a matter of course, the rest of the nation. Policy required that the general acquiescence should not have been taken for granted. Tiridates should have made a military progress through the East, no less than the West,<sup>58</sup> and have sought out his rival in the distant Hyrcania, and slain him, or driven him beyond the borders. Instead of thus occupying himself, he was content to besiege a stronghold where Artabanus had left his treasure and his harem. This conduct was imprudent; and the imprudence cost him his crown. That fickle temper which Artabanus had noted in

his countrymen began to work so soon as the new king was well installed in his office; the coveted post of chief vizier could but be assigned to one, and the selection of the fortunate individual was the disappointment of a host of expectants; nobles absent from the coronation, whether by choice or necessity, began to be afraid that their absence would cost them dear, when Tiridates had time to reflect upon it and to listen to their detractors. The thoughts of the malcontents turned towards their dethroned monarch; and emissaries were despatched to seek him out, and put before him the project of a restoration. He was found in Hyrcania, in a miserable dress and plight, living on the produce of his bow. At first he suspected the messengers, believing that their intention was to seize him and deliver him up to Tiridates; but it was not long ere they persuaded him that, whether their affection for himself were true or feigned, their enmity to Tiridates was real.<sup>59</sup> They had indeed no worse charges to bring against this prince than his youth, and the softness of his Roman breeding; but they were evidently in earnest, and had committed themselves too deeply to make it possible for them to retract. Artabanus, therefore, accepted their offers, and having obtained the services of a body of Dahæ and other Scyths,<sup>60</sup> proceeded westward, retaining the miserable garb and plight in which he had been found, in order to draw men to his side by pity; and making all haste, in order that his enemies might have less opportunity to prepare obstructions and his friends less time to change their minds. He reached the neighborhood of Ctesiphon while Tiridates was still doubting what he should do, distracted between the counsels of some who recommended an immediate engagement with the rebels before they recovered from the fatigues of their long march or grew accustomed to act together, and of others who advised a retreat into Mesopotamia, reliance upon the Armenians and other tribes of the north,<sup>61</sup> and a union with the Roman troops, which Vitellius, on the first news of what had happened, had thrown across the Euphrates. The more timid counsel had the support of Abdageses, whom Tiridates had made his vizier, and therefore naturally prevailed, the prince himself being moreover of an unwarlike temper. It had, in appearance, much to recommend it; and if its execution had been in the hands of Occidentals might have succeeded. But, in the East, the first movement in retreat is taken as a confession of weakness and almost as an act of despair: an order to retire is regarded as a direction

to fly. No sooner was the Tigris crossed and the march through Mesopotamia began, than the host of Tiridates melted away like an iceberg in the Gulf Stream. The tribes of the Desert set the example of flight;<sup>62</sup> and in a little time almost the whole army had dispersed, drawing off either to the camp of the enemy or to their homes. Tiridates reached the Euphrates with a mere handful of followers, and crossing into Syria found himself once more safe under the protection of the Romans.

The flight of Tiridates gave Parthia back into the hands of its former ruler. Artabanus reoccupied the throne, apparently without having to fight a battle.<sup>63</sup> He seems, however, not to have felt himself strong enough either to resume his designs upon Armenia, or to retaliate in any way upon the Romans for their support of Tiridates. Mithridates, the Iberian, was left in quiet possession of the Armenian kingdom, and Vitellius found himself unmolested on the Euphrates. Tiberius, however, was anxious that the war with Parthia should be formally terminated, and, having failed in his attempts to fill the Parthian throne with a Roman nominee, was ready to acknowledge Artabanus, and eager to enter into a treaty with him. He instructed Vitellius to this effect;<sup>64</sup> and that officer (late in A.D. 36 or early in A.D. 37), having invited Artabanus to an interview on the Euphrates,<sup>65</sup> persuaded him to terms which were regarded by the Romans as highly honorable to themselves, though Artabanus probably did not feel them to be degrading to Parthia. Peace and amity were re-established between the two nations. Rome, it may be assumed, undertook to withhold her countenance from all pretenders to the Parthian throne, and Parthia withdrew her claims upon Armenia. Artabanus was persuaded to send his son, Darius, with some other Parthians of rank, to Rome, and was thus regarded by the Romans as having given hostages for his good behavior.<sup>66</sup> He was also induced to throw a few grains of frankincense on the sacrificial fire which burnt in front of the Roman standards and the Imperial images, an act which was accepted at Rome as one of submission and homage.<sup>67</sup> The terms and circumstances of the peace did not become known in Italy till Tiberius had been succeeded by Caligula (March, A.D. 37).<sup>68</sup> When known, they gave great satisfaction, and were regarded as glorious alike to the negotiator, Vitellius, and to the prince whom he represented. The false report was spread that the Parthian monarch had granted to the new Cæsar what his

contempt and hatred would have caused him to refuse to Tiberius; and the inclination of the Romans towards their young sovereign was intensified by the ascription to him of a diplomatic triumph which belonged of right to his predecessor.

Contemporaneously with the troubles which have been above described, but reaching down, it would seem, a few years beyond them, were other disturbances of a peculiar character in one of the Western provinces of the Empire. The Jewish element in the population of Western Asia had been one of importance from a date anterior to the rise, not only of the Parthian, but even of the Persian Empire. Dispersed colonies of Jews were to be found in Babylonia, Armenia, Media, Susiana, Mesopotamia, and probably in other Parthian provinces.<sup>68</sup> These colonies dated from the time of Nebuchadnezzar's captivity, and exhibited everywhere the remarkable tendency of the Jewish race to an increase disproportionate to that of the population among which they are settled. The Jewish element became perpetually larger and more important in Babylonia and Mesopotamia, in spite of the draughts which were made upon it by Seleucus and other Syrian princes.<sup>69</sup> Under the Parthians, it would seem that the Mesopotamian Jews enjoyed generally the same sort of toleration, and the same permission to exercise a species of self-government, which Jews and Christians enjoy now in many parts of Turkey. They formed a recognized community, had some cities which were entirely their own, possessed a common treasury, and from time to time sent up to Jerusalem the offerings of the people under the protection of a convoy of 30,000 or 40,000 men.<sup>70</sup> The Parthian kings treated them well, and no doubt valued them as a counterpoise to the disaffected Greeks and Syrians of this part of their Empire. They had no grievance of which to complain, and it might have been thought very unlikely that any troubles would arise in connection with them; but circumstances seemingly trivial threw the whole community into commotion, and led on to disasters of a very lamentable character.

Two young Jews, Asinai and Anilai, brothers, natives of Nearda, the city in which the treasury of the community was established, upon suffering some ill-treatment at the hands of the manufacturer who employed them, gave up their trade, and, withdrawing to a marshy district between two arms of the Euphrates, made up their minds to live by robbery.<sup>72</sup> A band of needy youths soon gathered about them, and they became

the terror of the entire neighborhood. They exacted a blackmail from the peaceable population of shepherds and others who lived near them, made occasional plundering raids to a distance, and required an acknowledgment (*bakhshish*) from travellers. Their doings having become notorious, the satrap of Babylonia marched against them with an army, intending to surprise them on the Sabbath, when it was supposed that they would not fight; but his approach was discovered, it was determined to disregard the obligation of Sabbatical rest, and the satrap was himself surprised and completely defeated. Artabanus, having heard of the disaster, made overtures to the brothers, and, after receiving a visit from them at his court, assigned to Asinai, the elder of the two, the entire government of the Babylonian satrapy. The experiment appeared at first to have completely succeeded. Asinai governed the province with prudence and zeal, and for fifteen years<sup>73</sup> no complaint was made against his administration. But at the end of this time the lawless temper, held in restraint for so long, reasserted itself, not, indeed, in Asinai, but in his brother. Anilai fell in love with the wife of a Parthian magnate, commander (apparently) of the Parthian troops stationed in Babylonia, and, seeing no other way of obtaining his wishes, made war upon the chieftain and killed him. He then married the object of his affections, and might perhaps have been content; but the Jews under Asinai's government remonstrated against the idolatries which the Parthian woman had introduced into a Jewish household, and prevailed on Asinai to require that she should be divorced. His compliance with their wishes proved fatal to him, for the woman, fearing the consequences, contrived to poison Asinai; and the authority which he had wielded passed into the hands of Anilai, without (so far as we hear) any fresh appointment from the Parthian monarch. Anilai had, it appears, no instincts but those of a freebooter, and he was no sooner settled in the government than he proceeded to indulge them by attacking the territory of a neighboring satrap, Mithridates, who was not only a Parthian of high rank, but had married one of the daughters of Artabanus. Mithridates flew to arms to defend his province; but Anilai fell upon his encampment in the night, completely routed his troops, and took Mithridates himself prisoner. Having subjected him to a gross indignity,<sup>74</sup> he was nevertheless afraid to put him to death, lest the Parthian king should avenge the slaughter of his relative on the Jews of Babylon. Mithridates was conse-

quently released, and returned to his wife, who was so indignant at the insult whereto he had been subjected that she left him no peace till he collected a second army and resumed the war. Analai was no ways daunted. Quitting his stronghold in the marshes, he led his troops a distance of ten miles through a hot and dry plain to meet the enemy, thus unnecessarily exhausting them, and exposing them to the attack of their enemies under the most unfavorable circumstances. He was of course defeated with loss; but he himself escaped and revenged himself by carrying fire and sword over the lands of the Babylonians, who had hitherto lived peaceably under his protection. The Babylonians sent to Nearda and demanded his surrender; but the Jews of Nearda, even if they had had the will, had no power to comply. A pretence was then made of arranging matters by negotiation; but the Babylonians, having in this way obtained a knowledge of the position which Anilai and his troops occupied, fell upon them in the night, when they were all either drunk or asleep, and at one stroke exterminated the whole band.

Thus far no great calamity had occurred. Two Jewish robber-chiefs had been elevated into the position of Parthian satraps; and the result had been, first, fifteen years of peace, and then a short civil war, ending in the destruction of the surviving chief and the annihilation of the band of marauders. But the lamentable consequences of the commotion were now to show themselves. The native Babylonians had always looked with dislike on the Jewish colony, and occasions of actual collision between the two bodies had not been wholly wanting.<sup>75</sup> The circumstances of the existing time seemed to furnish a good excuse for an outbreak; and scarcely were Anilai and his followers destroyed, when the Jews of Babylon were set upon by their native fellow-citizens. Unable to make an effectual resistance, they resolved to retire from the place, and, at the immense loss which such a migration necessarily costs, they quitted Babylon and transferred themselves in great numbers to Seleucia. Here they lived quietly for five years (about A.D. 34-39), but in the sixth year (A.D. 40) fresh troubles broke out. The remnant of the Jews at Babylon were assailed, either by their old enemies or by a pestilence,<sup>76</sup> and took refuge at Seleucia with their brethren. It happened that at Seleucia there was a feud of long standing between the Syrian population and the Greeks. The Jews naturally joined the Syrians, who were a kindred race, and the two together brought the

Greeks under; whereupon these last contrived to come to terms with the Syrians, and persuaded them to join in an attack on the late allies. Against the combined Greeks and Syrians the Jews were powerless, and in the massacre which ensued they lost above 50,000 men. The remnant withdrew to Ctesiphon; but even there the malice of their enemies pursued them, and the persecution was only brought to an end by their quitting the metropolitan cities altogether, and withdrawing to the provincial towns of which they were the sole occupants.<sup>77</sup>

The narrative of these events derives its interest, not so much from any sympathy that we can feel with any of the actors in it as from the light which it throws upon the character of the Parthian rule, and the condition of the countries under Parthian government. In the details given we seem once more to trace a near resemblance between the Parthian system and that of the Turks; we seem to see thrown back into the mirror of the past an image of those terrible conflicts and disorders which have passed before our own eyes in Syria and the Lebanon while under acknowledged Turkish sovereignty. The picture has the same features of antipathies of race unsoftened by time and contact, of perpetual feud bursting out into occasional conflict, of undying religious animosities, of strange combinations, of fearful massacres, and of a government looking tamely on, and allowing things for the most part to take their course. We see how utterly the Parthian system failed to blend together or amalgamate the conquered peoples; and not only so, but how impotent it was even to effect the first object of a government, the securing of peace and tranquillity within its borders. If indeed it were necessary to believe that the picture brought before us represented truthfully the *normal* condition of the people and countries with which it is concerned, we should be forced to conclude that Parthian government was merely another name for anarchy, and that it was only good fortune that preserved the empire from falling to pieces at this early date, within two centuries of its establishment. But there is reason to believe that the reign of Artabanus III. represents, not the normal, but an exceptional state of things—a state of things which could only arise in Parthia when the powers of government were relaxed in consequence of rebellion and civil war.<sup>79</sup> We must remember that Artabanus was actually twice driven from his kingdom, and that during the greater part of his reign he lived in perpetual fear of revolt and insurrection. It is not improbable that the cul-

minating atrocities of the struggle above described synchronized with the second expulsion of the Parthian monarch,<sup>60</sup> and are thus not so much a sign of the ordinary weakness of the Parthian rule as of the terrible strength of the forces which that rule for the most part kept under control.

The causes which led to the second expulsion of Artabanus<sup>61</sup> are not distinctly stated, but they were probably not very different from those that brought about the first. Artabanus was undoubtedly a harsh ruler; and those who fell under his displeasure, naturally fearing his severity, and seeing no way of meeting it but by a revolution, were driven to adopt extreme measures. Something like a general combination of the nobles against him seems to have taken place about the year A.D. 40; and it appears that he, on becoming aware of it, determined to quit the capital and throw himself on the protection of one of the tributary monarchs. This was Izates, the sovereign of Adiabêné, or the tract between the Zab rivers, who is said to have been a convert to Judaism.<sup>62</sup> On the flight of Artabanus to Izates it would seem that the Megistanes formally deposed him, and elected in his place a certain Kinnam, or Kinnamus, an Arsacid who had been brought up by the king. Izates, when he interfered on behalf of the deposed monarch, was met by the objection that the newly-elected prince had rights which could not be set aside. The difficulty appeared insuperable; but it was overcome by the voluntary act of Kinnamus, who wrote to Artabanus and offered to retire in his favor. Hereupon Artabanus returned and remounted his throne, Kinnamus carrying his magnanimity so far as to strip the diadem from his own brow and replace it on the head of the old monarch. A condition of the restoration was a complete amnesty for all political offences, which was not only promised by Artabanus, but likewise guaranteed by Izates.

It was very shortly after his second restoration to the throne that Artabanus died. One further calamity must, however, be noticed as having fallen within the limits of his reign. The great city of Seleucia, the second in the Empire, shortly after it had experienced the troubles above narrated,<sup>63</sup> revolted absolutely from the Parthian power, and declared itself independent. No account has reached us of the circumstances which caused this revolt; but it was indicative of a feeling that Parthia was beginning to decline, and that the disintegration of the Empire was a thing that might be expected. The Seleucians had at no time been contented with their position

as Parthian subjects. Whether they supposed that they could stand alone, or whether they looked to enjoying under Roman protection a greater degree of independence than had been allowed them by the Parthians, is uncertain. They revolted, however, in A. D. 40, and declared themselves a self-governing community. It does not appear that the Romans lent them any assistance, or broke for their sake the peace established with Parthia in A. D. 37. The Seleucians had to depend upon themselves alone, and to maintain their rebellion by means of their own resources. No doubt Artabanus proceeded at once to attack them, but his arms made no impression. They were successful in defending their independence during his reign, and for some time afterwards, although compelled in the end to succumb and resume a subject position under their own masters. Artabanus seems to have died in August or September A. D. 42,<sup>84</sup> the year after the death of Caligula. His checkered reign had covered a space which cannot have fallen much short of thirty years.

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## CHAPTER XV.

*Doubts as to the successor of Artabanus III. First short reign of Gotarzes. He is expelled and Vardanes made king. Reign of Vardanes. His war with Izates. His Death. Second reign of Gotarzes. His Contest with his Nephew, Meherdates. His Death. Short and inglorious reign of Vonones II.*

“Turbatæ Parthorum res, inter ambiguos, quis in regnum acciperetur.”  
Tacit. *Ann* xi. 10.

THERE is considerable doubt as to the immediate successor of Artabanus. According to Josephus<sup>1</sup> he left his kingdom to his son, Bardanes or Vardanes, and this prince entered without difficulty and at once upon the enjoyment of his sovereignty. According to Tacitus,<sup>2</sup> the person who obtained the throne directly upon the death of Artabanus was his son, Gotarzes, who was generally accepted for king, and might have reigned without having his title disputed, had he not given indications of a harsh and cruel temper. Among other atrocities whereof

he was guilty was the murder of his brother, Artabanus,<sup>3</sup> whom he put to death, together with his wife and son, apparently upon mere suspicion. This bloody initiation of his reign spread alarm among the nobles, who thereupon determined to exert their constitutional privilege of deposing an obnoxious monarch and supplying his place with a new one. Their choice fell upon Vardanes, brother of Gotarzes, who was residing in a distant province, 350 miles from the Court. [Pl. II. Fig. 5.] Having entered into communications with this prince, they easily induced him to quit his retirement, and to take up arms against the tyrant. Vardanes was ambitious, bold and prompt: he had no sooner received the invitation of the Megistanes than he set out, and, having accomplished his journey to the Court in the space of two days,<sup>4</sup> found Gotarzes wholly unprepared to offer resistance. Thus Vardanes became king without fighting a battle. Gotarzes fled, and escaped into the country of the Dahæ, which lay east of the Caspian Sea, and north of the Parthian province of Hyrcania. Here he was allowed to reign for some time unmolested by his brother, and to form plans and make preparations for the recovery of his lost power.

The statements of Tacitus are so circumstantial, and his authority as an historian is so great, that we can scarcely hesitate to accept the history as he delivers it, rather than as it is related by the Jewish writer. It is, however, remarkable that the series of Parthian coins presents an appearance of accordance rather with the latter than the former, since it affords no trace of the supposed first reign of Gotarzes in A.D. 42, while it shows Vardanes to have held the throne from Sept. A.D. 42 to at least A.D. 46.<sup>5</sup> Still this does not absolutely contradict Tacitus. It only proves that the first reign of Gotarzes was comprised within a few weeks, and that before two months had passed from the death of Artabanus, the kingdom was established in the hands of Vardanes. That prince, after the flight of his brother, applied himself for some time to the reduction of the Seleucians,<sup>6</sup> whose continued independence in the midst of a Parthian province he regarded as a disgrace to the Empire. His efforts to take the town failed, however, of success. Being abundantly provisioned and strongly fortified, it was well able to stand a siege; and the high spirit of its inhabitants made them determined to resist to the uttermost. While they still held out, Vardanes was called away to the East, where his brother had been gathering

strength, and was once more advancing his pretensions. The Hyrcanians, as well as the Dahæ, had embraced his cause, and Parthia was threatened with dismemberment. Vardanes, having collected his troops, occupied a position in the plain region of Bactria,<sup>7</sup> and there prepared to give battle to his brother, who was likewise at the head of a considerable army. Before, however, an engagement took place, Gotarzes discovered that there was a design among the nobles on either side to rid themselves of both the brothers, and to set up a wholly new king. Apprehensive of the consequences, he communicated his discovery to Vardanes; and the result was that the two brothers made up their differences and agreed upon terms of peace. Gotarzes yielded his claim to the crown, and was assigned a residence in Hyrcania, which was, probably, made over to his government. Vardanes then returned to the west, and, resuming the siege of Seleucia, compelled the rebel city to a surrender in the seventh year after it had revolted (A. D. 46.)<sup>8</sup>


Successful thus far, and regarding his quarrel with his brother as finally arranged, Vardanes proceeded to contemplate a military expedition of the highest importance. The time, he thought, was favorable for reviving the Parthian claim to Armenia,<sup>9</sup> and disputing once more with Rome the possession of a paramount influence over that country. The Roman government of the dependency, since Artabanus formally relinquished it to them, had been far from proving satisfactory. Mithridates, their protégé,<sup>10</sup> had displeased them, and had been summoned to Rome by Caligula,<sup>11</sup> who kept him there a prisoner until his death.<sup>12</sup> Armenia, left without a king, had asserted her independence; and when, after an absence of several years, Mithridates was authorized by Claudius to return to his kingdom, the natives resisted him in arms, and were only brought under his rule by the combined help of the Romans and the Iberians. Forced upon a reluctant people by foreign arms, Mithridates felt himself insecure, and this feeling made him rule his subjects with imprudent severity.<sup>13</sup> Under these circumstances it seemed to Vardanes that it would not be very difficult to recover Armenia, and thus gain a signal triumph over the Romans.

But to engage in so great a matter with a good prospect of success it was necessary that the war should be approved, not only by himself, but by his principal feudatories.<sup>14</sup> The most important of these was now Izates, king of Adiabêné and Gordyêné,<sup>15</sup> who in the last reign had restored Artabanus to

his lost throne.<sup>16</sup> Vardanes, before committing himself by any overt act, appears to have taken this prince into his counsels, and to have requested his opinion on affronting the Romans by an interference with Armenian affairs. Izates strenuously opposed the project. He had a personal interest in the matter, since he had sent five of his boys to Rome, to receive there a polite education, and he had also a profound respect for the Roman power and military system. He endeavored, both by persuasion and reasoning, to induce Vardanes to abandon his design. His arguments may have been cogent, but they were not thought by Vardanes to have much force, and the result of the conference was that the Great King declared war against his feudatory.<sup>17</sup>

The war had, apparently, but just begun, when fresh troubles broke out in the north-east. Gotarzes had never ceased to regret his renunciation of his claims, and was now, on the invitation of the Parthian nobility, prepared to come forward again and contest the kingdom with his brother. Vardanes had to relinquish his attempt to coerce Izates, and to hasten to Hyrcania in order to engage the troops which Gotarzes had collected in that distant region. These he met and defeated more than once in the country between the Caspian and Herat;<sup>18</sup> but the success of his military operations failed to strengthen his hold upon the affections of his subjects. Like the generality of the Parthian princes, he showed himself harsh and cruel in the hour of victory, and in conquering an opposition roused an opposition that was fiercer and more formidable. A conspiracy was formed against him shortly after his return from Hyrcania, and he was assassinated while indulging in the national amusement of the chase.<sup>19</sup>

The murder of Vardanes was immediately followed by the restoration of Gotarzes to the throne. There may have been some who doubted his fitness for the regal office,<sup>20</sup> and inclined to keep the throne vacant till they could send to Rome and obtain from thence one of the younger and more civilized Parthian princes. But we may be sure that the general desire was not for a Romanized sovereign, but for a truly national king, one born and bred in the country. Gotarzes was proclaimed by common consent, and without any interval, after the death of Vardanes, and ascended the Parthian throne before the end of the year A.D. 46.<sup>21</sup> It is not likely that his rule would have been resisted had he conducted himself well; but the cruelty of his temper, which had already once cost him his crown,




EARLIER COINS OF ARTAXERXES I.

Fig. 2.



ANCIENT PERSIANS (from a bas-relief at Persepolis).

No. 1.



ANTAXENES I. GIVING THE CROWN TO HIS SON, SAPOR.

again displayed itself after his restoration, and to this defect was added a slothful indulgence yet more distasteful to his subjects.<sup>22</sup> Some military expeditions which he undertook, moreover, failed of success, and the crime of defeat caused the cup of his offences to brim over. The discontented portion of his people, who were a strong party, sent envoys to the Roman Emperor, Claudius (A.D. 49), and begged that he would surrender to them Meherdates, the grandson of Phraates IV. and son of Vonones, who still remained at Rome in a position between that of a guest and a hostage. "They were not ignorant," they said, "of the treaty which bound the Romans to Parthia, nor did they ask Claudius to infringe it. Their desire was not to throw off the authority of the Arsacidæ, but only to exchange one Arsacid for another. The rule of Gotarzes had become intolerable, alike to the nobility and the common people. He had murdered all his male relatives, or at least all that were within his reach—first his brothers, then his near kinsmen, finally even those whose relationship was remote; nor had he stopped there; he had proceeded to put to death their young children and their pregnant wives. He was sluggish in his habits, unfortunate in his wars, and had betaken himself to cruelty, that men might not despise him for his want of manliness. The friendship between Rome and Parthia was a public matter; it bound the Romans to help the nation allied to them—a nation which, though equal to them in strength, was content on account of its respect for Rome to yield her precedence. Parthian princes were allowed to be hostages in foreign lands for the very reason that then it was always possible, if their own monarch displeased them, for the people to obtain a king from abroad, brought up under milder influences."<sup>23</sup>

This harangue was made before the Emperor Claudius and the assembled Senate, Meherdates himself being also present. Claudius responded to it favorably. "He would follow the example of the Divine Augustus, and allow the Parthians to take from Rome the monarch whom they requested. That prince, bred up in the city, had always been remarkable for his moderation. He would (it was to be hoped) regard himself in his new position, not as a master of slaves, but as a ruler of citizens. He would find that clemency and justice were the more appreciated by a barbarous nation, the less they had had experience of them. Meherdates might accompany the Parthian envoys; and a Roman of rank, Caius Cassius, the prefect

of Syria, should be instructed to receive them on their arrival in Asia, and to see them safely across the Euphrates."<sup>24</sup>

The young prince accordingly set out, and reached the city of Zeugma in safety. Here he was joined, not only by a number of the Parthian nobles, but also by the reigning king of Osrhoëné, who bore the usual name of Abgarus.<sup>24</sup> The Parthians were anxious that he should advance at his best speed and by the shortest route on Ctesiphon, and the Roman governor, Cassius, strongly advised the same course; but Meherdates fell under the influence of the Osrhoëné monarch, who is thought by Tacitus to have been a false friend, and to have determined from the first to do his best for Gotarzes. Abgarus induced Meherdates to proceed from Zeugma to his own capital, Edessa, and there detained him for several days by means of a series of festivities. He then persuaded him, though the winter was approaching, to enter Armenia, and to proceed against his antagonist by the circuitous route of the Upper Tigris, instead of the more direct one through Mesopotamia. In this way much valuable time was lost. The rough mountain-routes and snows of Armenia harassed and fatigued the pretender's troops, while Gotarzes was given an interval during which to collect a tolerably large body of soldiers. Still, the delay was not very great. Meherdates marched probably by Diarbekr, Til, and Jezireh, or in other words, followed the course of the Tigris, which he crossed in the neighborhood of Mosul, after taking the small town which represented the ancient Nineveh. His line of march had now brought him into Adiabêné; and it seemed a good omen for the success of his cause that Izates, the powerful monarch of that tract, declared in his favor, and brought a body of troops to his assistance.<sup>25</sup> Gotarzes was in the neighborhood, but was distrustful of his strength, and desirous of collecting a larger force before committing himself to the hazard of an engagement. He had taken up a strong position with the river Corma in his front,<sup>26</sup> and, remaining on the defensive, contented himself with trying by his emissaries the fidelity of his rival's troops and allies. The plan succeeded. After a little time, the army of Meherdates began to melt away. Izates of Adiabêné and Abgarus of Edessa drew off their contingents, and left the pretender to depend wholly on his Parthian supporters. Even their fidelity was doubtful, and might have given way on further trial; Meherdates therefore resolved, before being wholly deserted, to try the chance of a battle.

His adversary was now as willing to engage as himself, since he felt that he was no longer outnumbered. The rivals met, and a fierce and bloody action was fought between the two armies, no important advantage being for a long time gained by either. At length Carrhenes, the chief general on the side of Meherdates, having routed the troops opposed to him and pursued them too hotly, was intercepted by the enemy on his return and either killed or made prisoner. This event proved decisive. The loss of their leader caused the army of Meherdates to fly; and he himself, being induced to intrust his safety to a certain Parrhaces, a dependent of his father's, was betrayed by this miscreant, loaded with chains, and given up to his rival. Gotarzes now proved less unmerciful than might have been expected from his general character. Instead of punishing Meherdates with death, he thought it sufficient to insult him with the names of "foreigner" and "Roman," and to render it impossible that he should be again put forward as monarch by subjecting him to mutilation.<sup>27</sup> The Roman historian supposes that this was done to cast a slur upon Rome;<sup>28</sup> but it was a natural measure of precaution under the circumstances, and had probably no more recondite motive than compassion for the youth and inexperience of the pretender.

Gotarzes, having triumphed over his rival, appears to have resolved on commemorating his victory in a novel manner. Instead of striking a new coin, like Vonones,<sup>29</sup> he determined to place his achievement on record by making it the subject of a rock-tablet, which he caused to be engraved on the sacred mountain of Baghistan, adorned already with sculptures and inscriptions by the greatest of the Achæmenian monarchs. The bas-relief and its inscription have been much damaged, both by the waste of ages and the rude hand of man; but enough remains to show that the conqueror was represented as pursuing his enemies in the field, on horseback, while a winged Victory, flying in the air, was on the point of placing a diadem on his head.<sup>30</sup> In the Greek legend which accompanied the sculpture he was termed "Satrap of Satraps"—an equivalent of the ordinary title "King of Kings"; and his conquered rival was mentioned under the name of Mithrates, a corrupt form of the more common or Mithridates or Meherdates.<sup>31</sup>

Very shortly after his victory Gotarzes died. His last year seems to have been A.D. 51.<sup>32</sup> According to Tacitus, he died a natural death, from the effects of disease;<sup>33</sup> but, according to

Josephus, he was the victim of a conspiracy.<sup>34</sup> The authority of Tacitus, here as elsewhere generally, is to be preferred; and we may regard Gotarzes as ending peacefully his unquiet reign, which had begun in A.D. 42, immediately after the death of his father, had been interrupted for four years—from A.D. 42 to A.D. 46—and had then been renewed and lasted from A.D. 46 to A.D. 51. Gotarzes was not a prince of any remarkable talents, or of a character differing in any important respects from the ordinary Parthian type. He was perhaps even more cruel than the bulk of the Arsacidæ, though his treatment of Meherdates showed that he could be lenient upon occasion. He was more prudent than daring, more politic than brave, more bent on maintaining his own position than on advancing the power or dignity of his country. Parthia owed little or nothing to him. The internal organization of the country must have suffered from his long wars with his brother and his nephew; its external reputation was not increased by one whose foreign expeditions were uniformly unfortunate.

The successor of Gotarzes was a certain Vonones. His relationship to previous monarchs is doubtful—and may be suspected to have been remote.<sup>35</sup> Gotarzes had murdered or mutilated all the Arsacidæ on whom he could lay his hands; and the Parthians had to send to Media<sup>36</sup> upon his disease in order to obtain a sovereign of the required blood. The coins of Vonones II. are scarce, and have a peculiar rudeness. The only date<sup>37</sup> found upon them is one equivalent to A.D. 51–52; and it would seem that his entire reign was comprised within the space of a few months. Tacitus tells us that his rule was brief and inglorious, marked by no important events, either prosperous or adverse. He was succeeded by his son, Volagases I., who appears to have ascended the throne before the year A.D. 51 had expired.<sup>38</sup>

## CHAPTER XVI.

*Reign of Volagases I. His first attempt on Armenia fails. His quarrel with Izates. Invasion of Parthia Proper by the Dahæ and Sacæ. Second attack of Volagases on Armenia. Tiridates established as King. First expedition of Corbulo. Half submission of Volagases. Revolt of Vardanes. Second expedition of Corbulo. Armenia given to Tigranes. Revolt of Hyrcania. Third attack of Volagases on Armenia. Defeat of Pætus, and re-establishment of Tiridates. Last expedition of Corbulo, and arrangement of Terms of Peace. Tiridates at Rome. Probable time of the Death of Volagases.*

“Genti Parthorum Vologeses imperitabat, materna origine ex pellice Græca.”

Tac. *Ann.* xii. 44.

VONONES the Second left behind him three sons, Volagases, Tiridates, and Pacorus. It is doubtful which of them was the eldest, but, on the whole, most probable that that position belonged to Pacorus. We are told that Volagases obtained the crown by his brothers' yielding up their claim to him,<sup>1</sup> from which we must draw the conclusion that both of them were his elders. These circumstances of his accession will account for much of his subsequent conduct. It happened that he was able at once to bestow a principality upon Pacorus,<sup>2</sup> to whom he felt specially indebted; but in order adequately to reward his other benefactor, he found it necessary to conquer a province and then make its government over to him. Hence his frequent attacks upon Armenia, and his numerous wars with Rome for its possession, which led ultimately to an arrangement by which the quiet enjoyment of the Armenian throne was secured to Tiridates.

The circumstances under which Volagases made his first attack upon Armenia were the following. Pharasmanes of Iberia,<sup>3</sup> whose brother, Mithridates, the Romans had (in A.D. 47) replaced upon the Armenian throne, had a son named Rhadamistus, whose lust of power was so great that to prevent his making an attempt on his own crown Pharasmanes found it necessary to divert his thoughts to another quarter.<sup>4</sup>

Armenia, he suggested, lay near, and was a prize worth winning; Rhadamistus had only to ingratiate himself with the people, and then craftily remove his uncle, and he would probably step with ease into the vacant place. The son took the advice of his father, and in a little time succeeded in getting Mithridates into his power, when he ruthlessly put him to death, together with his wife and children.<sup>5</sup> Rhadamistus then, supported by his father, obtained the object of his ambition, and became king. It was known, however, that a considerable number of the Armenians were adverse to a rule which had been brought about by treachery and murder; and it was suspected that, if an attack were made upon him, he would not be supported with much zeal by his subjects. This was the condition of things when Volagases ascended the Parthian throne, and found himself in want of a principality with which he might reward the services of Tiridates, his brother. It at once occurred to him that a happy chance presented him with an excellent opportunity of acquiring Armenia, and he accordingly proceeded, in the very year of his accession, to make an expedition against it.<sup>6</sup> At first he carried all before him. The Iberian supporters of Rhadamistus fled without risking a battle; his Armenian subjects resisted weakly; Artaxata and Tigranocerta opened their gates; and the country generally submitted. Tiridates enjoyed his kingdom for a few months; but a terrible pestilence, brought about by a severe winter and a want of proper provisions, decimated the Parthian force left in garrison; and Volagases found himself obliged, after a short occupation, to relinquish his conquest. Rhadamistus returned, and, although the Armenians opposed him in arms, contrived to re-establish himself. The Parthians did not renew their efforts, and for three years—from A.D. 51 to A.D. 54—Rhadamistus was left in quiet possession of the Armenian kingdom.<sup>7</sup>

It appears to have been in this interval that the arms of Volagases were directed against one of his great feudatories, Izates. As in Europe during the prevalence of the feudal system, so under the Parthian government, it was always possible that the sovereign might be forced to contend with one of the princes who owed him fealty. Volagases seems to have thought that the position of the Adiabeanian monarch was becoming too independent, and that it was necessary to recall him, by a sharp mandate, to his proper position of subordinate and tributary. Accordingly, he sent him a demand that he

should surrender the special privileges which had been conferred upon him by Artabanus III.,<sup>8</sup> and resume the ordinary status of a Parthian feudatory. Izates, who feared that if he yielded he would find that this demand was only a prelude to others more intolerable, replied by a positive refusal, and immediately prepared to resist an invasion. He sent his wives and children to the strongest fortress within his dominions, collected all the grain that his subjects possessed into fortified places, and laid waste the whole of the open country, so that it should afford no sustenance to an invading army. He then took up a position on the lower Zab, or Caprius, and stood prepared to resist an attack upon his territory. Volagases advanced to the opposite bank of the river, and was preparing to invade Adiabêné, when news reached him of an important attack upon his eastern provinces. A horde of barbarians, consisting of Dahæ and other Scythians, had poured into Parthia Proper, knowing that he was engaged elsewhere, and threatened to carry fire and sword through the entire province. The Parthian monarch considered that it was his first duty to meet these aggressors; and leaving Izates unchastised, he marched away to the north-east to repel the external enemy.<sup>9</sup>

Volagases, after defeating this foe, would no doubt have returned to Adiabêné, and resumed the war with Izates, but in his absence that prince died.<sup>10</sup> Monobazus, his brother, who inherited his crown, could have no claim to the privileges which had been conferred for personal services upon Izates; and consequently there was no necessity for the war to be renewed. The bones of Izates were conveyed to the holy soil of Palestine and buried in the vicinity of Jerusalem. Monobazus was accepted by Volagases as his brother's successor without any apparent reluctance, and proved a faithful tributary, on whom his suzerain could place complete dependence.

The quarrel with Izates, and the war with the Dahæ and Sacæ, may have occupied the years A.D. 52 and 53. At any rate it was not till A.D. 54, his fourth year, that Volagases resumed his designs against Armenia.<sup>11</sup> Rhadamistus, though he had more than once had to fly the country, was found in possession as king, and for some time he opposed the progress of the Parthian arms; but, before the year was out, despairing of success, he again fled, and left Volagases to arrange the affairs of Armenia at his pleasure. Tiridates was at once established as king, and Armenia brought into the position of a

regular Parthian dependency. The claims of Rome were ignored. Volagases was probably aware that the Imperial throne was occupied by a mere youth, not eighteen years old, one destitute of all warlike tastes, a lover of music and of the arts, who might be expected to submit to the loss of a remote province without much difficulty. He therefore acted as if Rome had no rights in this part of Asia, established his brother at Artaxata, and did not so much as send an embassy to Nero to excuse or explain his acts. These proceedings caused much uneasiness in Italy. If Nero himself cannot be regarded as likely to have felt very keenly the blow struck at the prestige of the Empire, yet there were those among his advisers who could well understand and appreciate the situation. The ministers of the young prince resolved that efforts on the largest scale should be made. Orders were at once issued for recruiting the Oriental legions, and moving them nearer to Armenia; preparations were set on foot for bridging the Euphrates; Antiochus of Commagêné, and Herod Agrippa II., were required to collect troops and hold themselves in readiness to invade Parthia; the Roman provinces bordering upon Armenia were placed under new governors;<sup>12</sup> above all, Corbulo, regarded as the best general of the time, was summoned from Germany, and assigned the provinces of Cappadocia and Galatia, together with the general superintendence of the war "for retaining possession of Armenia."<sup>13</sup> At the same time instructions were sent out to Ummidius, proconsul of Syria, requiring him to co-operate with Corbulo; and arrangements were made to obviate the clashing of authority which was to be feared between two equal commanders. In the spring of A.D. 55 the Roman armies were ready to take the field, and a struggle seemed impending which would recall the times of Antony and Phraates.

But, at the moment when expectation was at its height, and the clang of arms appeared about to resound throughout Western Asia, suddenly a disposition for peace manifested itself. Both Corbulo and Ummidius sent embassies to Volagases, exhorting him to make concessions, and apparently giving him to understand that something less was required of him than the restoration of Armenia to the Romans.<sup>14</sup> Volagases listened favorably to the overtures, and agreed to put into the hands of the Roman commanders the most distinguished members of the royal family as hostages. At the same time he withdrew his troops from Armenia;<sup>15</sup> which the Romans, however, did not

occupy, and which continued, as it would seem, to be governed by Tiridates. The motive of the Parthian king in acting as he did is obvious. A revolt against his authority had broken out in Parthia, headed by his son, Vardanes; and, until this internal trouble should be suppressed, he could not engage with advantage in a foreign war.<sup>16</sup> [Pl. III. Fig. 1.] The reasons which actuated the Roman generals are far more obscure. It is difficult to understand their omission to press upon Volagases in his difficulties, or their readiness to accept the persons of a few hostages, however high their rank, as an equivalent for the Roman claim to a province. Perhaps the jealousy which subsequently showed itself in regard to the custody of the hostages<sup>17</sup> may have previously existed between the two commanders, and they may have each consented to a peace disadvantageous to Rome through fear of the other's obtaining the chief laurels if war were entered on.

The struggle for power between Volagases and his son Vardanes seems to have lasted for three years<sup>18</sup>—from A.D. 55 to A.D. 58. Its details are unknown to us; but Volagases must have been successful; and we may assume that the pretender, of whom we hear no more, was put to death. No sooner was the contest terminated than Volagases, feeling that he was now free to act, took a high tone in his communications with Corbulo and Ummidius, and declared that not only must his brother, Tiridates, be left in the undisturbed possession of Armenia, but it must be distinctly understood that he held it as a Parthian, and not as a Roman, feudatory.<sup>19</sup> At the same time Tiridates began to exercise his authority over the Armenians with severity, and especially to persecute those whom he suspected of inclining towards the Romans.<sup>20</sup> Corbulo appears to have felt that it was necessary to atone for his three years of inaction by at length prosecuting the war in earnest. He tightened the discipline of the legions, while he recruited them to their full strength,<sup>21</sup> made fresh friends among the hardy races of the neighborhood,<sup>22</sup> renewed the Roman alliance with Pharasmanes of Iberia, urged Antiochus of Commagêné to cross the Armenian frontier, and taking the field himself, carried fire and sword over a large portion of the Armenian territory. Volagases sent a contingent of troops to the assistance of his feudatory, but was unable to proceed to his relief in person, owing to the occurrence of a revolt in Hyrcania,<sup>23</sup> which broke out, fortunately for the Romans, in the very year that the rebellion of Vardanes was suppressed. Under these

circumstances it is not surprising that Tiridates had recourse to treachery,<sup>24</sup> or that on his treachery failing he continually lost ground, and was at last compelled to evacuate the country and yield the possession of it to the Romans. It is more remarkable that he prolonged his resistance into the third year than that he was unable to continue the struggle to a later date. He lost his capital, Artaxata, in A.D. 58, and Tigranocerta, the second city of Armenia, in A.D. 60. After this he made one further effort from the side of Media,<sup>25</sup> but the attempt was unavailing; and on suffering a fresh defeat he withdrew altogether from the struggle, whereupon Armenia reverted to the Romans. They entrusted the government to a certain Tigranes, a grandson of Archelaüs, king of Cappadocia, but at the same time greatly diminished the extent of the kingdom by granting portions of it to neighboring princes. Pharasmanes of Iberia, Polemo of Pontus, Aristobulus of the Lesser Armenia, and Antiochus of Commagêné, received an augmentation of their territories at the expense of the rebel state, which had shown itself incapable of appreciating the blessings of Roman rule and had manifested a decided preference for the Parthians.<sup>26</sup>

But the fate of Armenia, and the position which she was to hold in respect of the two great rivals, Rome and Parthia, were not yet decided. Hitherto Volagases, engaged in a contest with the Hyrcanians and with other neighboring nations, whereto the flames of war had spread,<sup>27</sup> had found himself unable to take any personal part in the struggle in which his brother and vassal had been engaged in the west. Now matters in Hyrcania admitted of arrangement, and he was at liberty to give his main attention to Armenian affairs. His presence in the West had become absolutely necessary. Not only was Armenia lost to him, but it had been made a centre from which his other provinces in this quarter might be attacked and harassed. Tigranes, proud of his newly-won crown, and anxious to show himself worthy of it, made constant incursions into Adiabêné, ravaging and harrying the fertile country far and wide.<sup>28</sup> Monobazus, unable to resist him in the field, was beginning to contemplate the transfer of his allegiance to Rome, as the only means of escaping from the evils of a perpetual border war.<sup>29</sup> Tiridates, discontented with the position whereto he found himself reduced, and angry that his brother had not given him more effective support, was loud in his complaints, and openly taxed Volagases with an inertness that bordered on cowardice.<sup>30</sup> Public opinion was inclined to accept

and approve the charge; and in Parthia public opinion could not be safely contemned. Volagases found it necessary to win back his subjects' good-will by calling a council of the nobility, and making them a formal address:<sup>31</sup> "Parthians," he said, "when I obtained the first place among you by my brothers ceding their claims, I endeavored to substitute for the old system of fraternal hatred and contention a new one of domestic affection and agreement; my brother Pacorus received Media from my hands at once; Tiridates, whom you see now before you, I inducted shortly afterwards into the sovereignty of Armenia, a dignity reckoned the third in the Parthian kingdom. Thus I put my family matters on a peaceful and satisfactory footing. But these arrangements are now disturbed by the Romans, who have never hitherto broken their treaties with us to their profit, and who will now find that they have done so to their ruin. I will not deny that hitherto I have preferred to maintain my right to the territories, which have come to me from my ancestors, by fair dealing rather than by shedding of blood—by negotiation rather than by arms; if, however, I have erred in this and have been weak to delay so long, I will now correct my fault by showing the more zeal. You at any rate have lost nothing by my abstinence; your strength is intact, your glory undiminished; you have added, moreover, to your reputation for valor the credit of moderation—a virtue which not even the highest among men can afford to despise, and which the Gods view with special favor." Having concluded his speech, he placed a diadem on the brow of Tiridates, proclaiming by this significant act his determination to restore him to the Armenian throne. At the same time he ordered Monæses, a Parthian general, and Monobazus, the Adiabeanian monarch, to take the field and enter Armenia, while he himself with the main strength of the empire advanced towards the Euphrates and threatened Syria with invasion.<sup>32</sup>

The results of the campaign which followed (A.D. 62) scarcely answered to this magnificent opening. Monæses indeed, in conjunction with Monobazus, invaded Armenia, and, advancing to Tigranocerta, besieged Tigranes in that city,<sup>33</sup> which, upon the destruction of Artaxata by Corbulo,<sup>34</sup> had become the seat of government. Volagases himself proceeded as far as Nisibis,<sup>35</sup> whence he could threaten at the same time Armenia and Syria: The Parthian arms proved, however, powerless to effect any serious impression upon Tigranocerta; and Volagases, being met at Nisibis by envoys from Corbulo, who

threatened an invasion of Parthia in retaliation of the Parthian attack upon Armenia, consented to an arrangement. A plague of locusts had spread itself over Upper Mesopotamia, and the consequent scarcity of forage completely paralyzed a force which consisted almost entirely of cavalry.<sup>86</sup> Volagases was glad under the circumstances to delay the conflict which had seemed impending, and readily agreed that his troops should suspend the siege of Tigranocerta and withdraw from Armenia on condition that the Roman should at the same time evacuate the province.<sup>87</sup> He would send, he said, ambassadors to Rome who should arrange with Nero the footing upon which Armenia was to be placed. Meanwhile, until the embassy returned, there should be peace—the Armenians should be left to themselves—neither Rome nor Parthia should maintain a soldier within the limits of the province, and any collision between the armies of the two countries should be avoided.

A pause, apparently of some months' duration, followed. Towards the close of autumn, however, a new general came upon the scene; and a new factor was introduced into the political and military combinations of the period. L. Cæsennius Pætus, a favorite of the Roman Emperor, but a man of no capacity, was appointed by Nero to take the main direction of affairs in Armenia, while Corbulo confined himself to the care of Syria, his special province. Corbulo had requested a coadjutor,<sup>88</sup> probably not so much from an opinion that the war would be better conducted by two commanders than by one, as from fear of provoking the jealousy of Nero, if he continued any longer to administer the whole of the East. On the arrival of Pætus, who brought one legion with him, an equitable division of the Roman forces was made between the generals. Each had three legions; and while Corbulo retained the Syrian auxiliaries, those of Pontus, Galatia, and Cappadocia were attached to the army of Pætus. But no friendly feeling united the leaders. Corbulo was jealous of the rival whom he knew to have been sent out as a check upon him rather than as a help; and Pætus was inclined to despise the slow and temporizing policy of the elder chief. The war, according to his views, required to be carried on with more dash and vigor than had hitherto appeared in its conduct—cities should be stormed, he said—the whole country plundered—severe examples made of the guilty. The object of the war also should be changed—instead of setting up shadowy kings, his own aim would be to reduce Armenia into the form of a province.<sup>89</sup>

The truce established in the early summer, when Volagases sent his envoys to Nero, expired in the autumn, on their return without a definite reply;<sup>40</sup> and the Roman commanders at once took the offensive and entered upon an autumn campaign, the second within the space of a year. Corbulo crossed the Euphrates in the face of a large Parthian army, which he forced to retire from the eastern bank of the river by means of military engines worked from ships anchored in mid-stream. He then advanced and occupied a strong position in the hills at a little distance from the river, where he caused his legions to construct an entrenched camp.<sup>41</sup> Pætus, on his part, entered Armenia from Cappadocia with two legions, and, passing the Taurus range, ravaged a large extent of country; winter, however, approaching, and the enemy nowhere appearing in force, he led back his troops across the mountains, and, regarding the campaign as finished, wrote a despatch to Nero boasting of his successes, sent one of his three legions to winter in Pontus, and placed the other two in quarters between the Taurus and the Euphrates, at the same time granting furloughs to as many of the soldiers as chose to apply for them. A large number took advantage of his liberality, preferring no doubt the pleasures and amusements of the Syrian and Cappadocian cities to the hardships of a winter in the Armenian highlands. While matters were in this position Pætus suddenly heard that Volagases was advancing against him. As once before at an important crisis,<sup>42</sup> so now with the prospect of Armenia as the prize of victory, the Parthians defied the severities of winter and commenced a campaign when their enemy regarded the season for war as over. In this crisis Pætus exhibited an entire unfitness for command. First, he resolved to remain on the defensive in his camp; then, affecting to despise the protection of ramparts and ditches, he gave the order to advance and meet the enemy; finally, after losing a few scouts whom he had sent forward, he hastily retreated and resumed his old position, but at the same time unwisely detached three thousand of his best foot to block the pass of Taurus, through which Volagases was advancing.<sup>43</sup> After some hesitation he was induced to make Corbulo acquainted with his position; but the message which he sent merely stated that he was expecting to be attacked.<sup>44</sup> Corbulo was in no hurry to proceed to his relief, preferring to appear upon the scene at the last moment, when he would be hailed as a savior.

Volagases, meanwhile, continued his march. The small force left by Pætus to block his progress was easily overpowered, and for the most part destroyed.<sup>45</sup> The castle of Arsamosata,<sup>46</sup> where Pætus had placed his wife and child, and the fortified camp of the legions, were besieged.<sup>47</sup> The Romans were challenged to a battle, but dared not show themselves outside their entrenchments. Having no confidence in their leader, the legionaries despaired and began openly to talk of a surrender. As the danger drew nearer, fresh messengers had been despatched to Corbulo, and he had been implored to come at his best speed in order to save the poor remnant of a defeated army.<sup>48</sup> That commander was on his march, by way of Commagêné and Cappadocia; it could not be very long before he would arrive; and the supplies in the camp of Pætus were sufficient to have enabled him to hold out for weeks and months.<sup>49</sup> But an unworthy terror had seized both Pætus and his soldiers. Instead of holding out to the last, the alarmed chief proposed negotiations, and the result was that he consented to capitulate. His troops were to be allowed to quit their entrenchments and withdraw from the country, but were to surrender their strongholds and their stores. Armenia was to be completely evacuated by the Romans; and a truce was to be observed and Armenia not again invaded, until a fresh embassy, which Volagases proposed to send to Rome, returned. Moreover, a bridge was to be made by the Romans over the Arsanias, a tributary of the Euphrates, which, as it was of no immediate service to the Parthians, could only be intended as a monument of the Roman defeat.<sup>50</sup> Pætus assented to these terms, and they were carried out; not, however, without some further ignominy to the Romans. The Parthians entered the Roman entrenchments before the legionaries had left them, and laid their hands on anything which they recognized as Armenian spoil. They even seized the soldiers' clothes and arms, which were relinquished to them without a struggle, lest resistance should provoke an outbreak.<sup>51</sup> Pætus, once more at liberty, proceeded with unseemly haste to the Euphrates, deserting his wounded and his stragglers,<sup>52</sup> whom he left to the tender mercies of the Armenians. At the Euphrates he effected a junction with Corbulo, who was but three days' march distant when Pætus so gracefully capitulated.

The chiefs, when they met, exchanged no cordial greeting. Corbulo complained that he had been induced to make a useless journey, and to weary his troops to no purpose, since


without any aid from him the legions might have escaped from their difficulties by simply waiting until the Parthians had exhausted their stores, when they must have retired. Pætus, anxious to obliterate the memory of his failure, proposed that the combined armies should at once enter Armenia and overrun it, since Volagases and his Parthians had withdrawn. Corbulo replied coldly—that “he had no such orders from the Emperor. He had quitted his province to rescue the threatened legions from their peril; now that the peril was past, he must return to Syria, since it was quite uncertain what the enemy might next attempt. It would be hard work for his infantry, tired with the long marches it had made, to keep pace with the Parthian cavalry, which was fresh and would pass rapidly through the plains. The generals upon this parted. Pætus wintered in Cappadocia; Corbulo returned into Syria, where a demand reached him from Volagases that he would evacuate Mesopotamia. He agreed to do so on the condition that Armenia should be evacuated by the Parthians.<sup>63</sup> To this Volagases consented; since he had re-established Tiridates as king, and the Armenians might be trusted, if left to themselves, to prefer Parthian to Roman ascendancy.


There was now, again, a pause in the war for some months. The envoys sent by Volagases after the capitulation of Pætus reached Rome at the commencement of spring<sup>64</sup> (A.D. 63), and were there at once admitted to an audience. They proposed peace on the terms that Tiridates should be recognized as king of Armenia, but that he should go either to Rome, or to the head-quarters of the Roman legions in the East, in order to receive investiture, either from the Emperor or his representative. It was with some difficulty that Nero was brought to believe in the success of Volagases, so entirely had he trusted the despatches of Pætus, which represented the Romans as triumphant.<sup>65</sup> When the state of affairs was fully understood from the letters of Corbulo and the accounts given by a Roman officer who had accompanied the Parthian envoys, there was no doubt or hesitation as to the course which should be pursued. The Parthian proposals must be rejected. Rome must not make peace immediately upon a disaster, or until she had retrieved her reputation and shown her power by again taking the offensive. Pætus was at once recalled, and the whole direction of the war given to Corbulo, who was intrusted with a wide-spreading and extraordinary authority.<sup>66</sup> The Parthian envoys were dismissed, but with gifts, which seemed to show

that it was not so much their proposals as the circumstances under which they had been made that were unpalatable.<sup>57</sup> Another legion was sent to the East; and the semi-independent princes and dynasts were exhorted to support Corbulo with zeal. That commander used his extraordinary powers to draw together, not so much a very large force, as one that could be thoroughly trusted;<sup>58</sup> and, collecting his troops at Melitêné (Malatiyeh), made his arrangements for a fresh invasion.

Penetrating into Armenia by the road formerly followed by Lucullus, Corbulo, with three legions, and probably the usual proportion of allies—an army of about 30,000 men—advanced against the combined Armenians and Parthians under Tiridates and Volagases, freely offering battle, and at the same time taking vengeance, as he proceeded, on the Armenian nobles who had been especially active in opposing Tigranes, the late Roman puppet-king.<sup>59</sup> His march led him near the spot where the capitulation of Pætus had occurred in the preceding winter; and it was while he was in this neighborhood that envoys from the enemy met him with proposals for an accommodation. Corbulo, who had never shown himself anxious to push matters to an extremity, readily accepted the overtures. The site of the camp of Pætus was chosen for the place of meeting; and there, accompanied by twenty horsemen each, Tiridates and the Roman general held an interview.<sup>60</sup> The terms proposed and agreed upon were the same that Nero had rejected; and thus the Parthians could not but be satisfied, since they obtained all for which they had asked. Corbulo, on the other hand, was content to have made the arrangement on Armenian soil, while he was at the head of an intact and unblemished army, and held possession of an Armenian district; so that the terms could not seem to have been extorted by fear, but rather to have been allowed as equitable. He also secured the immediate performance of a ceremony at which Tiridates divested himself of the regal ensigns and placed them at the foot of the statue of Nero; and he took security for the performance of the promise that Tiridates should go to Rome and receive his crown from the hands of Nero, by requiring and obtaining one of his daughters as a hostage. In return, he readily undertook that Tiridates should be treated with all proper honor during his stay at Rome, and on his journeys to and from Italy, assuring Volagases, who was anxious on these points, that Rome regarded only the substance, and made no account of the mere show and trappings of power.<sup>61</sup>

SAPOR I. PRESENTING CYRANIDES TO THE ROMAN TROOPS AS THEIR EMPRESS.





VALERIAN DOING HOMAGE TO CYPHIADES (OR MYIADES).

The arrangement thus made was honestly executed. After a delay of about two years,<sup>62</sup> for which it is difficult to account, Tiridates set out upon his journey. He was accompanied by his wife, by a number of noble youths, among whom were sons of Volagases and of Monobazus, and by an escort of three thousand Parthian cavalry.<sup>63</sup> The long cavalcade passed, like a magnificent triumphal procession, through two thirds of the Empire, and was everywhere warmly welcomed and sumptuously entertained. Each city which lay upon its route was decorated to receive it; and the loud acclaims of the multitudes expressed their satisfaction at the novel spectacle. The riders made the whole journey, except the passage of the Hellespont, by land, proceeding through Thrace and Illyricum to the head of the Adriatic,<sup>64</sup> and then descending the peninsula. Their entertainment was furnished at the expense of the state, and is said to have cost the treasury 800,000 sesterces (about 6250*l.*) a day:<sup>65</sup> this outlay was continued for nine months, and must have amounted in the aggregate to above a million and a half of our money. The first interview of the Parthian prince with his nominal sovereign was at Naples, where Nero happened to be staying. According to the ordinary etiquette of the Roman court, Tiridates was requested to lay aside his sword before approaching the Emperor; but this he declined to do; and the difficulty seemed serious until a compromise was suggested, and he was allowed to approach wearing his weapon, after it had first been carefully fastened to the scabbard by nails. He then drew near, bent one knee to the ground, interlaced his hands, and made obeisance, at the same time saluting the Emperor as his "lord."<sup>66</sup>

The ceremony of the investiture was performed afterwards at Rome. On the night preceding, the whole city was illuminated and decorated with garlands; the Forum, as morning approached, was filled with "the people," arranged in their several tribes, clothed in white robes and bearing boughs of laurel; the Prætorians, in their splendid arms, were drawn up in two lines from the further extremity of the Forum to the Rostra, to maintain the avenue of approach clear; all the roofs of the buildings on every side were thronged with crowds of spectators; at break of day Nero arrived in the attire appropriated to triumphs, accompanied by the members of the Senate and his body-guard, and took his seat on the Rostra in a curule chair. Tiridates and his suite were then introduced between the two long lines of soldiers; and the prince, advanc-

ing to the Rostra, made an oration, which (as reported by Dio) was of a sufficiently abject character.<sup>67</sup> Nero responded proudly; and then the Armenian prince, ascending the Rostra by a way constructed for the purpose, and sitting at the feet of the Roman Emperor, received from his hand, after his speech had been interpreted to the assembled Romans, the coveted diadem, the symbol of Oriental sovereignty.<sup>68</sup>

After a stay of some weeks, or possibly months, at Rome, during which he was entertained by Nero with extreme magnificence, Tiridates returned, across the Adriatic and through Greece and Asia Minor,<sup>69</sup> to his own land. The circumstances of his journey and his reception involved a concession to Rome of all that could be desired in the way of formal and verbal acknowledgment. The substantial advantage, however, remained with the Parthians. The Romans, both in the East and at the capital, were flattered by a show of submission; but the Orientals must have concluded that the long struggle had terminated in an acknowledgment by Rome of Parthia as the stronger power. Ever since the time of Lucullus, Armenia had been the object of contention between the two states, both of which had sought, as occasion served, to place upon the throne its own nominees. Recently the rival powers had at one and the same time brought forward rival claimants; and the very tangible issue had been raised, Was Tigranes or Tiridates to be king? When the claims of Tigranes were finally, with the consent of Rome, set aside, and those of Tiridates allowed, the real point in dispute was yielded by the Romans. A Parthian, the actual brother of the reigning Parthian king, was permitted to rule the country which Rome had long deemed her own. It could not be doubted that he would rule it in accordance with Parthian interests. His Roman investiture was a form which he had been forced to go through; what effect could it have on him in the future, except to create a feeling of soreness? The arms of Volagases had been the real force which had placed him upon the throne; and to those arms he must have looked to support him in case of an emergency. Thus Armenia was in point of fact relinquished to Parthia at the very time when it was nominally replaced under the sovereignty of the Romans.<sup>70</sup>

There is much doubt as to the time at which Volagases I. ceased to reign. The classical writers give no indication of the death of any Parthian king between the year A.D. 51, when they record the demise of Vonones II., and about the year A.D.

90, when they speak of a certain Pacorus as occupying the throne.<sup>71</sup> Moreover, during this interval, whenever they have occasion to mention the reigning Parthian monarch, they always give him the name of Volagases.<sup>72</sup> Hence it has been customary among writers on Parthian history to assign to Volagases I. the entire period between A.D. 51 and A.D. 90—a space of thirty-nine years.<sup>73</sup> Recently, however, the study of the Parthian coins has shown absolutely that Pacorus began to reign at least as early as A.D. 78,<sup>74</sup> while it has raised a suspicion that the space between A.D. 51 and A.D. 78 was shared between two kings,<sup>75</sup> one of whom reigned from A.D. 51 to about A.D. 62, and the other from about A.D. 62 to A.D. 78. It has been proposed to call these kings respectively Volagases I. and Artabanus IV.<sup>76</sup> or Volagases I. and Volagases II.,<sup>77</sup> and Parthian history has been written on this basis;<sup>78</sup> but it is confessed that the entire absence of any intimation by the classical writers that there was any change of monarch in this space, or that the Volagases of whom they speak as a contemporary of Vespasian was any other than the adversary of Corbulo, is a very great difficulty in the way of this view being accepted; and it is suggested that the two kings which the coins indicate may have been contemporary monarchs reigning in different parts of Parthia.<sup>79</sup> To such a theory there can be no objection. The Parthian coins distinctly show the existence under the later Arsacidæ of numerous pretenders, or rivals to the true monarch, of whom we have no other trace. In the time of Volagases I. there was (we know) a revolt in Hyrcania,<sup>80</sup> which was certainly not suppressed as late as A.D. 75. The king who has been called Artabanus IV. or Volagases II. may have maintained himself in this region, while Volagases I. continued to rule in the Western provinces and to be the only monarch known to the Romans and the Jews. If this be the true account of the matter, we may regard Volagases I. as having most probably reigned from A.D. 51 to about A.D. 78—a space of twenty-seven years.

## CHAPTER XVII.

*Results of the Establishment of Tiridates in Armenia. Long period of Peace between Parthia and Rome. Obscurity of Parthian History at this time. Relations of Volagases I. with Vespasian. Invasion of Western Asia by Alani. Death of Volagases I. and Character of his Reign. Accession and Long Reign of Pacorus. Relations of Pacorus with Decebalus of Dacia. Internal Condition of Parthia during his Reign. Death of Pacorus and Accession of Chosroës.*

“Longa concordia quietus Oriens. . . tantum adversus Parthos minæ.”

Tacit. *Hist.* ii. 6.

THE establishment of Tiridates as king of Armenia, with the joint consent of Volagases and Nero, inaugurated a period of peace between the two Empires of Rome and Parthia, which exceeded half a century.<sup>1</sup> This result was no doubt a fortunate one for the inhabitants of Western Asia; but it places the modern historian of the Parthians at a disadvantage. Hitherto the classical writers, in relating the wars of the Syro-Macedonians and the Romans, have furnished materials for Parthian history, which, if not as complete as we might wish, have been at any rate fairly copious and satisfactory. Now, for the space of half a century, we are left without anything like a consecutive narrative, and are thrown upon scattered and isolated notices, which can form only a most incomplete and disjointed narrative. The reign of Volagases I. appears to have continued for about twelve years after the visit of Tiridates to Rome;<sup>2</sup> and no more than three or four events are known as having fallen into this interval. Our knowledge of the reign of Pacorus is yet more scanty. But as the business of the workman is simply to make the best use that he can of his materials, such a sketch of this dark period as the notices which have come down to us allow will now be attempted.

When the troubles which followed upon the death of Nero shook the Roman world, and after the violent ends of Galba and Otho, the governor of Judæa, Vespasian, resolved to become a candidate for the imperial power (A.D. 69), Volagases

was at once informed by envoys of the event, and was exhorted to maintain towards the new monarch the same peaceful attitude which he had now for seven years observed towards his predecessors.<sup>3</sup> Volagases not only complied with the request, but sent ambassadors in return to Vespasian, while he was still at Alexandria (A.D. 70), and offered to put at his disposal a body of forty thousand Parthian cavalry.<sup>4</sup> The circumstances of his position allowed Vespasian to decline this magnificent proposal, and to escape the odium which would have attached to the employment of foreign troops against his countrymen. His generals in Italy had by this time carried all before them; and he was able, after thanking the Parthian monarch, to inform him that peace was restored to the Roman world, and that he had therefore no need of auxiliaries.<sup>5</sup> In the same friendly spirit in which he had made this offer, Volagases, in the next year (A.D. 71), sent envoys to Titus at Zeugma, who presented to him the Parthian king's congratulations on his victorious conclusion of the Jewish war, and begged his acceptance of a crown of gold. The polite attention was courteously received; and before allowing them to return to their master the young prince hospitably entertained the Parthian messengers at a banquet.<sup>6</sup>

Soon after this, circumstances occurred in the border state of Commagêné which threatened a rupture of the friendly relations that had hitherto subsisted between Volagases and Vespasian.<sup>7</sup> Cæsennius Pætus, proconsul of Syria, the unsuccessful general in the late Armenian war, informed Vespasian, early in A.D. 72, that he had discovered a plot, by which Commagêné, one of the Roman subject kingdoms, was to be detached from the Roman alliance, and made over to the Parthians. Antiochus, the aged monarch, and his son Epiphanes were, according to Pætus, both concerned in the treason; and the arrangement with the Parthians was, he said, actually concluded. It would be well to nip the evil in the bud. If the transfer of territory once took place, a most serious disturbance of the Roman power would follow. Commagêné lay west of the Euphrates; and its capital city, Samosata (the modern Sumeïsät), commanded one of the points where the great river was most easily crossed; so that, if the Parthians held it, they would have a ready access at all times to the Roman provinces of Cappadocia, Cilicia, and Syria, with a perfectly safe retreat. These arguments had weight with Vespasian, who seems to have had entire confidence in Pætus, and induced him to give

the proconsul full liberty to act as he thought best. Thus empowered, Pætus at once invaded Commagêné in force, and meeting at first with no resistance (for the Commagênians were either innocent or unprepared), succeeded in occupying Samosata by a *coup de main*. The aged king wished to yield everything without a blow; but his two sons, Epiphanes and Callinicus, were not to be restrained. They took arms, and, at the head of such a force as they could hastily muster, met Pætus in the field, and fought a battle with him which lasted the whole day, and ended without advantage to either side. But the decision of Antiochus was not to be shaken; he refused to countenance his sons' resistance, and, quitting Commagêné, passed with his wife and daughters into the Roman province of Cilicia, where he took up his abode at Tarsus. The spirit of the Commagênians could not hold out against this defection; the force collected began to disperse; and the young princes found themselves forced to fly, and to seek a refuge in Parthia, which they reached with only ten horsemen.<sup>8</sup> Volagases received them with the courtesy and hospitality due to their royal rank; but as he had given them no help in the struggle, so now he made no effort to reinstate them. All the exertion to which he could be brought was to write a letter on their behalf to Vespasian,<sup>9</sup> in which he probably declared them guiltless of the charges that had been brought against them by Pætus. Vespasian, at any rate, seems to have become convinced of their innocence; for though he allowed Commagêné to remain a Roman province, he permitted the two princes with their father to reside at Rome, assigned the ex-monarch an ample revenue, and gave the family an honorable status.

It was probably not more than two or three years after the events above narrated,<sup>10</sup> that Volagases found himself in circumstances which impelled him to send a petition to the Roman Emperor for help. The Alani, a Scythian people, who had once dwelt near the Tanais<sup>11</sup> and the Lake Mæotis, or Sea of Azof, but who must now have lived further to the East, had determined on a great predatory invasion of the countries west of the Caspian Gates, and having made alliance with the Hyrcanians, who were in possession of that important pass,<sup>12</sup> had poured into Media through it, driven King Pacorus to the mountains, and overrun the whole of the open country. From hence they had passed on into Armenia, defeated Tiri-dates, in a battle, and almost succeeded in capturing him by means of a lasso.<sup>13</sup> Volagases, whose subject-kings were thus

rudely treated, and who might naturally expect his own proper territories to be next attacked, sent in this emergency a request to Vespasian for aid. He asked moreover that the forces put at his disposal should be placed under the command of either Titus or Domitian,<sup>14</sup> probably not so much from any value that he set on their military talents as from a conviction that if a member of the Imperial family was sent, the force which accompanied him would be considerable. We are told that the question, whether help be given or no, was seriously discussed at Rome, and that Domitian was exceedingly anxious that the troops should go, and begged that he might be their commander. But Vespasian was disinclined for any expenditure of which he did not recognize the necessity, and disliked all perilous adventure. His own refusal of extraneous support, when offered by his rival, rendered it impossible for him to reject Volagases's request without incurring the charge of ingratitude. The Parthians were therefore left to their own resources; and the result seems to have been that the invaders, after ravaging and harrying Media and Armenia at their pleasure, carried off a vast number of prisoners and an enormous booty into their own country.<sup>15</sup> Soon after this, Volagases must have died. The coins of his successor<sup>16</sup> commence in June, A.D. 78, and thus he cannot have outlived by more than three years the irruption of the Alani. If he died, as is most probable, in the spring of A.D. 78, his reign would have covered the space of twenty-seven years. It was an eventful one for Parthia. It brought the second period of struggle with the Romans to an end<sup>17</sup> by compromise which gave to Rome the shadow and to Parthia the substance of victory. And it saw the first completed disintegration of the Empire in the successful revolt of Hyrcania—an event of evil portent. Volagases was undoubtedly a monarch of considerable ability. He conducted with combined prudence and firmness the several campaigns against Corbulo; he proved himself far superior to Pætus; exposed to attacks in various quarters from many different enemies, he repulsed all foreign invaders and, *as against them*, maintained intact the ancient dominions of the Arsacidæ. He practically added Armenia to the Empire. Everywhere success attended him, except against a domestic foe. Hyrcania seceded during his reign, and it may be doubted whether Parthia ever afterwards recovered it. An example was thus set of successful Arian revolt against the hitherto irresistible Turanians, which may have tended in no

slight degree to produce the insurrection which eventually subverted the Parthian Empire.

The successor of Volagases I. was Pacorus, whom most writers on Parthian history have regarded as his son.<sup>18</sup> There is, however, no evidence of this relationship; and the chief reason for regarding Pacorus as belonging even to the same branch of the Arsacidæ with Volagases I. is his youth at his accession, indicated by the beardless head upon his early coins, which is no doubt in favor of his having been a near relation of the preceding king. Pl. III., Fig 1. The Parthian coins show that his reign continued *at least* till A.D. 93; it may have lasted considerably longer, for the earliest date on any coin of Chosroës is Ær. Seleuc. 421, or A.D. 110. The accession of Chosroës has been conjecturally assigned to A.D. 108, which would allow to Pacorus the long reign of thirty years. Of this interval it can only be said that, so far as our knowledge goes, it was almost wholly uneventful. We know absolutely nothing of this Pacorus except that he gave encouragement to a person who pretended to be Nero; that he enlarged and beautified Ctesiphon;<sup>19</sup> that he held friendly communications with Decebalus, the great Dacian chief, who was successively the adversary of Domitian and Trajan; and that he sold the sovereignty of Osrhoëné at a high price to the Edessene prince who was cotemporary with him. The Pseudo-Nero in question appears to have taken refuge with the Parthians in the year A.D. 89, and to have been demanded as an impostor by Domitian.<sup>20</sup> Pacorus was at first inclined to protect and to even assist him, but after a while was induced to give him up, probably by a threat of hostilities. The communication with the Dacian chief was most likely earlier. The Dacians, in one of those incursions into Moesia which they made during the first years of Domitian, took captive a certain Callidromus,<sup>21</sup> a Greek, if we may judge by his name, slave to a Roman of some rank, named Liberius Maximus. This prisoner Decebalus (we are told) sent as a present to Pacorus, in whose service and favor he remained for a number of years. This circumstance, insignificant enough in itself, acquires an interest from the indication which it gives of intercommunication between the enemies of Rome, even when they were separated by vast spaces, and might have been thought to have been wholly ignorant of each other's existence. Decebalus can scarcely have been drawn to Pacorus by any other attraction than that which always subsists between enemies of any great dominant power. He must

have looked to the Parthian monarch as a friend who might make a diversion on his behalf upon occasion; and that monarch, by accepting his gift, must be considered to have shown a willingness to accept this kind of relation.

The sale of the Osrhoëné territory to Abgarus by Pacorus<sup>22</sup> was not a fact of much consequence. It may indicate an exhaustion of his treasury, resulting from the expenditure of vast sums on the enlargement and adornment of the capital, but otherwise it has no bearing on the general condition of the Empire. Perhaps the Parthian feudatories generally paid a price for their investiture. If they did not, and the case of Abgarus was peculiar, still it does not appear that his purchase at all altered his position as a Parthian subject. It was not until they transferred their allegiance to Rome that the Osrhoëné princes struck coins, or otherwise assumed the status of kings. Up to the time of M. Aurelius they continued just as much subject to Parthia as before, and were far from acquiring a position of independence.

There is reason to believe that the reign of Pacorus was a good deal disturbed by internal contentions. We hear of an Artabanus<sup>23</sup> as king of Parthia in A.D. 79; and the Parthian coins of about this period present us with two very marked types of head, both of them quite unlike that of Pacorus,<sup>24</sup> which must be those of monarchs who either contended with Pacorus for the crown, or ruled contemporaneously with him over other portions of the Parthian Empire. [Pl. III., Fig. 2.] Again, towards the close of Pacorus's reign, and early in that of his recognized successor, Chosroës, a monarch called Mithridates is shown by the coins to have borne sway for at least six years—from A.D. 107 to 113. This monarch commenced the practice of placing a Semitic legend upon his coins,<sup>25</sup> which would seem to imply that he ruled in the western rather than the eastern provinces. The probability appears, on the whole, to be that the disintegration which has been already noticed as having commenced under Volagases I. was upon the increase. Three or four monarchs were ruling together in different portions of the Parthian world, each claiming to be the true Arsaces, and using the full titles of Parthian sovereignty upon his coins. The Romans knew but little of these divisions and contentions,<sup>26</sup> their dealings being only with the Arsacid who reigned at Ctesiphon and bore sway over Mesopotamia and Adiabêné.

Pacorus must have died about A.D. 108, or a little later.

He left behind him two sons, Exedares and Parthamasiris,<sup>27</sup> but neither of these two princes was allowed to succeed him. The Parthian Megistanes assigned the crown to Chosroës, the brother of their late monarch, perhaps regarding Exedares and Parthamasiris as too young to administer the government of Parthia satisfactorily. If they knew, as perhaps they did,<sup>28</sup> that the long period of peace with Rome was coming to an end, and that they might expect shortly to be once more attacked by their old enemy, they might well desire to have upon the throne a prince of ripe years and approved judgment. A raw youth would certainly have been unfit to cope with the age, the experience, and the military genius of Trajan.

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## CHAPTER XVIII.

*Reign of Chosroës. General condition of Oriental Affairs gives a handle to Trajan. Trajan's Schemes of Conquest. Embassy of Chosroës to Trajan fails. Great Expedition of Trajan. Campaign of A.D. 115. Campaign of A.D. 116. Death of Trajan, and relinquishment of his Parthian Conquests by Hadrian. Interview of Chosroës with Hadrian. Its Consequences. Death of Chosroës and Accession of Volagases II.*

“Ad ortum solis, cunctæ gentes quæ inter Indum et Euphratem amnes inclytos sunt, concussæ bello.”—Aurel. Vict. *Hist.* § 13.

THE general state of Oriental affairs at the accession of Chosroës seems to have been the following. Upon the demise of Tiridates (about A.D. 100)<sup>1</sup> Pacorus had established upon the Armenian throne one of his sons, named Exedares, or Axidares, and this prince had thenceforth reigned as king of Armenia without making any application to Rome for investiture, or acknowledging in any way the right of the Romans to interfere with the Armenian succession.<sup>2</sup> Trajan, sufficiently occupied in the West,<sup>3</sup> had borne this insult. When, however, in A.D. 114, the subjugation of Dacia was completed, and the Roman Emperor found his hands free, he resolved to turn his arms towards Asia, and to make the Armenian difficulty a pretext for a great military expedition, designed to establish unmis-

takably the supremacy of Rome throughout the East. The condition of the East at once called for the attention of Rome, and was eminently favorable for the extension of her influence at this period. Disintegrating forces were everywhere at work, tending to produce a confusion and anarchy which invited the interposition of a great power, and rendered resistance to such a power difficult. Christianity, which was daily spreading itself more and more widely, acted as a dissolvent upon the previously-existing forms of society, loosening the old ties, dividing man from man by an irreconcilable division, and not giving much indication as yet of its power to combine and unite. Judaism, embittered by persecution, had from a nationality become a conspiracy; and the disaffected adherents of the Mosaic system, dispersed through all the countries of the East, formed an explosive element in the population which involved the constant danger of a catastrophe.<sup>4</sup> The Parthian political system was also, as already remarked, giving symptoms of breaking up. Those bonds which for two centuries and a half had sufficed to hold together a heterogeneous kingdom extending from the Euphrates to the Indus, and from the Oxus to the Southern Ocean, were beginning to grow weak, and the Parthian Empire appeared to be falling to pieces. There seemed to be at once a call and an opportunity for a fresh arrangement of the East, for the introduction of a unifying power, such as Rome recognized in her own administrative system, which should compel the crumbling atoms of the Oriental world once more into cohesion.

To this call Trajan responded. His vast ambition had been whetted, rather than satiated, by the conquest of a barbarous nation, and a single, not very valuable, province. In the East he might hope to add to the Roman State half a dozen countries of world-wide repute, the seats of ancient empires, the old homes of Asiatic civilization, countries associated with the immortal names of Sennacherib and Sardanapalus, Cyrus, Darius, and Alexander. The career of Alexander had an attraction for him, which he was fain to confess;<sup>5</sup> and he pleased himself by imitating, though he could not hope at his age to equal it. His Eastern expedition was conceived very much in the same spirit as that of Crassus;<sup>6</sup> but he possessed the military ability in which the Triumvir was deficient, and the enemy whom he had to attack was grown less formidable.

Trajan commenced his Eastern expedition in A.D. 114, seven years after the close of the Dacian War. He was met at

Athens in the autumn of that year by envoys from Chosroës, who brought him presents, and made representations which, it was hoped, would induce him to consent to peace.<sup>7</sup> Chosroës stated that he had deposed his nephew, Exedares, the Armenian prince whose conduct had been offensive to Rome; and proposed that, as the Armenian throne was thereby vacant, it should be filled by the appointment of Parthamasiris, Exedares's brother. This prince would be willing, he said, to receive investiture at the hands of Rome; and he requested that Trajan would transmit to him the symbol of sovereignty. The accommodation suggested would have re-established the relations of the two countries towards Armenia on the basis on which they had been placed by the agreement between Volagases and Nero. It would have saved the credit of Rome, while it secured to Parthia the substantial advantage of retaining Armenia under her authority and protection. Trajan might well have consented to it, had his sole object been to reclaim the rights or to vindicate the honor of his country. But he had distinctly made up his mind to aim, not at the re-establishment of any former condition of things, but at the placing of matters in the East on an entirely new footing.<sup>8</sup> He therefore gave the ambassadors of Chosroës a cold reception, declined the gifts offered him, and replied to the proposals of accommodation that the friendship of kings was to be measured by deeds rather than by words—he would therefore say nothing, but when he reached Syria would act in a becoming manner.<sup>9</sup> The envoys of the Parthian monarch were obliged to return with this unsatisfactory answer; and Chosroës had to wait and see what interpretation it would receive from the course of events.

During the later months of autumn, Trajan advanced from Athens to Antioch.<sup>10</sup> At that luxurious capital, he mustered his forces and prepared for the campaign of the ensuing year. Abgarus, the Osrhoëne prince who had lately purchased his sovereignty from Pacorus,<sup>11</sup> sent an embassy to him in the course of the winter, with presents and an offer of friendship.<sup>12</sup> Parthamasiris also entered into communications with him, first assuming the royal title, and then, when his letter received no answer, dropping it, and addressing the Roman Emperor as a mere private person.<sup>13</sup> Upon this act of self-humiliation, negotiations were commenced. Parthamasiris was encouraged to present himself at the Roman camp, and was given to understand that he would there receive from Trajan, as Tiridates had

received from Nero, the emblem of sovereignty and permission to rule Armenia. The military preparations were, however, continued. Vigorous measures were taken to restore the discipline of the Syrian legions, which had suffered through the long tranquillity of the East and the enervating influence of the climate.<sup>14</sup> With the spring Trajan commenced his march. Ascending the Euphrates, to Samosata, and receiving as he advanced the submission of various semi-independent dynasts and princes, he took possession of Satala and Elegeia, Armenian cities on or near the Euphrates, and establishing himself at the last-named place, waited for the arrival of Parthamasiris. That prince shortly rode into the Roman camp, attended by a small retinue; and a meeting was arranged, at which the Parthian, in the sight of the whole Roman army, took the diadem from his brows and laid it at the feet of the Roman Emperor, expecting to have it at once restored to him. But Trajan had determined otherwise. He made no movement; and the army, prepared no doubt for the occasion, shouted with all their might, saluting him anew as Imperator, and congratulating him on his "bloodless victory."<sup>15</sup> Parthamasiris felt that he had fallen into a trap, and would gladly have turned and fled; but he found himself surrounded by the Roman troops and virtually a prisoner. Upon this he demanded a private audience, and was conducted to the Emperor's tent, where he made proposals which were coldly rejected, and he was given to understand that he must regard his crown as forfeited. It was further required of him that, to prevent false rumors, he should present himself a second time at the Emperor's tribunal, prefer his requests openly, and hear the Imperial decision. The Parthian consented. With a boldness worthy of his high descent, he affirmed that he had neither been defeated nor made prisoner, but had come of his own free will to hold a conference with the Roman chief, in the full expectation of receiving from him, as Tiridates had received from Nero, the crown of Armenia, confident, moreover, that in any case he would suffer no wrong, but be allowed to depart in safety. Trajan answered that he did not intend to give the crown of Armenia to any one—the country belonged to the Romans, and should have a Roman governor. As for Parthamasiris, he was free to go whithersoever he pleased, and his Parthian attendants might accompany him. The Armenians, however, must remain. They were Roman subjects, and owed no allegiance to Parthia.<sup>16</sup>

The tale thus told, with no appearance of shame, by the Roman historian, Dio Cassius, is sufficiently disgraceful to Trajan, but it does not reveal to us the entire baseness of his conduct. We learn from other writers,<sup>17</sup> two of them contemporary with the events, that the pompous dismissal of Parthamasiris, with leave to go wherever he chose, was a mere pretence. Trajan had come to the conclusion, if not before the interview, at any rate in the course of it, that the youth was dangerous, and could not be allowed to live. He therefore sent troops to arrest him as he rode off from the camp, and when he offered resistance caused him to be set upon and slain. This conduct he afterwards strove to justify by accusing the young prince of having violated the agreement made at the interview;<sup>18</sup> but even the debased moral sense of his age was revolted by this act, and declared the grounds whereon he excused it insufficient. Good faith and honor had been sacrificed (it was said) to expediency—the reputation of Rome had been tarnished—it would have been better, even if Parthamasiris were guilty, to have let him escape, than to have punished him at the cost of a public scandal.<sup>19</sup> So strongly was the disgrace felt that some (it seems) endeavored to exonerate Trajan from the responsibility of having contrived the deed, and to throw the blame of it on Exedares, the ex-king of Armenia and brother of Parthamasiris. But Trajan had not sunk so low as to shift his fault on another. He declared openly that the act was his own, and that Exedares had had no part in it.<sup>20</sup>

The death of Parthamasiris was followed by the complete submission of Armenia.<sup>21</sup> Chosroës made no attempt to avenge the murder of his nephew, or to contest with Trajan the possession of the long-disputed territory. A little doubt seems for a short time to have been entertained by the Romans as to its disposal. The right of Exedares to be reinstated in his former kingdom<sup>22</sup> was declared by some to be clear; and it was probably urged that the injuries which he had suffered at the hands of Chosroës would make him a sure Roman ally. But these arguments had no weight with Trajan. He had resolved upon his course. An end should be put, at once and forever, to the perpetual intrigues and troubles inseparable from such relations as had hitherto subsisted between Rome and the Armenian kingdom. The Greater and the Lesser Armenia should be annexed to the Empire, and should form a single Roman province.<sup>23</sup> This settled, attention was turned to the neighboring countries. Alliance was made with Anchialus, king

of the Heniochi and Macheloni, and presents were sent to him in return for those which his envoys had brought to Trajan.<sup>24</sup> A new king was given to the Albanians. Friendly relations were established with the chiefs of the Iberi, Sauromataæ, Colchi, and even with the tribes settled on the Cimmerian Bosphorus.<sup>25</sup> The nations of these parts were taught that Rome was the power which the inhabitants even of the remote East and North had most to fear; and a wholesome awe was instilled into them which would, it was hoped, conduce to the general tranquillity of the Empire.

But the objects thus accomplished, considerable as they were, did not seem to the indefatigable Emperor sufficient for one year. Having settled the affairs of the North-east, and left garrisons in the chief Armenian strongholds,<sup>26</sup> Trajan marched southwards to Edessa, the capital of the province of Gsrhoêné, and there received the humble submission of Abgarus, who had hitherto wavered between the two contending powers.<sup>27</sup> Manisares, a satrap of these parts, who had a quarrel of his own with Chosroës, also embraced his cause,<sup>28</sup> while other chiefs wavered in their allegiance to Parthia, but feared to trust the invader. Hostilities were commenced by attacks in two directions—southward against the tract known as Anthemusia, between the Euphrates and the Khabour;<sup>29</sup> and eastward against Batnæ, Nisibis, and the mountain region known as Gordyêné, or the Mons Masius.<sup>30</sup> Success attended both these movements; and, before winter set in, the Romans had made themselves masters of the whole of Upper Mesopotamia, and had even pushed southwards as far as Singara,<sup>31</sup> a town on the skirts of the modern Sinjar mountain-range. Mesopotamia was at once, like Armenia, “reduced into the form of a Roman province.” Medals were issued representing the conqueror with these subject countries at his foot;<sup>32</sup> and the obsequious Senate conferred the title of “Parthicus” upon the Emperor,<sup>33</sup> who had thus robbed the Parthians of two provinces.

According to some, the headquarters of Trajan during the ensuing winter were at Nisibis or Edessa,<sup>34</sup> but the nexus of the narrative in Dio seems rather to require, and the other ancient notices to allow, the belief that he returned to Syria and wintered at Antioch,<sup>35</sup> leaving his generals in possession of the conquered regions, with orders to make every preparation for the campaign of the next year. Among other instructions which they received was the command to build a large fleet at Nisibis, where good timber was abundant,<sup>36</sup> and to prepare for

its transport to the Tigris, at the point where that stream quits the mountains and enters on the open country.<sup>37</sup> Meanwhile, in the month of December,<sup>38</sup> the magnificent Syrian capital, where Trajan had his headquarters, was visited by a calamity of a most appalling character. An earthquake, of a violence and duration unexampled in ancient times, destroyed the greater part of its edifices, and buried in their ruins vast multitudes of the inhabitants and of the strangers that had flocked into the town in consequence of the Imperial presence. Many Romans of the highest rank perished, and among them M. Virgilianus Pedo, one of the consuls for the year. The Emperor himself was in danger, and only escaped by creeping through a window of the house in which he resided; nor was his person quite unscathed. Some falling fragments struck him; but fortunately the injuries that he received were slight, and had no permanent consequence. The bulk of the surviving inhabitants, finding themselves houseless, or afraid to enter their houses if they still stood, bivouacked during the height of the winter in the open air, in the Circus, and elsewhere about the city. The terror which legitimately followed from the actual perils was heightened by imaginary fears. It was thought that the Mons Casius, which towers above Antioch to the south-west, was about to be shattered by the violence of the shocks, and to precipitate itself upon the ruined town.<sup>39</sup>

Nor were the horrors of the catastrophe confined to Antioch. The earthquake was one of a series which carried destruction and devastation through the greater part of the East. In the Roman province of Asia, four cities were completely destroyed—Eleia, Myrina, Pitané, and Cymé. In Greece two towns were reduced to ruins, namely, Opus in Locris, and Oritus. In Galatia three cities, unnamed, suffered the same fate.<sup>40</sup> It seemed as if Providence had determined that the new glories which Rome was gaining by the triumphs of her arms should be obscured by calamities of a kind that no human power could avert or control, and that despite the efforts of Trajan to make his reign a time of success and splendor, it should go down to posterity as one of gloom, suffering, and disaster.

Trajan, however, did not allow himself to be diverted from the objects that he had set before him by such trifling matters as the sufferings of a certain number of provincial towns. With the approach of spring (A.D. 116) he was up and doing.<sup>41</sup> His officers had obeyed his orders, and a fleet had been built at Nisibis during the winter amply sufficient for the purpose

for which it was wanted. The ships were so constructed that they could be easily taken to pieces and put together again. Trajan had them conveyed on wagons to the Tigris at Jezireh,<sup>42</sup> and there proceeded to make preparations for passing the river and attacking Adiabéné. By embarking on board some of his ships companies of heavy-armed and archers, who protected his working parties, and at the same time threatening with other ships to cross at many different points, he was able, though with much difficulty, to bridge the stream in the face of a powerful body of the enemy, and to land his troops safely on the opposite bank. This done, his work was more than half accomplished. Chosroës remained aloof from the war, either husbanding his resources, or perhaps occupied by civil feuds,<sup>43</sup> and left the defence of his outlying provinces to their respective governors. Mebarsapes, the Adiabeanian monarch, had set his hopes on keeping the invader out of his kingdom by defending the line of the Tigris, and when that was forced he seems to have despaired, and to have made no further effort. His towns and strongholds were taken one after another, without their offering any serious resistance. Nineveh, Arbela, and Gaugamala fell into the enemy's hands. Adenystæ, a place of great strength, was captured by a small knot of Roman prisoners, who, when they found their friends near, rose upon the garrison, killed the commandant, and opened the gates to their countrymen.<sup>44</sup> In a short time the whole tract between the Tigris and the Zagros mountains was overrun; resistance ceased; and the invader was able to proceed to further conquests.

It might have been expected that an advance would have at once been directed on Ctesiphon, the Parthian capital; but Trajan, for some reason which is not made clear to us, determined otherwise. He repassed the Tigris into Mesopotamia, took Hatra<sup>45</sup> (now el-Hadhr), at that time one of the most considerable places in those parts, and then, crossing to the Euphrates, descended its course to Hit<sup>46</sup> and Babylon. No resistance was offered him, and he became master of the mighty Babylon without a blow. Seleucia seems also to have submitted;<sup>47</sup> and it remained only to attack and take the capital in order to have complete possession of the entire region watered by the two great rivers. For this purpose a fleet was again necessary, and, as the ships used on the upper Tigris had, it would seem, been abandoned,<sup>48</sup> Trajan conveyed a flotilla, which had descended the Euphrates, across Meso-

potamia on rollers, and launching it upon the Tigris, proceeded to the attack of the great metropolis.<sup>49</sup> Here again the resistance that he encountered was trivial. Like Babylon and Seleucia, Ctesiphon at once opened its gates. The monarch had departed with his family and his chief treasures,<sup>50</sup> and had placed a vast space between himself and his antagonist. He was prepared to contend with his Roman foe, not in battle array, but by means of distance, natural obstacles, and guerilla warfare. He had evidently determined neither to risk a battle nor stand a siege. As Trajan advanced, he retreated, seeming to yield all, but no doubt intending, if it should be necessary, to turn to bay at last, and in the meantime diligently fomenting that spirit of discontent and disaffection which was shortly to render the further advance of the Imperial troops impossible.

But, for the moment, all appeared to go well with the invaders. The surrender of Ctesiphon brought with it the submission of the whole region on the lower courses of the great rivers, and gave the conqueror access to the waters of a new sea. Trajan may be excused if he overrated his successes, regarded himself as another Alexander, and deemed that the great monarchy, so long the rival of Rome, was now at last swept away, and that the entire East was on the point of being absorbed into the Roman Empire. The capture by his lieutenants of the golden throne of the Parthian kings may well have seemed to him emblematic of this change; and the flight of Chosroës into the remote and barbarous regions of the far East may have helped to lull his adversary into a feeling of complete security. Such a feeling is implied in the pleasure voyage of the conqueror down the Tigris to the Persian Gulf, in his embarkation on the waters of the Southern Sea, in the inquiries which he instituted with respect to Indian affairs, and in the regret to which he gave utterance, that his advanced years prevented him from making India the term of his labors.<sup>51</sup> No shadow of his coming troubles seems to have flitted before the eyes of the Emperor during the weeks that he was thus occupied—weeks which he passed in self-complacent contemplation of the past and dreams of an impossible future.

Suddenly, tidings of a most alarming kind dispelled his pleasing visions, and roused him to renewed exertions. Revolt, he found, had broken out everywhere in his rear. At Seleucia, at Hatra, at Nisibis, at Edessa,<sup>52</sup> the natives had

flown to arms; his entire line of retreat was beset by foes, and he ran a risk of having his return cut off, and of perishing in the land which he had invaded. Trajan had hastily to retrace his steps, and to send his generals in all directions to check the spread of insurrection. Seleucia was recovered by Erucius Clarus and Julius Alexander, who punished its rebellion by delivering it to the flames. Lucius Quietus retook Nisibis, and plundered and burnt Edessa. Maximus, on the contrary, was defeated and slain by the rebels,<sup>53</sup> who completely destroyed the Roman army under his orders.<sup>54</sup> Trajan, perceiving how slight his hold was upon the conquered populations, felt compelled to change his policy, and, as the only mode of pacifying, even temporarily, the growing discontent, instead of making Lower Mesopotamia into a Roman province, as he had made Armenia, Upper Mesopotamia, and Adiabêné (or Assyria), he proceeded with much pomp and display to set up a native king. The prince selected was a certain Parthaspates, a member of the royal family of the Arsacidæ, who had previously sided with Rome against the reigning monarch.<sup>55</sup> In a plain near Ctesiphon, where he had had his tribunal erected, Trajan, after a speech wherein he extolled the greatness of his own exploits, presented to the assembled Romans and natives this youth as King of Parthia, and with his own hand placed the diadem upon his brow.<sup>56</sup>

Under cover of the popularity acquired by this act the aged Emperor now commenced his retreat. The line of the Tigris was no doubt open to him, and along this he might have marched in peace to Upper Mesopotamia or Armenia; but either he preferred the direct route to Syria by way of Hatra and Singara, or the insult offered to the Roman name by the independent attitude which the people of the former place still maintained induced him to diverge from the general line of his course, and to enter the desert in order to chastise their presumption. Hatra was a small town, but strongly fortified. The inhabitants at this time belonged<sup>57</sup> to that Arabian immigration which was always more and more encroaching upon Mesopotamia. They were Parthian subjects, but appear to have had their own native kings.<sup>58</sup> On the approach of Trajan, nothing daunted, they closed their gates, and prepared themselves for resistance. Though he battered down a portion of the wall, they repulsed all the attempts of his soldiers to enter through the breach, and when he himself came near to reconnoitre, they drove him off with their arrows. His troops

suffered from the heat, from the want of provisions and fodder, from the swarms of flies which disputed with them every morsel of their food and every drop of their drink, and finally from violent hail and thunderstorms. Trajan was forced to withdraw after a time without effecting anything, and to own himself baffled and defeated by the garrison of a petty fortress.<sup>60</sup>

The year, A.D. 116, seems to have closed with this memorable failure. In the following spring, Chosroës, learning the retreat of the Romans, returned to Ctesiphon, expelled Parthamaspatès, who retired into Roman territory, and re-established his authority in Susiana and Southern Mesopotamia.<sup>60</sup> The Romans, however, still held Assyria (Adiabêné) and Upper Mesopotamia, as well as Armenia, and had the strength of the Empire been exerted to maintain these possessions, they might have continued in all probability to be Roman provinces, despite any efforts that Parthia could have made to recover them. But in August, A.D. 117, Trajan died; and his successor, Hadrian, was deeply impressed with the opinion that Trajan's conquests had been impolitic, and that it was unsafe for Rome to attempt under the circumstances of the time any extension of the Eastern frontier. The first act of Hadrian was to relinquish the three provinces which Trajan's Parthian war had added to the Empire, and to withdraw the legions within the Euphrates.<sup>61</sup> Assyria and Mesopotamia were at once re-occupied by the Parthians. Armenia appears to have been made over by Hadrian to Parthamaspatès,<sup>62</sup> and to have thus returned to its former condition of a semi-independent kingdom, leaning alternately on Rome and Parthia. It has been asserted that Osrhoêné was placed likewise upon the same footing;<sup>63</sup> but the numismatic evidence adduced in favor of this view is weak;<sup>64</sup> and upon the whole it appears most probable that, like the other Mesopotamian countries, Osrhoêné again fell under the dominion of the Arsacidae. Rome therefore gained nothing by the great exertions which she had made,<sup>65</sup> unless it were a partial recovery of her lost influence in Armenia, and a knowledge of the growing weakness of her Eastern rival—a knowledge which, though it produced no immediate fruit, was of importance, and was borne in mind when, after another half-century of peace, the relations of the two empires became once more unsatisfactory.

The voluntary withdrawal of Hadrian from Assyria and Mesopotamia placed him on amicable terms with Parthia dur-

ing the whole of his reign. Chosroës and his successor could not but feel themselves under obligations to the monarch who, without being forced to it by a defeat, had restored to Parthia the most valuable of her provinces. On one occasion alone do we hear of any, even threatened, interruption of the friendly relations subsisting between the two powers; and then the misunderstanding, whatever it may have been, was easily rectified and peace maintained. Hadrian, in A.D. 122, had an interview with Chosroës on his eastern frontier, and by personal explanations and assurances averted, we are told,<sup>66</sup> an impending outbreak. Not long afterwards (A.D. 130, probably) he returned to Chosroës the daughter who had been captured by Trajan, and at the same time promised the restoration of the golden throne,<sup>67</sup> on which the Parthians appear to have set a special value.

It must have been soon after he received back his daughter that Chosroës died. His latest coins bear a date equivalent to A.D. 128;<sup>68</sup> and the Roman historians give Volagases II. as king of Parthia in A.D. 133.<sup>69</sup> It has been generally supposed that this prince was Chosroës' son, and succeeded him in the natural course;<sup>70</sup> but the evidence of the Parthian coins is strong against these suppositions. According to them, Volagases had been a pretender to the Parthian throne as early as A.D. 78, and had struck coins both in that year and the following one, about the date of the accession of Pacorus. His attempt had, however, at that time failed, and for forty-one years he kept his pretensions in abeyance; but about A.D. 119 or 120 he appears to have again come forward, and to have disputed the crown with Chosroës, or reigned contemporaneously with him over some portion of the Parthian kingdom, till about A.D. 130, when—probably on the death of Chosroës—he was acknowledged as sole king by the entire nation. Such is the evidence of the coins, which in this case are very peculiar, and bear the name of Volagases from first to last.<sup>71</sup> It seems to follow from them that Chosroës was succeeded, not by a son, but by a rival, an old claimant of the crown, who cannot have been much younger than Chosroës himself.

## CHAPTER XIX.

*Reign of Volagases II. Invasion of the Alani. Communications between Volagases and Antoninus Pius. Death of Volagases II. and Accession of Volagases III. Aggressive War of Volagases III. on Rome. Campaign of A.D. 162. Verus sent to the East. Sequel of the War. Losses suffered by Parthia. Death of Volagases III.*

“Parthicum bellum, quod Volagessus . . . indixit.”

Jul. Capit. *M. Antonin.* § 8.

VOLAGASES II. appears to have occupied the Parthian throne, after the death of Chosroës, for the space of nineteen years. His reign has a general character of tranquillity, which agrees well with the advanced period of life at which, according to the coins, he first became actual king of Parthia.<sup>1</sup> It was disturbed by only one actual outbreak of hostilities, an occasion upon which Volagases stood upon the defensive; and on one other occasion was for a brief period threatened with disturbance. Otherwise it seems to have been wholly peaceful. So far as appears, no pretenders troubled it. The coins show, for the years between A.D. 130 and A.D. 149, the head of but one monarch, a head of a marked type, which is impossible to be mistaken.<sup>2</sup> [Pl. III., Fig. 4.]

The occasion upon which actual hostilities disturbed the repose of Volagases was in A.D. 133, when, by the intrigues of Pharasmanes, king of the Iberians, a great horde of Alani from the tract beyond the Caucasus was induced to pour itself through the passes of that mountain chain upon the territories of both the Parthians and the Romans.<sup>3</sup> Pharasmanes had previously shown contempt for the power of Rome by refusing to pay court to Hadrian, when, in A.D. 130, he invited the monarchs of Western Asia generally to a conference.<sup>4</sup> He had also, it would seem, been insulted by Hadrian, who, when Pharasmanes sent him a number of cloaks made of cloth-of-gold, employed them in the adornment of three hundred convicts condemned to furnish sport to the Romans in the amphitheatre.<sup>5</sup> What quarrel he had with the Parthians we are not told; but it is related that at his instigation the savage Alani, introduced

within the mountain barrier, poured at one and the same time into Media Atropaténé, which was a dependency of Parthia; into Armenia, which was under Parthamaspatés; and into the Roman province of Cappadocia. Volagases sent an embassy to Rome complaining of the conduct of Pharasmanes,<sup>6</sup> who appears to have been regarded as ruling under Roman protection; and that prince was summoned to Rome in order to answer for his conduct. But the Alanian inroad had to be dealt with at once. The Roman governor of Cappadocia, who was Arrian, the historian of Alexander, by a mere display of force drove the barbarians from his province. Volagases showed a tamer spirit; he was content to follow an example, often set in the East, and already in one instance imitated by Rome,<sup>7</sup> but never adopted by any nation as a settled policy without fatal consequences, and to buy at a high price the retreat of the invaders.

It was to have been expected that Rome would have punished severely the guilt of Pharasmanes in exposing the Empire and its allies to horrors such as always accompany the inroads of a barbarous people. But though the Iberian monarch was compelled to travel to Rome and make his appearance before the Emperor's tribunal,<sup>8</sup> yet Hadrian, so far from punishing him, was induced to load him with benefits and honors. He permitted him to sacrifice in the Capitol, placed his equestrian statue in the temple of Bellona, and granted him an augmentation of territory.<sup>9</sup> Volagases can scarcely have been pleased at these results of his complaints; he bore them, however, without murmuring, and, when (in A.D. 138) Hadrian died and was succeeded by his adopted son, T. Aurelius, better known as Antoninus Pius, Volagases sent to Rome an embassy of congratulation, and presented the new monarch with a crown of gold.<sup>10</sup>

It was probably at this same time that he ventured to make an unpleasant demand. Hadrian had promised that the golden throne which Trajan had captured in his expedition, and by which the Parthians set so much store, should be surrendered to them;<sup>11</sup> but this promise he had failed to perform. Volagases appears to have thought that his successor might be more facile, and accordingly instructed his envoys to re-open the subject, to remind Antoninus of the pledged faith of his adopted father, and to make a formal request for the delivery of the valued relic.<sup>12</sup> Antoninus, however, proved as obdurate as Hadrian. He was not to be persuaded by any argument to give back the trophy; and the envoys had to return with the

report that their representations upon the point had been in vain, and had wholly failed to move the new Emperor.

The history of Volagases II. ends with this transaction. No events are assignable to the last ten years of his reign, which was probably a season of profound repose, in the East as it was in the West—a period having (as our greatest historian observes of it) “the rare advantage of furnishing very few materials for history,” which is, indeed (as he says), “little more than the register of the crimes, follies, and misfortunes of mankind.”<sup>13</sup> The influence of Rome extended beyond his borders. As in modern times it has become a proverb that when a particular European nation is satisfied the peace of the world is assured, so in the days whereof we are treating it would seem that Rome had only to desire repose, for the surrounding nations to find themselves tranquil. The inference appears to be that not only were the wars which occurred between Rome and her neighbors for the most part stirred up by herself, but that even the civil commotions which disturbed States upon her borders had very generally their origin in Roman intrigues, which, skilfully concealed from view, nevertheless directed the course of affairs in surrounding States, and roused in them, when Rome thought her interests required it, civil differences, disorders, and contentions.

The successor of Volagases II. was Volagases III., who was most probably his son, although of this there is no direct evidence. The Parthian coins show<sup>14</sup> that Volagases III. ascended the throne in A.D. 148 or 149, and reigned till A.D. 190 or 191—a space of forty-two years. We may assume that he was a tolerably young man at his accession, though the effigy upon his earliest coins is well bearded, and that he was somewhat tired of the long inactivity which had characterized the period of his father's rule. He seems very early to have meditated a war with Rome,<sup>15</sup> and to have taken certain steps which betrayed his intentions; but, upon their coming to the knowledge of Antoninus, and that prince writing to him on the subject, Volagases altered his plans,<sup>16</sup> and resolved to wait, at any rate, until a change of Emperor at Rome should give him a chance of taking the enemy at a disadvantage. Thus it was not till A.D. 161—twelve years after his accession—that his original design was carried out, and the flames of war were once more lighted in the East to the ruin and desolation of the fairest portion of Western Asia.

The good Antoninus was succeeded in the spring of A.D. 161

by his adopted son, Marcus Aurelius, who at once associated with him in the government the other adopted son of Antoninus, Lucius Verus. Upon this, thinking that the opportunity for which he had been so long waiting had at last arrived, Volagases marched his troops suddenly into Armenia, expelled Soæmus, the king protected by the Romans,<sup>17</sup> and established in his place a certain Tigranes, a scion of the old royal stock, whom the Armenians regarded as their rightful monarch.<sup>18</sup> News of this bold stroke soon reached the governors of the adjacent Roman provinces, and Severianus, præfect of Cappadocia, a Gaul by birth, incited by the predictions of a pseudo-prophet of those parts, named Alexander,<sup>19</sup> proceeded at the head of a legion into the adjoining kingdom, in the hope of crushing the nascent insurrection and punishing at once the Armenian rebels and their Parthian supporters. Scarcely, however, had he crossed the Euphrates, when he found himself confronted by an overwhelming force, commanded by a Parthian called Chosroës,<sup>20</sup> and was compelled to throw himself into the city of Elegeia, where he was immediately surrounded and besieged.<sup>21</sup> Various tales were told of his conduct under these circumstances, and of the fate which overtook him:<sup>22</sup> the most probable account being that after holding out for three days he and his troops were assailed on all sides, and, after a brave resistance, were shot down almost to a man. The Parthians then crossed the Euphrates, and carried fire and sword through Syria.<sup>23</sup> Attidius Cornelianus, the proconsul, having ventured to oppose them, was repulsed.<sup>24</sup> Vague thoughts of flying to arms and shaking off the Roman yoke possessed the minds of the Syrians,<sup>25</sup> and threatened to lead to some overt act. The Parthians passed through Syria into Palestine, and almost the whole East seemed to lie open to their incursions. When these facts were reported at Rome, it was resolved to send Lucius Verus to the East. He was of an age to undergo the hardships of campaigning, and therefore better fitted than Marcus Aurelius to undertake the conduct of a great war. But, as his military talent was distrusted, it was considered necessary to place at his disposal a number of the best Roman generals of the time, whose services he might use while he claimed as his own their successes. Statius Priscus, Avidius Cassius, and Martius Verus, were the most important of these officers; and it was by them, and not by Verus himself, that the military operations were, in fact, conducted.

It was not till late in the year A.D. 162 that Verus, having

with reluctance torn himself from Italy,<sup>26</sup> appeared, with his lieutenants, upon the scene in Syria, and, after vainly offering them terms of peace,<sup>27</sup> commenced hostilities against the triumphant Parthians. The young Emperor did not adventure his own person in the field, but stationed himself at Antioch,<sup>28</sup> where he could enjoy the pleasures and amusements of a luxurious capital, while he committed to his lieutenants the task of recovering Syria and Armenia, and of chastising the invaders. Avidius Cassius, to whom the Syrian legions were entrusted, had a hard task to bring them into proper discipline after their long period of inaction,<sup>29</sup> but succeeded after a while by the use of almost unexampled severities. Attacked by Volagases within the limits of his province, he made a successful defence,<sup>30</sup> and in a short time was able to take the offensive, to defeat Volagases in a great battle near Europus,<sup>31</sup> and (A.D. 163) to drive the Parthians across the Euphrates. The Armenian war was at the same time being pressed by Statius Priscus, who advanced without a check from the frontier to the capital, Artaxata, which he took and (as it seems) destroyed.<sup>32</sup> He then built a new city, which he strongly garrisoned with Roman troops, and sent intelligence of his successes to Rome, whither Soæmus, the expelled monarch, had betaken himself. Soæmus was upon this replaced on the Armenian throne, the task of settling him in the government being deputed to a certain Thucydides, by whose efforts, together with those of Martius Verus, all opposition to the restored monarch was suppressed, and the entire country tranquillized.<sup>33</sup>

Rome had thus in the space of two years recovered her losses, and shown Parthia that she was still well able to maintain the position in Western Asia which she had acquired by the victories of Trajan. But such a measure of success did not content the ambitious generals into whose hands the incompetence of Verus had thrown the real direction of the war. Military distinction at this time offered to a Roman a path to the very highest honors, each successful general becoming at once by force of his position a candidate for the Imperial dignity. Of the various able officers employed under Verus, the most distinguished and the most ambitious was Cassius—a chief who ultimately raised the standard of revolt against Aurelius, and lost his life in consequence.<sup>34</sup> Cassius, after he had succeeded in clearing Syria of the invaders, was made by Aurelius a sort of generalissimo;<sup>35</sup> and being thus free to act as he chose, determined to carry the war into the enemy's country, and to

try if he could not rival, or outdo, the exploits of Trajan fifty years previously. Though we have no continuous narrative of his expedition, we may trace its course with tolerable accuracy in the various fragmentary writings which bear upon the history of the time—from Zeugma, when he crossed the Euphrates into Mesopotamia,<sup>36</sup> to Nicephorium,<sup>37</sup> near the junction of the Belik with the Euphrates; and thence down the course of the stream to Sura<sup>38</sup> (Sippara?) and Babylon.<sup>39</sup> At Sura a battle was fought, in which the Romans were victorious; and then the final efforts were made, which covered Cassius with glory. The great city of Seleucia, upon the Tigris, which had a population of 400,000 souls, was besieged, taken, and burnt, to punish an alleged treason of the inhabitants.<sup>40</sup> Ctesiphon, upon the opposite side of the stream, was occupied, and the summer palace of Volagases there situated was levelled with the ground.<sup>41</sup> The various temples were plundered; secret places, where it was thought treasure might be hid, were examined, and a rich booty was carried off by the invaders. The Parthians, worsted in every encounter, ceased to resist; and all the conquests made by Trajan were recovered. Nor was this all. The Roman general, after conquering the Mesopotamian plain, advanced into the Zagros mountains, and occupied, at any rate, a portion of Media, thereby entitling his Imperial masters to add to the titles of “Armeniacus,” and “Parthicus,” which they had already assumed, the further and wholly novel title of “Medicus.”<sup>42</sup>

But Rome was not to escape the Nemesis which is wont to pursue the over-fortunate. During the stay of the army in Babylonia a disease was contracted of a strange and terrible character, whereto the superstitious fears of the soldiers assigned a supernatural origin. The pestilence, they said, had crept forth from a subterranean cell in the temple of Comæan Apollo at Seleucia,<sup>43</sup> which those who were plundering the town rashly opened in the hope of its containing treasure, but which held nothing except this fearful scourge, placed there in primeval times by the spells of the Chaldeans. Such a belief, however fanciful, was calculated to increase the destructive power of the malady, and so to multiply its victims. Vast numbers of the soldiers perished, we are told, from its effects during the march homeward; their sufferings being further aggravated by the failure of supplies, which was such that many died of famine.<sup>44</sup> The stricken army, upon entering the Roman territory, communicated the infection to the inhab-

tants, and the return of Verus and his troops to Rome was a march of Death through the provinces. The pestilence raged with special force throughout Italy, and spread as far as the Rhine and the Atlantic Ocean.<sup>45</sup> According to one writer<sup>46</sup> more than one half of the entire population, and almost the whole Roman army, was carried off by it.

But though Rome suffered in consequence of the war, its general result was undoubtedly disadvantageous to the Parthians. The expedition of Cassius was the first invasion of Parthia in which Rome had been altogether triumphant. Trajan's campaign had brought about the submission of Armenia to the Romans; but it did not permanently deprive Parthia of any portion of her actual territory. And the successes of the Emperor in his advance were almost balanced by the disasters which accompanied his retreat—disasters so serious as to cause a general belief that Hadrian's concessions sprang more from prudence than from generosity. The war of Verus produced the actual cession to Rome of a Parthian province, which continued thenceforth for centuries to be an integral portion of the Roman Empire.<sup>47</sup> Western Mesopotamia, or the tract between the Euphrates and the Khabour, passed under the dominion of Rome at this time; and, though not reduced to the condition of a province, was none the less lost to Parthia, and absorbed by Rome into her territory. Parthia, moreover, was penetrated by the Roman arms more deeply at this time than she had ever been previously, and was made to feel, as she had never felt before, that in contending with Rome she was fighting a losing battle. It added to the disgrace of her defeats, and to her own sense of their decisive character, that they were inflicted by a mere general, a man of no very great eminence, and one who was far from possessing the free command of those immense resources which Rome had at her disposal.

Parthia had now, in fact, entered upon the third stage of her decline. The first was reached when she ceased to be an aggressive and was content to become a stationary power;<sup>48</sup> the second set in when she began to lose territory by the revolt of her own subjects;<sup>49</sup> the third—which commences at this point—is marked by her inability to protect herself from the attacks of a foreign assailant. The causes of her decline were various. Luxury had no doubt done its ordinary work upon the conquerors of rich and highly-civilized regions, softening down their original ferocity, and rendering them at once less robust in frame and less bold and venturesome in character.

The natural law of exhaustion, which sooner or later affects all races of any distinction, may also not improbably have come into play, rendering the Parthians of the age of Verus very degenerate descendants of those who displayed such brilliant qualities when they contended with Crassus and Mark Antony. Loyalty towards the monarch, and the absolute devotion of every energy to his service, which characterized the earlier times, dwindled and disappeared as the succession became more and more disputed, and the kings less worthy of their subjects' admiration. The strength needed against foreign enemies was, moreover, frequently expended in civil broils; the spirit of patriotism declined; and tameness under insult and indignity took the place of that fierce pride and fiery self-assertion which had once characterized the people.

The war with Rome terminated in the year A.D. 165. Volagases survived its close for at least twenty-five years; but he did not venture at any time to renew the struggle, or to make any effort for the recovery of his lost territory. Once only does he appear to have contemplated an outbreak. When, about the year A.D. 174 or 175, Aurelius being occupied in the west with repelling the attacks of the wild tribes upon the Danube, Avidius Cassius assumed the purple in Syria,<sup>50</sup> and a civil war seemed to be imminent, Volagases appears to have shown an intention of once more taking arms and trying his fortune. A Parthian war was at this time expected to break out by the Romans.<sup>51</sup> But the crisis passed without an actual explosion. The promptness of Aurelius, who, on hearing the news, at once quitted the Danube and marched into Syria, together with the rapid collapse of the Cassian revolt, rendered it imprudent for Volagases to persist in his project. He therefore laid aside all thought of renewing hostilities with Rome; and, on the arrival of Aurelius in Syria, sent ambassadors to him with friendly assurances, who were received favorably by the philosophic Emperor.<sup>52</sup>

Four years after this Marcus Aurelius died,<sup>53</sup> and was succeeded in the purple by his youthful son, Lucius Aurelius Commodus. It might have been expected that the accession of this weak and inexperienced prince would have induced Volagases to resume his warlike projects, and attempt the recovery of Mesopotamia. But the scanty history of the time which has come down to us<sup>54</sup> shows no trace of his having entertained any such design. He had probably reached the age at which repose becomes a distinct object of desire, and is infinitely preferred

to active exertion. At any rate, it is clear that he made no effort. The reign of Commodus was from first to last untroubled by Oriental disturbance. Volgases III. was for ten years contemporary with this mean and unwarlike prince; but Rome was allowed to retain her Parthian conquests unmolested. At length, in A.D. 190 or 191, Volgases died,<sup>55</sup> and the destinies of Parthia passed into the hands of a new monarch.

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## CHAPTER XX.

*Accession of Volgases IV. His Alliance sought by Pescennius Niger. Part taken by Parthia in the Contest between Niger and Severus. Mesopotamia revolts from Rome. First Eastern Expedition of Severus. Its Results. Second Expedition. Successes of Severus. His Failure at Hatra. General Results of the War. Death of Volgases IV.*

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ὁ Σεβήτρος ἐκστρατεύει κατὰ τῶν Πάρθων . . . ἦρχε δ' αὐτῶν Οὐολόγαισος.—  
Dio Cass. lxxv. 9.

ON the death of Volgases III., in A.D. 190 or 191, the Parthian crown fell to another prince of the same name, who was probably the eldest son of the late monarch.<sup>1</sup> This prince was scarcely settled upon the throne when the whole of Western Asia was violently disturbed by the commotions which shook the Roman Empire after the murder of Commodus. The virtuous Pertinax was allowed to reign but three months (A.D. 193, January—March). His successor was scarcely proclaimed when in three different quarters the legionaries rose in arms, and, saluting their commanders as "Emperors," invested them with the purple. Clodius Albinus, in Britain; Severus, in Pannonia; and Pescennius Niger, in Syria, at one and the same time claimed the place which the wretched Julianus had bought, and prepared themselves to maintain their rights against all who should impugn them. It seems that, on the first proclamation of Niger, and before it had become evident that he would have to establish his authority by force of arms, either the Parthian monarch, or at any rate princes who were among his dependants,<sup>2</sup> sent to congratulate the new Emperor

on his accession and to offer him contingents of troops, if he required them. These spontaneous proposals were at the first politely declined, since Niger expected to find himself accepted joyfully as sovereign, and did not look to have to engage in war. When, however, the news reached him that he had formidable competitors, and that Severus, acknowledged Emperor at Rome, was about to set out for the East, at the head of vast forces, he saw that it would be necessary for him, if he were to make head against his powerful rival, to draw together troops from all quarters. Accordingly, towards the close of A.D. 193, he sent envoys to the princes beyond the Euphrates, and especially to the kings of Parthia, Armenia, and Hatra, entreating them to send their troops at once to his aid.<sup>3</sup> Volagases, under these circumstances, appears to have hesitated. He sent an answer that he would issue orders to his satraps for the collection of a force, but made no haste to redeem his promise, and in fact refrained from despatching any body of distinctly Parthian troops to the assistance of Niger in the impending struggle.

While, however, thus abstaining from direct interference in the contest between the two Roman pretenders, Volagases appears to have allowed one of his dependent monarchs to mix himself up in the quarrel. Hatra, at this time the capital of an Arabian community,<sup>4</sup> and the chief city of central Mesopotamia (or the tract between the Sinjar and the Babylonian alluvium), was a dependency of Parthia, and though, like so many other Parthian dependencies, it possessed its native kings,<sup>5</sup> cannot have been in a position to engage in a great war without permission from the Court of Ctesiphon. When, therefore, we find that Barsemius, the King of Hatra, not only received the envoys of Niger favorably, but actually sent to his aid a body of archers,<sup>6</sup> we must understand that Volagases sanctioned the measure. Probably he thought it prudent to secure the friendship of the pretender whom he expected to be successful, but sought to effect this in the way that would compromise him least if the result of the struggle should be other than he looked for. The sending of his own troops to the camp of Niger would have committed him irretrievably; but the actions of a vassal monarch might with some plausibility be disclaimed.

As the struggle between the two pretenders progressed in the early months of A.D. 194, the nations beyond the Euphrates grew bolder, and allowed themselves to indulge their natural feelings of hostility towards the Romans. The newly subjected

Mesopotamians flew to arms, massacred most of the Roman detachments stationed about their country, and laid siege to Nisibis,<sup>7</sup> which since the cession Rome had made her head-quarters. The natives of the region were assisted by their kindred races across the Tigris, particularly by the people of Adiabêné,<sup>8</sup> who, like the Arabs of Hatra, were Parthian vassals. Severus had no sooner overcome his rival and slain him, than he hastened eastward with the object of relieving the troops shut up in Nisibis, and of chastising the rebels and their abettors. It was in vain that the Mesopotamians sought to disarm his resentment by declaring that they had taken up arms in his cause, and had been only anxious to distress and injure the partisans of his antagonist. Though they sent ambassadors to him with presents, and offered to make restitution of the Roman spoil still in their hands, and of the Roman prisoners, it was observed that they said nothing about restoring the strongholds which they had taken, or resuming the position of Roman tributaries. On the contrary, they required that all Roman soldiers still in their country should be withdrawn from it, and that their independence should henceforth be respected.<sup>9</sup> As Severus was not inclined to surrender Roman territory without a contest, war was at once declared. His immediate adversaries were of no great account, being, as they were, the petty kings of Osrhoêné, Adiabêné, and Hatra; but behind them loomed the massive form of the Parthian State, which was attacked through them, and could not be indifferent to their fortunes.

In the spring of A.D. 195, Severus, at the head of his troops, crossed the Euphrates in person, and taking up his own quarters at Nisibis, which the Mesopotamians had been unable to capture, proceeded to employ his generals in the reduction of the rebels and the castigation of their aiders and abettors. Though his men suffered considerably from the scarcity and badness of the water,<sup>10</sup> yet he seems to have found no great difficulty in reducing Mesopotamia once more into subjection. Having brought it completely under, and formally made Nisibis the capital, at the same time raising it to the dignified position of a Roman colony,<sup>11</sup> he caused his troops to cross the Tigris into Adiabêné, and, though the inhabitants offered a stout resistance, succeeded in making himself master of the country.<sup>12</sup> The Parthian monarch seems to have made no effort to prevent the occupation of this province. He stood probably on the defensive, expecting to be attacked,



LATER COINS OF ARTAXERXES I.



COIN OF HORMISDAS I.

Fig 2.



R

COINS OF SAPOR I.

Fig 4.

Fig. 5.

Fig. 6.



COIN OF VARAHRAN I.




HEAD OF SAPOR I.  
(from a gem).




COIN OF VARAHRAN II.

Fig. 7.



COIN OF SAPOR I.



YRAHAN II. ADDRESSING HIS NOBLES.

in or near his capital. But Severus could not afford to remain in these remote regions. He had still a rival in the West in the person of Clodius Albinus, who might be expected to descend upon Italy, if it were left exposed to his attacks much longer. He therefore quitted the East early in A.D. 196, and returned to Rome with all speed, leaving Parthia very insufficiently chastised, and his new conquests very incompletely settled.

Scarcely was he gone when the war broke out with greater violence than ever. Volagases took the offensive, recovered Adiabêné, and crossing the Tigris into Mesopotamia, swept the Romans from the open country. Nisibis alone, which two years before had defied all the efforts of the Mesopotamians, held out against him, and even this stronghold was within a little of being taken.<sup>13</sup> According to one writer,<sup>14</sup> the triumphant Parthians even crossed the Euphrates, and once more spread themselves over the fertile plains of Syria. Severus was forced in A.D. 197 to make a second Eastern expedition, to recover his lost glory and justify the titles which he had taken. On his first arrival in Syria, he contented himself with expelling the Parthians from the province, nor was it till late in the year,<sup>15</sup> that, having first made ample preparation, he crossed the Euphrates into Mesopotamia.

The success of any expedition against Parthia depended greatly on the dispositions of the semi-dependent princes, who possessed territories bordering upon those of the two great empires. Among these the most important were at this time the kings of Armenia and Osrhoêné. Armenia had at the period of Niger's attempt been solicited by his emissaries; but its monarch had then refused to take any part in the civil conflict.<sup>16</sup> Subsequently, however, he in some way offended Severus, who, when he reached the East, regarded Armenia as a hostile State requiring instant subjugation.<sup>17</sup> It seems to have been in the summer of A.D. 197, soon after his first arrival in Syria, that Severus despatched a force against the Armenian prince, who was named (like the Parthian monarch of the time) Volagases. That prince mustered his troops and met the invaders at the frontier of his kingdom. A battle seemed imminent; but ere the fortune of war was tried the Armenian made an application for a truce, which was granted by the Roman leaders. A breathing-space being thus gained, Volagases sent ambassadors with presents and hostages to the Roman emperor in Syria, professed to be animated by friendly feelings

towards Rome, and entreated Severus to allow him terms of peace. Severus permitted himself to be persuaded; a formal treaty was made, and the Armenian prince even received an enlargement of his previous territory at the hands of his mollified suzerain.<sup>18</sup>

The Osrhoënian monarch, who bore the usual name of Abgarus, made a more complete and absolute submission. He came in person into the emperor's camp, accompanied by a numerous body of archers, and bringing with him his sons as hostages.<sup>19</sup> Severus must have hailed with especial satisfaction the adhesion of this chieftain, which secured him the undisturbed possession of Western Mesopotamia as far as the junction of the Khabour with the Euphrates. It was his design to proceed himself by the Euphrates route,<sup>20</sup> while he sent detachments under other leaders to ravage Eastern Mesopotamia and Adiabêné,<sup>21</sup> which had evidently been re-occupied by the Parthians. To secure his army from want, he determined, like Trajan,<sup>22</sup> to build a fleet of ships in Upper Mesopotamia, where suitable timber abounded, and to march his army down the left bank of the Euphrates into Babylonia, while his transports, laden with stores, descended the course of the river.<sup>23</sup> In this way he reached the neighborhood of Ctesiphon without suffering any loss, and easily captured the two great cities of Babylon and Seleucia, which on his approach were evacuated by their garrisons. He then proceeded to the attack of Ctesiphon itself, passing his ships probably through one of the canals which united the Tigris with the Euphrates, or else (like Trajan) conveying them on rollers across the neck of land which separates the two rivers.

Volagases had taken up his own position at Ctesiphon, bent on defending his capital. It is possible that the approach of Severus by the line of march which he pursued was unexpected,<sup>24</sup> and that the sudden presence of the Romans before the walls of Ctesiphon came upon the Parthian monarch as a surprise. He seems, at any rate, to have made but a poor resistance. It may be gathered, indeed, from one author<sup>25</sup> that he met the invaders in the open field, and fought a battle in defence of Ctesiphon before allowing himself to be shut up within its walls. But after the city was once invested it appears to have been quickly taken. We hear of no such resistance as that which was soon afterwards offered by Hatra. The soldiers of Severus succeeded in storming Ctesiphon on the first assault; the Parthian monarch betook himself to

flight, accompanied by a few horsemen;<sup>26</sup> and the seat of empire thus fell easily—a second time within the space of eighty-two years—into the hands of a foreign invader. The treatment of the city was such as we might expect from the ordinary character of Roman warfare. A general massacre of the male population was made. The soldiers were allowed to plunder both the public and the private buildings at their pleasure. The precious metals accumulated in the royal treasury were seized, and the chief ornaments of the palace were taken and carried off. Nor did blood and plunder content the victors. After slaughtering the adult males they made prize of the women and children, who were torn from their homes without compunction and led into captivity, to the number of a hundred thousand.<sup>27</sup>

Notwithstanding the precautions which he had taken, Severus appears to have become straitened for supplies about the time that he captured Ctesiphon. His soldiers were compelled for some days to exist on roots, which produced a dangerous dysentery.<sup>28</sup> He found himself unable to pursue Volagases,<sup>29</sup> and recognized the necessity of retreating before disaster overtook him. He could not, however, return by the route of the Euphrates, since his army had upon its advance completely exhausted the resources of the Euphrates region.<sup>30</sup> The line of the Tigris was therefore preferred for the retreat; and while the ships with difficulty made their way up the course of the stream, the army pursued its march upon the banks, without, so far as appears, any molestation. It happened, however, that the route selected led Severus near to the small state of Hatra, which had given him special offence by supporting the cause of his rival, Niger; and it seemed to him of importance that the inhabitants should receive condign punishment for this act of audacity. He may also have hoped to eclipse the fame of Trajan by the capture of a town which had successfully resisted that hero.<sup>31</sup> He therefore stopped his march in order to lay siege to the place, which he attacked with military engines, and with all the other offensive means known at the time to the Romans. His first attempt was, however, easily repulsed.<sup>32</sup> The walls of the town were strong, its defenders brave and full of enterprise. They burnt the siege-machines brought against them, and committed great havoc among the soldiers. Under these circumstances disorders broke out among the besiegers; mutinous words were heard; and the emperor thought himself compelled to have recourse to

severe measures of repression. Having put to death two of his chief officers.<sup>33</sup> and then found it necessary to deny that he had given orders for the execution of one of them, he broke up from before the place and removed his camp to a distance.

He had not, however, as yet relinquished the hope of bringing his enterprise to a successful issue. In the security of his distant camp he constructed fresh engines in increased numbers, collected an abundant supply of provisions, and made every preparation for renewing the siege with effect at no remote period.<sup>34</sup> The treasures stored up in the city were reported to be great, especially those which the piety of successive generations had accumulated in the Temple of the Sun.<sup>35</sup> This rich booty appealed forcibly to the cupidity of the emperor, while his honor seemed to require that he should not suffer a comparatively petty town to defy his arms with impunity. He, therefore, after a short absence retraced his steps, and appeared a second time before Hatra with a stronger siege-train and a better appointed army than before. But the Hatreni met his attack with a resolution equal to his own. They were excellent archers; they possessed a powerful force of cavalry; they knew their walls to be strong; and they were masters of a peculiar kind of fire, which was calculated to terrify and alarm, if not greatly to injure, an enemy unacquainted with its qualities.<sup>36</sup> Severus once more lost almost all his machines; the Hatrene cavalry severely handled his foragers; his men for a long time made but little impression upon the walls, while they suffered grievously from the enemy's slingers<sup>37</sup> and archers, from his warlike engines, and especially, we are told, from the fiery darts which were rained upon them incessantly.<sup>38</sup> However, after enduring these various calamities for a length of time, the perseverance of the Romans was rewarded by the formation of a practicable breach in the outer wall; and the soldiers demanded to be led to the assault, confident in their power to force an entrance and carry the place.<sup>39</sup> But the emperor resisted their inclination. He did not wish that the city should be stormed, since in that case it must have been given up to indiscriminate pillage, and the treasures which he coveted would have become the prey of the soldiery. The Hatreni, he thought, would make their submission, if he only gave them a little time, now that they must see further resistance to be hopeless. He waited therefore a day, expecting an offer of surrender. But the Hatreni made no sign, and in the night restored their wall where it had been broken down.

Severus then made up his mind to sacrifice the treasures on which his heart had been set, and, albeit with reluctance, gave the word for the assault. But now the legionaries refused. They had been forbidden to attack when success was certain and the danger trivial—they were now required to imperil their lives while the result could not but be doubtful. Perhaps they divined the emperor's motive in withholding them from the assault, and resented it; at any rate they openly declined to execute his orders. After a vain attempt to force an entrance by means of his Asiatic allies, Severus desisted from his undertaking. The summer was far advanced;<sup>40</sup> the heat was great; disease had broken out among his troops; above all, they had become demoralized, and their obedience could no longer be depended on.<sup>41</sup> Severus broke up from before Hatra a second time, after having besieged it for twenty days,<sup>42</sup> and returned—by what route we are not told—into Syria.

Nothing is more surprising in the history of this campaign than the inaction and apparent apathy of the Parthians. Volagases, after quitting his capital, seems to have made no effort at all to hamper or harass his adversary. The prolonged resistance of Hatra, the sufferings of the Romans, their increasing difficulties with respect to provisions, the injurious effect of the summer heats upon their unacclimatized constitutions, would have been irresistible temptations to a prince of any spirit or energy, inducing him to advance as the Romans retired, to hang upon their rear, to cut off their supplies, and to render their retreat difficult, if not disastrous. Volagases appears to have remained wholly inert and passive. His conduct is only explicable by the consideration of the rapid decline which Parthia was now undergoing, of the general decay of patriotic spirit, and the sea of difficulties into which a monarch was plunged who had to retreat before an invader.

The expedition of Severus was on the whole glorious for Rome, and disastrous for Parthia, though the glory of the victor was tarnished at the close by his failure before Hatra. It cost Parthia a second province. The Roman emperor not only recovered his previous position in Mesopotamia, but overstepping the Tigris, established the Roman dominion firmly in the fertile tract between that stream and the Zagros mountain-range. The title of "Adiabenicus" became no empty boast. Adiabêné, or the tract between the Zab rivers—probably including at this time the entire low region at the foot of Zagros

from the eastern Khabour on the north to the Adhem towards the south—passed under the dominion of Rome, the monarch of the country, hitherto a Parthian vassal, becoming her tributary.<sup>43</sup> Thus the imperial standards were planted permanently at a distance less than a degree from the Parthian capital, which, with the great cities of Seleucia and Babylon in its neighborhood, was exposed to be captured almost at any moment by a sudden and rapid inroad.

Volagases survived his defeat by Severus about ten or eleven years. For this space Parthian history is once more a blank, our authorities containing no notice that directly touches Parthia during the period in question. The stay of Severus in the East<sup>44</sup> during the years A.D. 200 and 201, would seem to indicate that the condition of the Oriental provinces was unsettled and required the presence of the Emperor. But we hear of no effort made by Parthia at this time to recover her losses—of no further collision between her troops and those of Rome; and we may assume therefore that peace was preserved, and that the Parthian monarch acquiesced, however unwillingly, in the curtailment of his territory. Probably internal, no less than external, difficulties pressed upon him. The diminution of Parthian prestige which had been brought about by the successive victories of Trajan, Avidius Cassius, and Severus must have loosened the ties which bound to Parthia the several vassal kingdoms. Her suzerainty had been accepted as that of the Asiatic nation most competent to make head against European intruders, and secure the native races in continued independence of a wholly alien power.<sup>45</sup> It may well have appeared at this time to the various vassal states that the Parthian vigor had become effete, that the qualities which had advanced the race to the leadership of Western Asia were gone, and that unless some new power could be raised up to act energetically against Rome, the West would obtain complete dominion over the East, and Asia be absorbed into Europe. Thoughts of this kind, fermenting among the subject populations, would produce a general debility, a want both of power and of inclination to make any combined effort, a desire to wait until an opportunity of acting with effect should offer. Hence probably the deadness and apathy which characterize this period, and which seem at first sight so astonishing. Distrust of their actual leader paralyzed the nations of Western Asia, and they did not as yet see their way clearly towards placing themselves under any other guidance.

Volagases IV. reigned till A.D. 208-9, dying thus about two years before his great adversary, who expired<sup>46</sup> at York, February 4, A.D. 211.

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## CHAPTER XXI.

*Struggle between the two Sons of Volagases IV., Volagases V. and Artabanus. Continued Sovereignty of both Princes. Ambition of Caracallus. His Proceedings in the East. His Resolve to quarrel with Parthia. First Proposal made by him to Artabanus. Perplexity of Artabanus. Caracallus invades Parthia. His Successes, and Death. Macrinus, defeated by Artabanus, consents to Terms of Peace. Revolt of the Persians under Artaxerxes. Prolonged Struggle. Death of Artabanus, and Downfall of the Parthian Empire.*

Τελευταίος γέγονεν ὁ Ἀρτάβανος.—Dio Cass. lxxx. 3.

ON the death of Volagases IV., the Parthian crown was disputed between his two sons, Artabanus and Volagases. According to the classical writers, the contest resulted in favor of the former, whom they regard as undisputed sovereign of the Parthians, at any rate from the year A.D. 216.<sup>1</sup> It appears, however, from the Parthian coins, that both the brothers claimed and exercised sovereignty during the entire term of seventeen or eighteen years which intervened between the death of Volagases IV. and the revolt of the Persians.<sup>2</sup> Artabanus must beyond all doubt have acquired the sole rule in the western portions of the empire, since (from A.D. 216 to A.D. 226) he was the only monarch known to the Romans. But Volagases may at the same time have been recognized in the more eastern provinces, and may have maintained himself in power in those remote regions without interfering with his brother's dominion in the West. Still this division of the empire must naturally have tended to weaken it; and the position of Volagases has to be taken into account in estimating the difficulties under which the last monarch of the Arsacid series found himself placed—difficulties to which, after a struggle, he was at last forced to succumb. Domestic

dissension, wars with a powerful neighbor (Rome), and internal disaffection and rebellion formed a combination, against which the last Parthian monarch, albeit a man of considerable energy, strove in vain. But he strove bravely; and the closing scenes of the empire, in which he bore the chief part, are not unworthy of its best and palmiest days.

An actual civil war appears to have raged between the two brothers for some years. Caracallus, who in A.D. 211 succeeded his father, Severus, as Emperor of Rome, congratulated the Senate in A.D. 212 on the strife still going on in Parthia, which could not fail (he said) to inflict serious injury on that hostile state.<sup>3</sup> The balance of advantage seems at first to have inclined towards Volagases, whom Caracallus acknowledged as monarch of Parthia<sup>4</sup> in the year A.D. 215. But soon after this the fortune of war must have turned; for subsequently to the year A.D. 215, we hear nothing more of Volagases, but find Caracallus negotiating with Artabanus instead, and treating with him as undisputed monarch of the entire Parthian empire.<sup>5</sup> That this was not his real position, appears from the coins; but the classical evidence may be accepted as showing that from the year A.D. 216, Volagases ceased to have much power, sinking from the rank of a rival monarch into that of a mere pretender, who may have caused some trouble to the established sovereign, but did not inspire serious alarm.

Artabanus, having succeeded in reducing his brother to this condition, and obtained a general acknowledgment of his claims, found himself almost immediately in circumstances of much difficulty. From the moment of his accession, Caracallus had exhibited an inordinate ambition; and this ambition had early taken the shape of a special desire for the glory of Oriental conquests. The weak and dissolute son of Severus fancied himself, and called himself, a second Alexander;<sup>6</sup> and thus he was in honor bound to imitate that hero's marvellous exploits. The extension of the Roman territory towards the East became very soon his great object, and he shrank from no steps, however base and dishonorable, which promised to conduce towards the accomplishment of his wishes. As early as A.D. 212 he summoned Abgarus, the tributary king of Osrhoêné, into his presence, and when he unsuspectingly complied, seized him, threw him into prison, and declaring his territories forfeited, reduced them into the form of a Roman province.<sup>7</sup> Successful in this bold proceeding, he attempted to deal with Armenia in the same way; but, though the

monarch fell foolishly into the trap set for him, the nation was not so easily managed. The Armenians flew to arms on learning the imprisonment of their king and royal family;<sup>8</sup> and when, three year afterwards (A.D. 215), Caracallus sent a Roman army under Theocritus, one of his favorites, to chastise them, they inflicted a severe defeat on their assailant.<sup>9</sup> But the desire of Caracallus to effect Oriental conquests was increased, rather than diminished, by this occurrence. He had sought a quarrel with Parthia as early as A.D. 214, when he demanded of Volagases the surrender of two refugees of distinction.<sup>10</sup> The rupture, which he courted, was deferred by the discreditable compliance of the Great King with his requisition.<sup>11</sup>

Volagases surrendered the two unfortunates; and the Roman Emperor was compelled to declare himself satisfied with the concession. But a year had not elapsed before he had devised a new plan of attack and proceeded to put it in execution.

Volagases V. was about this time compelled to yield the western capital to his brother; and Artabanus IV. became the representative of Parthian power in the eyes of the Romans. Caracallus in the summer of A.D. 215, having transferred his residence from Nicomedia to Antioch, sent ambassadors from the last-named place to Artabanus, who were to present the Parthian monarch with presents of unusual magnificence,<sup>12</sup> and to make him an unheard-of proposition. "The Roman Emperor," said the despatch with which they were intrusted, "could not fitly wed the daughter of a subject or accept the position of son-in-law to a private person. No one could be a suitable wife to him who was not a princess. He therefore asked the Parthian monarch for the hand of his daughter. Rome and Parthia divided between them the sovereignty of the world; united, as they would be by this marriage, no longer recognizing any boundary as separating them, they would constitute a power that could not but be irresistible. It would be easy for them to reduce under their sway all the barbarous races on the skirts of their empires, and to hold them in subjection by a flexible system of administration and government. The Roman infantry was the best in the world, and in steady hand-to-hand fighting must be allowed to be unrivalled. The Parthians surpassed all nations in the number of their cavalry and in the excellency of their archers. If these advantages, instead of being separated, were combined, and the various elements on which success in war depends

were thus brought into harmonious union, there could be no difficulty in establishing and maintaining a universal monarchy. Were that done, the Parthian spices and rare stuffs, as also the Roman metals and manufactures, would no longer need to be imported secretly and in small quantities by merchants, but, as the two countries would form together but one nation and one state, there would be a free interchange among all the citizens of their various products and commodities."<sup>13</sup>

The recital of this despatch threw the Parthian monarch into extreme perplexity. He did not believe that the proposals made to him were serious, or intended to have an honorable issue. The project broached appeared to him altogether extravagant, and such as no one in his senses could entertain for a moment. Yet he was anxious not to offend the master of two-and-thirty legions,<sup>14</sup> nor even to give him a pretext for a rupture of amicable relations. Accordingly he temporized, contenting himself with setting forth some objections to the request of Caracallus, and asking to be excused compliance with it.<sup>15</sup> "Such a union, as Caracallus proposed, could scarcely," he said, "prove a happy one. The wife and husband, differing in language, habits, and mode of life, could not but become estranged from one another. There was no lack of patricians at Rome, possessing daughters with whom the emperor might wed as suitably as the Parthian kings did with the females of their own royal house. It was not fit that either family should sully its blood by mixture with the other."

There is some doubt whether Caracallus construed this response as an absolute refusal, and thereupon undertook his expedition, or whether he regarded it as inviting further negotiation, and sent a second embassy, whose arguments and persuasions induced Artabanus to consent to the proposed alliance. The contemporary historian, Dio, states positively that Artabanus refused to give his daughter to the Roman monarch, and that Caracallus undertook his expedition to avenge this insult;<sup>16</sup> but Herodian, another contemporary, declares exactly the reverse. According to him, the Roman Emperor, on receiving the reply of Artabanus, sent a new embassy to urge his suit, and to protest with oaths that he was in earnest and had the most friendly intentions. Artabanus upon this yielded, addressed Caracallus as his son-in-law, and invited him to come and fetch home his bride.<sup>17</sup> Herodian describes with much minuteness, and with a good deal of picturesque effect, the stately march of the Imperial prince through the Parthian

territory, the magnificent welcome which he received, and the peaceful meeting of the two kings in the plain before Ctesiphon, which was suddenly interrupted by the meditated treason of the crafty Roman. Taken at disadvantage, the Parthian monarch with difficulty escaped, while his soldiers and other subjects, incapable of making any resistance, were slaughtered like sheep by their assailants, who then plundered and ravaged the Parthian territory at their will, and returned laden with spoil into Mesopotamia. In general, Dio is a more trustworthy authority than Herodian, and most moderns have therefore preferred his version of the story.<sup>18</sup> But it may be questioned whether in this particular case the truth has not been best preserved by the historian on whom under ordinary circumstances we place less dependence. If so disgraceful an outrage as that described by Herodian was, indeed, committed by the head of the Roman State on a foreign potentate, Dio, as a great State official, would naturally be anxious to gloss it over. There are, moreover, internal difficulties in his narrative;<sup>19</sup> and on more than one point of importance he contradicts not only Herodian, but also Spartianus.<sup>20</sup> It is therefore not improbable that Herodian has given with most truth the general outline of the expedition of Caracallus, though, with that love of effect which characterizes him, he may have unduly embellished the narrative.

The advance of Caracallus was, if Spartianus is to be believed, through Babylonia.<sup>21</sup> The return may have been (as Dio seems to indicate that it was<sup>22</sup>) by the way of the Tigris, through Adiabêné and Upper Mesopotamia. It was doubtless on the return that Caracallus committed a second and wholly wanton outrage upon the feelings of his adversary, by violating the sanctity of the Parthian royal sepulchres, and dispersing their contents to the four winds. These tombs were situated at Arbela, in Adiabêné, a place which seems to have been always regarded as in some sort a City of the Dead.<sup>23</sup> The useless insult and impiety were worthy of one who, like Caracallus, was "equally devoid of judgment and humanity," and who has been pronounced by the most unimpassioned of historians to have been "the common enemy of mankind."<sup>24</sup> A severe reckoning was afterwards exacted for the indignity, which was felt by the Parthians with all the keenness wherewith Orientals are wont to regard any infringement of the sanctity of the grave.

Caracallus appears to have passed the winter at Edessa,

amusing himself with hunting and charioteering after the fatigues of his campaign.<sup>25</sup> In the spring he threatened another advance into Parthian territory, and threw the Medes and Parthians into great alarm.<sup>26</sup> He had not, however, the opportunity of renewing his attack. On April 8, A.D. 217, having quitted Edessa with a small retinue for the purpose of visiting a famous temple of the Moon-God near Carrhæ, he was surprised and murdered on the way by Julius Martialis, one of his guards.<sup>27</sup> His successor, Macrinus, though a Prætorian prefect, was no soldier, and would willingly have retired at once from the war. But the passions of the Parthians had been roused. Artabanus possessed the energy and spirit which most of the recent monarchs had lacked; and though defeated when taken at disadvantage, and unable for some months to obtain any revenge, had employed the winter in the collection of a vast army, and was determined to exact a heavy retribution for the treacherous massacre of Ctesiphon and the wanton impiety of Arbela. He had already taken the field and conducted his troops to the neighborhood of the Roman frontier when Caracallus lost his life. Macrinus was scarcely acknowledged emperor when he found that the Parthians were close at hand, that the frontier was crossed, and that unless a treaty could be concluded he must risk a battle.<sup>28</sup>

Under these circumstances the unwarlike emperor hurriedly sent ambassadors to the Parthian camp, with an offer to restore all the prisoners made in the late campaign as the price of peace. Artabanus unhesitatingly rejected the overture, but at the same time informed his adversary of the terms on which he was willing to treat. Macrinus, he said, must not only restore the prisoners, but must also consent to rebuild all the towns and castles which Caracallus had laid in ruins, must make compensation for the injury done to the tombs of the kings, and further must cede Mesopotamia to the Parthians.<sup>29</sup> It was impossible for a Roman Emperor to consent to such demands without first trying the fortune of war, and Macrinus accordingly made up his mind to fight a battle. The Parthian prince had by this time advanced as far as Nisibis, and it was in the neighborhood of that city that the great struggle took place.

The battle of Nisibis, which terminated the long contest between Rome and Parthia, was the fiercest and best-contested which was ever fought between the rival powers. It lasted for the space of three days.<sup>30</sup> The army of Artabanus was numer-

ous and well-appointed: like almost every Parthian force, it was strong in cavalry and archers; and it had moreover a novel addition of considerable importance, consisting of a corps of picked soldiers, clad in complete armor, and carrying long spears or lances, who were mounted on camels.<sup>31</sup> The Roman legionaries were supported by numerous light-armed troops, and a powerful body of Mauritanian cavalry.<sup>32</sup> According to Dio, the first engagement was brought on accidentally by a contest which arose among the soldiers for the possession of a watering-place.<sup>33</sup> Herodian tells us that it commenced with a fierce assault of the Parthian cavalry, who charged the Romans with loud shouts, and poured into their ranks flight after flight of arrows. A long struggle followed. The Romans suffered greatly from the bows of the horse-archers, and from the lances of the corps mounted on camels; and though, when they could reach their enemy, they had always the superiority in close combat, yet after a while their losses from the cavalry and camels forced them to retreat. As they retired they strewed the ground with spiked balls and other contrivances for injuring the feet of animals; and this stratagem was so far successful that the pursuers soon found themselves in difficulties, and the armies respectively retired, without any decisive result, to their camps.

The next day there was again a combat from morning to night, of which we have no description, but which equally terminated without any clear advantage to either side.<sup>34</sup> The fight was then renewed for the third time on the third day, with the difference that the Parthians now directed all their efforts towards surrounding the enemy, and thus capturing their entire force.<sup>35</sup> As they greatly outnumbered the Romans, these last found themselves compelled to extend their line unduly, in order to meet the Parthian tactics; and the weakness of the extended line seems to have given the Parthians an opportunity of throwing it into confusion, and thus causing the Roman defeat.<sup>36</sup> Macrinus took to flight among the first; and his hasty retreat discouraged his troops,<sup>37</sup> who soon afterwards acknowledged themselves beaten, and retired within the lines of their camp. Both armies had suffered severely. Herodian describes the heaps of dead as piled to such a height that the manœuvres of the troops were impeded by them, and at last the two contending hosts could scarcely see one another! Both armies, therefore, desired peace.<sup>38</sup> The soldiers of Macrinus, who had never had much confidence in their leader, were de

moralized by ill success, and showed themselves inclined to throw off the restraints of discipline. Those of Artabanus, a militia rather than a standing force, were unaccustomed to sustained efforts; and having been now for some months in the field, had grown weary, and wished to return home. Macrinus under these circumstances re-opened negotiations with his adversary. He was prepared to concede something more than he had proposed originally, and he had reason to believe that the Parthian monarch, having found the Roman resistance so stubborn, would be content to insist on less. The event justified his expectations. Artabanus relinquished his demand for the cession of Mesopotamia, and accepted a pecuniary compensation for his wrongs. Besides restoring the captives and the booty carried off by Caracallus in his raid, Macrinus had to pay a sum exceeding a million and a half of our money. Rome thus concluded her transactions with Parthia, after nearly three centuries of struggle, by ignominiously purchasing a peace.<sup>39</sup>

It might have been expected that the glory of this achievement would have brought the troubles of Artabanus to a close; and if they did not cause the pretender who still disputed his possession of the throne to submit, would at any rate have put an end to any disaffection on the part of the subject nations that the previous ill-success of Parthia in her Roman wars might have provoked. But in the histories of nations and empires we constantly find that noble and gallant efforts to retrieve disaster and prevent the ruin consequent upon it come too late. When matters have gathered to a head, when steps that commit important persons have been taken, when classes or races have been encouraged to cherish hopes, when plans have been formed and advanced to a certain point, the course of action that has been contemplated and arranged for cannot suddenly be given up. The cause of discontent is removed, but the effects remain. Affections have been alienated, and the alienation still continues. A certain additional resentment is even felt at the tardy repentance, or revival, which seems to cheat the discontented of that general sympathy whereof without it they would have been secure. In default of their original grievance, it is easy for them to discover minor ones, to exaggerate these into importance, and to find in them a sufficient reason for persistence in the intended course. Hence revolutions often take place just when the necessity for them seems to be past, and kingdoms perish at a time when they have begun to show themselves deserving of a longer term of life.


It is impossible at the present day to form any trustworthy estimate of the real value of those grounds of complaint which the Persians, in common doubtless with other subject races, thought that they had against the Parthian rule. We can well understand that the supremacy of any dominant race is irksome to the aliens who have to submit to it; but such information as we possess fails to show us either anything seriously oppressive in the general system of the Parthian government, or any special grievance whereof the Persians had to complain. The Parthians were tolerant; they did not interfere with the religious prejudices of their subjects, or attempt to enforce uniformity of creed or worship. Their military system did not press over-heavily on the subject peoples, nor is there any reason to believe that the scale of their taxation was excessive. Such tyranny as is charged upon certain Parthian monarchs is not of a kind that would have been sensibly felt by the conquered nations, for it was exercised upon none who were not Parthians. If we endeavor to form a distinct notion of the grievances under which the Persians suffered, they seem to have amounted to no more than this: 1. That high offices, whether military or civil, were for the most part confined to those of Parthian blood, and not thrown open to Parthian subjects generally; 2. That the priests of the Persian religion were not held in any special honor,<sup>40</sup> but placed merely on a par with the religious ministers of the other subject races; 3. That no advantage in any respect was allowed to the Persians over the rest of the conquered peoples, notwithstanding that they had for so many years exercised supremacy over Western Asia, and given to the list of Asiatic worthies such names as those of Cyrus and Darius Hystaspis. It must, however, be confessed that the account which has come down to us of the times in question is exceedingly meagre and incomplete; that we cannot say whether the Persians had not also other grounds of complaint besides those that are known to us; and, more especially, that we have no means of determining what the actual pressure of the grievances complained of was, or whether it did not reach to that degree of severity which moderns mostly hold to justify disaffection and rebellion. On the whole, perhaps, our conclusion must be, that the best justification of the outbreak is to be found in its success. The Parthians had no right to their position but such as arose out of the law of the stronger—

The ancient rule, the good old plan,  
That those shall take who have the power,  
And those shall keep who can—

when the time came that they had lost this pre-eminence, superiority in strength having passed from them to a nation hitherto counted among their subjects, it was natural and right that the seat of authority should shift with the shift in the balance of power, and that the leadership of the Persians should be once more recognized.

If the motives which actuated the nation of the Persians in rising against their masters are thus obscure and difficult to be estimated, still less can we form any decided judgment upon those which caused their leader, Artaxerxes, to attempt his perilous enterprise. Could we trust implicitly the statement of Agathias, that Artaxerxes was himself a Magus, initiated in the deepest mysteries of the Order,<sup>41</sup> we should have grounds for considering that religious zeal was, at any rate, a leading motive of his conduct. It is certain that among the principal changes consequent upon his success was a religious revolution—the substitution for Parthian tolerance of all faiths and worships, of a rigidly enforced uniformity in religion, the establishment of the Magi in power, and the bloody persecution of all such as declined obedience to the precepts of Zoroaster.<sup>42</sup> But the conjecture has been made, and cannot be refuted, that the proceedings of Artaxerxes in this matter should be ascribed to policy rather than to bigotry,<sup>43</sup> and in that case we could not regard him as originally inspired by a religious sentiment. Perhaps it is best to suppose that, like most founders of empires, he was mainly prompted by ambition; that he saw in the distracted state of Parthia and in the awakening of hope among the subject races, an occasion of which he determined to avail himself as far as he could, and that he was gradually led on to enlarge his views and to effect the great revolution, which he brought about, by the force of circumstances, the wishes of others, and the occurrence of opportunities which at first he neither foresaw nor desired.

It has been observed,<sup>44</sup> that Parthia was, during the whole reign of Artaxerxes, distracted by the claims of a pretender, Volagases V. According to Moses of Chorêné, two branches of the Arsacid family, both of them settled in Bactria, were at feud with the reigning prince; and these offended relatives carried their enmity to such a length as to consider sub-



VARAHRAN II. RECEIVING THE SUBMISSION OF THE SOGESTANI.




Fig. 1.

HEAD OF NARSES (after Flaminio).



Fig. 2.

COINS OF NARSES.



Fig. 4

HORMISDAS II. (from a Gem).



COIN OF HORMISDAS II.



Fig. 3.

COIN OF VARAHRAN III.

mission to a foreigner a less evil than subjection to the *de facto* head of their house.<sup>45</sup> The success of Artabanus in the war against Rome had no effect upon his domestic foes; and Artaxerxes undoubtedly knew that, if he raised the standard of revolt, he might count on a certain amount of support from discontented Arsacids and their followers. But his main reliance must have been on the Persians. The Persians had, in the original arrangements of the Parthian empire, been treated with a certain amount of favor. They had been allowed to retain their native monarchs,<sup>46</sup> a concession which naturally involved the continuance of the nation's laws, customs, and traditions. Their religion had not been persecuted, and had even in the early times attracted a considerable amount of Court favor.<sup>47</sup> But it would seem that latterly the privileges of the nation had been diminished, while their prejudices were wantonly shocked. The Magi had ceased to be regarded as of much account,<sup>48</sup> and, if they still formed nominally a portion of the king's council, can have had little influence on the conduct of affairs by the government. Such a custom as that of burning the dead, which seems to have been the rule in the later Parthian times,<sup>49</sup> could never have maintained its ground, if the opinion of the Magi, or their co-religionists, had been considered of much account.

Encouraged by the dissensions prevailing in the Parthian royal house, strong in the knowledge of his fellow-countrymen's discontent, and perhaps thinking that the losses which Artabanus had sustained in his three days' battle against the Romans under Macrinus had seriously weakened his military strength, Artaxerxes, tributary king of Persia under Parthia,<sup>50</sup> about A.D. 220,<sup>51</sup> or a little later, took up arms against his master, and in a little time succeeded in establishing the independence of Persia Proper, or the modern province of Fars.<sup>52</sup> Artabanus is said to have taken no steps at first to crush the rebellion, or to re-establish his authority over his revolted vassal.<sup>53</sup> Thus the Persian monarch, finding himself unmolested, was free to enlarge his plans, and having originally, as is probable, designed only the liberation of his own people, began to contemplate conquests. Turning his arms eastwards against Carmania (Kerman), he easily reduced that scantily-peopled tract under his dominion, after which he made war towards the north, and added to his kingdom some of the outlying regions of Media. Artabanus now at length resolved to bestir himself, and collecting his forces, took the

field in person. Invading Persia Proper, he engaged in a desperate struggle with his rival. Three great battles were fought between the contending powers.<sup>54</sup> In the last, which took place in the plain of Hormuz,<sup>55</sup> between Bebahan and Shuster, on the course of the Jerahi river, Artabanus was, after a desperate conflict, completely defeated,<sup>56</sup> and not only defeated but slain (A.D. 226).

The victory of Hormuz did not, however, absolutely decide the contest, or determine at once that the Parthian empire should fall, and the new Persian kingdom succeed into its place. Artabanus had left sons;<sup>57</sup> and there were not wanting those among the feudatories of the empire, and even among the neighboring potentates, who were well inclined to embrace their cause. A certain Artavasdes seems to have claimed the throne, and to have been accepted as king, at least by a portion of the Parthians, in the year following the death of Artabanus (A.D. 227), when he certainly issued coins.<sup>58</sup> The Armenian monarch, who had been set on his throne by Artabanus, and was uncle to the young princes,<sup>59</sup> was especially anxious to maintain the Arsacids in power; he gave them a refuge in Armenia,<sup>60</sup> collected an army on their behalf, and engaging Artaxerxes, is even said to have defeated him in a battle.<sup>61</sup> But his efforts, and those of Artavasdes, were unavailing. The arms of Artaxerxes in the end everywhere prevailed. After a struggle, which cannot have lasted more than a few years, the provinces of the old Parthian empire submitted; the last Arsacid prince fell into the hands of the Persian king;<sup>62</sup> and the founder of the new dynasty sought to give legitimacy to his rule by taking to wife an Arsacid princess.<sup>63</sup>

Thus perished the great Parthian monarchy after an existence of nearly five centuries. Its end must be attributed in the main to internal decay, working itself out especially in two directions. The Arsacid race, with which the idea of the empire was bound up,<sup>64</sup> instead of clinging together with that close "union" which is "strength," allowed itself to be torn to pieces by dissensions, to waste its force in quarrels, and to be made a handle of by every foreign invader, or domestic rebel, who chose to use its name in order to cloak his own selfish projects. The race itself does not seem to have become exhausted. Its chiefs, the successive occupants of the throne, never sank into mere weaklings or *fainéants*, never shut themselves up in their seraglios, or ceased to take a leading

part, alike in civil broils, and in struggles with foreign rivals. But the hold which the race had on the population, native and foreign, was gradually weakened by the feuds which raged within it, by the profusion with which the sacred blood was shed by those in whose veins it ran, and the difficulty of knowing which living member of it was its true head, and so entitled to the allegiance of those who wished to be faithful Parthian subjects. Further, the vigor of the Parthian soldiery must have gradually declined, and their superiority over the mass of the nations under their dominion have diminished. We found reasons for believing that, as early as A.D. 58, Hyrcania succeeded in throwing off the Parthian yoke,<sup>65</sup> and thus setting an example of successful rebellion to the subject peoples. The example may have been followed in cases of which we hear nothing; for the condition of the more remote portions of the empire was for the most part unknown to the Romans. When Persia, about A.D. 220, revolted from Artabanus, it was no doubt with a conviction that the Parthians were no longer the terrible warriors who under Mithridates I. had driven all the armies of the East before them like chaff, or who under Orodes and Phraates IV. had gained signal victories over the Romans. It is true that Artabanus had contended not unsuccessfully with Macrinus. But the prestige of Parthia was far from being re-established by the result of his three days' battle. Rome retained as her own, notwithstanding his success, the old Parthian province of Mesopotamia, and was thus, even in the moment of her weakness, acknowledged by Parthia to be the stronger. The Persians are not likely to have been braver or more warlike at the time of their revolt from Artabanus than in the days when they were subjected by Mithridates. Any alteration, therefore, in the relative strength of the two peoples must be ascribed to Parthian decline, since it cannot have been owing to Persian advance and improvement. To conclude, we may perhaps allow something to the personal qualities of Artaxerxes, who appears to have possessed all the merits of the typical Oriental conqueror. Artabanus was among the most able of the later Parthian monarchs; but his antagonist was more than this, possessing true military genius. It is quite possible that, if the leaders on the two sides had changed places, the victory might have rested, not with the Persians, but with the Parthians.

## CHAPTER XXII.

*On the Architecture and Ornamental Art of the Parthians.*

THE modern historian of Architecture observes,<sup>1</sup> when he reaches the period with which we have had to deal in this volume, that, with the advent of Alexander, Oriental architecture disappears, and that its history is an absolute blank from the downfall of the Achæmenians in B.C. 331 to the rise of the Sassanians, about A.D. 226. The statement made involves a certain amount of exaggeration; but still it expresses, roughly and strongly, a curious and important fact. The Parthians were not, in any full or pregnant sense of the word, builders. They did not aim at leaving a material mark upon the world by means of edifices or other great works. They lacked the spirit which had impelled successively the Assyrians, the Babylonians, and the Persians to cover Western Asia with architectural monuments, proofs at once of the wealth, and the grand ideas, of those who raised them. Parthia, compared to these pretentious empires, was retiring and modest. The monarchs, however rich they may have been, affected something of primitive rudeness and simplicity in their habits and style of life, their dwellings and temples, their palaces and tombs. It is difficult indeed to draw the line in every case between pure Parthian work and Sassanian; but on the whole there is, no doubt, reason to believe that the architectural remains in Mesopotamia and Persia which belong to the period between Alexander and the Arab conquest, are mainly the work of the Sassanian or New Persian kingdom, and that comparatively few of them can be ascribed with confidence to a time anterior to A.D. 227. Still a certain number, which have about them indications of greater antiquity than the rest, or which belong to sites famous in Parthian rather than in Persian times, may reasonably be regarded as in all probability structures of the Arsacid period; and from these we may gather at least the leading characteristics of the Parthian architecture, its aims and resources, its style and general effect, while from other remains—scanty indeed, and often mutilated—we may obtain a tolerable notion of their sculpture and other ornamental art.

The most imposing remains which seem certainly assignable to the Parthian period are those of Hatra, or El-Hadr, visited by Mr. Layard in 1846, and described at length by Mr. Ross in the ninth volume of the "Journal of the Royal Geographical Society,"<sup>2</sup> as well as by Mr. Fergusson, in his "History of Architecture."<sup>3</sup> Hatra became known as a place of importance in the early part of the second century after Christ.<sup>4</sup> It successfully resisted Trajan in A.D. 116, and Severus in A.D. 198.<sup>5</sup> It is then described as a large and populous city, defended by strong and extensive walls,<sup>6</sup> and containing within it a temple of the Sun, celebrated for the great value of its offerings.<sup>7</sup> It enjoyed its own kings at this time,<sup>8</sup> who were regarded as of Arabian stock, and were among the more important of the Parthian tributary monarchs. By the year A.D. 363 Hatra had gone to ruin, and is then described as "long since deserted."<sup>9</sup> Its flourishing period thus belongs to the space between A.D. 100 and A.D. 300; and its remains, to which Mr. Fergusson assigns the date A.D. 250, must be regarded as probably at least a century earlier, and consequently as indicating the character of the architecture which prevailed under the later Parthians, and which, if Sassanian improvements had not obliterated them, we should have found upon the site of Ctesiphon.

The city of Hatra<sup>10</sup> was enclosed by a circular wall of great thickness,<sup>11</sup> built of large square-cut stones, and strengthened at intervals of about 170 yards by square towers or bastions. [Pl. IV. Fig. 1.] Its circumference considerably exceeded three miles. Outside the wall was a broad and very deep ditch, and on the further side of the ditch was an earthen rampart of considerable height and thickness. Two detached forts, situated on eminences, commanded the approaches to the place, one towards the east, and the other towards the north. The wall was pierced by four gateways, of which the principal one faced the east.<sup>12</sup>

The circular space within the walls was divided into two portions by a water-course<sup>13</sup> passing across it from north to south, and running somewhat east of the centre, which thus divided the circle into two unequal parts. The eastern portion was left comparatively clear of buildings, and seems to have been used mainly as a burial-ground; in the western were the public edifices and the more important houses of the inhabitants. Of the former by far the most remarkable was one which stood nearly in the centre of the city, and which

has been called by some a palace, by others a temple, but which may best be regarded as combining both uses.<sup>14</sup> [Pl. IV. Fig. 2.] This building stood within a walled enclosure of an oblong square shape, about 800 feet long by 700 broad.<sup>15</sup> The wall surrounding it was strengthened with bastions, like the wall around the city. The enclosure comprised two courts, an inner and an outer. The outer court, which lay towards the east, and was first entered, was entirely clear of buildings, while the inner court contained two considerable edifices. Of these the less important was one which stretched from north to south across the entire inclosure, and abutted upon the outer court; this was confused in plan, and consisted chiefly of a number of small apartments, which have been regarded as guard-rooms.<sup>16</sup> The other was a building of greater pretensions. It was composed mainly of seven vaulted halls, all of them parallel one to another, and all facing eastward, three being of superior and four of inferior size. The smaller halls (Nos. I., III., IV., and VI., on the plan) were about thirty feet long by twenty wide, and had a height of thirty feet;<sup>17</sup> the larger ones measured ninety feet in length,<sup>18</sup> and were from thirty-five to forty feet broad,<sup>19</sup> with a height of sixty feet.<sup>20</sup> All were upon the same plan. They had semicircular vaulted roofs, no windows, and received their light from the archway at the east end, which was either left entirely open, or perhaps closed with curtains.

Externally, the eastern façade of the building, which was evidently its main front, had for ornament, besides the row of seven arches, a series of pillars, or rather pilasters, from which the arches sprang, some sculptures on the stones composing the arches, and one or two emblematic figures in the spaces left between the pilasters. The sculptures on the stones of the arches consisted either of human heads, or of representations of a female form, apparently floating in air.<sup>21</sup> [Pl. IV. Fig. 3.] An emblematic sculpture between the fourth and fifth arch represented a griffin with twisted tail, raised about 5 feet above the ground. The entire length of the façade was about 300 feet.

The interior of the smaller halls had no ornament; but the larger ones were decorated somewhat elaborately. Here the side walls were broken by three squared pilasters, rising to the commencement of the vaulting, and terminated by a quasi-capital of ornamental work, consisting of a series of ovals, each oval containing in its centre a round ball of dark stone.

Underneath these quasi-capitals, at the distance of from two to three feet, ran a cornice, which crossed the pilasters, and extended the whole length of the apartment, consisting of flowers and half-ovals, each oval containing a half-ball of the same dark stone as the capitals. [Pl. IV. Fig. 4.] Finally, on the pilasters, immediately below the cornice, were sculptured commonly either two or three human heads,<sup>22</sup> the length of each head being about two feet, and the faces representing diverse types of humanity, some old and some young, some male and some female, some apparently realistic, some idealized and more or less grotesque in their accompaniments. The drawing of the heads is said to have been full of spirit, and their general effect is pronounced life-like and striking.

The seven halls, which have been described, were divided into two groups, of three and four respectively, by a low fence, which ran from east to west across the inner court, from the partition wall separating the third and fourth halls to the buildings which divided the inner court from the outer. It is probable that this division separated the male and female apartments. The female ornamentation<sup>23</sup> of the large hall (No. II.) belonging to the southern group is perhaps an indication of the sex of its inmates; and another sign that these were the female quarters is to be found in the direct communication existing between this portion of the building and "the Temple" (No. VIII.), which could not be reached from the male apartments except by a long circuit round the building.

The "Temple" itself was an apartment of a square shape, each side being about forty feet. It was completely surrounded by a vaulted passage, into which light came from two windows at its south-west and north-west corners. The Temple was entered by a single doorway, the position of which was directly opposite an opening leading into the passage from Hall No. II. Above this doorway was a magnificent frieze, the character of which is thought to indicate the religious purpose of the structure. [Pl. V. Fig. 1.] The interior of the Temple was without ornamentation, vaulted, and except for the feeble light which entered by the single doorway, dark. On the west side a portal led into the passage from the outer air.

Besides these main apartments, the edifice which we are describing contained a certain number of small rooms, lying behind the halls, and entered by doorways opening from them. One or two such rooms are found behind each of the smaller

halls; and another of somewhat larger dimensions lay behind the great hall (numbered VII. in the plan), forming the extreme north-western corner of the building. These rooms were vaulted and had no windows, receiving their only light from the small doorways by which they were entered.

It is believed that the entire edifice, or at any rate the greater portion of it, had an upper story. Traces of such a structure appear over the halls numbered I and VI.; and it is thought that the story extended over the entire range of halls. One traveller,<sup>24</sup> on conjectural grounds, even assigns to the building an elevation of three stories, and ventures to restore the second and third in the mode represented in the woodcut. [Pl. V. Fig. 2.] According to this author the upper portion of the edifice resembled in many respects the great palace of the Sassanian monarchs, of which splendid remains still exist on the site of Ctesiphon, where they are known as the Takht-i-Khuzroo, or Palace of Chosroës. That palace was, however, on a very different plan from the Hatra one, comprising as it did one hall only, but of a size vastly superior to any of those at Hatra, and two wings, one on either side of the hall, made up of dwelling and sleeping apartments.<sup>25</sup>

The few windows which exist at Hatra are oblong square in shape,<sup>26</sup> as in general are the doorways connecting one apartment with another. In one case there is an arched doorway, or niche, which has been blocked up. There are no passages except the one which surrounds "the Temple," the apartments generally leading directly one into another. In some cases the lintel of a doorway is formed of a single stone, and ornamented with very delicate carving.<sup>27</sup> The doorways are for the most part towards the corners of apartments; that of the Temple, however, is in the centre of its eastern wall.

The general style of the buildings at Hatra has been said to be "Roman or Byzantine;" and it has even been supposed that "in the style of the ornaments and sculptured figures may be traced the corrupt taste and feeble outline of the artists of Constantinople."<sup>28</sup> But there is abundant reason to believe that the Hatra Palace was built nearly two centuries before Constantinople came into existence; and, although the large use of the round arch in vaulting may be due to the spread of Roman architectural ideas, yet there are no grounds for supposing that any but native artists, Parthian subjects, were employed in the work, or that it is other than a fair specimen of what was achieved by the Parthian builders during the

later period of the empire. The palace of Volagases III. at Ctesiphon, which Avidius Cassius destroyed in his invasion,<sup>29</sup> was most likely of the same general character—a combination of lofty halls suitable for ceremonies and audiences with small and dark sleeping or living rooms, opening out of them, the whole placed in the middle of a paved court, and the male apartments carefully divided from those of the women.

The remains at Hatra are further remarkable for a considerable number of reservoirs and tombs. The open space between the town proper and the eastern wall and gate is dotted with edifices of a square shape, standing apart from one another, which are reasonably regarded as sepulchres.<sup>30</sup> These are built in a solid way, of hewn stone, and consist either of one or two chambers. They vary in size from twenty feet square to forty, and are generally of about the same height. Some are perfectly plain, but the exteriors of others are ornamented with pilasters. The reservoirs occur in the paved court which surrounds the main building; they have narrow apertures, but expand below the aperture into the shape of a bell, and are carefully constructed of well-cut stones closely fitted together.

The material used at Hatra is uniformly a brownish gray limestone; and the cutting is so clean and smooth that it is doubted whether the stones have needed any cement. If cement has been employed, at any rate it cannot now be seen, the stones everywhere appearing to touch one another.

There are several buildings remaining in Persia, the date of which cannot be much later than that of the Hatra edifice;<sup>31</sup> but, as it is on the whole more probable that they belong to the Sassanian than to the Parthian period, no account of them will be given here. It will be sufficient to observe that their architecture grows naturally out of that which was in use at Hatra, and that thus we are entitled to ascribe to Parthian times and to subjects of the Parthian Empire that impulse to Oriental architecture which awoke it to renewed life after a sleep of ages, and which in a short time produced such imposing results as the Takht-i-Khuzroo at Ctesiphon, the ruins of Shapur, and the triumphal arch at Takht-i-Bostan.

The decorative and fictile art of the Parthians has received no inconsiderable amount of illustration from remains discovered, in the years 1850-1852, in Babylonia. In combination with a series of Parthian coins were found by Mr. Loftus, on the site of the ancient Erech (now Warka), a number of objects in clay, plaster, and metal,<sup>32</sup> enabling us to form a fair idea of

the mode in which purely Parthian edifices were decorated during the best times of the empire, and of the style that then prevailed in respect of personal ornaments, domestic utensils, and other objects capable, more or less, of æsthetic handling. The remains discovered comprised numerous architectural fragments in plaster and brick; a large number of ornamental coffins; several statuettes in terra-cotta; jars, jugs, vases, and lamps in earthenware; some small glass bottles; and various personal decorations, such as beads, rings, and earrings.

The architectural fragments consisted of capitals of pillars [Pl. V. Fig. 3], portions of cornices, and specimens of a sort of diapering which seems to have been applied to screens or thin partitions. The capitals were somewhat heavy in design, and at first sight struck the spectator as barbarous; but they exhibited a good deal of ingenious boldness, an absence of conventionality, and an occasional quaintness of design not unworthy of a Gothic decorator. One especially, which combines the upper portion of a human figure, wearing the puffed-out hair or wig, which the Parthians affected, with an elegant leaf rising from the neck of the capital, and curving gracefully under the abacus, has decided merit, and is "suggestive of the later Byzantine style."<sup>33</sup> The cornices occasionally reminded the discoverer of the remarkable frieze at El-Hadhr,<sup>34</sup> and were characterized by the same freedom and boldness of invention as the capitals. But the most curious remains were the fragments of a sort of screen work, pieces of plaster covered with geometric designs upon both sides, the patterns on the two sides differing. [Pl. V. Fig. 4.] These designs, though unlike in many respects the arabesques of the Mohammedans, yet seemed on the whole to be their precursors, the "geometric curves and tracery" appearing to "shadow forth the beauty and richness of a style which afterwards followed the tide of Mohammedan conquest to the remotest corners of the known world."<sup>35</sup>

The ornamental coffins were of a coarse glazed earthenware, bluish-green in hue, and belonged to the kind which has been called "slipper-shaped."<sup>36</sup> [Pl. VI. Fig. 1.] They varied in length from three feet to six, and had a large aperture at their upper end, by means of which the body was placed in them, and a flat lid to close this aperture, ornamented like the coffin, and fixed in its place by a fine lime cement. A second aperture at the lower extremity of the coffin allowed for the escape of

the gases disengaged during decomposition. The ornamentation of the coffins varied, but consisted generally of small figures of men, about six or seven inches in length, the most usual figure being a warrior with his arms akimbo and his legs astride, wearing on his head a *coiffure*, like that which is seen on the Parthian coins, and having a sword hanging from the belt. [Pl. VI. Fig. 2.]

Of the statuettes in terra-cotta, one of the most curious represented a Parthian warrior, recumbent, and apparently about to drink out of a cup held in the left hand.<sup>37</sup> [Pl. VI. Fig. 3.] The figure was clad in a long coat of mail, with greaves on the legs and a helmet upon the head. Others represented females; these had lofty head-dresses, which sometimes rose into two peaks or horns, recalling the costume of English ladies in the time of Henry IV. These figures were veiled and carefully draped about the upper part of the person, but showed the face, and had the legs bare from the knee downwards.<sup>38</sup>

The jars, jugs, vases, and lamps greatly resembled those of the Assyrian and Babylonian periods, but were on the whole more elegant and artistic. The forms appended will give a tolerable idea of the general character of these vessels. [Pl. VI. Fig. 4.] They were of various sizes, and appear to have been placed in the tombs, partly as the offerings of friends and well-wishers, partly with the more superstitious object of actually supplying the deceased with the drink and light needful for him on his passage from earth to the realms of the dead.<sup>39</sup>

The glass bottles were, perhaps, lachrymatories.<sup>40</sup> They had no peculiar characteristics, but were almost exactly similar to objects of the same kind belonging to the times of the Assyrian and Babylonian Empires.<sup>41</sup> They exhibited the same lovely prismatic colors, which have been so admired in the glass of those kingdoms, an effect of decomposition, which, elsewhere generally disfiguring, in the case of this material enhances the original beauty of the object tenfold by clothing it in hues of the utmost brilliance and delicacy.<sup>42</sup>

The personal decorations consisted chiefly of armlets, bangles, beads, rings, and ear-rings.<sup>43</sup> They were in gold, silver, copper, and brass. Some of the smaller gold ornaments, such as ear-rings, and small plates or beads for necklaces and fillets, were "of a tasteful and elegant design."<sup>44</sup> The finger-rings were coarser, while the toe-rings, armlets, and bangles, were for the most part exceedingly rude and barbarous. Head-dresses in gold, tall and pointed, are said to have been found occasionally;

but the museums of Europe have not yet been able to secure any, as they are usually melted down by the finders. Broad ribbons of gold, which may have depended like strings from a cap, are commoner, and were seen by Mr. Loftus. Altogether, the ornaments indicated a strong love of personal display, and the possession of considerable wealth, but no general diffusion of a correct taste, nor any very advanced skill in design or metallurgy.

Of purely æsthetic art—art, that is, into which the idea of the useful does not enter at all—the Parthians appear scarcely to have had an idea. During the five centuries of their sway, they seem to have set up no more than some half-dozen bas-reliefs. There is, indeed, only one such work which can be positively identified as belonging to the Parthian period by the inscription which accompanies it.<sup>45</sup> The other presumed Parthian reliefs are adjudged to the people by art critics merely from their style and their locality, occurring as they do within the limits of the Parthian kingdom, and lacking the characteristics which attach to the art of those who preceded and of those who followed the Parthians in these countries.

The one certainly Parthian bas-relief is that which still exists on the great rock of Behistun, at the foot of the mountain, raised but slightly above the plain.<sup>46</sup> It seems to have contained a series of tall figures, looking towards the right, and apparently engaged in a march or procession, while above and between them were smaller figures on horseback, armed with lances, and galloping in the same direction. One of these was attended by a figure of Fame or Victory, flying in the air, and about to place a diadem around his brow. The present condition of the sculpture is extremely bad. Atmospheric influences have worn away the larger figures to such an extent that they are discerned with difficulty; and a recent Governor of Kirmanshah has barbarously inserted into the middle of the relief an arched niche, in which he has placed a worthless Arabic inscription. It is with difficulty that we form any judgment of the original artistic merit of a work which presents itself to us in such a worn and mutilated form; but, on the whole, we are perhaps justified in pronouncing that it must at its best have been one of inferior quality, even when compared only with the similar productions of Asiatics. The general character is rather that of the Sassanian than of the Assyrian or Persian period. The human figures have a heavy clumsiness about them that is unpleasant to contemplate; the

horses are rudely outlined, and are too small for the men; the figure of Fame is out of all proportion to the hero whom she crowns, and the diadem which she places on his head is ridiculous, being nearly as large as herself! On the other hand, there is spirit in the attitudes of both men and horses; the Fame floats well in air; and the relief is free from that coarse grotesqueness which offends us in the productions of the Sasanian artists.

Another bas-relief, probably, but not quite certainly Parthian, exists in the gorge of Sir-pul-i-zohab, and has been recently published in the great work of M. Flandin.<sup>47</sup> (Pl. VIII.) The inscription on this monument, though it has not yet been deciphered,<sup>48</sup> appears to be written in the alphabet found upon the Parthian coins. The monument seems to represent a Parthian king, mounted on horseback, and receiving a chaplet at the hand of a subject. The king wears a cap bound round with the diadem, the long ends of which depend over his shoulder. He is clothed in a close-fitting tunic and loose trowsers, which hang down upon his boots, and wears also a short cloak fastened under the chin, and reaching nearly to the knee. The horse which he bestrides is small, but strongly made; the tail is long, and the mane seems to be plaited. Thus far the representation, though somewhat heavy and clumsy, is not ill-drawn; but the remaining figure—that of the Parthian subject—is wholly without merit. The back of the man is turned, but the legs are in profile; one arm is ridiculously short, and the head is placed too near the left shoulder. It would seem that the artist, while he took pains with the representation of the monarch, did not care how ill he rendered the subordinate figure, which he left in the unsatisfactory condition that may be seen in the preceding woodcut.

A set of reliefs,<sup>49</sup> discovered by the Baron de Bode in the year 1841, are also thought by the best judges to be Parthian. The most important of them represents a personage of consequence, apparently a Magus, who seems to be in the act of consecrating a sacred cippus, round which have been placed wreaths or chaplets. (Pl. IX.) Fifteen spectators are present, arranged in two rows, one above the other, all except the first of them standing. The first sits upon a rude chair or stool. The figures generally are in an advanced stage of decay; but that of the Magus is tolerably well preserved, and probably indicates with sufficient accuracy the costume and appearance of the great hierarchs under the Parthians. The conical cap de-

scribed by Strabo<sup>50</sup> is very conspicuous. Below this the hair is worn in the puffed-out fashion of the later Parthian period. The upper lip is ornamented by moustaches, and the chin covered by a straight beard. The figure is dressed in a long sleeved tunic, over which is worn a cloak, fastened at the neck by a round brooch, and descending a little below the knees. The legs are encased in a longer and shorter pair of trowsers, the former plain, the latter striped perpendicularly. Round the neck is worn a collar or necklace; and on the right arm are three armlets and three bracelets. The conical cap appears to be striped or fluted.

On the same rock, but in no very evident connection with the main representation, is a second relief, in which a Parthian cavalier, armed with a bow and arrows, and a spear, contends with a wild animal, seemingly a bear.<sup>51</sup> (Pl. X. Fig. 1.) A long flowing robe here takes the place of the more ordinary tunic and trowsers. On the head is worn a rounded cap or tiara. The hair has the usual puffed-out appearance. The bow is carried in the left hand, and the quiver hangs from the saddle behind the rider,<sup>52</sup> while with his right hand he thrusts his spear into the beast's neck. The execution of the whole tablet seems to have been rude; but it has suffered so much from time and weather, that no very decided judgment can be passed upon it.

Another still ruder representation occurs also on another face of the same rock. This consists of a female figure reclining upon a couch, and guarded by three male attendants, one at the head of the couch unarmed, and the remaining two at its foot, seated, and armed with spears. The female has puffed-out hair, and carries in her right hand, which is outstretched, a wreath or chaplet. One of the spearmen has a curious rayed head-dress; and the other has a short streamer attached to the head of his spear. Below the main tablet are three rudely carved standing figures, representing probably other attendants.

This set of reliefs may perhaps be best regarded as forming a single series, the Parthian king being represented as engaged in hunting the bear, while the queen awaits his return upon her couch, and the chief Magus attached to the court makes prayer for the monarch's safety.

Such are the chief remains of Parthian æsthetic art. They convey an idea of decline below the standard reached by the Persians of the Achæmenian times, which was itself a decline

from the earlier art of the Assyrians. Had they been the efforts of a race devoid of models, they might fairly have been regarded as not altogether without promise. But, considered as the work of a nation which possessed the Achæmenian sculptures, and which had moreover, to a certain extent, access to Greek examples,<sup>53</sup> they must be pronounced clumsy, coarse, and wanting in all the higher qualities of Fine Art. It is no wonder that they are scanty and exceptional. The nation which could produce nothing better must have felt that its vocation was not towards the artistic, and that its powers had better be employed in other directions, e.g. in conquest and in organization. It would seem that the Parthians perceived this, and therefore devoted slight attention to the Fine Arts, preferring to occupy themselves mainly with those pursuits in which they excelled; viz. war, hunting, and government.

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## CHAPTER XXIII.

*Customs of the Parthians—in Religion; in War; in their Embassies and Dealings with Foreign Nations; at the Court; in Private Life. Extent of the Refinement to which they reached. Their gradual Decline in Taste and Knowledge.*


\*Ἔθῃ ἔχοντα πολὺ μὲν τὸ βάρβαρον καὶ τὸ Σκυθικόν, πλέον μόντοι τὸ χρήσιμον πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς πολέμοις κατόρθωσιν.—Strab. xi. 9, § 2.

VERY little is known as to the religion of the Parthians. It seems probable that during the Persian period they submitted to the Zoroastrian system,<sup>1</sup> which was generally maintained by the Achæmenian kings, acquiescing, like the great bulk of the conquered nations, in the religious views of their conquerors; but as this was not their own religion, we may conclude that they were at no time very zealous followers of the Bactrian prophet,<sup>2</sup> and that as age succeeded age they became continually more lukewarm in their feelings, and more lax in their religious practice. The essence of Zoroastrian belief was dualism—recognition of Ormazd as the great Principle of Good, and of Ahriman as the Principle of Evil. We need not doubt that, in word, the Parthians from first to last admitted this antagonism, and professed a belief in Ormazd as the supreme god, and a

dread of Ahriman and his ministers. But practically, their religious aspirations rested, not on these dim abstractions, but on beings whose existence they could better realize, and whom they could feel to be less remote from themselves. The actual devotion of the Parthians was offered to the Sun and Moon, to deities who were supposed to preside over the royal house, and to ancestral idols which each family possessed, and conveyed with it from place to place with every change of habitation. The Sun was saluted at his rising,<sup>3</sup> was worshipped in temples, under the name of Mithra, with sacrifices and offerings;<sup>4</sup> had statues erected in his honor, and was usually associated with the lesser luminary.<sup>5</sup> The deities of the royal house were probably either genii, ministers of Ormazd, to whom was committed the special protection of the monarchs and their families, like the *bagâha vithiyâ* of the Persians,<sup>6</sup> or else the ancestors of the reigning monarch, to whom a qualified divinity seems to have been assigned in the later times of the empire.<sup>7</sup> The Parthians kings usually swore by these deities on solemn occasions;<sup>8</sup> and other members of the royal family made use of the same oath.<sup>9</sup> The main worship, however, of the great mass of the people, even when they were of the royal stock, was concentrated upon ancestral images,<sup>10</sup> which had a place sacred to them in each house, and received the constant adoration of the household.

In the early times of the empire the Magi were held in high repute, and most of the peculiar tenets and rites of the Magian religion were professed and followed by the Parthians. Elemental worship was practised. Fire was, no doubt, held sacred, and there was an especial reverence for rivers.<sup>11</sup> Dead bodies were not burned, but were exposed to be devoured by birds and beasts of prey, after which the dry bones were collected and placed in tombs.<sup>12</sup> The Magi formed a large portion of the great national council, which elected and, if need were, deposed the kings.<sup>13</sup> But in course of time much laxity was introduced. The Arsacid monarchs of Armenia allowed the Sacred Fire of Ormazd, which ought to have been kept continually burning, to go out;<sup>14</sup> and we can scarcely suppose but that the Parthian Arsacidæ shared their negligence. Respect for the element of fire so entirely passed away, that we hear of the later Parthians burning their dead.<sup>15</sup> The Magi fell into disrepute, and, if not expelled from their place in the council, at any rate found themselves despised and deprived of influence.<sup>16</sup> The later Parthian religion can have been little more

Fig. 1.



COINS OF SĀPOR II.

Fig 2.

Fig. 3.



COIN OF ARTAXERXES II.



LATER SEAL  
OF VARAHRAN IV.

Fig 4.



COIN OF VARAHRAN IV.

Fig. 5.




PORTRAIT OF VARAHRAN IV. (from a seal).

Fig. 6.



COINS OF SĀPOR III.



BAS-RELIEF NEAR KERMANSHAH, REPRESENTING SATOR II. AND SATOR III.

than a worship of the Sun and Moon, and of the *teraphim*, or sacred images, which were the most precious possession of each household.

While thus lax and changeful in their own religious practice, the Parthians were, naturally, tolerant of a variety of creeds among their subjects. Fire altars were maintained, and Zoroastrian zeal was allowed to flourish in the dependent kingdom of Persia.<sup>17</sup> In the Greek cities the Olympian gods were permitted to receive the veneration of thousands,<sup>18</sup> while in Babylon, Nearda, and Nisibis the Jews enjoyed the free exercise of their comparatively pure and elevated religion.<sup>19</sup> No restrictions seem to have been placed on proselytism, and Judaism certainly boasted many converts from the heathen in Adiabêné, Charax Spasini, and elsewhere.<sup>20</sup> Christianity also penetrated the Parthian provinces to a considerable extent, and in one Parthian country, at any rate, seems to have become the state religion. The kings of Osrhoêné are thought to have been Christians from the time of the Antonines,<sup>21</sup> if not from that of our Lord;<sup>22</sup> and a flourishing church was certainly established at Edessa before the end of the second century.<sup>23</sup> The Parthian Jews who were witnesses of the miraculous events which signalized the day of Pentecost<sup>24</sup> may have, in some cases, taken with them the new religion to the land where they had their residence; or the Apostle, St. Thomas, may (as Eusebius declares<sup>25</sup>) have carried the Gospel into the regions beyond the Euphrates, and have planted the Christian Church in the countries out of which the Jewish Church sprang. Besides the flourishing community of Edessa, which was predominantly, if not wholly, Christian from the middle of the second century, many converts were, we are told, to be found among the inhabitants of Persia, Media, Parthia Proper, and even Bactria.<sup>26</sup> The infusion, however, was not sufficient to leaven to any serious extent the corrupt mass of heathenism into which it was projected; and we cannot say that the general character of the Parthian empire, or of the manners and customs of its subjects, was importantly affected by the new religion, though it had an extraordinary influence over individuals.

The Parthians were essentially a warlike people; and the chief interest which attaches to them is connected with their military vigor and ability. It is worth while to consider at some length the peculiarities of that military system which proved itself superior to the organization of the Macedonians,

and able to maintain for nearly three hundred years a doubtful contest with the otherwise irresistible Romans.

We are told that the Parthians had no standing army.<sup>27</sup> When war was proclaimed and the monarch needed a force, he made his immediate vassals acquainted with the fact, and requested each of them to marshal their troops, and bring them to a fixed rendezvous by a certain day.<sup>28</sup> The troops thus summoned were of two kinds, Parthian and foreign. The governors of the provinces, whether tributary kings or satraps, called out the military strength of their respective districts, saw to their arming and provisioning, and, marching each at the head of his contingent, brought a foreign auxiliary force to the assistance of the Great King.<sup>29</sup> But the back-bone of the army, its main strength, the portion on which alone much reliance was placed, consisted of Parthians. Each Parthian noble was bound to call out his slaves and his retainers, to arm and equip them at his own expense, and bring them to the rendezvous by the time named.<sup>30</sup> The number of troops furnished by each noble varied according to his position and his means; we hear in one instance of their amounting to as many as 10,000,<sup>31</sup> while in another recorded case<sup>32</sup> the average number which each furnished was no more than 125. The various contingents had their own baggage-trains, consisting ordinarily of camels, in the proportion (as it would seem) of one to every ten fighting-men.<sup>33</sup>

A Parthian army consisted usually of both horse and foot, but in proportions unusual elsewhere. The foot soldiers were comparatively few in number, and were regarded as of small account.<sup>34</sup> Every effort was made to increase the amount and improve the equipment of the horsemen, who bore the brunt of every fight, and from whose exertions alone victory was hoped. Sometimes armies consisted of horsemen only,<sup>35</sup> or rather of horsemen followed by a baggage train composed of camels and chariots.

The horse were of two kinds, heavy and light. The heavy horsemen (*κατάφρακτοι*) wore coats of mail, reaching to their knees, composed of raw hide covered with scales of iron or steel,<sup>36</sup> very bright,<sup>37</sup> and capable of resisting a strong blow.<sup>38</sup> They had on their heads burnished helmets of Margian steel, whose glitter dazzled the spectator.<sup>39</sup> Their legs seem not to have been greaved, but encased in a loose trouser, which hung about the ankles and embarrassed the feet, if by any chance the horseman was forced to dismount.<sup>40</sup> They carried no

shield,<sup>41</sup> being sufficiently defended by their coats of mail. Their offensive arms were a long spear (*κόντος*), which was of great strength and thickness,<sup>42</sup> and a bow and arrows of unusual size.<sup>43</sup> They likewise carried in their girdle a short sword<sup>44</sup> or knife (*μάχαιρα*), which might be used in close combat. Their horses were, like themselves, protected by a defence of scale armor,<sup>45</sup> which was either of steel or bronze.<sup>46</sup>

The light horse was armed with the same sort of bows and arrows as the heavy, but carried no spear and wore no armor. It was carefully trained to the management of the horse and the bow,<sup>47</sup> and was unequalled in the rapidity and dexterity of its movements. The archer delivered his arrows with as much precision and force in retreat as in advance, and was almost more feared when he retired than when he charged his foe.<sup>48</sup> Besides his arrows, the light horseman seems to have carried a sword,<sup>49</sup> and he no doubt wore also the customary knife in his belt.

We are told by one writer<sup>50</sup> that it was a practice of the Parthians to bring into battle a number of led horses, and that the riders from time to time exchanged their tired steeds for fresh ones, thus obtaining a great advantage over enemies who had no such practice. But the accounts which we have of Parthian engagements make no reference to this usage, which we can therefore scarcely suppose to have been adopted to any large extent. It may be doubted, also, if the practice could ever be one of much value, since the difficulty of managing led horses amid the tumult of a battle would probably more than counter-balance the advantage derivable from relays of fresh steeds.

During the later period of the monarchy, the Parthians, who had always employed camels largely in the conveyance of stores and baggage,<sup>51</sup> are said to have introduced a camel corps into the army itself, and to have derived considerable advantage from the new arm.<sup>52</sup> The camels could bear the weight of the mailed warrior and of their own armor better than horses, and their riders were at once more safe in their elevated position and more capable of dealing effective blows upon the enemy. As a set-off, however, against these advantages, the spongy feet of the camel were found to be more readily injured by the *tribulus*, or caltrop, than the harder feet of the horse, and the corps was thus more easily disabled than an equal force of cavalry, if it could be tempted to pass over ground on which caltrops had been previously scattered.<sup>53</sup>

The Parthian tactics were of a simple kind, and differed little

from those of other nations in the same region, which have depended mainly on their cavalry. To surround their foe, to involve him in difficulties, to cut off his supplies and his stragglers, and ultimately to bring him into a position where he might be overwhelmed by missiles, was the aim of all Parthian commanders of any military capacity. Their warfare was suited for defence rather than for attack, unless against contemptible enemies.<sup>54</sup> They were bad hands at sieges,<sup>55</sup> and seldom ventured to engage in them, though they would do so if circumstances required it.<sup>56</sup> They wearied of long campaigns, and if they did not find victory tolerably easy, were apt to retire and allow their foe to escape,<sup>57</sup> or baffle him by withdrawing their forces into a distant and inaccessible region. After their early victories over Crassus and Antony, they never succeeded in preventing the steady advance of a Roman army into their territory, or in repulsing a determined attack upon their capital. Still they generally had their revenge after a short time. It was easy for the Romans to overrun Mesopotamia, but it was not so easy for them to hold it; and it was scarcely possible for them to retire from it after an occupation without disaster. The clouds of Parthian horse hung upon their retreating columns, straitened them for provisions, galled them with missiles, and destroyed those who could not keep up with the main body. The towns upon the line of their retreat revolted and shut their gates, defying even such commanders as Severus and Trajan. Of the six great expeditions of Rome against Parthia, one only, that of Avidius Cassius, was entirely successful. In every other case either the failure of the expedition was complete, or the glory of the advance was tarnished by disaster and suffering during the retreat.

The results of invading Parthia would have been even more calamitous to an assailant but for one weak point in the military system of the Parthians. They were excessively unwilling to venture near an enemy at night, and as a general rule abstained from all military movements during the hours of darkness.<sup>58</sup> As evening approached, they drew off to a considerable distance from their foe, and left him unmolested to retreat in any direction that he pleased. The reason of this probably was, not merely that they did not fortify their camps;<sup>59</sup> but that, depending wholly on their horses, and being forced to hobble or tether them at night, they could not readily get into fighting order on a sudden during darkness. Once or twice in the course of their history, we find them de-

parting from their policy of extreme precaution, and recommending the pursuit of a flying foe before dawn; but it is noted as an unusual occurrence.<sup>60</sup>

It was also a general principle of Parthian warfare to abstain from campaigning during the winter.<sup>61</sup> So much depended upon the tension of their bow-strings, which any dampness relaxed, that their rule was to make all their expeditions in the dry time of their year, which lasted from early in the spring until late in the autumn. The rule was, however, transgressed upon occasions. Phraates II. made his attack upon Antiochus Sidetes, while the snow was still upon the ground;<sup>62</sup> and Volagases I. fell upon Pætus after the latter had sent his troops into winter quarters.<sup>63</sup> The Parthians could bear cold no less than heat; though it was perhaps rather in the endurance of the latter than of the former that they surpassed the Romans. The sun's rays were never too hot for them;<sup>64</sup> and they did not need water frequently or in large quantities. The Romans believed that they increased their ability of bearing thirst by means of certain drugs which they consumed;<sup>65</sup> but it may be questioned whether they really employed any other remedies than habit and resolution.

We find no use of chariots among the Parthians, except for the conveyance of the females, who accompanied the nobles upon their expeditions. The wives and concubines of the chiefs followed the camp in great numbers;<sup>66</sup> and women of a less reputable class, singers, dancers, and musicians, swelled the ranks of the supernumeraries.<sup>67</sup> Many of these were Greeks from Seleucia and other Macedonian towns.<sup>68</sup> The commissariat and transport departments are said to have been badly organized;<sup>69</sup> but some thousands of baggage camels always accompanied an army,<sup>70</sup> carrying stores and provisions. Of these a considerable portion were laden with arrows,<sup>71</sup> of which the supply was in this way rendered inexhaustible.

The use of the elephant in war was still more rare in Parthia than that of the chariot. While the Seleucid kings employed the animal to a large extent,<sup>72</sup> and its use was also probably known to the Greek princes of Bactria,<sup>73</sup> the Arsacidæ appear to have almost entirely neglected it. On one occasion alone do we find their employment of it mentioned,<sup>74</sup> and then we hear of only a single animal, which is ridden by the monarch. Probably the unwieldy creature was regarded by the Parthians as too heavy and clumsy for the light and rapid movements of their armies, and was thus disused during the period of their

supremacy, though again employed, after Parthia had fallen, by the Sassanidæ.<sup>75</sup>

The Parthians entered into battle with much noise and shouting.<sup>76</sup> They made no use of trumpets or horns, but employed instead the kettledrum, which resounded from all parts of the field when they made their onset.<sup>77</sup> Their attack was furious. The mailed horsemen charged at speed, and often drove their spears through the bodies of two enemies at a blow.<sup>78</sup> The light horse and the foot, when any was present, delivered their arrows with precision and with extraordinary force. But if the assailants were met with a stout resistance, the first vigor of the attack was rarely long maintained. The Parthian warriors grew quickly weary of an equal contest, and, if they could not force their enemy to give way, soon changed their tactics. Pretending panic, dispersing, and beating a hasty retreat, they endeavored to induce their foe to pursue hurriedly and in disorder, being ready at any moment to turn and take advantage of the least appearance of confusion. If these tactics failed, as they commonly did after they came to be known, the simulated flight was generally converted into a real one; further conflict was avoided, or at any rate deferred to another occasion.<sup>79</sup>

When the Parthians wished to parley with an enemy, they unstrung their bows,<sup>80</sup> and advancing with the right hand outstretched,<sup>81</sup> asked for a conference. They are accused by the Romans of sometimes using treachery on such occasions, but, except in the single case of Crassus, the charge of bad faith cannot be sustained against them. On solemn occasions, when the intention was to discuss grounds of complaint or to bring a war to an end by the arrangement of terms of peace, a formal meeting was arranged between their representatives and those of their enemy, generally on neutral ground, as on an island in the Euphrates, or on a bridge constructed across it.<sup>82</sup> Here the chiefs of the respective nations met, accompanied by an equal number of guards, while the remainder of their forces occupied the opposite banks of the river. Matters were discussed in friendly fashion, the Greek language being commonly employed as the vehicle of communication;<sup>83</sup> after which festivities usually took place, the two chiefs mutually entertaining each other, or accepting in common the hospitalities of a third party.<sup>84</sup> The terms of peace agreed upon were reduced to writing;<sup>85</sup> hands were grasped as a sign that faith was pledged;<sup>86</sup> and oaths having been interchanged,<sup>87</sup> the confer-

ence broke up, and the chiefs returned to their respective residences.

Besides negotiating by means of conferences, the Parthian monarchs often sent out to neighboring states, and in return received from them formal embassies. The ambassadors in every case conveyed, as a matter of course, gifts to the prince to whom they were accredited,<sup>88</sup> which might consist of articles of value, or of persons. Augustus included an Italian slave-girl<sup>89</sup> among the presents which he transmitted to Phraates IV. : and Artabanus III. sent a Jewish giant to Tiberius.<sup>90</sup> The object of an embassy was sometimes simply to congratulate; but more often the ambassadors were instructed to convey certain demands, or proposals, from their own prince to the head of the other nation, whereto his assent was required, or requested. These proposals were commonly formulated in a letter from the one prince to the other,<sup>91</sup> which it was the chief duty of the ambassadors to convey safely. Free powers to conclude a treaty at their discretion were rarely, or never, entrusted to them. Their task was merely to deliver the royal letter, to explain its terms, if they were ambiguous, and to carry back to their own monarch the reply of the foreign sovereign. The sanctity of the ambassadorial character was invariably respected by the Parthians, who are never even taxed with a violation of it.

As a security for the performance of engagements, or for the permanent maintenance of a friendly attitude, it was usual in the East during the Parthian period to require, and give, hostages. The princes who occupied the position of Parthian feudatories gave hostages to their suzerain, who were frequently their near relations, as sons or brothers.<sup>92</sup> And a practice grew up of the Parthian monarchs themselves depositing their own sons or brothers with the Roman Emperor, at first perhaps merely for their own security,<sup>93</sup> but afterwards as pledges for their good behavior.<sup>94</sup> Such hostages lived at the expense of the Roman court, and were usually treated with distinction. In the event of a rupture between their country and Rome, they had little to fear. Rome found her advantage in employing them as rivals to a monarch with whom she had quarrelled, and did not think it necessary to punish them for his treachery or inconstancy.

The magnificence of the Parthian court is celebrated in general terms by various writers, but not very many particulars have come down to us respecting it. We know that it was

migratory, moving from one of the chief cities of the empire to another at different seasons of the year,<sup>95</sup> and that owing to the vast number of the persons composing it, there was a difficulty sometimes in providing for their subsistence upon the road.<sup>96</sup> The court comprised the usual extensive harem of an Oriental prince, consisting of a single recognized queen, and a multitude of secondary wives or concubines. The legitimate wife of the prince was commonly a native, and in most cases was selected from the royal race of the Arsacidæ;<sup>97</sup> but sometimes she was the daughter of a dependent monarch,<sup>98</sup> and she might even be a slave raised by royal favor from that humble position.<sup>99</sup> The concubines were frequently Greeks.<sup>100</sup> Both wives and concubines remained ordinarily in close seclusion, and we have little mention of them in the Parthian annals. But in one instance, at any rate, a queen, brought up in the notions of the West, succeeded in setting Oriental etiquette at defiance, took the direction of affairs out of the hands of her husband, and subsequently ruled the empire in conjunction with her son.<sup>101</sup> Generally, however, the Parthian kings were remarkably free from the weakness of subservience to women, and managed their kingdom with a firm hand, without allowing either wives or ministers to obtain any undue ascendancy over them. In particular, we may note that they never, so far as appears, fell under the baleful influence of eunuchs, who, from first to last, play a very subordinate part in the Parthian history.<sup>102</sup>

The dress of the monarch was commonly the loose Median robe, which had been adopted from the Medes by the Persians. This flowed down to the feet in numerous folds, enveloping and concealing the entire figure.<sup>103</sup> Trousers and a tunic were probably worn beneath it, the latter of linen, the former of silk or wool. As head-dress, the king wore either the mere diadem, which was a band or ribbon, passed once or oftener round the head, and terminating in two long ends which fell down behind,<sup>104</sup> or else a more pretentious cap, which in the earlier times was a sort of Scythian pointed helmet,<sup>105</sup> and in the later a rounded tiara, sometimes adorned with pearls or gems.<sup>106</sup> His neck appears to have been generally encircled with two or three collars or necklaces, and he frequently wore ear-rings in his ears. The beard was almost always cultivated, and, with the hair, was worn variously. Generally both hair and beard were carefully curled; but sometimes they depended in long straight locks. Mostly the beard was pointed, but oc-

asionally it was worn square. In later times a fashion arose of puffing out the hair at either side extravagantly, so as to give it the appearance of a large bushy wig.<sup>107</sup>

In war the monarch seems to have exchanged his Median robe for a short cloak, reaching half way down the thigh.<sup>108</sup> His head was protected by a helmet, and he carried the national arm of offence, the bow. He usually took the field on horseback, but was sometimes mounted on an elephant,<sup>109</sup> trained to encounter the shock of battle. Gold and silver were abundantly used in the trappings of his steed and in his arms. He generally took the command, and mingled freely in the fight, though he might sometimes shrink without reproach from adventuring his own person.<sup>110</sup> His guards fought about him; and he was accompanied by attendants, whose duty it was to assist him in mounting on horseback and dismounting.<sup>111</sup>

The status of the queen was not much below that of her royal consort. She wore a tiara far more elaborate than his, and, like him, exhibited the diadem. Her neck was encircled with several necklaces.<sup>112</sup> As the title of Theos, "God," was often assumed by her husband, so she was allowed the title of "Goddess" (*Θεά*), or "Heavenly Goddess" (*Θεά οὐρανια*).

Separate apartments were of course assigned to the queen, and to the royal concubines in the various palaces. These were buildings on a magnificent scale, and adorned with the utmost richness. Philostratus, who wrote in Parthian times,<sup>113</sup> thus describes the royal palace at Babylon. "The palace is roofed with brass, and a bright light flashes from it. It has chambers for the women, and chambers for the men, and porticos, partly glittering with silver, partly with cloth-of-gold embroideries, partly with solid slabs of gold, let into the walls, like pictures. The subjects of the embroideries are taken from the Greek mythology, and include representations of Andromeda, of Amymoné, and of Orpheus, who is frequently repeated . . . Datis is moreover represented, destroying Naxos with his fleet, and Artaphernes besieging Eretria, and Xerxes gaining his famous victories. You behold the occupation of Athens, and the battle of Thermopylæ, and other points still more characteristic of the great Persian war, rivers drunk up and disappearing from the face of the earth, and a bridge stretched across the sea, and a canal cut through Athos . . . One chamber for the men has a roof fashioned into a vault like the heaven, composed entirely of sapphires, which

are the bluest of stones, and resemble the sky in color. Golden images of the gods whom they worship, are set up about the vault, and show like stars in the firmament. This is the chamber in which the king delivers his judgments. Four golden magic-wheels hang from its roof, and threaten the monarch with the Divine Nemesis, if he exalts himself above the condition of man. These wheels are called 'the tongues of the gods,' and are set in their places by the Magi who frequent the palace."<sup>114</sup>

The state and pomp which surrounded the monarch seem scarcely to have fallen short of the Achæmenian standard. Regarded as in some sort divine during his life, and always an object of national worship after his death, the "Brother of the Sun and Moon"<sup>115</sup> occupied a position far above that of the most exalted of his subjects. Tributary monarchs were shocked, when, in times of misfortune, the "Great King" stooped to solicit their aid, and appeared before them in the character of a suppliant, shorn of his customary splendor.<sup>116</sup> Nobles coveted the dignity of "King's Friend," and were content to submit to blows and buffets at the caprice of their royal master, before whom they prostrated themselves in adoration after each castigation.<sup>117</sup> The Parthian monarch dined in solitary grandeur, extended on his own special couch, and eating from his own special table, which was placed at a greater elevation than those of his guests.<sup>118</sup> His "friend" sat on the ground at his feet, and was fed like a dog by scraps from his master's board. Guards, ministers, and attendants of various kinds surrounded him, and were ready at the slightest sign to do his bidding. Throughout the country he had numerous "Eyes" and "Ears"<sup>119</sup>—officers who watched his interests and sent him word of whatever touched his safety. The bed on which the monarch slept was of gold, and subjects were forbidden to take their repose on couches of this rich material.<sup>120</sup> No stranger could obtain access to him unless introduced by the proper officer; and it was expected that all who asked an audience would be prepared with some present of high value.<sup>121</sup> For the gifts received the monarch made a suitable return, allowing those whom he especially favored to choose the presents that they preferred.<sup>122</sup>

The power and dignity of the Parthian nobles was greater than that usually enjoyed by any subjects of an Oriental king. Rank in Parthia being hereditary and not simply official, the "megistanes" were no mere creatures of the monarch, but a

class which stood upon its own indefeasible rights. As they had the privilege of electing to the throne upon a vacancy, and even that of deposing a duly elected monarch,<sup>123</sup> the king could not but stand in wholesome awe of them, and feel compelled to treat them with considerable respect and deference. Moreover, they were not without a material force calculated to give powerful support to their constitutional privileges. Each stood at the head of a body of retainers accustomed to bear arms and to serve in the wars of the Empire. Together these bodies constituted the strength of the army; and though the royal body-guard might perhaps have been capable of dealing successfully with each group of retainers separately, yet such an *esprit de corps* was sure to animate the nobles generally, that they would make common cause in case one of their number were attacked, and would support him against the crown with the zeal inspired by self-interest. Thus the Parthian nobility were far more powerful and independent than any similar class under the Achæmenian, Sassanian, Modern Persian, or Turkish sovereigns. They exercised a real control over the monarch, and had a voice in the direction of the Empire. Like the great feudal vassals of the Middle Ages, they from time to time quarrelled with their liege lord, and disturbed the tranquillity of the kingdom by prolonged and dangerous civil wars; but these contentions served to keep alive a vigor, a life, and a spirit of sturdy independence very unusual in the East, and gave a stubborn strength to the Parthian monarchy, in which Oriental governments have for the most part been wanting.

There were probably several grades of rank among the nobles. The highest dignity in the kingdom, next to the Crown, was that of Surena, or "Field-Marshal;" and this position was hereditary in a particular family,<sup>124</sup> which can have stood but a little below the royal house in wealth and consequence. The head of this noble house is stated to have at one time brought into the field as many as 10,000 retainers and slaves, of whom a thousand were heavy-armed.<sup>125</sup> It was his right to place the diadem on the king's brow at his coronation. The other nobles lived for the most part on their domains, but took the field at the head of their retainers in case of war, and in peace sometimes served the offices of satrap, vizier, or royal councillor. The wealth of the class was great;<sup>126</sup> its members were inclined to be turbulent, and, like the barons of the European kingdoms, acted as a constant check and counterpoise to the royal dignity.

Next to war, the favorite employment of the king and of the

nobles was hunting.<sup>127</sup> The lion continued in the wild state an occupant of the Mesopotamian river-banks and marshes;<sup>128</sup> and in other parts of the empire bears, leopards, and even tigers abounded.<sup>129</sup> Thus the higher kinds of sport were readily obtainable. The ordinary practice, however, of the monarch and his courtiers seems to have fallen short of the true sportsman's ideal. Instead of seeking the more dangerous kinds of wild beasts in their native haunts, and engaging with them under the conditions designed by nature, the Parthians were generally content with a poorer and tamer method. They kept lions, leopards, and bears in enclosed parks, or "paradises," and found pleasure in the pursuit and slaughter of these denaturalized and half-domesticated animals.<sup>130</sup> The employment may still, even under these circumstances, have contained an element of danger which rendered it exciting; but it was a poor substitute for the true sport which the "mighty Hunter before the Lord"<sup>131</sup> had first practised in these regions.

The ordinary dress of the Parthian noble was a long loose robe reaching to the feet,<sup>132</sup> under which he wore a vest and trousers.<sup>133</sup> Bright and varied colors were affected, and sometimes dresses were interwoven or embroidered with gold.<sup>134</sup> In seasons of festivity garlands of fresh flowers were worn upon the head.<sup>135</sup> A long knife or dagger was carried at all times,<sup>136</sup> which might be used either as an implement or as a weapon.

In the earlier period of the empire the Parthian was noted as a spare liver;<sup>137</sup> but, as time went on, he aped the vices of more civilized peoples, and became an indiscriminate eater<sup>138</sup> and a hard drinker.<sup>139</sup> Game formed a main portion of his diet;<sup>140</sup> but he occasionally indulged in pork,<sup>141</sup> and probably in other sorts of butcher's meat. He ate leavened bread with his meat, and various kinds of vegetables.<sup>142</sup> The bread, which was particularly light and porous, seems to have been imported sometimes by the Romans, who knew it as *panis aquaticus* or *panis Parthicus*.<sup>143</sup> Dates were also consumed largely by the Parthians,<sup>144</sup> and in some parts of the country grew to an extraordinary size. A kind of wine was made from them; and this seems to have been the intoxicating drink in which the nation generally indulged too freely.<sup>145</sup> That made from the dates of Babylon was the most highly esteemed, and was reserved for the use of the king and the higher order of satraps.<sup>146</sup>

Of the Parthian feasts, music was commonly an accompaniment. The flute, the pipe, the drum, and the instrument called *sambuca*, appear to have been known to them;<sup>147</sup> and they un-

derstood how to combine these instruments in concerted harmony. They are said to have closed their feasts with dancing—an amusement of which they were inordinately fond<sup>148</sup>—but this was probably the case only with the lower class of people. Dancing in the East, if not associated with religion, is viewed as degrading, and, except as a religious exercise, is not indulged in by respectable persons.

The separation of the sexes was very decided in Parthia. The women took their meals, and passed the greater portion of their life, apart from the men.<sup>149</sup> Veils were commonly worn, as in modern Mohammedan countries; and it was regarded as essential to female delicacy that women, whether married or single, should converse freely with no males but either their near relations or eunuchs. Adultery was punished with great severity;<sup>150</sup> but divorce was not difficult, and women of rank released themselves from the nuptial bond on light grounds of complaint, without much trouble.<sup>151</sup> Polygamy was the established law; and every Parthian was entitled, besides his chief wife, to maintain as many concubines as he thought desirable.<sup>152</sup> Some of the nobles supported an excessive number:<sup>153</sup> but the expenses of the seraglio prevented the generality from taking much advantage of the indulgence which the law permitted.

The degree of refinement and civilization which the Parthians reached is difficult to determine with accuracy. In mimetic art their remains certainly do not show much taste or sense of beauty.<sup>154</sup> There is some ground to believe that their architecture had merit; but the existing monuments can scarcely be taken as representations of pure Parthian work, and may have owed their excellence (in some measure, at any rate) to foreign influence. Still, the following particulars, for which there is good evidence, seem to imply that the nation had risen in reality far above that "barbarism" which it was the fashion of the Greek and Roman writers to ascribe to it. In the first place, the Parthians had a considerable knowledge of foreign languages. Plutarch tells us that Orodes, the opponent of Crassus, was acquainted with the Greek language and literature, and could enjoy the representation of a play of Euripides.<sup>155</sup> The general possession of such knowledge, at any rate by the kings and the upper classes, seems to be implied by the use of the Greek letters and language in the legends upon coins and in inscriptions. Other languages were also to some extent cultivated. The later kings almost invariably placed a Semitic legend upon their coins; and there is one instance of a

Parthian prince adopting an Aryan legend of the type known as Bactrian.<sup>166</sup> Josephus, moreover, regarded the Parthians as familiar with Hebrew, or Syro-Chaldaic, and wrote his history of the Jewish War in his own native tongue, before he put out his Greek version, for the benefit especially of the Parthians, among whom he declares that he had many readers.<sup>167</sup>

Though the Parthians had, so far as we can tell, no native literature, yet writing was familiar to them, and was widely used in matters of business. Not only were negotiations carried on with foreign powers by means of despatches,<sup>168</sup> but the affairs of the empire generally were conducted by writing. A custom-house system was established along the frontier, and all commodities liable to duty that entered the country were registered in a book<sup>169</sup> at the time of entry by the custom-house officer. In the great cities where the Court passed a portion of the year, account was kept of the arrival of strangers, whose names and descriptions were placed upon record by the keepers of the gates.<sup>160</sup> The orders of the Crown were signified in writing to the satraps;<sup>161</sup> and they doubtless corresponded with the Court in the same way. In the earlier times the writing material commonly used was linen; but shortly before the time of Pliny, the Parthians began to make paper from the papyrus, which grew in the neighborhood of Babylon, though they still employed in preference the old material.<sup>162</sup>

There was a considerable trade between Parthia and Rome, carried on by means of a class of merchants.<sup>163</sup> Parthia imported from Rome various metals, and numerous manufactured articles of a high class. Her principal exports were textile fabrics and spices.<sup>164</sup> The textile fabrics seem to have been produced chiefly in Babylonia, and to have consisted of silks, carpets, and coverlets.<sup>165</sup> The silks were largely used by the Roman ladies.<sup>166</sup> The coverlets, which were patterned with various colors, fetched enormous prices, and were regarded as fit adornments of the Imperial palace.<sup>167</sup> Among the spices exported, the most celebrated were bdellium, and the *juncus odoratus* or odoriferous bulrush.<sup>168</sup>

The Parthians had many liberal usages which imply a fairly advanced civilization. Their tolerance of varieties in religion has been already mentioned.<sup>169</sup> Even in political matters they seem to have been free from the narrowness which generally characterizes barbarous nations. They behaved well to prisoners,<sup>170</sup> admitted foreigners freely to offices of high trust,<sup>171</sup> gave an asylum to refugees, and treated them with respect and

kindness,<sup>172</sup> were scrupulous observers of their pledged word,<sup>173</sup> and eminently faithful to their treaty obligations.<sup>174</sup> On the other hand, it must be admitted that they had some customs which indicate a tinge of barbarism. They used torture for the extraction of answers from reluctant persons,<sup>175</sup> employed the scourge to punish trifling offences,<sup>176</sup> and, in certain cases, condescended to mutilate the bodies of their dead enemies.<sup>177</sup> Their addiction to intemperance is also a barbaric trait. They were, no doubt, on the whole, less civilized than either the Greeks or Romans; but the difference does not seem to have been so great as represented by the classical writers.

Speaking broadly, the position that they occupied was somewhat similar to that which the Turks hold in the system of modern Europe. They had a military strength which caused them to be feared and respected, a vigor of administration<sup>178</sup> which was felt to imply many sterling qualities. A certain coarseness and rudeness attached to them which they found it impossible to shake off; and this drawback was exaggerated by their rivals into an indication of irreclaimable barbarity. Except in respect of their military prowess, it may be doubtful if justice is done them by any classical writer. They were not merely the sole rival which dared to stand up against Rome in the interval between B.C. 65 and A.D. 226, but they were a rival falling in many respects very little below the great power whose glories have thrown them so much into the shade. They maintained from first to last a freedom unknown to later Rome; they excelled the Romans in toleration and in liberal treatment of foreigners, they equalled them in manufactures and in material prosperity, and they fell but little short of them in the extent and productiveness of their dominions. They were the second power in the world for nearly three centuries, and formed a counterpoise to Rome which greatly checked Roman decline, and, by forcing the Empire to exert itself, prevented stagnation and corruption.

It must, however, be confessed, that the tendency of the Parthians was to degenerate. Although the final blow was struck in an unexpected quarter, and perhaps surprised the victors as much as the vanquished, still it is apparent that for a considerable space before the revolt of Artaxerxes the Parthian Empire had shown signs of failing strength, and had tended rapidly towards decay and ruin. The constant quarrels among the Arsacidæ and the incipient disintegration of the Empire have been noticed.<sup>179</sup> It may be added here that a

growing barbarism, a decline in art and letters, is observable in the Parthian remains, such as have usually been found to accompany the decrepitude of a nation. The coinage has from first to last a somewhat rude character, which indicates that it is native, and not the production of Greek artists.<sup>160</sup> But on the earlier coins the type, though not indicative of high art, is respectable, and the legends are, with few exceptions,<sup>161</sup> perfectly correct and classical. Barbarism first creeps in about the reign of Gotarzes,<sup>162</sup> A.D. 42-51. It increases as time goes on, until, from about A.D. 133, the Greek legend upon the coins becomes indistinct and finally unintelligible, the letters being strewn about the surface of the coin, like dead soldiers over a field of battle. It is clear that the later directors of the mint were completely ignorant of Greek, and merely attempted to reproduce on the coin some semblance of a language which neither they nor their countrymen understood. Such a condition of a coinage is almost without parallel, and indicates a want of truth and honesty in the conduct of affairs which implies deep-seated corruption. The Parthians must have lost the knowledge of Greek about A.D. 130, yet still a pretence of using the language was kept up. On the tetradrachms—comparatively rare coins—no important mistake was committed; but on the more usual drachm, from the time of Gotarzes, the most absurd errors were introduced, and thenceforth perpetuated.<sup>163</sup> The old inscription was, in a certain sense, imitated, but every word of it ceased to be legible: the old figures disappeared in an indistinct haze, and—if we except the head and name of the king (written now in a Semitic character)—the whole emblazonment of the coin became unmeaning. A degeneracy less marked, but still sufficiently clear to the numismatic critic, is observable in the heads of the kings, which, in the earlier times, if a little coarse, are striking and characteristic; while in the later they sink to a conventional type, rudely and poorly rendered, and so uniform that the power of distinguishing one sovereign from another rests no longer upon feature, but upon mere differences in the arrangement of hair, or beard, or head-dress.





# HISTORY OF THE SASSANIAN OR NEW PERSIAN EMPIRE.

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## CHAPTER I.

*Condition of the Persians under the Successors of Alexander—under the Arsacidæ. Favor shown them by the latter—allowed to have Kings of their own. Their Religion at first held in honor. Power of their Priests. Gradual Change of Policy on the part of the Parthian Monarchs, and final Oppression of the Magi. Causes which produced the Insurrection of Artaxerxes.*

“The Parthians had been barbarians; they had ruled over a nation far more civilized than themselves, and had oppressed them and their religion.”

NIEBUHR, *Lectures on Roman History*, vol. iii. p. 276.

WHEN the great Empire of the Persians, founded by Cyrus, collapsed under the attack of Alexander the Great, the dominant race of Western Asia did not feel itself at the first reduced to an intolerable condition. It was the benevolent design of Alexander to fuse into one the two leading peoples of Europe and Asia, and to establish himself at the head of a Perso-Hellenic State, the capital of which was to have been Babylon.<sup>1</sup> Had this idea been carried out, the Persians would, it is evident, have lost but little by their subjugation. Placed on a par with the Greeks, united with them in marriage bonds,<sup>2</sup> and equally favored by their common ruler, they could scarcely have uttered a murmur, or have been seriously discontented with their position. But when the successors of the great Macedonian, unable to rise to the height of his grand conception, took lower ground, and, giving up the idea of a fusion, fell back upon the ordinary status, and proceeded to enact the ordinary rôle, of conquerors, the feelings of the late lords of Asia, the countrymen of Cyrus and Darius, must have under-

gone a complete change. It had been the intention of Alexander to conciliate and elevate the leading Asiatics by uniting them with the Macedonians and the Greeks, by promoting social intercourse between the two classes of his subjects and encouraging them to intermarry, by opening his court to Asiatics, by educating them in Greek ideas and in Greek schools, by promoting them to high employments, and making them feel that they were as much valued and as well cared for as the people of the conquering race: it was the plan of the Seleucidæ to govern wholly by means of European officials, Greek or Macedonian, and to regard and treat the entire mass of their Asiatic subjects as mere slaves.<sup>3</sup> Alexander had placed Persian satraps over most of the provinces, attaching to them Greek or Macedonian commandants as checks.<sup>4</sup> Seleucus divided his empire into seventy-two satrapies; but among his satraps not one was an Asiatic—all were either Macedonians or Greeks. Asiatics, indeed, formed the bulk of his standing army, and so far were admitted to employment; they might also, no doubt, be tax-gatherers, couriers, scribes, constables, and officials of that mean stamp; but they were as carefully excluded from all honorable and lucrative offices as the natives of Hindustan under the rule of the East India Company. The standing army of the Seleucidæ was wholly officered, just as was that of our own Sepoys, by Europeans; Europeans thronged the court, and filled every important post under the government. There cannot be a doubt that such a high-spirited and indeed arrogant people as the Persians must have fretted and chafed under this treatment, and have detested the nation and dynasty which had thrust them down from their pre-eminence and converted them from masters into slaves. It would scarcely much tend to mitigate the painfulness of their feelings that they could not but confess their conquerors to be a civilized people—as civilized, perhaps more civilized than themselves—since the civilization was of a type and character which did not please them or command their approval. There is an essential antagonism between European and Asiatic ideas and modes of thought, such as seemingly to preclude the possibility of Asiatics appreciating a European civilization. The Persians must have felt towards the Greco-Macedonians much as the Mohammedans of India feel towards ourselves—they may have feared and even respected them—but they must have very bitterly hated them.

Nor was the rule of the Seleucidæ such as to overcome by its

justice or its wisdom the original antipathy of the dispossessed lords of Asia towards those by whom they had been ousted. The satrapial system, which these monarchs lazily adopted from their predecessors, the Achæmenians, is one always open to great abuses, and needs the strictest superintendence and supervision. There is no reason to believe that any sufficient watch was kept over their satraps by the Seleucid kings, or even any system of checks established, such as the Achæmenidæ had, at least in theory, set up and maintained.<sup>5</sup> The Greco-Macedonian governors of provinces seem to have been left to themselves almost entirely, and to have been only controlled in the exercise of their authority by their own notions of what was right or expedient. Under these circumstances, abuses were sure to creep in; and it is not improbable that gross outrages were sometimes perpetrated by those in power—outrages calculated to make the blood of a nation boil, and to produce a keen longing for vengeance. We have no direct evidence that the Persians of the time did actually suffer from such a misuse of satrapial authority; but it is unlikely that they entirely escaped the miseries which are incidental to the system in question. Public opinion ascribed the grossest acts of tyranny and oppression to some of the Seleucid satraps;<sup>6</sup> probably the Persians were not exempt from the common lot of the subject races.

Moreover, the Seleucid monarchs themselves were occasionally guilty of acts of tyranny, which must have intensified the dislike wherewith they were regarded by their Asiatic subjects. The reckless conduct of Antiochus Epiphanes towards the Jews is well known; but it is not perhaps generally recognized that intolerance and impious cupidity formed a portion of the system on which he governed. There seems, however, to be good reason to believe that, having exhausted his treasury by his wars and his extravagances, Epiphanes formed a general design of recruiting it by means of the plunder of his subjects. The temples of the Asiatics had hitherto been for the most part respected by their European conquerors,<sup>7</sup> and large stores of the precious metals were accumulated in them. Epiphanes saw in these hoards the means of relieving his own necessities, and determined to seize and confiscate them. Besides plundering the Temple of Jehovah at Jerusalem, he made a journey into the southeastern portion of his empire, about B.C. 165, for the express purpose of conducting in person the collection of the sacred treasures. It was while he was engaged

in this unpopular work that a spirit of disaffection showed itself; the East took arms no less than the West; and in Persia, or upon its borders, the avaricious monarch was forced to retire before the opposition which his ill-judged measures had provoked, and to allow one of the doomed temples to escape him.<sup>8</sup> When he soon afterwards sickened and died, the natives of this part of Asia saw in his death a judgment upon him for his attempted sacrilege.<sup>9</sup>

It was within twenty years of this unfortunate attempt that the dominion of the Seleucidæ over Persia and the adjacent countries came to an end. The Parthian Empire had for nearly a century been gradually growing in power and extending itself at the expense of the Syro-Macedonian; and, about B.C. 163, an energetic prince, Mithridates I., commenced a series of conquests towards the West, which terminated (about B.C. 150) in the transference from the Syro-Macedonian to the Parthian rule of Media Magna, Susiana, Persia, Babylonia, and Assyria Proper. It would seem that the Persians offered no resistance to the progress of the new conqueror.<sup>10</sup> The Seleucidæ had not tried to conciliate their attachment, and it was impossible that they should dislike the rupture of ties which had only galled hitherto. Perhaps their feeling, in prospect of the change, was one of simple indifference. Perhaps it was not without some stir of satisfaction and complacency that they saw the pride of the hated Europeans abased, and a race, which, however much it might differ from their own, was at least Asiatic, installed in power. The Parthia system, moreover, was one which allowed greater liberty to the subject races than the Macedonian, as it had been understood and carried out by the Seleucidæ; and so far some real gain was to be expected from the change. Religious motives must also have conspired to make the Persians sympathize with the new power, rather than with that which for centuries had despised their faith and had recently insulted it.

The treatment of the Persians by their Parthian lords seems, on the whole, to have been marked by moderation. Mithridates indeed, the original conqueror, is accused of having alienated his new subjects by the harshness of his rule;<sup>11</sup> and in the struggle which occurred between him and the Seleucid king, Demetrius II., Persians, as well as Elymæans and Bactrians, are said to have fought on the side of the Syro-Macedonian.<sup>12</sup> But this is the only occasion in Parthian history, between the submission of Persia and the great revolt under Artaxerxes,

where there is any appearance of the Persians regarding their masters with hostile feelings. In general they show themselves submissive and contented with their position, which was certainly, on the whole, a less irksome one than they had occupied under the Seleucidæ.

It was a principle of the Parthian governmental system to allow the subject peoples, to a large extent, to govern themselves. These peoples generally, and notably the Persians, were ruled by native kings,<sup>13</sup> who succeeded to the throne by hereditary right, had the full power of life and death,<sup>14</sup> and ruled very much as they pleased, so long as they paid regularly the tribute imposed upon them by the "King of Kings," and sent him a respectable contingent when he was about to engage in a military expedition.<sup>15</sup> Such a system implies that the conquered peoples have the enjoyment of their own laws and institutions, are exempt from troublesome interference, and possess a sort of semi-independence. Oriental nations, having once assumed this position, are usually contented with it, and rarely make any effort to better themselves. It would seem that, thus far at any rate, the Persians could not complain of the Parthian rule, but must have been fairly satisfied with their condition.

Again, the Greco-Macedonians had tolerated, but they had not viewed with much respect, the religion which they had found established in Persia. Alexander, indeed, with the enlightened curiosity which characterised him, had made inquiries concerning the tenets of the Magi, and endeavored to collect in one the writings of Zoroaster.<sup>16</sup> But the later monarchs, and still more their subjects, had held the system in contempt, and, as we have seen, Epiphanes had openly insulted the religious feelings of his Asiatic subjects. The Parthians, on the other hand, *began* at any rate with a treatment of the Persian religion which was respectful and gratifying. Though perhaps at no time very sincere Zoroastrians, they had conformed to the State religion under the Achæmænian kings; and when the period came that they had themselves to establish a system of government, they gave to the Magian hierarchy a distinct and important place in their governmental machinery. The council, which advised the monarch, and which helped to elect and (if need were) depose him, was composed of two elements—the *Sophi*, or wise men, who were civilians; and the *Magi*, or priests of the Zoroastrian religion.<sup>17</sup> The Magi had thus an important political status in Parthia

during the early period of the Empire; but they seem gradually to have declined in favor, and ultimately to have fallen into disrepute.<sup>18</sup> The Zoroastrian creed was, little by little, superseded among the Parthians by a complex idolatry, which, beginning with an image-worship of the Sun and Moon, proceeded to an association with those deities of the deceased kings of the nation, and finally added to both a worship of ancestral idols, which formed the most cherished possession of each family, and practically monopolized the religious sentiment.<sup>19</sup> All the old Zoroastrian practices were by degrees laid aside. In Armenia the Arsacid monarchs allowed the sacred fire of Ormazd to become extinguished;<sup>20</sup> and in their own territories the Parthian Arsacidæ introduced the practice, hateful to Zoroastrians, of burning the dead.<sup>21</sup> The ultimate religion of these monarchs seems in fact to have been a syncretism wherein Sabaism, Confucianism, Greco-Macedonian notions, and an inveterate primitive idolatry<sup>22</sup> were mixed together. It is not impossible that the very names of Ormazd and Ahriman had ceased to be known at the Parthian Court, or were regarded as those of exploded deities, whose dominion over men's minds had passed away.

On the other hand, in Persia itself, and to some extent doubtless among the neighboring countries, Zoroastrianism (or what went by the name) had a firm hold on the religious sentiments of the multitude, who viewed with disfavor the tolerant and eclectic spirit which animated the Court of Ctesiphon. The perpetual fire, kindled, as it was, from heaven, was carefully tended and preserved on the fire-altars of the Persian holy places;<sup>23</sup> the Magian hierarchy was held in the highest repute, the kings themselves (as it would seem) not disdaining to be Magi;<sup>24</sup> the ideas—even perhaps the forms<sup>25</sup>—of Ormazd and Ahriman were familiar to all; image-worship was abhorred;<sup>26</sup> the sacred writings in the Zend or most ancient Iranian language were diligently preserved and multiplied; a pompous ritual was kept up; the old national religion, the religion of the Achæmenians, of the glorious period of Persian ascendancy in Asia, was with the utmost strictness maintained, probably the more zealously as it fell more and more into disfavor with the Parthians.

The consequence of this divergence of religious opinion between the Persians and their feudal lords must undoubtedly have been a certain amount of alienation and discontent. The Persian Magi must have been especially dissatisfied with the

position of their brethren at Court; and they would doubtless use their influence to arouse the indignation of their countrymen generally. But it is scarcely probable that this cause alone would have produced any striking result. Religious sympathy rarely leads men to engage in important wars, unless it has the support of other concurrent motives. To account for the revolt of the Persians against their Parthian lords under Artaxerxes, something more is needed than the consideration of the religious differences which separated the two peoples.

First, then, it should be borne in mind that the Parthian rule must have been from the beginning distasteful to the Persians, owing to the rude and coarse character of the people. At the moment of Mithridates's successes, the Persians might experience a sentiment of satisfaction<sup>27</sup> that the European invader was at last thrust back, and that Asia had re-asserted herself; but a very little experience of Parthian rule was sufficient to call forth different feelings. There can be no doubt that the Parthians, whether they were actually Turanians or no,<sup>28</sup> were, in comparison with the Persians, unpolished and uncivilized. They showed their own sense of this inferiority by an affectation of Persian manners.<sup>29</sup> But this affectation was not very successful. It is evident that in art, in architecture, in manners, in habits of life, the Parthian race reached only a low standard; they stood to their Hellenic and Iranian subjects in much the same relation that the Turks of the present day stand to the modern Greeks; they made themselves respected by their strength and their talent for organization; but in all that adorns and beautifies life they were deficient.<sup>30</sup> The Persians must, during the whole time of their subjection to Parthia, have been sensible of a feeling of shame at the want of refinement and of a high type of civilization in their masters.

Again, the later sovereigns of the Arsacid dynasty were for the most part of weak and contemptible character. From the time of Volagases I. to that of Artabanus IV., the last king, the military reputation of Parthia had declined. Foreign enemies ravaged the territories of Parthian vassal kings, and retired when they chose, unpunished.<sup>31</sup> Provinces revolted and established their independence.<sup>32</sup> Rome was entreated to lend assistance to her distressed and afflicted rival, and met the entreaties with a refusal.<sup>33</sup> In the wars which still from time to time were waged between the two empires Parthia

was almost uniformly worsted. Three times her capital was occupied,<sup>34</sup> and once her monarch's summer palace was burned.<sup>35</sup> Province after province had to be ceded to Rome.<sup>36</sup> The golden throne which symbolized her glory and magnificence was carried off.<sup>37</sup> Meanwhile feuds raged between the different branches of the Arsacid family; civil wars were frequent; two or three monarchs at a time claimed the throne, or actually ruled in different portions of the Empire.<sup>38</sup> It is not surprising that under these circumstances the bonds were loosened between Parthia and her vassal kingdoms, or that the Persian tributary monarchs began to despise their suzerains, and to contemplate without alarm the prospect of a rebellion which should place them in an independent position.

While the general weakness of the Arsacid monarchs was thus a cause naturally leading to a renunciation of their allegiance on the part of the Persians, a special influence upon the decision taken by Artaxerxes is probably to be assigned to one, in particular, of the results of that weakness. When provinces long subject to Parthian rule revolted, and revolted successfully, as seems to have been the case with Hyrcania, and partially with Bactria,<sup>39</sup> Persia could scarcely for very shame continue submissive. Of all the races subject to Parthia, the Persians were the one which had held the most brilliant position in the past, and which retained the liveliest remembrance of its ancient glories. This is evidenced not only by the grand claims which Artaxerxes put forward in his early negotiations with the Romans,<sup>40</sup> but by the whole course of Persian literature, which has fundamentally an historic character, and exhibits the people as attached, almost more than any other Oriental nation, to the memory of its great men and of their noble achievements.<sup>41</sup> The countrymen of Cyrus, of Darius, of Xerxes, of Ochus, of the conquerors of Media, Bactria, Babylon, Syria, Asia Minor, Egypt, of the invaders of Scythia and Greece, aware that they had once borne sway over the whole region between Tunis and the Indian Desert, between the Caucasus and the Cataracts, when they saw a petty mountain clan, like the Hyrcanians, establish and maintain their independence despite the efforts of Parthia to coerce them, could not very well remain quiet. If so weak and small a race could defy the power of the Arsacid monarchs, much more might the far more numerous and at least equally courageous Persians expect to succeed, if they made a resolute attempt to recover their freedom.

It is probable that Artaxerxes, in his capacity of vassal, served personally in the army with which the Parthian monarch Artabanus carried on the struggle against Rome, and thus acquired the power of estimating correctly the military strength still possessed by the Arsacidæ, and of measuring it against that which he knew to belong to his nation. It is not unlikely that he formed his plans during the earlier period of Artabanus's reign, when that monarch allowed himself to be imposed upon by Caracallus, and suffered calamities and indignities in consequence of his folly.<sup>42</sup> When the Parthian monarch atoned for his indiscretion and wiped out the memory of his disgraces by the brilliant victory of Nisibis and the glorious peace which he made with Macrinus, Artaxerxes may have found that he had gone too far to recede; or, undazzled by the splendor of these successes, he may still have judged that he might with prudence persevere in his enterprise. Artabanus had suffered great losses in his two campaigns against Rome, and especially in the three days' battle of Nisibis. He was at variance with several princes of his family, one of whom certainly maintained himself during his whole reign with the State and title of "King of Parthia."<sup>43</sup> Though he had fought well at Nisibis, he had not given any indications of remarkable military talent. Artaxerxes, having taken the measure of his antagonist during the course of the Roman war, having estimated his resources and formed a decided opinion on the relative strength of Persia and Parthia, deliberately resolved, a few years after the Roman war had come to an end,<sup>44</sup> to revolt and accept the consequences. He was no doubt convinced that his nation would throw itself enthusiastically into the struggle, and he believed that he could conduct it to a successful issue. He felt himself the champion of a depressed, if not an oppressed,<sup>45</sup> nationality, and had faith in his power to raise it into a lofty position. Iran, at any rate, should no longer, he resolved, submit patiently to be the slave of Turan; the keen, intelligent, art-loving Aryan people should no longer bear submissively the yoke of the rude, coarse, clumsy Scyths. An effort after freedom should be made. He had little doubt of the result. The Persians, by the strength of their own right arms and the blessing of Ahuramazda, the "All-bounteous,"<sup>46</sup> would triumph over their impious masters, and become once more a great and independent people. At the worst, if he had miscalculated, there would be the alternative of a glorious death upon the battle-field in one of the noblest of all causes, the assertion of a nation's freedom.<sup>47</sup>

## CHAPTER II.

*Situation and Size of Persia. General Character of the Country and Climate. Chief Products. Characteristics of the Persian People, physical and moral. Differences observable in the Race at different periods.*

Ἡ Περσίς ἐστὶ πολλή μὲν ἐν τῇ παραλίᾳ . . . πολὺ δὲ μείζων ἐν τῇ μεσογαίᾳ.—Strabo, STRABO, XV. 3, § 1.

PERSIA PROPER was a tract of country lying on the Gulf to which it has given name, and extending about 450 miles from north-west to south-east, with an average breadth of about 250 miles. Its entire area may be estimated at about a hundred thousand square miles. It was thus larger than Great Britain, about the size of Italy, and rather less than half the size of France.<sup>1</sup> The boundaries were, on the west, Elymais or Susiana (which, however, was sometimes reckoned a part of Persia);<sup>2</sup> on the north, Media; on the east, Carmania;<sup>3</sup> and on the south, the sea. It is nearly represented in modern times by the two Persian provinces of Farsistan and Laristan, the former of which retains, but slightly changed, the ancient appellation. The Hindyan or Tab (ancient Oroatis) seems towards its mouth to have formed the western limit.<sup>4</sup> Eastward, Persia extended to about the site of the modern Bunder Kongo.<sup>5</sup> Inland, the northern boundary ran probably a little south of the thirty-second parallel, from long. 50° to 55°. The line dividing Persia Proper from Carmania (now Kerman) was somewhat uncertain.

The character of the tract is extremely diversified. Ancient writers divided the country into three strongly contrasted regions. The first, or coast tract, was (they said) a sandy desert, producing nothing but a few dates, owing to the intensity of the heat. Above this was a fertile region, grassy, with well-watered meadows and numerous vineyards, enjoying a delicious climate, producing almost every fruit but the olive, containing pleasant parks or "paradises," watered by a number of limpid streams and clear lakes, well wooded in places, affording an excellent pasture for horses and for all sorts of cattle, abounding in water-fowl and game of every

kind, and altogether a most delightful abode. Beyond this fertile region, towards the north, was a rugged mountain tract, cold and mostly covered with snow, of which they did not profess to know much.<sup>6</sup>

In this description there is no doubt a certain amount of truth; but it is mixed probably with a good deal of exaggeration. There is no reason to believe that the climate or character of the country has undergone any important alteration between the time of Nearchus or Strabo and the present day. At present it is certain that the tract in question answers but very incompletely to the description which those writers give of it. Three regions may indeed be distinguished, though the natives seem now to speak of only *two*;<sup>7</sup> but none of them corresponds at all exactly to the accounts of the Greeks. The coast tract is represented with the nearest approach to correctness. This is, in fact, a region of arid plain, often impregnated with salt, ill-watered, with a poor soil, consisting either of sand or clay, and productive of little besides dates and a few other fruits.<sup>8</sup> A modern historian<sup>9</sup> says of it that "it bears a greater resemblance in soil and climate to Arabia than to the rest of Persia." It is very hot and unhealthy, and can at no time have supported more than a sparse and scanty population. Above this, towards the north, is the best and most fertile portion of the territory. A mountain tract,<sup>10</sup> the continuation of Zagros, succeeds to the flat and sandy coast region, occupying the greater portion of Persia Proper. It is about two hundred miles in width, and consists of an alternation of mountain, plain, and narrow valley, curiously intermixed, and hitherto mapped very imperfectly.<sup>11</sup> In places this district answers fully to the description of Nearchus, being, "richly fertile, picturesque, and romantic almost beyond imagination, with lovely wooded dells, green mountain sides, and broad plains, suited for the production of almost any crops."<sup>12</sup> But it is only to the smaller moiety of the region that such a character attaches; more than half the mountain tract is sterile and barren;<sup>13</sup> the supply of water is almost everywhere scanty; the rivers are few, and have not much volume; many of them, after short courses, end in the sand, or in small salt lakes, from which the superfluous water is evaporated. Much of the country is absolutely without streams, and would be uninhabitable were it not for the *kanats* or *kareezes*<sup>14</sup>—subterranean channels made by art for the conveyance of spring water to be used in irrigation. The most

desolate portion of the mountain tract is towards the north and north-east, where it adjoins upon the third region, which is the worst of the three. This is a portion of the high tableland of Iran, the great desert which stretches from the eastern skirts of Zagros to the Hamoon, the Helمند, and the river of Subzawur. It is a dry and hard plain, intersected at intervals by ranges of rocky hills,<sup>15</sup> with a climate extremely hot in summer and extremely cold in winter, incapable of cultivation, excepting so far as water can be conveyed by *kanats*, which is, of course, only a short distance. The fox, the jackal, the antelope, and the wild ass possess this sterile and desolate tract, where "all is dry and cheerless,"<sup>16</sup> and verdure is almost unknown.

Perhaps the two most peculiar districts of Persia are the lake basins of Neyriz and Deriah-i-Nemek. The rivers given off from the northern side of the great mountain chain between the twenty-ninth and thirty-first parallels, being unable to penetrate the mountains, flow eastward towards the desert; and their waters gradually collect into two streams, which end in two lakes, the Deriah-i-Nemek and that of Neyriz, or Lake Bakhtigan.<sup>17</sup> The basin of Lake Neyriz lies towards the north. Here the famous "Bendamir,"<sup>18</sup> and the Pulwar or Kur-ab, flowing respectively from the north-east and the north, unite in one near the ruins of the ancient Persepolis, and, after fertilizing the plain of Merdasht,<sup>19</sup> run eastward down a rich vale for a distance of some forty miles into the salt lake which swallows them up. This lake, when full, has a length of fifty or sixty miles, with a breadth of from three to six.<sup>20</sup> In summer, however, it is often quite dry,<sup>21</sup> the water of the Bendamir being expended in irrigation before reaching its natural terminus. The valley and plain of the Bendamir, and its tributaries, are among the most fertile portions of Persia, as well as among those of most historic interest.<sup>22</sup>

The basin of the Deriah-i-Nemek is smaller than that of the Neyriz, but it is even more productive. Numerous brooks and streams, rising not far from Shiraz, run on all sides into the Nemek lake, which has a length of about fifteen and a breadth of three or three and a half miles.<sup>23</sup> Among the streams is the celebrated brook of Hafiz, the Rocknabad, which still retains "its singular transparency and softness to the taste."<sup>24</sup> Other rills and fountains of extreme clearness abound,<sup>25</sup> and a verdure is the result, very unusual in Persia. The vines grown in the

basin produce the famous Shiraz wine, the only good wine which is manufactured in the East. The orchards are magnificent. In the autumn "the earth is covered with the gathered harvest, flowers, and fruits; melons, peaches, pears, nectarines, cherries, grapes, pomegranates; all is a garden, abundant in sweets and refreshment."<sup>26</sup>

But, notwithstanding the exceptional fertility of the Shiraz plain and of a few other places, Persia Proper seems to have been rightly characterized in ancient times as "a scant land and a rugged."<sup>27</sup> Its area was less than a fifth of the area of modern Persia; and of this space nearly one half was uninhabitable, consisting either of barren stony mountain or of scorching sandy plain, ill supplied with water and often impregnated with salt. Its products, consequently, can have been at no time either very abundant or very varied. Anciently, the low coast tract seems to have been cultivated to a small extent in corn,<sup>28</sup> and to have produced good dates and a few other fruits.<sup>29</sup> The mountain region was, as we have seen,<sup>30</sup> celebrated for its excellent pastures, for its abundant fruits, and especially for its grapes. Within the mountains, on the high plateau, assafoetida (*silphium*) was found,<sup>31</sup> and probably some other medicinal herbs.<sup>32</sup> Corn, no doubt, could be grown largely in the plains and valleys of the mountain tract, as well as on the plateau, so far as the *kanats* carried the water. There must have been, on the whole, a deficiency of timber, though the palms of the low tract, and the oaks, planes, chenars or sycamores, poplars, and willows<sup>33</sup> of the mountain regions sufficed for the wants of the natives. Not much fuel was required, and stone was the general material used for building. Among the fruits for which Persia was famous are especially noted the peach,<sup>34</sup> the walnut, and the citron.<sup>35</sup> The walnut bore among the Romans the appellation of "royal."<sup>36</sup>

Persia, like Media, was a good nursery for horses.<sup>37</sup> Fine grazing grounds existed in many parts of the mountain region, and for horses of the Arab breed even the Deshtistan was not unsuited.<sup>38</sup> Camels were reared in some places,<sup>39</sup> and sheep and goats were numerous.<sup>40</sup> Horned cattle were probably not so abundant, as the character of the country is not favorable for them.<sup>41</sup> Game existed in large quantities,<sup>42</sup> the lakes abounding with water-fowl,<sup>43</sup> such as ducks, teal, heron, snipe, etc.; and the wooded portions of the mountain tract giving shelter to the stag, the wild goat, the wild boar, the hare, the pheasant, and the heathcock.<sup>44</sup> Fish were also plen-

tiful. Whales visited the Persian Gulf, and were sometimes stranded upon the shores, where their carcasses furnished a mine of wealth to the inhabitants.<sup>45</sup> Dolphins abounded, as well as many smaller kinds; and shell-fish, particularly oysters, could always be obtained without difficulty.<sup>46</sup> The rivers, too, were capable of furnishing fresh-water fish in good quantity,<sup>47</sup> though we cannot say if this source of supply was utilized in antiquity.

The mineral treasures of Persia were fairly numerous. Good salt was yielded by the lakes of the middle region, and was also obtainable upon the plateau. Bitumen and naphtha were produced by sources in the low country.<sup>48</sup> The mountains contained most of the important metals and a certain number of valuable gems.<sup>49</sup> The pearls of the Gulf acquired early a great reputation, and a regular fishery was established for them before the time of Alexander.<sup>50</sup>

But the most celebrated of all the products of Persia were its men. The "scant and rugged country" gave birth, as Cyrus the Great is said to have observed,<sup>51</sup> to a race brave, hardy, and enduring, calculated not only to hold its own against aggressors, but to extend its sway and exercise dominion over the Western Asiatics generally. The Aryan family is the one which, of all the races of mankind, is the most self-asserting, and has the greatest strength, physical, moral, and intellectual. The Iranian branch of it, whereto the Persians belonged, is not perhaps so gifted as some others; but it has qualities which place it above most of those by which Western Asia was anciently peopled. In the primitive times, from Cyrus the Great to Darius Hystaspis, the Persians seem to have been rude mountaineers, probably not very unlike the modern Kurds and Lurs, who inhabit portions of the same chain which forms the heart of the Persian country. Their physiognomy was handsome.<sup>52</sup> A high straight forehead, a long slightly aquiline nose, a short and curved upper lip, a well-rounded chin, characterized the Persian. The expression of his face was grave and noble. He had abundant hair, which he wore very artificially arranged. Above and round the brow it was made to stand away from the face in short crisp curls; on the top of the head it was worn smooth; at the back of the head it was again trained into curls, which followed each other in several rows from the level of the forehead to the nape of the neck. The moustache was always cultivated, and curved in a gentle sweep. A beard and whiskers were worn, the former some-

times long and pendent, like the Assyrian, but more often clustering around the chin in short close curls. The figure was well-formed, but somewhat stout; the carriage was dignified and simple. [Pl. XI., Fig. 1.]


Simplicity of manners prevailed during this period. At the court there was some luxury; but the bulk of the nation, living in their mountain territory, and attached to agriculture and hunting, maintained the habits of their ancestors, and were a somewhat rude though not a coarse people. The dress commonly worn was a close-fitting shirt or tunic of leather,<sup>53</sup> descending to the knee, and with sleeves that reached down to the wrist. Round the tunic was worn a belt or sash, which was tied in front. The head was protected by a loose felt cap,<sup>54</sup> and the feet by a sort of high shoe or low boot. The ordinary diet was bread and cress-seed,<sup>55</sup> while the sole beverage was water.<sup>56</sup> In the higher ranks, of course, a different style of living prevailed; the elegant and flowing "Median robe" was worn;<sup>57</sup> flesh of various kinds was eaten;<sup>58</sup> much wine was consumed;<sup>59</sup> and meals were extended to a great length;<sup>60</sup> The Persians, however, maintained during this period a general hardihood and bravery which made them the most dreaded adversaries of the Greeks,<sup>61</sup> and enabled them to maintain an unquestioned dominion over the other native races of Western Asia.

As time went on, and their monarchs became less warlike, and wealth accumulated, and national spirit decayed, the Persian character by degrees deteriorated, and sank, even under the Achæmenian kings, to a level not much superior to that of the ordinary Asiatic. The Persian antagonists of Alexander were pretty nearly upon a par with the races which in Hindustan have yielded to the British power; they occasionally fought with gallantry,<sup>62</sup> but they were deficient in resolution, in endurance, in all the elements of solid strength; and they were quite unable to stand their ground against the vigor and dash of the Macedonians and the Greeks. Whether physically they were very different from the soldiers of Cyrus may be doubted, but morally they had fallen far below the ancient standard; their self-respect their love of country, their attachment to their monarch had diminished; no one showed any great devotion to the cause for which he fought; after two defeats<sup>63</sup> the empire wholly collapsed; and the Persians submitted, apparently without much reluctance, to the Helleno-Macedonian yoke.

Five centuries and a half of servitude could not much improve or elevate the character of the people. Their fall from power, their loss of wealth and of dominion did indeed advantage them in one way: it but an end to that continually advancing sloth and luxury which had sapped the virtue of the nation, depriving it of energy, endurance, and almost every manly excellence. It dashed the Persians back upon the ground whence they had sprung, and whence, Antæus-like, they proceeded to derive fresh vigor and vital force. In their "scant and rugged" fatherland, the people of Cyrus once more recovered to a great extent their ancient prowess and hardihood—their habits became simplified, their old patriotism revived, their self-respect grew greater. But while adversity thus in some respects proved its "sweet uses" upon them, there were other respects in which submission to the yoke of the Greeks, and still more to that of the Parthians, seems to have altered them for the worse rather than for the better. There is a coarseness and rudeness about the Sassanian Persians which we do not observe in Achæmenian times. The physique of the nation is not indeed much altered. Nearly the same countenance meets us in the sculptures of Artaxerxes, the son of Babek, of Sapor, and of their successors,<sup>64</sup> with which we are familiar from the bas-reliefs of Darius Hystapis and Xerxes. There is the same straight forehead, the same aquiline nose, the same well-shaped mouth, the same abundant hair. The form is, however, coarser and clumsier; the expression is less refined; and the general effect produced is that the people have, even physically, deteriorated. The mental and æsthetic standard seems still more to have sunk. There is no evidence that the Persians of Sassanian times possessed the governmental and administrative ability of Darius Hystapis or Artaxerxes Ochus. Their art, though remarkable, considering the almost entire disappearance of art from Western Asia under the Parthians,<sup>65</sup> is, compared with that of Achæmenian times, rude and grotesque. In architecture, indeed, they are not without merit, though even here the extent to which they were indebted to the Parthians, which cannot be exactly determined, must lessen our estimation of them; but their mimetic art, while not wanting in spirit, is remarkably coarse and unrefined. As a later chapter will be devoted to this subject, no more need be said upon it here. It is sufficient for our present purpose to note that the impression which we obtain from the monumental remains of the Sassanian Persians accords with what is to be

24 26 28 30 32 34 36 38

68



2242



MAP OF THE  
**SASSANIAN EMPIRE**  
 A.D. 226 - 641

English Miles  
 0 20 40

Fig. 1.



COIN OF ISDIGERD I.

Fig. 2.



COIN OF VARAHRAN V.

Fig. 3.



COIN OF ISDIGERD II.

Fig. 4




COIN OF BALAS.

Fig. 5.



COIN OF HORMISDAS III.  
(doubtful).


Fig. 6.



COIN OF PEROZES.



Fig. 1.



COIN OF ZAMASP.




Fig 2.

COIN OF KOBAD.




Fig. 3.

COIN OF CHOSROES I.




Fig 4.

COIN OF CHOSROES I.

gathered of them from the accounts of the Romans and the Greeks. The great Asiatic revolution of the year A.D. 226 marks a revival of the Iranian nationality from the depressed state into which it had sunk for more than five hundred years; but the revival is not full or complete. The Persians of the Sassanian kingdom are not equal to those of the time between Cyrus the Great and Darius Codomannus; they have ruder manners, a grosser taste, less capacity for government and organization; they have, in fact, been coarsened by centuries of Tartar rule; they are vigorous, active, energetic, proud, brave; but in civilization and refinement they do not rank much above their Parthian predecessors. Western Asia gained, perhaps, something, but it did not gain much, from the substitution of the Persians for the Parthians as the dominant power. The change is the least marked among the revolutions which the East underwent between the accession of Cyrus and the conquests of Timour. But it is a change, on the whole, for the better. It is accompanied by a revival of art, by improvements in architecture; it inaugurates a religious revolution which has advantages. Above all, it saves the East from stagnation. It is one among many of those salutary shocks which, in the political as in the natural world, are needed from time to time to stimulate action and prevent torpor and apathy.

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### CHAPTER III.

*Reign of Artaxerxes I. Stories told of him. Most probable account of his Descent, Rank, and Parentage. His Contest with Artabanus. First War with Chosroës of Armenia. Contest with Alexander Severus. Second War with Chosroës and conquest of Armenia. Religious Reforms. Internal Administration and Government. Art. Coinage. Inscriptions.*

ἜΟΝ sc. Ἀρτάβανον) Ἀρταξέρξης ἀποκτείνας, Πέρσαις τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀνεκτίσαστο· τὰ τε γεινιῶν  
τα ἔθνη βάρβαρα χειρωσάμενος, ῥαδίως ἤδη καὶ τῇ Ῥωμαίων ἀρχῇ ἐπεβούλευσεν.—HERO-  
DIAN. vi. 2, *ad fin.*

AROUND the cradle of an Oriental sovereign who founds a dynasty there cluster commonly a number of traditions, which have, more or less, a mythical character. The tales told of Cyrus the Great, which even Herodotus set aside as incredible,<sup>1</sup>

have their parallels in narratives that were current within one or two centuries<sup>2</sup> with respect to the founder of the Second Persian Empire, which would not have disgraced the mythologers of Achæmenian times. Artaxerxes, according to some,<sup>3</sup> was the son of a common soldier who had an illicit connection with the wife of a Persian cobbler<sup>4</sup> and astrologer, a certain Babek or Papak, an inhabitant of the Cadusian country<sup>5</sup> and a man of the lowest class.<sup>6</sup> Papak, knowing by his art that the soldier's son would attain a lofty position, voluntarily ceded his rights as husband to the favorite of fortune, and bred up as his own the issue of this illegitimate commerce, who, when he attained to manhood, justified Papak's foresight by successfully revolting from Artabanus and establishing the new Persian monarchy. Others<sup>7</sup> said that the founder of the new kingdom was a Parthian satrap, the son of a noble, and that, having long meditated revolt, he took the final plunge in consequence of a prophecy uttered by Artabanus, who was well skilled in magical arts, and saw in the stars that the Parthian empire was threatened with destruction. Artabanus, on a certain occasion, when he communicated this prophetic knowledge to his wife, was overheard by one of her attendants, a noble damsel named Artaducta, already affianced to Artaxerxes and a sharer in his secret counsels. At her instigation he hastened his plans, raised the standard of revolt, and upon the successful issue of his enterprise made her his queen. Miraculous circumstances were freely interwoven with these narratives,<sup>8</sup> and a result was produced which staggered the faith even of such a writer as Moses of Chorêné, who, desiring to confine himself to what was strictly true and certain, could find no more to say of Artaxerxes's birth and origin than that he was the son of a certain Sasan, and a native of Istakr, or Persepolis.

Even, however, the two facts thus selected as beyond criticism by Moses are far from being entitled to implicit credence. Artaxerxes, the son of Sasan according to Agathangelus and Moses,<sup>9</sup> is the same as Papak (or Babek) in his own<sup>10</sup> and his son's inscriptions. The Persian writers generally take the same view, and declare that Sasan was a remoter ancestor of Artaxerxes, the acknowledged founder of the family, and not Artaxerxes' father.<sup>11</sup> In the extant records of the new Persian Kingdom, the coins and the inscriptions, neither Sasan nor the gentilitial term derived from it, Sasanidæ, has any place; and though it would perhaps be rash to question on this account the employment of the term Sasanidæ by the dynasty.<sup>12</sup> vet

we may regard it as really "certain" that the father of Artaxerxes was named, not Sasan, but Papak; and that, if the term Sasanian was in reality a patronymic, it was derived, like the term "Achaemenian,"<sup>18</sup> from some remote progenitor<sup>14</sup> whom the royal family of the new empire believed to have been their founder.

The native country of Artaxerxes is also variously stated by the authorities. Agathangelus calls him an Assyrian,<sup>15</sup> and makes the Assyrians play an important part in his rebellion.<sup>16</sup> Agathias says that he was born in the Cadusian country,<sup>17</sup> or the low tract south-west of the Caspian, which belonged to Media rather than to Assyria or Persia. Dio Cassius<sup>18</sup> and Herodian,<sup>19</sup> the contemporaries of Artaxerxes, call him a Persian; and there can be no reasonable doubt that they are correct in so doing. Agathangelus allows the predominantly Persian character of his revolt, and Agathias is apparently unaware that the Cadusian country was no part of Persia. The statement that he was a native of Persepolis (*Istakr*) is first found in Moses of Chorêné.<sup>20</sup> It may be true, but it is uncertain; for it may have grown out of the earlier statement of Agathangelus, that he held the government of the province of *Istakr*.<sup>21</sup> We can only affirm with confidence that the founder of the new Persian monarchy was a genuine Persian, without attempting to determine positively what Persian city or province had the honor of producing him.<sup>22</sup>

A more interesting question, and one which will be found perhaps to admit of a more definite answer, is that of the rank and station in which Artaxerxes was born. We have seen<sup>23</sup> that Agathias (writing ab. A.D. 580) called him the supposititious son of a cobbler. Others<sup>24</sup> spoke of him as the child of a shepherd; while some said that his father was "an inferior officer in the service of the government."<sup>25</sup> But on the other hand, in the inscriptions which Artaxerxes himself set up in the neighborhood of Persepolis,<sup>26</sup> he gives his father, Papak, the title of "King." Agathangelus calls him a "noble"<sup>27</sup> and "satrap of Persepolitan government;"<sup>28</sup> while Herodian seems to speak of him as "king of the Persians," *before* his victories over Artabanus.<sup>29</sup> On the whole, it is perhaps most probable that, like Cyrus, he was the hereditary monarch of the subject kingdom of Persia, which had always its own princes under the Parthians,<sup>30</sup> and that thus he naturally and without effort took the leadership of the revolt when circumstances induced his nation to rebel and seek to establish its independence. The

stories told of his humble origin, which are contradictory and improbable, are to be paralleled with those which made Cyrus the son of a Persian of moderate rank,<sup>31</sup> and the foster-child of a herdsman.<sup>32</sup> There is always in the East a tendency towards romance and exaggeration; and when a great monarch emerges from a comparatively humble position, the humility and obscurity of his first condition are intensified, to make the contrast more striking between his original low estate and his ultimate splendor and dignity.

The circumstances of the struggle between Artaxerxes and Artabanus are briefly sketched by Dio Cassius<sup>33</sup> and Agathangelus,<sup>34</sup> while they are related more at large by the Persian writers.<sup>35</sup> It is probable that the contest occupied a space of four or five years. At first, we are told,<sup>36</sup> Artabanus neglected to arouse himself, and took no steps towards crushing the rebellion, which was limited to an assertion of the independence of Persia Proper, or the province of Fars. After a time the revolted vassal, finding himself unmolested, was induced to raise his thoughts higher, and commenced a career of conquest. Turning his arms eastward, he attacked Kerman (Carmania), and easily succeeded in reducing that scantily-peopled tract under his dominion.<sup>37</sup> He then proceeded to menace the north, and, making war in that quarter, overran and attached to his kingdom some of the outlying provinces of Media. Roused by these aggressions, the Parthian monarch at length took the field, collected an army consisting in part of Parthians, in part of the Persians who continued faithful to him,<sup>38</sup> against his vassal, and, invading Persia, soon brought his adversary to a battle. A long and bloody contest followed, both sides suffering great losses; but victory finally declared itself in favor of Artaxerxes, through the desertion to him, during the engagement, of a portion of his enemy's forces.<sup>39</sup> A second conflict ensued within a short period, in which the insurgents were even more completely successful; the carnage on the side of the Parthians was great, the loss of the Persians small; and the great king fled precipitately from the field. Still the resources of Parthia were equal to a third trial of arms. After a brief pause, Artabanus made a final effort to reduce his revolted vassal; and a last engagement took place in the plain of Hormuz,<sup>40</sup> which was a portion of the Jerahi valley, in the beautiful country between Bebahan and Shuster. Here, after a desperate conflict, the Parthian monarch suffered a third and signal defeat; his army was scattered; and he himself lost his

life in the combat. According to some, his death was the result of a hand-to-hand conflict with his great antagonist,<sup>41</sup> who, pretending to fly, drew him on, and then pierced his heart with an arrow.

The victory of Hormuz gave to Artaxerxes the dominion of the East; but it did not secure him this result at once, or without further struggle. Artabanus had left sons;<sup>42</sup> and both in Bactria and Armenia there were powerful branches of the Arsacid family,<sup>43</sup> which could not see unmoved the downfall of their kindred in Parthia. Chosroës, the Armenian monarch, was a prince of considerable ability, and is said to have been set upon his throne by Artabanus, whose brother he was, according to some writers.<sup>44</sup> At any rate he was an Arsacid; and he felt keenly the diminution of his own influence involved in the transfer to an alien race of the sovereignty wielded for five centuries by the descendants of the first Arsaces. He had set his forces in motion, while the contest between Artabanus and Artaxerxes was still in progress, in the hope of affording substantial help to his relative.<sup>45</sup> But the march of events was too rapid for him; and, ere he could strike a blow, he found that the time for effectual action had gone by, that Artabanus was no more, and that the dominion of Artaxerxes was established over most of the countries which had previously formed portions of the Parthian Empire. Still, he resolved to continue the struggle; he was on friendly terms with Rome,<sup>46</sup> and might count on an imperial contingent; he had some hope that the Bactrian Arsacidæ would join him;<sup>47</sup> at the worst, he regarded his own power as firmly fixed and as sufficient to enable him to maintain an equal contest with the new monarchy. Accordingly he took the Parthian Arsacids under his protection, and gave them a refuge in the Armenian territory.<sup>48</sup> At the same time he negotiated with both Balkh and Rome, made arrangements with the barbarians upon his northern frontier to lend him aid,<sup>49</sup> and, having collected a large army, invaded the new kingdom on the north-west,<sup>50</sup> and gained certain not unimportant successes. According to the Armenian historians, Artaxerxes lost Assyria and the adjacent regions; Bactria wavered; and, after the struggle had continued for a year or two, the founder of the second Persian empire was obliged to fly ignominiously to India!<sup>51</sup> But this entire narrative seems to be deeply tinged with the vitiating stain of intense national vanity, a fault which markedly characterizes the Armenian writers, and renders them, when unconfirmed by other author-

ities, almost worthless. The general course of events, and the position which Artaxerxes takes in his dealings with Rome (A.D. 229—230), sufficiently indicate that any reverses which he sustained at this time in his struggle with Chosroës and the unsubmitted Arsacidæ<sup>52</sup> must have been trivial, and that they certainly had no greater result than to establish the independence of Armenia, which, by dint of leaning upon Rome,<sup>53</sup> was able to maintain itself against the Persian monarch and to check the advance of the Persians in North-Western Asia.

Artaxerxes, however, resisted in this quarter, and unable to overcome the resistance, which he may have regarded as deriving its effectiveness (in part at least) from the support lent it by Rome, determined (ab. A.D. 229) to challenge the empire to an encounter. Aware that Artabanus, his late rival, against whom he had measured himself, and whose power he had completely overthrown, had been successful in his war with Macrinus, had gained the great battle of Nisibis, and forced the Imperial State to purchase an ignominious peace by a payment equal to nearly two millions of our money,<sup>54</sup> he may naturally have thought that a facile triumph was open to his arms in this direction. Alexander Severus, the occupant of the imperial throne, was a young man of a weak character, controlled in a great measure by his mother, Julia Mamaëa, and as yet quite undistinguished as a general. The Roman forces in the East were known to be licentious and insubordinate;<sup>55</sup> corrupted by the softness of the climate and the seductions of Oriental manners, they disregarded the restraints of discipline, indulged in the vices which at once enervate the frame and lower the moral character, had scant respect for their leaders, and seemed a defence which it would be easy to overpower and sweep away. Artaxerxes, like other founders of great empires, entertained lofty views of his abilities and his destinies; the monarchy which he had built up in the space of some five or six years was far from contenting him; well read in the ancient history of his nation, he sighed after the glorious days of Cyrus the Great and Darius Hystaspis, when all Western Asia from the shores of the Ægean to the Indian desert, and portions of Europe and Africa, had acknowledged the sway of the Persian king. The territories which these princes had ruled he regarded as his own by right of inheritance; and we are told that he not only entertained, but boldly published, these views.<sup>56</sup> His emissaries everywhere declared that their master claimed the dominion of Asia as far as the

Ægean Sea and the Propontis. It was his duty and his mission to recover to the Persians their pristine empire. What Cyrus had conquered, what the Persian kings had held from that time until the defeat of Codomannus by Alexander, was his by indefeasible right, and he was about to take possession of it.

Nor were these brave words a mere *brutum fulmen*. Simultaneously with the putting forth of such lofty pretensions the troops of the Persian monarch crossed the Tigris and spread themselves over the entire Roman province of Mesopotamia,<sup>57</sup> which was rapidly overrun and offered scarcely any resistance. Severus learned at the same moment the demands of his adversary and the loss of one of his best provinces. He heard that his strong posts upon the Euphrates, the old defences of the empire in this quarter, were being attacked,<sup>58</sup> and that Syria daily expected the passage of the invaders. The crisis was one requiring prompt action; but the weak and inexperienced youth was content to meet it with diplomacy, and, instead of sending an army to the East, despatched ambassadors to his rival with a letter. "Artaxerxes," he said, "ought to confine himself to his own territories and not seek to revolutionize Asia; it was unsafe, on the strength of mere unsubstantial hopes, to commence a great war. Every one should be content with keeping what belonged to him. Artaxerxes would find war with Rome a very different thing from the contests in which he had been hitherto engaged with barbarous races like his own. He should call to mind the successes of Augustus and Trajan, and the trophies carried off from the East by Lucius Verus and by Septimius Severus."

The counsels of moderation have rarely much effect in restraining princely ambition. Artaxerxes replied by an embassy in which he ostentatiously displayed the wealth and magnificence of Persia;<sup>59</sup> but, so far from making any deduction from his original demands, he now distinctly formulated them, and required their immediate acceptance. "Artaxerxes, the Great King," he said, "ordered"<sup>60</sup> the Romans and their ruler to take their departure forthwith from Syria and the rest of Western Asia, and to allow the Persians to exercise dominion over Ionia and Caria and the other countries within the Ægean and the Euxine, since these countries belonged to Persia by right of inheritance."<sup>61</sup> A Roman emperor had seldom received such a message; and Alexander, mild and gentle as he was by nature, seems to have had his equanimity

disturbed by the insolence of the mandate. Disregarding the sacredness of the ambassadorial character, he stripped the envoys of their splendid apparel, treated them as prisoners of war, and settled them as agricultural colonists in Phrygia. If we may believe Herodian, he even took credit to himself for sparing their lives, which he regarded as justly forfeit to the offended majesty of the empire.

Meantime the angry prince, convinced at last against his will that negotiations with such an enemy were futile, collected an army and began his march towards the East. Taking troops from the various provinces through which he passed,<sup>62</sup> he conducted to Antioch, in the autumn of A.D. 231,<sup>63</sup> a considerable force, which was there augmented by the legions of the East and by troops drawn from Egypt<sup>64</sup> and other quarters. Artaxerxes, on his part, was not idle. According to Severus himself,<sup>65</sup> the army brought into the field by the Persian monarch consisted of one hundred and twenty thousand mailed horsemen, of eighteen hundred scythed chariots, and of seven hundred trained elephants, bearing on their backs towers filled with archers; and though this pretended host has been truly characterized as one "the like of which is not to be found in Eastern history, and has scarcely been imagined in Eastern romance,"<sup>66</sup> yet, allowing much for exaggeration, we may still safely conclude that great exertions had been made on the Persian side, that their forces consisted of the three arms mentioned, and that the numbers of each were large beyond ordinary precedent. The two adversaries were thus not ill-matched; each brought the flower of his troops to the conflict; each commanded the army, on which his dependence was placed, in person; each looked to obtain from the contest not only an increase of military glory, but substantial fruits of victory in the shape of plunder or territory.

It might have been expected that the Persian monarch, after the high tone which he had taken, would have maintained an aggressive attitude, have crossed the Euphrates, and spread the hordes at his disposal over Syria, Cappadocia, and Asia Minor. But it seems to be certain that he did not do so, and that the initiative was taken by the other side. Probably the Persian arms, as inefficient in sieges as the Parthian,<sup>67</sup> were unable to overcome the resistance offered by the Roman forts upon the great river; and Artaxerxes was too good a general to throw his forces into the heart of an enemy's country with-

out having first secured a safe retreat. The Euphrates was therefore crossed by his adversary<sup>68</sup> in the spring of A.D. 232; the Roman province of Mesopotamia was easily recovered;<sup>69</sup> and arrangements were made by which it was hoped to deal the new monarchy a heavy blow, if not actually to crush and conquer it.<sup>70</sup>

Alexander divided his troops into three bodies. One division was to act towards the north, to take advantage of the friendly disposition of Chosroës, king of Armenia, and, traversing his strong mountain territory, to direct its attack upon Media, into which Armenia gave a ready entrance. Another was to take a southern line,<sup>71</sup> and to threaten Persia Proper from the marshy tract about the junction of the Euphrates with the Tigris, a portion of the Babylonian territory. The third and main division, which was to be commanded by the emperor in person, was to act on a line intermediate between the other two, which would conduct it to the very heart of the enemy's territory, and at the same time allow of its giving effective support to either of the two other divisions if they should need it.

The plan of operations appears to have been judiciously constructed, and should perhaps be ascribed rather to the friends whom the youthful emperor consulted<sup>72</sup> than to his own unassisted wisdom. But the best designed plans may be frustrated by unskilfulness or timidity in the execution; and it was here, if we may trust the author who alone gives us any detailed account of the campaign,<sup>73</sup> that the weakness of Alexander's character showed itself. The northern army successfully traversed Armenia, and, invading Media, proved itself in numerous small actions superior to the Persian force opposed to it, and was able to plunder and ravage the entire country at its pleasure. The southern division crossed Mesopotamia in safety, and threatened to invade Persia Proper.<sup>74</sup> Had Alexander with the third and main division kept faith with the two secondary armies, had he marched briskly and combined his movements with theirs, the triumph of the Roman arms would have been assured. But, either from personal timidity or from an amiable regard for the anxieties of his mother Mamæa, he hung back while his right and left wings made their advance, and so allowed the enemy to concentrate their efforts on these two isolated bodies. The army in Media, favored by the rugged character of the country, was able to maintain its ground without much difficulty; but that which

had advanced by the line of the Euphrates and Tigris, and which was still marching through the boundless plains of the great alluvium, found itself suddenly beset by a countless host, commanded by Artaxerxes in person, and, though it struggled gallantly, was overwhelmed and utterly destroyed by the arrows of the terrible Persian bowmen. Herodian says, no doubt with some exaggeration, that this was the greatest calamity which had ever befallen the Romans.<sup>75</sup> It certainly cannot compare with Cannæ, with the disaster of Varus, or even with the similar defeat of Crassus in a not very distant region. But it was (if rightly represented by Herodian) a terrible blow. It absolutely determined the campaign. A Cæsar or a Trajan might have retrieved such a loss. An Alexander Severus was not likely even to make an attempt to do so. Already weakened in body by the heat of the climate and the unwonted fatigues of war,<sup>76</sup> he was utterly prostrated in spirit by the intelligence when it reached him. The signal was at once given for retreat. Orders were sent to the *corps d'armée* which occupied Media to evacuate its conquests and to retire forthwith upon the Euphrates. These orders were executed, but with difficulty. Winter had already set in throughout the high regions; and in its retreat the army of Media suffered great losses through the inclemency of the climate, so that those who reached Syria were but a small proportion of the original force. Alexander himself, and the army which he led, experienced less difficulty; but disease dogged the steps of this division, and when its columns reached Antioch it was found to be greatly reduced in numbers by sickness, though it had never confronted an enemy. The three armies of Severus suffered not indeed equally, but still in every case considerably, from three distinct causes—sickness, severe weather, and marked inferiority to the enemy.<sup>77</sup> The last-named cause had annihilated the southern division; the northern had succumbed to climate; the main army, led by Severus himself, was (comparatively speaking) intact, but even this had been decimated by sickness, and was not in a condition to carry on the war with vigor. The result of the campaign had thus been altogether favorable to the Persians,<sup>78</sup> but yet it had convinced Artaxerxes that Rome was more powerful than he had thought. It had shown him that in imagining the time had arrived when they might be easily driven out of Asia he had made a mistake. The imperial power had proved itself strong enough to penetrate

deeply within his territory, to ravage some of his best provinces, and to threaten his capital.<sup>79</sup> The grand ideas with which he had entered upon the contest had consequently to be abandoned; and it had to be recognized that the struggle with Rome was one in which the two parties were very evenly matched, one in which it was not to be supposed that either side would very soon obtain any decided preponderance. Under these circumstances the grand ideas were quietly dropped; the army which had been gathered together to enforce them was allowed to disperse, and was not required within any given time to reassemble; it is not unlikely that (as Niebuhr conjectures<sup>80</sup>) a peace was made, though whether Rome ceded any of her territory<sup>81</sup> by its terms is exceedingly doubtful. Probably the general principle of the arrangement was a return to the *status quo ante bellum*, or, in other words, the acceptance by either side, as the true territorial limits between Rome and Persia, of those boundaries which had been previously held to divide the imperial possessions from the dominions of the Arsacidæ.

The issue of the struggle was no doubt disappointing to Artaxerxes; but if, on the one hand, it dispelled some illusions and proved to him that the Roman State, though verging to its decline, nevertheless still possessed a vigor and a life which he had been far from anticipating, on the other hand it left him free to concentrate his efforts on the reduction of Armenia, which was really of more importance to him, from Armenia being the great stronghold of the Arsacid power, than the nominal attachment to the empire of half-a-dozen Roman provinces. So long as Arsacidæ maintained themselves in a position of independence and substantial power so near the Persian borders, and in a country of such extent and such vast natural strength as Armenia, there could not but be a danger of reaction, of the nations again reverting to the yoke whereto they had by long use become accustomed, and of the star of the Sasanidæ paling before that of the former masters of Asia. It was essential to the consolidation of the new Persian Empire that Armenia should be subjugated, or at any rate that Arsacidæ should cease to govern it; and the fact that the peace which appears to have been made between Rome and Persia, A.D. 232, set Artaxerxes at liberty to direct all his endeavors to the establishment of such relations between his own state and Armenia as he deemed required by public policy and necessary for the security of his own power, must be re-

garded as one of paramount importance, and as probably one of the causes mainly actuating him in the negotiations and inclining him to consent to peace on any fair and equitable terms.

Consequently, the immediate result of hostilities ceasing between Persia and Rome was their renewal between Persia and Armenia. The war had indeed, in one sense, never ceased; for Chosroës had been an ally of the Romans during the campaign of Severus,<sup>62</sup> and had no doubt played a part in the invasion and devastation of Media which have been described above.<sup>63</sup> But, the Romans having withdrawn, he was left wholly dependent on his own resources; and the entire strength of Persia was now doubtless brought into the field against him. Still he defended himself with such success, and caused Artaxerxes so much alarm, that after a time that monarch began to despair of ever conquering his adversary by fair means, and cast about for some other mode of accomplishing his purpose. Summoning an assembly of all the vassal kings, the governors, and the commandants throughout the empire, he besought them to find some cure for the existing distress, at the same time promising a rich reward to the man who should contrive an effectual remedy. The second place in the kingdom should be his; he should have dominion over one half of the Arians;<sup>64</sup> nay, he should share the Persian throne with Artaxerxes himself, and hold a rank and dignity only slightly inferior. We are told that these offers prevailed with a noble of the empire, named Anak,<sup>65</sup> a man who had Arsacid blood in his veins, and belonged to that one of the three branches of the old royal stock which had long been settled at Bactria (Balkh), and that he was induced thereby to come forward and undertake the assassination of Chosroës, who was his near relative and would not be likely to suspect him of an ill intent. Artaxerxes warmly encouraged him in his design, and in a little time it was successfully carried out. Anak, with his wife, his children, his brother, and a train of attendants, pretended to take refuge in Armenia from the threatened vengeance of his sovereign, who caused his troops to pursue him, as a rebel and deserter, to the very borders of Armenia. Unsuspicious of any evil design, Chosroës received the exiles with favor, discussed with them his plans for the subjugation of Persia, and, having sheltered them during the whole of the autumn and winter, proposed to them in the spring that they should accompany him and take part in the year's campaign.<sup>66</sup> Anak, forced by this proposal to precipitate his designs, contrived a

meeting between himself, his brother, and Chosroës, without attendants, on the pretext of discussing plans of attack, and, having thus got the Armenian monarch at a disadvantage, drew sword upon him, together with his brother, and easily put him to death. The crime which he had undertaken was thus accomplished; but he did not live to receive the reward promised him for it. Armenia rose in arms on learning the foul deed wrought upon its king; the bridges and the few practicable outlets by which the capital could be quitted were occupied by armed men; and the murderers, driven to desperation, lost their lives in an attempt to make their escape by swimming the river Araxes.<sup>87</sup> Thus Artaxerxes obtained his object without having to pay the price that he had agreed upon; his dreaded rival was removed; Armenia lay at his mercy; and he had not to weaken his power at home by sharing it with an Arsacid partner.

The Persian monarch allowed the Armenians no time to recover from the blow which he had treacherously dealt them. His armies at once entered their territory<sup>88</sup> and carried everything before them. Chosroës seems to have had no son of sufficient age to succeed him, and the defence of the country fell upon the satraps, or governors of the several provinces. These chiefs implored the aid of the Roman emperor,<sup>89</sup> and received a contingent; but neither were their own exertions nor was the valor of their allies of any avail. Artaxerxes easily defeated the confederate army, and forced the satraps to take refuge in Roman territory. Armenia submitted to his arms, and became an integral portion of his empire.<sup>90</sup> It probably did not greatly trouble him that Artavasdes, one of the satraps, succeeded in carrying off one of the sons of Chosroës, a boy named Tiridates, whom he conveyed to Rome, and placed under the protection of the reigning emperor.<sup>91</sup>

Such were the chief military successes of Artaxerxes. The greatest of our historians, Gibbon, ventures indeed to assign to him, in addition, "some easy victories over the wild Scythians and the effeminate Indians."<sup>92</sup> But there is no good authority for this statement; and on the whole it is unlikely that he came into contact with either nation. His coins are not found in Afghanistan;<sup>93</sup> and it may be doubted whether he ever made any eastern expedition. His reign was not long; and it was sufficiently occupied by the Roman and Armenian wars, and by the greatest of all his works, the reformation of religion.

The religious aspect of the insurrection which transferred the headship of Western Asia from the Parthians to the Persians, from Artabanus to Artaxerxes, has been already noticed;<sup>94</sup> but we have now to trace, so far as we can, the steps by which the religious revolution was accomplished, and the faith of Zoroaster, or what was believed to be such, established as the religion of the State throughout the new empire. Artaxerxes, himself (if we may believe Agathias<sup>95</sup>) a Magus, was resolved from the first that, if his efforts to shake off the Parthian yoke succeeded, he would use his best endeavors to overthrow the Parthian idolatry and install in its stead the ancestral religion of the Persians. This religion consisted of a combination of Dualism with a qualified creature-worship, and a special reverence for the elements, earth, air, water, and fire. Zoroastrianism, in the earliest form which is historically known to us,<sup>96</sup> postulated two independent and contending principles—a principle of good, Ahura-Mazda, and a principle of evil, Angro-Mainyus. These beings, who were coeternal and coequal, were engaged in a perpetual struggle for supremacy; and the world was the battle-field wherein the strife was carried on. Each had called into existence numerous inferior beings, through whose agency they waged their interminable conflict. Ahura-Mazda (Oromazdes, Ormazd) had created thousands of angelic beings to perform his will and fight on his side against the Evil One; and Angro-Mainyus (Arimanius, Ahriman) had equally on his part called into being thousands of malignant spirits to be his emissaries in the world, to do his work, and fight his battles. The greater of the powers called into being by Ahura-Mazda were proper objects of the worship of man,<sup>97</sup> though, of course, his main worship was to be given to Ahura-Mazda. Angro-Mainyus was not to be worshipped, but to be hated and feared. With this dualistic belief had been combined, at a time not much later than that of Darius Hystaspis, an entirely separate system,<sup>98</sup> the worship of the elements. Fire, air, earth, and water were regarded as essentially holy, and to pollute any of them was a crime. Fire was especially to be held in honor; and it became an essential part of the Persian religion to maintain perpetually upon the fire-altars the sacred flame, supposed to have been originally kindled from heaven, and to see that it never went out.<sup>99</sup> Together with this elemental worship was introduced into the religion a profound regard for an order of priests called Magians, who interposed themselves

between the deity and the worshipper,<sup>100</sup> and claimed to possess prophetic powers.<sup>101</sup> This Magian order was a priest-caste, and exercised vast influence, being internally organized into a hierarchy containing many ranks, and claiming a sanctity far above that of the best laymen.

Artaxerxes found the Magian order depressed by the systematic action of the later Parthian princes,<sup>102</sup> who had practically fallen away from the Zoroastrian faith and become mere idolaters. He found the fire-altars in ruins, the sacred flame extinguished,<sup>103</sup> the most essential of the Magian ceremonies and practices disregarded.<sup>104</sup> Everywhere, except perhaps in his own province of Persia Proper, he found idolatry established. Temples of the sun abounded, where images of Mithra were the object of worship,<sup>105</sup> and the Mithraic cult was carried out with a variety of imposing ceremonies. Similar temples to the moon existed in many places; and the images of the Arsacidæ were associated with those of the sun and moon gods in the sanctuaries dedicated to them.<sup>106</sup> The precepts of Zoroaster were forgotten. The sacred compositions which bore that sage's name, and had been handed down from a remote antiquity, were still indeed preserved, if not in a written form,<sup>107</sup> yet in the memory of the faithful few who clung to the old creed; but they had ceased to be regarded as binding upon their consciences by the great mass of the Western Asiatics. Western Asia was a seething-pot, in which were mixed up a score of contradictory creeds, old and new, rational and irrational, Sabaism, Magism, Zoroastrianism, Grecian polytheism, teraphim-worship, Judaism, Chaldee mysticism, Christianity. Artaxerxes conceived it to be his mission to evoke order out of this confusion, to establish in lieu of this extreme diversity an absolute uniformity of religion.

The steps which he took to effect his purpose seem to have been the following. He put down idolatry by a general destruction of the images, which he overthrew and broke to pieces.<sup>108</sup> He raised the Magian hierarchy to a position of honor and dignity such as they had scarcely enjoyed even under the later Achæmenian princes,<sup>109</sup> securing them in a condition of pecuniary independence by assignments of lands,<sup>110</sup> and also by allowing their title to claim from the faithful the tithe of all their possessions.<sup>111</sup> He caused the sacred fire to be rekindled on the altars where it was extinguished,<sup>112</sup> and assigned to certain bodies of priests the charge of maintaining

the fire in each locality. He then proceeded to collect the supposed precepts of Zoroaster into a volume, in order to establish a standard of orthodoxy whereto he might require all to conform. He found the Zoroastrians themselves divided into a number of sects.<sup>113</sup> Among these he established uniformity by means of a "general council," which was attended by Magi from all parts of the empire, and which settled what was to be regarded as the true Zoroastrian faith. According to the Oriental writers, this was effected in the following way: Forty thousand, or, according to others, eighty thousand Magi having assembled, they were successively reduced by their own act to four thousand, to four hundred, to forty, and finally to seven, the most highly respected for their piety and learning. Of these seven there was one, a young but holy priest, whom the universal consent of his brethren recognized as pre-eminent. His name was Ardâ-Viraf. "Having passed through the strictest ablutions, and drunk a powerful opiate, he was covered with a white linen and laid to sleep. Watched by seven of the nobles, including the king, he slept for seven days and nights; and, on his reawaking, the whole nation listened with believing wonder to his exposition of the faith of Ormazd, which was carefully written down by an attendant scribe for the benefit of posterity."<sup>114</sup>

The result, however brought about, which must always remain doubtful, was the authoritative issue of a volume which the learned of Europe have now possessed for some quarter of a century,<sup>115</sup> and which has recently been made accessible to the general reader by the labors of Spiegel.<sup>116</sup> This work, the *Zendavesta*, while it may contain fragments of a very ancient literature,<sup>117</sup> took its present shape in the time of Artaxerxes, and was probably then first collected from the mouths of the Zoroastrian priests and published by Ardâ-Viraf. Certain additions may since have been made to it; but we are assured that "their number is small," and that we "have no reason to doubt that the text of the *Avesta*, in the days of Ardâ-Viraf, was on the whole exactly the same as at present."<sup>118</sup> The religious system of the new Persian monarchy is thus completely known to us, and will be described minutely in a later chapter. At present we have to consider, not what the exact tenets of the Zoroastrians were, but only the mode in which Artaxerxes imposed them upon his subjects.

The next step, after settling the true text of the sacred volume, was to agree upon its interpretation. The language of




Fig. 1.

COIN OF HORMISDAS IV.




Fig. 2.

EARLY COIN OF VARAHRAN VI.




Fig. 3.

LATE COIN OF VARAHRAN VI.






Fig. 4.


COIN OF CHOSROËS II.




RARE COIN OF CHOSROËS II.



COIN OF SIROËS OR KOBAD II.



COIN OF ARTAXERXES III.



COIN OF ISDIGERD III.

the Avesta, though pure Persian,<sup>119</sup> was of so archaic a type that none but the most learned of the Magi understood it; to the common people, even to the ordinary priest, it was a dead letter. Artaxerxes seems to have recognized the necessity of accompanying the Zend text with a translation and a commentary in the language of his own time, the Pehlevi or Huzvaresh. Such a translation and commentary exist; and though in part belonging to later Sassanian times, they reach back probably in their earlier portions to the era of Artaxerxes, who may fairly be credited with the desire to make the sacred book "understood of the people."

Further, it was necessary, in order to secure permanent uniformity of belief, to give to the Magian priesthood, the keepers and interpreters of the sacred book, very extensive powers. The Magian hierarchy was therefore associated with the monarch in the government and administration of the State. It was declared that the altar and the throne were inseparable, and must always sustain each other.<sup>120</sup> The Magi were made to form the great council of the nation.<sup>121</sup> While they lent their support to the crown, the crown upheld them against all impugnors, and enforced by pains and penalties their decisions. Persecution was adopted and asserted as a principle of action without any disguise. By an edict of Artaxerxes, all places of worship were closed except the temples of the fire-worshippers.<sup>122</sup> If no violent outbreak of fanaticism followed, it was because the various sectaries and schismatics succumbed to the decree without resistance. Christian, and Jew, and Greek, and Parthian, and Arab allowed their sanctuaries to be closed without striking a blow to prevent it; and the non-Zoroastrians of the empire, the votaries of foreign religions, were shortly reckoned at the insignificant number of 80,000.<sup>123</sup>

Of the internal administration and government of his extensive empire by Artaxerxes, but little is known.<sup>124</sup> That little seems, however, to show that while in general type and character it conformed to the usual Oriental model, in its practical working it was such as to obtain the approval of the bulk of his subjects. Artaxerxes governed his provinces either through native kings, or else through Persian satraps.<sup>125</sup> At the same time, like the Achæmenian monarchs, he kept the armed force under his own control by the appointment of "generals" or "commandants" distinct from the satraps.<sup>126</sup> Discarding the Parthian plan of intrusting the military defence of the empire and the preservation of domestic order to a

mere militia, he maintained on a war footing a considerable force, regularly paid and drilled. "There can be no power," he remarked, "without an army, no army without money, no money without agriculture, and no agriculture without justice."<sup>127</sup> To administer strict justice was therefore among his chief endeavors. Daily reports were made to him of all that passed not only in his capital, but in every province of his vast empire; and his knowledge extended even to the private actions of his subjects.<sup>128</sup> It was his earnest desire that all well-deposed persons should feel an absolute assurance of security with respect to their lives, their property, and their honor.<sup>129</sup> At the same time he punished crimes with severity, and even visited upon entire families the transgression of one of their members. It is said to have been one of his maxims, that "kings should never use the sword where the cane would answer;"<sup>130</sup> but, if the Armenian historians are to be trusted, in practice he certainly did not err on the side of clemency.<sup>131</sup>

Artaxerxes was, of course, an absolute monarch, having the entire power of life or death, and entitled, if he chose, to decide all matters at his own mere will and pleasure. But, in practice, he, like most Oriental despots, was wont to summon and take the advice of counsellors. It is perhaps doubtful whether any regular "Council of State" existed under him. Such an institution had prevailed under the Parthians, where the monarchs were elected and might be deposed by the Megistanes;<sup>132</sup> but there is no evidence that Artaxerxes continued it, or did more than call on each occasion for the advice of such persons among his subjects as he thought most capable. In matters affecting his relations towards foreign powers he consulted with the subject kings, the satraps, and the generals;<sup>133</sup> in religious affairs he no doubt took counsel with the chief Magi.<sup>134</sup> The general principles which guided his conduct both in religious and other matters may perhaps be best gathered from the words of that "testament," or "dying speech," which he is said to have addressed to his son Sapor. "Never forget," he said, "that, as a king, you are at once the protector of religion and of your country. Consider the altar and the throne as inseparable; they must always sustain each other. A sovereign without religion is a tyrant; and a people who have none may be deemed the most monstrous of all societies. Religion may exist without a state; but a state cannot exist without religion; and it is by holy laws that a political association can alone be bound. You should be to your people an example of

piety and of virtue, but without pride or ostentation. . . . . Remember, my son, that it is the prosperity or adversity of the ruler which forms the happiness or misery of his subjects, and that the fate of the nation depends on the conduct of the individual who fills the throne. The world is exposed to constant vicissitudes; learn, therefore, to meet the frowns of fortune with courage and fortitude, and to receive her smiles with moderation and wisdom. To sum up all—may your administration be such as to bring, at a future day, the blessings of those whom God has confided to our parental care upon both your memory and mine!"<sup>135</sup>

There is reason to believe that Artaxerxes, some short time before his death, invested Sapor with the emblems of sovereignty, and either associated him in the empire, or wholly ceded to him his own place. The Arabian writer, Maçoudi, declares that, sated with glory and with power, he withdrew altogether from the government, and, making over the administration of affairs to his favorite son, devoted himself to religious contemplation.<sup>136</sup> Tabari knows nothing of the religious motive, but relates that towards the close of his life Artaxerxes "made Sapor regent, appointed him formally to be his successor, and with his own hands placed the crown on his head."<sup>137</sup> [Pl. XII.] These notices would, by themselves, have been of small importance; but force is lent to them by the facts that Artaxerxes is found to have placed the effigy of Sapor on his later coins,<sup>138</sup> and that in one of his bas-reliefs he seems to be represented as investing Sapor with the diadem.<sup>139</sup> This tablet, which is at Takht-i-Bostan, has been variously explained,<sup>140</sup> and, as it is unaccompanied by any inscription, no certain account can be given of it; but, on the whole the opinion of those most competent to judge seems to be that the intention of the artist was to represent Artaxerxes (who wears the cap and inflated ball) as handing the diadem to Sapor—distinguished by the mural crown of his own tablets and coins<sup>141</sup>—while Ormazd, marked by his customary *bâton*, and further indicated by a halo of glory around his head, looks on, sanctioning and approving the transaction. A prostrate figure under the feet of the two Sassanian kings represents either Artabanus or the extinct Parthian monarchy, probably the former; while the sunflower upon which Ormazd stands, together with the rays that stream from his head, denote an intention to present him under a Mithraic aspect, suggestive to the beholder of a real latent identity between the two great objects of Persian worship.

The coins of Artaxerxes present five different types.<sup>142</sup> [Pl. XI., Fig. 1.] In the earliest his effigy appears on the obverse, front-faced, with the simple legend ARTAHSHATR (Artaxerxes), or sometimes with the longer one, BAGI ARTAHSHATR MALKA, "Divine Artaxerxes, King;" while the reverse bears the profile of his father, Papak, looking to the left, with the legend BAGI PAPAHI MALKA, "Divine Papak, King;" or BARI BAGI PAPAHI MALKA, "Son of Divine Papak, King." Both heads wear the ordinary Parthian diadem and tiara; and the head of Artaxerxes much resembles that of Volagases V., one of the later Parthian kings.<sup>143</sup> The coins of the next period have a head on one side only. This is in profile, looking to the right, and bears a highly ornamental tiara, exactly like that of Mithridates I. of Parthia,<sup>144</sup> the great conqueror. It is usually accompanied by the legend MAZDISN BAGI ARTAHSHATR MALKA (or MALKAN MALKA) AIRAN, *i.e.* "The Ormazd-worshipping Divine Artaxerxes, King of Iran," or "King of the Kings of Iran." The reverse of these coins bears a fire-altar, with the legend ARTAHSHATR NUVAZI, a phrase of doubtful import.<sup>145</sup> In the third period, while the reverse remains unchanged, on the obverse the Parthian costume is entirely given up; and the king takes, instead of the Parthian tiara, a low cap surmounted by the inflated ball, which thenceforth becomes the almost universal badge of a Sassanian monarch. The legend is now longer, being commonly MAZDISN BAGI ARTAHSHATR MALKAN MALKA AIRAN MINUCHITRI MIN YAZDAN, or "The Ormazd-worshipping Divine Artaxerxes, King of the Kings of Iran, heaven-descended of (the race of) the Gods." The fourth period is marked by the assumption of the mural crown,<sup>146</sup> which in the sculptures of Artaxerxes is given only to Ormazd, but which was afterwards adopted by Sapor I. and many later kings,<sup>147</sup> in combination with the ball, as their usual head-dress. The legend on these coins remains as in the third period, and the reverse is likewise unchanged. Finally, there are a few coins of Artaxerxes, belonging to the very close of his reign, where he is represented with the tiara of the third period, looking to the right; while in front of him, and looking towards him, is another profile, that of a boy, in whom numismatists recognize his eldest son and successor, Sapor.<sup>148</sup> [Pl. XV., Fig. 1.]

It is remarkable that with the accession of Artaxerxes there is at once a revival of art. Art had sunk under the Parthians, despite their Grecian leanings, to the lowest ebb which it had known in Western Asia since the accession of Asshur-izir-pal

to the throne of Assyria (B.C. 886). Parthian attempts at art were few and far between, and when made were unhappy, not to say ridiculous.<sup>149</sup> The coins of Artaxerxes, compared with those of the later Parthian monarchs, show at once a renaissance.<sup>150</sup> The head is well cut; the features have individuality and expression; the epigraph is sufficiently legible. Still more is his sculpture calculated to surprise us. Artaxerxes represents himself as receiving the Persian diadem from the hands of Ormazd; both he and the god are mounted upon chargers of a stout breed, which are spiritedly portrayed; Artabanus lies prostrate under the feet of the king's steed, while under those of the deity's we observe the form of Ahriman, also prostrate, and indeed seemingly dead.<sup>151</sup> Though the tablet has not really any great artistic merit, it is far better than anything that remains to us of the Parthians; it has energy and vigor; the physiognomies are carefully rendered; and the only flagrant fault is a certain over-robustness in the figures, which has an effect that is not altogether pleasing. Still, we cannot but see in the new Persian art—even at its very beginning—a movement towards life after a long period of stagnation; an evidence of that general stir of mind which the downfall of Tartar oppression rendered possible; a token that Aryan intelligence was beginning to recover and reassert itself in all the various fields in which it had formerly won its triumphs.<sup>152</sup>

The coinage of Artaxerxes, and of the other Sassanian monarchs, is based, in part upon Roman, in part upon Parthian, models. The Roman *aureus* furnishes the type which is reproduced in the Sassanian gold coins,<sup>153</sup> while the silver coins follow the standard long established in Western Asia, first under the Seleucid, and then under the Arsacid princes. This standard is based upon the Attic drachm, which was adopted by Alexander as the basis of his monetary system. The curious occurrence of a completely different standard for gold and silver in Persia during this period is accounted for by the circumstances of the time at which the coinage took its rise. The Arsacidæ had employed no gold coins,<sup>154</sup> but had been content with a silver currency; any gold coin that may have been in use among their subjects for purposes of trade during the continuance of their empire must have been foreign money—Roman, Bactrian, or Indian;<sup>155</sup> but the quantity had probably for the most part been very small. But, about ten years before the accession of Artaxerxes there had been a sudden influx into Western Asia of Roman gold, in consequence of the

terms of the treaty concluded between Artabanus and Macrinus (A.D. 217), whereby Rome undertook to pay to Parthia an indemnity of above a million and a half of our money.<sup>156</sup> It is probable that the payment was mostly made in *aurei*. Artaxerxes thus found current in the countries, which he overran and formed into an empire, two coinages—a gold and a silver—coming from different sources and possessing no common measure. It was simpler and easier to retain what existed, and what had sufficiently adjusted itself through the working of commercial needs, than to invent something new; and hence the anomalous character of the New Persian monetary system.

The remarkable bas-relief of Artaxerxes described above.<sup>157</sup> and figured below in the chapter on the Art of the Sassanians, is accompanied by a bilingual inscription,<sup>158</sup> or perhaps we should say by two bilingual inscriptions, which possess much antiquarian and some historic interest. The longer of the two runs as follows:—“*Pathkar zanî mazdisn bagi Artahshatr, malkan malka Airan, minuchitri min Yâztan, bari bagi Papaki malka;*” while the Greek version of it is—

ΤΟΥΤΟΤΟΪΠΡΟΣΟΠΟΝΜΑΣΔΑΣΝΟΥ  
 ΘΕΟΥΑΡΤΑΞΕΡΟΥΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΝ  
 ΑΡΙΑΝΩΝΕΚΓΕΝΟΥΣΘΕΩΝΥΙΟΥ  
 ΘΕΟΥΠΑΠΑΚΟΥΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ.

The shorter inscription runs—“*Pathkar zanî Ahuramazda bagi,* the Greek being

ΤΟΥΤΟΤΟΠΡΟΣΩΠΟΝΔΙΟΣΘΕΟΥ.

The inscriptions are interesting, first, as proving the continued use of the Greek character and language by a dynasty that was intensely national and that wished to drive the Greeks out of Asia. Secondly, they are interesting as showing the character of the native language, and letters, employed by the Persians, when they came suddenly into notice as the ruling people of Western Asia. Thirdly, they have an historic interest in what they tell us of the relationship of Artaxerxes to Babek (Papak), of the rank of Babek, and of the religious sympathies of the Sassanians. In this last respect they do indeed, in themselves, little but confirm the evidence of the coins

and the general voice of antiquity on the subject. Coupled, however, with the reliefs to which they are appended, they do more. They prove to us that the Persians of the earliest Sassanian times were not averse to exhibiting the great personages of their theology in sculptured forms; nay, they reveal to us the actual forms then considered appropriate to Ahura-Mazda (Ormazd) and Angro-Mainyus (Ahriman); for we can scarcely be mistaken in regarding the prostrate figure under the hoofs of Ahura-Mazda's steed as the antagonist Spirit of Evil.<sup>169</sup> Finally, the inscriptions show that, from the commencement of their sovereignty, the Sassanian princes claimed for themselves a qualified divinity, assuming the title of BAG,<sup>160</sup> or ALHA,<sup>161</sup> "god," and taking, in the Greek version of their legends, the correspondent epithet of ΘΕΟΣ.

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#### CHAPTER IV.

*Death of Artaxerxes I. and Accession of Sapor I. War of Sapor with Manizen. His first War with Rome. Invasion of Mesopotamia, A.D. 241. Occupation of Antioch. Expedition of Gordian to the East. Recovery by Rome of her lost Territory. Peace made between Rome and Persia. Obscure Interval. Second War with Rome. Mesopotamia again invaded, A.D. 258. Valerian takes the Command in the East. Struggle between him and Sapor. Defeat and Capture of Valerian, A.D. 260. Sapor invests Miriades with the Purple. He takes Syria and Southern Cappadocia, but is shortly afterwards attacked by Odenathus. Successes of Odenathus. Treatment of Valerian. Further successes of Odenathus. Period of Tranquillity. Great Works of Sapor. His Sculptures. His Dyke. His Inscriptions. His Coins. His Religion. Religious Condition of the East in his Time. Rise into Notice of Mani. His Rejection by Sapor. Sapor's Death. His Character.*

Διαδέχεται τὸ κράτος Σαπώρης ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἐναγέστατος, καὶ διεβίω πρὸς τῷ ἐνὶ τριάκοντα τοὺς πάντας ἐνιαυτοὺς, πλείστα ὅσα τοὺς Ῥωμαίους λυμαινόμενος.—AGATHIAS, iv. p. 134, B.

ARTAXERXES appears to have died in A.D. 240.<sup>1</sup> He was succeeded by his son, Shahpuhri,<sup>2</sup> or Sapor, the first Sassanian prince of that name. According to the Persian historians, the

mother of Sapor was a daughter of the last Parthian king, Artabanus,<sup>3</sup> whom Artaxerxes had taken to wife after his conquest of her father. But the facts known of Sapor throw doubt on this story,<sup>4</sup> which has too many parallels in Oriental romance to claim implicit credence.<sup>5</sup> Nothing authentic has come down to us respecting Sapor during his father's lifetime;<sup>6</sup> but from the moment that he mounted the throne, we find him engaged in a series of wars, which show him to have been of a most active and energetic character. Armenia, which Artaxerxes had subjected, attempted (it would seem) to regain its independence at the commencement of the new reign; but Sapor easily crushed the nascent insurrection,<sup>7</sup> and the Armenians made no further effort to free themselves till several years after his death. Contemporaneously with this revolt in the mountain region of the north, a danger showed itself in the plain country of the south, where Manizen,<sup>8</sup> king of Hatra, or El Hadhr, not only declared himself independent, but assumed dominion over the entire tract between the Euphrates and the Tigris, the Jezireh of the Arabian geographers. The strength of Hatra was great, as had been proved by Trajan and Severus;<sup>9</sup> its thick walls and valiant inhabitants would probably have defied every attempt of the Persian prince to make himself master of it by force. He therefore condescended to stratagem. Manizen had a daughter who cherished ambitious views. On obtaining a promise from Sapor that if she gave Hatra into his power he would make her his queen, this unnatural child turned against her father, betrayed him into Sapor's hands, and thus brought the war to an end. Sapor recovered his lost territory; but he did not fulfil his bargain. Instead of marrying the traitress, he handed her over to an executioner, to receive the death that she had deserved, though scarcely at his hands.<sup>10</sup>

Encouraged by his success in these two lesser contests, Sapor resolved (apparently in A.D. 241<sup>11</sup>) to resume the bold projects of his father, and engage in a great war with Rome. The confusion and troubles which afflicted the Roman Empire at this time were such as might well give him hopes of obtaining a decided advantage. Alexander, his father's adversary, had been murdered in A.D. 235 by Maximin,<sup>12</sup> who from the condition of a Thracian peasant had risen into the higher ranks of the army. The upstart had ruled like the savage that he was; and, after three years of misery, the whole Roman world had risen against him. Two emperors had been proclaimed in Africa;<sup>13</sup> on their fall, two others had been elected by the Sen-

ate;<sup>14</sup> a third, a mere boy,<sup>15</sup> had been added at the demand of the Roman populace. All the pretenders except the last had met with violent deaths; and, after the shocks of a year unparalleled since A. D. 69, the administration of the greatest kingdom in the world was in the hands of a youth of fifteen. Sapor, no doubt, thought he saw in this condition of things an opportunity that he ought not to miss, and rapidly matured his plans lest the favorable moment should pass away.

Crossing the middle Tigris into Mesopotamia, the bands of Sapor first attacked the important city of Nisibis. Nisibis, at this time a Roman colony,<sup>16</sup> was strongly situated on the outskirts of the mountain range which traverses Northern Mesopotamia between the 37th and 38th parallels. The place was well fortified and well defended; it offered a prolonged resistance; but at last the walls were breached, and it was forced to yield itself.<sup>17</sup> The advance was then made along the southern flank of the mountains, by Carrhæ (Harran) and Edessa to the Euphrates, which was probably reached in the neighborhood of Birehjik. The hordes then poured into Syria, and, spreading themselves over that fertile region, surprised and took the metropolis of the Roman East, the rich and luxurious city of Antioch.<sup>18</sup> But meantime the Romans had shown a spirit which had not been expected from them. Gordian, young as he was, had quitted Rome and marched through Mœsia and Thrace into Asia,<sup>19</sup> accompanied by a formidable army, and by at least one good general. Timesitheus,<sup>20</sup> whose daughter Gordian had recently married, though his life had hitherto been that of a civilian,<sup>21</sup> exhibited, on his elevation to the dignity of Prætorian prefect, considerable military ability. The army, nominally commanded by Gordian, really acted under his orders. With it Timesitheus attacked and beat the bands of Sapor in a number of engagements,<sup>22</sup> recovered Antioch, crossed the Euphrates, retook Carrhæ, defeated the Persian monarch in a pitched battle near Resaina<sup>23</sup> (Ras-el-Ain), recovered Nisibis, and once more planted the Roman standards on the banks of the Tigris. Sapor hastily evacuated most of his conquests,<sup>24</sup> and retired first across the Euphrates and then across the more eastern river; while the Romans advanced as he retreated, placed garrisons in the various Mesopotamian towns, and even threatened the great city of Ctesiphon.<sup>25</sup> Gordian was confident that his general would gain further triumphs, and wrote to the Senate to that effect; but either disease or the arts of a rival cut short the career of the victor,<sup>26</sup> and from the time of his

death the Romans ceased to be successful. The legions had, it would seem, invaded Southern Mesopotamia<sup>27</sup> when the Prætorian prefect who had succeeded Timesitheus brought them intentionally into difficulties by his mismanagement of the commissariat;<sup>28</sup> and at last retreat was determined on. The young emperor was approaching the Khabour, and had almost reached his own frontier, when the discontent of the army, fomented by the prefect, Philip, came to a head. Gordian was murdered at a place called Zaitha, about twenty miles south of Circesium, and was buried where he fell, the soldiers raising a tumulus in his honor. His successor, Philip, was glad to make peace on any tolerable terms with the Persians; he felt himself insecure upon his throne, and was anxious to obtain the Senate's sanction of his usurpation. He therefore quitted the East in A.D. 244, having concluded a treaty with Sapor, by which Armenia seems to have been left to the Persians, while Mesopotamia returned to its old condition of a Roman province.<sup>29</sup>

The peace made between Philip and Sapor was followed by an interval of fourteen years,<sup>30</sup> during which scarcely anything is known of the condition of Persia. We may suspect that troubles in the north-east of his empire occupied Sapor during this period, for at the end of it we find Bactria, which was certainly subject to Persia during the earlier years of the monarchy,<sup>31</sup> occupying an independent position, and even assuming an attitude of hostility towards the Persian monarch.<sup>32</sup> Bactria had, from a remote antiquity, claims to pre-eminence among the Aryan nations.<sup>33</sup> She was more than once inclined to revolt from the Achæmenidæ;<sup>34</sup> and during the later Parthian period she had enjoyed a sort of semi-independence.<sup>35</sup> It would seem that she now succeeded in detaching herself altogether from her southern neighbor, and becoming a distinct and separate power. To strengthen her position she entered into relations with Rome, which gladly welcomed any adhesions to her cause in this remote region.

Sapor's second war with Rome was, like his first, provoked by himself. After concluding his peace with Philip, he had seen the Roman world governed successively by six weak emperors,<sup>36</sup> of whom four had died violent deaths, while at the same time there had been a continued series of attacks upon the northern frontiers of the empire by Alemanni, Goths, and Franks, who had ravaged at their will a number of the finest provinces, and threatened the absolute destruction of the great monarchy of the West.<sup>37</sup> It was natural that the chief king-

dom of Western Asia should note these events, and should seek to promote its own interests by taking advantage of the circumstances of the time. Sapor, in A.D. 258, determined on a fresh invasion of the Roman provinces, and, once more entering Mesopotamia, carried all before him, became master of Nisibis, Carrhæ, and Edessa, and, crossing the Euphrates, surprised Antioch, which was wrapped in the enjoyment of theatrical and other representations, and only knew its fate on the exclamation of a couple of actors "that the Persians were in possession of the town."<sup>38</sup> The aged emperor, Valerian, hastened to the protection of his more eastern territories, and at first gained some successes, retaking Antioch, and making that city his headquarters during his stay in the East.<sup>39</sup> But, after this, the tide turned. Valerian entrusted the whole conduct of the war to Macrianus, his Prætorian prefect, whose talents he admired, and of whose fidelity he did not entertain a suspicion.<sup>40</sup> Macrianus, however, aspired to the empire, and intentionally brought Valerian into difficulties,<sup>41</sup> in the hope of disgracing or removing him. His tactics were successful. The Roman army in Mesopotamia was betrayed into a situation whence escape was impossible, and where its capitulation was only a question of time. A bold attempt made to force a way through the enemy's lines failed utterly,<sup>42</sup> after which famine and pestilence began to do their work. In vain did the aged emperor send envoys to propose a peace, and offer to purchase escape by the payment of an immense sum in gold.<sup>43</sup> Sapor, confident of victory, refused the overture, and, waiting patiently till his adversary was at the last gasp, invited him to a conference, and then treacherously seized his person.<sup>44</sup> The army surrendered or dispersed.<sup>45</sup> Macrianus, the Prætorian prefect, shortly assumed the title of emperor, and marched against Gallienus, the son and colleague of Valerian, who had been left to direct affairs in the West. But another rival started up in the East. Sapor conceived the idea of complicating the Roman affairs by himself putting forward a pretender; and an obscure citizen of Antioch, a certain Miriades or Cyriades,<sup>46</sup> a refugee in his camp, was invested with the purple, and assumed the title of Cæsar.<sup>47</sup> [Pl. XIII.]

The blow struck at Edessa laid the whole of Roman Asia open to attack, and the Persian monarch was not slow to seize the occasion. His troops crossed the Euphrates in force, and, marching on Antioch, once more captured that unfortunate town, from which the more prudent citizens had withdrawn,

but where the bulk of the people, not displeased at the turn of affairs, remained and welcomed the conqueror.<sup>48</sup> Miriades was installed in power, while Sapor himself, at the head of his irresistible squadrons, pressed forward, bursting "like a mountain torrent"<sup>49</sup> into Cilicia and thence into Cappadocia. Tarsus, the birthplace of St. Paul, at once a famous seat of learning and a great emporium of commerce, fell; Cilicia Campestris was overrun; and the passes of Taurus, deserted or weakly defended by the Romans, came into Sapor's hands. Penetrating through them and entering the champaign country beyond, his bands soon formed the siege of Cæsarea Mazaca, the greatest city of these parts, estimated at this time to have contained a population of four hundred thousand souls. Demosthenes, the governor of Cæsarea, defended it bravely, and, had force only been used against him, might have prevailed; but Sapor found friends within the walls, and by their help made himself master of the place, while its bold defender was obliged to content himself with escaping by cutting his way through the victorious host.<sup>50</sup> All Asia Minor now seemed open to the conqueror; and it is difficult to understand why he did not at any rate attempt a permanent occupation of the territory which he had so easily overrun. But it seems certain that he entertained no such idea.<sup>51</sup> Devastation and plunder, revenge and gain, not permanent conquest, were his objects; and hence his course was everywhere marked by ruin and carnage, by smoking towns, ravaged fields, and heaps of slain. His cruelties have no doubt been exaggerated; but when we hear that he filled the ravines and valleys of Cappadocia with dead bodies, and so led his cavalry across them;<sup>52</sup> that he depopulated Antioch, killing or carrying off into slavery almost the whole population; that he suffered his prisoners in many cases to perish of hunger, and that he drove them to water once a day like beasts,<sup>53</sup> we may be sure that the guise in which he showed himself to the Romans was that of a merciless scourge—an avenger bent on spreading the terror of his name—not of one who really sought to enlarge the limits of his empire.

During the whole course of this plundering expedition, until the retreat began, we hear but of one check that the bands of Sapor received. It had been determined to attack Emesa (now Hems), one of the most important of the Syrian towns, where the temple of Venus was known to contain a vast treasure. The invaders approached, scarcely expecting to be resisted; but the high priest of the temple, having collected a large body of

peasants, appeared, in his sacerdotal robes, at the head of a fanatic multitude armed with slings, and succeeded in beating off the assailants.<sup>64</sup> Emesa, its temple, and its treasure, escaped the rapacity of the Persians; and an example of resistance was set, which was not perhaps without important consequences.

For it seems certain that the return of Sapor across the Euphrates was not effected without considerable loss and difficulty. On his advance into Syria he had received an embassy from a certain Odenathus, a Syrian or Arab chief, who occupied a position of semi-independence at Palmyra, which, through the advantages of its situation, had lately become a flourishing commercial town. Odenathus sent a long train of camels laden with gifts, consisting in part of rare and precious merchandise, to the Persian monarch, begging him to accept them, and claiming his favorable regard on the ground that he had hitherto refrained from all acts of hostility against the Persians. It appears that Sapor took offence at the tone of the communication, which was not sufficiently humble to please him. Tearing the letter to fragments and trampling it beneath his feet, he exclaimed—"Who is this Odenathus, and of what country, that he ventures thus to address his lord? Let him now, if he would lighten his punishment, come here and fall prostrate before me with his hands tied behind his back. Should he refuse, let him be well assured that I will destroy himself, his race, and his land." At the same time he ordered his servants to cast the costly presents of the Palmyrene prince into the Euphrates.<sup>65</sup>

This arrogant and offensive behavior naturally turned the willing friend into an enemy.<sup>66</sup> Odenathus, finding himself forced into a hostile position, took arms and watched his opportunity. So long as Sapor continued to advance, he kept aloof. As soon, however, as the retreat commenced, and the Persian army, encumbered with its spoil and captives, proceeded to make its way back slowly and painfully to the Euphrates, Odenathus, who had collected a large force, in part from the Syrian villages,<sup>67</sup> in part from the wild tribes of Arabia,<sup>68</sup> made his appearance in the field. His light and agile horsemen hovered about the Persian host, cut off their stragglers, made prize of much of their spoil, and even captured a portion of the seraglio of the Great King.<sup>69</sup> The harassed troops were glad when they had placed the Euphrates between themselves and their pursuer, and congratulated each other on their escape.<sup>69</sup> So much had they suffered, and so little did they feel equal to

further conflicts, that on their march through Mesopotamia they consented to purchase the neutrality of the people of Edessa by making over to them all the coined money that they had carried off in their Syrian raid.<sup>61</sup> After this it would seem that the retreat was unmolested, and Sapor succeeded in conveying the greater part of his army, together with his illustrious prisoner, to his own country.

With regard to the treatment that Valerian received at the hands of his conqueror, it is difficult to form a decided opinion. The writers nearest to the time speak vaguely and moderately, merely telling us that he grew old in his captivity,<sup>62</sup> and was kept in the condition of a slave.<sup>63</sup> It is reserved for authors of the next generation<sup>64</sup> to inform us that he was exposed to the constant gaze of the multitude, fettered, but clad in the imperial purple;<sup>65</sup> and that Sapor, whenever he mounted on horseback, placed his foot upon his prisoner's neck.<sup>66</sup> Some add that, when the unhappy captive died, about the year A.D. 265 or 266, his body was flayed, and the skin inflated and hung up to view in one of the most frequented temples of Persia, where it was seen by Roman envoys on their visits to the Great King's court.<sup>67</sup>

It is impossible to deny that Oriental barbarism may conceivably have gone to these lengths; and it is in favor of the truth of the details that Roman vanity would naturally have been opposed to their invention. But, on the other hand, we have to remember that in the East the person of a king is generally regarded as sacred, and that self-interest restrains the conquering monarch from dishonoring one of his own class. We have also to give due weight to the fact that the earlier authorities are silent with respect to any such atrocities, and that they are first related half a century after the time when they are said to have occurred. Under these circumstances the scepticism of Gibbon with respect to them<sup>68</sup> is perhaps more worthy of commendation than the ready faith of a recent French writer.<sup>69</sup>

It may be added that Oriental monarchs, when they are cruel, do not show themselves ashamed of their cruelties, but usually relate them openly in their inscriptions, or represent them in their bas-reliefs.<sup>70</sup> The remains ascribed on good grounds to Sapor do not, however, contain anything confirmatory of the stories which we are considering. Valerian is represented on them in a humble attitude,<sup>71</sup> but not fettered,<sup>72</sup> and never in the posture of extreme degradation commonly associ-

ated with his name. He bends his knee, as no doubt he would be required to do, on being brought into the Great King's presence; but otherwise he does not appear to be subjected to any indignity. It seems thus to be on the whole most probable that the Roman emperor was not more severely treated than the generality of captive princes, and that Sapor has been unjustly taxed with abusing the rights of conquest.<sup>73</sup>


The hostile feeling of Odenathus against Sapor did not cease with the retreat of the latter across the Euphrates. The Palmyrene prince was bent on taking advantage of the general confusion of the times to carve out for himself a considerable kingdom, of which Palmyra should be the capital. Syria and Palestine on the one hand, Mesopotamia on the other, were the provinces that lay most conveniently near to him, and that he especially coveted. But Mesopotamia had remained in the possession of the Persians as the prize of their victory over Valerian, and could only be obtained by wresting it from the hands into which it had fallen. Odenathus did not shrink from this contest. It is had been with some reason conjectured<sup>74</sup> that Sapor must have been at this time occupied with troubles which had broken out on the eastern side of his empire. At any rate, it appears that Odenathus, after a short contest with Macrianus and his son, Quietus,<sup>75</sup> turned his arms once more, about A.D. 263, against the Persians, crossed the Euphrates into Mesopotamia, took Carrhæ and Nisibis, defeated Sapor and some of his sons in a battle,<sup>76</sup> and drove the entire Persian host in confusion to the gates of Ctesiphon. He even ventured to form the siege of that city;<sup>77</sup> but it was not long before effectual relief arrived; from all the provinces flocked in contingents for the defence of the Western capital; several engagements were fought, in some of which Odenathus was defeated;<sup>78</sup> and at last he found himself involved in difficulties through his ignorance of the localities,<sup>79</sup> and so thought it best to retire. Apparently his retreat was undisturbed; he succeeded in carrying off his booty and his prisoners, among whom were several satraps,<sup>80</sup> and he retained possession of Mesopotamia, which continued to form a part of the Palmyrene kingdom until the capture of Zenobia by Aurelian (A.D. 273).

The successes of Odenathus in A.D. 263 were followed by a period of comparative tranquillity. That ambitious prince seems to have been content with ruling from the Tigris to the Mediterranean, and with the titles of "Augustus," which he

received from the Roman emperor, Gallienus,<sup>81</sup> and "king of kings," which he assumed upon his coins.<sup>82</sup> He did not press further upon Sapor; nor did the Roman emperor make any serious attempt to recover his father's person or revenge his defeat upon the Persians. An expedition which he sent out to the East, professedly with this object, in the year A.D. 267, failed utterly, its commander, Heraclianus, being completely defeated by Zenobia, the widow and successor of Odenathus.<sup>83</sup> Odenathus himself was murdered by a kinsman three or four years after his great successes; and, though Zenobia ruled his kingdom almost with a man's vigor,<sup>84</sup> the removal of his powerful adversary must have been felt as a relief by the Persian monarch. It is evident, too, that from the time of the accession of Zenobia, the relations between Rome and Palmyra had become unfriendly;<sup>85</sup> the old empire grew jealous of the new kingdom which had sprung up upon its borders; and the effect of this jealousy, while it lasted, was to secure Persia from any attack on the part of either.

It appears that Sapor, relieved from any further necessity of defending his empire in arms, employed the remaining years of his life in the construction of great works, and especially in the erection and ornamentation of a new capital. The ruins of Shahpur, which still exist near Kazerun, in the province of Fars,<sup>86</sup> commemorate the name, and afford some indication of the grandeur, of the second Persian monarch. Besides remains of buildings, they comprise a number of bas-reliefs and rock inscriptions, some of which were beyond a doubt set up by Sapor I.<sup>87</sup> In one of the most remarkable the Persian monarch is represented on horseback, wearing the crown usual upon his coins, and holding by the hand a tunicked figure, probably Miriades, whom he is presenting to the captured Romans as their sovereign. Foremost to do him homage is the kneeling figure of a chieftain, probably Valerian, behind whom are arranged in a double line seventeen persons, representing appasently the different corps of the Roman army. [Pl. XIV.] All these persons are on foot, while in contrast with them are arranged behind Sapor ten guards on horseback, who represent his irresistible cavalry.<sup>88</sup> Another bas-relief at the same place<sup>89</sup> gives us a general view of the triumph of Sapor on his return to Persia with his illustrious prisoner. Here fifty-seven guards are ranged behind him, while in front are thirty-three tribute-bearers, having with them an elephant and a chariot. In the centre is a group of seven figures, com-

Fig 1.




GROUND PLAN OF THE SERBISTAN PALACE (after Flandin).


N.B.—The dimensions are given in English yards.

- |       |              |     |                 |
|-------|--------------|-----|-----------------|
| A A A | Porches.     | C C | Pillared Halls. |
| B B   | Domed Halls. | D   | Court.          |

Fig. 2.



FRONT VIEW OF SERBISTAN PALACE, RESTORED (after Flandin).



GROUND PLAN OF THE PALACE AT FIRUZABAD (after Flandin).  
 N.B.—The dimensions are in English yards.

prising Sapor, who is on horseback in his usual costume; Valerian, who is under the horse's feet; Miriades, who stands by Sapor's side; three principal tribute-bearers in front of the main figure; and a Victory which floats in the sky.

Another important work, assigned by tradition to Sapor I., is the great dyke at Shuster. This is a dam across the river Karun, formed of cut stones, cemented by lime, and fastened together by clamps of iron; it is twenty feet broad, and no less than twelve hundred feet in length. The whole is a solid mass excepting in the centre, where two small arches have been constructed for the purpose of allowing a part of the stream to flow in its natural bed. The greater portion of the water is directed eastward into a canal cut for it; and the town of Shuster is thus defended on both sides by a water barrier, whereby the position becomes one of great strength.<sup>90</sup> Tradition says that Sapor used his power over Valerian to obtain Roman engineers for this work;<sup>91</sup> and the great dam is still known as the Bund-i-Kaisar,<sup>92</sup> or "dam of Cæsar," to the inhabitants of the neighboring country.

Besides his works at Shahpur and Shuster, Sapor set up memorials of himself at Haji-abad, Nakhsh-i-Rajab, and Nakhsh-i-Rustam, near Persepolis, at Darabgerd in South-eastern Persia, and elsewhere; most of which still exist and have been described by various travellers.<sup>93</sup> At Nakhsh-i-Rustam Valerian is seen making his submission in one tablet,<sup>94</sup> while another exhibits the glories of Sapor's court.<sup>95</sup> The sculptures are in some instances accompanied by inscriptions. One of these is, like those of Artaxerxes, bilingual, Greek and Persian. The Greek inscription runs as follows:

ΤΟΠΡΟΣΟΠΟΝΤΟΥΤΟΜΑCΔΑCΝΟΥΘΕΟΥ  
 CΑΠΩΡΟΥΒΑCΙΛΕΩCΒΑCΙΛΕΩΝΑΡΙΑΝΩΝ  
 ΚΑΙΑΝΑΡΙΑΝΩΝΕΚΓΕΝΟΥCΘΕΩΝΥΙΟΥ  
 ΜΑCΔΑCΝΟΥΘΕΟΥΑΡΤΑΞΑΡΟΥΒΑCΙΛΕΩC  
 ΒΑCΙΛΕΩΝΑΡΙΑΝΩΝΕΚΓΕΝΟΥCΘΕΩΝ  
 ΕΚΓΟΝΟΥΘΕΟΥΠΑΠΑΚΟΥΒΑCΙΛΕΩC

Its Persian transcript is read thus: "*Pathkar (?) zanî mazdisn bag Shahpuhri, malkan malka Airan ve Aniran minuchitri min yaztan, barî mazdisn bag Artahshetr malkan malka*

*Airan, minuchitri min yaztan, napi bag Papaki malka.*"<sup>96</sup> In the main, Sapor, it will be seen, follows the phrases of his father Artaxerxes; but he claims a wider dominion. Artaxerxes is content to rule over Ariana (or Iran) only; his son calls himself lord both of the Arians and the non-Arians, or of Iran and Turan. We may conclude from this as probable that he held some Scythic tribes under his sway, probably in Segestan, or Seistan, the country south and east of the Hamoon, or lake in which the Helمند is swallowed up. Scythians had been settled in these parts, and in portions of Afghanistan and India, since the great invasion of the Yue-chi,<sup>97</sup> about B.C. 200; and it is not unlikely that some of them may have passed under the Persian rule during the reign of Sapor, but we have no particulars of these conquests.

Sapor's coins resemble those of Artaxerxes in general type,<sup>98</sup> but may be distinguished from them, first, by the head-dress, which is either a cap terminating in the head of an eagle, or else a mural crown surmounted by an inflated ball; and, secondly, by the emblem on the reverse, which is almost always a fire-altar *between two supporters*.<sup>99</sup> [Pl. XV., Fig. 2.] The ordinary legend on the coins is "*Mazdisn bag Shahpuhri, malkan malka Airan, minuchitri min yazdan,*" on the obverse; and on the reverse "*Shahpuhri nuvazi.*"<sup>100</sup>

It appears from these legends, and from the inscription above given, that Sapor was, like his father, a zealous Zoroastrian. His faith was exposed to considerable trial. Never was there a time of greater religious ferment in the East, or a crisis which more shook men's belief in ancestral creeds. The absurd idolatry which had generally prevailed through Western Asia for two thousand years—a nature-worship which gave the sanction of religion to the gratification of men's lowest propensities—was shaken to its foundation; and everywhere men were striving after something higher, nobler, and truer than had satisfied previous generations for twenty centuries. The sudden revivification of Zoroastrianism, after it had been depressed and almost forgotten for five hundred years, was one result of this stir of men's minds. Another result was the rapid progress of Christianity, which in the course of the third century overspread large portions of the East, rooting itself with great firmness in Armenia, and obtaining a hold to some extent on Babylonia, Bactria, and perhaps even on India.<sup>101</sup> Judaism, also, which had long had a footing in Mesopotamia, and which after the time of Hadrian may be regarded as hav-

ing its headquarters at Babylon—Judaism itself, usually so immovable, at this time showed signs of life and change, taking something like a new form in the schools wherein was compiled the vast and strange work known as “the Babylonian Talmud.”<sup>102</sup>

Amid the strife and jar of so many conflicting systems, each having a root in the past, and each able to appeal with more or less of force to noble examples of virtue and constancy among its professors in the present, we cannot be surprised that in some minds the idea grew up that, while all the systems possessed some truth, no one of them was perfect or indeed much superior to its fellows. Eclectic or syncretic views are always congenial to some intellects; and in times when religious thought is deeply stirred, and antagonistic creeds are brought into direct collision, the amiable feeling of a desire for peace comes in to strengthen the inclination for reconciling opponents by means of a fusion, and producing harmony by a happy combination of discords. It was in Persia, and in the reign of Sapor, that one of the most remarkable of these well-meaning attempts at fusion and reconciliation that the whole of history can show was made, and with results which ought to be a lasting warning to the apostles of comprehension. A certain Mani (or Manes, as the ecclesiastical writers call him<sup>103</sup>), born in Persia about A.D. 240,<sup>104</sup> grew to manhood under Sapor, exposed to the various religious influences of which we have spoken. With a mind free from prejudice and open to conviction, he studied the various systems of belief which he found established in Western Asia—the Cabalism of the Babylonian Jews, the Dualism of the Magi, the mysterious doctrines of the Christians, and even the Buddhism of India.<sup>105</sup> At first he inclined to Christianity, and is said to have been admitted to priest's orders and to have ministered to a congregation;<sup>106</sup> but after a time he thought that he saw his way to the formation of a new creed, which should combine all that was best in the religious systems which he was acquainted with, and omit what was superfluous or objectionable. He adopted the Dualism of the Zoroastrians, the metempsychosis of India, the angelism and demonism of the Talmud, and the Trinitarianism of the Gospel of Christ. Christ himself he identified with Mithra, and gave Him his dwelling in the sun. He assumed to be the Paraclete promised by Christ, who should guide men into all truth, and claimed that his “Ertang,” a sacred book illustrated by pictures of his own painting, should supersede the New Testa-

ment.<sup>107</sup> Such pretensions were not likely to be tolerated by the Christian community; and Manes had not put them forward very long when he was expelled from the church<sup>108</sup> and forced to carry his teaching elsewhere. Under these circumstances he is said to have addressed himself to Sapor, who was at first inclined to show him some favor;<sup>109</sup> but when he found out what the doctrines of the new teacher actually were, his feelings underwent a change, and Manes, proscribed, or at any rate threatened with penalties, had to retire into a foreign country.<sup>110</sup>

The Zoroastrian faith was thus maintained in its purity by the Persian monarch, who did not allow himself to be imposed upon by the specious eloquence of the new teacher, but ultimately rejected the strange amalgamation that was offered to his acceptance. It is scarcely to be regretted that he so determined. Though the morality of the Manichees was pure,<sup>111</sup> and though their religion is regarded by some as a sort of Christianity, there were but few points in which it was an improvement on Zoroastrianism. Its Dualism was pronounced and decided; its Trinitarianism was questionable; its teaching with respect to Christ destroyed the doctrines of the incarnation and atonement; its "Ertang" was a poor substitute for Holy Scripture. Even its morality, being deeply penetrated with asceticism, was of a wrong type and inferior to that preached by Zoroaster. Had the creed of Manes been accepted by the Persian monarch, the progress of real Christianity in the East would, it is probable, have been impeded rather than forwarded—the general currency of the debased amalgam would have checked the introduction of the pure metal.

It must have been shortly after his rejection of the teaching of Manes that Sapor died, having reigned thirty-one years, from A.D. 240 to A.D. 271. He was undoubtedly one of the most remarkable princes of the Sassanian series. In military talent, indeed, he may not have equalled his father; for though he defeated Valerian, he had to confess himself inferior to Odenathus. But in general governmental ability he is among the foremost of the Neo-Persian monarchs, and may compare favorably with almost any prince of the series. He baffled Odenathus, when he was not able to defeat him, by placing himself behind walls, and by bringing into play those advantages which naturally belonged to the position of a monarch attacked in his own country.<sup>112</sup> He maintained, if he did not permanently advance, the power of Persia in the west; while in the east it is

probable that he considerably extended the bounds of his dominion.<sup>113</sup> In the internal administration of his empire he united works of usefulness<sup>114</sup> with the construction of memorials which had only a sentimental and æsthetic value. He was a liberal patron of art, and is thought not to have confined his patronage to the encouragement of native talent.<sup>115</sup> On the subject of religion he did not suffer himself to be permanently led away by the enthusiasm of a young and bold freethinker. He decided to maintain the religious system that had descended to him from his ancestors, and turned a deaf ear to persuasions that would have led him to revolutionize the religious opinion of the East without placing it upon a satisfactory footing. The Orientals add to these commendable features of character, that he was a man of remarkable beauty,<sup>116</sup> of great personal courage, and of a noble and princely liberality. According to them, "he only desired wealth that he might use it for good and great purposes."<sup>117</sup>

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## CHAPTER V.

*Short Reign of Hormisdas I. His dealings with Manes. Accession of Varahran I. He puts Manes to Death. Persecutes the Manichæans and the Christians. His Relations with Zenobia. He is threatened by Aurelian. His Death. Reign of Varahran II. His Tyrannical Conduct. His Conquest of Seistan, and War with India. His war with the Roman Emperors Carus and Diocletian. His Loss of Armenia. His Death. Short Reign of Varahran III.*

Τεθνηκότος τοῦ Σαπώρου, Ὁρμισδάτης, ὁ τούτου παῖς, τὴν βασιλείαν παραλαμβάνει.

AGATH. iv. p. 134, C.

THE first and second kings of the Neo-Persian Empire were men of mark and renown. Their successors for several generations were, comparatively speaking, feeble and insignificant. The first burst of vigor and freshness which commonly attends the advent to power of a new race in the East, or the recovery of its former position by an old one, had passed away, and was succeeded, as so often happens, by reaction and exhaustion, the monarchs becoming luxurious

and inert, while the people willingly acquiesced in a policy of which the principle was "Rest and be thankful." It helped to keep matters in this quiescent state, that the kings who ruled during this period had, in almost every instance, short reigns, four monarchs coming to the throne and dying within the space of a little more than twenty-one years.<sup>1</sup> The first of these four was Hormisdates, Hormisdas, or Hormuz,<sup>2</sup> the son of Sapor, who succeeded his father in A.D. 271. His reign lasted no more than a year and ten days,<sup>3</sup> and was distinguished by only a single event of any importance. Mani, who had fled from Sapor, ventured to return to Persia on the accession of his son,<sup>4</sup> and was received with respect and favor. Whether Hormisdas was inclined to accept his religious teaching or no, we are not told; but at any rate he treated him kindly, allowed him to propagate his doctrines, and even assigned him as his residence a castle named Arabion. From this place Mani proceeded to spread his views among the Christians of Mesopotamia, and in a short time succeeded in founding the sect which, under the name of Manichæans or Manichees, gave so much trouble to the Church for several centuries. Hormisdas, who, according to some,<sup>5</sup> founded the city of Ram-Hormuz in Eastern Persia, died in A.D. 272, and was succeeded by his son or brother,<sup>6</sup> Vararanes or Varahran.<sup>7</sup> He left no inscriptions, and it is doubted whether we possess any of his coins.<sup>8</sup>

Varahran I., whose reign lasted three years only,<sup>9</sup> from A.D. 272 to 275, is declared by the native historians to have been a mild and amiable prince;<sup>10</sup> but the little that is positively known of him does not bear out this testimony. It seems certain that he put Mani to death, and probable that he enticed him to leave the shelter of his castle by artifice,<sup>11</sup> thus showing himself not only harsh but treacherous towards the unfortunate heresiarch. If it be true that he caused him to be flayed alive,<sup>12</sup> we can scarcely exonerate him from the charge of actual cruelty, unless indeed we regard the punishment as an ordinary mode of execution in Persia.<sup>13</sup> Perhaps, however, in this case, as in other similar ones, there is no sufficient evidence that the process of flaying took place until the culprit was dead,<sup>14</sup> the real object of the excoriation being, not the infliction of pain, but the preservation of a memorial which could be used as a warning and a terror to others. The skin of Mani, stuffed with straw, was no doubt suspended for some time after his execution over one of the gates of the great city

of Shahpur;<sup>15</sup> and it is possible that this fact may have been the sole ground of the belief (which, it is to be remembered, was not universal<sup>16</sup>) that he actually suffered death by flaying.

The death of the leader was followed by the persecution of his disciples. Mani had organized a hierarchy, consisting of twelve apostles, seventy-two bishops, and a numerous priesthood;<sup>17</sup> and his sect was widely established at the time of his execution. Varahran handed over these unfortunates, or at any rate such of them as he was able to seize, to the tender mercies of the Magians, who put to death great numbers of Manichæans. Many Christians at the same time perished, either because they were confounded with the followers of Mani, or because the spirit of persecution, once let loose, could not be restrained, but passed on from victims of one class to those of another, the Magian priesthood seizing the opportunity of devoting all heretics to a common destruction.

Thus unhappy in his domestic administration, Varahran was not much more fortunate in his wars. Zenobia, the queen of the East, held for some time to the policy of her illustrious husband, maintaining a position inimical alike to Rome and Persia from the death of Odenathus in A.D. 267 to Aurelian's expedition against her in A.D. 272. When, however, in this year, Aurelian marched to attack her with the full forces of the empire, she recognized the necessity of calling to her aid other troops besides her own. It was at this time that she made overtures to the Persians, which were favorably received;<sup>18</sup> and, in the year A.D. 273, Persian troops are mentioned among those with whom Aurelian contended in the vicinity of Palmyra.<sup>19</sup> But the succors sent were inconsiderable, and were easily overpowered by the arts or arms of the emperor. The young king had not the courage to throw himself boldly into the war. He allowed Zenobia to be defeated and reduced to extremities without making anything like an earnest or determined effort to save her. He continued her ally, indeed, to the end, and probably offered her an asylum at his court, if she were compelled to quit her capital; but even this poor boon he was prevented from conferring by the capture of the unfortunate princess just as she reached the banks of the Euphrates.<sup>20</sup>

In the aid which he lent Zenobia, Varahran, while he had done too little to affect in any degree the issue of the struggle, had done quite enough to provoke Rome and draw down upon him the vengeance of the Empire. It seems that he quite re-

alized the position in which circumstances had placed him. Feeling that he had thrown out a challenge to Rome, and yet shrinking from the impending conflict, he sent an embassy to the conqueror, deprecating his anger and seeking to propitiate him by rare and costly gifts. Among these were a purple robe<sup>21</sup> from Cashmere, or some other remote province of India, of so brilliant a hue that the ordinary purple of the imperial robes could not compare with it, and a chariot like to those in which the Persian monarch was himself wont to be carried.<sup>22</sup> Aurelian accepted these gifts; and it would seem to follow that he condoned Varahran's conduct, and granted him terms of peace. Hence, in the triumph which Aurelian celebrated at Rome in the year A.D. 274, no Persian captives appeared in the procession, but Persian envoys<sup>23</sup> were exhibited instead, who bore with them the presents wherewith their master had appeased the anger of the emperor.

A full year, however, had not elapsed from the time of the triumph when the master of the Roman world thought fit to change his policy, and, suddenly declaring war against the Persians,<sup>24</sup> commenced his march towards the East. We are not told that he discovered, or even sought to discover, any fresh ground of complaint. His talents were best suited for employment in the field, and he regarded it as expedient to "exercise the restless temper of the legions in some foreign war."<sup>25</sup> Thus it was desirable to find or make an enemy; and the Persians presented themselves as the foe which could be attacked most conveniently. There was no doubt a general desire to efface the memory of Valerian's disaster by some considerable success; and war with Persia was therefore likely to be popular at once with the Senate, with the army, and with the mixed multitude which was dignified with the title of "the Roman people."

Aurelian, therefore, set out for Persia at the head of a numerous, but still a manageable, force.<sup>26</sup> He proceeded through Illyricum and Macedonia towards Byzantium, and had almost reached the straits, when a conspiracy, fomented by one of his secretaries, cut short his career, and saved the Persian empire from invasion. Aurelian was murdered in the spring of A.D. 275, at Cœnophrurium, a small station between Heraclea (Perinthus) and Byzantium.<sup>27</sup> The adversary with whom he had hoped to contend, Varahran, cannot have survived him long, since he died (of disease as it would seem) in the course of the year, leaving his crown to a young son who bore the same

name with himself, and is known in history as Varahran the Second.<sup>28</sup>

Varahran II. is said to have ruled at first tyrannically,<sup>29</sup> and to have greatly disgusted all his principal nobles, who went so far as to form a conspiracy against him, and intended to put him to death. The chief of the Magians, however, interposed, and, having effectually alarmed the king, brought him to acknowledge himself wrong and to promise an entire change of conduct.<sup>30</sup> The nobles upon this returned to their allegiance; and Varahran, during the remainder of his reign, is said to have been distinguished for wisdom and moderation, and to have rendered himself popular with every class of his subjects.

It appears that this prince was not without military ambition. He engaged in a war with the Segestani<sup>31</sup> (or Sacastani), the inhabitants of Segestan or Seistan, a people of Scythic origin,<sup>32</sup> and after a time reduced them to subjection<sup>33</sup> [Pl. XVII]. He then became involved in a quarrel with some of the natives of Afghanistan, who were at this time regarded as "Indians." A long and desultory contest followed without definite result, which was not concluded by the year A.D. 283, when he found himself suddenly engaged in hostilities on the opposite side of the empire.<sup>34</sup>

Rome, in the latter part of the third century, had experienced one of those reactions which mark her later history, and which alone enabled her to complete her predestined term of twelve centuries. Between the years A.D. 274 and 282, under Aurelian, Tacitus, Probus, and Carus, she showed herself once more very decidedly the first military power in the world, drove back the barbarians on all sides, and even ventured to indulge in an aggressive policy. Aurelian, as we have seen, was on the point of invading Persia when a domestic conspiracy brought his reign and life to an end. Tacitus, his successor, scarcely obtained such a firm hold upon the throne as to feel that he could with any prudence provoke a war. But Probus, the next emperor, revived the project of a Persian expedition,<sup>35</sup> and would probably have led the Roman armies into Mesopotamia, had not his career been cut short by the revolt of the legions in Illyria (A.D. 282). Carus, who had been his prætorian prefect, and who became emperor at his death, adhered steadily to his policy. It was the first act of his reign to march the forces of the empire to the extreme east, and to commence in earnest the war which had so long been threatened. Led by the Emperor in person, the legions once more crossed the Euphrates.

Mesopotamia was rapidly overrun, since the Persians (we are told) were at variance among themselves, and a civil war was raging.<sup>36</sup> The bulk of their forces, moreover, were engaged on the opposite side of the empire in a struggle with the Indians,<sup>37</sup> probably those of Afghanistan. Under these circumstances, no effectual resistance was possible; and, if we may believe the Roman writers, not only was the Roman province of Mesopotamia recovered, but the entire tract between the rivers as far south as the latitude of Bagdad was ravaged, and even the two great cities of Seleucia and Ctesiphon were taken without the slightest difficulty.<sup>38</sup> Persia Proper seemed to lie open to the invader, and Carus was preparing to penetrate still further to the east, when again an opportune death checked the progress of the Roman arms, and perhaps saved the Persian monarchy from destruction. Carus had announced his intention of continuing his march; some discontent had shown itself; and an oracle had been quoted which declared that a Roman emperor would never proceed victoriously beyond Ctesiphon. Carus was not convinced, but he fell sick, and his projects were delayed; he was still in his camp near Ctesiphon, when a terrible thunderstorm broke over the ground occupied by the Roman army. A weird darkness was spread around, amid which flash followed flash at brief intervals, and peal upon peal terrified the superstitious soldiery. Suddenly, after the most violent clap of all, the cry arose that the Emperor was dead.<sup>39</sup> Some said that his tent had been struck by lightning, and that his death was owing to this cause; others believed that he had simply happened to succumb to his malady at the exact moment of the last thunder-clap; a third theory was that his attendants had taken advantage of the general confusion to assassinate him, and that he merely added another to the long list of Roman emperors murdered by those who hoped to profit by their removal. It is not likely that the problem of what really caused the death of Carus will ever be solved.<sup>40</sup> That he died very late in A.D. 283, or within the first fortnight of A.D. 284, is certain;<sup>41</sup> and it is no less certain that his death was most fortunate for Persia, since it brought the war to an end when it had reached a point at which any further reverses would have been disastrous, and gave the Persians a breathing-space during which they might, at least partially, recover from their prostration.

Upon the death of Carus, the Romans at once determined on retreat. It was generally believed that the imperial tent had

been struck by lightning; and it was concluded that the decision of the gods against the further advance of the invading army had been thereby unmistakably declared.<sup>42</sup> The army considered that it had done enough, and was anxious to return home; the feeble successor of Carus, his son Numerian, if he possessed the will, was at any rate without the power to resist the wishes of the troops; and the result was that the legions quitted the East without further fighting,<sup>43</sup> and without securing, by the conclusion of formal terms of peace, any permanent advantage from their victories.

A pause of two years now occurred, during which Varahran had the opportunity of strengthening his position while Rome was occupied by civil wars and distracted between the claims of pretenders.<sup>44</sup> No great use seems, however, to have been made of this interval. When, in A.D. 286, the celebrated Diocletian determined to resume the war with Persia, and, embracing the cause of Tiridates, son of Chosroës, directed his efforts to the establishment of that prince, as a Roman feudatory, on his father's throne, Varahran found himself once more over-matched, and could offer no effectual resistance. Armenia had now been a province of Persia for the space of twenty-six (or perhaps forty-six) years;<sup>45</sup> but it had in no degree been conciliated or united with the rest of the empire. The people had been distrusted and oppressed; the nobles had been deprived of employment; a heavy tribute had been laid on the land; and a religious revolution had been violently effected.<sup>46</sup> It is not surprising that when Tiridates, supported by a Roman *corps d'armée*,<sup>47</sup> appeared upon the frontiers, the whole population received him with transports of loyalty and joy. All the nobles flocked to his standard, and at once acknowledged him for their king.<sup>48</sup> The people everywhere welcomed him with acclamations. A native prince of the Arsacid dynasty united the suffrages of all; and the nation threw itself with enthusiastic zeal into a struggle which was viewed as a war of independence. It was forgotten that Tiridates was in fact only a puppet in the hand of the Roman emperor, and that, whatever the result of the contest, Armenia would remain at its close, as she had been at its commencement, a dependant upon a foreign power.

The success of Tiridates at the first was such as might have been expected from the forces arrayed in his favor. He defeated two Persian armies in the open field, drove out the garrisons which held the more important of the fortified towns,

and became undisputed master of Armenia.<sup>49</sup> He even crossed the border which separated Armenia from Persia, and gained signal victories on admitted Persian ground.<sup>50</sup> According to the native writers, his personal exploits were extraordinary; he defeated singly a corps of giants, and routed on foot a large detachment mounted on elephants!<sup>51</sup> The narrative is here, no doubt, tinged with exaggeration; but the general result is correctly stated. Tiridates, within a year of his invasion, was complete master of the entire Armenian highland, and was in a position to carry his arms beyond his own frontiers.

Such seems to have been the position of things, when Varahran II. suddenly died, after a reign of seventeen years,<sup>52</sup> A.D. 292. He is generally said to have left behind him two sons,<sup>53</sup> Varahran and Narsehi, or Narses, of whom the elder, Varahran, was proclaimed king. This prince was of an amiable temper, but apparently of a weakly constitution. He was with difficulty persuaded to accept the throne,<sup>54</sup> and anticipated from the first an early demise.<sup>55</sup> No events are assigned to his short reign, which (according to the best authorities) did not exceed the length of four months.<sup>56</sup> It is evident that he must have been powerless to offer any effectual opposition to Tiridates, whose forces continued to ravage, year after year, the north-western provinces of the Persian empire.<sup>57</sup> Had Tiridates been a prince of real military talent, it could scarcely have been difficult for him to obtain still greater advantages. But he was content with annual raids, which left the substantial power of Persia untouched. He allowed the occasion of the throne's being occupied by a weak and invalid prince to slip by. The consequences of this negligence will appear in the next chapter. Persia, permitted to escape serious attack in her time of weakness, was able shortly to take the offensive and to make the Armenian prince regret his indolence or want of ambition. The son of Chosroës became a second time a fugitive; and once more the Romans were called in to settle the affairs of the East. We have now to trace the circumstances of this struggle, and to show how Rome under able leaders succeeded in revenging the defeat and captivity of Valerian, and in inflicting, in her turn, a grievous humiliation upon her adversary.

## CHAPTER VI.

*Civil War of Narses and his Brother Hormisdas. Narses victorious. He attacks and expels Tiridates. War declared against him by Diocletian. First Campaign of Galerius, A.D. 297. Second Campaign, A.D. 298. Defeat suffered by Narses. Negotiations. Conditions of Peace. Abdication and Death of Narses.*

Ναρσῆς ἑβδομος ἀναγράφεται βασιλεῦσαι Περσῶν ἀπὸ Ἀρταξέρξου.—ZONORAS, xii. 31.

IT appears that on the death of Varahran III., probably without issue, there was a contention for the crown between two brothers,<sup>1</sup> Narses and Hormisdas.<sup>2</sup> We are not informed which of them was the elder, nor on what grounds they respectively rested their claims; but it seems that Narses was from the first preferred by the Persians, and that his rival relied mainly for success on the arms of foreign barbarians. Worsted in encounters wherein none but Persians fought on either side, Hormisdas summoned to his aid the hordes of the north<sup>3</sup>—Gelli from the shores of the Caspian, Scyths from the Oxus or the regions beyond, and Russians, now first mentioned by a classical writer. But the perilous attempt to settle a domestic struggle by the swords of foreigners was not destined on this occasion to prosper. Hormisdas failed in his endeavor to obtain the throne; and, as we hear no more of him, we may regard it as probable that he was defeated and slain. At any rate Narses was, within a year or two of his accession, so firmly settled in his kingdom that he was able to turn his thoughts to the external affairs of the empire, and to engage in a great war. All danger from internal disorder must have been pretty certainly removed before Narses could venture to affront, as he did, the strongest of existing military powers. [Pl. XVIII.]

Narses ascended the throne in A.D. 292 or 293. It was at least as early as A.D. 296 that he challenged Rome to an encounter by attacking in force the vassal monarch whom her arms had established in Armenia.<sup>4</sup> Tiridates had, it is evident, done much to provoke the attack by his constant raids into Persian territory,<sup>5</sup> which were sometimes carried even to the south of Ctesiphon.<sup>6</sup> He was probably surprised by the

sudden march and vigorous assault of an enemy whom he had learned to despise; and, feeling himself unable to organize an effectual resistance, he had recourse to flight, gave up Armenia to the Persians,<sup>7</sup> and for a second time placed himself under the protection of the Roman emperor. The monarch who held this proud position was still Diocletian, the greatest emperor that had occupied the Roman throne since Trajan, and the prince to whom Tiridates was indebted for his restoration to his kingdom. It was impossible that Diocletian should submit to the affront put upon him without an earnest effort to avenge it. His own power rested, in a great measure, on his military prestige; and the unpunished insolence of a foreign king would have seriously endangered an authority not very firmly established. The position of Diocletian compelled him to declare war against Narses<sup>8</sup> in the year A.D. 296, and to address himself to a struggle of which he is not likely to have misconceived the importance. It might have been expected that he would have undertaken the conduct of the war in person; but the internal condition of the empire was far from satisfactory, and the chief of the State seems to have felt that he could not conveniently quit his dominions to engage in war beyond his borders. He therefore committed the task of reinstating Tiridates and punishing Narses to his favorite and son-in-law, Galerius,<sup>9</sup> while he himself took up a position within the limits of the empire,<sup>10</sup> which at once enabled him to overawe his domestic adversaries and to support and countenance his lieutenant.

The first attempts of Galerius were unfortunate. Summoned suddenly from the Danube to the Euphrates, and placed at the head of an army composed chiefly of the levies of Asia, ill-disciplined, and unacquainted with their commander, he had to meet an adversary of whom he knew little or nothing, in a region the character of which was adverse to his own troops and favorable to those of the enemy. Narses had invaded the Roman province of Mesopotamia, had penetrated to the Khabor, and was threatening to cross the Euphrates into Syria.<sup>11</sup> Galerius had no choice but to encounter him on the ground which he had chosen. Now, though Western Mesopotamia is ill-described as "a smooth and barren surface of sandy desert, without a hillock, without a tree, and without a spring of fresh water,"<sup>12</sup> it is undoubtedly an open country, possessing numerous plains, where, in a battle, the advantage of numbers is likely to be felt, and where there is abundant room for the

evolutions of cavalry. The Persians, like their predecessors the Parthians, were especially strong in horse; and the host which Narses had brought into the field greatly outnumbered the troops which Diocletian had placed at the disposal of Galerius. Yet Galerius took the offensive. Fighting under the eye of a somewhat stern master, he was scarcely free to choose his plan of campaign. Diocletian expected him to drive the Persians from Mesopotamia,<sup>13</sup> and he was therefore bound to make the attempt. He accordingly sought out his adversary in this region, and engaged him in three great battles.<sup>14</sup> The first and second appear to have been indecisive; but in the third the Roman general suffered a complete defeat.<sup>15</sup> The catastrophe of Crassus was repeated almost upon the same battle-field, and probably almost by the same means.<sup>16</sup> But, personally, Galerius was more fortunate than his predecessor. He escaped from the carnage, and, recrossing the Euphrates, rejoined his father-in-law in Syria. A conjecture, not altogether destitute of probability,<sup>17</sup> makes Tiridates share both the calamity and the good fortune of the Roman Cæsar. Like Galerius, he escaped from the battle-field, and reached the banks of the Euphrates. But his horse, which had received a wound, could not be trusted to pass the river. In this emergency the Armenian prince dismounted, and, armed as he was, plunged into the stream. The river was both wide and deep; the current was rapid; but the hardy adventurer, inured to danger and accustomed to every athletic exercise, swam across and reached the opposite bank in safety.<sup>18</sup>

Thus, while the rank and file perished ignominiously, the two personages of most importance on the Roman side were saved. Galerius hastened towards Antioch, to rejoin his colleague and sovereign. The latter came out to meet him, but, instead of congratulating him on his escape, assumed the air of an offended master, and, declining to speak to him or to stop his chariot, forced the Cæsar to follow him on foot for nearly a mile before he would condescend to receive his explanations and apologies for defeat.<sup>19</sup> The disgrace was keenly felt, and was ultimately revenged upon the prince who had contrived it. But, at the time, its main effect doubtless was to awake in the young Cæsar the strongest desire of retrieving his honor, and wiping out the memory of his great reverse by a yet more signal victory. Galerius did not cease through the winter of A.D. 297 to importune his father-in-law for an opportunity of redeeming the past and recovering his lost laurels.

The emperor, having sufficiently indulged his resentment, acceded to the wishes of his favorite. Galerius was continued in his command. A new army was collected during the winter, to replace that which had been lost; and the greatest care was taken that its material should be of good quality, and that it should be employed where it had the best chance of success. The veterans of Illyria and Mœsia constituted the flower of the force now enrolled;<sup>20</sup> and it was further strengthened by the addition of a body of Gothic auxiliaries.<sup>21</sup> It was determined, moreover, where the attack should this time be made on the side of Armenia; where it was felt that the Romans would have the double advantage of a friendly country, and of one far more favorable for the strength of infantry than for those of an army whose strength was in its horse.<sup>22</sup> The number of the troops employed was still small. Galerius entered Armenia at the head of only a few auxiliaries;<sup>23</sup> but they were a picked force, and they might be supported almost to any extent, by the national militia of the Armenians. He was now, moreover, as cautious as he had previously been rash; he advanced slowly, feeling his way; he even personally made reconnaissances, accompanied by only one or two horsemen, and, under the shelter of a flag of truce, explored the position of his adversary.<sup>24</sup> Narses found himself overmatched alike in art and in force. He allowed himself to be surprised in his camp by his active enemy,<sup>25</sup> and suffered a defeat by which he more than lost all the fruits of his former victory. Most of his army was destroyed; he himself received a wound,<sup>26</sup> and with difficulty escaped by a hasty flight. Galerius pursued, and, though he did not succeed in taking the monarch himself, made prize of his wives, his sisters, and a number of his children,<sup>27</sup> besides capturing his military chest. He also took many of the most illustrious Persians prisoners.<sup>28</sup> How far he followed his flying adversary is uncertain;<sup>29</sup> but it is scarcely probable that he proceeded much southward of the Armenian frontier. He had to reinstate Tiridates in his dominions, to recover Eastern Mesopotamia, and to lay his laurels at the feet of his colleague and master. It seems probable that having driven Narses from Armenia, and left Tiridates there to administer the government, he hastened to rejoin Diocletian before attempting any further conquests.

The Persian monarch, on his side, having recovered from his wound,<sup>30</sup> which could have been but slight, set himself to collect another army, but at the same time sent an ambassador to

to the camp of Galerius, requesting to know the terms on which Rome would consent to make peace. A writer of good authority<sup>31</sup> has left us an account of the interview which followed between the envoy of the Persian monarch and the victorious Roman. Apherban (so was the envoy named) opened the negotiations with the following speech<sup>32</sup>:

“The whole human race knows,” he said, “that the Roman and Persian kingdoms resemble two great luminarię, and that, like a man’s two eyes, they ought mutually to adorn and illustrate each other, and not in the extremity of their wrath to seek rather each other’s destruction. So to act is not to act manfully, but is indicative rather of levity and weakness; for it is to suppose that our inferiors can never be of any service to us, and that therefore we had better get rid of them. Narses, moreover, ought not to be accounted a weaker prince than other Persian kings; thou hast indeed conquered him, but then thou surpassest all other monarchs; and thus Narses has of course been worsted by thee, though he is no whit inferior in merit to the best of his ancestors. The orders which my master has given me are to entrust all the rights of Persia to the clemency of Rome; and I therefore do not even bring with me any conditions of peace, since it is for the emperor to determine everything. I have only to pray, on my master’s behalf, for the restoration of his wives and male children; if he receives them at your hands, he will be forever beholden to you, and will be better pleased than if he recovered them by force of arms. Even now my master cannot sufficiently thank you for the kind treatment which he hears you have vouchsafed them, in that you have offered them no insult, but have behaved towards them as though on the point of giving them back to their kith and kin. He sees herein that you bear in mind the changes of fortune and the instability of all human affairs.”

At this point Galerius, who had listened with impatience to the long harangue, burst in with a movement of anger that shook his whole frame—“What? Do the Persians dare to remind us of the vicissitudes of fortune, as though we could forget how *they* behave when victory inclines to them? Is it not their wont to push their advantage to the uttermost and press as heavily as may be on the unfortunate? How charmingly they showed the moderation that becomes a victor in Valerian’s time! They vanquished him by fraud; they kept him a prisoner to advanced old age; they let him die in dishonor; and then when he was dead they stripped off his skin,

and with diabolical ingenuity made of a perishable human body an imperishable monument of our shame.<sup>33</sup> Verily, if we follow this envoy's advice, and look to the changes of human affairs, we shall not be moved to clemency, but to anger, when we consider the past conduct of the Persians. If pity be shown them, if their requests be granted, it will not be for what they have urged, but because it is a principle of action with us—a principle handed down to us from our ancestors—'to spare the humble and chastise the proud.'" Apharban, therefore, was dismissed with no definite answer to his question, what terms of peace Rome would require; but he was told to assure his master that Rome's clemency equalled her valor, and that it would not be long before he would receive a Roman envoy authorized to signify the Imperial pleasure, and to conclude a treaty with him.

Having held this interview with Apharban, Galerius hastened to meet and consult his colleague.<sup>34</sup> Diocletian had remained in Syria, at the head of an army of observation,<sup>35</sup> while Galerius penetrated into Armenia and engaged the forces of Persia. When he heard of his son-in-law's great victory he crossed the Euphrates, and advancing through Western Mesopotamia, from which the Persians probably retired, took up his residence at Nisibis,<sup>36</sup> now the chief town of these parts. It is perhaps true that his object was "to moderate, by his presence and counsels, the pride of Galerius."<sup>37</sup> That prince was bold to rashness, and nourished an excessive ambition. He is said to have at this time entertained a design of grasping at the conquest of the East, and to have even proposed to himself to reduce the Persian Empire into the form of a Roman province.<sup>38</sup> But the views of Diocletian were humbler and more prudent. He held to the opinion of Augustus and Hadrian, that Rome did not need any enlargement of her territory, and that the absorption of the East was especially undesirable. When he and his son-in-law met and interchanged ideas at Nisibis, the views of the elder ruler naturally prevailed; and it was resolved to offer to the Persians tolerable terms of peace. A civilian of importance,<sup>39</sup> Sicorius Probus, was selected for the delicate office of envoy, and was sent, with a train of attendants, into Media, where Narses had fixed his headquarters. We are told that the Persian monarch received him with all honor, but, under pretence of allowing him to rest and refresh himself after his long journey, deferred his audience from day to day; while he employed the time thus gained in collecting from various

quarters such a number of detachments and garrisons as might constitute a respectable army. He had no intention of renewing the war, but he knew the weight which military preparation ever lends to the representations of diplomacy. Accordingly it was not until he had brought under the notice of Sicius a force of no inconsiderable size that he at last admitted him to an interview. The Roman ambassador was introduced into an inner chamber of the royal palace in Media,<sup>40</sup> where he found only the king and three others—Apharban, the envoy sent to Galerius, Archapetes, the captain of the guard, and Barsaborsus, the governor of a province on the Armenian frontier.<sup>41</sup> He was asked to unfold the particulars of his message, and say what were the terms on which Rome would make peace. Sicius complied. The emperors, he said, required five things: —(i.) The cession to Rome of five provinces beyond the river Tigris, which are given by one writer<sup>42</sup> as Intilene, Sophene, Arzanene, Carduene, and Zabdicene; by another<sup>43</sup> as Arzanene, Moxoene, Zabdicene, Rehimene, and Corduene; (ii.) the recognition of the Tigris, as the general boundary between the two empires; (iii.) the extension of Armenia to the fortress of Zintha, in Media; (iv.) the relinquishment by Persia to Rome of her protectorate over Iberia, including the right of giving investiture to the Iberian kings; and (v.) the recognition of Nisibis as the place at which alone commercial dealings could take place between the two nations.

It would seem that the Persians were surprised at the moderation of these demands. Their exact value and force will require some discussion; but at any rate it is clear that, under the circumstances, they were not felt to be excessive. Narses did not dispute any of them except the last: and it seems to have been rather because he did not wish it to be said that he had yielded everything, than because the condition was really very onerous, that he made objection in this instance.<sup>44</sup> Sicius was fortunately at liberty to yield the point. He at once withdrew the fifth article of the treaty, and, the other four being accepted, a formal peace was concluded between the two nations.

To understand the real character of the peace now made, and to appreciate properly the relations thereby established between Rome and Persia, it will be necessary to examine at some length the several conditions of the treaty, and to see exactly what was imported by each of them. There is scarcely one out of the whole number that carries its meaning plainly upon

its face; and on the more important very various interpretations have been put, so that a discussion and settlement of some rather intricate points is here necessary.

(i.) There is a considerable difference of opinion as to the five provinces ceded to Rome by the first article of the treaty, as to their position and extent, and consequently as to their importance. By some they are put on the right,<sup>45</sup> by others on the left, bank of the Tigris; while of those who assign them this latter position some place them in a cluster about the sources of the river,<sup>46</sup> while others extend them very much further to the southward.<sup>47</sup> Of the five provinces three only can be certainly named, since the authorities differ as to the two others.<sup>48</sup> These three are Arzanene, Cordyene, and Zabdicene, which occur in that order in Patricius. If we can determine the position of these three, that of the others will follow, at least within certain limits.

Now Arzanene was certainly on the left bank of the Tigris. It adjoined Armenia,<sup>49</sup> and is reasonably identified with the modern district of Kherzan, which lies between Lake Van and the Tigris, to the west of the Bitlis river.<sup>50</sup> All the notices of Arzanene<sup>51</sup> suit this locality; and the name "Kherzan" may be regarded as representing the ancient appellation.<sup>52</sup>

Zabdicene was a little south and a little east of this position. It was the tract about a town known as Bezabda (perhaps a corruption of Beit-Zabda), which had been anciently called Phœnica.<sup>53</sup> This town is almost certainly represented by the modern Fynyk,<sup>54</sup> on the left bank of the Tigris, a little above Jezireh. The province whereof it was the capital may perhaps have adjoined Arzanene, reaching as far north as the Bitlis river.

If these two tracts are rightly placed, Cordyene must also be sought on the left bank of the Tigris. The word is no doubt the ancient representative of the modern Kurdistan, and means a country in which Kurds dwelt. Now Kurds seem to have been at one time the chief inhabitants of the Mons Masius, the modern Jebel Karajah Dagh and Jebel Tur, which was thence called Cordyene, Gordyene, or the Gordiæan mountain chain.<sup>55</sup> But there was another and a more important Cordyene on the opposite side of the river. The tract to this day known as Kurdistan, the high mountain region south and south-east of Lake Van between Persia and Mesopotamia, was in the possession of Kurds from before the time of Xenophon, and was known as the country of the Carduchi, as Cardyene,

and as Cordyene.<sup>56</sup> This tract, which was contiguous to Arzanene and Zabdicene, if we have rightly placed those regions, must almost certainly have been the Cordyene of the treaty, which, if it corresponded at all nearly in extent with the modern Kurdistan, must have been by far the largest and most important of the five provinces.

The two remaining tracts, whatever their names,<sup>57</sup> must undoubtedly have lain on the same side of the Tigris with these three. As they are otherwise unknown to us (for Sophene, which had long been Roman, cannot have been one of them), it is impossible that they should have been of much importance. No doubt they helped to round off the Roman dominion in this quarter; but the great value of the entire cession lay in the acquisition of the large and fruitful<sup>58</sup> province of Cordyene, inhabited by a brave and hardy population, and afterwards the seat of fifteen fortresses<sup>59</sup> which brought the Roman dominion to the very edge of Adiabene, made them masters of the passes into Media, and laid the whole of Southern Mesopotamia open to their incursions. It is probable that the hold of Persia on the territory had never been strong; and in relinquishing it she may have imagined that she gave up no very great advantage; but in the hands of Rome Kurdistan became a standing menace to the Persian power, and we shall find that on the first opportunity the false step now taken was retrieved, Cordyene with its adjoining districts was pertinaciously demanded of the Romans,<sup>60</sup> was grudgingly surrendered, and was then firmly re-attached to the Sassanian dominions.

(ii.) The Tigris is said by Patricius and Festus<sup>61</sup> to have been made the boundary of the two empires. Gibbon here boldly substitutes the Western Khabour and maintains that "the Roman frontier traversed, but never followed, the course of the Tigris."<sup>62</sup> He appears not to be able to understand how the Tigris could be the frontier, when five provinces across the Tigris were Roman. But the intention of the article probably was, first, to mark the complete cession to Rome of Eastern as well as Western Mesopotamia, and, secondly, to establish the Tigris as the line separating the empires below the point down to which the Romans held both banks. Cordyene may not have touch the Tigris at all, or may have touched it only about the 37th parallel. From this point southwards, as far as Mosul, or Nimrud, or possibly Kileh Sherghat, the Tigris was probably now recognized as the dividing line between the empires. By the letter of the treaty the whole Euphrates valley

might indeed have been claimed by Rome; but practically she did not push her occupation of Mesopotamia below Circesium. The real frontier from this point was the Mesopotamian desert, which extends from Kerkesiyeh to Nimrud, a distance of 150 miles. Above this it was the Tigris, as far probably as Feshapoor; after which it followed the line, whatever it was, which divided Cordyene from Assyria and Media.

(iii.) The extension of Armenia to the fortress of Zintha, in Media, seems to have imported much more than would at first sight appear from the words. Gibbon interprets it as implying the cession of all Media Atropatene,<sup>63</sup> which certainly appears a little later to be in the possession of the Armenian monarch, Tiridates.<sup>64</sup> A large addition to the Armenian territory out of the Median is doubtless intended; but it is quite impossible to determine definitely the extent or exact character of the cession.<sup>65</sup>

(iv.) The fourth article of the treaty is sufficiently intelligible. So long as Armenia had been a fief of the Persian empire, it naturally belonged to Persia to exercise influence over the neighboring Iberia, which corresponded closely to the modern Georgia, intervening between Armenia and the Caucasus. Now, when Armenia had become a dependency of Rome, the protectorate hitherto exercised by the Sassanian princes passed naturally to the Cæsars; and with the protectorate was bound up the right of granting investiture to the kingdom, whereby the protecting power was secured against the establishment on the throne of an unfriendly person. Iberia was not herself a state of much strength; but her power of opening or shutting the passes of the Caucasus gave her considerable importance, since by the admission of the Tatar hordes, which were always ready to pour in from the plains of the North, she could suddenly change the whole face of affairs in North-Western Asia, and inflict a terrible revenge on any enemy that had provoked her. It is true that she might also bring suffering on her friends, or even on herself, for the hordes, once admitted, were apt to make little distinction between friend and foe; but prudential considerations did not always prevail over the promptings of passion, and there had been occasions when, in spite of them, the gates had been thrown open and the barbarians invited to enter.<sup>66</sup> It was well for Rome to have it in her power to check this peril. Her own strength and the tranquillity of her eastern provinces were confirmed and secured by the right which she (practically) obtained of nominating the Iberian monarchs.

(v.) The fifth article of the treaty, having been rejected by Narses and then withdrawn by Sicorius, need not detain us long. By limiting the commercial intercourse of the two nations to a single city, and that a city within their own dominions, the Romans would have obtained enormous commercial advantages. While their own merchants remained quietly at home, the foreign merchants would have had the trouble and expense of bringing their commodities to market a distance of sixty miles from the Persian frontier and of above a hundred from any considerable town;<sup>67</sup> they would of course have been liable to market dues, which would have fallen wholly into Roman hands; and they would further have been chargeable with any duty, protective or even prohibitive, which Rome chose to impose. It is not surprising that Narses here made a stand, and insisted on commerce being left to flow in the broader channels which it had formed for itself in the course of ages.<sup>68</sup>

Rome thus terminated her first period of struggle with the newly revived monarchy of Persia by a great victory and a great diplomatic success. If Narses regarded the terms—and by his conduct he would seem to have done so—as moderate under the circumstances,<sup>69</sup> our conclusion must be that the disaster which he had suffered was extreme, and that he knew the strength of Persia to be, for the time, exhausted. Forced to relinquish his suzerainty over Armenia and Iberia, he saw those countries not merely wrested from himself, but placed under the protectorate, and so made to minister to the strength, of his rival. Nor was this all. Rome had gradually been advancing across Mesopotamia and working her way from the Euphrates to the Tigris. Narses had to acknowledge, in so many words, that the Tigris, and not the Euphrates, was to be regarded as her true boundary, and that nothing consequently was to be considered as Persian beyond the more eastern of the two rivers. Even this concession was not the last or the worst. Narses had finally to submit to see his empire dismembered, a portion of Media attached to Armenia, and five provinces, never hitherto in dispute, torn from Persia and added to the dominion of Rome. He had to allow Rome to establish herself in force on the left bank of the Tigris, and so to lay open to her assaults a great portion of his northern besides all his western frontier. He had to see her brought to the very edge of the Iranian plateau, and within a fortnight's march of Persia Proper. The ambition to rival his ancestor Sapor, if really entertained,<sup>70</sup> was

severely punished; and the defeated prince must have felt that he had been most ill-advised in making the venture.

Narses did not long continue on the throne after the conclusion of this disgraceful, though, it may be, necessary, treaty. It was made in A.D. 297. He abdicated in A.D. 301. It may have been disgust at his ill-success, it may have been mere weariness of absolute power, which caused him to descend from his high position and retire into private life.<sup>71</sup> He was so fortunate as to have a son of full age in whose favor he could resign, so that there was no difficulty about the succession. His ministers seem to have thought it necessary to offer some opposition to his project;<sup>72</sup> but their resistance was feeble, perhaps because they hoped that a young prince would be more entirely guided by their counsels. Narses was allowed to complete his act of self-renunciation, and, after crowning his son Hormisdas with his own hand, to spend the remainder of his days in retirement. According to the native writers, his main object was to contemplate death and prepare himself for it. In his youth he had evinced some levity of character, and had been noted for his devotion to games and to the chase;<sup>73</sup> in his middle age he laid aside these pursuits, and, applying himself actively to business, was a good administrator, as well as a brave soldier. But at last it seemed to him that the only life worth living was the contemplative, and that the happiness of the hunter and the statesman must yield to that of the philosopher. It is doubtful how long he survived his resignation of the throne,<sup>74</sup> but tolerably certain that he did not outlive his son and successor, who reigned less than eight years.

## CHAPTER VII.

*Reign of Hormisdas II. His Disposition. General Character of his Reign. His Taste for Building. His new Court of Justice. His Marriage with a Princess of Cabul. Story of his Son Hormisdas. Death of Hormisdas II., and Imprisonment of his Son Hormisdas. Interregnum. Crown assigned to Sapor II. before his Birth. Long Reign of Sapor. First Period of his Reign, from A.D. 309 to A.D. 337. Persia plundered by the Arabs and the Turks. Victories of Sapor over the Arabs. Persecution of the Christians. Escape of Hormisdas. Feelings and Conduct of Sapor.*

“Regnum in Persas obtinuit Hormoz, Narsis filius.”—ΕΥΤΥΧΗ, vol. i. p. 396.

HORMISDAS II., who became king on the abdication of his father, Narses, had, like his father, a short reign. He ascended the throne A.D. 301; he died A.D. 309, not quite eight years later.<sup>1</sup> To this period historians assign scarcely any events. The personal appearance of Hormisdas, if we may judge by a gem, was pleasing; [Pl. XVIII., Fig. 4.] he is said, however, to have been of a harsh temper by nature, but to have controlled his evil inclinations after he became king, and in fact to have then neglected nothing that could contribute to the welfare of his subjects.<sup>2</sup> He engaged in no wars; and his reign was thus one of those quiet and uneventful intervals which, furnishing no materials for history, indicate thereby the happiness of a nation.<sup>3</sup> We are told that he had a strong taste for building,<sup>4</sup> and could never see a crumbling edifice without instantly setting to work to restore it. Ruined towns and villages, so common throughout the East in all ages, ceased to be seen in Persia while he filled the throne. An army of masons always followed him in his frequent journeys throughout his empire, and repaired dilapidated homesteads and cottages with as much care and diligence as edifices of a public character. According to some writers he founded several entirely new towns in Khuzistan or Susiana,<sup>5</sup> while, according to others,<sup>6</sup> he built the important city of Hormuz, or (as it is sometimes called) Ram-Aormuz, in the province of Kerman, which is still a flourishing

place. Other authorities<sup>7</sup> ascribe this city, however, to the first Hormisdas, the son of Sapor I. and grandson of Artaxerxes.

Among the means devised by Hormisdas II. for bettering the condition of his people the most remarkable was his establishment of a new Court of Justice. In the East the oppression of the weak by the powerful is the most inveterate and universal of all evils, and the one that well-intentioned monarchs have to be most careful in checking and repressing. Hormisdas, in his anxiety to root out this evil, is said to have set up a court expressly for the hearing of causes where complaint was made by the poor of wrongs done to them by the rich.<sup>8</sup> The duty of the judges was at once to punish the oppressors, and to see that ample reparation was made to those whom they had wronged. To increase the authority of the court, and to secure the impartiality of its sentences, the monarch made a point of often presiding over it himself, of hearing the causes, and pronouncing the judgments in person. The most powerful nobles were thus made to feel that, if they offended, they would be likely to receive adequate punishment; and the weakest and poorest of the people were encouraged to come forward and make complaint if they had suffered injury.

Among his other wives, Hormisdas, we are told, married a daughter of the king of Cabul.<sup>9</sup> It was natural that, after the conquest of Seistan<sup>10</sup> by Varahran II., about A.D. 280, the Persian monarchs should establish relations with the chieftains ruling in Afghanistan. That country seems, from the first to the fourth century of our era, to have been under the government of princes of Scythian descent and of considerable wealth and power.<sup>11</sup> Kadphises, Kanerki, Kenorano, Ooerki, Baraoro, had the main seat of their empire in the region about Cabul and Jellalabad; but from this centre they exercised an extensive sway, which at times probably reached Candahar on the one hand, and the Punjab region on the other. Their large gold coinage proves them to have been monarchs of great wealth, while their use of the Greek letters and language indicates a certain amount of civilization. The marriage of Hormisdas with a princess of Cabul implies that the hostile relations existing under Varahran II. had been superseded by friendly ones.<sup>12</sup> Persian aggression had ceased to be feared. The reigning Indo-Scythic monarch felt no reluctance to give his daughter in marriage to his Western neighbor, and sent

her to his court (we are told) with a wardrobe and ornaments of the utmost magnificence and costliness.<sup>13</sup>

Hormisdas II. appears to have had a son, of the same name with himself, who attained to manhood while his father was still reigning.<sup>14</sup> This prince, who was generally regarded, and who, of course, viewed himself, as the heir-apparent, was no favorite with the Persian nobles, whom he had perhaps offended by an inclination towards the literature and civilization of the Greeks.<sup>15</sup> It must have been upon previous consultation and agreement that the entire body of the chief men resolved to vent their spite by insulting the prince in the most open and public way at the table of his father. The king was keeping his birthday, which was always, in Persia, the greatest festival of the year,<sup>16</sup> and so the most public occasion possible. All the nobles of the realm were invited to the banquet; and all came and took their several places. The prince was absent at the first, but shortly arrived, bringing with him, as the excuse for his late appearance, a quantity of game, the produce of the morning's chase. Such an entrance must have created some disturbance and have drawn general attention; but the nobles, who were bound by etiquette to rise from their seats, remained firmly fixed in them, and took not the slightest notice of the prince's arrival.<sup>17</sup> This behavior was an indignity which naturally aroused his resentment. In the heat of the moment he exclaimed aloud that "those who had insulted him should one day suffer for it—their fate should be the fate of Marsyas." At first the threat was not understood; but one chieftain, more learned than his fellows, explained to the rest that, according to the Greek myth, Marsyas was flayed alive. Now, flaying alive was a punishment not unknown to the Persian law;<sup>18</sup> and the nobles, fearing that the prince really entertained the intention which he had expressed, became thoroughly alienated from him, and made up their minds that they would not allow him to reign. During his father's lifetime, they could, of course, do nothing; but they laid up the dread threat in their memory, and patiently waited for the moment when the throne would become vacant, and their enemy would assert his right to it.

Apparently, their patience was not very severely taxed. Hormisdas II. died within a few years; and Prince Hormisdas, as the only son whom he had left behind him,<sup>19</sup> thought to succeed as a matter of course. But the nobles rose in insurrection, seized his person, and threw him into a dungeon, intending

that he should remain there for the rest of his life. They themselves took the direction of affairs, and finding that, though King Hormisdas had left behind him no other son, yet one of his wives was pregnant, they proclaimed the unborn infant king, and even with the utmost ceremony proceeded to crown the embryo by suspending the royal diadem over the womb of the mother.<sup>20</sup> A real interregnum must have followed; but it did not extend beyond a few months. The pregnant widow of Hormisdas fortunately gave birth to a boy, and the difficulties of the succession were thereby ended. All classes acquiesced in the rule of the infant monarch, who received the name of Sapor—whether simply to mark the fact that he was believed to be the late king's son,<sup>21</sup> or in the hope that he would rival the glories of the first Sapor, is uncertain.

The reign of Sapor II. is estimated variously, at 69, 70, 71, and 72 years;<sup>22</sup> but the balance of authority is in favor of seventy. He was born in the course of the year A.D. 309, and he seems to have died in the year after the Roman emperor Valens,<sup>23</sup> or A.D. 379. He thus reigned nearly three-quarters of a century, being contemporary with the Roman emperors, Galerius, Constantine, Constantius and Constans, Julian, Jovian, Valentinian I., Valens, Gratian, and Valentinian II.

This long reign is best divided into periods. The first period of it extended from A.D. 309 to A.D. 337, or a space of twenty-eight years. This was the time anterior to Sapor's wars with the Romans. It included the sixteen years of his minority<sup>24</sup> and a space of twelve years during which he waged successful wars with the Arabs. The minority of Sapor was a period of severe trial to Persia. On every side the bordering nations endeavored to take advantage of the weakness incident to the rule of a minor, and attacked and ravaged the empire at their pleasure.<sup>25</sup> The Arabs were especially aggressive, and made continual raids into Babylonia, Khuzistan, and the adjoining regions, which desolated these provinces and carried the horrors of war into the very heart of the empire. The tribes of Beni-Ayar and Abdul-Kais, which dwelt on the southern shores of the Persian Gulf, took the lead in these incursions, and though not attempting any permanent conquests, inflicted terrible sufferings on the inhabitants of the tracts which they invaded. At the same time a Mesopotamian chieftain, called Tayer or Thair,<sup>26</sup> made an attack upon Ctesiphon, took the city by storm, and captured a sister or aunt of the Persian monarch. The nobles, who, during Sapor's minority, guided the helm of

the State, were quite incompetent to make head against these numerous enemies. For sixteen years the marauding bands had the advantage, and Persia found herself continually weaker, more impoverished, and less able to recover herself. The young prince is said to have shown extraordinary discretion and intelligence.<sup>27</sup> He diligently trained himself in all manly exercises, and prepared both his mind and body for the important duties of his station. But his tender years forbade him as yet taking the field; and it is not unlikely that his ministers prolonged the period of his tutelage in order to retain, to the latest possible moment, the power whereto they had become accustomed. At any rate, it was not till he was sixteen, a later age than Oriental ideas require,<sup>28</sup> that Sapor's minority ceased—that he asserted his manhood, and, placing himself at the head of his army, took the entire direction of affairs, civil and military, into his own hands.<sup>29</sup>

From this moment the fortunes of Persia began to rise. Content at first to meet and chastise the marauding bands on his own territory, Sapor, after a time, grew bolder, and ventured to take the offensive. Having collected a fleet of considerable size,<sup>30</sup> he placed his troops on board, and conveyed them to the city of El-Katif, an important place on the south coast of the Persian Gulf, where he disembarked and proceeded to carry fire and sword through the adjacent region. Either on this occasion, or more probably in a long series of expeditions, he ravaged the whole district of the Hejer, gaining numerous victories over the tribes of the Temanites, the Beni-Waïel, the Abdul-Kaïs, and others, which had taken a leading part in the invasion of Persia. His military genius and his valor were everywhere conspicuous; but unfortunately these excellent qualities were unaccompanied by the humanity which has been the crowning virtue of many a conqueror. Sapor, exasperated by the sufferings of his countrymen during so many years, thought that he could not too severely punish those who had inflicted them. He put to the sword the greater part of every tribe that he conquered; and, when his soldiers were weary of slaying, he made them pierce the shoulders of their prisoners, and insert in the wound a string or thong by which to drag them into captivity.<sup>31</sup> The barbarity of the age and nation approved these atrocities; and the monarch who had commanded them was, in consequence, saluted as *Dhoulacta*, or "Lord of the Shoulders," by an admiring people.<sup>32</sup>

Cruelties almost as great, but of a different character, were

at the same time sanctioned by Sapor in regard to one class of his own subjects—viz., those who had made profession of Christianity. The Zoroastrian zeal of this king was great, and he regarded it as incumbent on him to check the advance which Christianity was now making in his territories. He issued severe edicts against the Christians soon after attaining his majority;<sup>33</sup> and when they sought the protection of the Roman emperor, he punished their disloyalty by imposing upon them a fresh tax, the weight of which was oppressive. When Symeon, Archbishop of Seleucia, complained of this additional burden in an offensive manner, Sapor retaliated by closing the Christian churches, confiscating the ecclesiastical property, and putting the complainant to death. Accounts of these severities reached Constantine, the Roman emperor, who had recently embraced the new religion (which, in spite of constant persecution, had gradually overspread the empire), and had assumed the character of a sort of general protector of the Christians throughout the world.<sup>34</sup> He remonstrated with Sapor, but to no purpose.<sup>35</sup> Sapor had formed the resolution to renew the contest terminated so unfavorably forty years earlier by his grandfather. He made the emperor's interference with Persian affairs, and encouragement of his Christian subjects in their perversity, a ground of complaint, and began to threaten hostilities.<sup>36</sup> Some negotiations, which are not very clearly narrated,<sup>37</sup> followed. Both sides, apparently, had determined on war, but both wished to gain time. It is uncertain what would have been the result had Constantine lived. But the death of that monarch in the early summer of A.D. 337, on his way to the eastern frontier, dispelled the last chance of peace by relieving Sapor from the wholesome fear which had hitherto restrained his ambition. The military fame of Constantine was great, and naturally inspired respect; his power was firmly fixed, and he was without competitor or rival. By his removal the whole face of affairs was changed; and Sapor, who had almost brought himself to venture on a rupture with Rome during Constantine's life, no longer hesitated on receiving news of his death, but at once commenced hostilities.<sup>38</sup>

It is probable that among the motives which determined the somewhat wavering conduct of Sapor at this juncture<sup>39</sup> was a reasonable fear of the internal troubles which it seemed to be in the power of the Romans to excite among the Persians, if from friends they became enemies. Having tested his own

military capacity in his Arab wars, and formed an army on whose courage, endurance, and attachment he could rely, he was not afraid of measuring his strength with that of Rome in the open field; but he may well have dreaded the arts which the Imperial State was in the habit of employing,<sup>40</sup> to supplement her military shortcomings, in wars with her neighbors. There was now at the court of Constantinople a Persian refugee of such rank and importance that Constantine had, as it were, a pretender ready made to his hand, and could reckon on creating dissension among the Persians whenever he pleased, by simply proclaiming himself this person's ally and patron. Prince Hormisdas, the elder brother of Sapor, and rightful king of Persia, had, after a long imprisonment,<sup>41</sup> contrived, by the help of his wife, to escape from his dungeon,<sup>42</sup> and had fled to the court of Constantine as early as A.D. 323. He had been received by the emperor with every mark of honor and distinction, had been given a maintenance suited to his rank, and had enjoyed other favors.<sup>43</sup> Sapor must have felt himself deeply aggrieved by the undue attention paid to his rival; and though he pretended to make light of the matter, and even generously sent Hormisdas the wife to whom his escape was due,<sup>44</sup> he cannot but have been uneasy at the possession, by the Roman emperor, of his brother's person. In weighing the reasons for and against war he cannot but have assigned considerable importance to this circumstance. It did not ultimately prevent him from challenging Rome to the combat; but it may help to account for the hesitation, the delay, and the fluctuations of purpose, which we remark in his conduct during the four or five years<sup>45</sup> which immediately preceded the death of Constantine.

## CHAPTER VIII.

*Position of Affairs on the Death of Constantine. First War of Sapor with Rome, A. D. 337-350. First Siege of Nisibis. Obscure Interval. Troubles in Armenia, and Recovery of Armenia by the Persians. Sapor's Second Siege of Nisibis. Its Failure. Great Battle of Singara. Sapor's Son made Prisoner and murdered in cold blood. Third Siege of Nisibis. Sapor called away by an Invasion of the Masagete.*

“Constantius adversus Persas et Saporem, qui Mesopotamiam vastaverant, novem præliis parum prospere decertavit.”—Orosius, *Hist.* vii. 29.

THE death of Constantine was followed by the division of the Roman world among his sons. The vast empire with which Sapor had almost made up his mind to contend was partitioned out into three moderate-sized kingdoms.<sup>1</sup> In place of the late brave and experienced emperor, a raw youth,<sup>2</sup> who had given no signs of superior ability, had the government of the Roman provinces of the East, of Thrace, Asia Minor, Syria, Mesopotamia, and Egypt. Master of one third of the empire only, and of the least warlike portion,<sup>3</sup> Constantius was a foe whom the Persian monarch might well despise, and whom he might expect to defeat without much difficulty. Moreover, there was much in the circumstances of the time that seemed to promise success to the Persian arms in a struggle with Rome. The removal of Constantine had been followed by an outburst of licentiousness and violence among the Roman soldiery in the capital;<sup>4</sup> and throughout the East the army had cast off the restraints of discipline, and given indications of a turbulent and seditious spirit.<sup>5</sup> The condition of Armenia was also such as to encourage Sapor in his ambitious projects. Tiridates, though a persecutor of the Christians in the early part of his reign, had been converted by Gregory the Illuminator,<sup>6</sup> and had then enforced Christianity on his subjects by fire and sword. A sanguinary conflict had followed. A large portion of the Armenians, firmly attached to the old national idolatry, had resisted determinedly.<sup>7</sup> Nobles, priests, and people had fought desperately in defence of their temples, images, and

Fig. 1




CHOSROËS II. FROM A RELIEF AT TAKHT-I-BOSTAN (after Flandin).

Fig. 2.



Fig. 3.



SASSANIAN CHARIOT (from the bas-reliefs).

Fig. 4



A PERSIAN GUARDSMAN (from the bas-reliefs)






Fig. 1.



ELEVATION AND GROUND PLAN OF THE PALACE AT CTESIPHON (after Flandin). Scale, 1 inch to 100 feet.

Fig. 2.



GENERAL VIEW OF MASHITA PALACE (from a Photograph).

altars; and, though the persistent will of the king overbore all opposition, yet the result was the formation of a discontented faction, which rose up from time to time against its rulers, and was constantly tempted to ally itself with any foreign power from which it could hope the re-establishment of the old religion. Armenia had also, after the death of Tiridates (in A.D. 314), fallen under the government of weak princes.<sup>8</sup> Persia had recovered from it the portion of Media Atropatene ceded by the treaty between Galerius and Narses.<sup>9</sup> Sapor, therefore, had nothing to fear on this side; and he might reasonably expect to find friends among the Armenians themselves, should the general position of his affairs allow him to make an effort to extend Persian influence once more over the Armenian highland.

The bands of Sapor crossed the Roman frontier soon after, if not even before,<sup>10</sup> the death of Constantine; and after an interval of forty years the two great powers of the world were once more engaged in a bloody conflict. Constantius, having paid the last honors to his father's remains,<sup>11</sup> hastened to the eastern frontier, where he found the Roman army weak in numbers, badly armed and badly provided, ill-disposed towards himself, and almost ready to mutiny.<sup>12</sup> It was necessary, before anything could be done to resist the advance of Sapor, that the insubordination of the troops should be checked, their wants supplied, and their good-will conciliated. Constantius applied himself to effect these changes.<sup>13</sup> Meanwhile Sapor set the Arabs and Armenians in motion, inducing the Pagan party among the latter to rise in insurrection, deliver their king, Tiranus, into his power,<sup>14</sup> and make incursions into the Roman territory, while the latter infested with their armed bands the provinces of Mesopotamia and Syria.<sup>15</sup> He himself was content, during the first year of the war, A.D. 337, with moderate successes, and appeared to the Romans to avoid rather than seek a pitched battle.<sup>16</sup> Constantius was able, under these circumstances, not only to maintain his ground, but to gain certain advantages. He restored the direction of affairs in Armenia to the Roman party,<sup>17</sup> detached some of the Mesopotamian Arabs from the side of his adversary, and attached them to his own,<sup>18</sup> and even built forts in the Persian territory on the further side of the Tigris.<sup>19</sup> But the gains made were slight; and in the ensuing year (A.D. 338) Sapor took the field in greater force than before, and addressed himself to an important enterprise. He aimed, it is evident, from the first, at the recovery of Mesopotamia,

and at thrusting back the Romans from the Tigris to the Euphrates. He found it easy to overrun the open country, to ravage the crops, drive off the cattle, and burn the villages and homesteads. But the region could not be regarded as conquered, it could not be permanently held, unless the strongly fortified posts which commanded it, and which were in the hands of Rome, could be captured.<sup>20</sup> Of all these the most important was Nisibis. This ancient town, known to the Assyrians as Nazibina,<sup>21</sup> was, at any rate from the time of Lucullus,<sup>22</sup> the most important city of Mesopotamia. It was situated at the distance of about sixty miles from the Tigris, at the edge of the Mons Masius, in a broad and fertile plain, watered by one of the affluents<sup>23</sup> of the river Khabour, or Aborrhias. The Romans, after their occupation of Mesopotamia, had raised it to the rank of a colony;<sup>24</sup> and its defences, which were of great strength, had always been maintained by the emperors in a state of efficiency. Sapor regarded it as the key of the Roman position in the tract between the rivers,<sup>25</sup> and, as early as A.D. 338, sought to make himself master of it.<sup>26</sup>

The first siege of Nisibis by Sapor lasted, we are told, sixty-three days.<sup>27</sup> Few particulars of it have come down to us. Sapor had attacked the city, apparently, in the absence of constantius,<sup>28</sup> who had been called off to Pannonia to hold a conference with his brothers. It was defended, not only by its garrison and inhabitants, but by the prayers and exhortations of its bishop,<sup>29</sup> St. James, who, if he did not work miracles for the deliverance of his countrymen, at any rate sustained and animated their resistance. The result was that the bands of Sapor were repelled with loss, and he was forced, after wasting two months before the walls, to raise the siege and own himself baffled.<sup>30</sup>

After this, for some years the Persian war with Rome languished. It is difficult to extract from the brief statements of epitomizers,<sup>31</sup> and the loose invectives or panegyrics of orators,<sup>32</sup> the real circumstances of the struggle; but apparently the general condition of things was this. The Persians were constantly victorious in the open field; Constantius was again and again defeated;<sup>33</sup> but no permanent gain was effected by these successes. A weakness inherited by the Persians from the Parthians<sup>34</sup>—an inability to conduct sieges to a prosperous issue—showed itself; and their failures against the fortified posts which Rome had taken care to establish in the disputed regions were continual. Up to the close of A.D. 340 Sapor had made

no important gain, had struck no decisive blow, but stood nearly in the same position which he had occupied at the commencement of the conflict.

But the year A.D. 341 saw a change. Sapor, after obtaining possession of the person of Tiranus, had sought to make himself master of Armenia, and had even attempted to set up one of his own relatives as king.<sup>35</sup> But the indomitable spirit of the inhabitants, and their firm attachment to their Arsacid princes, caused his attempts to fail of any good result, and tended on the whole to throw Armenia into the arms of Rome. Sapor, after a while, became convinced of the folly of his proceedings, and resolved on the adoption of a wholly new policy. He would relinquish the idea of conquering, and would endeavor instead to conciliate the Armenians, in the hope of obtaining from their gratitude what he had been unable to extort from their fears. Tiranus was still living; and Sapor, we are told, offered to replace him upon the Armenian throne;<sup>36</sup> but, as he had been blinded by his captors, and as Oriental notions did not allow a person thus mutilated to exercise royal power,<sup>37</sup> Tiranus declined the offer made him, and suggested the substitution of his son. Arsaces, who was, like himself, a prisoner in Persia. Sapor readily consented; and the young prince, released from captivity, returned to his country, and was installed as king by the Persians,<sup>38</sup> with the good-will of the natives, who were satisfied so long as they could feel that they had at their head a monarch of the ancient stock. The arrangement, of course, placed Armenia on the Persian side, and gave Sapor for many years a powerful ally in his struggle with Rome.<sup>39</sup>

Thus Sapor had, by the year A.D. 341, made a very considerable gain. He had placed a friendly sovereign on the Armenian throne, had bound him to his cause by oaths, and had thereby established his influence, not only over Armenia itself, but over the whole tract which lay between Armenia and the Caucasus. But he was far from content with these successes. It was still his great object to drive the Romans from Mesopotamia; and with that object in view it continued to be his first wish to obtain possession of Nisibis. Accordingly, having settled Armenian affairs to his liking, he made, in A.D. 346, a second attack on the great city of Northern Mesopotamia, again investing it with a large body of troops, and this time pressing the siege during the space of nearly three months.<sup>40</sup> Again, however, the strength of the walls and the endurance of the garrison baffled him. Sapor was once more obliged to

withdraw from before the place, having suffered greater loss than those whom he had assailed, and forfeited much of the prestige which he had acquired by his many victories.

It was, perhaps, on account of the repulse from Nisibis, and in the hope of recovering his lost laurels, that Sapor, in the next year but one, A.D. 348, made an unusual effort. Calling out the entire military force of the empire, and augmenting it by large bodies of allies and mercenaries,<sup>41</sup> the Persian king, towards the middle of summer, crossed the Tigris by three bridges,<sup>42</sup> and with a numerous and well-appointed army invaded Central Mesopotamia, probably from Adiabene, or the region near and a little south of Nineveh. Constantius, with the Roman army, was posted on and about the Sinjar range of hills, in the vicinity of the town of Singara, which is represented by the modern village of Sinjar.<sup>43</sup> The Roman emperor did not venture to dispute the passage of the river, or to meet his adversary in the broad plain which intervenes between the Tigris and the mountain range, but clung to the skirts of the hills, and commanded his troops to remain wholly on the defensive.<sup>44</sup> Sapor was thus enabled to choose his position, to establish a fortified camp at a convenient distance from the enemy, and to occupy the hills in its vicinity—some portion of the Sinjar range—with his archers. It is uncertain whether, in making these dispositions, he was merely providing for his own safety, or whether he was laying a trap into which he hoped to entice the Roman army.<sup>45</sup> Perhaps his mind was wide enough to embrace both contingencies. At any rate, having thus established a *point d'appui* in his rear, he advanced boldly and challenged the legions to an encounter. The challenge was at once accepted, and the battle commenced about midday;<sup>46</sup> but now the Persians, having just crossed swords with the enemy, almost immediately began to give ground, and retreating hastily drew their adversaries along, across the thirsty plain, to the vicinity of their fortified camp, where a strong body of horse and the flower of the Persian archers were posted. The horse charged, but the legionaries easily defeated them,<sup>47</sup> and elated with their success burst into the camp, despite the warnings of their leader, who strove vainly to check their ardor and to induce them to put off the completion of their victory till the next day.<sup>48</sup> A small detachment found within the ramparts was put to the sword; and the soldiers scattered themselves among the tents, some in quest of booty, others only anxious for some means of

quenching their raging thirst.<sup>49</sup> Meantime the sun had gone down, and the shades of night fell rapidly. Regarding the battle as over, and the victory as assured, the Romans gave themselves up to sleep or feasting. But now Sapor saw his opportunity—the opportunity for which he had perhaps planned and waited. His light troops on the adjacent hills commanded the camp, and, advancing on every side, surrounded it. They were fresh and eager for the fray; they fought in the security afforded by the darkness; while the fires of the camp showed them their enemies, worn out with fatigue, sleepy, or drunken.<sup>50</sup> The result, as might have been expected, was a terrible carnage.<sup>51</sup> The Persians overwhelmed the legionaries with showers of darts and arrows; flight, under the circumstances, was impossible; and the Roman soldiers mostly perished where they stood. They took, however, ere they died, an atrocious revenge. Sapor's son had been made prisoner in the course of the day; in their desperation the legionaries turned their fury against this innocent youth; they beat him with whips, wounded him with the points of their weapons, and finally rushed upon him and killed him with a hundred blows.<sup>52</sup>

The battle of Singara, though thus disastrous to the Romans, had not any great effect in determining the course or issue of the war. Sapor did not take advantage of his victory to attack the rest of the Roman forces in Mesopotamia, or even to attempt the siege of any large town.<sup>53</sup> Perhaps he had really suffered large losses in the earlier part of the day; <sup>54</sup> perhaps he was too much affected by the miserable death of his son to care, till time had dulled the edge of his grief, for military glory.<sup>55</sup> At any rate, we hear of his undertaking no further enterprise till the second year after the battle,<sup>56</sup> A. D. 350, when he made his third and most desperate attempt to capture Nisibis.

The rise of a civil war in the West, and the departure of Constantius for Europe with the flower of his troops early in the year,<sup>57</sup> no doubt encouraged the Persian monarch to make one more effort against the place which had twice repulsed him with ignominy.<sup>58</sup> He collected a numerous native army, and strengthened it by the addition of a body of Indian allies,<sup>59</sup> who brought a large troop of elephants into the field.<sup>60</sup> With this force he crossed the Tigris in the early summer, and, after taking several fortified posts, march northwards and invested Nisibis. The Roman commander in the place was the

Count Lucilianus, afterwards the father-in-law of Jovian, a man of resource and determination. He is said to have taken the best advantage of every favorable turn of fortune in the course of the siege, and to have prolonged the resistance by various subtle stratagems.<sup>61</sup> But the real animating spirit of the defence was once more the bishop, St. James, who roused the enthusiasm of the inhabitants to the highest pitch by his exhortations, guided them by his counsels, and was thought to work miracles for them by his prayers.<sup>62</sup> Sapor tried at first the ordinary methods of attack; he battered the walls with his rams, and sapped them with mines. But finding that by these means he made no satisfactory progress, he had recourse shortly to wholly novel proceedings. The river Mygdonius (now the Jerujer), swollen by the melting of the snows in the Mons Masius, had overflowed its banks and covered with an inundation the plain in which Nisibis stands. Sapor saw that the forces of nature might be employed to advance his ends, and so embanked the lower part of the plain that the water could not run off, but formed a deep lake round the town, gradually creeping up the walls till it had almost reached the battlements.<sup>63</sup> Having thus created an artificial sea, the energetic monarch rapidly collected, or constructed,<sup>64</sup> a fleet of vessels, and, placing his military engines on board, launched the ships upon the waters, and so attacked the walls of the city at great advantage. But the defenders resisted stoutly, setting the engines on fire with torches, and either lifting the ships from the water by means of cranes, or else shattering them with the huge stones which they could discharge from their *balistæ*.<sup>65</sup> Still, therefore, no impression was made; but at last an unforeseen circumstance brought the besieged into the greatest peril, and almost gave Nisibis into the enemy's hands. The inundation, confined by the mounds of the Persians, which prevented it from running off, pressed with continually increasing force against the defences of the city, till at last the wall, in one part, proved too weak to withstand the tremendous weight which bore upon it, and gave way suddenly for the space of a hundred and fifty feet.<sup>66</sup> What further damage was done to the town we know not; but a breach was opened through which the Persians at once made ready to pour into the place, regarding it as impossible that so huge a gap should be either repaired or effectually defended. Sapor took up his position on an artificial eminence, while his troops rushed to the assault.<sup>67</sup> First of all marched the heavy cav-

alry, accompanied by the horse-archers; next came the elephants, bearing iron towers upon their backs, and in each tower a number of bowmen; intermixed with the elephants were a certain amount of heavy-armed foot.<sup>68</sup> It was a strange column with which to attack a breach; and its composition does not say much for Persian siege tactics, which were always poor and ineffective,<sup>69</sup> and which now, as usually, resulted in failure. The horses became quickly entangled in the ooze and mud which the waters had left behind them as they subsided; the elephants were even less able to overcome these difficulties, and as soon as they received a wound sank down—never to rise again—in the swamp.<sup>70</sup> Sapor hastily gave orders for the assailing column to retreat and seek the friendly shelter of the Persian camp, while he essayed to maintain his advantage in a different way. His light archers were ordered to the front, and, being formed into divisions which were to act as reliefs, received orders to prevent the restoration of the ruined wall by directing an incessant storm of arrows into the gap made by the waters. But the firmness and activity of the garrison and inhabitants defeated this well-imagined proceeding. While the heavy-armed troops stood in the gap receiving the flights of arrows and defending themselves as they best could, the unarmed multitude raised a new wall in their rear, which, by the morning of the next day, was six feet in height.<sup>71</sup> This last proof of his enemies' resolution and resource seems to have finally convinced Sapor of the hopelessness of his enterprise. Though he still continued the siege for a while, he made no other grand attack, and at length drew off his forces, having lost twenty thousand men before the walls,<sup>72</sup> and wasted a hundred days, or more than three months.<sup>73</sup>

Perhaps he would not have departed so soon, but would have turned the siege into a blockade, and endeavored to starve the garrison into submission, had not alarming tidings reached him from his north-eastern frontier. Then, as now, the low flat sandy region east of the Caspian was in the possession of nomadic hordes, whose whole life was spent in war and plunder. The Oxus might be nominally the boundary of the empire in this quarter; but the nomads were really dominant over the entire desert to the foot of the Hyrcanian and Parthian hills.<sup>74</sup> Petty plundering forays into the fertile region south and east of the desert were no doubt constant, and were not greatly regarded; but from time to time some tribe or chieftain bolder than the rest made a deeper inroad and a more sustained



once more replaced that country under Roman influence. Arsaces, the son of Tiranus, had been, as we have seen,<sup>1</sup> established as monarch, by Sapor, in the year A.D. 341, under the notion that, in return for the favor shown him, he would administer Armenia in the Persian interest. But gratitude is an unsafe basis for the friendships of monarchs. Arsaces, after a time, began to chafe against the obligations under which Sapor had laid him, and to wish, by taking independent action, to show himself a real king, and not a mere feudatory. He was also, perhaps, tired of aiding Sapor in his Roman war, and may have found that he suffered more than he gained by having Rome for an enemy. At any rate, in the interval<sup>2</sup> between A.D. 351 and 359, probably while Sapor was engaged in the far East,<sup>3</sup> Arsaces sent envoys to Constantinople with a request to Constantius that he would give him in marriage a member of the Imperial house.<sup>4</sup> Constantius was charmed with the application made to him, and at once accepted the proposal. He selected for the proffered honor a certain Olympias, the daughter of Ablabius, a Prætorian prefect, and lately the betrothed bride of his own brother, Constans; and sent her to Armenia,<sup>5</sup> where Arsaces welcomed her, and made her (as it would seem) his chief wife, provoking thereby the jealousy and aversion of his previous sultana, a native Armenian, named Pharandzem.<sup>6</sup> The engagement thus entered into led on, naturally, to the conclusion of a formal alliance between Rome and Armenia—an alliance which Sapor made fruitless efforts to disturb,<sup>7</sup> and which continued unimpaired down to the time (A.D. 359) when hostilities once more broke out between Rome and Persia.

Of Sapor's Eastern wars we have no detailed account. They seem to have occupied him from A.D. 350 to A.D. 357, and to have been, on the whole, successful. They were certainly terminated by a peace in the last-named year<sup>8</sup>—a peace of which it must have been a condition that his late enemies should lend him aid in the struggle which he was about to renew with Rome. Who these enemies exactly were, and what exact region they inhabited, is doubtful. They comprised certainly the Chionites and Gelani, probably the Euseni and the Vertæ.<sup>9</sup> The Chionites are thought to have been Hiongnu or Huns;<sup>10</sup> and the Euseni are probably the U-siun, who, as early as B.C. 200, are found among the nomadic hordes pressing towards the Oxus.<sup>11</sup> The Vertæ are wholly unknown. The Gelani should, by their name, be the inhabitants of Ghilan, or the coast tract south-west of the Caspian; but this locality seems too remote

from the probable seats of the Chionites and Euseni to be the one intended. The general scene of the wars was undoubtedly east of the Caspian, either in the Oxus region, or still further eastward, on the confines of India and Scythia.<sup>12</sup> The result of the wars, though not a conquest, was an extension of Persian influence and power. Troublesome enemies were converted into friends and allies. The loss of a predominating influence over Armenia was thus compensated, or more than compensated, within a few years, by a gain of a similar kind in another quarter.

While Sapor was thus engaged in the far East, he received letters from the officer whom he had left in charge of his western frontier,<sup>13</sup> informing him that the Romans were anxious to exchange the precarious truce which Mesopotamia had been allowed to enjoy during the last five or six years for a more settled and formal peace. Two great Roman officials, Cassianus, duke of Mesopotamia, and Musonianus, Prætorian prefect, understanding that Sapor was entangled in a bloody and difficult war at the eastern extremity of his empire, and knowing that Constantius was fully occupied with the troubles caused by the inroads of the barbarians into the more western of the Roman provinces, had thought that the time was favorable for terminating the provisional state of affairs in the Mesopotamian region by an actual treaty.<sup>14</sup> They had accordingly opened negotiations with Tamsapor, satrap of Adiabene, and suggested to him that he should sound his master on the subject of making peace with Rome. Tamsapor appears to have misunderstood the character of these overtures, or to have misrepresented them to Sapor; in his despatch he made Constantius himself the mover in the matter, and spoke of him as humbly supplicating the great king to grant him conditions.<sup>15</sup> It happened that the message reached Sapor just as he had come to terms with his eastern enemies, and had succeeded in inducing them to become his allies. He was naturally elated at his success, and regarded the Roman overture as a simple acknowledgment of weakness. Accordingly he answered in the most haughty style. His letter, which was conveyed to the Roman emperor at Sirmium by an ambassador named Narses,<sup>16</sup> was conceived in the following terms:<sup>17</sup>

“Sapor, king of kings, brother of the sun and moon, and companion of the stars, sends salutation to his brother, Constantius Cæsar. It glads me to see that thou art at last returned to the right way, and art ready to do what is just and

fair, having learned by experience that inordinate greed is oft-times punished by defeat and disaster. As then the voice of truth ought to speak with all openness, and the more illustrious of mankind should make their words mirror their thoughts, I will briefly declare to thee what I propose, not forgetting that I have often said the same things before. Your own authors are witness that the entire tract within the river Strymon and the borders of Macedon was once held by my ancestors; if I required you to restore all this, it would not ill become me (excuse the boast), inasmuch as I excel in virtue and in the splendor of my achievements the whole line of our ancient monarchs. But as moderation delights me, and has always been the rule of my conduct—wherefore from my youth up I have had no occasion to repent of any action—I will be content to receive Mesopotamia and Armenia, which was fraudulently extorted from my grandfather. We Persians have never admitted the principle, which you proclaim with such effrontery, that success in war is always glorious, whether it be the fruit of courage or trickery. In conclusion, if you will take the advice of one who speaks for your good, sacrifice a small tract of territory, one always in dispute and causing continual bloodshed, in order that you may rule the remainder securely. Physicians, remember, often cut and burn, and even amputate portions of the body, that the patient may have the healthy use of what is left to him; and there are animals which, understanding why the hunters chase them, deprive themselves of the thing coveted, to live thenceforth without fear. I warn you, that, if my ambassador returns in vain, I will take the field against you, so soon as the winter is past, with all my forces, confiding in my good fortune and in the fairness of the conditions which I have now offered.”

It must have been a severe blow to Imperial pride to receive such a letter: and the sense of insult can scarcely have been much mitigated by the fact that the missive was enveloped in a silken covering,<sup>18</sup> or by the circumstance that the bearer, Narses, endeavored by his conciliating manners to atone for his master's rudeness.<sup>19</sup> Constantius replied, however, in a dignified and calm tone.<sup>20</sup> “The Roman emperor,” he said, “victorious by land and sea, saluted his brother, King Sapor. His lieutenant in Mesopotamia had meant well in opening a negotiation with a Persian governor; but he had acted without orders, and could not bind his master. Nevertheless, he (Constantius) would not disclaim what had been done, since he did

not object to a peace, provided it were fair and honorable. But to ask the master of the whole Roman world to surrender territories which he had successfully defended when he ruled only over the provinces of the East was plainly indecent and absurd. He must add that the employment of threats was futile, and too common an artifice; more especially as the Persians themselves must know that Rome always defended herself when attacked, and that, if occasionally she was vanquished in a battle, yet she never failed to have the advantage in the event of every war." Three envoys were entrusted with the delivery of this reply<sup>21</sup>—Prosper, a count of the empire; Spectatus, a tribune and notary; and Eustathius, an orator and philosopher, a pupil of the celebrated Neo-Platonist, Jamblichus,<sup>22</sup> and a friend of St. Basil.<sup>23</sup> Constantius was most anxious for peace, as a dangerous war threatened with the Alemanni, one of the most powerful tribes of Germany.<sup>24</sup> He seems to have hoped that, if the unadorned language of the two statesmen failed to move Sapor, he might be won over by the persuasive eloquence of the professor of rhetoric.

But Sapor was bent on war. He had concluded arrangements with the natives so long his adversaries in the East, by which they had pledged themselves to join his standard with all their forces in the ensuing spring.<sup>25</sup> He was well aware of the position of Constantius in the West, of the internal corruption of his court, and of the perils constantly threatening him from external enemies. A Roman official of importance, bearing the once honored name of Antoninus, had recently taken refuge with him from the claims of pretended creditors, and had been received into high favor on account of the information which he was able to communicate with respect to the disposition of the Roman forces and the condition of their magazines.<sup>26</sup> This individual, ennobled by the royal authority, and given a place at the royal table, gained great influence over his new master, whom he stimulated by alternately reproaching him with his backwardness in the past, and putting before him the prospect of easy triumphs over Rome in the future. He pointed out that the emperor, with the bulk of his troops and treasures, was detained in the regions adjoining the Danube; and that the East was left almost undefended; he magnified the services which he was himself competent to render;<sup>27</sup> he exhorted Sapor to bestir himself, and to put confidence in his good fortune. He recommended that the old plan of sitting down before walled towns should be given up, and that

the Persian monarch, leaving the strongholds of Mesopotamia in his rear, should press forward to the Euphrates,<sup>28</sup> pour his troops across it, and overrun the rich province of Syria, which he would find unguarded, and which had not been invaded by an enemy for nearly a century. The views of Antoninus were adopted; but, in practice, they were overruled by the exigencies of the situation. A Roman army occupied Mesopotamia, and advanced to the banks of the Tigris. When the Persians in full force crossed the river, accompanied by Chionite and Albanian allies,<sup>29</sup> they found a considerable body of troops prepared to resist them. Their opponents did not, indeed offer battle, but they laid waste the country as the Persians took possession of it; they destroyed the forage, evacuated the indefensible towns<sup>30</sup> (which fell, of course, into the enemy's hands), and fortified the line of the Euphrates with castles, military engines, and palisades.<sup>31</sup> Still the programme of Antoninus would probably have been carried out, had not the swell of the Euphrates exceeded the average, and rendered it impossible for the Persian troops to ford the river at the usual point of passage into Syria. On discovering this obstacle, Antoninus suggested that, by a march to the north-east through a fertile country, the Upper Euphrates might be reached, and easily crossed, before its waters had attained any considerable volume. Sapor agreed to adopt this suggestion. He marched from Zeugma across the Mons Masius towards the Upper Euphrates, defeated the Romans in an important battle near Amida,<sup>32</sup> took, by a sudden assault, two castles which defended the town,<sup>33</sup> and then somewhat hastily resolved that he would attack the place, which he did not imagine capable of making much resistance.

Amida, now Diarbekr, was situated on the right bank of the Upper Tigris, in a fertile plain, and was washed along the whole of its western side by a semi-circular bend of the river.<sup>34</sup> It had been a place of considerable importance from a very ancient date,<sup>35</sup> and had recently been much strengthened by Constantius, who had made it an arsenal for military engines, and had repaired its towers and walls.<sup>36</sup> The town contained within it a copious fountain of water, which was liable, however, to acquire a disagreeable odor in the summer time. Seven legions, of the moderate strength to which legions had been reduced by Constantine,<sup>37</sup> defended it; and the garrison included also a body of horse-archers, composed chiefly or entirely of noble foreigners.<sup>38</sup> Sapor hoped in the first instance to terrify

it into submission by his mere appearance, and boldly rode up to the gates with a small body of his followers, expecting that they would be opened to him. But the defenders were more courageous than he had imagined. They received him with a shower of darts and arrows that were directed specially against his person, which was conspicuous from its ornaments; and they aimed their weapons so well that one of them passed through a portion of his dress and was nearly wounding him.<sup>39</sup> Persuaded by his followers, Sapor upon this withdrew, and committed the further prosecution of the attack to Grumbates, the king of the Chionites, who assaulted the walls on the next day with a body of picked troops, but was repulsed with great loss, his only son, a youth of great promise, being killed at his side by a dart from a *balista*.<sup>40</sup> The death of this prince spread dismay through the camp, and was followed by a general mourning; but it now became a point of honor to take the town which had so injured one of the great king's royal allies; and Grumbates was promised that Amida should become the funeral pile of his lost darling.<sup>41</sup>

The town was now regularly invested. Each nation was assigned its place. The Chionites, burning with the desire to avenge their late defeat, were on the east; the Vertæ on the south; the Albanians, warriors from the Caspian region, on the north; the Segestans,<sup>42</sup> who were reckoned the bravest soldiers of all, and who brought into the field a large body of elephants, held the west. A continuous line of Persians, five ranks deep, surrounded the entire city, and supported the auxiliary detachments. The entire besieging army was estimated at a hundred thousand men;<sup>43</sup> the besieged, including the unarmed multitude, were under 30,000.<sup>44</sup> After the pause of an entire day, the first general attack was made. Grumbates gave the signal for the assault by hurling a bloody spear into the space before the walls, after the fashion of a Roman *fetialis*.<sup>45</sup> A cloud of darts and arrows from every side followed the flight of this weapon, and did severe damage to the besieged, who were at the same time galled with discharges from Roman military engines, taken by the Persians in some capture of Singara, and now employed against their former owners.<sup>46</sup> Still a vigorous resistance continued to be made, and the besiegers, in their exposed positions, suffered even more than the garrison; so that after two days the attempt to carry the city by general assault was abandoned, and the slow process of a regular siege was adopted. Trenches were opened at the usual distance from the walls,

along which the troops advanced under the cover of hurdles towards the ditch, which they proceeded to fill up in places. Mounds were then thrown up against the walls; and movable towers were constructed and brought into play, guarded externally with iron, and each mounting a *balista*.<sup>47</sup> It was impossible long to withstand these various weapons of attack. The hopes of the besieged lay, primarily, in their receiving relief from without by the advance of an army capable of engaging their assailants and harassing them or driving them off; secondarily, in successful sallies, by means of which they might destroy the enemy's works and induce him to retire from before the place.


There existed, in the neighborhood of Amida, the elements of a relieving army, under the command of the new prefect of the East, Sabinianus. Had this officer possessed an energetic and enterprising character, he might, without much difficulty, have collected a force of light and active soldiers, which might have hung upon the rear of the Persians, intercepted their convoys, cut off their stragglers, and have even made an occasional dash upon their lines. Such was the course of conduct recommended by Ursicinus, the second in command, whom Sabinianus had recently superseded; but the latter was jealous of his subordinate, and had orders from the Byzantine court to keep him unemployed.<sup>48</sup> He was himself old and rich, alike disinclined to and unfit for military enterprise;<sup>49</sup> he therefore absolutely rejected the advice of Ursicinus, and determined on making no effort. He had positive orders, he said, from the court to keep on the defensive and not endanger his troops by engaging them in hazardous adventures. Amida must protect itself, or at any rate not look to him for succor. Ursicinus chafed terribly, it is said, against this decision,<sup>50</sup> but was forced to submit to it. His messengers conveyed the dispiriting intelligence to the devoted city, which learned thereby that it must rely wholly upon its own exertions.

Nothing now remained but to organize sallies on a large scale and attack the besieger's works. Such attempts were made from time to time with some success; and on one occasion two Gaulish legions, banished to the East for their adherence to the cause of Magnentius, penetrated, by night, into the heart of the besieging camp, and brought the person of the monarch into danger. This peril was, however, escaped; the legions were repulsed with the loss of a sixth of their number;<sup>51</sup> and nothing was gained by the audacious enterprise beyond a truce

of three days, during which each side mourned its dead, and sought to repair its losses.

The fate of the doomed city drew on. Pestilence was added to the calamities which the besieged had to endure.<sup>52</sup> Desertion and treachery were arrayed against them. One of the natives of Amida, going over to the Persians, informed them that on the southern side of the city a neglected staircase led up from the margin of the Tigris through underground corridors to one of the principal bastions; and under his guidance seventy archers of the Persian guard, picked men, ascended the dark passage at dead of night, occupied the tower, and when morning broke displayed from it a scarlet flag, as a sign to their countrymen that a portion of the wall was taken. The Persians were upon the alert, and an instant assault was made. But the garrison, by extraordinary efforts, succeeded in recapturing the tower before any support reached its occupants; and then, directing their artillery and missiles against the assailing columns, inflicted on them tremendous losses, and soon compelled them to return hastily to the shelter of their camp. The Vertæ, who maintained the siege on the south side of the city, were the chief sufferers in this abortive attempt.<sup>53</sup>


Sapor had now spent seventy days before the place, and had made no perceptible impression. Autumn was already far advanced,<sup>54</sup> and the season for military operations would soon be over. It was necessary, therefore, either to take the city speedily or to give up the siege and retire. Under these circumstances Sapor resolved on a last effort. He had constructed towers of such a height that they overtopped the wall, and poured their discharges on the defenders from a superior elevation. He had brought his mounds in places to a level with the ramparts, and had compelled the garrison to raise countermounds within the walls for their protection. He now determined on pressing the assault day after day, until he either carried the town or found all his resources exhausted. His artillery, his foot, and his elephants were all employed in turn or together; he allowed the garrison no rest.<sup>55</sup> Not content with directing the operations, he himself took part in the supreme struggle, exposing his own person freely to the enemy's weapons, and losing many of his attendants.<sup>56</sup> After the contest had lasted three continuous days from morn to night, fortune at last favored him. One of the inner mounds, raised by the besieged behind their wall, suddenly gave way, involving its defenders in its fall, and at the same time filling up the




GROUND-PLAN OF PALACE AT MASHITA (after Tristram .

A A, Sculptured façade. B B B, Pillared entrances. c, Well or *Abwatala*.  
 D, Tower with staircase. E E E, Main building of Palace.

Fig. 2.



INNER GATEWAY OF MASHITA PALACE (from a Photograph).



ELABORATE ORNAMENTATION OF PALACE AT MASHITA.

entire space between the wall and the mound raised outside by the Persians. A way into the town was thus laid open,<sup>57</sup> and the besiegers instantly occupied it. It was in vain that the flower of the garrison threw itself across the path of the entering columns—nothing could withstand the ardor of the Persian troops. In a little time all resistance was at an end; those who could quitted the city and fled—the remainder, whatever their sex, age, or calling, whether armed or unarmed, were slaughtered like sheep by the conquerors.<sup>58</sup>

Thus fell Amida after a siege of seventy-three days.<sup>59</sup> Sapor, who on other occasions showed himself not deficient in clemency,<sup>60</sup> was exasperated by the prolonged resistance and the losses which he had sustained in the course of it. Thirty thousand of his best soldiers had fallen;<sup>61</sup> the son of his chiefly ally had perished;<sup>62</sup> he himself had been brought into imminent danger. Such audacity on the part of a petty town seemed no doubt to him to deserve a severe retribution. The place was therefore given over to the infuriated soldiery, who were allowed to slay and plunder at their pleasure. Of the captives taken, all belonging to the five provinces across the Tigris, claimed as his own by Sapor, though ceded to Rome by his grandfather, were massacred in cold blood. The Count *Ælian*, and the commanders of the legions who had conducted the gallant defence, were barbarously crucified. Many other Romans of high rank were subjected to the indignity of being manacled, and were dragged into Persia as slaves rather than as prisoners.<sup>63</sup>

The campaign of A.D. 359 terminated with this dearly bought victory. The season was too far advanced for any fresh enterprise of importance; and Sapor was probably glad to give his army a rest after the toils and perils of the last three months. Accordingly he retired across the Tigris, without leaving (so far as appears) any garrisons in Mesopotamia, and began preparations for the campaign of A.D. 360. Stores of all kinds were accumulated during the winter; and, when the spring came, the indefatigable monarch once more invaded the enemy's country, pouring into Mesopotamia an army even more numerous and better appointed than that which he had led against Amida in the preceding year.<sup>64</sup> His first object now was to capture Singara, a town of some consequence, which was, however, defended by only two Roman legions and a certain number of native soldiers. After a vain attempt to persuade the garrison to a surrender, the attack was made in

the usual way, chiefly by scaling parties with ladders, and by battering parties which shook the walls with the ram. The defenders kept the scalers at bay by a constant discharge of stones and darts from their artillery, arrows from their bows, and leaden bullets<sup>65</sup> from their slings. They met the assaults of the ram by attempts to fire the wooden covering which protected it and those who worked it. For some days these efforts sufficed; but after a while the besiegers found a weak point in the defences of the place—a tower so recently built that the mortar in which the stones were laid was still moist, and which consequently crumbled rapidly before the blows of a strong and heavy battering-ram, and in a short time fell to the ground. The Persians poured in through the gap, and were at once masters of the entire town, which ceased to resist after the catastrophe. This easy victory allowed Sapor to exhibit the better side of his character; he forbade the further shedding of blood, and ordered that as many as possible of the garrisons and citizens should be taken alive. Reviving a favorite policy of Oriental rulers from very remote times,<sup>66</sup> he transported these captives to the extreme eastern parts of his empire,<sup>67</sup> where they might be of the greatest service to him in defending his frontier against the Scythians and Indians.

It is not really surprising, though the historian of the war regards it as needing explanation,<sup>68</sup> that no attempt was made to relieve Singara by the Romans. The siege was short; the place was considered strong; the nearest point held by a powerful Roman force was Nisibis, which was at least sixty miles distant from Singara. The neighborhood of Singara was, moreover, ill supplied with water; and a relieving army would probably have soon found itself in difficulties. Singara, on the verge of the desert, was always perilously situated. Rome valued it as an outpost from which her enemy might be watched, and which might advertise her of a sudden danger, but could not venture to undertake its defence in case of an attack in force, and was prepared to hear of its capture with equanimity.

From Singara Sapor directed his march almost due northwards, and, leaving Nisibis unassailed upon his left, proceeded to attack the strong fort known indifferently as Phœnica or Bezabde.<sup>69</sup> This was a position on the east bank of the Tigris, near the point where that river quits the mountains and debouches upon the plain;<sup>70</sup> though not on the site,<sup>71</sup> it may be considered the representative of the modern Jezireh, which

commands the passes from the low country into the Kurdish mountains. Bezabde was the chief city of the province, called after it Zabdicene, one of the five ceded by Narses and greatly coveted by his grandson. It was much valued by Rome, was fortified in places with a double wall, and was guarded by three legions and a large body of Kurdish archers.<sup>72</sup> Sapor, having reconnoitred the place, and, with his usual hardihood, exposed himself to danger in doing so, sent a flag of truce to demand a surrender, joining with the messengers some prisoners of high rank taken at Singara, lest the enemy should open fire upon his envoys. The device was successful; but the garrison proved stanch, and determined on resisting to the last. Once more all the known resources of attack and defence were brought into play; and after a long siege, of which the most important incident was an attempt made by the bishop of the place to induce Sapor to withdraw,<sup>73</sup> the wall was at last breached, the city taken, and its defenders indiscriminately massacred. Regarding the position as one of first-rate importance, Sapor, who had destroyed Singara, carefully repaired the defences of Bezabde, provisioned it abundantly, and garrisoned it with some of his best troops. He was well aware that the Romans would feel keenly the loss of so important a post, and expected that it would not be long before they made an effort to recover possession of it.

The winter was now approaching, but the Persian monarch still kept the field. The capture of Bezabde was followed by that of many other less important strongholds,<sup>74</sup> which offered little resistance. At last, towards the close of the year, an attack was made upon a place called Virta, said to have been a fortress of great strength, and by some moderns<sup>75</sup> identified with Tekrit, an important city upon the Tigris between Mosul and Bagdad. Here the career of the conqueror was at last arrested. Persuasion and force proved alike unavailing to induce or compel a surrender; and, after wasting the small remainder of the year, and suffering considerable loss, the Persian monarch reluctantly gave up the siege, and returned to his own country.<sup>76</sup>

Meanwhile the movements of the Roman emperor had been slow and uncertain. Distracted between a jealous fear of his cousin Julian's proceedings in the West, and a desire of checking the advance of his rival Sapor in the East, he had left Constantinople in the early spring,<sup>77</sup> but had journeyed leisurely through Cappadocia and Armenia Minor to Samosata, whence,

after crossing the Euphrates, he had proceeded to Edessa, and there fixed himself.<sup>78</sup> While in Cappadocia he had summoned to his presence Arsaces, the tributary king of Armenia, had reminded him of his engagements, and had endeavored to quicken his gratitude by bestowing on him liberal presents.<sup>79</sup> At Edessa he employed himself during the whole of the summer in collecting troops and stores; nor was it till the autumnal equinox was past<sup>80</sup> that he took the field, and, after weeping over the smoking ruins of Amida, marched to Bezabde, and, when the defenders rejected his overtures of peace, formed the siege of the place. Sapor was, we must suppose, now engaged before Virta, and it is probable that he thought Bezabde strong enough to defend itself. At any rate, he made no effort to afford it any relief; and the Roman emperor was allowed to employ all the resources at his disposal in reiterated assaults upon the walls. The defence, however, proved stronger than the attack. Time after time the bold sallies of the besieged destroyed the Roman works. At last the rainy season set in, and the low ground outside the town became a glutinous and adhesive marsh.<sup>81</sup> It was no longer possible to continue the siege; and the disappointed emperor reluctantly drew off his troops, recrossed the Euphrates, and retired into winter quarters at Antioch.

The successes of Sapor in the campaigns of A.D. 359 and 360, his captures of Amida, Singara, and Bezabde, together with the unfortunate issue of the expedition made by Constantius against the last-named place, had a tendency to shake the fidelity of the Roman vassal-kings, Arsaces<sup>82</sup> of Armenia, and Meribanes of Iberia. Constantius, therefore, during the winter of A.D. 360-1, which he passed at Antioch, sent emissaries to the courts of these monarchs, and endeavored to secure their fidelity by loading them with costly presents.<sup>83</sup> His policy seems to have been so far successful that no revolt of these kingdoms took place; they did not as yet desert the Romans or make their submission to Sapor. Their monarchs seem to have simply watched events, prepared to declare themselves distinctly on the winning side so soon as fortune should incline unmistakably to one or the other combatant. Meanwhile they maintained the fiction of a nominal dependence upon Rome.<sup>84</sup>

It might have been expected that the year A.D. 361 would have been a turning-point in the war, and that, if Rome did not by a great effort assert herself and recover her prestige, the advance of Persia would have been marked and rapid. But

the actual course of events was far different. Hesitation and diffidence characterize the movements of both parties to the contest, and the year is signalized by no important enterprise on the part of either monarch. Constantius reoccupied Edessa,<sup>85</sup> and had (we are told)<sup>86</sup> some thoughts of renewing the siege of Bezabde; actually, however, he did not advance further, but contented himself with sending a part of his army to watch Sapor, giving them strict orders not to risk an engagement.<sup>87</sup> Sapor, on his side, began the year with demonstrations which were taken to mean that he was about to pass the Euphrates;<sup>88</sup> but in reality he never even brought his troops across the Tigris, or once <sup>his</sup> <sup>In-</sup> <sup>his</sup> <sup>feath.</sup> <sup>Rev.</sup> <sup>of Peace.</sup> foot in Mesopotamia. After wasting weeks or months in <sup>his</sup> <sup>In-</sup> <sup>his</sup> <sup>feath.</sup> <sup>Rev.</sup> <sup>of Peace.</sup> display of his armed strength upon the eastern bank, and violently alarming the officers sent by Constantius to observe his movements,<sup>89</sup> he suddenly, towards autumn, withdrew his troops, having attempted nothing, and quietly returned to his capital!

It is by no means difficult to understand the motives which actuated Constantius. He was, month after month, receiving intelligence from the West of steps taken by Julian which amounted to open rebellion, and challenged him to engage in civil war.<sup>90</sup> So long as Sapor threatened invasion he did not like to quit Mesopotamia, lest he might appear to have sacrificed the interests of his country to his own private quarrels; but he must have been anxious to return to the seat of empire from the first moment that intelligence reached him of Julian's assumption of the imperial name and dignity; and when Sapor's retreat was announced he naturally made all haste to reach his capital. Meanwhile the desire of keeping his army intact caused him to refrain from any movement which involved the slightest risk of bringing on a battle, and, in fact, reduced him to inaction. So much is readily intelligible. But what at this time withheld Sapor, when he had so grand an opportunity of making an impression upon Rome—what paralyzed his arm when it might have struck with such effect—it is far from easy to understand, though perhaps not impossible to conjecture. The historian of the war ascribes his abstinence to a religious motive, telling us that the auguries were not favorable for the Persians crossing the Tigris.<sup>91</sup> But there is no other evidence that the Persians of this period were the slaves of any such superstition as that noted by Ammianus, nor any probability that a monarch of Sapor's force of character would have suffered his military policy to be affected by

omens. We must therefore ascribe the conduct of the Persian king to some cause not recorded by the historian—some failure of health, or some peril from internal or external enemies which called him away from the scene of his recent exploits, just at the time when his continued presence there was most important. Once before in his lifetime, an invasion of his eastern provinces had required his immediate presence, and allowed his adversary to quit Mesopotamia and march against Magnentius.<sup>92</sup> It is not improbable that a fresh attack of the same or some other kind of barbarians now again happened opportunely for the purpose of calling Sapor away, and thus enabling Constantius to march upon the East, and set out for Europe in the autumn of 360.

The meeting with Sapor was not destined to take place. On his way from Antioch to Constantinople the unfortunate Constantius, anxious and perhaps over-fatigued, fell sick at Mopsucrene, in Cilicia, and died there, after a short illness,<sup>93</sup> towards the close of A.D. 361. Julian the Apostate succeeded peacefully to the empire whereto he was about to assert his right by force of arms; and Sapor found that the war which he had provoked with Rome, in reliance upon his adversary's weakness and incapacity, had to be carried on with a prince of far greater natural powers and of much superior military training.

## CHAPTER X.

*Julian becomes Emperor of Rome. His Resolution to invade Persia. His Views and Motives. His Proceedings. Proposals of Sapor rejected. Other Embassies. Relations of Julian with Armenia. Strengthening of his Army. His invasion of Mesopotamia. His Line of march. Siege of Persis; of Maogamalcha. Battle of Samarra. Further Progress of Julian checked by his Infirmities. Siege of Ctesiphon. His Retreat. His Death. Revolutions continued by Jovian. Sapor offers Terms of Peace. Peace made by Jovian. Its Conditions. Reflections on the Peace and on the Termination of the Second Period of Struggle between Rome and Persia.*

“Julianus, redacta ad unum se orbis Romani curatione, gloriæ nimis cupidus, in Persas proficiscitur.”—Aurel. Vict. *Epit.* § 43.

THE prince on whom the government of the Roman empire, and consequently the direction of the Persian war, devolved by the death of Constantius, was in the flower of his age,<sup>1</sup> proud, self-confident, and full of energy. He had been engaged for a period of four years<sup>2</sup> in a struggle with the rude and warlike tribes of Germany, had freed the whole country west of the Rhine from the presence of those terrible warriors, and had even carried fire and sword far into the wild and savage districts on the right bank of the river, and compelled the Alemanni and other powerful German tribes to make their submission to the majesty of Rome. Personally brave, by temperament restless, and inspired with an ardent desire to rival or eclipse the glorious deeds of those heroes of former times who had made themselves a name in history, he viewed the disturbed condition of the East at the time of his accession not as a trouble, not as a drawback upon the delights of empire, but as a happy circumstance, a fortunate opportunity for distinguishing himself by some great achievement. Of all the Greeks, Alexander appeared to him the most illustrious;<sup>3</sup> of all his predecessors on the imperial throne, Trajan and Marcus Aurelius were those whom he most wished to emulate.<sup>4</sup> But all these princes had either led or sent<sup>5</sup> expeditions into

the far East, and had aimed at uniting in one the fairest provinces of Europe and Asia. Julian appears, from the first moment that he found himself peaceably established upon the throne,<sup>6</sup> to have resolved on undertaking in person a great expedition against Sapor, with the object of avenging upon Persia the ravages and defeats of the last sixty years, or at any rate of obtaining such successes as might justify his assuming the title of "Persicus."<sup>7</sup> Whether he really entertained any hope of rivalling Alexander, or supposed it possible that he should effect "the final conquest of Persia,"<sup>8</sup> may be doubted. Acquainted, as he must have been,<sup>9</sup> with the entire course of Roman warfare in these parts from the attack of Crassus to the last defeat of his own immediate predecessor, he can scarcely have regarded the subjugation of Persia as an easy matter, or have expected to do much more than strike terror into the "barbarians" of the East, or perhaps obtain from them the cession of another province. The sensible officer, who, after accompanying him in his expedition, wrote the history of the campaign, regarded his actuating motives as the delight that he took in war, and the desire of a new title.<sup>10</sup> Confident in his own military talent, in his training, and in his power to inspire enthusiasm in an army, he no doubt looked to reap laurels sufficient to justify him in making his attack; but the wild schemes ascribed to him, the *conquest* of the Sasanian kingdom, and the subjugation of Hyrcania and India,<sup>11</sup> are figments (probably) of the imagination of his historians.

Julian entered Constantinople on the 11th of December, A.D. 361; he quitted it towards the end of May,<sup>12</sup> A.D. 362, after residing there less than six months. During this period, notwithstanding the various important matters in which he was engaged, the purifying of the court, the depression of the Christians, the restoration and revivification of Paganism, he found time to form plans and make preparations for his intended eastern expedition, in which he was anxious to engage as soon as possible. Having designated for the war such troops as could be spared from the West, he committed them and their officers to the charge of two generals, carefully chosen, Victor, a Roman of distinction, and the Persian refugee, Prince Hormisdas,<sup>13</sup> who conducted the legions without difficulty to Antioch. There Julian himself arrived in June or July,<sup>14</sup> after having made a stately progress through Asia Minor; and it would seem that he would at once have marched against the enemy, had not his counsellors strongly urged the necessity of

a short delay,<sup>16</sup> during which the European troops might be rested, and adequate preparations made for the intended invasion. It was especially necessary to provide stores and ships,<sup>16</sup> since the new emperor had resolved not to content himself with an ordinary campaign upon the frontier, but rather to imitate the examples of Trajan and Severus, who had carried the Roman eagles to the extreme south of Mesopotamia.<sup>17</sup> Ships, accordingly, were collected, and probably built,<sup>18</sup> during the winter of A.D. 362-3; provisions were laid in; warlike stores, military engines, and the like accumulated; while the impatient monarch, galled by the wit and raillery of the gay Antiochenes,<sup>19</sup> chafed at his compelled inaction, and longed to exchange the war of words in which he was engaged with his subjects for the ruder contests of arms wherewith use had made him more familiar.

It must have been during the emperor's stay at Antioch that he received an embassy from the court of Persia, commissioned to sound his inclinations with regard to the conclusion of a peace. Sapor had seen, with some disquiet, the sceptre of the Roman world assumed by an enterprising and courageous youth, inured to warfare and ambitious of military glory. He was probably very well informed as to the general condition of the Roman State<sup>20</sup> and the personal character of its administrator; and the tidings which he received concerning the intentions and preparations of the new prince were such as caused him some apprehension, if not actual alarm. Under these circumstances he sent an embassy with overtures, the exact nature of which is not known, but which, it is probable, took for their basis the existing territorial limits of the two countries. At least, we hear of no offer of surrender or submission on Sapor's part; and we can scarcely suppose that, had such offers been made, the Roman writers would have passed them over in silence. It is not surprising that Julian lent no favorable ear to the envoys, if these were their instructions; but it would have been better for his reputation had he replied to them with less of haughtiness and rudeness. According to one authority,<sup>21</sup> he tore up before their faces the autograph letter of their master; while, according to another,<sup>22</sup> he responded, with a contemptuous smile, that "there was no occasion for an exchange of thought between him and the Persian king by messengers, since he intended very shortly to treat with him in person." Having received this rebuff, the envoys of Sapor took their departure,

and conveyed to their sovereign the intelligence that he must prepare himself to resist a serious invasion.

About the same time various offers of assistance reached the Roman emperor from the independent or semi-independent princes and chieftains of the regions adjacent to Mesopotamia.<sup>23</sup> Such overtures were sure to be made by the heads of the plundering desert tribes to any powerful invader, since it would be hoped that a share in the booty might be obtained without much participation in the danger. We are told that Julian promptly rejected these offers, grandly saying that it was for Rome rather to give aid to her allies than to receive assistance from them.<sup>24</sup> It appears, however, that at least two exceptions were made to the general principle thus magniloquently asserted. Julian had taken into his service, ere he quitted Europe, a strong body of Gothic auxiliaries;<sup>25</sup> and, while at Antioch, he sent to the Saracens, reminding them of their promise to lend him troops, and calling upon them to fulfil it.<sup>26</sup> If the advance on Persia was to be made by the line of the Euphrates, an alliance with these agile sons of the desert was of first-rate importance, since the assistance which they could render as friends was considerable, and the injury which they could inflict as enemies was almost beyond calculation. It is among the faults of Julian in this campaign that he did not set more store by the Saracen alliance, and make greater efforts to maintain it; we shall find that after a while he allowed the brave nomads to become disaffected, and to exchange their friendship with him for hostility.<sup>27</sup> Had he taken more care to attach them cordially to the side of Rome, it is quite possible that his expedition might have had a prosperous issue.

There was another ally, whose services Julian regarded himself as entitled not to request, but to command. Arsaces, king of Armenia, though placed on his throne by Sapor, had (as we have seen) transferred his allegiance to Constantius, and voluntarily taken up the position of a Roman feudatory.<sup>28</sup> Constantius had of late suspected his fidelity; but Arsaces had not as yet, by any overt act, justified these suspicions, and Julian seems to have regarded him as an assured friend and ally. Early in A.D. 363 he addressed a letter to the Armenian monarch, requiring him to levy a considerable force, and hold himself in readiness to execute such orders as he would receive within a short time.<sup>29</sup> The style, address, and purport of this letter were equally distasteful to Arsaces, whose pride was out-

raged, and whose indolence was disturbed, by the call thus suddenly made upon him. His own desire was probably to remain neutral; he felt no interest in the standing quarrel between his two powerful neighbors; he was under obligations to both of them; and it was for his advantage that they should remain evenly balanced. We cannot ascribe to him any earnest religious feeling;<sup>30</sup> but, as one who kept up the profession of Christianity, he could not but regard with aversion the Apostate, who had given no obscure intimation of his intention to use his power to the utmost in order to sweep the Christian religion from the face of the earth. The disinclination of their monarch to observe the designs of Julian was shared, or rather surpassed, by his people, the more educated portion of whom were strongly attached to the new faith and worship.<sup>31</sup> If the great historian of Armenia is right in stating that Julian at this time offered an open insult to the Armenian religion,<sup>32</sup> we must pronounce him strangely imprudent. The alliance of Armenia was always of the utmost importance to Rome in any attack upon the East. Julian seems to have gone out of his way to create offence in this quarter,<sup>33</sup> where his interests required that he should exercise all his powers of conciliation.

The forces which the emperor regarded as at his disposal, and with which he expected to take the field, were the following. His own troops amounted to 83,000 or (according to another account) to 95,000 men.<sup>34</sup> They consisted chiefly of Roman legionaries, horse and foot, but included a strong body of Gothic auxiliaries. Armenia was expected to furnish a considerable force, probably not less than 20,000 men;<sup>35</sup> and the light horse of the Saracens would, it was thought, be tolerably numerous. Altogether, an army of above a hundred thousand men was about to be launched on the devoted Persia, which was believed unlikely to offer any effectual, if even any serious, resistance.

The impatience of Julian scarcely allowed him to await the conclusion of the winter. With the first breath of spring he put his forces in motion,<sup>36</sup> and, quitting Antioch, marched with all speed to the Euphrates. Passing Litarbi, and then Hierapolis, he crossed the river by a bridge of boats in the vicinity of that place, and proceeded by Batnæ to the important city of Carrhæ,<sup>37</sup> once the home of Abraham.<sup>38</sup> Here he halted for a few days and finally fixed his plans. It was by this time well known to the Romans that there were two, and two only, convenient roads whereby Southern Mesopotamia was to be reached, one along the line of the Mons Masius to the Tigris,

and then along the banks of that stream, the other down the valley of the Euphrates to the great alluvial plain on the lower course of the rivers. Julian had, perhaps, hitherto doubted which line he should follow in person.<sup>39</sup> The first had been preferred by Alexander and by Trajan, the second by the younger Cyrus, by Avidius Cassius, and by Severus. Both lines were fairly practicable; but that of the Tigris was circuitous, and its free employment was only possible under the condition of Armenia being certainly friendly. If Julian had cause to suspect, as it is probable that he had, the fidelity of the Armenians, he may have felt that there was one line only which he could with prudence pursue. He might send a subsidiary force by the doubtful route which could advance to his aid if matters went favorably, or remain on the defensive if they assumed a threatening aspect; but his own grand attack must be by the other. Accordingly he divided his forces. Committing a body of troops, which is variously estimated at from 18,000 to 30,000,<sup>40</sup> into the hands of Procopius, a connection of his own, and Sebastian, Duke of Egypt, with orders that they should proceed by way of the Mons Masius to Armenia, and, uniting themselves with the forces of Arsaces, invade Northern Media, ravage it, and then join him before Ctesiphon by the line of the Tigris,<sup>41</sup> he reserved for himself and for his main army the shorter and more open route down the valley of the Euphrates. Leaving Carrhæ on the 26th of March, after about a week's stay, he marched southward, at the head of 65,000 men, by Davana and along the course of the Belik, to Callinicus or Nicephorium, near the junction of the Belik with the Euphrates. Here the Saracen chiefs came and made their submission, and were graciously received by the emperor, to whom they presented a crown of gold.<sup>42</sup> At the same time the fleet made its appearance, numbering at least 1100 vessels,<sup>43</sup> of which fifty were ships of war, fifty prepared to serve as pontoons, and the remaining thousand transports laden with provisions, weapons, and military engines.

From Callinicus the emperor marched along the course of the Euphrates to Circusium, or Circesium,<sup>44</sup> at the junction of the Khabour with the Euphrates, arriving at this place early in April.<sup>45</sup> Thus far he had been marching through his own dominions, and had had no hostility to dread. Being now about to enter the enemy's country, he made arrangements for the march which seem to have been extremely judicious. The cavalry was placed under the command of Arinthæus and

Prince Hormisdas, and was stationed at the extreme left, with orders to advance on a line parallel with the general course of the river. Some picked legions under the command of Nevitta formed the right wing, and, resting on the Euphrates, maintained communication with the fleet. Julian, with the main part of his troops, occupied the space intermediate between these two extremes, marching in a loose column which from front to rear covered a distance of above nine miles. A flying corps of fifteen hundred men acted as an avant-guard under Count Lucilianus, and explored the country in advance, feeling on all sides for the enemy. The rear was covered by a detachment under Secundinus, Duke of Osrhoëne, Dagalaphus, and Victor.<sup>46</sup>

Having made his dispositions, and crossed the broad stream of the Khabour, on the 7th of April, by a bridge of boats, which he immediately broke up,<sup>47</sup> Julian continued his advance along the course of the Euphrates, supported by his fleet, which was not allowed either to outstrip or to lag behind the army.<sup>48</sup> The first halt was at Zaitha.<sup>49</sup> famous as the scene of the murder of Gordian, whose tomb was in its vicinity.<sup>50</sup> Here Julian encouraged his soldiers by an eloquent speech,<sup>51</sup> in which he recounted the past successes of the Roman arms, and promised them an easy victory over their present adversary. He then, in a two days' march, reached Dura,<sup>52</sup> a ruined city, destitute of inhabitants, on the banks of the river; from which a march of four days more brought him to Anathan,<sup>53</sup> the modern Anah, a strong fortress on an island in the mid-stream, which was held by a Persian garrison. An attempt to surprise the place by a night attack having failed, Julian had recourse to persuasion, and by the representations of Prince Hormisdas induced its defenders to surrender the fort and place themselves at his mercy.<sup>54</sup> It was, perhaps, to gall the Antiochenes with an indication of his victorious progress that he sent his prisoners under escort into Syria, and settled them in the territory of Chalcis, at no great distance from the city of his aversion. Unwilling further to weaken his army by detaching a garrison to hold his conquest, he committed Anathan to the flames before proceeding further down the river.<sup>55</sup>

About eight miles below Anathan, another island and another fortress were held by the enemy. Thilutha is described as stronger than Anathan, and indeed as almost impregnable.<sup>56</sup> Julian felt that he could not attack it with any hope

of success, and therefore once more submitted to use persuasion. But the garrison, feeling themselves secure, rejected his overtures; they would wait, they said, and see which party was superior in the approaching conflict, and would then attach themselves to the victors. Meanwhile, if unmolested by the invader, they would not interfere with his advance, but would maintain a neutral attitude. Julian had to determine whether he would act in the spirit of an Alexander,<sup>57</sup> and, rejecting with disdain all compromise, compel by force of arms an entire submission, or whether he would take lower ground, accept the offer made to him, and be content to leave in his rear a certain number of unconquered fortresses. He decided that prudence required him to take the latter course, and left Thilutha unassailed. It is not surprising that, having admitted the assumption of a neutral position by one town, he was forced to extend the permission to others,<sup>58</sup> and so to allow the Euphrates route to remain, practically, in the hands of the Persians.


A five days' march from Thilutha brought the army to a point opposite Diacira, or Hit,<sup>59</sup> a town of ancient repute,<sup>60</sup> and one which happened to be well provided with stores and provisions. Though the place lay on the right bank of the river, it was still exposed to attack, as the fleet could convey any number of troops from one shore to the other. Being considered untenable, it was deserted by the male inhabitants, who, however, left some of their women behind them. We obtain an unpleasant idea of the state of discipline which the philosophic emperor allowed to prevail, when we find that his soldiers, "without remorse and without punishment, massacred these defenceless persons."<sup>61</sup> The historian of the war records this act without any appearance of shame, as if it were a usual occurrence, and no more important than the burning of the plundered city which followed.<sup>62</sup>

From Hit the army pursued its march, through Sitha and Megia,<sup>63</sup> to Zaragardia or Ozogardana, where the memory of Trajan's expedition still lingered, a certain pedestal or pulpit of stone being known to the natives as "Trajan's tribunal." Up to this time nothing had been seen or heard of any Persian opposing army;<sup>64</sup> one man only on the Roman side, so far as we hear, had been killed.<sup>65</sup> No systematic method of checking the advance had been adopted; the corn was everywhere found standing; forage was plentiful; and there were magazines of grain in the towns. No difficulties had delayed

the invaders but such as Nature had interposed to thwart them, as when a violent storm on one occasion shattered the tents, and on another a sudden swell of the Euphrates wrecked some of the corn transports, and interrupted the right wing's line of march.<sup>66</sup> But this pleasant condition of things was not to continue. At Hit the rolling Assyrian plain had come to an end, and the invading army had entered upon the low alluvium of Babylonia,<sup>67</sup> a region of great fertility, intersected by numerous canals, which in some places were carried the entire distance from the one river to the other.<sup>68</sup> The change in the character of the country encouraged the Persians to make a change in their tactics. Hitherto they had been absolutely passive; now at last they showed themselves, and commenced the active system of perpetual harassing warfare in which they were adepts. A surena, or general of the first rank,<sup>69</sup> appeared in the field, at the head of a strong body of Persian horse, and accompanied by a sheikh of the Saracenic Arabs,<sup>70</sup> known as Malik (or "King") Rodosaces. Retreating as Julian advanced, but continually delaying his progress, hanging on the skirts of his army, cutting off his stragglers, and threatening every unsupported detachment, this active force changed all the conditions of the march, rendering it slow and painful, and sometimes stopping it altogether. We are told that on one occasion Prince Hormisdas narrowly escaped falling into the surena's hands.<sup>71</sup> On another, the Persian force, having allowed the Roman vanguard to proceed unmolested, suddenly showed itself on the southern bank of one of the great canals connecting the Euphrates with the Tigris, and forbade the passage of Julian's main army.<sup>72</sup> It was only after a day and a night's delay that the emperor, by detaching troops under Victor to make a long circuit, cross the canal far to the east, recall Lucilianus with the vanguard, and then attack the surena's troops in the rear, was able to overcome the resistance in his front, and carry his army across the cutting.

Having in this way effected the passage, Julian continued his march along the Euphrates, and in a short time came to the city of Perisabor<sup>73</sup> (Firuz Shapur), the most important that he had yet reached, and reckoned not much inferior to Ctesiphon.<sup>74</sup> As the inhabitants steadily refused all accommodation, and insulted Hormisdas, who was sent to treat with them, by the reproach that he was a deserter and a traitor, the emperor determined to form the siege of the place and see if he

could not compel it to a surrender. Situated between the Euphrates and one of the numerous canals derived from it, and further protected by a trench drawn across from the canal to the river, Perisabor occupied a sort of island, while at the same time it was completely surrounded with a double wall. The citadel, which lay towards the north, and overhung the Euphrates, was especially strong; and the garrison was brave, numerous, and full of confidence. The walls, however, composed in part of brick laid in bitumen, were not of much strength;<sup>75</sup> and the Roman soldiers found little difficulty in shattering with the ram one of the corner towers, and so making an entrance into the place. But the real struggle now began. The brave defenders retreated into the citadal, which was of imposing height, and from this vantage-ground galled the Romans in the town with an incessant shower of arrows, darts, and stones. The ordinary catapults and balistæ of the Romans were no match for such a storm descending from such a height; and it was plainly necessary, if the place was to be taken, to have recourse to some other device. Julian, therefore, who was never sparing of his own person, took the resolution, on the second day of the siege, of attempting to burst open one of the gates. Accompanied by a small band, who formed a roof over his head with their shields, and by a few sappers with their tools, he approached the gate-tower, and made his men commence their operations. The doors, however, were found to be protected with iron, and the fastenings to be so strong that no immediate impression could be made; while the alarmed garrison, concentrating its attention on the threatened spot, kept up a furious discharge of missiles on their daring assailants. Prudence counselled retreat from the dangerous position which had been taken up; and the emperor, though he felt acutely the shame of having failed,<sup>76</sup> retired. But his mind, fertile in resource, soon formed a new plan. He remembered that Demetrius Poliorcetes had acquired his surname by the invention and use of the "Helepolis," a movable tower of vast height, which placed the assailants on a level with the defenders even of the loftiest ramparts. He at once ordered the construction of such a machine; and, the ability of his engineers being equal to the task, it rapidly grew before his eyes. The garrison saw its growth with feelings very opposite to those of their assailant; they felt that they could not resist the new creation, and anticipated its employment by a surrender.<sup>77</sup> Julian agreed to spare their lives, and allowed




ARCHIVOLTE AT TAKHT-I-BOSTAN (after Flandin).


Fig. 2.




FLOWERED PANEL AT TAKHT-I-BOSTAN (after Flandin).



A.



B.



C.

SASSANIAN CAPITALS (after Flandin).

them to withdraw and join their countrymen, each man taking with him a spare garment and a certain sum of money. The other stores contained within the walls fell to the conquerors, who found them to comprise a vast quantity of corn, arms, and other valuables. Julian distributed among his troops whatever was likely to be serviceable; the remainder, of which he could make no use, was either burned or thrown into the Euphrates.

The latitude of Ctesiphon was now nearly reached, but Julian still continued to descend the Euphrates, while the Persian cavalry made occasional dashes upon his extended line, and sometimes caused him a sensible loss.<sup>78</sup> At length he came to the point where the Nahr-Malcha, or "Royal river," the chief of the canals connecting the Euphrates with the Tigris, branched off from the more western stream, and ran nearly due east to the vicinity of the capital. The canal was navigable by his ships, and he therefore at this point quitted the Euphrates, and directed his march eastward along the course of the cutting, following in the footsteps of Severus, and no doubt expecting, like him, to capture easily the great metropolitan city. But his advance across the neck of land which here separates the Tigris from the Euphrates<sup>79</sup> was painful and difficult, since the enemy laid the country under water, and at every favorable point disputed his progress. Julian, however, still pressed forward, and advanced, though slowly. By felling the palms which grew abundantly in this region, and forming with them rafts supported by inflated skins, he was able to pass the inundated district, and to approach within about eleven miles of Ctesiphon. Here his further march was obstructed by a fortress, built (as it would seem) to defend the capital, and fortified with especial care. Ammianus calls this place Maogamalcha,<sup>80</sup> while Zosimus gives it the name of Besuchis;<sup>81</sup> but both agree that it was a large town, commanded by a strong citadel, and held by a brave and numerous garrison. Julian might perhaps have left it unassailed, as he had left already several towns upon his line of march; but a daring attempt made against himself by a portion of the garrison caused him to feel his honor concerned in taking the place; and the result was that he once more arrested his steps, and, sitting down before the walls, commenced a formal siege. All the usual arts of attack and defence were employed on either side for several days, the chief novel feature in the warfare being the use by the besieged of blazing balls of bitumen,<sup>82</sup> which they

shot from their lofty towers against the besiegers' works and persons. Julian, however, met this novelty by a device on his side which was uncommon; he continued openly to assault the walls and gates with his battering rams, but he secretly gave orders that the chief efforts of his men should be directed to the formation of a mine,<sup>83</sup> which should be carried under both the walls that defended the place, and enable him to introduce suddenly a body of troops into the very heart of the city. His orders were successfully executed; and while a general attack upon the defences occupied the attention of the besieged, three corps<sup>84</sup> introduced through the mine suddenly showed themselves in the town itself, and rendered further resistance hopeless. Maogamalcha, which a little before had boasted of being impregnable, and had laughed to scorn the vain efforts of the emperor,<sup>85</sup> suddenly found itself taken by assault and undergoing the extremities of sack and pillage. Julian made no efforts to prevent a general massacre,<sup>86</sup> and the entire population, without distinction of age or sex, seems to have been put to the sword.<sup>87</sup> The commandant of the fortress, though he was at first spared, suffered death shortly after on a frivolous charge.<sup>88</sup> Even a miserable remnant, which had concealed itself in caves and cellars, was hunted out, smoke and fire being used to force the fugitives from their hiding-places, or else cause them to perish in the darksome dens by suffocation.<sup>89</sup> Thus there was no extremity of savage warfare which was not used, the fourth century anticipating some of the horrors which have most disgraced the nineteenth.<sup>90</sup>

Nothing now but the river Tigris intervened between Julian and the great city of Ctesiphon, which was plainly the special object of the expedition. Ctesiphon, indeed, was not to Persia what it had been to Parthia; but still it might fairly be looked upon as a prize of considerable importance. Of Parthia it had been the main, in later times perhaps the sole, capital; to Persia it was a secondary rather than a primary city, the ordinary residence of the court being Istakr, or Persepolis. Still the Persian kings seem occasionally to have resided at Ctesiphon; and among the secondary cities of the empire it undoubtedly held a high rank. In the neighborhood were various royal hunting-seats, surrounded by shady gardens, and adorned with paintings or bas-reliefs;<sup>91</sup> while near them were parks or "paradises," containing the game kept for the prince's sport, which included lions, wild boars, and bears of remarkable fierceness.<sup>92</sup> As Julian advanced, these pleasaunces fell, one after

another, into his hands, and were delivered over to the rude soldiery, who trampled the flowers and shrubs under foot, destroyed the wild beasts, and burned the residences. No serious resistance was as yet made by any Persian force to the progress of the Romans, who pressed steadily forward, occasionally losing a few men or a few baggage animals,<sup>93</sup> but drawing daily nearer to the great city, and on their way spreading ruin and desolation over a most fertile district, from which they drew abundant supplies as they passed through it, while they left it behind them blackened, wasted, and almost without inhabitant. The Persians seem to have had orders not to make, as yet, any firm stand. One of the sons of Sapor was now at their head, but no change of tactics occurred. As Julian drew near, this prince indeed quitted the shelter of Ctesiphon, and made a reconnaissance in force; but when he fell in with the Roman advanced guard under Victor, and saw its strength, he declined an engagement, and retired without coming to blows.<sup>94</sup>

Julian had now reached the western suburb of Ctesiphon, which had lost its old name of Seleucia and was known as Coché.<sup>95</sup> The capture of this place would, perhaps, not have been difficult; but, as the broad and deep stream of the Tigris flowed between it and the main town, little would have been gained by the occupation. Julian felt that, to attack Ctesiphon with success, he must, like Trajan and Severus, transport his army to the left bank of the Tigris, and deliver his assault upon the defences that lay beyond that river. For the safe transport of his army he trusted to his fleet, which he had therefore caused to enter the Nahr-Malcha, and to accompany his troops thus far. But at Coché he found that the Nahr-Malcha, instead of joining the Tigris, as he had expected, above Ctesiphon, ran into it at some distance below.<sup>96</sup> To have pursued this line with both fleet and army would have carried him too far into the enemy's country, have endangered his communications, and especially have cut him off from the Armenian army under Procopius and Sebastian, with which he was at this time looking to effect a junction. To have sent the fleet into the Tigris below Coché, while the army occupied the right bank of the river above it, would, in the first place, have separated the two, and would further have been useless, unless the fleet could force its way against the strong current through the whole length of the hostile city. In this difficulty Julian's book-knowledge was found of service. He had studied

with care the campaigns of his predecessors in these regions, and recollected that one of them<sup>97</sup> at any rate had made a cutting from the Nahr-Malcha, by which he had brought his fleet into the Tigris *above* Ctesiphon. If this work could be discovered, it might, he thought, in all probability be restored. Some of the country people were therefore seized, and, inquiry being made of them, the line of the canal was pointed out, and the place shown at which it had been derived from the Nahr-Malcha. Here the Persians had erected a strong dam, with sluices, by means of which a portion of the water could occasionally be turned into the Roman cutting.<sup>98</sup> Julian had the cutting cleared out, and the dam torn down; whereupon the main portion of the stream rushed at once into the old channel, which rapidly filled, and was found to be navigable by the Roman vessels. The fleet was thus brought into the Tigris above Coché; and the army advancing with it encamped upon the right bank of the river.

The Persians now for the first time appeared in force.<sup>99</sup> As Julian drew near the great stream, he perceived that his passage of it would not be unopposed. Along the left bank, which was at this point naturally higher than the right, and which was further crowned by a wall built originally to fence in one of the royal parks,<sup>100</sup> could be seen the dense masses of the enemy's horse and foot, stretching away to right and left, the former encased in glittering armor,<sup>101</sup> the latter protected by huge wattled shields.<sup>102</sup> Behind these troops were discernible the vast forms of elephants, looking (says the historian) like moving mountains,<sup>103</sup> and regarded by the legionaries with extreme dread. Julian felt that he could not ask his army to cross the stream openly in the face of a foe thus advantageously posted. He therefore waited the approach of night. When darkness had closed in, he made his dispositions; divided his fleet into portions; embarked a number of his troops; and, despite the dissuasions of his officers,<sup>104</sup> gave the signal for the passage to commence. Five ships, each of them conveying eighty soldiers, led the way, and reached the opposite shore without accident. Here, however, the enemy received them with a sharp fire of burning darts, and the two foremost were soon in flames.<sup>105</sup> At the ominous sight the rest of the fleet wavered, and might have refused to proceed further, had not Julian, with admirable presence of mind, exclaimed aloud—"Our men have crossed and are masters of the bank—that fire is the signal which I bade them make if they

were victorious." Thus encouraged, the crews plied their oars with vigor, and impelled the remaining vessels rapidly across the stream. At the same time, some of the soldiers who had not been put on board, impatient to assist their comrades, plunged into the stream, and swam across supported by their shields.<sup>106</sup> Though a stout resistance was offered by the Persians, it was found impossible to withstand the impetuosity of the Roman attack. Not only were the half-burned vessels saved, the flames extinguished, and the men on board rescued from their perilous position, but everywhere the Roman troops made good their landing, fought their way up the bank against a storm of missile weapons, and drew up in good order upon its summit. A pause probably now occurred, as the armies could not see each other in the darkness; but, at dawn of day,<sup>107</sup> Julian, having made a fresh arrangement of his troops, led them against the dense array of the enemy, and engaged in a hand-to-hand combat, which lasted from morning to mid-day, when it was terminated by the flight of the Persians. Their leaders, Tigranes, Narseus, and the Surena,<sup>108</sup> are said<sup>109</sup> to have been the first to quit the field and take refuge within the defences of Ctesiphon. The example thus set was universally followed; and the entire Persian army, abandoning its camp and baggage, rushed in the wildest confusion across the plain to the nearest of the city gates, closely pursued by its active foe up to the very foot of the walls. The Roman writers assert that Ctesiphon might have been entered and taken, had not the general, Victor, who was wounded by a dart from a catapult, recalled his men as they were about to rush in through the open gateway.<sup>110</sup> It is perhaps doubtful whether success would really have crowned such audacity. At any rate the opportunity passed—the runaways entered the town—the gate closed upon them; and Ctesiphon was safe unless it were reduced by the operations of a regular siege.

But the fruits of the victory were still considerable. The entire Persian army collected hitherto for the defence of Ctesiphon had been defeated by one-third of the Roman force under Julian.<sup>111</sup> The vanquished had left 2,500 men dead upon the field, while the victors had lost no more than seventy-five.<sup>112</sup> A rich spoil had fallen into the hands of the Romans, who found in the abandoned camp couches and tables of massive silver, and on the bodies of the slain, both men and horses, a profusion of gold and silver ornaments, besides trappings and apparel of great magnificence.<sup>113</sup> A welcome supply

of provisions was also furnished by the lands and houses in the neighborhood of Ctesiphon; and the troops passed from a state of privation to one of extreme abundance, so that it was feared lest they might suffer from excess.<sup>114</sup>

Affairs had now reached a point when it was necessary to form a definite resolution as to what should be the further aim and course of the expedition. Hitherto all had indicated an intention on the part of Julian to occupy Ctesiphon, and thence dictate a peace. His long march, his toilsome canal-cutting, his orders to his second army,<sup>115</sup> his crossing of the Tigris, his engagement with the Persians in the plain before Ctesiphon, were the natural steps conducting to such a result, and are explicable on one hypothesis and one hypothesis only. He *must* up to this time have designed to make himself master of the great city, which had been the goal of so many previous invasions, and had always fallen whenever Rome attacked it. But, having overcome all the obstacles in his path, and having it in his power at once to commence the siege, a sudden doubt appears to have assailed him as to the practicability of the undertaking. It can scarcely be supposed that the city was really stronger now than it had been under the Parthians;<sup>116</sup> much less can it be argued that Julian's army was insufficient for the investment of such a place. It was probably the most powerful army with which the Romans had as yet invaded Southern Mesopotamia; and it was amply provided with all the appurtenances of war. If Julian did not venture to attempt what Trajan and Avidius Cassius and Septimius Severus had achieved without difficulty, it must have been because the circumstances under which he would have had to make the attack were different from those under which they had ventured and succeeded. And the difference—a most momentous one—was this. They besieged and captured the place after defeating the greatest force that Parthia could bring into the field against them. Julian found himself in front of Ctesiphon before he had crossed swords with the Persian king, or so much as set eyes on the grand army which Sapor was known to have collected. To have sat down before Ctesiphon under such circumstances would have been to expose himself to great peril; while he was intent upon the siege, he might at any time have been attacked by a relieving army under the Great King, have been placed between two fires, and compelled to engage at extreme disadvantage.<sup>117</sup> It was a consideration of this danger that impelled the council of war, whereto he sub-

mitted the question, to pronounce the siege of Ctesiphon too hazardous an operation, and to dissuade the emperor from attempting it.

But, if the city were not to be besieged, what course could with any prudence be adopted? It would have been madness to leave Ctesiphon unassailed, and to press forward against Susa and Persepolis. It would have been futile to remain encamped before the walls without commencing a siege. The heats of summer had arrived,<sup>118</sup> and the malaria of autumn was not far off. The stores brought by the fleet were exhausted;<sup>119</sup> and there was a great risk in the army's depending wholly for its subsistence on the supplies that it might be able to obtain from the enemy's country. Julian and his advisers must have seen at a glance that if the Romans were not to attack Ctesiphon, they must retreat. And accordingly retreat seems to have been at once determined on. As a first step, the whole fleet, except some dozen vessels,<sup>120</sup> was burned, since twelve was a sufficient number to serve as pontoons, and it was not worth the army's while to encumber itself with the remainder. They could only have been tracked up the strong stream of the Tigris by devoting to the work some 20,000 men;<sup>121</sup> thus greatly weakening the strength of the armed force, and at the same time hampering its movements. Julian, in sacrificing his ships, suffered simply a pecuniary loss—they could not possibly have been of any further service to him in the campaign.

Retreat being resolved upon, it only remained to determine what route should be followed, and on what portion of the Roman territory the march should be directed. The soldiers clamored for a return by the way whereby they had come;<sup>122</sup> but many valid objections to this course presented themselves to their commanders. The country along the line of the Euphrates had been exhausted of its stores by the troops in their advance; the forage had been consumed, the towns and villages desolated. There would be neither food nor shelter for the men along this route; the season was also unsuitable for it, since the Euphrates was in full flood, and the moist atmosphere would be sure to breed swarms of flies and mosquitoes. Julian saw that by far the best line of retreat was along the Tigris, which had higher banks than the Euphrates, which was no longer in flood,<sup>123</sup> and which ran through a tract that was highly productive and that had for many years not been visited by an enemy. The army, therefore, was ordered to

commence its retreat through the country lying on the left bank of the Tigris, and to spread itself over the fertile region, in the hope of obtaining ample supplies. The march was understood to be directed on Cordyene (Kurdistan), a province now in the possession of Rome, a rich tract, and not more than about 250 miles distant from Ctesiphon.<sup>124</sup>

Before, however, the retreat commenced, while Julian and his victorious army were still encamped in sight of Ctesiphon, the Persian king, according to some writers,<sup>125</sup> sent an embassy proposing terms of peace. Julian's successes are represented as having driven Sapor to despair—"the pride of his royalty was humbled in the dust; he took his repasts on the ground; and the grief and anxiety of his mind were expressed by the disorder of his hair."<sup>126</sup> He would, it is suggested, have been willing "to purchase, with one half of his kingdom, the safety of the remainder, and would have gladly subscribed himself, in a treaty of peace, the faithful and dependent ally of the Roman conqueror."<sup>127</sup> Such are the pleasing fictions wherewith the rhetorician of Antioch, faithful to the memory of his friend and master, consoled himself and his readers after Julian's death. It is difficult to decide whether there underlies them any substratum of truth. Neither Ammianus nor Zosimus makes the slightest allusion to any negotiations at all at this period; and it is thus open to doubt whether the entire story told by Libanius is not the product of his imagination. But at any rate it is quite impossible that the Persian king can have made any abject offers of submission, or have been in a state of mind at all akin to despair. His great army, collected from all quarters,<sup>128</sup> was intact; he had not yet condescended to take the field in person; he had lost no important town, and his adversary had tacitly confessed his inability to form the siege of a city which was far from being the greatest in the empire. If Sapor, therefore, really made at this time overtures of peace, it must have been either with the intention of amusing Julian, and increasing his difficulties by delaying his retreat, or because he thought that Julian's consciousness of his difficulties would induce him to offer terms which he might accept.

The retreat commenced on June 16.<sup>129</sup> Scarcely were the troops set in motion, when an ominous cloud of dust appeared on the southern horizon, which grew larger as the day advanced; and, though some suggested that the appearance was produced by a herd of wild asses, and others ventured the con-

jecture that it was caused by the approach of a body of Julian's Saracenic allies, the emperor himself was not deceived, but, understanding that the Persians had set out in pursuit, he called in his stragglers, massed his troops, and pitched his camp in a strong position.<sup>130</sup> Day-dawn showed that he had judged aright, for the earliest rays of the sun were reflected from the polished breastplates and cuirasses of the Persians, who had drawn up at no great distance during the night.<sup>131</sup> A combat followed in which the Persian and Saracenic horse attacked the Romans vigorously, and especially threatened the baggage, but were repulsed by the firmness and valor of the Roman foot. Julian was able to continue his retreat after a while, but found himself surrounded by enemies, some of whom, keeping in advance of his troops, or hanging upon his flanks, destroyed the corn and forage that his men so much needed; while others, pressing upon his rear, retarded his march, and caused him from time to time no inconsiderable losses.<sup>132</sup> The retreat under these circumstances was slow; the army had to be rested and recruited when it fell in with any accumulation of provisions; and the average progress made seems to have been not much more than ten miles a day.<sup>133</sup> This tardy advance allowed the more slow-moving portion of the Persian army to close in upon the retiring Romans; and Julian soon found himself closely followed by dense masses of the enemy's troops, by the heavy cavalry clad in steel panoplies, and armed with long spears, by large bodies of archers, and even by a powerful corps of elephants.<sup>134</sup> This grand army was under the command of a general whom the Roman writers call Meranes,<sup>135</sup> and of two sons of Sapor. It pressed heavily upon the Roman rearguard; and Julian, after a little while, found it necessary to stop his march, confront his pursuers, and offer them battle. The offer was accepted, and an engagement took place in a tract called Maranga.<sup>136</sup> The enemy advanced in two lines—the first composed of the mailed horsemen and the archers intermixed, the second of the elephants. Julian prepared his army to receive the attack by disposing it in the form of a crescent, with the centre drawn back considerably; but as the Persians advanced into the hollow space, he suddenly led his troops forward at speed, allowing the archers scarcely time to discharge their arrows before he engaged them and the horse in close combat. A long and bloody struggle followed; but the Persians were unaccustomed to hand-to-hand fighting and disliked it; they gradually gave

ground, and at last broke up and fled, covering their retreat, however, with the clouds of arrows which they knew well how to discharge as they retired. The weight of their arms, and the fiery heat of the summer sun, prevented the Romans from carrying the pursuit very far. Julian recalled them quickly to the protection of the camp, and suspended his march for some days<sup>137</sup> while the wounded had their hurts attended to.

The Persian troops, having suffered heavily in the battle, made no attempt to storm the Roman camp. They were content to spread themselves on all sides, to destroy or carry off all the forage and provisions, and to make the country, through which the Roman army must retire, a desert. Julian's forces were already suffering severely from scarcity of food; and the general want was but very slightly relieved by a distribution of the stores set apart for the officers and for the members of the imperial household. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that Julian's firmness deserted him, and that he began to give way to melancholy forebodings, and to see visions and omens which portended disaster and death. In the silence of his tent, as he studied a favorite philosopher during the dead of night, he thought he saw the Genius of the State, with veiled head and cornucopia, stealing away through the hangings slowly and sadly.<sup>138</sup> Soon afterwards, when he had just gone forth into the open air to perform averting sacrifices, the fall of a shooting star seemed to him a direct threat from Mars, with whom he had recently quarrelled.<sup>139</sup> The soothsayers were consulted, and counselled abstinence from all military movement; but the exigencies of the situation caused their advice to be for once contemned. It was only by change of place that there was any chance of obtaining supplies of food; and ultimate extrication from the perils that surrounded the army depended on a steady persistence in retreat.

At dawn of day,<sup>140</sup> therefore, on the memorable 26th of June, A.D. 363, the tents were struck, and the Roman army continued its march across the wasted plain, having the Tigris at some little distance on its left, and some low hills upon its right.<sup>141</sup> The enemy did not anywhere appear; and the troops advanced for a time without encountering opposition. But, as they drew near the skirts of the hills, not far from Samarah, suddenly an attack was made upon them. The rearguard found itself violently assailed; and when Julian hastened to its relief, news came that the van was also engaged with the enemy, and was

already in difficulties. The active commander now hurried towards the front, and had accomplished half the distance, when the main Persian attack was delivered upon his right centre,<sup>142</sup> and to his dismay he found himself entangled amid the masses of heavy horse and elephants, which had thrown his columns into confusion. The suddenness of the enemy's appearance had prevented him from donning his complete armor; and as he fought without a breastplate, and with the aid of his light-armed troops restored the day, falling on the foe from behind and striking the backs and houghs of the horses and elephants, the javelin of a horseman, after grazing the flesh of his arm, fixed itself in his right side, penetrating through the ribs to the liver.<sup>143</sup> Julian, grasping the head of the weapon, attempted to draw it forth, but in vain—the sharp steel cut his fingers, and the pain and loss of blood caused him to fall fainting from his steed. His guards, who had closed around him, carefully raised him up, and conveyed him to the camp, where the surgeons at once declared the wound mortal. The sad news spread rapidly among the soldiery, and nerved them to desperate efforts—if they must lose their general, he should, they determined, be avenged. Striking their shields with their spears,<sup>144</sup> they everywhere rushed upon the enemy with incredible ardor, careless whether they lived or died, and only seeking to inflict the greatest possible loss on those opposed to them. But the Persians, who had regarded the day as theirs, resisted strenuously, and maintained the fight with obstinacy till evening closed in and darkness put a stop to the engagement. The losses were large on both sides; the Roman right wing had suffered greatly; its commander, Anatolius, master of the offices, was among the slain, and the prefect Salust was with difficulty saved by an attendant.<sup>145</sup> The Persians, too, lost their generals Meranes and Nohodares; and with them no fewer than fifty satraps and great nobles are said to have perished.<sup>146</sup> The rank and file no doubt suffered in proportion; and the Romans were perhaps justified in claiming that the balance of advantage upon the day rested with them.

But such advantage as they could reasonably assert was far more than counterbalanced by the loss of their commander, who died in his tent towards midnight on the day of the battle.<sup>147</sup> Whatever we may think of the general character of Julian, or of the degree of his intellectual capacity, there can be no question as to his excellence as a soldier, or his ability as a commander in the field. If the expedition which he had led

into Persia was to some extent rash—if his preparations for it had been insufficient, and his conduct of it not wholly faultless—if consequently he had brought the army of the East into a situation of great peril and difficulty—yet candor requires us to acknowledge that of all the men collected in the Roman camp he was the fittest to have extricated the army from its embarrassments, and have conducted it, without serious disaster or loss of honor, into a position of safety. No one, like Julian, possessed the confidence of the troops; no one so combined experience in command with the personal activity and vigor that was needed under the circumstances. When the leaders met to consult about the appointment of a successor to the dead prince, it was at once apparent how irreparable was their loss. The prefect Sallust, whose superior rank and length of service pointed him out for promotion to the vacant post, excused himself on account of his age and infirmities.<sup>148</sup> The generals of the second grade—Arinthæus, Victor, Nevitta, Dagalaiphus—had each their party among the soldiers, but were unacceptable to the army generally. None could claim any superior merit which might clearly place him above the rest; and a discord that might have led to open strife seemed impending, when a casual voice pronounced the name of Jovian, and, some applause following the suggestion, the rival generals acquiesced in the choice; and this hitherto insignificant officer was suddenly invested with the purple and saluted as “Augustus” and “Emperor.”<sup>149</sup> Had there been any one really fit to take the command, such an appointment could not have been made; but, in the evident dearth of warlike genius, it was thought best that one whose rank was civil rather than military<sup>150</sup> should be preferred, for the avoidance of jealousies and contentions. A deserter carried the news to Sapor, who was not now very far distant, and described the new emperor to him as effeminate and slothful.<sup>151</sup> A fresh impulse was given to the pursuit by the intelligence thus conveyed; the army engaged in disputing the Roman retreat was reinforced by a strong body of cavalry; and Sapor himself pressed forward with all haste, resolved to hurl his main force on the rear of the retreating columns.<sup>152</sup>

It was with reluctance that Jovian, on the day of his elevation to the supreme power (June 27, A.D. 363), quitted the protection of the camp,<sup>153</sup> and proceeded to conduct his army over the open plain, where the Persians were now collected in great force, prepared to dispute the ground with him inch by

inch. Their horse and elephants again fell upon the right wing of the Romans, where the Jovians and Herculians were now posted, and, throwing those renowned corps<sup>154</sup> into disorder, pressed on, driving them across the plain in headlong flight and slaying vast numbers of them. The corps would probably have been annihilated, had they not in their flight reached a hill occupied by the baggage train, which gallantly came to their aid, and, attacking the horse and elephants from higher ground, gained a signal success.<sup>155</sup> The elephants, wounded by the javelins hurled down upon them from above, and maddened with the pain, turned upon their own side, and, roaring frightfully,<sup>156</sup> carried confusion among the ranks of the horse, which broke up and fled. Many of the frantic animals were killed by their own riders or by the Persians on whom they were trampling, while others succumbed to the blows dealt them by the enemy. There was a frightful carnage, ending in the repulse of the Persians and the resumption of the Roman march. Shortly before night fell, Jovian and his army reached Samarah,<sup>157</sup> then a fort of no great size upon the Tigris,<sup>158</sup> and, encamping in its vicinity, passed the hours of rest unmolested.

The retreat now continued for four days along the left bank of the Tigris,<sup>159</sup> the progress made each day being small,<sup>160</sup> since the enemy incessantly obstructed the march, pressing on the columns as they retired, but when they stopped drawing off, and declining an engagement at close quarters. On one occasion they even attacked the Roman camp, and, after insulting the legions with their cries, forced their way through the prætorian gate, and had nearly penetrated to the royal tent, when they were met and defeated by the legionaries.<sup>161</sup> The Sarcenic Arabs were especially troublesome. Offended by the refusal of Julian to continue their subsidies,<sup>162</sup> they had transferred their services wholly to the other side, and pursued the Romans with a hostility that was sharpened by indignation and resentment. It was with difficulty that the Roman army, at the close of the fourth day, reached Dura, a small place upon the Tigris, about eighteen miles north of Samarah.<sup>163</sup> Here a new idea seized the soldiers. As the Persian forces were massed chiefly on the left bank of the Tigris, and might find it difficult to transfer themselves to the other side, it seemed to the legionaries that they would escape half their difficulties if they could themselves cross the river, and place it between them and their foes. They had also a notion that on the west side of the stream the Roman frontier was not far distant, but

might be reached by forced marches in a few days.<sup>164</sup> They therefore begged Jovian to allow them to swim the stream. It was in vain that he and his officers opposed the project; mutinous cries arose; and, to avoid worse evils, he was compelled to consent that five hundred Gauls and Sarmatians, known to be expert swimmers, should make the attempt. It succeeded beyond his hopes. The corps crossed at night, surprised the Persians who held the opposite bank, and established themselves in a safe position before the dawn of day. By this bold exploit the passage of the other troops, many of whom could not swim, was rendered feasible, and Jovian proceeded to collect timber, brushwood, and skins for the formation of large rafts on which he might transport the rest of his army.<sup>165</sup>

These movements were seen with no small disquietude by the Persian king. The army which he had regarded as almost a certain prey seemed about to escape him. He knew that his troops could not pass the Tigris by swimming; he had, it is probable, brought with him no boats, and the country about Dura could not supply many; to follow the Romans, if they crossed the stream, he must construct a bridge, and the construction of a bridge was, to such unskilful engineers as the Persians, a work of time. Before it was finished the legions might be beyond his reach, and so the campaign would end, and he would have gained no advantage from it. Under these circumstances he determined to open negotiations with the Romans, and to see if he could not extract from their fears some important concessions. They were still in a position of great peril, since they could not expect to embark and cross the stream without suffering tremendous loss from the enemy before whom they would be flying. And it was uncertain what perils they might not encounter beyond the river in traversing the two hundred miles that still separated them from Roman territory.<sup>166</sup> The Saracenic allies of Persia were in force on the further side of the stream;<sup>167</sup> and a portion of Sapor's army might be conveyed across in time to hang on the rear of the legions and add largely to their difficulties. At any rate, it was worth while to make overtures and see what answer would be returned. If the idea of negotiating were entertained at all, something would be gained; for each additional day of suffering and privation diminished the Roman strength, and brought nearer the moment of absolute and complete exhaustion. Moreover, a bridge might be at once commenced at some little distance,<sup>168</sup> and might be pushed forward, so that, if the nego-

tiations failed, there should be no great delay in following the Romans across the river.

Such were probably the considerations<sup>169</sup> which led Sapor to send as envoys to the Roman camp at Dura the Surena and another great noble, who announced that they came to offer terms of peace.<sup>170</sup> The great king, they said, having respect to the mutability of human affairs, was desirous of dealing mercifully with the Romans, and would allow the escape of the remnant which was left of their army, if the Cæsar and his advisers accepted the conditions that he required.<sup>171</sup> These conditions would be explained to any envoys whom Jovian might empower to discuss them with the Persian plenipotentiaries. The Roman emperor and his council gladly caught at the offer; and two officers of high rank, the general Arinthæus and the prefect Sallust, were at once appointed to confer with Sapor's envoys, and ascertain the terms on which peace would be granted. They proved to be such as Roman pride felt to be almost intolerable; and great efforts were made to induce Sapor to be content with less. The negotiations lasted for four days;<sup>172</sup> but the Persian monarch was inexorable; each day diminished his adversary's strength and bettered his own position; there was no reason why he should make any concession at all; and he seems, in fact, to have yielded nothing of his original demands, except points of such exceedingly slight moment that to insist on them would have been folly.<sup>173</sup>

The following were the terms of peace to which Jovian consented. First, the five provinces east of the Tigris, which had been ceded to Rome by Narses, the grandfather of Sapor, after his defeat by Galerius,<sup>174</sup> were to be given back to Persia, with their fortifications, their inhabitants, and all that they contained of value. The Romans in the territory were, however, to be allowed to withdraw and join their countrymen. Secondly, three places in Eastern Mesopotamia, Nisibis, Singara, and a fort called "the Camp of the Moors," were to be surrendered, but with the condition that not only the Romans, but the inhabitants generally, might retire ere the Persians took possession, and carry with them such of their effects as were movable.<sup>175</sup> The surrender of these places necessarily involved that of the country which they commanded, and can scarcely imply less than the withdrawal of Rome from any claim to dominion over the region between the Tigris and the Khabour.<sup>176</sup> Thirdly, all connection between Armenia and Rome was to be broken off; Arsaces was to be left to his own resources; and in

any quarrel between him and Persia Rome was precluded from lending him aid. On these conditions a peace was concluded for thirty years;<sup>177</sup> oaths to observe it faithfully were interchanged; and hostages were given and received on either side, to be retained until the stipulations of the treaty were executed.

The Roman historian who exclaims that it would have been better to have fought ten battles than to have conceded a single one of these shameful terms,<sup>178</sup> commands the sympathy of every reader, who cannot fail to recognize in his utterance the natural feeling of a patriot. And it is possible that Julian, had he lived, would have rejected so inglorious a peace, and have preferred to run all risks rather than sign it. But in that case there is every reason to believe that the army would have been absolutely destroyed, and a few stragglers only have returned to tell the tale of disaster.<sup>179</sup> The alternative which Ammianus suggests—that Jovian, instead of negotiating, should have pushed on to Cordyene, which he might have reached in four days—is absurd;<sup>180</sup> for Cordyene was at least a hundred and fifty miles distant from Dura, and, at the rate of retreat which Jovian had found possible (four and a half miles a day), would have been reached in three days over a month! The judgment of Eutropius, who, like Ammianus, shared in the expedition, is probably correct—that the peace, though disgraceful, was necessary.<sup>181</sup> Unless Jovian was prepared to risk not only his own life, but the lives of all his soldiers, it was essential that he should come to terms; and the best terms that he could obtain were those which he has been blamed for accepting.

It is creditable to both parties that the peace, once made, was faithfully observed, all its stipulations being honestly and speedily executed. The Romans were allowed to pass the river without molestation from Sapor's army,<sup>182</sup> and, though they suffered somewhat from the Saracens when landing on the other side,<sup>183</sup> were unpursued in their retreat,<sup>184</sup> and were perhaps even, at first, supplied to some extent with provisions.<sup>185</sup> Afterwards, no doubt, they endured for some days great privations; but a convoy with stores was allowed to advance from Roman Mesopotamia into Persian territory,<sup>186</sup> which met the famished soldiers at a Persian military post, called Ur or Adur,<sup>187</sup> and relieved their most pressing necessities. On the Roman side, the ceded provinces and towns were quietly surrendered; offers on the part of the inhabitants to hold their own against the Persians without Roman aid were refused;<sup>188</sup> the Roman troops were withdrawn from the

fortresses; and the Armenians were told that they must henceforth rely upon themselves, and not look to Rome for help or protection. Thus Jovian, though strongly urged to follow ancient precedent,<sup>189</sup> and refuse to fulfil the engagements contracted under the pressure of imminent peril, stood firm, and honorably performed all the conditions of the treaty.

The second period of struggle between Rome and Persia had thus a termination exactly the reverse of the first. Rome ended the first period by a great victory and a great diplomatic success.<sup>190</sup> At the close of the second she had to relinquish all her gains, and to draw back even behind the line which she occupied when hostilities first broke out. Nisibis, the great stronghold of Eastern Mesopotamia, had been in her possession ever since the time of Verus.<sup>191</sup> Repeatedly attacked by Parthia and Persia, it had never fallen; but once, after which it had been soon recovered; and now for many years it had come to be regarded as the bulwark of the Roman power in the East, and as carrying with it the dominion of Western Asia.<sup>192</sup> A fatal blow was dealt to Roman prestige when a city held for near two hundred years, and one honored with the name of "colony," was wrested from the empire and occupied by the most powerful of its adversaries. Not only Amida and Carrhæ, but Antioch itself, trembled at a loss which was felt to lay open the whole eastern frontier to attack,<sup>193</sup> and which seemed ominous of further retrogression. Although the fear generally felt proved to be groundless, and the Roman possessions in the East were not, for 200 years, further curtailed by the Persians, yet Roman influence in Western Asia from this time steadily declined, and Persia came to be regarded as the first power in these regions. Much credit is due to Sapor II. for his entire conduct of the war with Constantius, Julian, and Jovian. He knew when to attack and when to remain upon the defensive, when to press on the enemy and when to hold himself in reserve and let the enemy follow his own devices. He rightly conceived from the first the importance of Nisibis, and resolutely persisted in his determination to acquire possession of it, until at last he succeeded. When, in B.C. 337, he challenged Rome to a trial of strength, he might have seemed rash and presumptuous. But the event justified him. In a war which lasted twenty-seven years, he fought numerous pitched battles with the Romans, and was never once defeated. He proved himself greatly superior as a general to Constantius and Jovian,

and not unequal to Julian. By a combination of courage, perseverance, and promptness, he brought the entire contest to a favorable issue, and restored Persia, in A.D. 363, to a higher position than that from which she had descended two generations earlier. If he had done nothing more than has already come under our notice, he would still have amply deserved that epithet of "Great" which, by the general consent of historians, has been assigned to him. He was undoubtedly among the greatest of the Sassanian monarchs, and may properly be placed above all his predecessors, and above all but one<sup>14</sup> of those who succeeded him.

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## CHAPTER XI.

*Attitude of Armenia during the War between Sapor and Julian. Sapor's Treachery towards Arsaces. Sapor conquers Armenia. He attacks Iberia, deposes Sauromaces, and sets up a new King. Resistance and Capture of Artogerassa. Difficulties of Sapor. Division of Iberia between the Roman and Persian Pretenders. Renewal of Hostilities between Rome and Persia. Peace made with Valens. Death of Sapor. His Coins.*

"Rex Persidis, longævus ille Sapor, post imperatoris Juliani excessum et pudendæ pacis icta fœdera . . . injectabat Armeniæ manum."—Amm. Marc. xxvii. 12.

THE successful issue of Sapor's war with Julian and Jovian resulted in no small degree from the attitude which was assumed by Armenia soon after Julian commenced his invasion. We have seen that the emperor, when he set out upon his expedition, regarded Armenia as an ally, and in forming his plans placed considerable dependence on the contingent which he expected from Arsaces, the Armenian monarch.<sup>1</sup> It was his intention to attack Ctesiphon with two separate armies, acting upon two converging lines. While he himself advanced with his main force by way of the Euphrates valley and the Nahr-Malcha, he had arranged that his two generals, Procopius and Sebastian, should unite their troops with those of the Armenian king, and, after ravaging a fertile district of Media, make their way towards the great city, through

Assyria and Adiabene,<sup>2</sup> along the left bank of the Tigris. It was a bitter disappointment to him when, on nearing Ctesiphon, he could see no signs and hear no tidings of the northern army, from which he had looked for effectual aid at this crisis of the campaign.<sup>3</sup> We have now to consider how this failure came about, what circumstances induced that hesitation and delay on the part of Sebastian and Procopius which had at any rate a large share in frustrating Julian's plans and causing the ill-success of his expedition.

It appears that the Roman generals, in pursuance of the orders given them, marched across Northern Mesopotamia to the Armenian borders, and were there joined by an Armenian contingent which Arsaces sent to their assistance.<sup>4</sup> The allies marched together into Media, and carried fire and sword through the fruitful district known as Chiliacomus, or "the district of the Thousand Villages."<sup>5</sup> They might easily have advanced further; but the Armenians suddenly and without warning drew off and fell back towards their own country. According to Moses of Chorêné, their general, Zuræus, was actuated by a religious motive; it seemed to him monstrous that Armenia, a Christian country, should embrace the cause of an apostate, and he was prepared to risk offending his own sovereign rather than lend help to one whom he regarded as the enemy of his faith.<sup>6</sup> The Roman generals, thus deserted by their allies, differed as to the proper course to pursue. While one was still desirous of descending the course of the Tigris, and making at least an attempt to effect a junction with Julian, the other forbade his soldiers to join in the march, and insisted on falling back and re-entering Mesopotamia.<sup>7</sup> As usual in such cases, the difference of opinion resulted in a policy of inaction. The attempt to join Julian was given up; and the second army, from which he had hoped so much, played no further part in the campaign of A.D. 363.

We are told<sup>8</sup> that Julian heard of the defection of the Armenians while he was still on his way to Ctesiphon, and immediately sent a letter to Arsaces, complaining of his general's conduct, and threatening to exact a heavy retribution on his return from the Persian war, if the offence of Zuræus were not visited at once with condign punishment. Arsaces was greatly alarmed at the message; and, though he made no effort to supply the shortcomings of his officer by leading or sending fresh troops to Julian's assistance, yet he hastened to acquit himself of complicity in the misconduct of Zuræus by execut-

ing him, together with his whole family.<sup>9</sup> Having thus, as he supposed, secured himself against Julian's anger, he took no further steps, but indulged his love of ease and his distaste for the Roman alliance by remaining wholly passive during the rest of the year.

But though the attitude taken by Armenia was thus, on the whole, favorable to the Persians, and undoubtedly contributed to Sapor's success, he was himself so far from satisfied with the conduct of Arsaces that he resolved at once to invade his country and endeavor to strip him of his crown. As Rome had by the recent treaty relinquished her protectorate over Armenia, and bound herself not to interfere in any quarrel between the Armenians and the Persians, an opportunity was afforded for bringing Armenia into subjection which an ambitious monarch like Sapor was not likely to let slip. He had only to consider whether he would employ art or violence, or whether he would rather prefer a judicious admixture of the two. Adopting the last-named course as the most prudent, he proceeded to intrigue with a portion of the Armenian satraps, while he made armed incursions on the territories of others, and so harassed the country that after a while the satraps generally went over to his side, and represented to Arsaces that no course was open to him but to make his submission. Having brought matters to this point, Sapor had only further to persuade Arsaces to surrender himself, in order to obtain the province which he coveted, almost without striking a blow. He therefore addressed Arsaces a letter which, according to the only writer who professes to give its terms,<sup>10</sup> was expressed as follows:

“Sapor, the offspring of Ormazd, comrade of the sun, king of kings, sends greeting to his dear brother, Arsaces, king of Armenia, whom he holds in affectionate remembrance. It has come to our knowledge that thou hast approved thyself our faithful friend, since not only didst thou decline to invade Persia with Cæsar, but when he took a contingent from thee thou didst send messengers and withdraw it.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, we have not forgotten how thou actedst at the first, when thou didst prevent him from passing through thy territories, as he wished. Our soldiers, indeed, who quitted their post, sought to cast on thee the blame due to their own cowardice. But we have not listened to them: their leader we punished with death, and to thy realm, I swear by Mithra, we have done no hurt. Arrange matters then so that thou mayest come to us with all speed,

and consult with us concerning our common advantage. Then thou canst return home."

Arsaces, on receiving this missive, whatever suspicions he may have felt, saw no course open to him but to accept the invitation. He accordingly quitted Armenia and made his way to the court of Sapor, where he was immediately seized and blinded.<sup>12</sup> He was then fettered with chains of silver, according to a common practice of the Persians with prisoners of distinction,<sup>13</sup> and was placed in strict confinement in a place called "the Castle of Oblivion."<sup>14</sup>

But the removal of their head did not at once produce the submission of the people. A national party declared itself under Pharandzem, the wife, and Bab (or Para), the son of Arsaces, who threw themselves into the strong fortress of Artogerassa (Ardakers), and there offered to Sapor a determined resistance.<sup>15</sup> Sapor committed the siege of this place to two renegade Armenians, Cylaces and Artabannes, while at the same time he proceeded to extend his influence beyond the limits of Armenia into the neighboring country of Iberia, which was closely connected with Armenia, and for the most part followed its fortunes.

Iberia was at this time under the government of a king bearing the name of Sauromaces, who had received his investiture from Rome, and was consequently likely to uphold Roman interests. Sapor invaded Iberia, drove Sauromaces from his kingdom, and set up a new monarch in the person of a certain Aspacures, on whose brow he placed the coveted diadem.<sup>16</sup> He then withdrew to his own country, leaving the complete subjection of Armenia to be accomplished by his officers, Cylaces and Artabannes, or, as the Armenian historians call them, Zig and Garen.<sup>17</sup>

Cylaces and Artabannes commenced the siege of Artogerassa, and for a time pressed it with vigor, while they strongly urged the garrison to make their submission. But, having entered within the walls to negotiate, they were won over by the opposite side, and joined in planning a treacherous attack on the besieging force, which was surprised at night and compelled to retire. Para took advantage of their retreat to quit the town and throw himself on the protection of Valens, the Roman emperor, who permitted him to reside in regal state at Neocæsarea. Shortly afterwards, however, by the advice of Cylaces and Artabannes, he returned into Armenia, and was accepted by the patriotic party as their king, Rome secretly countenanc-

ing his proceedings.<sup>18</sup> Under these circumstances the Persian monarch once more took the field, and, entering Armenia at the head of a large army, drove Para, with his counsellors Cylaces and Artabannes, to the mountains, renewed the siege of Artogerassa, and forced it to submit, captured the queen Pharandzem, together with the treasure of Arsaces,<sup>19</sup> and finally induced Para to come to terms, and to send him the heads of the two arch-traitors. The resistance of Armenia would probably now have ceased, had Rome been content to see her old enemy so aggrandized, or felt her hands absolutely tied by the terms of the treaty of Dura.

But the success of Sapor thus far only brought him into greater difficulties. The Armenians and Iberians, who desired above all things liberty and independence, were always especially hostile to the power from which they felt that they had for the time being most to fear. As Christian nations, they had also at this period an additional ground of sympathy with Rome, and of aversion from the Persians, who were at once heathens and intolerant.<sup>20</sup> The patriotic party in both countries was thus violently opposed to the establishment of Sapor's authority over them, and cared little for the artifices by which he sought to make it appear that they still enjoyed freedom and autonomy. Above all, Rome, being ruled by monarchs<sup>21</sup> who had had no hand in making the disgraceful peace of A.D. 363, and who had no strong feeling of honor or religious obligation in the matter of treaties *with barbarians*, was preparing herself to fly in the face of her engagements, and, regarding her own interest as her highest law, to interfere effectually in order to check the progress of Persia in North-Western Asia.

Rome's first open interference was in Iberia. Iberia had perhaps not been expressly named in the treaty, and support might consequently be given to the expelled Sauromaces without any clear infraction of its conditions. The duke Terentius was ordered, therefore, towards the close of A.D. 370, to enter Iberia with twelve legions and replace upon his throne the old Roman feudatory.<sup>22</sup> Accordingly he invaded the country from Lazica, which bordered it upon the north, and found no difficulty in conquering it as far as the river Cyrus. On the Cyrus, however, he was met by Aspacures, the king of Sapor's choice, who made proposals for an accommodation. Representing himself as really well-inclined to Rome, and only prevented from declaring himself by the fact that Sapor held his son as a hostage, he asked Terentius' consent to a division of Iberia be-

tween himself and his rival, the tract north of the Cyrus being assigned to the Roman claimant, and that south of the river remaining under his own government. Terentius, to escape further trouble, consented to the arrangement; and the double kingdom was established. The northern and western portions of Iberia were made over to Sauromaces; the southern and eastern continued to be ruled by Aspacures.

When the Persian king received intelligence of these transactions he was greatly excited.<sup>23</sup> To him it appeared clear that by the spirit, if not by the letter, of the treaty of Dura, Rome had relinquished Iberia equally with Armenia;<sup>24</sup> and he complained bitterly of the division which had been made of the Iberian territory, not only without his consent, but without his knowledge. He was no doubt aware that Rome had not really confined her interference to the region with which she had some excuse for intermeddling, but had already secretly intervened in Armenia, and was intending further intervention. The count Arinthæus had been sent with an army to the Armenian frontier about the same time that Terentius had invaded Iberia, and had received positive instructions to help the Armenians if Sapor molested them. It was in vain that the Persian monarch appealed to the terms of the treaty of Dura—Rome dismissed his ambassadors with contempt, and made no change in her line of procedure. Upon this Sapor saw that war was unavoidable; and accordingly he wasted no more time in embassies, but employed himself during the winter, which had now begun, in collecting as large a force as he could, in part from his allies, in part from his own subjects, resolving to take the field in the spring; and to do his best to punish Rome for her faithlessness.<sup>25</sup>

Rome on her part made ready to resist the invasion which she knew to be impending. A powerful army was sent to guard the East under count Trajan, and Vadomair, ex-king of the Alemanni;<sup>26</sup> but so much regard for the terms of the recent treaty was still felt, or pretended, that the generals received orders to be careful not to commence hostilities, but to wait till an attack was made on them. They were not kept long in expectation. As soon as winter was over, Sapor crossed the frontier (A.D. 371) with a large force of native cavalry and archers, supported by numerous auxiliaries,<sup>27</sup> and attacked the Romans near a place called Vagabanta. The Roman commander gave his troops the order to retire; and accordingly they fell back under a shower of Persian arrows, until, several

having been wounded, they felt that they could with a good face declare that the rupture of the peace was the act of the Persians. The retreat was then exchanged for an advance, and after a brief engagement the Romans were victorious, and inflicted a severe loss upon their adversaries.<sup>28</sup> But the success was not followed by results of any importance. Neither side seems to have been anxious for another general encounter; and the season for hostilities was occupied by a sort of guerilla warfare, in which the advantage rested alternately with the Persians and the Romans.<sup>29</sup> At length, when the summer was ended, the commanders on either side entered into negotiations; and a truce was made which allowed Sapor to retire to Ctesiphon, and the Roman emperor, who was now personally directing the war, to go into winter quarters at Antioch.<sup>30</sup>

After this the war languished for two or three years.<sup>31</sup> Valens was wholly deficient in military genius, and was quite content if he could maintain a certain amount of Roman influence in Armenia and Iberia, while at the same time he protected the Roman frontier against Persian invasion. Sapor was advanced in years, and might naturally desire repose, having been almost constantly engaged in military expeditions since he reached the age of sixteen. Negotiations seem to have alternated with hostilities<sup>32</sup> during the interval between A.D. 371 and 376; but they resulted in nothing, until, in this last-named year, a peace was made,<sup>33</sup> which gave tranquillity to the East during the remainder of the reign of Sapor.

The terms upon which this peace was concluded are obscure. It is perhaps most probable that the two contracting powers agreed to abstain from further interference with Iberia and Armenia, and to leave those countries to follow their own inclinations. Armenia seems by the native accounts to have gravitated towards Rome under these circumstances,<sup>34</sup> and Iberia is likely to have followed her example. The tie of Christianity attached these countries to the great power of the West; and, except under compulsion, they were not likely at this time to tolerate the yoke of Persia for a day. When Jovian withdrew the Roman protection from them, they were forced for a while to submit to the power which they disliked; but no sooner did his successors reverse his policy, and show themselves ready to uphold the Armenians and Iberians against Persia, than they naturally reverted to the Roman side, and formed an important support to the empire against its Eastern rival.

The death of Sapor followed the peace of A.D. 376 within a few years. He died<sup>35</sup> A.D. 379 or 380, after having reigned seventy years. It is curious that, although possessing the crown for so long a term, and enjoying a more brilliant reign than any preceding monarch, he neither left behind him any inscriptions, nor any sculptured memorials. The only material evidences that we possess of his reign are his coins, which are exceedingly numerous. According to Mordtmann,<sup>36</sup> they may be divided into three classes, corresponding to three periods in his life. The earliest have on the reverse the fire-altar, with two priests, or guards, looking *towards* the altar, and with the flame rising from the altar in the usual way. The head on the obverse is archaic in type, and very much resembles that of Sapor I. The crown has attached to it, in many cases, that "cheek-piece" which is otherwise confined to the first three monarchs of the line. These coins are the best from an artistic point of view; they greatly resemble those of the first Sapor, but are distinguishable from them, first, by the guards looking towards the altar instead of away from it; and, secondly, by a greater profusion of pearls about the king's person. The coins of the second period lack the "cheek-piece," and have on the reverse the fire-altar without supporters; they are inferior as works of art to those of the first period, but much superior to those of the third. These last, which exhibit a marked degeneracy,<sup>37</sup> are especially distinguished by having a human head in the middle of the flames that rise from the altar. Otherwise they much resemble in their emblems the early coins, only differing from them in being artistically inferior. The ordinary legends upon the coins are in no respect remarkable;<sup>38</sup> but occasionally we find the monarch taking the new and expressive epithet of *Toham*, "the Strong."<sup>39</sup> [Pl. XIX., Fig. 1.]

## CHAPTER XII.

*Short Reigns of Artaxerxes II. and Sapor III. Obscurity of their History. Their Relations with Armenia. Monument of Sapor III. at Takht-i-Bostan. Coins of Artaxerxes II. and Sapor III. Reign of Varahran IV. His Signets. His Dealings with Armenia. His Death.*

'Αρταξήρ ἔτη δ' · Σαβῶρ, υἱὸς 'Αρταξήρ, ἔτη ε' · Οὐαπαράνης ἔτη ιά.

Syncellus, *Chronographia*, p. 360, C.

THE glorious reign of Sapor II., which carried the New Persian Empire to the highest point whereto it had yet attained, is followed by a time which offers to that remarkable reign a most complete contrast. Sapor had occupied the Persian throne for a space approaching nearly to three-quarters of a century; the reigns of his next three successors amounted to no more than twenty years in the aggregate.<sup>1</sup> Sapor had been engaged in perpetual wars, had spread the terror of the Persian arms on all sides, and ruled more gloriously than any of his predecessors. The kings who followed him were pacific and unenterprising; they were almost unknown to their neighbors,<sup>2</sup> and are among the least distinguished of the Sasanian monarchs. More especially does this character attach to the two immediate successors of Sapor II., viz. Artaxerxes II. and Sapor III. They reigned respectively four and five years;<sup>3</sup> and their annals during this period are almost a blank. Artaxerxes II., who is called by some the brother of Sapor II., was more probably his son.<sup>4</sup> He succeeded his father in A.D. 379, and died at Ctesiphon<sup>5</sup> in A.D. 383. He left a character for kindness and amiability behind him, and is known to the Persians as *Nikoukar*,<sup>6</sup> or "the Beneficent," and to the Arabs as *Al Djemil*,<sup>7</sup> "the Virtuous." According to the "*Modjmel-al-Tewarikh*," he took no taxes from his subjects during the four years of his reign, and thereby secured to himself their affection and gratitude. He seems to have received overtures from the Armenians soon after his accession,<sup>8</sup> and for a time to have been acknowledged by the turbulent mountaineers as their sovereign. After the murder of Bab, or Para, the Romans had set up, as king over Armenia, a certain Varaztad

(Pharasdates), a member of the Arsacid family, but no near relation of the recent monarchs, assigning at the same time the real direction of affairs to an Armenian noble named Moushegh, who belonged to the illustrious family of the Mamigonians.<sup>9</sup> Moushegh ruled Armenia with vigor, but was suspected of maintaining over-friendly relations with the Roman emperor, Valens, and of designing to undermine and supplant his master. Varaztad, after a while, having been worked on by his counsellors, grew suspicious of him, and caused him to be executed at a banquet.<sup>10</sup> This treachery roused the indignation of Moushegh's brother Manuel, who raised a rebellion against Varaztad, defeated him in open fight, and drove him from his kingdom.<sup>11</sup> Manuel then brought forward the princess Zermaducht, widow of the late king Para, together with her two young sons, Arsaces and Valarsaces, and, surrounding all three with royal pomp, gave to the two princes the name of king, while he took care to retain in his own hands the real government of the country. Under these circumstances he naturally dreaded the hostility of the Roman emperor, who was not likely to see with patience a monarch, whom he had set upon the throne, deprived of his kingdom by a subject. To maintain the position which he had assumed, it was necessary that he should contract some important alliance; and the alliance always open to Armenia when she had quarrelled with Rome was with the Persians. It seems to have been soon after Artaxerxes II. succeeded his father, that Manuel sent an embassy to him, with letters and rich gifts, offering, in return for his protection, to acknowledge him as lord-paramount of Armenia, and promising him unshakable fidelity.<sup>12</sup> The offer was, of course, received with extreme satisfaction; and terms were speedily arranged. Armenia was to pay a fixed tribute, to receive a garrison of ten thousand Persians and to provide adequately for their support, to allow a Persian satrap to divide with Manuel the actual government of the country, and to furnish him with all that was necessary for his court and table. On the other hand, Arsaces and Valarsaces, together (apparently) with their mother, Zermaducht, were to be allowed the royal title and honors; Armenia was to be protected in case of invasion; and Manuel was to be maintained in his office of *Sparapet* or generalissimo of the Armenian forces.<sup>13</sup> We cannot say with certainty how long this arrangement remained undisturbed; most probably, however, it did not continue in force more than a few years.<sup>14</sup> It was most likely

while Artaxerxes still ruled Persia, that the rupture described by Faustus occurred.<sup>15</sup> A certain Meroujan, an Armenian noble, jealous of the power and prosperity of Manuel, persuaded him that the Persian commandant in Armenia was about to seize his person, and either to send him a prisoner to Artaxerxes, or else to put him to death. Manuel, who was so credulous as to believe the information, thought it necessary for his own safety to anticipate the designs of his enemies, and, falling upon the ten thousand Persians with the whole of the Armenian army, succeeded in putting them all to the sword, except their commander, whom he allowed to escape.<sup>16</sup> War followed between Persia and Armenia with varied success, but on the whole Manuel had the advantage; he repulsed several Persian invasions, and maintained the independence and integrity of Armenia till his death, without calling in the aid of Rome.<sup>17</sup> When, however, Manuel died, about A.D. 383, Armenian affairs fell into confusion; the Romans were summoned to give help to one party, the Persians to render assistance to the other;<sup>18</sup> Armenia became once more the battle-ground between the two great powers, and it seemed as if the old contest, fraught with so many calamities, was to be at once renewed. But the circumstances of the time were such that neither Rome nor Persia now desired to reopen the contest. Persia was in the hands of weak and unwarlike sovereigns, and was perhaps already threatened by Scythic hordes upon the east.<sup>19</sup> Rome was in the agonies of a struggle with the ever-increasing power of the Goths; and though, in the course of the years A.D. 379-382, the Great Theodosius had established peace in the tract under his rule, and delivered the central provinces of Macedonia and Thrace from the intolerable ravages of the barbaric invaders,<sup>20</sup> yet the deliverance had been effected at the cost of introducing large bodies of Goths into the heart of the empire,<sup>21</sup> while still along the northern frontier lay a threatening cloud, from which devastation and ruin might at any time burst forth and overspread the provinces upon the Lower Danube. Thus both the Roman emperor and the Persian king were well disposed towards peace. An arrangement was consequently made, and in A.D. 384, five years after he had ascended the throne, Theodosius gave audience in Constantinople<sup>22</sup> to envoys from the court of Persepolis, and concluded with them a treaty whereby matters in Armenia were placed on a footing which fairly satisfied both sides, and the tranquillity of the East was assured.<sup>23</sup> The

high contracting powers agreed that Armenia should be partitioned between them. After detaching from the kingdom various outlying districts, which could be conveniently absorbed into their own territories, they divided the rest of the country into two unequal portions. The smaller of these, which comprised the more western districts, was placed under the protection of Rome, and was committed by Theodosius to the Arsaces who had been made king by Manuel, the son of the unfortunate Bab, or Para, and the grandson of the Arsaces contemporary with Julian. The larger portion, which consisted of the regions lying towards the east, passed under the suzerainty of Persia, and was confided by Sapor III., who had succeeded Artaxerxes II., to an Arsacid, named Chosroës, a Christian, who was given the title of king, and received in marriage at the same time one of Sapor's sisters. Such were the terms on which Rome and Persia brought their contention respecting Armenia to a conclusion. Friendly relations were in this way established between the two crowns, which continued undisturbed for the long space of thirty-six years (A.D. 384-420).<sup>24</sup>

Sapor III. appears to have succeeded his brother Artaxerxes in A.D. 383, the year before the conclusion of the treaty. It is uncertain whether Artaxerxes vacated the throne by death, or was deposed in consequence of cruelties whereof he was guilty towards the priests and nobles. Tabari and Maçoudi, who relate his deposition,<sup>25</sup> are authors on whom much reliance cannot be placed; and the cruelties reported accord but ill with the epithets of "the Beneficent" and "the Virtuous," assigned to this monarch by others.<sup>26</sup> Perhaps it is most probable that he held the throne till his death, according to the statements of Agathias and Euty chius.<sup>27</sup> Of Sapor III., his brother and successor, two facts only are recorded—his conclusion of the treaty with the Romans in B.C. 384, and his war with the Arabs of the tribe of Yad,<sup>28</sup> which must have followed shortly afterwards. It must have been in consequence of his contest with the latter, whom he attacked in their own country, that he received from his countrymen the appellation of "the Warlike,"<sup>29</sup> an appellation better deserved by either of the other monarchs who had borne the same name.

Sapor III. left behind him a sculptured memorial, which is still to be seen in the vicinity of Kermanshah. [Pl. XX.] It consists of two very similar figures, looking towards each other, and standing in an arched frame. On either side of the

figures are inscriptions in the Old Pehlevi character, whereby we are enabled to identify the individuals represented with the second and the third Sapor.<sup>30</sup> The inscriptions run thus:—  
 “*Pathkeli zanî mazdisn shahia Shahpuhri, malkan malka Ailan ve Anilan, minuchitli min yazdan, barî mazdisn shahia Auhrmazdi, malkan malka Ailan ve Anilan, minuchitli min yazdan, napi shahia Narshehi malkan malka;*”<sup>31</sup> and “*Pathkeli mazdisn shahia Shahpuhri, malkan malka Ailan ve Anilan, minuchitli min yazdan, barî mazdisn shahia Shahpuhri, malkan malka Ailan ve Anilan, minuchitli min yazdan, napi shahia Auhrmazdi, malkan malka.*” They are, it will be seen, identical in form, with the exception that the names in the right-hand inscription are “Sapor, Hormisdas, Narses,” while those in the left-hand one are “Sapor, Sapor, Hormisdas.” It has been supposed<sup>32</sup> that the right-hand figure was erected by Sapor II., and the other afterwards added by Sapor III.; but the unity of the whole sculpture, and its inclusion under a single arch, seem to indicate that it was set up by a single sovereign, and was the fruit of a single conception. If this be so, we must necessarily ascribe it to the later of the two monarchs commemorated, *i.e.* to Sapor III., who must be supposed to have possessed more than usual filial piety, since the commemoration of their predecessors upon the throne is very rare among the Sassanians.

The taste of the monument is questionable. An elaborate finish of all the details of the costume compensates but ill for a clumsiness of contour and a want of contrast and variety, which indicate a low condition of art, and compare unfavorably with the earlier performances of the Neo-Persian sculptors. It may be doubted whether, among all the reliefs of the Sassanians, there is one which is so entirely devoid of artistic merit as this coarse and dull production.

The coins of Sapor III. and his predecessor, Artaxerxes II., have little about them that is remarkable. Those of Artaxerxes bear a head which is surmounted with the usual inflated ball, and has the diadem, but is without a crown—a deficiency in which some see an indication that the prince thus represented was regent rather than monarch of Persia.<sup>33</sup> [Pl. XIX. Fig. 2.] The legends upon the coins are, however, in the usual style of royal epigraphs, running commonly<sup>34</sup>—“*Mazdisn bag Artashetri malkan malka Airan ve Aniran,*” or “the Ormazd-worshipping divine Artaxerxes, king of the kings of Iran and Turan.” They are easily distinguishable from those of Arta-

xerxes I., both by the profile, which is far less marked, and by the fire-altar on the reverse, which has always two supporters, looking towards the altar. The coins of Sapor III. present some unusual types. [Pl. XIX. Fig. 6.] On some of them the king has his hair bound with a simple diadem, without crown or cap of any kind.<sup>35</sup> On others he wears a cap of a very peculiar character, which has been compared to a *biretta*,<sup>36</sup> but is really altogether *sui generis*. The cap is surmounted by the ordinary inflated ball, is ornamented with jewels, and is bound round at bottom with the usual diadem.<sup>37</sup> The legend upon the obverse of Sapor's coins is of the customary character; but the reverse bears usually, besides the name of the king, the word *atur*, which has been supposed to stand for Aturia or Assyria;<sup>38</sup> this explanation, however, is very doubtful.<sup>39</sup>

The coins of both kings exhibit marks of decline, especially on the reverse, where the drawing of the figures that support the altar is very inferior to that which we observe on the coins of the kings from Sapor I. to Sapor II. The characters on both obverse and reverse are also carelessly rendered, and can only with much difficulty be deciphered.

Sapor III. died A.D. 388, after reigning a little more than five years.<sup>40</sup> He was a man of simple tastes,<sup>41</sup> and is said to have been fond of exchanging the magnificence and dreary etiquette of the court for the freedom and ease of a life under tents. On an occasion when he was thus enjoying himself, it happened that one of those violent hurricanes, to which Persia is subject, arose, and, falling in full force on the royal encampment, blew down the tent wherein he was sitting. It happened unfortunately that the main tent-pole struck him, as it fell, in a vital part, and Sapor died from the blow.<sup>42</sup> Such at least was the account given by those who had accompanied him, and generally believed by his subjects. There were not, however, wanting persons to whisper that the story was untrue—that the real cause of the catastrophe which had overtaken the unhappy monarch was a conspiracy of his nobles, or his guards, who had overthrown his tent purposely, and murdered him ere he could escape from them.

The successor of Sapor III. was Varahran IV., whom some authorities call his brother and others his son.<sup>43</sup> This prince is known to the oriental writers as "Varahran Kerman-shah," or "Varahran, king of Carmania." Agathias tells us<sup>44</sup> that during the lifetime of his father he was established as governor over Kerman or Carmania, and thus obtained the appellation which

pertinaciously adhered to him. A curious relic of antiquity, fortunately preserved to modern times amid so much that has been lost, confirms this statement. It is the seal of Varahran before he ascended the Persian throne, and contains, besides his portrait, beautifully cut, an inscription, which is read as follows:<sup>45</sup>—“*Varahran Kerman malka, bari mazdisn bag Shahpuhri malkan malka Airan ve Aniran, minuchitri min yazdan,*” or “Varahran, king of Kerman, son of the Ormazd-worshipping divine Sapor, king of the kings of Iran and Turan, heaven-descended of the race of the gods.” [Pl. XIX. Fig. 5.] Another seal, belonging to him probably after he had become monarch of Persia, contains his full-length portrait,<sup>46</sup> and exhibits him as trampling under foot a prostrate figure, supposed to represent a Roman,<sup>47</sup> by which it would appear that he claimed to have gained victories or advantages over Rome. [Pl. XIX. Figs. 3 and 4.] It is not altogether easy to understand how this could have been. Not only do the Roman writers mention no war between the Romans and Persians at this time, but they expressly declare that the East remained in profound repose during the entire reign of Varahran, and that Rome and Persia continued to be friends.<sup>48</sup> The difficulty may, however, be perhaps explained by a consideration of the condition of affairs in Armenia at this time; for in Armenia Rome and Persia had still conflicting interests, and, without having recourse to arms, triumphs might be obtained in this quarter by the one over the other.

On the division of Armenia between Arsaces and Chosroës, a really good understanding had been established, which had lasted for about six years. Arsaces had died two years after he became a Roman feudatory;<sup>49</sup> and, at his death, Rome had absorbed his territories into her empire, and placed the new province under the government of a count.<sup>50</sup> No objection to the arrangement had been made by Persia, and the whole of Armenia had remained for four years tranquil and without disturbance. But, about A.D. 390, Chosroës became dissatisfied with his position, and entered into relations with Rome which greatly displeased the Armenian monarch,<sup>51</sup> Chosroës obtained from Theodosius his own appointment to the Armenian countship, and thus succeeded in uniting both Roman and Persian Armenia under his government. Elated with this success, he proceeded further to venture on administrative acts which trespassed, according to Persian views, on the rights of the lord paramount.<sup>52</sup> Finally, when Varahran



D.




L.



F.

SASSANIAN CAPITALS (after Flandin)

Fig. 1



ARCH OF CHOSROËS II. AT TAKHT-I-BOSTAN (after Flandin).



Fig. 2

FIGURE OF VICTORY. FROM THE ARCH AT TAKHT-I-BOSTAN (after Flandin).

addressed to him a remonstrance, he replied in insulting terms, and, renouncing his authority, placed the whole Armenian kingdom under the suzerainty and protection of Rome.<sup>53</sup> War between the two great powers must now have seemed imminent, and could indeed only have been avoided by great moderation and self-restraint on the one side or the other. Under these circumstances it was Rome that drew back. Theodosius declined to receive the submission which Chosroës tendered, and refused to lift a finger in his defence. The unfortunate prince was forced to give himself up to Varahan, who consigned him to the Castle of Oblivion, and placed his brother, Varahran-Sapor, upon the Armenian throne.<sup>54</sup> These events seem to have fallen into the year A.D. 391, the third year of Varahran,<sup>55</sup> who may well have felt proud of them, and have thought that they formed a triumph over Rome which deserved to be commemorated.

The character of Varahran IV. is represented variously by the native authorities. According to some of them, his temper was mild, and his conduct irreproachable.<sup>56</sup> Others say that he was a hard man, and so neglected the duties of his station that he would not even read the petitions or complaints which were addressed to him.<sup>57</sup> It would seem that there must have been some ground for these latter representations, since it is generally agreed<sup>58</sup> that the cause of his death was a revolt of his troops, who surrounded him and shot at him with arrows. One shaft, better directed than the rest, struck him in a vital part, and he fell and instantly expired. Thus perished, in A.D. 399, the third son of the Great Sapor, after a reign of eleven years.

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### CHAPTER XIII.

*Accession of Isdigerd I. Peaceful Character of his Reign. His Alleged Guardianship of Theodosius II. His leaning towards Christianity, and consequent Unpopularity with his Subjects. His Change of view and Persecution of the Christians. His relations with Armenia. His Coins. His Personal Character. His Death.*

Επί τούτοις Ἰσδιγέρδης . . . τὴν Περσικὴν ἡγεμονίαν παραλαμβάνει, ὃ πολλὸς παρὰ Ῥωμαίοις καὶ περιάλητος.—Agathias, iv. 26; p. 136, C.

VARAHNAN IV. was succeeded (A.D. 399) by his son, Izdikerti,<sup>1</sup> or Isdigerd I.,<sup>2</sup> whom the soldiers, though they

had murdered his father,<sup>3</sup> permitted to ascend the throne without difficulty. He is said, at his accession, to have borne a good character for prudence and moderation,<sup>4</sup> a character which he sought to confirm by the utterance on various occasions of high-sounding moral sentiments.<sup>5</sup> The general tenor of his reign was peaceful;<sup>6</sup> and we may conclude therefore that he was of an unwarlike temper, since the circumstances of the time were such as would naturally have induced a prince of any military capacity to resume hostilities against the Romans. After the arrangement made with Rome by Sapor III. in A. D. 384, a terrible series of calamities had befallen the empire.<sup>7</sup> Invasions of Ostrogoths and Franks signalized the years A. D. 386 and 388; in A. D. 387 the revolt of Maximus seriously endangered the western moiety of the Roman state; in the same year occurred an outburst of sedition at Antioch, which was followed shortly by the more dangerous sedition, and the terrible massacre of Thessalonica; Argobastes and Eugenius headed a rebellion in A. D. 392; Gildo the Moor detached Africa from the empire in A. D. 386, and maintained a separate dominion on the southern shores of the Mediterranean for twelve years, from A. D. 386 to 398; in A. D. 395 the Gothic warriors within and without the Roman frontier took arms, and under the redoubtable Alaric threatened at once the East and the West, ravaged Greece, captured Corinth, Argos, and Sparta, and from the coasts of the Adriatic already marked for their prey the smiling fields of Italy. The rulers of the East and West, Arcadius and Honorius, were alike weak and unenterprising; and further, they were not even on good terms, nor was either likely to trouble himself very greatly about attacks upon the territories of the other. Isdigerd might have crossed the Euphrates, and overrun or conquered the Asiatic provinces of the Eastern Empire, without causing Honorius a pang, or inducing him to stir from Milan. It is true that Western Rome possessed at this time the rare treasure of a capable general; but Stilicho was looked upon with fear and aversion by the emperor of the East,<sup>8</sup> and was moreover fully occupied with the defence of his own master's territories. Had Isdigerd, on ascending the throne in A. D. 399, unsheathed the sword and resumed the bold designs of his grandfather, Sapor II., he could scarcely have met with any serious or prolonged resistance. He would have found the East governed practically by the eunuch Eutropius, a plunderer and oppressor, universally

hated and feared;<sup>9</sup> he would have had opposed to him nothing but distracted counsels and disorganized forces; Asia Minor was in possession of the Ostrogoths, who, under the leadership of Tribigild, were ravaging and destroying far and wide;<sup>10</sup> the armies of the State were commanded by Gainas, the Goth, and Leo, the wool-comber, of whom the one was incompetent, and the other unfaithful;<sup>11</sup> there was nothing, apparently, that could have prevented him from overrunning Roman Armenia, Mesopotamia, and Syria, or even from extending his ravages, or his dominion, to the shores of the *Ægean*. But the opportunity was either not seen, or was not regarded as having any attractions. Isdigerd remained tranquil and at rest within the walls of his capital. Assuming as his special title the characteristic epithet<sup>12</sup> of "Ramashtras," "the most quiet," or "the most firm," he justified his assumption of it by a complete abstinence from all military expeditions.

When Isdigerd had reigned peaceably for the space of nine years, he is said to have received a compliment of an unusual character. Arcadius, the emperor of the East, finding his end approaching, and anxious to secure a protector for his son Theodosius, a boy of tender age, instead of committing him to the charge of his uncle Honorius, or selecting a guardian for him from among his own subjects, by a formal testamentary act, we are told,<sup>13</sup> placed his child under the protection of the Persian monarch. He accompanied the appointment by a solemn appeal to the magnanimity of Isdigerd, whom he exhorted at some length to defend with all his force, and guide with his best wisdom, the young king and his kingdom.<sup>14</sup> According to one writer,<sup>15</sup> he further appended to this trust a valuable legacy—no less than a thousand pounds weight of pure gold, which he begged his Persian brother to accept as a token of his goodwill. When Arcadius died, and the testament was opened, information of its contents was sent to Isdigerd, who at once accepted the charge assigned to him, and addressed a letter to the Senate of Constantinople,<sup>16</sup> in which he declared his determination to punish any attempt against his ward with the extremest severity. Unable to watch over his charge in person, he selected for his guide and instructor a learned eunuch of his court, by name Antiochus, and sent him to Constantinople,<sup>17</sup> where for several years he was the young prince's constant companion. Even after his death or expulsion,<sup>18</sup> which took place in consequence of the intrigues of Pulcheria, Theodosius's elder sister, the Persian monarch continued faithful to

his engagements. During the whole of his reign he not only remained at peace with the Romans, but avoided every act that they could have regarded as in the least degree unfriendly.<sup>19</sup>

Such is the narrative which has come down to us on the authority of historians, the earliest of whom wrote a century and a half after Arcadius's death.<sup>20</sup> Modern criticism has, in general, rejected the entire story, on this account, regarding the silence of the earlier writers as outweighing the positive statements of the later ones.<sup>21</sup> It should, however, be borne in mind, first that the earlier writers are few in number,<sup>22</sup> and that their histories are very meagre and scanty; secondly, that the fact, if act it were, was one not very palatable to Christians; and thirdly, that, as the results, so far as Rome was concerned, were negative, the event might not have seemed to be one of much importance, or that required notice. The character of Procopius, with whom the story originates, should also be taken into consideration, and the special credit allowed him by Agathias for careful and diligent research.<sup>23</sup> It may be added, that one of the main points of the narrative—the position of Antiochus at Constantinople during the early years of Theodosius—is corroborated by the testimony of a contemporary, the bishop Synesius,<sup>24</sup> who speaks of a man of this name, recently in the service of a *Persian*,<sup>25</sup> as all-powerful with the Eastern emperor. It has been supposed by one writer<sup>26</sup> that the whole story grew out of this fact; but the basis scarcely seems to be sufficient; and it is perhaps most probable that Arcadius did really by his will commend his son to the kind consideration of the Persian monarch, and that that monarch in consequence sent him an adviser, though the formal character of the testamentary act, and the power and position of Antiochus at the court of Constantinople, may have been overstated. Theodosius no doubt owed his quiet possession of the throne rather to the good disposition towards him of his own subjects than to the protection of a foreigner; and Isdigerd refrained from all attack on the territories of the young prince, rather by reason of his own pacific temper than in consequence of the will of Arcadius.

The friendly relations established, under whatever circumstances, between Isdigerd and the Roman empire of the East seemed to have inclined the Persian monarch, during a portion of his reign, to take the Christians into his favor, and even to have induced him to contemplate seeking admission into the

Church by the door of baptism.<sup>27</sup> Antiochus, his representative at the Court of Arcadius, openly wrote in favor of the persecuted sect;<sup>28</sup> and the encouragement received from this high quarter rapidly increased the number of professing Christians in the Persian territories.<sup>29</sup> The sectaries, though oppressed, had long been allowed to have their bishops; and Isdigerd is said to have listened with approval to the teaching of two of them, Marutha, bishop of Mesopotamia, and Abdaäs, bishop of Ctesiphon.<sup>30</sup> Convinced of the truth of Christianity, but unhappily an alien from its spirit, he commenced a persecution of the Magians and their most powerful adherents,<sup>31</sup> which caused him to be held in detestation by his subjects, and has helped to attach to his name the epithets of "Al-Khasha," "the Harsh," and "Al-Athim," "the Wicked."<sup>32</sup> But the persecution did not continue long. The excessive zeal of Abdaäs after a while provoked a reaction; and Isdigerd, deserting the cause which he had for a time espoused, threw himself (with all the zeal of one who, after nearly embracing truth, relapses into error) into the arms of the opposite party. Abdaäs had ventured to burn down the great Fire-Temple of Ctesiphon, and had then refused to rebuild it.<sup>33</sup> Isdigerd authorized the Magian hierarchy to retaliate by a general destruction of the Christian churches throughout the Persian dominions, and by the arrest and punishment of all those who acknowledged themselves to believe the Gospel.<sup>34</sup> A fearful slaughter of the Christians in Persia followed during five years;<sup>35</sup> some, eager for the earthly glory and the heavenly rewards of martyrdom, were forward to proclaim themselves members of the obnoxious sect; others, less courageous or less inclined to self-assertion, sought rather to conceal their creed; but these latter were carefully sought out, both in the towns and in the country districts,<sup>36</sup> and when convicted were relentlessly put to death. Nor was mere death regarded as enough. The victims were subjected, besides, to cruel sufferings of various kinds,<sup>37</sup> and the greater number of them expired under torture.<sup>38</sup> Thus Isdigerd alternately oppressed the two religious professions, to one or other of which belonged the great mass of his subjects; and, having in this way given both parties reason to hate him, earned and acquired a unanimity of execration which has but seldom been the lot of persecuting monarchs.

At the same time that Isdigerd allowed this violent persecution of the Christians in his own kingdom of Persia, he also

sanctioned an attempt to extirpate Christianity in the dependent country of Armenia. Varahran-Sapor, the successor of Chosroës, had ruled the territory quietly and peaceably for twenty-one years.<sup>39</sup> He died A.D. 412, leaving behind him a single son, Artases, who was at his father's death aged no more than ten years.<sup>40</sup> Under these circumstances, Isaac, the Metropolitan of Armenia, proceeded to the court of Ctesiphon, and petitioned Isdigerd to replace on the Armenian throne the prince who had been deposed twenty-one years earlier, and who was still a prisoner on parole<sup>41</sup> in the "Castle of Oblivion"—viz. Chosroës. Isdigerd acceded to the request; and Chosroës was released from confinement and restored to the throne from which he had been expelled by Varahran IV. in A.D. 391. He, however, survived his elevation only a year. Upon his decease, A.D. 413, Isdigerd selected for the viceroyship, not an Arsacid, not even an Armenian, but his own son, Sapor, whom he forced upon the reluctant provincials, compelling them to acknowledge him as monarch (A.D. 413-414). Sapor was instructed to ingratiate himself with the Armenian nobles, by inviting them to visit him, by feasting them, making them presents, holding friendly converse with them, hunting with them; and was bidden to use such influence as he might obtain to convert the chiefs from Christianity to Zoroastrianism. The young prince appears to have done his best; but the Armenians were obstinate, resisted his blandishments, and remained Christians in spite of all his efforts. He reigned<sup>42</sup> from A.D. 414 to 418, at the end of which time, learning that his father had fallen into ill health, he quitted Armenia and returned to the Persian court, in order to press his claims to the succession. Isdigerd died soon afterwards<sup>43</sup> (A.D. 419 or 420); and Sapor made an attempt to seize the throne; but there was another pretender whose partisans had more strength, and the viceroy of Armenia was treacherously assassinated in the palace of his father.<sup>44</sup> Armenia remained for three years in a state of anarchy; and it was not till Varahran V. had been for some time established upon the Persian throne that Artases was made viceroy, under the name of Artasirjs or Artaxerxes.<sup>45</sup>

The coins of Isdigerd I. are not remarkable as works of art; but they possess some features of interest. They are numerous, and appear to have been issued from various mints,<sup>46</sup> but all bear a head of the same type. [Pl. XXI., Fig. 1.] It is that of a middle-aged man, with a short beard and hair gathered

behind the head in a cluster of curls. The distinguishing mark is the head-dress, which has the usual inflated ball above a *fragment* of the old mural crown, and further bears a crescent in front. The reverse has the usual fire-altar with supporters, and is for the most part very rudely executed.<sup>47</sup> The ordinary legend is, on the obverse, *Mazdisn bag ramashtras Izdikerti, malkan malka Airan*, or "the Ormazd-worshipping divine most peaceful Isdigerd, king of the kings of Iran;" and on the reverse, *Ramashtras Izdikerti*, "the most peaceful Isdigerd." In some cases, there is a second name, associated with that of the monarch, on the reverse, a name which reads either "Ardashatri" (Artaxerxes)<sup>48</sup> or, "Varahran."<sup>49</sup> It has been conjectured that, where the name of "Artaxerxes" occurs, the reference is to the founder of the empire;<sup>50</sup> while it is admitted that the "Varahran" intended is almost certainly Isdigerd's son and successor,<sup>51</sup> Varahran V., the "Bahram-Gur" of the modern Persians. Perhaps a more reasonable account of the matter would be that Isdigerd had originally a son Artaxerxes, whom he intended to make his successor, but that this son died or offended him, and that then he gave his place to Varahran.

The character of Isdigerd is variously represented. According to the Oriental writers, he had by nature an excellent disposition, and at the time of his accession was generally regarded as eminently sage, prudent, and virtuous; but his conduct after he became king disappointed all the hopes that had been entertained of him. He was violent, cruel, and pleasure-seeking; he broke all laws human and divine; he plundered the rich, ill-used the poor, despised learning, left those who did him a service unrewarded, suspected everybody.<sup>52</sup> He wandered continually about his vast empire, not to benefit his subjects, but to make them all suffer equally.<sup>53</sup> In curious contrast with these accounts is the picture drawn of him by the Western authors, who celebrate his magnanimity and his virtue,<sup>54</sup> his peaceful temper, his faithful guardianship of Theodosius, and even his exemplary piety.<sup>55</sup> A modern writer<sup>56</sup> has suggested that he was in fact a wise and tolerant prince, whose very mildness and indulgence offended the bigots of his own country, and caused them to represent his character in the most odious light, and do their utmost to blacken his memory. But this can scarcely be accepted as the true explanation of the discrepancy. It appears from the ecclesiastical historians<sup>57</sup> that, whatever other good qualities Isdigerd

may have possessed, tolerance at any rate was not among his virtues. Induced at one time by Christian bishops almost to embrace Christianity, he violently persecuted the professors of the old Persian religion. Alarmed at a later period by the excessive zeal of his Christian preceptors, and probably fearful of provoking rebellion among his Zoroastrian subjects, he turned around upon his late friends, and treated them with a cruelty even exceeding that previously exhibited towards their adversaries. It was probably this twofold persecution that, offending both professions, attached to Isdigerd in his own country the character of a harsh and bad monarch. Foreigners, who did not suffer from his caprices or his violence, might deem him magnanimous and a model of virtue. His own subjects with reason detested his rule, and branded his memory with the well-deserved epithet of *Al-Athim*, "the Wicked."

A curious tale is told as to the death of Isdigerd. He was still in the full vigor of manhood when one day a horse of rare beauty, without bridle or caparison, came of its own accord and stopped before the gate of his palace. The news was told to the king, who gave orders that the strange steed should be saddled and bridled, and prepared to mount it. But the animal reared and kicked, and would not allow any one to come near, till the king himself approached, when the creature totally changed its mood, appeared gentle and docile, stood perfectly still, and allowed both saddle and bridle to be put on. The crupper, however, needed some arrangement, and Isdigerd in full confidence proceeded to complete his task, when suddenly the horse lashed out with one of his hind legs, and dealt the unfortunate prince a blow which killed him on the spot. The animal then set off at speed, disembarassed itself of its accoutrements, and galloping away was never seen any more.<sup>58</sup> The modern historian of Persia compresses the tale into a single phrase,<sup>59</sup> and tells us that "Isdigerd died from the kick of a horse:" but the Persians of the time regarded the occurrence as an answer to their prayers, and saw in the wild steed an angel sent by God.<sup>60</sup>

## CHAPTER XIV.

*Internal Troubles on the Death of Isdigerd I. Accession of Varahran V. His Persecution of the Christians. His War with Rome. His Relations with Armenia from A.D. 422 to A.D. 428. His Wars with the Scythic Tribes on his Eastern Frontier. His Strange Death. His Coins. His Character.*

Ἐπεὶ Ἰσδιγέρδης νοσήσας ἐξ ἀνθρώπων ἠφάνιστο, ἐπῆλθεν ἐς Ῥωμαίων τὴν γῆν Οὐαραράνης ὁ Περσῶν βασιλεὺς στρατῷ μεγάλῳ.—Procop. *De Bell. Pers.* i. 2.

It would seem that at the death of Isdigerd there was some difficulty as to the succession. Varahran, whom he had designated as his heir,<sup>1</sup> appears to have been absent from the capital at the time; while another son, Sapor, who had held the Armenian throne from A.D. 414 to 418, was present at the seat of government, and bent on pushing his claims.<sup>2</sup> Varahran, if we may believe the Oriental writers, who are here unanimous,<sup>3</sup> had been educated among the Arab tribes dependent on Persia, who now occupied the greater portion of Mesopotamia. His training had made him an Arab rather than a Persian; and he was believed to have inherited the violence, the pride, and the cruelty of his father.<sup>4</sup> His countrymen were therefore resolved that they would not allow him to be king. Neither were they inclined to admit the claims of Sapor, whose government of Armenia had not been particularly successful,<sup>5</sup> and whose recent desertion of his proper post for the advancement of his own private interests was a crime against his country which deserved punishment rather than reward. Armenia had actually revolted as soon as he quitted it, had driven out the Persian garrison,<sup>6</sup> and was a prey to rapine and disorder. We cannot be surprised that, under these circumstances, Sapor's machinations and hopes were abruptly terminated, soon after his father's demise, by his own murder. The nobles and chief Magi took affairs into their own hands.<sup>7</sup> Instead of sending for Varahran, or awaiting his arrival, they selected for king a descendant of Artaxerxes I. only remotely related to Isdigerd—a prince of the name of Chosroës—and formally placed him upon the throne. But Varahran was not willing to cede his rights. Having persuaded the Arabs to

embrace his cause, he marched upon Ctesiphon at the head of a large force, and by some means or other, most probably by the terror of his arms,<sup>8</sup> prevailed upon Chosroës, the nobles, and the Magi, to submit to him. The people readily acquiesced in the change of masters; Chosroës descended into a private station, and Varahran, son of Isdigerd, became king.

Varahran seems to have ascended the throne in A.D. 420.<sup>9</sup> He at once threw himself into the hands of the priestly party, and, resuming the persecution of the Christians which his father had carried on during his later years, showed himself, to one moiety of his subjects at any rate, as bloody and cruel as the late monarch.<sup>10</sup> Tortures of various descriptions were employed;<sup>11</sup> and so grievous was the pressure put upon the followers of Christ that in a short time large numbers of the persecuted sect quitted the country, and placed themselves under the protection of the Romans. Varahran had to consider whether he would quietly allow the escape of these criminals, or would seek to enforce his will upon them at the risk of a rupture with Rome. He preferred the bolder line of conduct. His ambassadors were instructed to require the surrender of the refugees at the court of Constantinople;<sup>12</sup> and when Theodosius, to his honor, indignantly rejected the demand, they had orders to protest against the emperor's decision, and to threaten him with their master's vengeance.

It happened that at the time there were some other outstanding disputes, which caused the relations of the two empires to be less amicable than was to be desired. The Persians had recently begun to work their gold mines, and had hired experienced persons from the Romans, whose services they found so valuable that when the period of the hiring was expired they would not suffer the miners to quit Persia and return to their homes. They are also said to have ill-used the Roman merchants who traded in the Persian territories, and to have actually robbed them of their merchandise.<sup>13</sup>

These causes of complaint were not, however, it would seem, brought forward by the Romans, who contented themselves with simply refusing the demand for the extradition of the Christian fugitives, and refrained from making any counter-claims. But their moderation was not appreciated; and the Persian monarch, on learning that Rome would not restore the refugees, declared the peace to be at an end, and immediately made preparations for war. The Romans had, however, anticipated his decision, and took the field in force

before the Persians were ready. The command was entrusted to a general bearing the strange name of Ardaburius,<sup>14</sup> who marched his troops through Armenia into the fertile province of Arzanene,<sup>15</sup> and there defeated Narses,<sup>16</sup> the leader whom Varahran had sent against him. Proceeding to plunder Arzanene, Ardaburius suddenly heard that his adversary was about to enter the Roman province of Mesopotamia, which was denuded of troops, and seemed to invite attack. Hastily concluding his raid, he passed from Arzanene into the threatened district, and was in time to prevent the invasion intended by Narses, who, when he found his designs forestalled, threw himself into the fortress of Nisibis, and there stood on the defensive. Ardaburius did not feel himself strong enough to invest the town; and for some time the two adversaries remained inactive, each watching the other. It was during this interval that (if we may credit Socrates) the Persian general sent a challenge to the Roman, inviting him to fix time and place for a trial of strength between the two armies. Ardaburius prudently declined the overture, remarking that the Romans were not accustomed to fight battles when their enemies wished, but when it suited themselves. Soon afterwards he found himself able to illustrate his meaning by his actions. Having carefully abstained from attacking Nisibis while his strength seemed to him insufficient, he suddenly, upon receiving large reinforcements from Theodosius, changed his tactics, and, invading Persian Mesopotamia, marched upon the stronghold held by Narses, and formally commenced its siege.

Hitherto Varahran, confident in his troops or his good fortune, had left the entire conduct of the military operations to his general; but the danger of Nisibis—that dearly won and highly prized possession<sup>17</sup>—seriously alarmed him, and made him resolve to take the field in person with all his forces. Enlisting on his side the services of his friends the Arabs, under their great sheikh, Al-Amundarus (Moundsir),<sup>18</sup> and collecting together a strong body of elephants,<sup>19</sup> he advanced to the relief of the beleaguered town. Ardaburius drew off on his approach, burned his siege artillery, and retired from before the place. Nisibis was preserved; but soon afterwards a disaster is said to have befallen the Arabs, who, believing themselves about to be attacked by the Roman force, were seized with a sudden panic, and, rushing in headlong flight to the Euphrates (!) threw themselves into its waters, encumbered with

their clothes and arms, and there perished to the number of a hundred thousand.<sup>20</sup>

The remaining circumstances of the war are not related by our authorities in chronological sequence. But as it is certain that the war lasted only two years,<sup>21</sup> and as the events above narrated certainly belong to the earlier portion of it, and seem sufficient for one campaign, we may perhaps be justified in assigning to the second year, A.D. 421, the other details recorded—viz., the siege of Theodosiopolis, the combat between Areobindus and Ardazanes, the second victory of Ardaburius, and the destruction of the remnant of the Arabs by Vitianus.

Theodosiopolis was a city built by the reigning emperor, Theodosius II., in the Roman portion of Armenia, near the sources of the Euphrates.<sup>22</sup> It was defended by strong walls, lofty towers, and a deep ditch.<sup>23</sup> Hidden channels conducted an unfailing supply of water into the heart of the place, and the public granaries were large and generally well stocked with provisions.<sup>24</sup> This town, recently built for the defence of the Roman Armenia, was (it would seem) attacked in A.D. 421 by Varahran in person.<sup>25</sup> He besieged it for above thirty days, and employed against it all the means of capture which were known to the military art of the period. But the defence was ably conducted by the bishop of the city, a certain Eunomius, who was resolved that, if he could prevent it, an infidel and persecuting monarch should never lord it over his see. Eunomius not merely animated the defenders, but took part personally in the defence, and even on one occasion discharged a stone from a *balista* with his own hand, and killed a prince who had not confined himself to his military duties, but had insulted the faith of the besieged. The death of this officer is said to have induced Varahran to retire, and not further molest Theodosiopolis.<sup>26</sup>

While the fortified towns on either side thus maintained themselves against the attacks made on them, Theodosius, we are told,<sup>27</sup> gave an independent command to the patrician Procopius, and sent him at the head of a body of troops to oppose Varahran. The armies met, and were on the point of engaging when the Persian monarch made a proposition to decide the war, not by a general battle, but by a single combat. Procopius assented; and a warrior was selected on either side, the Persians choosing for their champion a certain Ardazanes, and the Romans "Areobindus the Goth," count of the

"Fœderati." In the conflict which followed the Persian charged his adversary with his spear, but the nimble Goth avoided the thrust by leaning to one side, after which he entangled Ardazanes in a net, and then despatched him with his sword.<sup>28</sup> The result was accepted by Varahran as decisive of the war, and he desisted from any further hostilities. Areobindus<sup>29</sup> received the thanks of the emperor for his victory, and twelve years later was rewarded with the consulship.

But meanwhile, in other portions of the wide field over which the war was raging, Rome had obtained additional successes. Ardaburius, who probably still commanded in Mesopotamia, had drawn the Persian force opposed to him into an ambuscade, and had destroyed it, together with its seven generals.<sup>30</sup> Vitianus, an officer of whom nothing more is known, had exterminated the remnant of the Arabs not drowned in the Euphrates.<sup>31</sup> The war had gone everywhere against the Persians; and it is not improbable that Varahran, before the close of A. D. 421, proposed terms of peace.<sup>32</sup>

Peace, however, was not exactly made till the next year. Early in A. D. 422, a Roman envoy, by name Maximus, appeared in the camp of Varahran,<sup>33</sup> and, when taken into the presence of the great king, stated that he was empowered by the Roman generals to enter into negotiations, but had had no communication with the Roman emperor, who dwelt so far off that he had not heard of the war, and was so powerful that, if he knew of it, he would regard it as a matter of small account. It is not likely that Varahran was much impressed by these falsehoods; but he was tired of the war; he had found that Rome could hold her own, and that he was not likely to gain anything by prolonging it; and he was in difficulties as to provisions,<sup>34</sup> whereof his supply had run short. He was therefore well inclined to entertain Maximus's proposals favorably. The corps of the "Immortals," however, which was in his camp, took a different view, and entreated to be allowed an opportunity of attacking the Romans unawares, while they believed negotiations to be going on, considering that under such circumstances they would be certain of victory. Varahran, according to the Roman writer who is here our sole authority,<sup>35</sup> consented. The Immortals made their attack, and the Romans were at first in some danger; but the unexpected arrival of a reinforcement saved them, and the Immortals were defeated and cut off to a man. After this, Varahran made peace with Rome through the instrumentality of Maxi-

mus,<sup>36</sup> consenting, it would seem, not merely that Rome should harbor the Persian Christians, if she pleased, but also that all persecution of Christians should henceforth cease throughout his own empire.<sup>37</sup>

The formal conclusion of peace was accompanied, and perhaps helped forward, by the well-judging charity of an admirable prelate. Acacius, bishop of Amida, pitying the condition of the Persian prisoners whom the Romans had captured during their raid into Arzanene, and were dragging off into slavery, interposed to save them; and, employing for the purpose all the gold and silver plate that he could find in the churches of his diocese, ransomed as many as *seven thousand* captives, supplied their immediate wants with the utmost tenderness, and sent them to Varahran,<sup>38</sup> who can scarcely have failed to be impressed by an act so unusual in ancient times. Our sceptical historian remarks, with more apparent sincerity than usual, that this act was calculated "to inform the Persian king of the true spirit of the religion which he persecuted," and that the name of the doer might well "have dignified the saintly calendar."<sup>39</sup> These remarks are just; and it is certainly to be regretted that, among the many unknown or doubtful names of canonized Christians to which the Church has given her sanction, there is no mention made of Acacius of Amida.

Varahran was perhaps the more disposed to conclude his war with Rome from the troubled condition of his own portion of Armenia, which imperatively required his attention. Since the withdrawal from that region of his brother Sapor<sup>40</sup> in A.D. 418 or 419, the country had had no king. It had fallen into a state of complete anarchy and wretchedness; no taxes were collected; the roads were not safe; the strong robbed and oppressed the weak at their pleasure.<sup>41</sup> Isaac, the Armenian patriarch, and the other bishops, had quitted their sees and taken refuge in Roman Armenia,<sup>42</sup> where they were received favorably by the prefect of the East, Anatolius, who no doubt hoped by their aid to win over to his master the Persian division of the country. Varahran's attack on Theodosiopolis had been a counter movement, and had been designed to make the Romans tremble for their own possessions, and throw them back on the defensive. But the attack had failed; and on its failure the complete loss of Armenia probably seemed imminent. Varahran therefore hastened to make peace with Rome, and, having so done, proceeded to give his attention to Arme-

nia, with the view of placing matters there on a satisfactory footing. Convinced that he could not retain Armenia unless with the good-will of the nobles,<sup>43</sup> and believing them to be deeply attached to the royal stock of the Arsacids, he brought forward a prince of that noble house, named Artases, a son of Varahran-Sapor, and, investing him with the ensigns of royalty, made him take the illustrious name of Artaxerxes, and delivered into his hands the entire government of the country. These proceedings are assigned to the year A.D. 422,<sup>44</sup> the year of the peace with Rome, and must have followed very shortly after the signature of the treaty.

It might have been expected that this arrangement would have satisfied the nobles of Armenia, and have given that unhappy country a prolonged period of repose. But the personal character of Artaxerxes was, unfortunately, bad; the Armenian nobles were, perhaps, capricious; and after a trial of six years it was resolved that the rule of the Arsacid monarch could not be endured, and that Varahran should be requested to make Armenia a province of his empire, and to place it under the government of a Persian satrap.<sup>45</sup> The movement was resisted with all his force by Isaac, the patriarch, who admitted the profligacy of Artaxerxes and deplored it, but held that the rôle of a Christian, however lax he might be, was to be preferred to that of a heathen, however virtuous.<sup>46</sup> The nobles, however, were determined; and the opposition of Isaac had no other result than to involve him in the fall of his sovereign. Appeal was made to the Persian king;<sup>47</sup> and Varahran, in solemn state, heard the charges made against Artaxerxes by his subjects, and listened to his reply to them. At the end he gave his decision. Artaxerxes was pronounced to have forfeited his crown, and was deposed; his property was confiscated, and his person committed to safe custody. The monarchy was declared to be at an end; and Persarmenia was delivered into the hands of a Persian governor.<sup>48</sup> The patriarch Isaac was at the same time degraded from his office and detained in Persia as a prisoner. It was not till some years later that he was released, allowed to return into Armenia, and to resume, under certain restrictions, his episcopal functions.<sup>49</sup>

The remaining circumstances of the reign of Varahran V. come to us wholly through the Oriental writers, amid whose exaggerations and fables it is very difficult to discern the truth. There can, however, be little doubt that it was during the reign of this prince that those terrible struggles commenced

between the Persians and their neighbors upon the north-east which continued, from the early part of the fifth till the middle of the sixth century, to endanger the very existence of the empire. Various names are given to the people with whom Persia waged her wars during this period. They are called Turks,<sup>50</sup> Huns,<sup>51</sup> sometimes even Chinese,<sup>52</sup> but these terms seem to be used in a vague way, as "Scythian" was by the ancients; and the special ethnic designation of the people appears to be quite a different name from any of them. It is a name the Persian form of which is *Haïthal* or *Haïathêleh*,<sup>53</sup> the Armenian *Hephthagh*,<sup>54</sup> and the Greek "Ephthalites," or sometimes "Nephthalites."<sup>55</sup> Different conjectures have been formed as to its origin; but none of them can be regarded as more than an ingenious theory.<sup>56</sup> All that we *know* of the Ephthalites is that they were established in force, during the fifth and sixth centuries of our era, in the regions east of the Caspian, especially in those beyond the Oxus river, and that they were generally regarded as belonging to the Scythic or Finno-Turkic population, which, at any rate from B.C. 200, had become powerful in that region. They were called "White Huns" by some of the Greeks;<sup>57</sup> but it is admitted that they were quite distinct from the Huns who invaded Europe under Attila;<sup>58</sup> and it may be doubted whether the term "Hun" is more appropriate to them than that of Turk or even of Chinese. The description of their physical character and habits left us by Procopius, who wrote when they were at the height of their power, is decidedly adverse to the view that they were really Huns. They were a light-complexioned race, whereas the Huns were decidedly swart;<sup>59</sup> they were not ill-looking, whereas the Huns were hideous; they were an agricultural people, while the Huns were nomads; they had good laws, and were tolerably well civilized, but the Huns were savages. It is probable that they belonged to the Thibetic or Turkish stock, which has always been in advance of the Finnic, and has shown a greater aptitude for political organization and social progress.

We are told that the war of Varahran V. with this people commenced with an invasion of his kingdom by their Khacan, or Kahn,<sup>60</sup> who crossed the Oxus with an army of 25,000 (or, according to others, of 250,000) men,<sup>61</sup> and carried fire and sword into some of the most fertile provinces of Persia. The rich oasis, known as Meru or Merv, the ancient Margiana, is especially mentioned as overrun by his troops,<sup>62</sup> which are said



STATUE OF SAPOR I. AT SHAPUR (RESTORED).

ORMAZD GIVING THE CROWN TO ARTAXERXES I




Fig. 1



Fig. 2.

HEAD-DRESS OF AN UNKNOWN KING (after Texier).

by some to have crossed the Elburz range into Khorassan and to have proceeded westward as far as Rei, or Rhages.<sup>63</sup> When news of the invasion reached the Persian court, the alarm felt was great; Varahran was pressed to assemble his forces at once and encounter the unknown enemy; he, however, professed complete indifference, said that the Almighty would preserve the empire, and that, for his own part, he was going to hunt in Azerbaijan,<sup>64</sup> or Media Atropatene. During his absence the government could be conducted by Narses, his brother. All Persia was now thrown into consternation; Varahran was believed to have lost his senses; and it was thought that the only prudent course was to despatch an embassy to the Khacan, and make an arrangement with him by which Persia should acknowledge his suzerainty and consent to pay him a tribute.<sup>65</sup> Ambassadors accordingly were sent; and the invaders, satisfied with the offer of submission, remained in the position which they had taken up, waiting for the tribute, and keeping slack guard, since they considered that they had nothing to fear. Varahran, however, was all the while preparing to fall upon them unawares. He had started for Azerbaijan with a small body of picked warriors;<sup>66</sup> he had drawn some further strength from Armenia;<sup>67</sup> he proceeded along the mountain line through Taberistan, Hyrcania, and Nissa (Nishapur),<sup>68</sup> marching only by night, and carefully masking his movements. In this way he reached the neighborhood of Merv unobserved. He then planned and executed a night attack on the invading army which was completely successful. Attacking his adversaries suddenly and in the dark—alarming them, moreover, with strange noises,<sup>69</sup> and at the same time assaulting them with the utmost vigor—he put to flight the entire Tatar army. The Khan himself was killed;<sup>70</sup> and the flying host was pursued to the banks of the Oxus. The whole of the camp equipage fell into the hands of the victors; and Khâtoun, the wife of the great Khan, was taken.<sup>71</sup> The plunder was of enormous value, and comprised the royal crown with its rich setting of pearls.<sup>72</sup>

After this success, Varahran, to complete his victory, sent one of his generals across the Oxus at the head of a large force, and falling upon the Tatars in their own country defeated them a second time with great slaughter.<sup>73</sup> The enemy then prayed for peace, which was granted them by the victorious Varahran, who at the same time erected a column to mark the boundary of his empire in this quarter,<sup>74</sup> and, appointing his brother Narses governor of Khorassan, ordered him to fix his

residence at Balkh, and to prevent the Tatars from making incursions across the Oxus.<sup>75</sup> It appears that these precautions were successful, for we hear nothing of any further hostilities in this quarter during the remainder of Varahran's reign.

The adventures of Varahran in India, and the enlargement of his dominions in that direction by the act of the Indian king, who is said so have voluntarily ceded to him Mekran and Scinde in return for his services against the Emperor of China,<sup>76</sup> cannot be regarded as historical. Scarcely more so is the story that Persia had no musicians in his day, for which reason he applied to the Indian monarch, and obtained from him twelve thousand performers, who became the ancestors of the Lurs.<sup>77</sup>

After a reign which is variously estimated at nineteen, twenty, twenty-one, and twenty-three years,<sup>78</sup> Varahran died by a death which would have been thought incredible, had not a repetition of the disaster, on the traditional site, been witnessed by an English traveller in comparatively recent times. The Persian writers state that Varahran was engaged in the hunt of the wild ass, when his horse came suddenly upon a deep pool, or spring of water, and either plunged into it or threw his rider into it, with the result that Varahran sank and never reappeared.<sup>79</sup> The supposed scene of the incident is a valley between Ispahan and Shiraz. Here, in 1810, an English soldier lost his life through bathing in the spring traditionally declared to be that which proved fatal to Varahran.<sup>80</sup> The coincidence has caused the general acceptance of a tale which would probably have been otherwise regarded as altogether romantic and mythical.

The coins of Varahran V. are chiefly remarkable for their rude and coarse workmanship and for the number of the mints from which they were issued. The mint-marks include Ctesiphon, Ecbatana, Isaphan, Arbela, Ledan, Nehavend, Assyria, Chuzistan, Media, and Kerman, or Carmania.<sup>81</sup> The ordinary legend is, upon the obverse, *Mazdisn bag Varahran malka*, or *Mazdisn bag Varahran rasti malka*, and on the reverse, "Varahran," together with a mint-mark. The head-dress has the mural crown in front and behind, but interposes between these two detached fragments a crescent and a circle, emblems, no doubt, of the sun and moon gods. The reverse shows the usual fire-altar, with guards, or attendants, watching it. The king's head appears in the flame upon the altar. (Pl. xxi. Fig. 2).

According to the Oriental writers, Varahran V. was one of the best of the Sassanian princes. He carefully administered

justice among his numerous subjects, remitted arrears of taxation, gave pensions to men of science and letters, encouraged agriculture, and was extremely liberal in the relief of poverty and distress.<sup>62</sup> His faults were, that he was over-generous and over-fond of amusements, especially of the chase. The nickname of "Bahram-Gur," by which he is known to the Orientals, marks this last-named predilection, transferring to him, as it does, the name of the animal which was the especial object of his pursuit.<sup>63</sup> But he was almost equally fond of dancing and of games.<sup>64</sup> Still it does not appear that his inclination for amusements rendered him neglectful of public affairs, or at all interfered with his administration of the State. Persia is said to have been in a most flourishing condition during his reign.<sup>65</sup> He may not have gained all the successes that are ascribed to him; but he was undoubtedly an active prince, brave, energetic, and clear-sighted. He judiciously brought the Roman war to a close when a new and formidable enemy appeared on his north-eastern frontier; he wisely got rid of the Armenian difficulty, which had been a stumbling block in the way of his predecessors for two hundred years; he inflicted a check on the aggressive Tatars, which indisposed them to renew hostilities with Persia for a quarter of a century. It would seem that he did not much appreciate art;<sup>66</sup> but he encouraged learning, and did his best to advance science.<sup>67</sup>

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## CHAPTER XV.

*Reign of Isdigerd II. His War with Rome. His Nine Years' War with the Ephthalites. His Policy towards Armenia. His Second Ephthalite War. His Character. His Coins.*

Οὐαράρανης . . . παραδίδωσι τὴν βασιλείαν Ἰσδιγέρδῃ θατέρῳ τῷ οἰκίῳ παιδί.—Agathias, iv. 27; p. 137, C.

THE SUCCESSOR of Varahan V. was his son, Isdigerd the Second, who ascended the Persian throne without opposition in the year A.D. 440.<sup>1</sup> His first act was to declare war against Rome. The Roman forces were, it would seem, concentrated in the vicinity of Nisibis;<sup>2</sup> and Isdigerd may have feared that they would make an attack upon the place. He therefore anticipated them, and invaded the empire with an army com-

posed in part of his own subjects, but in part also of troops from the surrounding nations. Saracens, Tzani, Isaurians, and Huns (Ephthalites?) served under his standard;<sup>3</sup> and a sudden incursion was made into the Roman territory, for which the imperial officers were wholly unprepared. A considerable impression would probably have been produced, had not the weather proved exceedingly unpropitious. Storms of rain and hail hindered the advance of the Persian troops, and allowed the Roman generals a breathing space, during which they collected an army.<sup>4</sup> But the Emperor Theodosius was anxious that the flames of war should not be relighted in this quarter; and his instructions to the prefect of the East, the Count Anatolius,<sup>5</sup> were such as speedily led to the conclusion, first of a truce for a year, and then of a lasting treaty. Anatolius repaired as ambassador to the Persian camp, on foot and alone, so as to place himself completely in Isdigerd's power—an act which so impressed the latter that (we are told) he at once agreed to make peace on the terms which Anatolius suggested.<sup>6</sup> The exact nature of these terms is not recorded; but they contained at least one unusual condition. The Romans and Persians agreed that neither party should construct any new fortified post in the vicinity of the other's territory—a loose phrase which was likely to be variously interpreted, and might easily lead to serious complications.

It is difficult to understand this sudden conclusion of peace by a young prince, evidently anxious to reap laurels, who in the first year of his reign had, at the head of a large army, invaded the dominions of a neighbor. The Roman account, that he invaded, that he was practically unopposed, and that then, out of politeness towards the prefect of the East, he voluntarily retired within his own frontier, "having done nothing disagreeable,"<sup>7</sup> is as improbable a narrative as we often meet with, even in the pages of the Byzantine historians. Something has evidently been kept back. If Isdigerd returned, as Procopius declares, without effecting anything, he must have been recalled by the occurrence of troubles in some other part of his empire.<sup>8</sup> But it is, perhaps, as likely that he retired, simply because he had effected the object with which he engaged in the war. It was a constant practice of the Romans to advance their frontier by building strong towns on or near a debatable border, which attracted to them the submission of the neighboring district. The recent building of Theodosiopolis<sup>9</sup> in the eastern part of Roman Armenia had

been an instance of this practice. It was perhaps being pursued elsewhere along the Persian border, and the invasion of Isdigerd may have been intended to check it. If so, the proviso of the treaty recorded by Procopius would have afforded him the security which he required, and have rendered it unnecessary for him to continue the war any longer.

His arms shortly afterwards found employment in another quarter. The Tatars of the Transoxianian regions were once more troublesome; and in order to check or prevent the incursions which they were always ready to make, if they were unmolested, Isdigerd undertook a long war on his north-eastern frontier, which he conducted with a resolution and perseverance not very common in the East. Leaving his vizier, Mihr-Narses, to represent him at the seat of government, he transferred his own residence to Nishapur,<sup>10</sup> in the mountain region between the Persian and Kharesmian deserts, and from that convenient post of observation directed the military operations against his active enemies, making a campaign against them regularly every year from A.D. 443 to 451. In the year last mentioned he crossed the Oxus, and, attacking the Ephthalites in their own territory, obtained a complete success, driving the monarch from the cultivated portion of the country, and forcing him to take refuge in the desert.<sup>11</sup> So complete was his victory that he seems to have been satisfied with the result, and, regarding the war as terminated, to have thought the time was come for taking in hand an arduous task, long contemplated, but not hitherto actually attempted.

This was no less a matter than the forcible conversion of Armenia to the faith of Zoroaster. It has been already noted<sup>12</sup> that the religious differences which—from the time when the Armenians, anticipating Constantine, adopted as the religion of their state and nation the Christian faith (ab. A.D. 300)—separated the Armenians from the Persians, were a cause of weakness to the latter, more especially in their contests with Rome. Armenia was always, naturally, upon the Roman side, since a religious sympathy united it with the the court of Constantinople, and an exactly opposite feeling tended to detach it from the court of Ctesiphon. The alienation would have been, comparatively speaking, unimportant, after the division of Armenia between the two powers, had that division been regarded by either party as final, or as precluding the formation of designs upon the territory which

each had agreed should be held by the other. But there never yet had been a time when such designs had ceased to be entertained; and in the war which Isdigerd had waged with Theodosius at the beginning of his reign, Roman intrigues in Persarmenia had forced him to send an army into that country.<sup>13</sup> The Persians felt, and felt with reason, that so long as Armenia remained Christian and Persia held to the faith of Zoroaster, the relations of the two countries could never be really friendly; Persia would always have a traitor in her own camp; and in any time of difficulty—especially in any difficulty with Rome—might look to see this portion of her territory go over to the enemy. We cannot be surprised if Persian statesmen were anxious to terminate so unsatisfactory a state of things, and cast about for a means whereby Armenia might be won over, and made a real friend instead of a concealed enemy.

The means which suggested itself to Isdigerd as the simplest and most natural was, as above observed, the conversion of the Armenians to the Zoroastrian religion. In the early part of his reign he entertained a hope of effecting his purpose by persuasion, and sent his vizier, Mihr-Narses, into the country, with orders to use all possible peaceful means—gifts, blandishments, promises, threats, removal of *malignant* chiefs—to induce Armenia to consent to a change of religion.<sup>14</sup> Mihr-Narses did his best, but failed signally. He carried off the chiefs of the Christian party, not only from Armenia, but from Iberia and Albania, telling them that Isdigerd required their services against the Tatars, and forced them with their followers to take part in the Eastern war.<sup>15</sup> He committed Armenia to the care of the Margrave, Vasag, a native prince who was well inclined to the Persian cause, and gave him instructions to bring about the change of religion by a policy of conciliation. But the Armenians were obstinate. Neither threats, nor promises, nor persuasions had any effect. It was in vain that a manifesto was issued, painting the religion of Zoroaster in the brightest colors, and requiring all persons to conform to it. It was to no purpose that arrests were made, and punishments threatened. The Armenians declined to yield either to argument or to menace; and no progress at all was made in the direction of the desired conversion.

In the year A.D. 450, the patriarch Joseph, by the general desire of the Armenians, held a great assembly, at which it was carried by acclamation that the Armenians were Chris-

tians, and would continue such, whatever it might cost them. If it was hoped by this to induce Isdigerd to lay aside his proselytizing schemes, the hope was a delusion. Isdigerd retaliated by summoning to his presence the principal chiefs, viz., Vasag, the Margrave;<sup>16</sup> the *Sparapet*, or commander-in-chief, Vartan, the Mamigonian; Vazten, prince of Iberia; Vatché, king of Albania, etc.; and having got them into his power, threatened them with immediate death, unless they at once renounced Christianity and made profession of Zoroastrianism. The chiefs, not having the spirit of martyrs, unhappily yielded, and declared themselves converts; whereupon Isdigerd sent them back to their respective countries, with orders to force everywhere on their fellow-countrymen a similar change of religion.

Upon this, the Armenians and Iberians broke out in open revolt. Vartan, the Mamigonian, repenting of his weakness, abjured his new creed, resumed the profession of Christianity, and made his peace with Joseph, the patriarch.<sup>17</sup> He then called the people to arms, and in a short time collected a force of a hundred thousand men. Three armies were formed, to act separately under different generals. One watched Azerbaijan, or Media Atropatene, whence it was expected that their main attack would be made by the Persians; another, under Vartan, proceeded to the relief of Albania, where proceedings were going on similar to those which had driven Armenia into rebellion; the third, under Vasag, occupied a central position in Armenia, and was intended to move wherever danger should threaten.<sup>18</sup> An attempt was at the same time made to induce the Roman emperor, Marcian, to espouse the cause of the rebels, and send troops to their assistance; but this attempt was unsuccessful. Marcian had but recently ascended the throne,<sup>19</sup> and was, perhaps, scarcely fixed in his seat. He was advanced in years, and naturally unenterprising. Moreover, the position of affairs in Western Europe was such that Marcian might expect at any moment to be attacked by an overwhelming force of northern barbarians, cruel, warlike, and unsparing. Attila was in A.D. 451 at the height of his power; he had not yet been worsted at Chalons;<sup>20</sup> and the terrible Huns, whom he led, might in a few months destroy the Western, and be ready to fall upon the Eastern empire. Armenia, consequently, was left to her own resources, and had to combat the Persians single-handed. Even so, she might probably have succeeded, have maintained

her Christianity, or even recovered her independence, had her people been of one mind, and had no defection from the national cause manifested itself. But Vasag, the Marzpan, had always been half-hearted in the quarrel; and, now that the crisis was come, he determined on going wholly over to the Persians. He was able to carry with him the army which he commanded; and thus Armenia was divided against itself; and the chance of victory was well-nigh lost before the struggle had begun. When the Persians took the field they found half Armenia ranged upon their side; and, though a long and bloody contest followed, the end was certain from the beginning. After much desultory warfare, a great battle was fought in the sixteenth year of Isdigerd (A.D. 455 or 456) between the Christian Armenians on the one side, and the Persians, with their Armenian abettors, on the other. The Persians were victorious; Vartan, and his brother, Hemaïag, were among the slain; and the patriotic party found that no further resistance was possible.<sup>21</sup> The patriarch, Joseph, and the other bishops, were seized, carried off to Persia, and martyred. Zoroastrianism was enforced upon the Armenian nation. All accepted it, except a few, who either took refuge in the dominions of Rome, or fled to the mountain fastnesses of Kurdistan.<sup>22</sup>

The resistance of Armenia was scarcely overborne, when war once more broke out in the East, and Isdigerd was forced to turn his attention to the defence of his frontier against the aggressive Ephthalites, who, after remaining quiet for three or four years, had again flown to arms, had crossed the Oxus, and invaded Khorassan in force.<sup>23</sup> On his first advance the Persian monarch was so far successful that the invading hordes seems to have retired, and left Persia to itself; but when Isdigerd, having resolved to retaliate, led his own forces into the Ephthalite country, they took heart, resisted him, and, having tempted him into an ambuscade, succeeded in inflicting upon him a severe defeat. Isdigerd was forced to retire hastily within his own borders, and to leave the honors of victory to his assailants, whose triumph must have encouraged them to continue year after year their destructive inroads into the north-eastern provinces of the empire.

It was not long after the defeat which he suffered in this quarter that Isdigerd's reign came to an end. He died A.D. 457, after having held the throne for seventeen or (according to some) for nineteen years.<sup>24</sup> He was a prince of con-

siderable ability, determination, and courage. That his subjects called him "the Clement"<sup>25</sup> is at first sight surprising, since clemency is certainly not the virtue that any modern writer would think of associating with his name. But we may assume from the application of the term that, where religious considerations did not come into play, he was fair and equitable, mild-tempered, and disinclined to harsh punishments. Unfortunately, experience tells us that natural mildness is no security against the acceptance of a bigot's creed; and, when a policy of persecution has once been adopted, a Trajan or a Valerian will be as unsparing as a Maximin or a Galerius. Isdigerd was a bitter and successful persecutor of Christianity, which he—for a time at any rate—stamped out, both from his own proper dominions, and from the newly-acquired province of Armenia. He would have preferred less violent means; but, when they failed, he felt no scruples in employing the extremest and severest coercion. He was determined on uniformity; and uniformity he secured, but at the cost of crushing a people, and so alienating them as to make it certain that they would, on the first convenient occasion, throw off the Persian yoke altogether.

The coins of Isdigerd II. nearly resemble those of his father, Varahran V., differing only in the legend, and in the fact that the mural crown of Isdigerd is complete.<sup>26</sup> The legend is remarkably short, being either *Masdisn kadi Yezdikerti*, or merely *Kadi Yezdikerti*—*i.e.* "the Ormazd-worshipping great Isdigerd;" or "Isdigerd the Great." The coins are not very numerous, and have three mint-marks only, which are interpreted to mean "Khuzistan," "Ctesiphon," and "Nehavend."<sup>27</sup> [Pl. XXI., Fig. 3.]

## CHAPTER XVI.

*Right of Succession disputed between the two Sons of Isdigerd II., Perozes (or Firuz) and Hormisdas. Civil War for two years. Success of Perozes, through aid given him by the Ephthalites. Great Famine. Perozes declares War against the Ephthalites, and makes an Expedition into their Country. His ill success. Conditions of Peace granted him. Armenian Revolt and War. Perozes, after some years, resumes the Ephthalite War. His attack fails, and he is slain in battle. Summary of his Character. Coins of Hormisdas III. and Perozes. Vase of Perozes.*

‘Yazdejerdo e medio sublato, de regno contenderunt duo ipsius filii, Phiruz et Hormoz, aliis a partibus Firuzi, aliis ab Hormozi stantibus.’—Eutyck. vol. i. p. 100.

ON the death of Isdigerd II. (A.D. 457) the throne was seized by his younger son,<sup>1</sup> Hormisdas, who appears to have owed his elevation, in a great measure, to the partiality of his father. That monarch, preferring his younger son above his elder, had made the latter governor of the distant Seistan, and had thus removed him far from the court, while he retained Hormisdas about his own person.<sup>2</sup> The advantage thus secured to Hormisdas enabled him when his father died to make himself king; and Perozes was forced, we are told, to fly the country, and place himself under the protection of the Ephthalite monarch, who ruled in the valley of the Oxus, over Bactria, Tokaristan, Badakshan, and other neighboring districts.<sup>3</sup> This king, who bore the name of Khush-newâz,<sup>4</sup> received him favorably, and though at first, out of fear for the power of Persia, he declined to lend him troops, was induced after a while to adopt a bolder policy. Hormisdas, despite his epithet of *Ferzan*, “the Wise,”<sup>5</sup> was soon at variance with his subjects, many of whom gathered about Perozes at the court which he was allowed to maintain in Taleqan, one of the Ephthalite cities. Supported by this body of refugees, and by an Ephthalite contingent,<sup>6</sup> Perozes ventured to advance against his brother. His army, which was commanded by a certain

Raham, or Ram, a noble of the Mihran family, attacked the forces of Hormisdas, defeated them, and made Hormisdas himself a prisoner.<sup>7</sup> The troops of the defeated monarch, convinced by the logic of success, deserted their late leader's cause, and went over in a body to the conqueror. Perozes, after somewhat more than two years of exile, was acknowledged as king by the whole Persian people, and, quitting Taleqan, established himself at Ctesiphon, or Al Modain, which had now become the main seat of government. It is uncertain what became of Hormisdas. According to the Armenian writers,<sup>8</sup> Raham, after defeating him, caused him to be put to death; but the native historian, Mirkhond, declares that, on the contrary, Perozes forgave him for having disputed the succession, and amiably spared his life.<sup>9</sup>

The civil war between the two brothers, short as it was, had lasted long enough to cost Persia a province. Vatché, king of Aghouank (Albania)<sup>10</sup> took advantage of the time of disturbance to throw off his allegiance, and succeeded in making himself independent.<sup>11</sup> It was the first object of Perozes, after establishing himself upon the throne, to recover this valuable territory. He therefore made war upon Vatché, thought that prince was the son of his sister, and with the help of his Ephthalite allies, and of a body of Alans whom he took into his service, defeated the rebellious Albanians and completely subjugated the revolted country.<sup>12</sup>

A time of prosperity now ensued. Perozes ruled with moderation and justice.<sup>13</sup> He dismissed his Ephthalite allies with presents that amply contented them,<sup>14</sup> and lived for five years in great peace and honor. But in the seventh year,<sup>15</sup> from the death of his father, the prosperity of Persia was suddenly and grievously interrupted by a terrible drought, a calamity whereto Asia has in all ages been subject, and which often produces the most frightful consequences. The crops fail; the earth becomes parched and burnt up; smiling districts are change into wildernesses; fountains and brooks cease to flow; then the wells have no water; finally even the great rivers are reduced to threads, and contain only the scantiest supply of the life-giving fluid in their channels. Famine under these circumstances of necessity sets in; the poor die by hundreds; even the rich have a difficulty in sustaining life by means of food imported from a distance. We are told<sup>16</sup> that the drought in the reign of Perozes was such that at last there was not a drop of water either in the Tigris or the Oxus; all the sources and

fountains, all the streams and brooks failed; vegetation altogether ceased; the beasts of the field and the fowls of the air perished; nowhere through the whole empire was a bird to be seen; the wild animals, even the reptiles, disappeared altogether. The dreadful calamity lasted for seven years,<sup>17</sup> and under ordinary circumstances the bulk of the population would have been swept off; but such were the wisdom and the beneficence of the Persian monarch, that during the entire duration of the scourge not a single person, or, according to another account, but one person,<sup>18</sup> perished of hunger. Perozes began by issuing general orders that the rich should come to the relief of their poorer brethren; he required the governors of towns, and the head-men of villages, to see that food was supplied to those in need, and threatened that for each poor man in a town or village who died of want he would put a rich man to death. At the end of two years, finding that the drought continued, he declined to take any revenue from his subjects, remitting taxes of all kinds, whether they were money imposts or contributions in kind. In the fourth year, not content with these measures, he went further: opened the treasury doors and made distributions of money from his own stores to those in need. At the same time he imported corn from Greece, from India, from the valley of the Oxus, and from Abyssinia, obtaining by these means such ample supplies that he was able to furnish an adequate sustenance to all his subjects.<sup>19</sup> The result was that not only did the famine cause no mortality among the poorer classes, but no one was even driven to quit the country in order to escape the pressure of the calamity.

Such is the account which is given by the Oriental authors of the terrible famine which they ascribe to the early part of the reign of Perozes. It is difficult, however, to suppose that the matter has not been very much exaggerated, since we find that, as early as A.D. 464-5, when the famine should have been at its height, Perozes had entered upon a great war and was hotly engaged in it, his ambassadors at the same time being sent to the Greek court, not to ask supplies of food, but to request a subsidy on account of his military operations.<sup>20</sup> The enemy which had provoked his hostility was the powerful nation of the Ephthalites, by whose aid he had so recently obtained the Persian crown. According to a contemporary Greek authority, more worthy of trust than most writers of his age and nation,<sup>21</sup> the origin of the war was a refusal on the part of the Ephthalites to make certain customary payments

which the Persians viewed in the light of a tribute.<sup>22</sup> Perozes determined to enforce his just rights, and marched his troops against the defaulters with this object. But in his first operations he was unsuccessful, and after a time he thought it best to conclude the war, and content himself with taking a secret revenge upon his enemy, by means of an occult insult. He proposed to Khush-newâz to conclude a treaty of peace, and to strengthen the compact by adding to it a matrimonial alliance. Khush-newâz should take to wife one of his daughters, and thus unite the interests of the two reigning families. The proposal was accepted by the Ephthalite monarch; and he readily espoused the young lady who was sent to his court apparelled as became a daughter of Persia. In a little time, however, he found that he had been tricked: Perozes had not sent him his daughter, but one of his female slaves;<sup>23</sup> and the royal race of the Ephthalite kings had been disgraced by a matrimonial union with a person of servile condition. Khush-newâz was justly indignant; but dissembled his feelings, and resolved to repay guile with guile. He wrote to Perozes that it was his intention to make war upon a neighboring tribe, and that he wanted officers of experience to conduct the military operations. The Persian monarch, suspecting nothing, complied with the request, and sent three hundred of his chief officers to Khush-newâz, who immediately seized them, put some to death, and, mutilating the remainder, commanded them to return to their sovereign, and inform him that the king of the Ephthalites now felt that he had sufficiently avenged the trick of which he had been the victim.<sup>24</sup> On receiving this message Perozes renewed the war, advanced towards the Ephthalite country, and fixed his head-quarters in Hyrcania, at the city of Gurgan,<sup>25</sup> He was accompanied by a Greek of the name of Eusebius,<sup>26</sup> an ambassador from the Emperor Zeno, who took back to Constantinople the following account of the campaign.

When Perozes, having invaded the Ephthalite territory, fell in with the army of the enemy, the latter pretended to be seized with a panic, and at once took to flight. The retreat was directed upon a portion of the mountain region, where a broad and good road led into a spacious plain, surrounded on all sides by wooded hills, steep and in places precipitous. Here the mass of the Ephthalite troops was cunningly concealed amid the foliage of the woods, while a small number, remaining visible, led the Persians into the *cul-de-sac*, the whole army unsuspect-

ingly entering, and only learning their danger when they saw the road whereby they had entered blocked up by the troops from the hills. The officers then apprehended the true state of the case, and perceived that they had been cleverly entrapped; but none of them, it would seem, dared to inform the monarch that he had been deceived by a stratagem. Application was made to Eusebius, whose ambassadorial character would protect him from an outbreak, and he was requested to let Perozes know how he was situated, and exhort him to endeavor to extricate himself by counsel rather than by a desperate act. Eusebius upon this employed the Oriental method of apologue, relating to Perozes how a lion in pursuit of a goat got himself into difficulties, from which all his strength could not enable him to make his escape. Perozes apprehended his meaning, understood the situation, and, desisting from the pursuit, prepared to give battle where he stood. But the Ephthalite monarch had no wish to push matters to extremities. Instead of falling on the Persians from every side, he sent an embassy to Perozes and offered to release him from his perilous situation, and allow him to return with all his troops to Persia, if he would swear a perpetual peace with the Ephthalites and do homage to himself as his lord and master, by prostration. Perozes felt that he had no choice but to accept these terms, hard as he might think them. Instructed by the Magi, he made the required prostration at the moment of sunrise, with his face turned to the east, and thought thus to escape the humiliation of abasing himself before a mortal by the mental reservation that the intention of his act was to adore the great Persian divinity. He then swore to the peace, and was allowed to return with his army intact into Persia.<sup>27</sup>

It seems to have been soon after the conclusion of his disgraceful treaty<sup>28</sup> that serious troubles once more broke out in Armenia. Perozes, following out the policy of his father, Isdigerd,<sup>29</sup> incessantly persecuted the Christians of his northern provinces, especially those of Armenia, Georgia, and Albania.<sup>30</sup> So severe were his measures that vast numbers of the Armenians quitted their country, and, placing themselves under the protection of the Greek Emperor, became his subjects, and entered into his service.<sup>31</sup> Armenia was governed by Persian officials, and by apostate natives who treated their Christian fellow-countrymen with extreme rudeness, insolence, and injustice. Their efforts were especially directed against the few noble families who still clung to the faith of Christ, and had


not chosen to expatriate themselves. Among these the most important was that of the Mamigonians, long celebrated in Armenian history,<sup>32</sup> and at this time reckoned chief among the nobility. The renegades sought to discredit this family with the Persians; and Vahan, son of Hemaïag, its head, found himself compelled to visit, once and again, the court of Persia, in order to meet the charges of his enemies and counteract the effect of their calumnies. Successful in vindicating himself, and received into high favor by Perozes, he allowed the sunshine of prosperity to extort from him what he had guarded firmly against all the blasts of persecution—to please his sovereign, he formally abjured the Christian faith, and professed himself a disciple of Zoroaster.<sup>33</sup> The triumph of the anti-Christian party seemed now secured; but exactly at this point a reaction set in. Vahan became a prey to remorse, returned secretly to his old creed.<sup>34</sup> and longed for an opportunity of wiping out the shame of his apostasy by perilling his life for the Christian cause. The opportunity was not long in presenting itself. In A. D. 481 Perozes suffered a defeat at the hand of the barbarous Koushans, who held at this time the low Caspian tract extending from Asterabad to Derbend. Iberia at once revolted, slew its Zoroastrian king, Vazken, and placed a Christian, Vakhtang, upon the throne. The Persian governor of Armenia, having received orders to quell the Iberian rebellion, marched with all the troops that he could muster into the northern province, and left the Armenians free to follow their own devices. A rising immediately took place. Vahan at first endeavored to check the movement, being doubtful of the power of Armenia to cope with Persia, and feeling sure that the aid of the Greek emperor could not be counted on. But the the popular enthusiasm overleaped all resistance; everywhere the Christian party rushed to arms, and swore to free itself; the Persians with their adherents fled the country; Artaxata, the capital, was besieged and taken; the Christians were completely victorious, and, having made themselves masters of all Persarmenia, proceeded to establish a national government, placing at their head as king, Sahag, the Bagratide, and appointing Vahan, the Mamigonian, to be *Sparapet*, or “Commander-in-Chief.”<sup>35</sup>

Intelligence of these events recalled the Persian governor, Ader-Veshnasp, from Iberia. Returning into his province at the head of an army of no great size, composed of Atropatenians, Medes, and Cadusians, he was encountered by Vasag,


a brother of Vahan, on the river Araxes, with a small force, and was completely defeated and slain.<sup>56</sup>

Thus ended the campaign of A.D. 481. In A.D. 482 the Persians made a vigorous attempt to recover their lost ground by sending two armies, one under Ader-Nerseh against Armenia, and the other under Mihran<sup>57</sup> into Iberia. Vahan met the army of Ader-Nerseh in the plain of Ardaz, engaged it, and defeated it after a sharp struggle, in which the king, Sahag, particularly distinguished himself. Mihran was opposed by Vakhtang, the Iberian king, who, however, soon found himself overmatched, and was forced to apply to Armenia for assistance. The Armenians came to his aid in full force; but their generosity was ill rewarded. Vakhtang plotted to make his peace with Persia by treacherously betraying his allies into their enemies' hands; and the Armenians, forced to fight at tremendous disadvantage, suffered a severe defeat. Sahag, the king, and Vasag, one of the brothers of Vahan, were slain; Vahan himself escaped, but at the head of only a few followers, with whom he fled to the highland district of Daik, on the borders of Rome and Iberia. Here he was "hunted upon the mountains" by Mihran, and would probably have been forced to succumb before the year was out, had not the Persian general suddenly received a summons from his sovereign, who needed his aid against the Koushans of the low Caspian region. Mihran, compelled to obey this call, had to evacuate Armenia, and Vahan in a few weeks recovered possession of the whole country.<sup>58</sup>

The year A.D. 483 now arrived, and another desperate attempt was made to crush the Armenian revolt. Early in the spring a Persian army invaded Armenia, under a general called Hazaravougd. Vahan allowed himself to be surprised, to be shut up in the city of Dovin, and to be there besieged. After a while he made his escape, and renewed the guerilla warfare in which he was an adept; but the Persians recovered most of the country, and he was himself, on more than one occasion, driven across the border and obliged to seek refuge in Roman Armenia, whither his adversary had no right to follow him. Even here, however, he was not safe. Hazaravougd, at the risk of a rupture with Rome, pursued his flying foe across the frontier;<sup>59</sup> and Vahan was for some time in the greatest danger. But the Persian system of constantly changing the commands of their chief officers saved him. Hazaravougd received orders from the court to deliver up Armenia



TRIUMPH OF SAFOR I. OVER VALERIAN.



FOREIGNERS BRINGING TRIBUTE TO SAPOR I.

to a newly appointed governor, named Sapor,<sup>40</sup> and to direct his own efforts to the recovery of Iberia, which was still in insurrection. In this latter enterprise he was successful; Iberia submitted to him; and Vakhtang fled to Colchis. But in Armenia the substitution of Sapor for Hazaravoug led to disaster. After a vain attempt to procure the assassination of Vahan by two of his officers, whose wives were Roman prisoners, Sapor moved against him with a strong body of troops;<sup>41</sup> but the brave Mamigonian, falling upon his assailant unawares, defeated him with great loss, and dispersed his army.<sup>42</sup> A second battle was fought with a similar result; and the Persian force, being demoralized, had to retreat; while Vahan, taking the offensive, established himself in Dovin, and once more rallied to his side the great mass of the nation.<sup>43</sup> Affairs were in this state, when suddenly there arrived from the east intelligence of the most supreme importance, which produced a pause in the Armenian conflict and led to the placing of Armenian affairs on a new footing.

Perozes had, from the conclusion of his treaty with the Ephthalite monarch (ab. A.D. 470), been tormented with the feeling that he had suffered degradation and disgrace.<sup>44</sup> He had, perhaps, plunged into the Armenian and other wars<sup>45</sup> in the hope of drowning the recollection of his shame, in his own mind as well as in the minds of others. But fortune had not greatly smiled on him in these struggles; and any credit that he obtained from them was quite insufficient to produce forgetfulness of his great disaster. Hence, as time went on, he became more and more anxious to wipe out the memory of the past by a great and signal victory over his conquerors. He therefore after some years<sup>46</sup> determined to renew the war. It was in vain that the chief Mobed opposed himself to this intention;<sup>47</sup> it was in vain that his other counsellors sought to dissuade him, that his general, Bahram, declared against the infraction of the treaty,<sup>48</sup> and that the soldiers showed themselves reluctant to fight. Perozes had resolved, and was not to be turned from his resolution. He collected from all parts of the empire a veteran force,<sup>49</sup> amounting, it is said,<sup>50</sup> to 100,000 men, and 500 elephants, placed the direction of affairs at the court in the hands of Balas (Palash), his son or brother,<sup>51</sup> and then marched upon the north-eastern frontier, with the determination to attack and defeat the Ephthalites or perish in the attempt. According to some Oriental writers<sup>52</sup> he endeavored to escape the charge of having falsified his engage-

ments by a curious subterfuge. The exact terms of his oath to Khush-newâz, the Ephthalite king, had been that he would never march his forces past a certain pillar which that monarch had erected to mark the boundary line between the Persian and Ephthalite dominions. Perozes persuaded himself that he would sufficiently observe his engagement if he kept its letter; and accordingly he lowered the pillar, and placed it upon a number of cars, which were attached together and drawn by a train of fifty elephants, in front of his army. Thus, however deeply he invaded the Ephthalite country, he never "passed beyond" the pillar which he had sworn not to pass. In his own judgment he kept his vow, but not in that of his natural advisers. It is satisfactory to find that the Zoroastrian priesthood, speaking by the mouth of the chief Mobed, disclaimed and exposed the fallacy of this wretched casuistry.<sup>53</sup>

The Ephthalite monarch, on learning the intention of Perozes, prepared to meet his attack by stratagem. He had taken up his position in the plain near Balkh, and had there established his camp, resolved to await the coming of the enemy. During the interval he proceeded to dig a deep and broad trench<sup>54</sup> in front of his whole position, leaving only a space of some twenty or thirty yards, midway in the work, untouched. Having excavated the trench, he caused it to be filled with water,<sup>55</sup> and covered carefully with boughs of trees, reeds, and earth, so as to be undistinguishable from the general surface of the plain on which he was encamped. On the arrival of the Persians in his front, he first of all held a parley with Perozes, in which, after reproaching him with his ingratitude and breach of faith, he concluded by offering to renew the peace. Perozes scornfully refused; whereupon the Ephthalite prince hung on the point of a lance the broken treaty,<sup>56</sup> and, parading it in front of the Persian troops, exhorted them to avoid the vengeance which was sure to fall on the perjurer by deserting their doomed monarch. Upon this, half the army, we are told,<sup>57</sup> retired; and Khush-newâz proceeded to effect the destruction of the remainder by means of the plan which he had so carefully prepared beforehand. He sent a portion of his troops across the ditch, with orders to challenge the Persians to an engagement, and, when the fight began, to fly hastily, and, returning within the ditch by the sound passage, unite themselves with the main army. The entire Persian host, as he expected, pursued the fugitives, and coming unawares upon

the concealed trench plunged into it, was inextricably entangled, and easily destroyed. Perozes himself, several of his sons,<sup>68</sup> and most of his army perished. Firuz-docht, his daughter, the chief Mobed, and great numbers of the rank and file were made prisoners. A vast booty was taken.<sup>69</sup> Khush-newâz did not tarnish the glory of his victory by any cruelties; he treated the captives tenderly, and caused search to be made for the body of Perozes, which was found and honorably interred.

Thus perished Perozes, after a reign of (probably) twenty-six years.<sup>60</sup> He was undoubtedly a brave prince, and entitled to the epithet of *Al Merdaneh*, "the Courageous," which he received from his subjects.<sup>61</sup> But his bravery, unfortunately, verged upon rashness,<sup>62</sup> and was unaccompanied (so far as appears) by any other military quality. Perozes had neither the sagacity to form a good plan of campaign, nor the ability to conduct a battle. In all the wars wherein he was personally engaged he was unsuccessful, and the only triumphs which gilded his arms were gained by his generals. In his civil administration, on the contrary, he obtained a character for humanity and justice;<sup>63</sup> and, if the Oriental accounts of his proceedings during the great famine<sup>64</sup> are to be regarded as trustworthy, we must admit that his wisdom and benevolence were such as are not commonly found in those who bear rule in the East. His conduct towards Khush-newâz has generally been regarded as the great blot upon his good fame;<sup>65</sup> and it is certainly impossible to justify the paltry casuistry by which he endeavored to reconcile his actions with his words at the time of his second invasion. But his persistent hostility towards the Ephthalites is far from inexcusable, and its motive may have been patriotic rather than personal. He probably felt that the Ephthalite power was among those from which Persia had most to fear, and that it would have been weak in him to allow gratitude for a favor conferred upon himself to tie his hands in a matter where the interests of his country were vitally concerned. The Ephthalites continued for nearly a century more to be among the most dangerous of her neighbors to Persia; and it was only by frequent attacks upon them in their own homes that Persia could reasonably hope to ward off their ravages from her territory.

It is doubtful whether we possess any coins of Hormisdas III., the brother and predecessor of Perozes. Those which are assigned to him by Mordtmann<sup>66</sup> bear a name which has no re-

semblance to his; and those bearing the name of Ram, which Mr. Taylor considers to be coins of Hormisdas,<sup>67</sup> cannot have been issued under his authority, since Ram was the guardian and general, not of Hormisdas, but of his brother.<sup>68</sup> Perhaps the remarkable specimen figured by M. Longpérier in his valuable work,<sup>69</sup> which shows a bull's head in place of the usual inflated ball, may really belong to this prince. The legend upon it is read without any doubt as *Auhrimazd*, or "Hormisdas;" and in general character it is certainly Sassanian,<sup>70</sup> and of about this period. [Pl. XXI., Fig. 5.]

The coins of Perozes are undoubted, and are very numerous. They are distinguished generally by the addition to the ordinary crown of two wings, one in front of the crown, and the other behind it,<sup>71</sup> and bear the legend, *Kadi Piruzi*,<sup>72</sup> or *Mazdisn Kadi Piruzi*, i. e., "King Perozes," or "the Ormazd-worshipping king Perozes." The earring of the monarch is a triple pendant.<sup>73</sup> On the reverse, besides the usual fire-altar and supporters, we see on either side of the altar-flame a star and a crescent. The legend here is M—probably for *malka*, "king"—or else *Kadi*, together with a mint-mark. The mints named are numerous, comprising (according to Mordtmann)<sup>74</sup> Persepolis, Ispahan, Rhages, Nehavend, Darabgherd, Zadracarta, Nissa, Behistun, Chuzistan, Media, Kerman, and Azerbijan; or (according to Mr. Thomas)<sup>75</sup> Persepolis, Rasht, Nehavend, Darabgherd, Baiza, Modain, Merv, Shiz, Iran, Kerman, Yezd, and fifteen others. The general character of the coinage is rude and coarse, the reverse of the coins showing especial signs of degradation. [Pl. XXI., Fig. 6.]

Besides his coins, one other memorial of the reign of Perozes has escaped the ravages of time. This is a cup or vase, of antique and elegant form, engraved with a hunting-scene, which has been thus described by a recent writer: "This cup, which comes from Russia, has a diameter of thirty-one centimètres, and is shaped like a ewer without handles. At the bottom there stands out in relief the figure of a monarch on horseback, pursuing at full speed various wild animals; before him fly a wild boar and wild sow, together with their young, an ibex, an antelope, and a buffalo. Two other boars, an ibex, a buffalo, and an antelope are strewn on the ground, pierced with arrows . . . . The king has an aquiline nose, an eye which is very wide open, a short beard, horizontal moustaches of considerable length, the hair gathered behind the head in quite a small knot, and the ear ornamented with a double pendant, pear-shaped:

the head of the monarch supports a crown, which is mural at the side and back, while it bears a crescent in front; two wings surmounting a globe within a crescent form the upper part of the head-dress. . . . On his right the king carries a short dagger and a quiver full of arrows, on his left a sword. . . . Firuz, who has the finger-guard of an archer on his right hand, is represented in the act of bending a large bow made of horn." 78 There would seem to be no doubt that the work thus described is rightly assigned to Perozes.

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CHAPTER XVII.

*Accession of Balas or Palash. His Relationship to Perozes. Peace made with the Ephthalites. Pacification of Armenia and General Edict of Toleration. Revolt of Zareh, Son of Perozes, and Suppression of the Revolt with the help of the Armenians. Flight of Kobad to the Ephthalites. Further Changes in Armenia. Vahan made Governor. Death of Balas; his Character. Coins ascribed to him.*

Βάλας . . . ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀναβάς, οὐδέν τι φαίνεται ἀξιαφῆγητον δράσας πολέμων ἕνεκα καὶ παρατάξεων.—Agathias, iv. 27; p. 137, D.

PEROZES was succeeded by a prince whom the Greeks call Balas, the Arabs and later Persians Palash, but whose real name appears to have been Valâkhesh<sup>1</sup> or Volagases. Different accounts are given of his relationship to his predecessor, the native writers unanimously representing him as the son of Perozes and brother of Kobad,<sup>2</sup> while the Greeks<sup>3</sup> and the contemporary Armenians<sup>4</sup> declare with one voice that he was Kobad's uncle and Perozes's brother. It seems on the whole most probable that the Greeks and Armenians are right;<sup>5</sup> and we may suppose that Perozes, having no son whom he could trust to take his place<sup>6</sup> when he quitted his capital in order to take the management of the Ephthalite war, put the regency and the guardianship of his children into the hands of his brother, Valâkhesh, who thus, not unnaturally, became king when it was found that Perozes had fallen.

The first efforts of the new monarch were of necessity directed towards an arrangement with the Ephthalites, whose signal victory over Perozes had laid the north-eastern frontier

of Persia open to their attack. Balas, we are told,<sup>7</sup> employed on this service the arms and arts of an officer named Sukhra or Sufraï, who was at the time governor of Seistan. Sukhra collected an imposing force, and conducted it to the Ephthalite border, where he alarmed Khush-newâz by a display of his own skill with the bow.<sup>8</sup> He then entered into negotiations and obtained the release of Firuz-docht, of the Grand Mobed, and of the other important prisoners, together with the restoration of a large portion of the captured booty, but was probably compelled to accept on the part of his sovereign some humiliating conditions. Procopius informs us that, in consequence of the defeat of Perozes, Persia became subject to the Ephthalites and paid them tribute for two years;<sup>9</sup> and this is so probable a result, and one so likely to have been concealed by the native writers, that his authority must be regarded as outweighing the silence of Mirkhond and Tabari. Balas, we must suppose, consented to become an Ephthalite tributary, rather than renew the war which had proved fatal to his brother. If he accepted this position, we can well understand that Khush-newâz would grant him the small concessions of which the Persian writers boast; while otherwise the restoration of the booty and the prisoners without a battle is quite inconceivable.

Secure, so long as he fulfilled his engagements, from any molestation in this quarter, Balas was able to turn his attention to the north-western portion of his dominions, and address himself to the difficult task of pacifying Armenia, and bringing to an end the troubles which had now for several years afflicted that unhappy province. His first step was to nominate as Marzpan, or governor, of Armenia, a Persian who bore the name of Nikhor, a man eminent for justice and moderation.<sup>10</sup> Nikhor, instead of attacking Vahan, who held almost the whole of the country, since the Persian troops had been withdrawn on the news of the death of Perozes,<sup>11</sup> proposed to the Armenian prince that they should discuss amicably the terms upon which his nation would be content to end the war and resume its old position of dependence upon Persia. Vahan expressed his willingness to terminate the struggle by an arrangement, and suggested the following as the terms on which he and his adherents would be willing to lay down their arms:

(1) The existing fire-altars should be destroyed, and no others should be erected in Armenia.

(2) The Armenians should be allowed the full and free exercise of the Christian religion, and no Armenians should be in

future tempted or bribed to declare themselves disciples of Zoroaster.

(3) If converts were nevertheless made from Christianity to Zoroastrianism, places should not be given to them.

(4) The Persian king should in person, and not by deputy, administer the affairs of Armenia.<sup>12</sup> Nikhor expressed himself favorable to the acceptance of these terms; and, after an exchange of hostages, Vahan visited his camp and made arrangements with him for the solemn ratification of peace on the aforesaid conditions. An edict of toleration was issued, and it was formally declared that "every one should be at liberty to adhere to his own religion, and that no one should be driven to apostatize."<sup>13</sup> Upon these terms peace was concluded between Vahan and Nikhor,<sup>14</sup> and it was only necessary that the Persian monarch should ratify the terms for them to become formally binding.

While matters were in this state, and the consent of Balas to the terms agreed upon had not yet been positively signified, an important revolution took place at the court of Persia. Zareh, a son of Perozes, preferred a claim to the crown, and was supported in his attempt by a considerable section of the people.<sup>15</sup> A civil war followed; and among the officers employed to suppress it was Nikhor, the governor of Armenia. On his appointment he suggested to Vahan that it would lend great force to the Armenian claims if under the existing circumstances the Armenians would furnish effective aid to Balas, and so enable him to suppress the rebellion. Vahan saw the importance of the conjuncture, and immediately sent to Nikhor's aid a powerful body of cavalry under the command of his own nephew, Gregory. Zareh was defeated, mainly in consequence of the great valor and excellent conduct of the Armenian contingent. He fled to the mountains, but was pursued, and was very shortly afterwards made prisoner and slain.<sup>16</sup>

Soon after this, Kobad, son of Perozes, regarding the crown as rightfully his, put forward a claim to it, but, meeting with no success, was compelled to quit Persia and throw himself upon the kind protection of the Ephthalites,<sup>17</sup> who were always glad to count among their refugees a Persian pretender. The Ephthalites, however, made no immediate stir—it would seem that so long as Balas paid his tribute they were content, and felt no inclination to disturb what seemed to them a satisfactory arrangement.

The death of Zareh and the flight of Kobad left Balas at

liberty to resume the work which their rebellions had interrupted—the complete pacification of Armenia. Knowing how much depended upon Vahan, he summoned him to his court, received him with the highest honors, listened attentively to his representations, and finally agreed to the terms which Vahan had formulated.<sup>18</sup> At the same time he replaced Nikhor by a governor named Antegan, a worthy successor, “mild, prudent, and equitable;”<sup>19</sup> and, to show his confidence in the Mamigonian prince, appointed him to the high office of Commander-in-Chief, or “*Sparapet*.” This arrangement did not, however, last long. Antegan, after ruling Armenia for a few months, represented to his royal master that it would be the wisest course to entrust Vahan with the government,<sup>20</sup> that the same head which had conceived the terms of the pacification might watch over and ensure their execution. Antegan’s recommendation approved itself to the Persian monarch, who proceeded to recall his self-denying councillor, and to install Vahan in the vacant office. The post of Sparapet was assigned to Vart, Vahan’s brother. Christianity was then formally re-established as the State religion of Armenia; the fire-altars were destroyed; the churches reclaimed and purified; the hierarchy restored to its former position and powers. A reconversion of almost the whole nation to the Christian faith was the immediate result; the apostate Armenians recanted their errors, and abjured Zoroastrianism; Armenia, and with it Iberia, were pacified;<sup>21</sup> and the two provinces which had been so long a cause of weakness to Persia grew rapidly into main sources of her strength and prosperity.

The new arrangement had not been long completed when Balas died (A. D. 487). It is agreed on all hands that he held the throne for no more than four years,<sup>22</sup> and generally allowed that he died peaceably by a natural death.<sup>23</sup> He was a wise and just prince,<sup>24</sup> mild in his temper,<sup>25</sup> averse to military enterprises,<sup>26</sup> and inclined to expect better results from pacific arrangements than from wars and expeditions. His internal administration of the empire gave general satisfaction to his subjects; he protected and relieved the poor, extended cultivation, and punished governors who allowed any men in their province to fall into indigence.<sup>27</sup> His prudence and moderation are especially conspicuous in his arrangement of the Armenian difficulty, whereby he healed a chronic sore that had long drained the resources of his country. His submission to pay tribute to the Ephthalites may be thought to indicate a

want of courage or of patriotism; but there are times when the purchase of a peace is a necessity; and it is not clear that Balas was minded to bear the obligation imposed on him a moment longer than was necessary. The writers who record the fact that Persia submitted for a time to pay a tribute limit the interval during which the obligation held to a couple of years.<sup>28</sup> It would seem, therefore, that Balas, who reigned four years, must, a year at least before his demise, have shaken off the Ephthalite yoke and ceased to make any acknowledgment of dependence. Probably it was owing to the new attitude assumed by him that the Ephthalites, after refusing to give Kobad any material support for the space of three years, adopted a new policy in the year of Balas's death (A.D. 487), and lent the pretender a force<sup>29</sup> with which he was about to attack his uncle when news reached him that attack was needless, since Balas was dead and his own claim to the succession undisputed. Balas nominated no successor upon his death-bed, thus giving in his last moments an additional proof of that moderation and love of peace which had characterized his reign.

Coins, which possess several points of interest, are assigned to Balas by the best authorities.<sup>30</sup> They bear on the obverse the head of the king with the usual mural crown surmounted by a crescent and inflated ball. The beard is short and curled. The hair falls behind the head, also in curls. The earring, wherewith the ear is ornamented, has a double pendent. *Flames issue from the left shoulder*, an exceptional peculiarity in the Sassanian series, but one which is found also among the Indo-Scythian kings with whom Balas was so closely connected. The full legend upon the coins appears to be *Hur Kadi Valakâshi*, "Volagases, the Fire King." The reverse exhibits the usual fire-altar, but with the king's head in the flames, and with the star and crescent on either side, as introduced by Perozes. It bears commonly the legend, *Valakâshi*, with a mint-mark. The mints employed are those of Iran, Kerman, Ispahan, Nisa, Ledan, Shiz, Zadracarta, and one or two others. [Platé XXI., Fig. 4].

## CHAPTER XVIII.

*First reign of Kobad. His Favorites, Sufraï and Sapor. His Khazar War. Rise, Teaching, and influence of Mazdak. His Claim to Miraculous Powers. Kobad adopts the new Religion, and attempts to impose it on the Armenians. Revolt of Armenia under Vahan, successful. Kobad yields. General Rebellion in Persia, and Deposition of Kobad. Escape of Mazdak. Short Reign of Zamasp. His Coins.*

Καβάδης δὲ ὁ τοῦ Περόξου ὕστατος υἱός, τῆς βασιλείας δραξάμενος, ἐπὶ τὸ βιαιότερον τῆ ἀρχῆ ἐχρᾶτο καὶ κοινὰς τὰς γυναῖκας ἐνομοθέτησεν ἔχειν.—Cedrenus, p. 356, B, C.

WHEN Kobad fled to the Ephthalites on the failure of his attempt to seize the crown, he was received, we are told,<sup>1</sup> with open arms; but no material aid was given to him for the space of three years. However, in the fourth year of his exile, a change came over the Ephthalite policy, and he returned to his capital at the head of an army, with which Khush-newâz had furnished him. The change is reasonably connected with the withholding of his tribute by Balas;<sup>2</sup> and it is difficult to suppose that Kobad, when he accepted Ephthalite aid, did not pledge himself to resume the subordinate position which his uncle had been content to hold for two years. It seems certain that he was accompanied to his capital by an Ephthalite contingent,<sup>3</sup> which he richly rewarded before dismissing it. Owing his throne to the aid thus afforded him, he can scarcely have refused to make the expected acknowledgment. Distinct evidence on the point is wanting; but there can be little doubt that for some years Kobad held the Persian throne on the condition of paying tribute to Khush-newâz, and recognizing him as his lord paramount.

During the early portion of his first reign, which extended from A. D. 487 to 498, we are told that he entrusted the entire administration of affairs to Sukhra, or Sufraï,<sup>4</sup> who had been the chief minister of his uncle. Sufraï's son, Zer-Mihr, had faithfully adhered to him throughout the whole period of his exile,<sup>5</sup> and Kobad did not regard it as a crime that the father had opposed his ambition, and thrown the weight of his authority into the scale against him. He recognized fidelity as a

quality that deserved reward, and was sufficiently magnanimous to forgive an opposition that had sprung from a virtuous motive, and, moreover, had not succeeded. Sufraï accordingly governed Persia for some years; the army obeyed him, and the civil administration was completely in his hands. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that Kobad after a while grew jealous of his subordinate, and was anxious to strip him of the quasi-regal authority which he exercised and assert his own right to direct affairs. But, alone, he felt unequal to such a task. He therefore called in the assistance of an officer who bore the name of Sapor, and had a command in the district of Rhages.<sup>6</sup> Sapor undertook to rid his sovereign of the incubus whereof he complained, and, with the tacit sanction of the monarch, he contrived to fasten a quarrel on Sufraï which he pushed to such an extremity that, at the end of it, he dragged the minister from the royal apartment to a prison, had him heavily ironed, and in a few days caused him to be put to death. Sapor, upon this, took the place previously occupied by Sufraï; he was recognized at once as Prime Minister, and Sipehbed, or commander-in-chief of the troops.<sup>7</sup> Kobad, content to have vindicated his royal power by the removal of Sufraï, conceded to the second favorite as much as he had allowed to the first, and once more suffered the management of affairs to pass wholly into the hands of a subject.

The only war in which Persia seems to have been engaged during the first reign of Kobad was one with the Khazars. This important people, now heard of for the first time in Persian history, appears to have occupied, in the reign of Kobad, the steppe country between the Wolga and the Don,<sup>8</sup> whence they made raids through the passes of the Caucasus into the fertile provinces of Iberia, Albania, and Armenia. Whether they were Turks, as is generally believed,<sup>9</sup> or Circassians, as has been ingeniously argued by a living writer,<sup>10</sup> is doubtful; but we cannot be mistaken in regarding them as at this time a race of fierce and terrible barbarians, nomadic in their habits, ruthless in their wars, cruel and uncivilized in their customs, a fearful curse to the regions which they overrun and desolated. We shall meet with them again, more than once, in the later history, and shall have to trace to their hostility some of the worst disasters that befel the Persian arms. On this occasion it is remarkable that they were repulsed with apparent ease. Kobad marched against their Khan in person, at the head of a hundred thousand men, defeated him in a battle, destroyed the

greater portion of his army, and returned to his capital with an enormous booty.<sup>11</sup> To check their incursions, he is said to have built on the Armenian frontier a town called Amid,<sup>12</sup> by which we are probably to understand, not the ancient Amida (or Diarbekr), but a second city of the name, further to the east and also further to the north, on the border line which separated Armenia from Iberia.

The triumphant return of Kobad from his Khazar war might have seemed likely to secure him a long and prosperous reign; but at the moment when fortune appeared most to smile upon him, an insidious evil, which had been gradually but secretly sapping the vitals of his empire, made itself apparent, and, drawing the monarch within the sphere of its influence, involved him speedily in difficulties which led to the loss of his crown. Mazdak, a native of Persepolis,<sup>13</sup> or, according to others, of Nishapur, in Khorassan,<sup>14</sup> and an Archimagus, or High Priest of the Zoroastrian religion, announced himself, early in the reign of Kobad, as a reformer of Zoroastrianism, and began to make proselytes to the new doctrines which he declared himself commissioned to unfold. All men, he said, were, by God's providence, born equal—none brought into the world any property, or any natural right to possess more than another. Property and marriage were mere human inventions, contrary to the will of God, which required an equal division of the good things of this world among all, and forbade the appropriation of particular women by individual men. In communities based upon property and marriage, men might lawfully vindicate their natural rights by taking their fair share of the good things wrongfully appropriated by their fellows. Adultery, incest, theft, were not really crimes, but necessary steps towards re-establishing the laws of nature in such societies.<sup>15</sup> To these communistic views, which seem to have been the original speculations of his own mind, the Magian reformer added tenets borrowed from the Brahmins or from some other Oriental ascetics, such as the sacredness of animal life, the necessity of abstaining from animal food, other than milk, cheese, or eggs, the propriety of simplicity in apparel, and the need of abstemiousness and devotion.<sup>16</sup> He thus presented the spectacle of an enthusiast who preached a doctrine of laxity and self-indulgence, not from any base or selfish motive, but simply from a conviction of its truth.<sup>17</sup> We learn without surprise that the doctrines of the new teacher were embraced with ardor by large classes among the Persians, by the young of all

ranks, by the lovers of pleasure, by the great bulk of the lower orders.<sup>18</sup> But it naturally moves our wonder that among the proselytes to the new religion was the king. Kobad, who had nothing to gain from embracing a creed which levelled him with his subjects, and was scarcely compatible with the continuance of monarchical rule, must have been sincere in his profession; and we inquire with interest, what were the circumstances which enabled Mazdak to attach to his cause so important and so unlikely a convert.

The explanation wherewith we are furnished by our authorities is, that Mazdak claimed to authenticate his mission by the possession and exhibition of miraculous powers. In order to impose on the weak mind of Kobad he arranged and carried into act an elaborate and clever imposture.<sup>19</sup> He excavated a cave below the fire-altar, on which he was in the habit of offering, and contrived to pass a tube from the cavern to the upper surface of the altar, where the sacred flame was maintained perpetually. Having then placed a confederate in the cavern, he invited the attendance of Kobad, and in his presence appeared to hold converse with the fire itself, which the Persians viewed as the symbol and embodiment of divinity. The king accepted the miracle as an absolute proof of the divine authority of the new teacher, and became thenceforth his zealous adherent and follower.

It may be readily imagined that the conversion of the monarch to such a creed was, under a despotic government, the prelude to disorders, which soon became intolerable. Not content with establishing community of property and of women among themselves, the sectaries claimed the right to plunder the rich at their pleasure, and to carry off for the gratification of their own passions the inmates of the most illustrious harems.<sup>20</sup> In vain did the Mobeds declare that the new religion was false, was monstrous, ought not to be tolerated for an hour. The followers of Mazdak had the support of the monarch, and this protection secured them complete impunity. Each day they grew bolder and more numerous. Persia became too narrow a field for their ambition, and they insisted on spreading their doctrines into the neighboring countries. We find traces of the acceptance of their views in the distant West;<sup>21</sup> and the historians of Armenia relate that in that unhappy country they so pressed their religion upon the people that an insurrection broke out,<sup>22</sup> and Persia was in danger of losing, by intolerance, one of her most valued dependencies.

Vahan, the Mamigonian, who had been superseded in his office by a fresh Marzpan, bent on forcing the Armenians to adopt the new creed, once more put himself forward as his country's champion, took arms in defence of the Christian faith, and endeavored to induce the Greek emperor, Anastasius, to accept the sovereignty of Persarmenia, together with the duty of protecting it against its late masters. Fear of the consequences, if he provoked the hostility of Persia, caused Anastasius to hesitate; and things might have gone hardly with the unfortunate Armenians,<sup>23</sup> had not affairs in Persia itself come about this time to a crisis.

The Mobeds and the principal nobles had in vain protested against the spread of the new religion and the patronage lent it by the Court. At length appeal was made to the chief Mobed, and he was requested to devise a remedy for the existing evils, which were generally felt to have passed the limits of endurance. The chief Mobed decided that, under the circumstances of the time, no remedy could be effectual but the deposition of the head of the State, through whose culpable connivance the disorders had attained their height.<sup>24</sup> His decision was received with general acquiescence. The Persian nobles agreed with absolute unanimity to depose Kobad, and to place upon the throne another member of the royal house. Their choice fell upon Zamasp,<sup>25</sup> a brother of Kobad, who was noted for his love of justice and for the mildness of his disposition.<sup>26</sup> The necessary arrangements having been made, they broke out into universal insurrection, arrested Kobad, and committed him to safe custody in the "Castle of Oblivion,"<sup>27</sup> proclaimed Zamasp, and crowned him king with all the usual formalities.

An attempt was then made to deal the new religion a fatal blow by the seizure and execution of the heresiarch, Mazdak. But here the counter-revolution failed. Mazdak was seized indeed and imprisoned; but his followers rose at once, broke open his prison doors, and set him at liberty. The government felt itself too weak to insist on its intended policy of coercion. Mazdak was allowed to live in retirement unmolested, and to increase the number of his disciples.

The reign of Zamasp appears to have lasted from A.D. 498 to A.D. 501, or between two and three years.<sup>28</sup> He was urged by the army to put Kobad to death,<sup>29</sup> but hesitated to adopt so extreme a course, and preferred retaining his rival as a prisoner. The "Castle of Oblivion" was regarded as a place of safe custody; but the ex-king contrived in a short time to put a cheat on his

guards<sup>30</sup> and effect his escape from confinement. Like other claimants of the Persian throne,<sup>31</sup> he at once took refuge with the Ephthalites, and sought to persuade the Great Khan to embrace his cause and place an army at his disposal. The Khan showed himself more than ordinarily complaisant. He can scarcely have sympathized with the religious leanings of his suppliant; but he remembered that he had placed him upon the throne, and had found him a faithful feudatory and a quiet neighbor. He therefore received him with every mark of honor, betrothed him to one of his own daughters,<sup>32</sup> and lent him an army of 30,000 men.<sup>33</sup> With this force Kobad returned to Persia, and offered battle to Zamasp. Zamasp declined the conflict. He had not succeeded in making himself popular with his subjects, and knew that a large party desired the return of his brother.<sup>34</sup> It is probable that he did not greatly desire a throne. At any rate, when his brother reached the neighborhood of the capital, at the head of the 30,000 Ephthalites and of a strong body of Persian adherents, Zamasp determined upon submission. He vacated the throne in favor of Kobad, without risking the chance of a battle, and descended voluntarily into a private station.<sup>35</sup> Different stories are told of his treatment by the restored monarch. According to Procopius,<sup>36</sup> he was blinded after a cruel method long established among the Persians; but Mirkhond declares that he was pardoned, and even received from his brother marked signs of affection and favor.<sup>37</sup>

The coins of Zamasp have the usual inflated ball and mural crown, but with a crescent in place of the front limb of the crown.<sup>38</sup> The ends of the diadem appear over the two shoulders. On either side of the head there is a star, and over either shoulder a crescent. Outside the encircling ring, or "pearl border," we see, almost for the first time,<sup>39</sup> three stars with crescents. The reverse bears the usual fire-altar, with a star and crescent on either side of the flame. The legend is extremely brief, being either *Zamasp* or *Bag Zamasp*, i. e. "Zamaspes," or "the divine Zamaspes." [Pl. XXII., Fig. 1.]

## CHAPTER XIX.

*Second Reign of Kobad. His Change of Attitude towards the Followers of Mazdak. His Cause of Quarrel with Rome. First Roman War of Kobad. Peace made A.D. 505. Rome fortifies Daras and Theodosiopolis. Complaint made by Persia. Negotiations of Kobad with Justin: Proposed Adoption of Chosroës by the Latter. Internal Troubles in Persia. Second Roman War of Kobad, A.D. 524-531. Death of Kobad. His Character. His coins.*

Καβάδης ὁ Περόζου, τῶν Περσικῶν πραγμάτων κρατήσας, πολλοὺς μὲν κατὰ Ῥωμαίων πολέμους διήνεγκε, πολλὰ δὲ κατὰ βαρβάρων τῶν προσοικούντων ἔστησε τρύπαια, καὶ χρόνον οὐδένα παρήκε ταραχαῖς τε καὶ κινδύνους ἐγκαλινδούμενος.—Agathias, iv. 27; p. 138, B.

THE second reign of Kobad covered a period of thirty years,<sup>1</sup> extending from A.D. 501 to A.D. 531.<sup>2</sup> He was contemporary, during this space, with the Roman emperors Anastasius, Justin, and Justinian, with Theodoric, king of Italy, with Cassiodorus, Symmachus, Boëthius, Procopius, and Belisarius. The Oriental writers tell us but little of this portion of his history. Their silence, however, is fortunately compensated by the unusual copiousness of the Byzantines, who deliver, at considerable length, the entire series of transactions in which Kobad was engaged with the Constantinopolitan emperors, and furnish some interesting notices of other matters which occupied him. Procopius especially, the eminent rhetorician and secretary of Belisarius, who was born about the time of Kobad's restoration to the Persian throne,<sup>3</sup> and became secretary to the great general four years before Kobad's death,<sup>4</sup> is ample in his details of the chief occurrences, and deserves a confidence which the Byzantines can rarely claim, from being at once a contemporary and a man of remarkable intelligence. "His facts," as Gibbon well observes,<sup>5</sup> "are collected from the personal experience and free conversation of a soldier, a statesman, and a traveller; his style continually aspires, and often attains, to the merit of strength and elegance; his reflections, more especially in the speeches, which he too frequently inserts, contain a rich fund of political knowledge; and the historian, excited by the generous ambition of pleasing and in-

structing posterity, appears to disdain the prejudices of the people and the flattery of courts."

The first question which Kobad had to decide, when, by the voluntary cession of his brother, Zamasp, he remounted his throne, was the attitude which he should assume towards Mazdak and his followers. By openly favoring the new religion and encouraging the disorders of its votaries, he had so disgusted the more powerful classes of his subjects that he had lost his crown and been forced to become a fugitive in a foreign country. He was not prepared to affront this danger a second time. Still, his attachment to the new doctrine was not shaken; he held the views propounded to be true, and was not ashamed to confess himself an unwavering adherent of the communistic prophet.<sup>6</sup> He contrived, however, to reconcile his belief with his interests by separating the individual from the king. As a man, he held the views of Mazdak; but, as a king, he let it be known that he did not intend to maintain or support the sectaries in any extreme or violent measures. The result was that the new doctrine languished; Mazdak escaped persecution and continued to propagate his views; but, practically, the progress of the new opinions was checked; they had ceased to command royal advocacy, and had consequently ceased to endanger the State; they still fermented among the masses, and might cause trouble in the future; but for the present they were the harmless speculations of a certain number of enthusiasts who did not venture any more to carry their theories into practice.

Kobad had not enjoyed the throne for more than a year before his relations with the great empire on his western frontier became troubled, and, after some futile negotiations, hostilities once more broke out. It appears that among the terms of the peace concluded in A.D. 442 between Isdigerd II. and the younger Theodosius,<sup>7</sup> the Romans had undertaken to pay annually a certain sum of money as a contribution towards the expenses of a fortified post which the two powers undertook to maintain in the pass of Derbend,<sup>8</sup> between the last spurs of the Caucasus and the Caspian. This fortress, known as Juroipach or Biraparach,<sup>9</sup> commanded the usual passage by which the hordes of the north were accustomed to issue from their vast arid steppes upon the rich and populous regions of the south for the purpose of plundering raids, if not of actual conquests. Their incursions threatened almost equally Roman and Persian territory,<sup>10</sup> and it was felt that the two nations

were alike interested in preventing them. The original agreement was that both parties should contribute equally, alike to the building and to the maintaining of the fortress; but the Romans were so occupied in other wars that the entire burden actually fell upon the Persians. These latter, as was natural, made from time to time demands upon the Romans for the payment of their share of the expenses;<sup>11</sup> but it seems that these efforts were ineffectual, and the debt accumulated. It was under these circumstances that Kobad, finding himself in want of money to reward adequately his Ephthalite allies,<sup>12</sup> sent an embassy to Anastasius, the Roman emperor, with a peremptory demand for a remittance. The reply of Anastasius was a refusal. According to one authority<sup>13</sup> he declined absolutely to make any payment; according to another,<sup>14</sup> he expressed his willingness to *lend* his Persian brother a sum of money on receiving the customary acknowledgment, but refused an advance on any other terms. Such a response was a simple repudiation of obligations voluntarily contracted, and could scarcely fail to rouse the indignation of the Persian monarch. If he learned further that the real cause of the refusal was a desire to embroil Persia with the Ephthalites, and to advance the interests of Rome by leading her enemies to waste each other's strength in an internecine conflict,<sup>15</sup> he may have admired the cunning of his rival, but can scarcely have felt the more amicably disposed towards him.

The natural result followed. Kobad at once declared war. The two empires had now been uninterruptedly at peace for sixty, and, with the exception of a single campaign (that of A.D. 441), for eighty years. They had ceased to feel that respect for each other's arms and valor which experience gives, and which is the best preservative against wanton hostilities. Kobad was confident in his strength, since he was able to bring into the field, besides the entire force of Persia, a large Ephthalite contingent, and also a number of Arabs. Anastasius, perhaps, scarcely thought that Persia would go to war on account of a pecuniary claim which she had allowed to be disregarded for above half a century. The resolve of Kobad evidently took him by surprise; but he had gone too far to recede. The Roman pride would not allow him to yield to a display of force what he had refused when demanded peacefully; and he was thus compelled to maintain by arms the position which he had assumed without anticipating its consequences.

The war began by a sudden inroad of the host of Persia into Roman Armenia,<sup>16</sup> where Theodosiopolis was still the chief stronghold and the main support of the Roman power.<sup>17</sup> Unprepared for resistance, this city was surrendered after a short siege by its commandant, Constantine, after which the greater part of Armenia was overrun and ravaged.<sup>18</sup> From Armenia Kobad conducted his army into Northern Mesopotamia, and formed the siege of Amida about the commencement of the winter.<sup>19</sup> The great strength of Amida has been already noticed in this volume.<sup>20</sup> Kobad found it ungarrisoned, and only protected by a small force, cantoned in its neighborhood, under the philosopher, Alypius.<sup>21</sup> But the resolution of the townsmen, and particularly of the monks, was great; and a most strenuous resistance met all his efforts to take the place. At first his hope was to effect a breach in the defences by means of the ram; but the besieged employed the customary means of destroying his engines, and, where these failed, the strength and thickness of the walls was found to be such that no serious impression could be made on them by the Persian battering train. It was necessary to have recourse to some other device; and Kobad proceeded to erect a mound in the immediate neighborhood of the wall, with a view of dominating the town, driving the defenders from the battlements, and then taking the place by escalade. He raised an immense work; but it was undermined by the enemy, and at last fell in with a terrible crash, involving hundreds in its ruin.<sup>22</sup> It is said that after this failure Kobad despaired of success, and determined to draw off his army; but the taunts and insults of the besieged, or confidence in the prophecies of the Magi, who saw an omen of victory in the grossest of all the insults, caused him to change his intention and still continue the siege. His perseverance was soon afterwards rewarded. A soldier discovered in the wall the outlet of a drain or sewer imperfectly blocked up with rubble, and, removing this during the night, found himself able to pass through the wall into the town. He communicated his discovery to Kobad, who took his measures accordingly. Sending, the next night, a few picked men through the drain, to seize the nearest tower, which happened to be slackly guarded by some sleepy monks, who the day before had been keeping festival,<sup>23</sup> he brought the bulk of his troops with scaling ladders to the adjoining portion of the wall, and by his presence, exhortations, and threats,<sup>24</sup> compelled them to force their way into the place. The inhabitants re-

sisted strenuously, but were overpowered by numbers, and the carnage in the streets was great. At last an aged priest, shocked at the indiscriminate massacre, made bold to address the monarch himself and tell him that it was no kingly act to slaughter captives. "Why, then, did you elect to fight?" said the angry prince. "It was God's doing," replied the priest, astutely; "He willed that thou shouldst owe thy conquest of Amida, not to our weakness, but to thy own valor." The flattery pleased Kobad, and induced him to stop the effusion of blood;<sup>25</sup> but the sack was allowed to continue; the whole town was pillaged;<sup>26</sup> and the bulk of the inhabitants were carried off as slaves.<sup>27</sup>

The siege of Amida lasted eighty days,<sup>28</sup> and the year A.D. 503 had commenced before it was over.<sup>29</sup> Anastasius, on learning the danger of his frontier town, immediately despatched to its aid a considerable force, which he placed under four commanders<sup>30</sup>—Areobindus, the grandson of the Gothic officer of the same name who distinguished himself in the Persian war of Theodosius;<sup>31</sup> Celer, captain of the imperial guard; Patricius, the Phrygian; and Hypatius, one of his own nephews. The army, collectively, is said to have been more numerous than any that Rome had ever brought into the field against the Persians;<sup>32</sup> but it was weakened by the divided command, and it was moreover broken up into detachments which acted independently of each other. Its advent also was tardy. Not only did it arrive too late to save Amida, but it in no way interfered with the after-movements of Kobad, who, leaving a small garrison to maintain his new conquest, carried off the whole of his rich booty to his city of Nisibis, and placed the bulk of his troops in a good position upon his own frontier.<sup>33</sup> When Areobindus, at the head of the first division, reached Amida and heard that the Persians had fallen back, he declined the comparatively inglorious work of a siege, and pressed forward, anxious to carry the war into Persian territory. He seems actually to have crossed the border and invaded the district of Arzanene,<sup>34</sup> when news reached him that Kobad was marching upon him with all his troops, whereupon he instantly fled, and threw himself into Constantia, leaving his camp and stores to be taken by the enemy. Meanwhile another division of the Roman army, under Patricius and Hypatius, had followed in the steps of Areobindus, and meeting with the advance-guard of Kobad, which consisted of eight hundred Ephthalites, had destroyed it almost to a man.<sup>35</sup>

Ignorant, however, of the near presence of the main Persian army, this body of troops allowed itself soon afterwards to be surprised on the banks of a stream, while some of the men were bathing and others were taking their breakfast, and was completely cut to pieces by Kobad, scarcely any but the generals escaping.<sup>36</sup>

Thus far success had been wholly on the side of the Persians; and if circumstances had permitted Kobad to remain at the seat of war and continue to direct the operations of his troops in person, there is every reason to believe that he would have gained still greater advantages. The Roman generals were incompetent; they were at variance among themselves; and they were unable to control the troops under their command. The soldiers were insubordinate, without confidence in their officers, and inclined to grumble at such an unwonted hardship as a campaign prolonged into the winter.<sup>37</sup> Thus all the conditions of the war were in favor of Persia. But unfortunately for Kobad, it happened that, at the moment when his prospects were the fairest,<sup>38</sup> a danger in another quarter demanded his presence, and required him to leave the conduct of the Roman war to others. An Ephthalite invasion called him to the defence of his north-eastern frontier before the year A.D. 503 was over,<sup>39</sup> and from this time the operations in Mesopotamia were directed, not by the king in person, but by his generals. A change is at once apparent. In A.D. 504 Celer invaded Arzanene, destroyed a number of forts, and ravaged the whole province with fire and sword.<sup>40</sup> Thence marching southward, he threatened Nisibis, which is said to have been within a little of yielding itself.<sup>41</sup> Towards winter Patricius and Hypatius took heart, and, collecting an army, commenced the siege of Amida, which they attempted to storm on several occasions, but without success.<sup>42</sup> After a while they turned the siege into a blockade, entrapped the commander of the Persian garrison, Glones, by a stratagem,<sup>43</sup> and reduced the defenders of the place to such distress that it would have been impossible to hold out much longer. It seems to have been when matters were at this point<sup>44</sup> that an ambassador of high rank<sup>45</sup> arrived from Kobad, empowered to conclude a peace, and instructed to declare his master's willingness to surrender all his conquests, including Amida, on the payment of a considerable sum of money. The Roman generals, regarding Amida as impregnable, and not aware of the exhaustion of its stores, gladly consented. They handed over to the Persians a

thousand pounds' weight of gold, and received in exchange the captured city and territory.<sup>46</sup> A treaty was signed by which the contracting powers undertook to remain at peace and respect each other's dominions for the space of seven years.<sup>47</sup> No definite arrangement seems to have been made with respect to the yearly payment on account of the fortress, Biraparach, the demand for which had occasioned the war. This claim remained in abeyance, to be pressed or neglected, as Persia might consider her interests to require.

The Ephthalite war, which compelled Kobad to make peace with Anastasius, appears to have occupied him uninterruptedly for ten years.<sup>48</sup> During its continuance Rome took advantage of her rival's difficulties to continue the system (introduced under the younger Theodosius<sup>49</sup>) of augmenting her own power, and crippling that of Persia, by establishing strongly fortified posts upon her border in the immediate vicinity of Persian territory. Not content with restoring Theodosiopolis and greatly strengthening its defences,<sup>50</sup> Anastasius erected an entirely new fortress at Daras,<sup>51</sup> on the southern skirts of the Mons Masius, within twelve miles of Nisibis, at the edge of the great Mesopotamian plain. This place was not a mere fort, but a city; it contained churches, baths, porticoes, large granaries, and extensive cisterns.<sup>52</sup> It constituted a standing menace to Persia;<sup>53</sup> and its erection was in direct violation of the treaty made by Theodosius with Isdigerd II.,<sup>54</sup> which was regarded as still in force by both nations.

We cannot be surprised that Kobad, when his Ephthalite war was over, made formal complaint at Constantinople (ab. A.D. 517) of the infraction of the treaty.<sup>55</sup> Anastasius was unable to deny the charge. He endeavored at first to meet it by a mixture of bluster with professions of friendship; but when this method did not appear effectual he had recourse to an argument whereof the Persians on most occasions acknowledged the force. By the expenditure of a large sum of money he either corrupted the ambassadors of Kobad, or made them honestly doubt whether the sum paid would not satisfy their master.<sup>56</sup>

In A.D. 518 Anastasius died, and the imperial authority was assumed by the Captain of the Guard, the "Dacian peasant,"<sup>57</sup> Justin. With him Kobad very shortly entered into negotiations. He had not, it is clear, accepted the pecuniary sacrifice of Anastasius as a complete satisfaction. He felt that he had many grounds of quarrel with the Romans. There was the old

matter of the annual payment due on account of the fortress of Biraparach; there was the recent strengthening of Theodosiopolis, and building of Daras; there was moreover an interference of Rome at this time in the region about the Caucasus which was very galling to Persia and was naturally resented by her monarch. One of the first proceedings of Justin after he ascended the throne was to send an embassy with rich gifts to the court of a certain Hunnic chief of these parts, called Ziligdes or Zilgibis,<sup>58</sup> and to conclude a treaty with him by which the Hun bound himself to assist the Romans against the Persians. Soon afterwards a Lazic prince, named Tzath, whose country was a Persian dependency, instead of seeking inauguration from Kobad, proceeded on the death of his father<sup>59</sup> to the court of Constantinople, and expressed his wish to become a Christian, and to hold his crown as one of Rome's vassal monarchs. Justin gave this person a warm welcome, had him baptized, married him to a Roman lady of rank, and sent him back to Lazica adorned with a diadem and robes that sufficiently indicated his dependent position.<sup>60</sup> The friendly relations established between Rome and Persia by the treaty of A.D. 505 were, under these circumstances, greatly disturbed, and on both sides it would seem that war was expected to break out.<sup>61</sup> But neither Justin nor Kobad was desirous of a rupture. Both were advanced in years,<sup>62</sup> and both had domestic troubles to occupy them. Kobad was at this time especially anxious about the succession. He had four sons,<sup>63</sup> Kaöses, Zames, Phthasuarsas, and Chosroës, of whom Kaöses was the eldest. This prince, however, did not please him. His affections were fixed on his fourth son, Chosroës, and he had no object more at heart than to secure the crown for this favorite child. The Roman writers tell us<sup>64</sup> that instead of resenting the proceedings of Justin in the years A.D. 520-522, Kobad made the strange proposal to him about this time that he should adopt Chosroës, in order that that prince might have the aid of the Romans against his countrymen, if his right of succession should be disputed. It is, no doubt, difficult to believe that such a proposition should have been made; but the circumstantial manner in which Procopius, writing not forty years after, relates the matter, renders it almost impossible for us to reject the story as a pure fabrication. There must have been some foundation for it. In the negotiations between Justin and Kobad during the early years of the former, the idea of Rome pledging herself to acknowledge Chosroës as his father's successor must have been brought

forward. The proposal, whatever its exact terms, led however to no result. Rome declined to do as Kobad desired;<sup>66</sup> and thus another ground of estrangement was added to those which had previously made the renewal of the Roman war a mere question of time.

It is probable that the rupture would have occurred earlier than it did had not Persia about the year A.D. 523 become once more the scene of religious discord and conspiracy. The followers of Mazdak had been hitherto protected by Kobad, and had lived in peace and multiplied throughout all the provinces of the empire.<sup>66</sup> Content with the toleration which they enjoyed, they had for above twenty years created no disturbance, and their name had almost disappeared from the records of history. But as time went on they began to feel that their position was insecure.<sup>67</sup> Their happiness, their very safety, depended upon a single life; and as Kobad advanced in years they grew to dread more and more the prospect which his death would open. Among his sons there was but one who had embraced their doctrine; and this prince, Phthasuarsas, had but little chance of being chosen to be his father's successor. Kaöses enjoyed the claim of natural right; Chosroës was his father's favorite; Zames had the respect and good wishes of the great mass of the people;<sup>68</sup> Phthasuarsas was disliked by the Magi,<sup>69</sup> and, if the choice lay with them, was certain to be passed over. The sectaries therefore determined not to wait the natural course of events, but to shape them to their own purposes. They promised Phthasuarsas to obtain by their prayers his father's abdication and his own appointment to succeed him, and asked him to pledge himself to establish their religion as that of the State when he became king. The prince consented; and the Mazdakites proceeded to arrange their plans, when, unfortunately for them, Kobad discovered, or suspected, that a scheme was on foot to deprive him of his crown. Whether the designs of the sectaries were really treasonable or not is uncertain; but whatever they were, an Oriental monarch was not likely to view them with favor. In the East it is an offence even to speculate on the death of the king; and Kobad saw in the intrigue which had been set on foot a criminal and dangerous conspiracy. He determined at once to crush the movement. Inviting the Mazdakites to a solemn assembly, at which he was to confer the royal dignity on Phthasuarsas, he caused his army to surround the unarmed multitude and massacre the entire number.<sup>70</sup>

Relieved from this peril, Kobad would at once have declared war against Justin, and have marched an army into Roman territory, had not troubles broken out in Iberia, which made it necessary for him to stand on the defensive.<sup>71</sup> Adopting the intolerant policy so frequently pursued, and generally with such ill results, by the Persian kings, Kobad had commanded Gurgenes, the Iberian monarch, to renounce Christianity and profess the Zoroastrian religion. Especially he had required that the Iberian custom of burying the dead should be relinquished, and that the Persian practice of exposing corpses to be devoured by dogs and birds of prey<sup>72</sup> should supersede the Christian rite of sepulture. Gurgenes was too deeply attached to his faith to entertain these propositions for a moment. He at once shook off the Persian yoke, and, declaring himself a vassal of Rome, obtained a promise from Justin that he would never desert the Iberian cause. Rome, however, was not prepared to send her own armies into this distant and inhospitable region; her hope was to obtain aid from the Tatars of the Crimea,<sup>73</sup> and to play off these barbarians against the forces wherewith Kobad might be expected shortly to vindicate his authority. An attempt to engage the Crimeans generally in this service was made, but it was not successful. A small force was enrolled and sent to the assistance of Gurgenes. But now the Persians took the field in strength. A large army was sent into Iberia by Kobad, under a general named Boës. Gurgenes saw resistance to be impossible. He therefore fled the country, and threw himself into Lazica, where the difficult nature of the ground, the favor of the natives, and the assistance of the Romans enabled him to maintain himself. Iberia, however, was lost, and passed once more under the Persians, who even penetrated into Lazic territory and occupied some forts which commanded the passes between Lazica and Iberia.<sup>74</sup>

Rome, on her part, endeavored to retaliate (A.D. 526) by invading Persarmenia and Mesopotamia. The campaign is remarkable as that in which the greatest general of the age, the renowned and unfortunate Belisarius, first held a command and thus commenced the work of learning by experience the duties of a military leader. Hitherto a mere guardsman, and still quite a youth,<sup>75</sup> trammelled moreover by association with a colleague, he did not on this occasion reap any laurels. A Persian force under two generals, Narses and Aratius, defended Persarmenia, and, engaging the Romans under Sittas and

Belisarius, succeeded in defeating them. At the same time, Licelarius, a Thracian in the Roman service, made an incursion into the tract about Nisibis, grew alarmed without cause and beat a speedy retreat. Hereupon Justin recalled him as incompetent, and the further conduct of the war in Mesopotamia was entrusted to Belisarius, who took up his headquarters at Daras.

The year A.D. 527 seems to have been one in which nothing of importance was attempted on either side. At Constantinople the Emperor Justin had fallen into ill health, and, after associating his nephew Justinian on the 1st of April, had departed this life on the 1st of August.<sup>76</sup> About the same time<sup>77</sup> Kobad found his strength insufficient for active warfare, and put the command of his armies into the hands of his sons. The struggle continued in Lazica, but with no decisive result.<sup>78</sup> At Daras, Belisarius, apparently, stood on the defensive. It was not till A.D. 528 had set in that he resumed operations in the open field, and prepared once more to measure his strength against that of Persia.

Belisarius was stirred from his repose by an order from court. Desirous of carrying further the policy of gaining ground by means of fortified posts,<sup>79</sup> Justinian, who had recently restored and strengthened the frontier city of Martyropolis,<sup>80</sup> on the Nymphius, sent instructions to Belisarius, early in A.D. 528, to the effect that he was to build a new fort at a place called Mindon, on the Persian border a little to the left of Nisibis.<sup>81</sup> The work was commenced, but the Persians would not allow it to proceed. An army which numbered 30,000 men, commanded by Xerxes,<sup>82</sup> son of Kobad, and Perozes, the Mihran,<sup>83</sup> attacked the Roman workmen; and when Belisarius, reinforced by fresh troops from Syria and Phœnicia, ventured an engagement, he was completely defeated and forced to seek safety in flight. The attempted fortification was, upon this, razed to the ground; and the Mihran returned, with numerous prisoners of importance, into Persia.<sup>84</sup>

It is creditable to Justinian that he did not allow the ill-success of his lieutenant to lead to his recall or disgrace. On the contrary, he chose exactly the time of his greatest depression to give him the title of "General of the East."<sup>85</sup> Belisarius upon this assembled at Daras an imposing force, composed of Romans and allies, the latter being chiefly Massagetæ. The entire number amounted to 25,000 men;<sup>86</sup> and with this

army he would probably have assumed the offensive, had not the Persian general of the last campaign, Perozes the Mihran,<sup>87</sup> again appeared in the field, at the head of 40,000 Persians<sup>88</sup> and declared his intention of besieging and taking Daras. With the insolence of an Oriental he sent a message to Belisarius, requiring him to have his bath prepared for the morrow, as after taking the town he would need that kind of refreshment.<sup>89</sup> Belisarius contented himself, in reply, with drawing out his troops in front of Daras in a position carefully prepared beforehand, where both his centre and his flanks would be protected by a deep ditch, outside of which there would be room to act for his cavalry. Perozes, having reconnoitred the position, hesitated to attack it without a greater advantage of numbers, and sent hastily to Nisibis for 10,000 more soldiers, while he allowed the day to pass without anything more serious than a demonstration of his cavalry against the Roman left, and some insignificant single combats.<sup>90</sup>

The next morning his reinforcement arrived;<sup>91</sup> and after some exchange of messages with Belisarius,<sup>92</sup> which led to no result, he commenced active operations. Placing his infantry in the centre, and his horse upon either wing, as the Romans had likewise done, and arranging his infantry so that one half should from time to time relieve the other,<sup>93</sup> he assaulted the Roman line with a storm of darts and arrows. The Romans replied with their missile weapons; but the Persians had the advantage of numbers; they were protected by huge wattled shields; and they were more accustomed to this style of warfare than their adversaries. Still the Romans held out; but it was a relief to them when the missile weapons were exhausted on both sides, and a closer fight began along the whole line with swords and spears. After a while the Roman left was in difficulties. Here the Cadiseni (Cadusians?) under Pituzes routed their opponents, and were pursuing them hastily when the Massagetic horse, commanded by Sunicas and Aigan, and three hundred Heruli under a chief called Pharas, charged them on their right flank, and at once threw them into disorder. Three thousand fell, and the rest were driven back upon their main body, which still continued to fight bravely. The Romans did not push their advantage, but were satisfied to reoccupy the ground from which they had been driven.<sup>94</sup>

Scarcely was the battle re-established in this quarter when the Romans found themselves in still greater difficulties upon their right. Here Perozes had determined to deliver his main

attack. The corps of *Immortals*, which he had kept in reserve, and such troops as he could spare from his centre, were secretly massed upon his own left,<sup>95</sup> and charged the Roman right with such fury that it was broken and began a hasty retreat. The Persians pursued in a long column, and were carrying all before them, when once more an impetuous flank charge of the barbarian cavalry, which now formed an important element in the Roman armies, changed the face of affairs, and indeed decided the fortune of the day. The Persian column was actually cut in two by the Massagetic horse; those who had advanced the furthest were completely separated from their friends, and were at once surrounded and slain. Among them was the standard-bearer of Baresmanes, who commanded the Persian left. The fall of this man increased the general confusion. In vain did the Persian column, checked in its advance, attempt an orderly retreat. The Romans assaulted it in front and on both flanks, and a terrible carnage ensued. The crowning disaster was the death of Baresmanes, who was slain by Sunicas, the Massa-Goth; whereupon the whole Persian army broke and fled without offering any further resistance. Here fell 5000, including numbers of the "Immortals." The slaughter would have been still greater, had not Belisarius and his lieutenant, Hermogenes, with wise caution restrained the Roman troops and recalled them quickly from the pursuit of the enemy, content with the success which they had achieved. It was so long since a Roman army had defeated a Persian one in the open field that the victory had an extraordinary value, and it would have been foolish to risk a reverse in the attempt to give it greater completeness.<sup>96</sup>

While these events took place in Mesopotamia, the Persian arms were also unsuccessful in the Armenian highlands, whither Kobad had sent a second army to act offensively against Rome, under the conduct of a certain Mermeröes. The Roman commanders in this region were Sittas, the former colleague of Belisarius,<sup>97</sup> and Dorotheas, a general of experience. Their troops did not amount to more than half the number of the enemy,<sup>98</sup> yet they contrived to inflict on the Persians two defeats, one in their own territory, the other in Roman Armenia. The superiority thus exhibited by the Romans encouraged desertions to their side; and in some instances the deserters were able to carry over with them to their new friends small portions of Persian territory.<sup>99</sup>

In the year A.D. 531, after a vain attempt at negotiating terms of peace with Rome,<sup>100</sup> the Persians made an effort to recover their laurels by carrying the war into a new quarter and effecting a new combination. Alamandarus, sheikh of the Saracenic Arabs, had long been a bitter enemy of the Romans, and from his safe retreat in the desert had been accustomed for fifty years to ravage, almost at his will, the eastern provinces of the empire.<sup>101</sup> Two years previously he had carried fire and sword through the regions of upper Syria, had burned the suburbs of Chalcis,<sup>102</sup> and threatened the Roman capital of the East, the rich and luxurious Antioch. He owed, it would seem, some sort of allegiance to Persia,<sup>103</sup> although practically he was independent, and made his expeditions when and where he pleased. However, in A.D. 531, he put himself at the disposal of Persia, proposed a joint expedition, and suggested a new plan of campaign. "Mesopotamia and Osrhoêné," he said, "on which the Persians were accustomed to make their attacks, could better resist them than almost any other part of the Roman territory. In these provinces were the strongest of the Roman cities, fortified according to the latest rules of art, and plentifully supplied with every appliance of defensive warfare. There, too, were the best and bravest of the Roman troops, and an army more numerous than Rome had ever employed against Persia before. It would be most perilous to risk an encounter on this ground. Let Persia, however, invade the country beyond the Euphrates, and she would find but few obstacles. In that region there were no strong fortresses, nor was there any army worth mention. Antioch itself, the richest and most populous city of the Roman East, was without a garrison, and, if it were suddenly assaulted, could probably be taken. The incursion might be made, Antioch sacked, and the booty carried off into Persian territory before the Romans in Mesopotamia received intelligence of what was happening." Kobad listened with approval, and determined to adopt the bold course suggested to him. He levied a force of 15,000 cavalry,<sup>104</sup> and, placing it under the command of a general named Azarethes,<sup>105</sup> desired him to take Alamandarus for his guide and make a joint expedition with him across the Euphrates. It was understood that the great object of the expedition was the capture of Antioch.

The allied army crossed the Euphrates below Circesium,<sup>106</sup> and ascended the right bank of the river till they neared the latitude of Antioch, when they struck westward and reached

Gabbula<sup>107</sup> (the modern *Jabul*), on the north shore of the salt lake now known as the Sabakhah.<sup>108</sup> Here they learned to their surprise that the movement, which they had intended to be wholly unknown to the Romans, had come to the ears of Belisarius,<sup>109</sup> who had at once quitted Daras, and proceeded by forced marches to the defence of Syria, into which he had thrown himself with an army of 20,000 men,<sup>110</sup> Romans, Isaurians, Lycaonians,<sup>111</sup> and Arabs. His troops were already interposed between the Persians and their longed-for prey, Belisarius having fixed his headquarters at Chalcis,<sup>112</sup> half a degree to the west of Gabbula, and twenty-five miles nearer to Antioch. Thus balked of their purpose, and despairing of any greater success than they had already achieved, the allies became anxious to return to Persia with the plunder of the Syrian towns and villages which they had sacked on their advance. Belisarius was quite content that they should carry off their spoil, and would have considered it a sufficient victory to have frustrated the expedition without striking a blow.<sup>113</sup> But his army was otherwise minded; they were eager for battle, and hoped doubtless to strip the flying foe of his rich booty. Belisarius was at last forced, against his better judgment, to indulge their desires and allow an engagement, which was fought on the banks of the Euphrates, nearly opposite Callinicus.<sup>114</sup> Here the conduct of the Roman troops in action corresponded but ill to the anxiety for a conflict. The infantry indeed stood firm, notwithstanding that they fought fasting;<sup>115</sup> but the Saracenic Arabs, of whom a portion were on the Roman side, and the Isaurian and Lycaonian horse, who had been among the most eager for the fray, offered scarcely any resistance; and, the right wing of the Romans being left exposed by their flight, Belisarius was compelled to make his troops turn their faces to the enemy and their backs to the Euphrates, and in this position, where defeat would have been ruin, to meet and resist all the assaults of the foe until the shades of evening fell, and he was able to transport his troops in boats across the river. The honors of victory rested with the Persians, but they had gained no substantial advantage; and when Azarethes returned to his master he was not unjustly reproached with having sacrificed many lives for no appreciable result.<sup>116</sup> The raid into Syria had failed of its chief object; and Belisarius, though defeated, had returned, with the main strength of his army intact, into Mesopotamia.

The battle of Callinicus was fought on Easter Eve, April 19.

Azarethes probably reached Ctesiphon and made his report to Kobad towards the end of the month. Dissatisfied with what Azarethes had achieved, and feeling that the season was not too far advanced for a second campaign, Kobad despatched an army under three chiefs, into Mesopotamia, where Sittas was now the principal commander on the Roman side, as Belisarius had been hastily summoned to Byzantium in order to be employed against the Vandals in Africa. This force found no one to resist in the open field, and was therefore able to invade Sophêné and lay siege to the Roman fortress of Martyropolis.<sup>117</sup> Martyropolis was ill provisioned, and its walls were out of repair. The Persians must soon have taken it, had not Sittas contrived to spread reports of a diversion which the Huns were about to make as Roman allies. Fear of being caught between two fires paralyzed the Persian commanders; and before events undeceived them, news arrived in the camp that Kobad was dead, and that a new prince sat upon the throne. Under these circumstances, Chanaranges, the chief of the Persian commanders, yielded to representations made by Sittas, that peace would now probably be made between the contending powers, and withdrew his army into Persian territory.<sup>118</sup>

Kobad had, in fact, been seized with paralysis on the 8th of September,<sup>119</sup> and after an illness which lasted only five days, had expired. Before dying, he had communicated to his chief minister, Mebodes, his earnest desire that Chosroës should succeed him upon the throne, and, acting under the advice of Mebodes, had formally left the crown to him by a will duly executed,<sup>120</sup> He is said by a contemporary to have been eighty-two years old at his death,<sup>121</sup> an age very seldom attained by an Oriental monarch. His long life was more than usually eventful, and he cannot be denied the praise of activity, perseverance, fertility of resource, and general military capacity. But he was cruel and fickle; he disgraced his ministers and his generals on insufficient grounds; he allowed himself, from considerations of policy, to smother his religious convictions; and he risked subjecting Persia to the horrors of a civil war, in order to gratify a favoritism which, however justified by the event, seems to have rested on no worthy motive. Chosroës was preferred on account of his beauty, and because he was the son of Kobad's best-loved wife,<sup>122</sup> rather than for any good qualities; and inherited the kingdom, not so much because he had shown any capacity to govern as because he was his father's darling.

The coins of Kobad are, as might be expected from the length of his reign, very numerous. In their general appearance they resemble those of Zamasp, but do not exhibit quite so many stars and crescents. The legend on the obverse is either "Kavát" or "Kavát" afzui," i.e. "Kobad," or "May Kobad be increased."<sup>123</sup> The reverse shows the regnal year, which ranges from eleven to forty-three,<sup>124</sup> together with a mint-mark. The mint-marks, which are nearly forty in number, comprise almost all those of Perozes, together with about thirteen others.<sup>125</sup> [Pl. XXII. Fig. 2.]

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## CHAPTER XX.

*Accession of Chosroës I. (Anushirwan). Conspiracy to dethrone him crushed. General Severity of his Government. He concludes Peace with Rome, A. D. 533. Terms of the Peace. Causes which led to its Rupture. First Roman War of Chosroës, A. D. 540-544. Second Roman War, A. D. 549-557. Eastern Wars. Conquest of Arabia Felix. Supposed Campaign in India. War with the Turks. Revolt of Persarmenia. Third Roman War, A. D. 572-579. Death of Chosroës.*

Τεθνηκότος τοῦ Κάβαδου, Χοσρόης ὁ πᾶν ὁ καθ' ἡμᾶς διαδέχεται τὴν πατρῶαν ἀρχὴν, καὶ πέπραχε πλείστα ὄσα καὶ μέγιστα.—Agathias, iv. 29; p. 140, A.

THE accession of Chosroës was not altogether undisputed. Kaöses, the eldest of the sons of Kobad, regarding himself as entitled to the crown by right of birth, assumed the insignia of royalty on the death of his father, and claimed to be acknowledged as monarch.<sup>1</sup> But Mebodes, the Grand Vizier, interposed with the assertion of a constitutional axiom, that no one had the right of taking the Persian crown until it was assigned to him by the assembly of the nobles.\* Kaöses, who thought he might count on the goodwill of the nobles, acquiesced; and the assembly being convened, his claims were submitted to it. Hereupon Mebodes brought forward the formal testament of Kobad, which he had hitherto concealed, and, submitting it to the nobles, exhorted them to accept as king the brave prince designated by a brave and successful father. His eloquence and authority prevailed; the claims of Kaöses and of at least one




A. REID. DEL.

VARAHAN IV. ENGAGED IN BATTLE.

PEARSON SC.

Artabanus V

Ardashir I



SASSANIAN MONARCH SPEARING A FOREIGN KING.

other son of Kobad<sup>3</sup> were set aside; and, in accordance with his father's will, Chosroës was proclaimed lawful monarch of Persia.

But a party among the nobles were dissatisfied with the decision to which the majority had come. They dreaded the restlessness,<sup>4</sup> and probably feared the cruelty, of Chosroës. It might have been expected that they would have espoused the cause of the disappointed Kaöses, which had a solid basis of legality to rest upon; but, apparently, the personal character of Kaöses was unsatisfactory, or at any rate, there was another prince whose qualities conciliated more regard and aroused more enthusiasm. Zames, the second son of Kobad, had distinguished himself repeatedly in the field,<sup>5</sup> and was the idol of a considerable section of the nation, who had long desired that he should govern them. Unfortunately, however, he possessed a disqualification fatal in the eyes of Orientals; he had, by disease or mischance, lost one of his eyes, and this physical blemish made it impossible that he should occupy the Persian throne.<sup>6</sup> Under these circumstances an ingenious plan was hit upon. In order to combine respect for law and usage with the practical advantage of being governed by the man of their choice, the discontented nobles conceived the idea of conferring the crown on a son of Zames, a boy named after his grandfather Kobad, on whose behalf Zames would naturally be regent.<sup>7</sup> Zames readily came into the plot; several of his brothers, and, what is most strange, Chosroës' maternal uncle, the Aspebed, supported him; the conspiracy seemed nearly sure of success, when by some accident it was discovered, and the occupant of the throne took prompt and effectual measures to crush it. Zames, Kaöses, and all the other sons of Kobad were seized by order of Chosroës, and, *together with their entire male offspring*, were condemned to death.<sup>8</sup> The Aspebed, and the other nobles found to have been accessory to the conspiracy, were, at the same time, executed. One prince alone, the intended puppet-king, Kobad, escaped, through the compassion of the Persian who had charge of him, and, after passing many years in concealment, became a refugee at the Court of Constantinople, where he was kindly treated by Justinian.<sup>9</sup>

When Chosroës had by these means secured himself against the claims of pretenders, he proceeded to employ equal severity in repressing the disorders, punishing the crimes, and compelling the abject submission of his subjects. The heresiarch Maz-

dak, who had escaped the persecution instituted in his later years by Kobad, and the sect of the Mazdakites, which, despite that persecution, was still strong and vigorous, were the first to experience the oppressive weight of his resentment; and the corpses of a hundred thousand martyrs blackening upon gibbets proved the determination of the new monarch to make his will law, whatever the consequences.<sup>10</sup> In a similar spirit the hesitation of Mebodes to obey instantaneously an order sent him by the king was punished capitally, and with circumstances of peculiar harshness,<sup>11</sup> by the stern prince, who did not allow gratitude for old benefits to affect the judgments which he passed on recent offences. Nor did signal services in the field avail to save Chanaranges, the nobleman who preserved the young Kobad, from his master's vengeance. The conqueror of twelve nations, betrayed by an unworthy son, was treacherously entrapped and put to death on account of a single humane act which had in no way harmed or endangered the jealous monarch.<sup>12</sup>

The fame of Chosroës rests especially on his military exploits and successes. On first ascending the throne he seems, however, to have distrusted his capacity for war; and it was with much readiness that he accepted the overtures for peace made by Justinian, who was anxious to bring the Eastern war to a close, in order that he might employ the talents of Belisarius in the reduction of Africa and Italy. A truce was made between Persia and Rome<sup>13</sup> early in A.D. 532; and the truce was followed after a short interval by a treaty—known as “the *endless peace*”<sup>14</sup>—whereby Rome and Persia made up their differences and arranged to be friends on the following conditions: (1) Rome was to pay over to Persia the sum of eleven thousand pounds of gold, or about half a million of our money, as her contribution towards the maintenance of the Caucasian defences, the actual defence being undertaken by Persia; (2) Daras was to remain a fortified post, but was not to be made the Roman head-quarters in Mesopotamia, which were to be fixed at Constantia; (3) the district of Pharangium and the castle of Bolon, which Rome had recently taken from Persia, were to be restored, and Persia on her part was to surrender the forts which she had captured in Lazica; (4) Rome and Persia were to be *eternal* friends and allies, and were to aid each other whenever required with supplies of men and money.<sup>15</sup> Thus was terminated the thirty years' war, which, commencing in A.D. 502 by the attack of Kobad on Anastasius,<sup>16</sup>

was brought to a close in A. D. 532, and ratified by Justinian in the year following.<sup>17</sup>

When Chosroës consented to substitute close relations of amity with Rome for the hereditary enmity which had been the normal policy of his house, he probably expected that no very striking or remarkable results would follow. He supposed that the barbarian neighbors of the empire on the north and on the west would give her arms sufficient employment, and that the balance of power in Eastern Europe and Western Asia would remain much as before. But in these expectations he was disappointed. Justinian no sooner found his eastern frontier secure than he directed the whole force of the empire upon his enemies in the regions of the west, and in the course of half a dozen years (A. D. 533-539), by the aid of his great general, Belisarius, he destroyed the kingdom of the Vandals in the region about Carthage and Tunis,<sup>18</sup> subdued the Moors,<sup>19</sup> and brought to its last gasp the power of the Ostrogoths in Italy.<sup>20</sup> The territorial extent of his kingdom was nearly doubled by these victories; his resources were vastly increased; the prestige of his arms was enormously raised; veteran armies had been formed which despised danger, and only desired to be led against fresh enemies; and officers had been trained capable of conducting operations of every kind, and confident, under all circumstances, of success. It must have been with feelings of dissatisfaction and alarm not easily to be dissembled that the Great King heard of his *brother's* long series of victories and conquests,<sup>21</sup> each step in which constituted a fresh danger to Persia by aggrandizing the power whom she had chiefly to fear. At first his annoyance found a vent in insolent demands for a share of the Roman spoils, which Justinian thought it prudent to humor;<sup>22</sup> but, as time went on, and the tide of victory flowed more and more strongly in one direction, he became less and less able to contain himself, and more and more determined to renounce his treaty with Rome and renew the old struggle for supremacy. His own inclination, a sufficiently strong motive in itself, was seconded and intensified by applications made to him from without on the part of those who had especial reasons for dreading the advance of Rome, and for expecting to be among her next victims. Witiges, the Ostrogoth king of Italy, and Bassaces, an Armenian chief, were the most important of these applicants. Embassies from these opposite quarters<sup>23</sup> reached Chosroës in the same year, A. D. 539, and urged him for his own security to declare war against

Justinian before it was too late. "Justinian," the ambassadors said, "aimed at universal empire. His aspirations had for a while been kept in check by Persia, and by Persia alone, the sole power in the world that he feared. Since the 'endless peace' was made, he had felt himself free to give full vent to his ambitious greed, had commenced a course of aggression upon all the other conterminous nations, and had spread war and confusion on all sides. He had destroyed the kingdom of the Vandals in Africa, conquered the Moors, deceived the Goths of Italy by professions of friendship, and then fallen upon them with all his forces, violated the rights of Armenia and driven it to rebellion, enslaved the Tzani and the Lazi, seized the Greek city of Bosphorus, and the 'Isle of Palms' on the shores of the Red Sea, solicited the alliance of barbarous Huns and Ethiopians, striven to sow discord between the Persian monarch and his vassals,<sup>24</sup> and in every part of the world shown himself equally grasping and restless. What would be the consequence if Persia continued to hold aloof? Simply that all the other nations would in turn be destroyed, and she would find herself face to face with their destroyer, and would enjoy the poor satisfaction of being devoured last. But did she fear to be reproached with breaking the treaty and forfeiting her pledged word? Rome had already broken it by her intrigues with the Huns, the Ethiopians, and the Saracens; and Persia would therefore be free from reproach if she treated the peace as no longer existing. The treaty-breaker is not he who first draws the sword, but he who sets the example of seeking the other's hurt. Or did Persia fear the result of declaring war? Such fear was unreasonable, for Rome had neither troops nor generals to oppose to a sudden Persian attack. Sittas was dead;<sup>25</sup> Belisarius and the best of the Roman forces were in Italy. If Justinian recalled Belisarius, it was not certain that he would obey; and, in the worst case, it would be in favor of Persia that the Goths of Italy, and the Armenians who for centuries had been subjects of Rome, were now ready to make common cause with her." Thus urged, the Persian king determined on openly declaring war and making an attack in force on the eastern provinces of the empire.

The scene of contest in the wars between Rome and Persia had been usually either Mesopotamia or Armenia. On rare occasions only had the traditional policy been departed from, and attempts made to penetrate into the richer parts of the Roman East, and to inflict serious injury on the empire by

carrying fire and sword into peaceful and settled provinces. Kobad, however, had in his later years ventured to introduce a new system, and had sent troops across the Euphrates into Syria<sup>26</sup> in the hope of ravaging that fertile region and capturing its wealthy metropolis, Antioch. This example Chosroës now determined to follow. Crossing the great stream in the lower portion of its course, he led his troops up its right bank, past Circesium, Zenobia,<sup>27</sup> and Callinicus, to Surôn,<sup>28</sup> a Roman town on the west side of the river. As this small place ventured to resist him, Chosroës, bent upon terrifying the other towns into submission, resolved to take a signal revenge. Though the garrison, after losing their commandant, made overtures for a surrender, he insisted on entering forcibly at one of the gates, and then, upon the strength of this violent entrance, proceeded to treat the city as one taken by storm, pillaged the houses, massacred a large portion of the inhabitants, enslaved the others, and in conclusion set the place on fire and burned it to the ground.<sup>29</sup> It was perhaps in a fit of remorse, though possibly only under the influence of greed,<sup>30</sup> that shortly afterwards he allowed the neighboring bishop of Sergiopolis to ransom these unfortunate captives, twelve thousand in number, for the modest sum of two hundred pounds of gold.

From Surôn the invading army advanced to Hierapolis,<sup>31</sup> without encountering the enemy, who did not dare to make any resistance in the open field, but sought the protection of walls and strongholds. The defences of Hierapolis were in tolerable order; its garrison was fairly strong; and the Great King therefore prudently resolved to allow the citizens to ransom themselves and their city at a moderate price. Two thousand pounds of silver was the amount fixed upon; and this sum was paid without any complaint by the Hierapolites. Plunder, not conquest, was already distinctly set before the invader's mind as his aim; and it is said that he even offered at this period to evacuate the Roman territory altogether upon receiving a thousand pounds of gold.<sup>32</sup> But the Romans were not yet brought so low as to purchase a peace; it was thought that Antioch and the other important towns might successfully defy the Persian arms, and hoped that Justinian would soon send into the field an army strong enough to cope with that of his adversary. The terms, therefore, which Chosroës offered by the mouth of Megas, bishop of Berhœa, were rejected; the Antiochenes were exhorted to remain firm; Ephraim, the bishop,

was denounced to the authorities for counselling submission; and it was determined to make no pacific arrangement, but to allow Chosroës to do his worst.<sup>33</sup> The Persian, on his side, was not slack or remiss. No sooner had he received the ransom of Hierapolis than he advanced upon Berhœa (now Aleppo), which he reached in four days.<sup>34</sup> Observing that the defences were weak, he here demanded twice the ransom that he had accepted from the Hierapolites, and was only induced to forego the claim by the tears and entreaties of the good bishop, who convinced him at length that the Berhœans could not pay so large a sum, and induced him to accept the half of it. A few more days' march brought him from Aleppo to the outskirts of Antioch; and after an interval of nearly three centuries<sup>35</sup> the "Queen of the East," the richest and most magnificent of Oriental cities, was once more invested by Persian troops and threatened by a Sassanian monarch.

A great calamity had fallen upon Antioch only fourteen years previously. The entire town had been ruined by a succession of terrible earthquakes, which commenced in October, A.D. 525, and terminated in August of the ensuing year.<sup>36</sup> All for a time was havoc and disorder. A landslip had covered a portion of the city,<sup>37</sup> and in the remainder almost every house was overthrown. But the liberality of Justinian,<sup>38</sup> the spirit of the inhabitants, and the efforts of the governor,<sup>39</sup> had effaced these disasters; and the city, when the Persians appeared before it, was in most respects grander and more magnificent than ever. The defences were, however, it would seem, imperfect. The citadel especially, which was on the high ground south of the city, had been constructed with small attention to the rules of engineering art, and was dominated by a height at a little distance, which ought to have been included within the walls.<sup>40</sup> Nor was this deficiency compensated by any strength in the garrison, or any weight of authority or talent among those with whom rested the command. Justinian had originally sent his nephew, Germanus, to conduct the defence of the Syrian capital,<sup>41</sup> while Buzes, an officer who had gained some repute in the Armenian war,<sup>42</sup> was entrusted with the general protection of the East until Belisarius should arrive from Italy;<sup>43</sup> but Germanus, after a brief stay, withdrew from Antioch into Cilicia,<sup>44</sup> and Buzes disappeared without any one knowing whither he had betaken himself.<sup>45</sup> Antioch was left almost without a garrison; and had not Theoctistus and Molatzes, two officers who commanded in the Lebanon, come to the

rescue and brought with them a body of six thousand disciplined troops,<sup>46</sup> it is scarcely possible that any resistance should have been made. As it was, the resistance was brief and ineffectual. Chosroës at once discerned the weak point in the defences, and, having given a general order to the less trusty of his troops to make attacks upon the lower town in various places, himself with the flower of the army undertook the assault upon the citadel. Here the commanding position so unaccountably left outside the walls enabled the Persians to engage the defenders almost on a level, and their superior skill in the use of missile weapons soon brought the garrison into difficulties. The assailants, however, might perhaps still have been repulsed, had not an unlucky accident supervened, which, creating a panic, put it in the power of the Persians by a bold movement to enter the place. The Romans, cramped for room upon the walls, had extemporized some wooden stages between the towers, which they hung outside by means of ropes. It happened that, in the crush and tumult, one of these stages gave way; the ropes broke, and the beams fell with a crash to the earth, carrying with them a number of the defenders. The noise made by the fall was great, and produced a general impression that the wall itself had been broken down; the towers and battlements were at once deserted; the Roman soldiers rushed to the gates and began to quit the town; while the Persians took advantage of the panic to advance their scaling ladders, to mount the walls, and to make themselves masters of the citadel.<sup>47</sup> Thus Antioch was taken. The prudence of Chosroës was shown in his quietly allowing the armed force to withdraw; his resolve to trample down all resistance appeared in his slaughter of the Antiochene youth, who with a noble recklessness continued the conflict after the soldiers had fled; his wish to inspire terror far and wide made him deliver the entire city, with few exceptions, to the flames;<sup>48</sup> while his avarice caused him to plunder the churches, and to claim as his own the works of art, the marbles, bronzes, tablets, and pictures, with which the Queen of the Roman East was at this time abundantly provided. But, while thus gratifying his most powerful passions, he did not lose sight of the opportunity to conclude an advantageous peace. Justinian's ambassadors had long been pressing him to come to terms with their master. He now consented to declare the conditions on which he was ready to make peace and withdraw his army. Rome must pay him, as an indemnity for the cost of the war, the sum of five

thousand pounds of gold, and must also contract to make a further payment of five hundred pounds of gold *annually*, not as a tribute, but as a fair contribution towards the expense of maintaining the Caspian Gates and keeping out the Huns.<sup>49</sup> If hostages were given him, he would consent to abstain from further acts of hostility while Justinian was consulted on these proposals, and would even begin at once to withdraw his army. The ambassadors readily agreed to these terms, and it was understood that a truce would be observed until Justinian's answer should be delivered to Chosroës.

But the Great King, in thus formulating the terms on which he would be content to make peace, did not intend to tie his own hands, or to allow the Syrian cities before which he had not yet appeared to be quit of him without the payment of ransom. After visiting Seleucia, the port of Antioch at the mouth of the Orontes, bathing in the blue waters of the Mediterranean, and offering sacrifice to the (setting?) sun upon the shore,<sup>50</sup> he announced his intention of proceeding to Apameia, a city on the middle Orontes, which was celebrated for its wealth, and particularly for its possession of a fragment of the "true cross," enshrined in a case which the pious zeal of the faithful had enriched with gold and jewels of extraordinary value.<sup>51</sup> Received peacefully into the city by the submissive inhabitants, instead of fixing their ransom at a definite sum, he demanded and obtained all the valuables of the sacred treasury,<sup>52</sup> including the precious relic which the Apamæans regarded as the most important of their possessions. As, however, it was the case, and not its contents, that he coveted, while he carried off the former, he readily restored the latter to the prayers of the bishop and inhabitants.<sup>53</sup>

From Apameia Chosroës returned to Antioch, and after witnessing the games of the amphitheatre and securing victory to the *green* champion because Justinian preferred the *blue*,<sup>54</sup> he set out at last on his return to Persia, taking care to visit, upon his way to the Euphrates, the city of Chalcis,<sup>55</sup> the only important place in Northern Syria that had hitherto escaped him. The Chalcedians were required not only to ransom themselves by a sum of money, but to give up to Chosroës the Roman soldiers who garrisoned their town. By a perjury that may well be forgiven them, they avoided the more important concession, but they had to satisfy the avarice of the conqueror by the payment of two hundred pounds of gold. The Persian host then continued its march, and reaching the Euphrates at

Obbane, in the neighborhood of Barbalissus,<sup>56</sup> crossed by a bridge of boats in three days. The object of Chosroës in thus changing his return line of march was to continue in Roman Mesopotamia the course which he had adopted in Syria since the conclusion of the truce—*i. e.* to increase his spoil by making each important city ransom itself. Edessa,<sup>57</sup> Constantina,<sup>58</sup> and Daras were successively visited, and purchased their safety by a contribution. According to Procopius,<sup>59</sup> the proceedings before Daras were exceptional. Although Chosroës, before he quitted Edessa, had received a communication from Justinian accepting the terms arranged with the Roman envoys at Antioch,<sup>60</sup> yet, when he reached Daras, he at once resolved upon its siege. The city was defended by two walls, an outer one of moderate strength, and an inner one sixty feet high, with towers at intervals, whose height was a hundred feet. Chosroës, having invested the place, endeavored to penetrate within the defences by means of a mine; but, his design having been betrayed, the Romans met him with a countermine, and completely foiled his enterprise. Unwilling to spend any more time on the siege, the Persian monarch upon this desisted from his attempt, and accepted the contribution of a thousand pounds of silver as a sufficient redemption for the great fortress.<sup>61</sup>

Such is the account of the matter given to us by Procopius, who is our only extant authority for the details of this war. But the account is violently improbable. It represents Chosroës as openly flying in the face of a treaty the moment that he had concluded it, and as departing in a single instance from the general tenor of his proceedings in all other cases. In view of the great improbability of such a course of action, it is perhaps allowable to suppose that Procopius has been for once carried away by partisanship, and that the real difference between the case of Daras and the other towns consisted in this, that Daras alone refused to pay its ransom, and Chosroës had, in consequence, to resort to hostilities in order to enforce it.

Still, no doubt, the whole conduct of Chosroës in enforcing ransoms from the towns after the conclusion of the truce was open to serious question, and Justinian was quite justified in treating his proceedings as a violation of his recent engagements. It is not unlikely that, even without any such excuse, he would shortly have renewed the struggle, since the return of Belisarius in triumph from the Italian war had placed at his service for employment in the East a general from whose

abilities much was naturally expected. As it was, Justinian was able, on receiving intelligence of the fines levied on Apameia, Chalcis, Edessa, Constantina, and Daras, and of the hostile acts committed against the last-named place, with great show of reason and justice, to renounce the recently concluded peace, and to throw on the ill faith of Chosroës the blame of the rupture.<sup>62</sup>

The Persian prince seems to have paid but little heed to the denunciation. He passed the winter in building and beautifying a Persian Antioch<sup>63</sup> in the neighborhood of Ctesiphon, assigning it as a residence to his Syrian captives, for whose use he constructed public baths and a spacious hippodrome, where the entertainments familiar to them from their youth were reproduced by Syrian artists.<sup>64</sup> The new city was exempt from the jurisdiction of Persian satraps, and was made directly dependent upon the king, who supplied it with corn gratuitously, and allowed it to become an inviolable asylum for all such Greek slaves as should take shelter in it, and be acknowledged as their kinsmen by any of the inhabitants. A model of Greek civilization was thus brought into close contact with the Persian court, which could amuse itself with the contrasts, if it did not learn much from the comparison, of European and Asiatic manners and modes of thought.

The campaign of A.D. 540 was followed by one of a very different character in A.D. 541. An unexpected offer suddenly made to the Persian king drew him from his capital, together with the bulk of his troops, to one of the remotest portions of the Persian territory, and allowed the Romans, instead of standing on their defence, to assume an aggressive in Mesopotamia, and even to retaliate the invasion which the year before Chosroës had conducted into the heart of their empire. The hostile operations of A.D. 541 had thus two distinct and far-distant scenes; in the one set the Persians, in the other the Romans, took the offensive; the two wars, for such they in reality were, scarcely affected one another; and it will therefore be convenient to keep the accounts of them distinct and separate. To commence with.

I. THE LAZIC WAR.—Lazica had been a dependency of Rome from the time when Tzath, upon his conversion to Christianity, professed himself the vassal of Justin,<sup>65</sup> and received the insignia of royalty from his new patron (A.D. 522). The terms of the connection had been at the first honorable to the weaker nation, which paid no tribute, admitted no Roman garrison,

and was troubled by no Roman governor.<sup>66</sup> As time went on, however, the Romans gradually encroached upon the rights of their dependants; they seized and fortified a strong post, called Petra, upon the coast,<sup>67</sup> appointed a commandant who claimed an authority as great as that of the Lazic king, and established a commercial monopoly which pressed with great severity upon the poorer classes of the Lazi.<sup>68</sup> Under these circumstances the nation determined on revolt; and in the winter of A.D. 540-1 Lazic ambassadors visited the court of Persia, exposed the grievances of their countrymen, and besought Chosroës to accept their submission, and extend to them the protection of his government.<sup>69</sup> The province was distant, and possessed few attractions; whatever the tales told of its ancient wealth, or glories, or trade,<sup>70</sup> in the time of Chosroës it was poor and unproductive, dependent on its neighbors for some of the necessaries and all the conveniences of life,<sup>71</sup> and capable of exporting nothing but timber, slaves, and skins.<sup>72</sup> It might have been expected, under such circumstances, that the burden of the protectorate would have been refused; but there was an advantage, apparent or real, in the position of the country, discovered by the sagacity of Chosroës or suggested to him by the interested zeal of the envoys,<sup>73</sup> which made its possession seem to the Persian king a matter of the highest importance, and induced him to accept the offer made him without a moment's delay. Lazica, the ancient Colchis and the modern Mingrelia and Imeritia, bordered upon the Black Sea, which the Persian dominions did not as yet touch. Once in possession of this tract, Chosroës conceived that he might launch a fleet upon the Euxine, command its commerce, threaten or ravage its shores, and even sail against Constantinople and besiege the Roman emperor in his capital. The Persian king therefore acceded to the request of the envoys, and, pretending to be called into Iberia by a threatened invasion of the Huns,<sup>74</sup> led a large army to the Lazic border, was conducted into the heart of the country by the envoys, received the submission of Gubazes, the king, and then, pressing on to the coast, formed the siege of Petra, where the Roman forces were collected.<sup>75</sup> Petra offered a stout resistance, and repulsed more than one Persian assault; but it was impossible for the small garrison to cope with the numbers, the engineering skill, and the ardor of the assailants. After the loss of their commandant, Johannes, and the fall of one of the principal towers, the soldiers capitulated;

Petra was made over to the Persians, who restored and strengthened its defences, and Lazica became for the time a Persian province.

II. THE WAR IN MESOPOTAMIA.—Belisarius, on reaching the eastern frontier, fixed his head-quarters at Daras,<sup>76</sup> and, finding that the Persians had no intention of invading Syria or Roman Mesopotamia, resolved to lead his troops into the enemy's territory. As his forces were weak in numbers, ill-armed, and ill-supplied, he could scarcely hope to accomplish any great enterprise; but it was important to recover the Roman prestige after the occurrences of the preceding year, and to show that Rome was willing to encounter in the open field any force that the Persians could bring against her. He therefore crossed the frontier and advanced in the direction of Nisibis,<sup>77</sup> less with the intention of attacking the town than of distinctly offering battle to the troops collected within it. His scheme succeeded; a small force, which he threw out in advance, drew the enemy from the walls; and their pursuit of this detachment brought them into contact with the main army of Belisarius, which repulsed them and sent them flying into the town.<sup>78</sup> Having thus established his superiority in the field, the Roman general, though he could not attack Nisibis with any prospect of success, was able to adopt other offensive measures. He advanced in person a day's march beyond Nisibis, and captured the fort of Sisauranôn.<sup>79</sup> Eight hundred Persian cavalry of the first class were made prisoners, and sent by Belisarius to Byzantium, where they were despatched by Justinian to Italy, where they served against the Goths. Arethas, the chief of the Saracens who fought on the side of Rome, was sent still further in advance. The orders given him were to cross the Tigris into Assyria, and begin to ravage it, but to return within a short time to the camp, and bring a report of the strength of the Persians beyond the river. If the report was favorable, Belisarius intended to quit Mesopotamia, and take the whole Roman force with him into Assyria. His plans, however, were frustrated by the selfish Arab, who, wishing to obtain the whole Assyrian spoil for himself, dismissed his Roman troops, proceeded to plunder the rich province on his own account, and sent Belisarius no intelligence of what he was so doing. After waiting at Sisauranôn till the heats of summer had decimated his army, the Roman general was compelled to retreat by the discontent of the soldiery and the representations of his principal officers. He with-

drew his forces within the Roman frontier without molestation from the enemy, and was shortly afterwards summoned to Constantinople to confer on the state of affairs with the emperor.<sup>80</sup>

The military operations of the next year (A.D. 542) were comparatively unimportant. Chosroës collected a large army, and, repeating the movement of A.D. 540, made his appearance in Commagene early in the year,<sup>81</sup> intending to press forward through Syria into Palestine,<sup>82</sup> and hoping to make himself master of the sacred treasures which he knew to be accumulated in the Holy City of Jerusalem. He found the provincial commanders, Buzes and Justus, despondent and unenterprising, declined to meet him in the field, and content to remain shut up within the walls of Hierapolis. Had these been his only opponents the campaign would probably have proved a success; but, at the first news of his invasion, Justinian despatched Belisarius to the East for the second time, and this able general, by his arts or by his reputation, succeeded in arresting the steps of Chosroës and frustrating his expedition. Belisarius took up his head-quarters at Europus, on the Euphrates, a little to the south of Zeugma, and, spreading his troops on both banks of the river, appeared both to protect the Roman province and to threaten the return of the enemy. Chosroës having sent an emissary to the Roman camp under the pretence of negotiating, but really to act the part of a spy,<sup>83</sup> was so impressed (if we may believe Procopius) by the accounts which he received of the ability of the general and the warlike qualities of his soldiers, that he gave up the idea of advancing further, and was content to retire through Roman Mesopotamia into his own territories. He is said even to have made a convention that he would commit no hostile act as he passed through the Roman province; but if so, he did not keep the engagement. The city of Callinicus lay in his way; its defences were undergoing repairs, and there was actually a gap in one place where the old wall had been pulled down and the new one had not yet been built. The Persian king could not resist the temptation of seizing this easy prey; he entered the undefended town, enslaved all whom he found in it, and then razed the place to the ground.<sup>84</sup>

Such is the account which the Byzantine historian gives of the third campaign of Chosroës against the Romans, and of the motive and manner of his retreat. Without taxing him with falsehood, we may suspect that, for the glorification of

his favorite hero, he has kept back a portion of the truth. The retreat of Chosroës may be ascribed with much probability to the advance of another danger, more formidable than Belisarius, which exactly at this time made its appearance in the country whereto he was hastening. It was in the summer of A.D. 542 that THE PLAGUE broke out at Pelusium,<sup>86</sup> and spread from that centre rapidly into the rest of Egypt and also into Palestine. Chosroës may well have hesitated to confront this terrible foe. He did not ultimately escape it; but he might hope to do so, and it would clearly have been the height of imprudence to have carried out his intention of invading Palestine when the plague was known to be raging there.

The fourth year of the Roman war (A.D. 543) opened with a movement of the Persian troops toward the Armenian frontier,<sup>86</sup> consequent upon the desertion of the Persian cause by the Roman Armenians in the course of the winter.<sup>87</sup> Chosroës in person once more led the attack, and proceeded as far as Azerbaijan; but, the pestilence breaking out in his army, he hastily retreated,<sup>88</sup> after some futile attempts at negotiation with the Roman officers opposed to him. Belisarius had this year been sent to Italy, and the Roman army of the East, amounting to thirty thousand men,<sup>89</sup> was commanded by as many as fifteen generals, almost of equal rank, among whom there was little concert or agreement. Induced to take the offensive by the retirement of the Persian king, these incapable officers invaded Persarmenia with all their troops, and proceeded to plunder its rich plains and fertile valleys. Encountering suddenly and unexpectedly the Persian general Nabedes, who, with a small force, was strongly posted at a village called Anglon,<sup>90</sup> they were compelled to engage at disadvantage; their troops, entangled in difficult ground, found themselves attacked in their rear by an ambush; Narses, the bravest of them, fell; and, a general panic seizing the entire multitude, they fled in the extremest disorder, casting away their arms, and pressing their horses till they sank and expired.<sup>91</sup> The Persians pursued, but with caution, and the carnage was not so great as might have been expected; but vast numbers of the disarmed fugitives were overtaken and made prisoners by the enemy; and the arms, animals, and camp equipment which fell into the hands of the Persians amply compensated all previous losses, and left Persarmenia the richer for the inroad.

The ravages of the pestilence having ceased, Chosroës, in the following year (A.D. 544), again marched westward in person, and laid siege to the city of Edessa.<sup>92</sup> It would seem that he had now resolved not to be content with plundering raids, but to attempt at any rate the permanent conquest of some portion of the Roman territory. Edessa and Daras were the two towns on which the Roman possession of Western Mesopotamia at this time mainly depended. As the passing of Nisibis, in A.D. 363, from Roman into Persian hands,<sup>93</sup> had given to Persia a secure hold on the eastern portion of the country between the rivers, so the occupation of Edessa and Daras could it have been effected, would have carried with it dominion over the more western regions. The Roman frontier would in this way have been thrown back to the Euphrates. Chosroës must be understood as aiming at this grand result in the siege which he so pertinaciously pressed, and which Edessa so gallantly resisted, during the summer of A.D. 544. The elaborate account which Procopius gives of the siege<sup>94</sup> may be due to a sense of its importance. Chosroës tried, not force only, but every art known to the engineering science of the period; he repeated his assaults day after day; he allowed the defenders no repose; yet he was compelled at last to own himself baffled by the valor of the small Roman garrison and the spirit of the native inhabitants, to burn his works, and to return home. The five hundred pounds of gold<sup>95</sup> which he extorted at last from Martinus, the commandant of the place, may have been a salve to his wounded pride; but it was a poor set-off against the loss of men, of stores, and of prestige, which he had incurred by his enterprise.

It was, perhaps, his repulse from the walls of Edessa that induced Chosroës, in A.D. 545, seriously to entertain the proposals for an arrangement which were made to him by the ambassadors of Justinian. Throughout the war their had been continual negotiations; but hitherto the Persian king had trifled with his antagonist, and had amused himself with discussing terms of accommodation without any serious purpose. Now at last, after five years of incessant hostilities, in which he had gained much glory but little profit, he seems to have desired a breathing-space. Justinian's envoys visited him at Ctesiphon,<sup>96</sup> and set forth their master's desire to conclude a regular peace. Chosroës professed to think that the way for a final arrangement would be best prepared by the conclusion, in the first instance, of a truce. He proposed, in lieu of a peace, a cessation

of hostilities for five years, during the course of which the causes of quarrel between the two nations might be considered, and a good understanding established. It shows the weakness of the Empire, that Justinian not only accepted this proposal, but was content to pay for the boon granted him. Chosroës received as the price of the five years' truce the services of a Greek physician and two thousand pounds of gold.<sup>97</sup>

The five years' truce seems to have been observed with better faith by the Persian than by the Roman monarch. Alamundarus indeed, though a Persian vassal, regarded himself as entitled, despite the truce, to pursue his quarrel with his natural enemy, Arethas,<sup>98</sup> who acknowledged the suzerainty of Rome; but Chosroës is not even accused of instigating his proceedings; and the war between the vassals was carried on without dragging either of the two lords-paramount into its vortex. Thus far, then, neither side had any cause of complaint against the other. If we were bound to accept the Roman story of a project formed by Chosroës for the surprise and seizure of Daras,<sup>99</sup> we should have to admit that circumstances rather than his own will saved the Persian monarch from the guilt of being the first to break the agreement. But the tale told by Procopius is improbable;<sup>100</sup> and the Roman belief of it can have rested at best only upon suspicion. Chosroës, it is allowed, committed no hostile act; and it may well be doubted whether he really entertained the design ascribed to him. At any rate, the design was not executed, nor even attempted; and the peace was thus not broken on his part. It was reserved for Rome in the fourth year of the truce (A.D. 549) expressly to break its provisions by accepting the Lazi into alliance and sending them a body of eight thousand men to help them against the Persians.<sup>101</sup>

Very soon after their submission to Persia the Lazi had repented of their rash and hasty action. They found that they had gained nothing, while in some respects they had lost, by their change of masters. The general system of the Persian administration was as arbitrary and oppressive as the Roman. If the commercial monopoly, whereof they so bitterly complained, had been swept away, commerce itself had gone with it, and they could neither find a market for their own products, nor obtain the commodities which they required.<sup>102</sup> The Persian manners and customs introduced into their country, if not imposed upon themselves, were detestable to the Lazi, who were zealous and devout Christians, and possessed by the spirit of intolerance.<sup>103</sup> Chosroës, after holding the territory for a few

years, became convinced that Persia could not retain it unless the disaffected population were removed and replaced by faithful subjects. He designed therefore, we are told, to deport the entire Lazic nation, and to plant the territory with colonies of Persians and others, on whose fidelity he could place full reliance.<sup>104</sup> As a preliminary step, he suggested to his lieutenant in Lazica that he should contrive the assassination of Gubazes, the Lazic king, in whom he saw an obstacle to his project. Phabrizus, however, failed in his attempt to execute this commission;<sup>105</sup> and his failure naturally produced the immediate revolt of the province, which threw itself once more into the arms of Rome, and, despite the existing treaty with the Persians, was taken by Justinian under his protection.

The Lazic war, which commenced in consequence of this act of Justinian's, continued almost without intermission for nine years—from A.D. 549 to 557. Its details are related at great length by Procopius and Agathias,<sup>106</sup> who view the struggle as one which vitally concerned the interests of their country. According to them, Chosroës was bent upon holding Lazica in order to construct at the mouth of the Phasis a great naval station and arsenal, from which his fleets might issue to command the commerce or ravage the shores of the Black Sea.<sup>107</sup> There is no doubt that the country was eminently fitted for such a purpose. The soil is for the most part richly fertile;<sup>108</sup> the hills are everywhere covered with forests of noble trees;<sup>109</sup> the Rion (Phasis) is deep and broad towards its mouth;<sup>110</sup> and there are other streams also which are navigable.<sup>111</sup> If Chosroës entertained the intentions ascribed to him, and had even begun the collection of timber for ship-building<sup>112</sup> at Petra on the Euxine as early as A.D. 549, we cannot be surprised at the attitude assumed by Rome, or at her persistent efforts to recover possession of the Lazic territory.

The war was opened by an attack upon the great centre of the Persian power, Petra. This place, which was strongly situated on a craggy rock projecting into the sea, had been carefully fortified by Justinian<sup>113</sup> before Lazica passed into the possession of Chosroës, and had since received important additions to its defences at the hands of the Persians.<sup>114</sup> It was sufficiently provisioned,<sup>115</sup> and was defended by a body of fifteen hundred men.<sup>116</sup> Dagisthæus, the Roman commander, besieged it with his entire force of eight thousand men, and succeeded by his constant attacks in reducing the garrison to little more than a fourth of its original number. Baffled in

one attempt to effect a breach by means of a mine, he had contrived to construct another, and might have withdrawn his props, destroyed the wall, and entered the place, had he not conceived the idea of bargaining with the emperor for a specific reward in case he effected the capture.<sup>117</sup> Whilst he waited for his messenger to bring a reply, the Persian general, Mermeroës, forced the passes from Iberia into Lazica, and descended the valley of the Phasis with an army of 30,000 men.<sup>118</sup> Dagisthæus in alarm withdrew, and Petra was relieved and revictualled. The walls were repaired hastily with sandbags,<sup>119</sup> and the further defence was entrusted to a fresh garrison of 3000 picked soldiers.<sup>120</sup> Mermeroës then, finding it difficult to obtain supplies for his large army, retired into Persarmenia, leaving only five thousand Persians in the country besides the garrison of Petra. This small force was soon afterwards surprised by the combined Romans and Lazi, who completely defeated it, destroying or making prisoners almost the entire number.<sup>121</sup>

In the ensuing year, A.D. 550, the Persians took the field under a fresh general, Chorianes,<sup>122</sup> who brought with him a considerable army, composed of Persians and Alans. The allied Romans and Lazi, under Dagisthæus and Gubazes, gave battle to this new foe on the banks of the Hippis (the Tschenikal?); and though the Lazi, who had insisted on taking the lead and fighting separately, were at the first encounter routed by the Persian horse, yet in the end Roman discipline and stubbornness triumphed. Their solid line of footmen, bristling with spears, offered an impervious barrier to the cavalry of the enemy, which did not dare to charge, but had recourse to volleys of missiles. The Romans responded with the same; and the battle raged for a while on something like even terms, the superior rapidity of the Asiatics being counterbalanced by the better protection which their shields gave to the Europeans, until at last, by a stroke of fortune, Rome obtained the victory. A chance arrow killed Chorianes, and his army instantly fled. There was a short struggle at the Persian camp; but the Romans and Lazi captured it. Most of the Persians were here put to the sword; the few who escaped quitted Lazica and returned to their own country.<sup>123</sup>

Soon afterwards Dagisthæus was superseded by Bessas,<sup>124</sup> and the siege of Petra was recommenced. The strength of the place had been considerably increased since the former attack upon it. A new wall of great height and solidity had

been built upon a framework of wood in the place which Daghasthæus had so nearly breached; the Roman mines had been filled up with gravel;<sup>125</sup> arms, offensive and defensive, had been collected in extraordinary abundance; a stock of flour and of salted meat had been laid in sufficient to support the garrison of 3000 men for five years; and a store of vinegar, and of the pulse from which it was made, had likewise been accumulated.<sup>126</sup> The Roman general began by attempting to repeat the device of his predecessor, attacking the defences in the same place and by the same means; but, just as his mine was completed, the new wall with its framework of wood sank quietly into the excavation, without suffering any disturbance of its parts, while enough of it still remained above the surface to offer an effectual bar to the assailants.<sup>127</sup> It seemed hopeless to recommence the mine in this place, and elsewhere the nature of the ground made mining impossible; some other mode of attack had therefore to be adopted, or the siege must have been abandoned. Rome generally took towns by the battering-ram; but the engines in use were of such heavy construction that they could not be dragged up an ascent like that upon which Petra stood. Bessas was in extreme perplexity, when some Hunnic allies, who happened to be in his camp, suggested a mode of constructing a ram, as effective as the ordinary one, which should nevertheless be so light that it could be carried on the shoulders of forty men.<sup>128</sup> Three such machines were quickly made; and under their blows the wall would soon have given way, had not the defenders employed against them the terrible agency of fire, showering upon them from the walls lighted casks of sulphur, bitumen, and naphtha, which last was known to the Greeks of Colchis as "Medea's oil."<sup>129</sup> Uncertain of succeeding in this attack, the Roman general gallantly led a scaling party to another portion of the walls, and, mounting at the head of his men, attempted to make good his footing on the battlements.<sup>130</sup> Thrown headlong to the ground, but undeterred by his fall, he was about to repeat his attempt, when he found it needless. Almost simultaneously his troops had in two other places penetrated into the town. One band had obtained an entrance by scaling the rocks in a place supposed to be inaccessible;<sup>131</sup> a second owed its success to a combination of accidents. First, it had happened that a gap had shown itself in the piece of the wall which sank into the Roman mine, and a violent struggle had ensued between the assailants and defenders at this place.<sup>132</sup>

Then, while this fight was going on, the fire which the Persians were using against the Roman battering-rams had been by a shift of wind blown back upon themselves, and the wooden structure from which they fought had been ignited, and in a short time entirely consumed, together with its inmates.<sup>133</sup> At sight of the conflagration, the Persians who stood in the gap had lost heart, and had allowed the Roman troops to force their way through it into Petra. Thus fell the great Lazic fortress, after a resistance which is among the most memorable in history. Of the three thousand defenders, seven hundred had been killed in the siege; one thousand and seventy were destroyed in the last assault. Only seven hundred and thirty were made prisoners; and of these no fewer than seven hundred and twelve were found to be wounded. The remaining five hundred threw themselves into the citadel, and there resisted to the last extremity, refusing all terms of capitulation, and maintaining themselves against an overwhelming force, until at last by sword and fire they perished to a man.<sup>134</sup>

The siege of Petra was prolonged far into the winter, and the year A.D. 551 had begun ere the resistance ceased.<sup>135</sup> Could the gallant defenders have maintained themselves for a few more weeks, they might not improbably have triumphed. Mermeroës, the Persian commander of two years previously,<sup>136</sup> took the field with the commencement of spring, and, at the head of a large body of cavalry, supported by eight elephants,<sup>137</sup> began his march to the coast, hoping to relieve the beleaguered garrison. Unfortunately he was too late. On his march he heard of the capture of Petra, and of its complete destruction by Bessas,<sup>138</sup> who feared lest the Persians should again occupy the dangerous post. Mermeroës had no difficulty in establishing Persian rule through almost the whole of Lazica. The Romans did not dare to meet him in the field.<sup>139</sup> Archæopolis, indeed, repulsed his attack;<sup>140</sup> but no other important place in the entire country remained subject to the Empire. Gubazes and his followers had to hide themselves in the recesses of the mountains.<sup>141</sup> Quartering his troops chiefly on the upper Phasis, about Kutaïs<sup>142</sup> and its neighborhood, Mermeroës strengthened his hold on the country by building forts or receiving their submission, and even extended the Persian dominion beyond Lazica into Scymnia and Suania.<sup>143</sup> Still Rome, with her usual tenacity, maintained a hold upon certain tracts; and Gubazes, faithful to his allies even in the

extremity of their depression, maintained a guerilla war, and hoped that some day fortune would cease to frown on him.<sup>144</sup>

Meanwhile, at Byzantium, fresh negotiations were in progress, and hopes were entertained of an arrangement by which all the differences between the two great powers would be satisfactorily adjusted. Isdigunas again represented his master at the Byzantine court, and conducted the diplomatic contest with skill and ability. Taxing Justinian with more than one infraction of the truce<sup>145</sup> concluded in A.D. 545, he demanded the payment of a lump sum of two thousand six hundred pounds of gold,<sup>146</sup> and expressed the willingness of Chosroës to conclude on these terms a fresh truce for five years, to take effect from the delivery of the money. With regard to the extent of country whereto the truce should apply, he agreed to an express limitation of its range—the settled provinces of both empires should be protected by it, but Lazica and the country of the Saracens should be excluded from its operation.<sup>147</sup> Justinian consented to these terms, despite the opposition of many of his subjects, who thought that Rome degraded herself by her repeated payments of money to Persia, and accepted a position little better than that of a Persian tributary.<sup>148</sup>

Thus the peace of A.D. 551 did nothing towards ending the Lazic war, which, after languishing through the whole of A.D. 552, burst out again with renewed vigor in the spring of A.D. 553. Mermeroës in that year advanced from Kutaïs against Telephis,<sup>149</sup> a strong fort in the possession of Rome, expelled the commandant, Martinus, by a stratagem, pressed forward against the combined Roman forces, which fled before him from Ollaria,<sup>150</sup> and finally drove them to the coast and cooped them up in "the Island,"<sup>151</sup> a small tract near the mouth of the Phasis between that stream and the Docônus. On his return he was able to reinforce a garrison which he had established at Onoguris in the immediate neighborhood of Archæopolis, as a means of annoying and weakening that important station.<sup>152</sup> He may naturally have hoped in one or two more campaigns to have driven the last Roman out of the country and to have attached Lazica permanently to the empire of the great king.

Unluckily, however, for Persia, the fatigues which the gallant veteran had undergone in the campaign of A.D. 553 proved more than his aged frame could endure, and he had scarcely reached Kutaïs when he was seized with a fatal malady, to

which he succumbed in the course of the winter.<sup>153</sup> Chosroës appointed as his successor a certain Nachoragan, who is said to have been a general of repute,<sup>154</sup> but who proved himself quite unequal to the position which he was called upon to fill, and in the course of two years ruined the Persian cause in Lazica. The failure was the more signal from the fact that exactly at the time of his appointment circumstances occurred which seriously shook the Roman influence over the Lazi, and opened a prospect to Persia transcending aught that she could reasonably have hoped. This was nothing less than a most serious quarrel between Gubazes, the Lazic king, and some of the principal Roman commanders—a quarrel which involved consequences fatal to both parties. Gubazes, disgusted with the negligence or incapacity of the Roman chiefs, had made complaint of them to Justinian;<sup>155</sup> they had retaliated by accusing him of meditating desertion, and had obtained the emperor's consent to his arrest, and to the use of violence if he offered resistance.<sup>156</sup> Armed with this mandate, they contrived in a little time to fasten a quarrel upon him; and, when he declined to do as they required, they drew their swords upon him and slew him.<sup>157</sup> The Lazic nation was, naturally enough, alienated by this outrage, and manifested an inclination to throw itself absolutely into the arms of Persia.<sup>158</sup> The Romans, dispirited at the attitude of their allies, and at variance among themselves, could for some months after Gubazes' death have offered but little resistance to an enterprising enemy. So demoralized were they that an army of 50,000 is said to have fled in dismay when attacked by a force of Persians less than a twelfth of their number,<sup>159</sup> and to have allowed their camp to be captured and plundered. During this critical time Nachoragan remained inactive in Iberia, and contented himself with sending messengers into Lazica to announce his near approach and to animate and encourage his party.<sup>160</sup> The result was such as might have been expected. The Lazi, finding that Persia made no effort to take advantage of their abstention, and that Rome despite of it maintained possession of the greater portion of their country, came to the conclusion that it would be unwise to desert their natural allies on account of a single outrage, however monstrous, and agreed to renew their close alliance with Rome on condition that the murderers of Gubazes should be punished, and his brother, Tzathes, appointed king in his place.<sup>161</sup> Justinian readily gave his consent;<sup>162</sup> and the year A.D. 555 saw the quarrel ended, and the Lazi once more heartily in accord with their Roman protectors.

It was when affairs were in this state, and he had exactly missed his opportunity, that Nachoragan took the field, and, advancing from Iberia into the region about Kutaïs with an army amounting to 60,000 men,<sup>163</sup> made preparations for carrying on the war with vigor. He was opposed by Martinus, Justin, and Babas, the two former of whom with the bulk of the Roman forces occupied the region on the lower Phasis, known as "the Island," while Babas held the more central position of Archæopolis.<sup>164</sup> Nachoragan, after losing about 2,000 of his best troops in the vicinity of this last-named place,<sup>165</sup> resolved to challenge the Romans to a decisive encounter by attacking the important post of Phasis at the mouth of the river. With some skill he succeeded in passing the Roman camp on the island, and in establishing himself in the plain directly south of Phasis before the Roman generals guessed his purpose.<sup>166</sup> They, however, were able by a quick movement to throw themselves into the town, and the struggle became one between fairly balanced forces, and was conducted with great obstinacy. The town was defended on the south by an outer palisade, a broad ditch protected by sharp stakes and full of water, and an inner bulwark of considerable height but constructed wholly of wood.<sup>167</sup> The Phasis guarded it on the north; and here a Roman fleet was stationed which lent its aid to the defenders at the two extremities of their line. The yards of the ships were manned with soldiers, and boats were hung from them containing slingers, archers, and even workers of catapults, who delivered their weapons from an elevation exceeding that of the towers.<sup>168</sup> But Nachoragan had the advantage of numbers; his men soon succeeded in filling up part of the ditch;<sup>169</sup> and the wooden bulwark could scarcely have long resisted his attacks, if the contest had continued to be wholly one of brute strength. But the Roman commander, Martinus, finding himself inferior in force, brought finesse and stratagem to his aid. Pretending to receive intelligence of the sudden arrival of a fresh Roman army from Byzantium, he contrived that the report should reach Nachoragan and thereby cause him to divide his troops, and send half of them to meet the supposed reinforcements.<sup>170</sup> Then, when the Persian general nevertheless renewed his assault, Martinus sent secretly 5,000 men under Justin to a short distance from Phasis;<sup>171</sup> and this detachment, appearing suddenly when the contest was going on at the wall, was naturally taken for the newly arrived army, and caused a general panic. The Persians, one and all, took to flight; a gen-

eral sally was made by the Romans in Phasis; a rout and a carnage followed, which completely disheartened the Persian leader, and led him to give up his enterprise.<sup>172</sup> Having lost nearly one-fourth of his army,<sup>173</sup> Nachoragan drew off to Kutaïs, and shortly afterwards, leaving the command of the Persians in Lazica to Vaphrizes, retired to winter quarters in Iberia.<sup>174</sup>

The failure of Nachoragan, following closely upon the decision of the Lazi to maintain their alliance with Rome in spite of the murder of Gubazes, seems to have convinced the Persian monarch that, in endeavoring to annex Lazica, he had engaged in a hopeless enterprise, and that it would be the most prudent and judicious course to yield to the inevitable, and gradually withdraw from a position which was untenable. Having meted out to Nachoragan the punishment usually assigned to unsuccessful commanders in Persia,<sup>175</sup> he sent an ambassador to Byzantium<sup>176</sup> in the spring of A.D. 556, and commenced negotiations which he intended to be serious. Diplomacy seems to have been as averse in the days of Chosroës as in our own to an undignified rapidity of proceeding. Hence, though there could be little to debate where both parties were substantially at one, the negotiations begun in May A.D. 556 were not concluded till after the commencement of the following year.<sup>177</sup> A complete suspension of hostilities was then agreed upon, to extend to Lazica no less than to the other dominions of the two monarchs.<sup>178</sup> In Lazica each party was to keep what it possessed, territory, cities, and castles.<sup>179</sup> As this joint occupation was scarcely suitable for a permanent arrangement, it was provided that the two belligerents should, during the continuance of the truce, proceed to settle the terms on which a lasting peace might be established.<sup>180</sup>

An interval of five years elapsed before the happy result, for which both parties had expressed themselves anxious, was accomplished.<sup>181</sup> It is uncertain how Chosroës was occupied during this period; but there are some grounds for believing that he was engaged in the series of Oriental wars<sup>182</sup> whereof we shall have to speak presently. Success appears to have crowned his arms wherever he directed them; but he remained undazzled by his victories, and still retained the spirit of moderation which had led him in A.D. 557 to conclude the general truce. He was even prepared, after five years of consideration, to go further in the line of pacific policy on which he had then entered, and, in order to secure the continuance of his good relations with Rome, was willing to relinquish all claim to the

sovereignty of Lazica. Under these circumstances, ambassadors of the highest rank, representing the two powers, met on the frontier between Daras and Nisibis, proclaimed the power and explained the motives of their respective sovereigns, and after a lengthy conference formulated a treaty of peace. The terms, which are given at length by a writer of the succeeding generation,<sup>183</sup> may be briefly expressed as follows:<sup>184</sup> (1) the Persians were to withdraw from Lazica, to give up all claim to it, and to hand over its possession to the Romans; (2) they were in return to receive from Rome an annual sum of 30,000 pieces of gold, the amount due for the first seven years being paid in advance;<sup>185</sup> (3) the Christians in Persia were guaranteed the full and free exercise of their religion, but were forbidden to make converts from the disciples of Zoroaster; (4) commercial intercourse was to be allowed between the two empires, but the merchants were restricted to the use of certain roads and certain emporia; (5) diplomatic intercourse was to be wholly free, and the goods of ambassadors were to be exempt from duty; (6) Daras was to continue a fortified town, but no new fortresses were to be built upon the frontier by either nation, and Daras itself was not to be made the headquarters of the Prefect of the East, or to be held by an unnecessarily large garrison; (7) all disputes arising between the two nations were to be determined by courts of arbitration; (8) the allies of the two nations were to be included in the treaty, and to participate in its benefits and obligations; (9) Persia was to undertake the sole charge of maintaining the Caspian Gates against the Huns and Alans; (10) the peace was made for a period of fifty years.

It has been held that by this treaty Justinian consented to become a tributary of the Persian Empire;<sup>186</sup> and undoubtedly it was possible for Oriental vanity to represent the arrangement made in this light.<sup>187</sup> But the million and a half, which Rome undertook to pay in the course of the next fifty years, might well be viewed by the Romans as an outlay for which they received an ample return in the cession to them of the Persian part of Lazica, and in the termination of their obligation to contribute towards the maintenance of the Caspian Gates. If there was any real danger of those results following from the Persian occupation of Lazica which both nations anticipated,<sup>188</sup> the sum must be considered to have been one of the best investments ever made by a State. Even if we believe the dangers apprehended to have been visionary, yet it cannot be viewed as an exorbitant price to have paid for a

considerable tract of fertile country, a number of strong fortresses, and the redemption of an obligation which could not with honor be disowned.

To Chosroës the advantage secured by the treaty was similar to that which Rome had obtained<sup>189</sup> by the peace of A.D. 532. Being no longer under any necessity of employing his forces against the Romans in the north-west, he found himself free to act with greatly increased effect against his enemies in the east and in the south. Already, in the interval between the conclusion of the general truce and of the fifty years' peace, he had, as it seems, invaded the territories of the Ephthalites,<sup>190</sup> and, with the help of the Great Khan of the Turks, inflicted upon this people, so long one of Persia's most formidable enemies, a severe defeat. According to Tabari, he actually slew the Ephthalite monarch, ravaged his territory, and pillaged his treasures.<sup>191</sup> About the same time he had also had a war with the Khazars, had overrun their country, wasted it with fire and sword, and massacred thousands of the inhabitants.<sup>192</sup> He now entertained designs against Arabia and perhaps India, countries on which he could not hope to make an impression without earnest and concentrated effort. It was doubtless with the view of extending his influence into these quarters that the Persian monarch evacuated Lazica, and bound his country to maintain peace with Rome for the next half-century.

The position of affairs in Arabia was at the time abnormal and interesting. For the most part that vast but sterile region has been the home of almost countless tribes, living independently of one another, each under its own sheikh or chief, in wild and unrestrained freedom.<sup>193</sup> Native princes have seldom obtained any widely extended dominion over the scattered population; and foreign powers have still more rarely exercised authority for any considerable period over the freedom-loving descendants of Ishmael. But towards the beginning of the sixth century of our era the Abyssinians of Axum, a Christian people, "raised" far "above the ordinary level of African barbarism"<sup>194</sup> by their religion and by their constant intercourse with Rome, succeeded in attaching to their empire a large portion of the Happy Arabia, and ruled it at first from their African capital, but afterwards by means of a viceroy, whose dependence on the Negus of Abyssinia was little more than nominal. Abraha, an Abyssinian of high rank,<sup>195</sup> being deputed by the Negus to re-establish the au-

thority of Abyssinia over the Yemen when it was shaken by a great revolt, made himself master of the country, assumed the crown, established Abyssinians in all the chief cities, built numerous churches, especially one of great beauty at Sana,<sup>196</sup> and at his death left the kingdom to his eldest son, Yaksoum.<sup>197</sup> An important Christian state was thus established in the Great Peninsula; and it was natural that Justinian should see with satisfaction, and Chosroës with some alarm, the growth of a power in this quarter which was sure to side with Rome and against Persia, if their rivalry should extend into these parts. Justinian had hailed with pleasure the original Abyssinian conquest, and had entered into amicable relations with both the Axumites and their colonists in the Yemen.<sup>198</sup> Chosroës now resolved upon a counter movement. He would employ the quiet secured to him by the peace of A.D. 562 in a great attack upon the Abyssinian power in Arabia. He would drive the audacious Africans from the soil of Asia, and would earn the eternal gratitude of the numerous tribes of the desert. He would extend Persian influence to the shores of the Arabian Gulf, and so confront the Romans along the whole line of their eastern boundary. He would destroy the *point d'appui* which Rome had acquired in South-western Asia, and so at once diminish her power and augment the strength and glory of Persia.

The interference of Chosroës in the affairs of a country so distant as Western Arabia involved considerable difficulties; but his expedition was facilitated by an application which he received from a native of the district in question. Saïf, the son of Dsu-Yezm, descended from the race of the old Homerite kings whom the Abyssinians had conquered, grew up at the court of Abraha in the belief that that prince, who had married his mother, was not his step-father, but his father.<sup>199</sup> Undeceived by an insult which Masrouq, the true son of Abraha and successor of Yaksoum, offered him,<sup>200</sup> Saïf became a refugee at the court of Chosroës, and importuned the Great King to embrace his quarrel and reinstate him on the throne of his fathers. He represented the Homerite population of Yemen as groaning under the yoke of their oppressors and only waiting for an opportunity to rise in revolt and shake it off. A few thousand Persian troops, enough to form the nucleus of an army, would suffice; they might be sent by sea to the port of Aden, near the mouth of the Arabian Gulf, where the Homerites would join them in large numbers; the combined

forces might then engage in combat with the Abyssinians, and destroy them or drive them from the land. Chosroës took the advice tendered him, so far at any rate as to make his expedition by sea. His ships were assembled in the Persian Gulf; a certain number of Persian troops<sup>201</sup> were embarked on board them; and the flotilla proceeded, under the conduct of Saïf, first to the mouth of the Gulf, and then along the southern coast of Arabia to Aden.<sup>202</sup> Encouraged by their presence, the Homerites rose against their foreign oppressors; a war followed, of which the particulars have been disfigured by romance;<sup>203</sup> but the result is undoubted—the Abyssinian strangers were driven from the soil of Arabia; the native race recovered its supremacy; and Saïf, the descendant of the old Homerite kings, was established, as the vassal or viceroy of Chosroës, on the throne of his ancestors.<sup>204</sup> This arrangement, however, was not lasting. Saïf, after a short reign, was murdered by his body-guard;<sup>205</sup> and Chosroës then conferred the government of Yemen upon a Persian officer, who seems to have borne the usual title of Marzpan,<sup>206</sup> and to have been in no way distinguished above other rulers of provinces. Thus the Homerites in the end gained nothing by their revolt but a change of masters. They may, however, have regarded the change as one worth making, since it gave them the mild sway of a tolerant heathen in lieu of the persecuting rule of Christian bigots.

According to some writers,<sup>207</sup> Chosroës also, in his later years, sent an expedition by sea against some portion of Hindustan, and received a cession of territory from an Indian monarch. But the country of the monarch is too remote for belief, and the ceded provinces seem to have belonged to Persia previously.<sup>208</sup> It is therefore, perhaps, most probable that friendly intercourse has been exaggerated into conquest, and the reception of presents from an Indian potentate<sup>209</sup> metamorphosed into the gain of territory. Some authorities do not assign to Chosroës any Indian dominion;<sup>210</sup> and it is at least doubtful whether he made any expedition in this direction.

A war, however, appears certainly to have occupied Chosroës about this period on his north-eastern frontier. The Turks had recently been advancing in strength and drawing nearer to the confines of Persia. They had extended their dominion over the great Ephthalite kingdom, partly by force of arms,<sup>211</sup> partly through the treachery of Katulphus, an Ephthalite chieftain;<sup>212</sup> they had received the submission of

the Sogdians, and probably of other tribes of the Transoxianian region, previously held in subjection by the Ephthalites; and they aspired to be acknowledged as a great power, the second, if not the first, in this part of Asia. It was perhaps rather with the view of picking a quarrel than in the hope of any valuable pacific result, that, about the close of A.D. 567, Dizabul, the Turkish Khan, sent ambassadors to Chosroës<sup>213</sup> with proposals for the establishment of free commercial intercourse between the Turks and Persians, and even for the conclusion of a treaty of friendship and alliance between the two nations. Chosroës suspected the motive for the overture, but was afraid openly to reject it. He desired to discourage intercourse between his own nation and the Turks, but could devise no better mode of effecting his purpose than by burning the Turkish merchandise offered to him after he had bought it, and by poisoning the ambassadors and giving out that they had fallen victims to the climate. His conduct exasperated the Turkish Khan, and created a deep and bitter hostility between the Turks and Persians.<sup>214</sup> It was at once resolved to send an embassy to Constantinople and offer to the Greek emperor the friendship which Chosroës had scorned. The embassy reached the Byzantine court early in A.D. 568, and was graciously received by Justin, the nephew of Justinian, who had succeeded his uncle on the imperial throne between three and four years previously. A treaty of alliance was made between the two nations; and a Roman embassy, empowered to ratify it, visited the Turkish court in the Altai mountains<sup>215</sup> during the course of the next year (A.D. 569), and drew closer the bonds of friendship between the high contracting powers.

But meanwhile Dizabul, confident in his own strength, had determined on an expedition into Persia. The Roman ambassador, Zemarchus, accompanied him on a portion of his march,<sup>216</sup> and witnessed his insulting treatment of a Persian envoy, sent by Chosroës to meet him and deprecate his attack. Beyond this point exact information fails us; but we may suspect that this is the expedition commemorated by Mirkhond,<sup>217</sup> wherein the Great Khan, having invaded the Persian territory in force, made himself master of Shash, Ferghana, Samarkand, Bokhara, Kesh, and Nesf, but, hearing that Hormisdas, son of Chosroës, was advancing against him at the head of a numerous army, suddenly fled, evacuating all the country that he had occupied, and retiring to the most distant portion of Turkestan. At any rate the expedition cannot have

had any great success; for shortly afterwards (A.D. 571) we find Turkish ambassadors once more visiting the Byzantine court,<sup>218</sup> and entreating Justin to renounce the fifty years' peace and unite with them in a grand attack upon the common enemy, which, if assaulted simultaneously on either side, might (they argued) be almost certainly crushed. Justin gave the ambassadors no definite reply, but renewed the alliance with Dizabul, and took seriously into consideration the question whether he should not yield to the representations made to him, and renew the war which Justinian had terminated nine years previously.


There were many circumstances which urged him towards a rupture. The payments to be made under the fifty years' peace had in his eyes the appearance of a tribute rendered by Rome to Persia, which was, he thought, an intolerable disgrace.<sup>219</sup> A subsidy, not very dissimilar, which Justinian had allowed the Saracenic Arabs under Persian rule, he had already discontinued;<sup>220</sup> and hostilities had, in consequence, already commenced between the Persian and the Roman Saracens.<sup>221</sup> The successes of Chosroës in Western Arabia had at once provoked his jealousy, and secured to Rome, in that quarter, an important ally in the great Christian kingdom of Abyssinia. The Turks of Central Asia had sought his friendship and offered to combine their attacks with his, if he would consent to go to war.<sup>222</sup> Moreover, there was once more discontent and even rebellion in Armenia, where the proselytizing zeal of the Persian governors had again driven the natives to take up arms and raise the standard of independence.<sup>223</sup> Above all, the Great King, who had warred with such success for twenty years against his uncle, was now in advanced age,<sup>224</sup> and seemed to have given signs of feebleness, inasmuch as in his recent expeditions he had individually taken no part, but had entrusted the command of his troops to others.<sup>225</sup> Under these circumstances, Justin, in the year A.D. 572, determined to renounce the peace made ten years earlier with the Persians, and to recommence the old struggle. Accordingly he at once dismissed the Persian envoy, Sebocthes, with contempt, refused wholly to make the stipulated payment, proclaimed his intention of receiving the Armenian insurgents under his protection, and bade Chosroës lay a finger on them at his peril.<sup>226</sup> He then appointed Marcian to the prefecture of the East,<sup>227</sup> and gave him the conduct of the war which was now inevitable.

No sooner did the Persian monarch find his kingdom seriously menaced than, despite his advanced age, he immediately took the field in person. Giving the command of a flying column of 6000 men to Adarman,<sup>228</sup> a skilful general, he marched himself against the Romans, who under Marcian<sup>229</sup> had defeated a Persian force, and were besieging Nisibis,<sup>230</sup> forced them to raise the siege, and, pressing forward as they retired, compelled them to seek shelter within the walls of Daras,<sup>231</sup> which he proceeded to invest with his main army. Meanwhile Adarman, at the head of the troops entrusted to him, crossed the Euphrates near Circesium, and, having entered Syria, carried fire and sword far and wide over that fertile province.<sup>232</sup> Repulsed from Antioch, where, however, he burnt the suburbs of the town, he invaded Cœlesyria, took and destroyed Apamea, and then, recrossing the great river, rejoined Chosroës before Daras. The renowned fortress made a brave defence. For about five months it resisted,<sup>233</sup> without obtaining any relief, the entire force of Chosroës, who is said<sup>234</sup> to have besieged it with 40,000 horse and 100,000 foot. At last, on the approach of winter, it could no longer hold out; enclosed within lines of circumvallation, and deprived of water by the diversion of its streams into new channels,<sup>235</sup> it found itself reduced to extremity, and forced to submit towards the close of A.D. 573. Thus the great Roman fortress in these parts was lost in the first year of the renewed war; and Justin, alarmed at his own temerity, and recognizing his weakness, felt it necessary to retire from the conduct of affairs, and deliver the reins of empire to stronger hands. He chose as his coadjutor and successor the Count Tiberius, a Thracian by birth, who had long stood high in his confidence; and this prince, in conjunction with the Empress Sophia, now took the direction of the war.<sup>236</sup>


The first need was to obtain a breathing-space. The Persian king having given an opening for negotiations,<sup>237</sup> advantage was taken of it by the joint rulers<sup>238</sup> to send an envoy, furnished with an autograph letter from the empress, and well provided with the best persuasives of peace, who was to suggest an armistice for a year, during which a satisfactory arrangement of the whole quarrel might be agreed upon. Tiberius thought that within this space he might collect an army sufficiently powerful to re-establish the superiority of the Roman arms in the east; Chosroës believed himself strong enough to defeat any force that Rome could now bring into

the field.<sup>239</sup> A truce for a year was therefore concluded, at the cost to Rome of 45,000 aurei;<sup>240</sup> and immense efforts were at once made by Tiberius to levy troops from his more distant provinces, or hire them from the lands beyond his borders. An army of 150,000 men was, it is said, collected from the banks of the Danube and the Rhine, from Scythia, Pannonia, Mœsia, Illyricum, and Isauria;<sup>241</sup> a general of repute, Justinian, the son of Germanus, was selected to command them; and the whole force was concentrated upon the eastern frontier;<sup>242</sup> but, after all these preparations, the Cæsar's heart failed him, and, instead of offering battle to the enemy, Tiberius sent a second embassy to the Persian head-quarters, early in A.D. 575, and besought an extension of the truce.<sup>243</sup> The Romans desired a short term of peace only, but wished for a general suspension of hostilities between the nations; the Persians advocated a longer interval, but insisted that the truce should not extend to Armenia.<sup>244</sup> The dispute continued till the armistice for a year had run out;<sup>245</sup> and the Persians had resumed hostilities and threatened Constantina<sup>246</sup> before the Romans would give way. At length it was agreed that there should be peace for three years, but that Armenia should be exempt from its operation.<sup>247</sup> Rome was to pay to Persia, during the continuance of the truce, the sum of 30,000 aurei annually.<sup>248</sup>

No sooner was the peace concluded than Chosroës put himself at the head of his army, and, entering Armenia Proper, proceeded to crush the revolt, and to re-establish the Persian authority throughout the entire region.<sup>249</sup> No resistance was offered to him; and he was able, before the close of the year, to carry his arms into the Roman territory of Armenia Minor, and even to threaten Cappadocia. Here Justinian opposed his progress; and in a partial engagement, Kurs (or Cursus), a leader of Scythians in the Roman service, obtained an advantage over the Persian rear-guard, captured the camp and the baggage, but did not succeed in doing any serious damage.<sup>250</sup> Chosroës soon afterwards revenged himself by surprising and destroying a Roman camp during the night; he then took and burnt the city of Melitene (Malatijeh); after which, as winter was approaching, he retired across the Euphrates, and returned into his own country. Hereupon Justinian seems to have invaded Persian Armenia, and to have enriched his troops with its plunder; according to some writers, he even penetrated as far as the Caspian Sea, and embarked upon its



CHOSROËS I. RECEIVING TRIBUTE FROM THE ROMANS.



CHOSROËS II. AND EMBLEMATIC FIGURES UNDER ARCH AT TAKHT-I-BOSTAN.

waters;<sup>251</sup> he continued on Persian soil during the whole of the winter, and it was not till the spring came that he re-entered Roman territory (A.D. 576).<sup>252</sup>

The campaign of A.D. 576 is somewhat obscure. The Romans seem to have gained certain advantages in Northern Armenia and Iberia,<sup>253</sup> while Chosroës on his part carried the war once more into Armenia Minor, and laid siege to Theodosiopolis, which, however, he was unable to take.<sup>254</sup> Negotiations were upon this resumed, and had progressed favorably to a certain point, when news arrived of a great disaster to the Roman arms in Armenia, which changed the face of affairs and caused the Persian negotiators to break up the conference. Tamchosro, a Persian general, had completely defeated the Roman army under Justinian.<sup>255</sup> Armenia had returned to its allegiance. There seemed every reason to believe that more was to be gained by arms than by diplomacy, and that, when the three years peace had run out, the Great King might renew the general war with a prospect of obtaining important successes.

There are no military events which can be referred to the year A.D. 577. The Romans and Persians amused each other with alternate embassies during its course, and with negotiations that were not intended to have any result.<sup>256</sup> The two monarchs made vast preparations; and with the spring of A.D. 578 hostilities recommenced. Chosroës is accused of having anticipated the expiration of the truce by a period of forty days;<sup>257</sup> but it is more probable that he and the Romans estimated the date of its expiration differently. However this was, it is certain that his generals, Mebodes and Sapoës, took the field in early spring with 20,000 horse,<sup>258</sup> and entering the Roman Armenia laid waste the country, at the same time threatening Constantina and Theodosiopolis.<sup>259</sup> Simultaneously Tamchosro,<sup>260</sup> quitting Persarmenia, marched westward and plundered the country about Amida (Diarbekr). The Roman commander Maurice, who had succeeded Justinian, possessed considerable military ability. On this occasion, instead of following the ordinary plan of simply standing on the defensive and endeavoring to repulse the invaders, he took the bolder course of making a counter movement. Entering Persarmenia, which he found denuded of troops, he carried all before him, destroying the forts, and plundering the country.<sup>261</sup> Though the summer heats brought on him an attack of fever, he continued without pause his destructive march; invaded and oc-

cupied Arzanene, with its stronghold, Aphumôn, carried off the population to the number of 10,090, and, pressing forwards from Arzanene into Eastern Mesopotamia, took Singara, and carried fire and sword over the entire region as far as the Tigris. He even ventured to throw a body of skirmishers across the river into Cordyêné (Kurdistan); and these ravagers, who were commanded by Kurs, the Scythian, spread devastation over a district where no Roman soldier had set foot since its cession by Jovian.<sup>262</sup> Agathias tells us that Chosroës was at the time enjoying his summer *villeggiatura* in the Kurdish hills, and saw from his residence the smoke of the hamlets which the Roman troops had fired.<sup>263</sup> He hastily fled from the danger, and shut himself up within the walls of Ctesiphon, where he was soon afterwards seized with the illness which brought his life to a close.

Meanwhile Kurs, unconscious probably of the prize that had been so near his grasp, recrossed the Tigris with his booty and rejoined Maurice, who on the approach of winter withdrew into Roman territory, evacuating all his conquests excepting Arzanene.<sup>264</sup> The dull time of winter was, as usual, spent in negotiations; and it was thought that a peace might have been concluded had Chosroës lived.<sup>265</sup> Tiberius was anxious to recover Daras, and was willing to withdraw the Roman forces wholly from Persarmenia and Iberia, and to surrender Arzanene and Aphumôn, if Daras were restored to him.<sup>266</sup> He would probably have been content even to pay in addition a sum of money.<sup>267</sup> Chosroës might perhaps have accepted these terms; but while the envoys empowered to propose them were on their way to his court, early<sup>268</sup> in the year A.D. 579, the aged monarch died in his palace at Ctesiphon after a reign of forty-eight years.<sup>269</sup>

## CHAPTER XXI.

*Administration of Persia under Chosroës I. Fourfold Division of the Empire. Careful Surveillance of those entrusted with Power. Severe Punishment of Abuse of Trust. New System of Taxation introduced. Correction of Abuse connected with the Military Service. Encouragement of Agriculture and Marriage. Relief of Poverty. Care for Travellers. Encouragement of Learning. Practice of Toleration within certain Limits. Domestic Life of Chosroës. His Wives. Revolt and Death of his Son, Nushizad. Coins of Chosroës. Estimate of his Character.*

Ἐγῶγε τὸν ἄνδρα μείζονα θεῖην τῶν ἄλλων βαρβάρων.—Agathias, ii. 28.

A GENERAL consensus of the Oriental writers<sup>1</sup> marks the reign of the first Chosroës as a period not only of great military activity, but also of improved domestic administration. Chosroës found the empire in a disordered and ill-regulated condition, taxation arranged on a bad system, the people oppressed by unjust and tyrannical governors, the military service a prey to the most scandalous abuses, religious fanaticism rampant, class at variance with class, extortion and wrong winked at, crime unpunished, agriculture languishing, and the masses throughout almost the whole of the country sullen and discontented. It was his resolve from the first<sup>2</sup> to carry out a series of reforms—to secure the administration of even-handed justice, to put the finances on a better footing, to encourage agriculture, to relieve the poor and the distressed, to root out the abuses that destroyed the efficiency of the army, and to excise the gangrene of fanaticism which was eating into the heart of the nation. How he effected the last named object by his wholesale destruction of the followers of Mazdak has been already related;<sup>3</sup> but it appeared unadvisable to interrupt the military history of the reign by combining with it any account of the numerous other reforms which he accomplished. It remains therefore to consider them in this place, since they are certainly not the least remarkable among the many achievements of this great monarch.

Persia, until the time of Anushirwan, had been divided into

a multitude of provinces, the satraps or governors of which held their office directly under the crown. It was difficult for the monarch to exercise a sufficient superintendence over so large a number of rulers, many of them remote from the court, and all united by a common interest. Chosroës conceived the plan of forming four great governments, and entrusting them to four persons in whom he had confidence, whose duty it should be to watch the conduct of the provincial satraps to control them, direct them, or report their misconduct to the crown. The four great governments were those of the east, the north, the south, and the west. The east comprised Khorassan, Seistan, and Kirman; the north, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ghilan, Koum, and Isfahan; the south, Fars and Ahwaz; the west, Irak, or Babylonia, Assyria, and Mesopotamia.<sup>4</sup>

It was not the intention of the monarch, however, to put a blind trust in his instruments. He made personal progresses through his empire from time to time, visiting each province in turn and inquiring into the condition of the inhabitants.<sup>5</sup> He employed continually an army of inspectors and spies, who reported to him from all quarters the sufferings or complaints of the oppressed, and the neglects or misdoings of those in authority.<sup>6</sup> On the occurrence of any specially suspicious circumstance, he appointed extraordinary commissions of inquiry, which, armed with all the power of the crown, proceeded to the suspected quarter, took evidence, and made a careful report of whatever wrongs or malpractices they discovered.<sup>7</sup>

When guilt was brought home to incriminated persons or parties, the punishment with which they were visited was swift and signal. We have seen how harsh were the sentences passed by Chosroës upon those whose offences attacked his own person or dignity.<sup>8</sup> An equal severity appears in his judgments, where there was no question of his own wrongs, but only of the interests of his subjects.<sup>9</sup> On one occasion he is said to have executed no fewer than eighty collectors of taxes on the report of a commission charging them with extortion.<sup>10</sup>

Among the principal reforms which Chosroës is said to have introduced was his fresh arrangement of the taxation. Hitherto all lands had paid to the State a certain proportion of their produce, a proportion which varied, according to the estimated richness of the soil, from a tenth to one-half.<sup>11</sup> The effect was to discourage all improved cultivation, since it was quite possible that the whole profit of any increased outlay might be

absorbed by the State, and also to cramp and check the liberty of the cultivators in various ways, since the produce could not be touched until the revenue official made his appearance and carried off the share of the crop which he had a right to take.<sup>12</sup> Chosroës resolved to substitute a land-tax for the proportionate payments in kind, and thus at once to set the cultivator at liberty with respect to harvesting his crops and to allow him the entire advantage of any augmented production which might be secured by better methods of farming his land. His tax consisted in part of a money payment, in part of a payment in kind; but both payments were fixed and invariable, each measure of ground being rated in the king's books at one *dirhem* and one measure of the produce.<sup>13</sup> Uncultivated land, and land lying fallow at the time, were exempt;<sup>14</sup> and thus the scheme involved, not one survey alone, but a recurring (annual) survey,<sup>15</sup> and an annual registration of all cultivators, with the quantity of land under cultivation held by each, and the nature of the crop or crops to be grown by them. The system was one of much complication, and may have pressed somewhat hardly upon the poorer and less productive soils; but it was an immense improvement upon the previously existing practice, which had all the disadvantages of the modern tithe system, aggravated by the high rates exacted<sup>16</sup> and by the certainty that, in any disputed case, the subject would have had a poor chance of establishing his right against the crown. It is not surprising that the caliphs, when they conquered Persia, maintained unaltered the land system of Chosroës<sup>17</sup> which they found established, regarding it as, if not perfect, at any rate not readily admitting of much improvement.

Besides the tax upon arable lands, of which we have hitherto spoken, Chosroës introduced into Persia various other imposts. The fruit trees were everywhere counted, and a small payment required for each.<sup>18</sup> The personality of the citizens was valued, and a graduated property-tax established, which, however, in the case of the most opulent, did not exceed the moderate sum of forty-eight *dirhems*<sup>19</sup> (about twenty-seven shillings). A poll-tax was required of Jews and Christians,<sup>20</sup> whereof we do not know the amount. From all these burdens liberal exemptions were made on account of age and sex; no female paid anything;<sup>21</sup> and males above fifty years of age or under twenty were also free of charge. Due notice was given to each individual of the sum for which he was liable, by the publication in each province, town, and village, of a tax table,

in which each citizen or alien could see against his name the amount about to be claimed of him, with the ground upon which it was regarded as due.<sup>22</sup> Payment had to be made by instalments, three times each year, at the end of every four months.<sup>23</sup>

In order to prevent the unfair extortion, which in the ancient world was always, with reason or without, charged upon collectors of revenue, Chosroës, by the advice of the Grand Mobed, authorized the Magian priests everywhere to exercise a supervision over the receivers of taxes, and to hinder them from exacting more than their due.<sup>24</sup> The priests were only too happy to discharge this popular function; and extortion must have become rare under a system which comprised so efficient a safeguard.

Another change ascribed to Chosroës is a reform of the administration of the army. Under the system previously existing, Chosroës found that the resources of the state were lavishly wasted, and the result was a military force inefficient and badly accoutred. No security was taken that the soldiers possessed their proper equipments or could discharge the duties appropriate to their several grades. Persons came before the paymaster, claiming the wages of a cavalry soldier, who possessed no horse, and had never learned to ride. Some, who called themselves soldiers, had no knowledge of the use of any weapon at all; others claimed for higher grades of the service than those whereto they really belonged; those who drew the pay of cuirassiers were destitute of a coat of mail; those who professed themselves archers were utterly incompetent to draw the bow. The established rates of pay varied between a hundred *dirhems* a year and four thousand, and persons entitled to the lowest rate often received an amount not much short of the highest.<sup>25</sup> The evil was not only that the treasury was robbed by unfair claims and unfounded pretences, but that artifice and false seeming were encouraged, while at the same time the army was brought into such a condition that no dependence could be placed upon it. If the number who actually served corresponded to that upon the rolls, which is uncertain,<sup>26</sup> at any rate all the superior arms of the service fell below their nominal strength, and the lower grades were crowded with men who were only soldiers in name.

As a remedy against these evils, Chosroës appointed a single paymaster-general, and insisted on his carefully inspecting and reviewing each body of troops before he allowed it to draw

its pay.<sup>27</sup> Each man was to appear before him fully equipped and to show his proficiency with his weapon or weapons; horse soldiers were to bring their horses, and to exhibit their mastery over the animals by putting them through their paces, mounting and dismounting, and performing the other usual exercises. If any clumsiness were noted, or any deficiency in the equipment, the pay was to be withheld until the defect observed had been made good. Special care was to be taken that no one drew the pay of a class superior to that whereto he really belonged—of an archer, for instance, when he was in truth a common soldier, or of a trooper when he served not in the horse, but in the foot.

A curious anecdote is related in connection with these military reforms. When Babek, the new paymaster, was about to hold his first review, he issued an order that all persons belonging to the army then present in the capital should appear before him on a certain day. The troops came; but Babek dismissed them on the ground that a certain person whose presence was indispensable had not made his appearance. Another day was appointed, with the same result, except that Babek on this occasion plainly intimated that it was the king whom he expected to attend. Upon this Chosroës, when a third summons was issued, took care to be present, and came fully equipped, as he thought, for battle. But the critical eye of the reviewing officer detected an omission, which he refused to overlook—the king had neglected to bring with him two extra bow-strings. Chosroës was required to go back to his palace and remedy the defect, after which he was allowed to pass muster, and then summoned to receive his pay. Babek affected to consider seriously what the pay of the commander-in-chief ought to be, and decided that it ought to exceed that of any other person in the army. He then, in the sight of all, presented the king with four thousand *and one* dirhems, which Chosroës received and carried home.<sup>28</sup> Thus two important principles were thought to be established—that no defect of equipment whatsoever should be overlooked in any officer, however high his rank, and that none should draw from the treasury a larger amount of pay than 4,000 dirhems (112*l.* of our money).

The encouragement of agriculture was an essential element in the system of Zoroaster;<sup>29</sup> and Chosroës, in devoting his attention to it, was at once performing a religious duty and increasing the resources of the state. It was his earnest

desire to bring into cultivation all the soil which was capable of it; and with this object he not only issued edicts commanding the reclamation of waste lands, but advanced from the treasury the price of the necessary seed-corn, implements, and beasts to all poor persons willing to carry out his orders.<sup>30</sup> Other poor persons, especially the infirm and those disabled by bodily defect, were relieved from his privy purse; mendicancy was forbidden, and idleness made an offence.<sup>31</sup> The lands forfeited by the followers of Mazdak were distributed to necessitous cultivators.<sup>32</sup> The water system was carefully attended to; river and torrent courses were cleared of obstructions and straightened;<sup>33</sup> the superfluous water of the rainy season was stored, and meted out with a wise economy to those who tilled the soil, in the spring and summer.<sup>34</sup>

The prosperity of a country depends in part upon the laborious industry of the inhabitants, in part upon their numbers. Chosroës regarded Persia as insufficiently peopled, and made efforts to increase the population by encouraging and indeed compelling marriage.<sup>35</sup> All marriageable females were required to provide themselves with husbands; if they neglected this duty, the government interfered, and united them to unmarried men of their own class. The pill was gilt to these latter by the advance of a sufficient dowry from the public treasury, and by the prospect that, if children resulted from the union, their education and establishment in life would be undertaken by the state. Another method of increasing the population, adopted by Chosroës to a certain extent, was the settlement within his own territories of the captives whom he carried off from foreign countries in the course of his military expeditions. The most notorious instance of this policy was the Greek settlement, known as Rumia (Rome), established by Chosroës after his capture of Antioch (A.D. 540), in the near vicinity of Ctesiphon.<sup>36</sup>

Oriental monarchs, in many respects civilized and enlightened, have often shown a narrow and unworthy jealousy of foreigners. Chosroës had a mind which soared above this petty prejudice. He encouraged the visits of all foreigners, excepting only the barbarous Turks,<sup>37</sup> readily received them at his court, and carefully provided for their safety. Not only were the roads and bridges kept in the most perfect order throughout his territories,<sup>38</sup> so as to facilitate locomotion, but on the frontiers and along the chief lines of route guard-houses were built and garrisons maintained for the

express purpose of securing the safety of travellers.<sup>39</sup> The result was that the court of Chosroës was visited by numbers of Europeans, who were hospitably treated, and invited, or even pressed, to prolong their visits.

To the proofs of wisdom and enlightenment here enumerated Chosroës added another, which is more surprising than any of them. He studied philosophy, and was a patron of science and learning. Very early in his reign he gave a refuge at his court to a body of seven Greek sages whom a persecuting edict, issued by Justinian, had induced to quit their country and take up their abode on Persian soil.<sup>40</sup> Among the refugees was the erudite Damascius, whose work *De Principiis* is well known, and has recently been found to exhibit an intimate acquaintance with some of the most obscure of the Oriental religions.<sup>41</sup> Another of the exiles was the eclectic philosopher Simplicius, "the most acute and judicious of the interpreters of Aristotle."<sup>42</sup> Chosroës gave the band of philosophers a hospitable reception, entertained them at his table, and was unwilling that they should leave his court.<sup>43</sup> They found him acquainted with the writings of Aristotle and Plato, whose works he had caused to be translated into the Persian tongue.<sup>44</sup> If he was not able to enter very deeply into the dialectical and metaphysical subtleties which characterize alike the Platonic Dialogues and the Aristotelian treatises, at any rate he was ready to discuss with them such questions as the origin of the world, its destructibility or indestructibility, and the derivation of all things from one First Cause or from more.<sup>45</sup> Later in his reign, another Greek, a sophist named Uranius, acquired his especial favor,<sup>46</sup> became his instructor in the learning of his country, and was presented by him with a large sum of money. Further, Chosroës maintained at his court, for the space of a year, the Greek physician, Tribunus, and offered him any reward that he pleased at his departure.<sup>47</sup> He also instituted at Gondi-Sapor, in the vicinity of Susa, a sort of medical school, which became by degrees a university, wherein philosophy, rhetoric, and poetry were also studied.<sup>48</sup> Nor was it Greek learning alone which attracted his notice and his patronage. Under his fostering care the history and jurisprudence of his native Persia were made special objects of study; the laws and maxims of the first Artaxerxes, the founder of the monarchy, were called forth from the obscurity which had rested on them for ages, were republished and declared to be authoritative;<sup>49</sup> while at the same time the annals

of the monarchy were collected and arranged, and a "Shah-nameh," or "Book of the Kings," composed, which it is probable formed the basis of the great work of Firdausi.<sup>50</sup> Even the distant land of Hindustan was explored in the search after varied knowledge, and contributed to the learning and civilization of the time the fables of Bidpai<sup>51</sup> and the game of chess.<sup>52</sup>

Though a fierce persecutor of the deluded followers of Mazdak,<sup>53</sup> Chosroës admitted and practised, to some extent, the principles of toleration. On becoming king, he laid it down as a rule of his government that the actions of men alone, and not their thoughts, were subject to his authority.<sup>54</sup> He was therefore bound not to persecute opinion; and we may suppose that in his proceedings against the Mazdakites he intended to punish their crimes rather than their tenets. Towards the Christians, who abounded in his empire,<sup>55</sup> he certainly showed himself, upon the whole, mild and moderate. He married a Christian wife, and allowed her to retain her religion.<sup>56</sup> When one of his sons became a Christian, the only punishment which he inflicted on him was to confine him to the palace.<sup>57</sup> He augmented the number of the Christians in his dominions by the colonies which he brought in from abroad. He allowed to his Christian subjects the free exercise of their religion, permitted them to build churches, elect bishops, and conduct services at their pleasure, and even suffered them to bury their dead,<sup>58</sup> though such pollution of the earth was accounted sacrilegious by the Zoroastrians. No unworthy compliances with the established cult were required of them. Proselytism, however, was not allowed; and all Christian sects were perhaps not viewed with equal favor. Chosroës, at any rate, is accused of persecuting the Catholics and the Monophysites, and compelling them to join the Nestorians, who formed the predominant sect in his dominions.<sup>59</sup> Conformity, however, in things outward, is compatible with a wide diversity of opinion; and Chosroës, while he disliked differences of practice, seems certainly to have encouraged, at least in his earlier years, a freedom of discussion in religious matters which must have tended to shake the hereditary faith of his subjects.<sup>60</sup> He also gave on one occasion a very remarkable indication of liberal and tolerant views. When he made his first peace with Rome,<sup>61</sup> the article on which he insisted the most was one whereby the free profession of their known opinions and tenets in their own country was secured

to the seven Grecian sages who had found at his court, in their hour of need, a refuge from persecution.<sup>62</sup>

In his domestic relations Chosroës was unfortunate. With his chief wife, indeed, the daughter of the great Khan of the Turks, he seems to have lived always on excellent terms; and it was his love for her which induced him to select the son whom she had borne him for his successor on the throne. But the wife who stood next in his favor displeased him by her persistent refusal to renounce the religion of Christ and adopt that of her husband in its stead;<sup>63</sup> and the quarrel between them must have been aggravated by the conduct of their child, Nushizad, who, when he came to years of discretion, deliberately preferred the faith of his mother to that of his father and of the nation.<sup>64</sup> With this choice Chosroës was naturally offended; but he restrained his anger within moderate limits, and was content to punish the young prince by forbidding him to quit the precincts of the palace.<sup>65</sup> Unhappy results followed. Nushizad in his confinement heard a rumor that his father, who had started for the Syrian war, was struck with sickness, was not likely to recover, was dead. It seemed to him a golden opportunity, of which he would be foolish not to make the most. He accordingly quitted his prison, spread the report of his father's death, seized the state treasure, and scattered it with a liberal hand among the troops left in the capital, summoned the Christians throughout the empire to his aid, assumed the title and state of king, was acknowledged by the whole of the southern province, and thought himself strong enough to take the offensive and attempt the subjugation of Irak.<sup>66</sup> Here, however, he was met by Phabrizus<sup>67</sup> (Firuz?), one of his father's generals, who completely defeated his army in a pitched battle. According to one account, Nushizad fell in the thick of the fight, mortally wounded by a chance arrow.<sup>68</sup> According to another, he was made prisoner, and carried to Chosroës, who, instead of punishing him with death, destroyed his hopes of reigning by inflicting on him a cruel disfigurement.<sup>69</sup>

The coins of Chosroës are very numerous, and offer one or two novel and curious types. The most remarkable have on the obverse the head of the king, presenting the full face, and surmounted by a mural crown with a low cap.<sup>70</sup> The beard is close, and the hair arranged in masses on either side. There are two stars above the crown, and two crescents, one over either shoulder, with a star and crescent on the dress in front

of each shoulder. The king wears a necklace, from which hang three pendants. On the reverse these coins have a full-length figure of the king, standing to the front, with his two hands resting on the hilt of his straight sword, and its point placed between his feet. The crown worn resembles that on the obverse; and there is a star and crescent on either side of the head. The legend on the obverse is *Khushludi afzum*, "May Chosroës increase;" the reverse has, on the left *Khushludi*, with the regnal year; on the right, a longer legend which has not yet been satisfactorily interpreted.<sup>71</sup> [Pl. XXII., Fig. 3.]

The more ordinary type on the coins of Chosroës I. is one differing but little from those of his father, Kobad, and his son, Hormazd IV. The obverse has the king's head in profile, and the reverse the usual fire-altar and supporters. The distinguishing mark of these coins is, in addition to the legend, that they have three simple crescents in the margin of the obverse, instead of three crescents with stars. [Pl. XXII., Fig. 4.]

A relic of Chosroës has come down to us, which is of great beauty. This is a cup composed of a number of small disks of colored glass, united by a gold setting, and having at the bottom a crystal, engraved with a figure of the monarch. As late as 1638 it was believed that the disks of glass were jacinths, garnets, and emeralds, while the stone which forms the base was thought to be a white sapphire. The original owner of so rare a drinking-vessel could (it was supposed) only be Solomon;<sup>72</sup> and the figure at the bottom was accordingly supposed to represent the Jewish king. Archæologists are now agreed that the engraving on the gem, which exactly resembles the figure upon the peculiar coins above described, represents Chosroës Anushirwan, and is of his age.<sup>73</sup> There is no sufficient reason to doubt but that the cup itself is one out of which he was accustomed to drink.

It is the great glory of Anushirwan that the title which his subjects gave him<sup>74</sup> was "the JUST." According to European, and especially to modern ideas, this praise would seem to have undeserved; and thus the great historian of the Byzantine period has not scrupled to declare that in his external policy Chosroës was actuated by mere ambition, and that "in his domestic administration he deserved the appellation of a tyrant."<sup>75</sup> Undoubtedly the punishments which he inflicted were for the most part severe; but they were not capricious, nor uniform, nor without reference to the character of the

offence. Plotting against his crown or his person, when the conspirators were of full age, treasonable correspondence with the enemy, violation of the sanctity of the harem, and the proselytism which was strictly forbidden by the laws, he punished with death.<sup>76</sup> But, when the rebel was a mere youth, he was content to inflict a disfigurement;<sup>77</sup> whence the offence was less, he could imprison,<sup>78</sup> or confine to a particular spot,<sup>79</sup> or simply banish the culprit from his presence.<sup>80</sup> Instances on record of his clemency to offenders,<sup>81</sup> and others which show that, when his own interests were at stake, he steadily refused to make use of his unlimited power for the oppression of individuals.<sup>82</sup> It is unlikely that Anushirwan was distinguished as "the Just" without a reason; and we may safely conclude from his acknowledged title that his subjects found his rule more fair and equitable than that of any previous monarch.

That the administration of Chosroës was wise, and that Persia prospered under his government, is generally admitted. His vigilance, his activity, his care for the poor, his efforts to prevent or check oppression, are notorious, and cannot be gainsaid. Nor can it be doubted that he was brave, hardy, temperate, prudent, and liberal. Whether he possessed the softer virtues, compassion, kindness, a tender and loving heart, is perhaps open to question. He seems, however, to have been a good husband and a good father, not easily offended, and not over-severe whence offence was given him.<sup>83</sup> His early severities<sup>84</sup> against his brothers and their followers may be regarded as caused by the advice of others, and perhaps as justified by state policy. In his later life, when he was his own master, he was content to chastise rebellion more mildly.

Intellectually, there is no reason to believe that Chosroës rose very high above the ordinary Oriental level. The Persians, and even many Greeks, in his own day, exalted him above measure, as capable of apprehending the most subtle arguments and the deepest problems of philosophy;<sup>85</sup> but the estimate of Agathias<sup>86</sup> is probably more just, and this reduces him to a standard about which there is nothing surprising. It is to his credit that although engaged in almost perpetual wars, and burdened moreover with the administration of a mighty empire, he had a mind large enough to entertain the consideration also of intellectual problems, and to enjoy and take part in their discussion; but it could scarcely be expected that, with

his numerous other employments, he should really sound to their utmost depths the profundities of Greek thought, or understand the speculative difficulties which separated the various schools one from another. No doubt his knowledge was superficial, and there may have been ostentation in the parade which he made of it;<sup>87</sup> but we must not deny him the praise of a quick, active intellect, and a width of view rarely found in an Oriental.

It was not, however, in the field of speculative thought, but in that of practical effort, that Chosroës chiefly distinguished himself and gained his choicest laurels. The excellence of his domestic administration has been already noticed. But, great as he was in peace, he was greater in war. Engaged for nearly fifty years in almost uninterrupted contests, he triumphed in every quarter, and scarcely experienced a reverse. Victorious over the Romans, the Abyssinians, the Ephthalites, and the Turks, he extended the limits of his empire on all sides, pacified the discontented Armenia, crushed internal revolt, frustrated the most threatening combinations, and established Persia in a position which she had scarcely occupied since the days of Darius Hystaspis. Personally engaged in above a score of fights, by the admission of his enemies he was never defeated but once;<sup>88</sup> and there are circumstances which make it probable that this single check was of slight importance.<sup>89</sup> The one real failure that can be laid to his charge was in another quarter, and involved no military, but only a political blunder. In recoiling from the difficulties of the Lazic war,<sup>90</sup> Chosroës had not to deplore any disgrace to his arms, but simply to acknowledge that he had misunderstood the temper of the Lazic people. In depreciation of his military talents it may be said that he was never opposed to any great general. With Belisarius it would certainly seem that he never actually crossed swords; but Justinian and Maurice (afterwards emperor), to whom he was opposed in his later years, were no contemptible antagonists. It may further be remarked that the collapse of Persia in her struggle with Rome<sup>91</sup> as soon as Chosroës was in his grave is a tolerably decisive indication that she owed her long career of victory under his guidance to his possession of uncommon military ability.

## CHAPTER XXII.

*Accession of Hormisdas IV. His good Government in the Earlier Portion of his Reign. Invasion of Persia by the Romans under Maurice. Defeats of Adarman and Tamchosro. Campaign of Johannes. Campaigns of Philippicus and Heraclius. Tyranny of Hormisdas. He is attacked by the Arabs, Khazars, and Turks. Bahram defeats the Turks. His Attack on Lazica. He suffers a Defeat. Disgrace of Bahram. Dethronement of Hormisdas IV. and Elevation of Chosroës II. Character of Hormisdas. Coins of Hormisdas.*

Χοσρόης κατεστρέψατο βίον, διάδοχον Ὁρμίσδαν τὸν υἱόν, ἄνδρα τῇ χαλεπότητι τὴν πατρίαν ὑπερῆκοντικότεν τῶν τρόπων ἀνοσιότητα· ἦν γὰρ βίαιός τε καὶ τοῦ πλειονος ἐραστής ἀκόρεστος.—Theophylact. Simocatt. iii. 16.

AT the death of Chosroës the crown was assumed without dispute or difficulty by his son, Hormazd, who is known to the Greek and Latin writers as Hormisdas IV. Hormazd was the eldest, or perhaps the only, son borne to Chosroës by the Turkish princess, Fakim,<sup>1</sup> who, from the time of her marriage, had held the place of sultana, or principal wife. His illustrious descent on both sides, added to the express appointment of his father, caused him to be universally accepted as king; and we do not hear that even his half-brothers, several of whom were older than himself,<sup>2</sup> put forward any claims in opposition to his, or caused him any anxiety or trouble. He commenced his reign amid the universal plaudits and acclamations of his subjects, whom he delighted by declaring that he would follow in all things the steps of his father, whose wisdom so much exceeded his own, would pursue his policy, maintain his officers in power, and endeavor in all respects to govern as he had governed.<sup>3</sup> When the mobeds attempted to persuade him to confine his favor to Zoroastrians and persecute such of his subjects as were Jews or Christians he rejected their advice with the remark<sup>4</sup> that, as in an extensive territory there were sure to be varieties of soil, so it was fitting that a great empire should embrace men of various opinions and manners. In his progresses from one part of his empire to another he allowed of

no injury being done to the lands or gardens along the route, and punished severely all who infringed his orders.<sup>5</sup> According to some,<sup>6</sup> his good dispositions lasted only during the time that he enjoyed the counsel and support of Abu-zurd-mihir, one of the best advisers of his father; but when this venerated sage was compelled by the infirmities of age to quit his court he fell under other influences, and soon degenerated into the cruel tyrant which, according to all the authorities,<sup>7</sup> he showed himself in his later years.

Meanwhile, however, he was engaged in important wars, particularly with the Roman emperors Tiberius and Maurice, who, now that the great Chosroës was dead, pressed upon Persia with augmented force, in the confident hope of recovering their lost laurels. On the first intelligence of the great king's death, Tiberius had endeavored to negotiate a peace with his successor, and had offered to relinquish all claim on Armenia, and to exchange Arzanene with its strong fortress, Aphumôn, for Daras; but Hormisdas had absolutely rejected his proposals, declared that he would surrender nothing, and declined to make peace on any other terms than the resumption by Rome of her old system of paying an annual subsidy.<sup>8</sup> The war consequently continued; and Maurice, who still held the command, proceeded, in the summer of A.D. 579, to take the offensive and invade the Persian territory. He sent a force across the Tigris under Romanus, Theodoric, and Martin, which ravaged Kurdistan, and perhaps penetrated into Media,<sup>9</sup> nowhere encountering any large body of the enemy, but carrying all before them and destroying the harvest at their pleasure. In the next year, A.D. 580, he formed a more ambitious project. Having gained over, as he thought, Alamundarus, the leader of the Saracens dependent on Persia, and collected a fleet to carry his stores, he marched from Circesium down the course of the Euphrates, intending to carry the war into Southern Mesopotamia,<sup>10</sup> and perhaps hoping to capture Ctesiphon. He expected to take the Persians unawares, and may not unnaturally have looked to gain an important success; but, unhappily for his plans, Alamundarus proved treacherous. The Persian king was informed of his enemy's march, and steps were at once taken to render it abortive. Adarman was sent, at the head of a large army, into Roman Mesopotamia, where he threatened the important city of Callinicus in Maurice's rear. That general dared advance no further. On the contrary, he felt constrained to fall back, to give up his scheme, burn his fleet, and return

hastily within the Roman frontier. On his arrival, he engaged Adarman near the city which he was attacking, defeated him, and drove him back into Persia.<sup>11</sup>

In the ensuing spring, after another vain attempt at negotiation,<sup>12</sup> the offensive was taken by the Persians, who, early in A.D. 581, crossed the frontier under Tam-chosro, and attacked the Roman city of Constantia, or Constantina.<sup>13</sup> Maurice hastened to its relief; and a great battle was fought in the immediate vicinity of the city, wherein the Persians were completely defeated, and their commander lost his life.<sup>14</sup> Further advantages might have been gained; but the prospect of the succession drew Maurice to Constantinople, where Tiberius, stricken with a mortal disease, received him with open arms, gave his daughter and the state into his care, and, dying soon after, left him the legacy of the empire, which he administered with success for above twenty years.<sup>15</sup>

On quitting the East, Maurice devolved his command upon an officer who bore the very common name of Johannes, but was distinguished further by the epithet of Mustacon, on account of his abundant moustache.<sup>16</sup> This seems to have been a bad appointment. Mustacon was unequal to the position. He gave the Persians battle at the conjunction of the Nymphius with the Tigris, but was defeated with considerable loss, partly through the misconduct of one of his captains. He then laid siege to Arbas,<sup>17</sup> a strong fort on the Persian side of the Nymphius, while the main body of the Persians were attacking Aphumôn in the neighboring district of Arzanene. The garrison of Arbas made signals of distress, which speedily brought the Persian army to their aid; a second battle was fought at Arbas, and Mustacon was again defeated, and forced to retire across the Nymphius into Roman territory.<sup>18</sup> His incapacity was now rendered so clearly evident that Maurice recalled him, and gave the command of the army of the East to a new general, Philippicus, his brother-in-law.<sup>19</sup>

The first and second campaigns of Philippicus, in the years A.D. 584 and 585, were of the most commonplace character. He avoided any general engagement, and contended himself with plundering inroads into the Persian territory on either side of the Upper Tigris, occasionally suffering considerably from want of water and provisions.<sup>20</sup> The Persians on their part undertook no operations of importance until late in A.D. 585, when Philippicus had fallen sick. They then made attempts upon Monocartum and Martyropolis, which were un-

successful, resulting only in the burning of a church and a monastery near the latter town.<sup>21</sup> Neither side seemed capable of making any serious impression upon the other; and early the next year negotiations were resumed,<sup>22</sup> which, however, resulted in nothing.

In his third campaign Philippicus adopted a bolder line of proceeding. Commencing by an invasion of Eastern Mesopotamia, he met and defeated the Persians in a great battle near Solachon,<sup>23</sup> having first roused the enthusiasm of his troops by carrying along their ranks a miraculous picture of our Lord,<sup>24</sup> which no human hand had painted. Hanging on the rear of the fugitives, he pursued them to Daras, which declined to receive within its walls an army that had so disgraced itself.<sup>25</sup> The Persian commander withdrew his troops further inland; and Philippicus, believing that he had now no enemy to fear, proceeded to invade Arzanene, to besiege the stronghold of Chlomarôn,<sup>26</sup> and at the same time to throw forward troops into the more eastern parts of the country. He expected them to be unopposed; but the Persian general, having rallied his force and augmented it by fresh recruits, had returned towards the frontier, and, hearing of the danger of Arzanene, had flown to its defence. Philippicus was taken by surprise, compelled to raise the siege of Chlomarôn, and to fall back in disorder. The Persians pressed on his retreat, crossed the Nymphius after him, and did not desist from the pursuit until the imperial general threw himself with his shattered army into the strong-fortress of Amida.<sup>27</sup> Disgusted and discredited by his ill-success, Philippicus gave over the active prosecution of the war to Heraclius, and, remaining at head-quarters, contented himself with a general supervision.

Heraclius, on receiving his appointment, is said to have at once assumed the offensive, and to have led an army, consisting chiefly or entirely of infantry,<sup>28</sup> into Persian territory, which devastated the country on both sides of the Tigris, and rejoined Philippicus, without having suffered any disaster, before the winter. Philippicus was encouraged by the success of his lieutenant to continue him in command for another year; but, through prudence or jealousy, he was induced to intrust a portion only of the troops to his care, while he assigned to others the supreme authority over no less than one third of the Roman army. The result was, as might have been expected, inglorious for Rome. During A.D. 587 the two divisions acted separately in different quarters; and, at the end of the year,

neither could boast of any greater success than the reduction, in each case, of a single fortress.<sup>29</sup> Philippicus, however, seems to have been satisfied; and at the approach of winter he withdrew from the East altogether, leaving Heraclius as his representative, and returned to Constantinople.

During the earlier portion of the year A.D. 588 the mutinous temper of the Roman army rendered it impossible that any military operations should be undertaken.<sup>30</sup> Encouraged by the disorganization of their enemies, the Persians crossed the frontier, and threatened Constantina, which was however saved by Germanus.<sup>31</sup> Later in the year, the mutinous spirit having been quelled, a counter-expedition was made by the Romans into Arzanene. Here the Persian general, Maruzas, met them, and drove them from the province; but, following up his success too ardently, he received a complete defeat near Martyropolis, and lost his life in the battle. His head was cut off by the *civilized* conquerors, and sent as a trophy to Maurice.<sup>32</sup>

The campaign of A.D. 589 was opened by a brilliant stroke on the part of the Persians, who, through the treachery of a certain Sittas, a petty officer in the Roman army, made themselves masters of Martyropolis.<sup>33</sup> It was in vain that Philippicus twice besieged the place; he was unable to make any impression upon it, and after a time desisted from the attempt. On the second occasion the garrison was strongly reinforced by the Persians under Mebodes and Aphraates, who, after defeating Philippicus in a pitched battle, threw a large body of troops into the town. Philippicus was upon this deprived of his office, and replaced by Comentiolus, with Heraclius as second in command.<sup>34</sup> The new leaders, instead of engaging in the tedious work of a siege, determined on re-establishing the Roman prestige by a bold counter-attack. They invaded the Persian territory in force, ravaged the country about Nisibis, and brought Aphraates to a pitched battle at Sisarbanôn, near that city. Victory seemed at first to incline to the Persians; Comentiolus was defeated and fled; but Heraclius restored the battle, and ended by defeating the whole Persian army, and driving it from the field, with the loss of its commander, who was slain in the thick of the fight.<sup>35</sup> The next day the Persian camp was taken, and a rich booty fell into the hands of the conquerors,<sup>36</sup> besides a number of standards. The remnant of the defeated army found a refuge within the walls of Nisibis. Later in the year Comentiolus recovered to some extent his

tarnished laurels by the siege and capture of Arbas,<sup>37</sup> whose strong situation in the immediate vicinity of Martyropolis rendered the position of the Persian garrison in that city insecure, if not absolutely untenable.

Such was the condition of affairs in the western provinces of the Persian Empire, when a sudden danger arose in the east, which had strange and most important consequences. According to the Oriental writers, Hormisdas had from a just monarch gradually become a tyrant; under the plea of protecting the poor had grievously oppressed the rich; through jealousy or fear had put to death no fewer than thirteen thousand of the upper classes,<sup>38</sup> and had thus completely alienated all the more powerful part of the nation. Aware of his unpopularity, the surrounding tribes and peoples commenced a series of aggressions, plundered the frontier provinces, defeated the detachments sent against them under commanders who were disaffected, and everywhere brought the empire into the greatest danger. The Arabs<sup>39</sup> crossed the Euphrates and spread themselves over Mesopotamia; the Khazars invaded Armenia and Azerbijan; rumor said that the Greek emperor had taken the field and was advancing on the side of Syria, at the head of 80,000 men;<sup>40</sup> above all, it was quite certain that the Great Khan of the Turks had put his hordes in motion, had passed the Oxus with a countless host,<sup>41</sup> occupied Balkh and Herat, and was threatening to penetrate into the very heart of Persia. The perilous character of the crisis is perhaps exaggerated;<sup>42</sup> but there can be little doubt that the advance of the Turks constituted a real danger. Hormisdas, however, did not even now quit the capital, or adventure his own person. He selected from among his generals a certain Varahran or Bahram,<sup>43</sup> a leader of great courage and experience, who had distinguished himself in the wars of Anushirwan,<sup>44</sup> and, placing all the resources of the empire at his disposal, assigned to him the entire conduct of the Turkish struggle. Bahram is said to have contented himself with a small force of picked men,<sup>45</sup> veterans between forty and fifty years of age,<sup>46</sup> to have marched with them upon Balkh, contended with the Great Khan in several partial engagements,<sup>47</sup> and at last entirely defeated him in a great battle, wherein the Khan lost his life.<sup>48</sup> This victory was soon followed by another over the Khan's son, who was made prisoner and sent to Hormisdas.<sup>49</sup> An enormous booty was at the same time despatched to the court;<sup>50</sup> and Bahram himself was about to return, when he

received his master's orders to carry his arms into another quarter.

It is supposed by some that, while the Turkish hordes were menacing Persia upon the north-east, a Roman army, intended to act in concert with them,<sup>51</sup> was sent by Maurice into Albania, which proceeded to threaten the common enemy in the north-west. But the Byzantine writers know of no alliance at this time between the Romans and Turks; nor do they tell of any offensive movement undertaken by Rome in aid of the Turkish invasion, or even simultaneously with it. According to them, the war in this quarter, which certainly broke out in A.D. 589, was provoked by Hormisdas himself, who, immediately after his Turkish victories, sent Bahram with an army to invade Colchis and Suania,<sup>52</sup> or in other words to resume the Lazic war, from which Anushirwan had desisted<sup>53</sup> twenty-seven years previously. Bahram found the province unguarded, and was able to ravage it at his will; but a Roman force soon gathered to its defence, and after some manœuvres a pitched battle was fought on the Araxes, in which the Persian general suffered a defeat.<sup>54</sup> The military results of the check were insignificant; but it led to an internal revolution. Hormisdas had grown jealous of his too successful lieutenant, and was glad of an opportunity to insult him.<sup>55</sup> No sooner did he hear of Bahram's defeat than he sent off a messenger to the camp upon the Araxes, who deprived the general of his command, and presented to him, on the part of his master, a distaff, some cotton, and a complete set of women's garments.<sup>56</sup> Stung to madness by the undeserved insult, Bahram retorted with a letter, wherein he addressed Hormisdas, not as the son, but as the *daughter* of Chosroës.<sup>57</sup> Shortly afterwards, upon the arrival of a second messenger from the court, with orders to bring the recalcitrant commander home in chains, Bahram openly revolted, caused the envoy to be trampled upon by an elephant,<sup>58</sup> and either by simply putting before the soldiers his services and his wrongs,<sup>59</sup> or by misrepresenting to them the intentions of Hormisdas towards themselves, induced his whole army with one accord to embrace his cause.

The news of the great general's revolt was received with acclamations by the provinces. The army of Mesopotamia, collected at Nisibis, made common cause with that of Albania; and the united force, advancing on the capital by way of Assyria, took up a position upon the Upper Zab river.<sup>60</sup> Hormisdas sent a general, Pherochanes, to meet and engage the rebels; but the

emissaries of Bahram seduced his troops from their allegiance; Pherochanes was murdered;<sup>61</sup> and the insurgent army, augmented by the force sent to oppose it, drew daily nearer to Ctesiphon. Meanwhile Hormisdas, distracted between hate and fear, suspecting every one, trusting no one, confined himself within the walls of the capital, where he continued to exercise the severities which had lost him the affections of his subjects. According to some, he suspected his son, Chosroës, of collusion with the enemy, and drove him into banishment,<sup>62</sup> imprisoning at the same time his own brothers-in-law, Bindoës and Bostam,<sup>63</sup> who would be likely, he thought, to give their support to their nephew. These violent measures precipitated the evils which he feared; a general revolt broke out in the palace; Bostam and Bindoës, released from prison, put themselves at the head of the malcontents, and, rushing into the presence-chamber, dragged the tyrant from his throne, stripped him of the diadem, and committed him to the dungeon from which they had themselves escaped. The Byzantine historians believed<sup>64</sup> that, after this, Hormisdas was permitted to plead his cause before an assembly of Persian nobles, to glorify his own reign, vituperate his eldest son, Chosroës, and express his willingness to abdicate in favor of another son, who had never offended him. They supposed that this ill-judged oration had sealed the fate of the youth recommended and of his mother, who were cut to pieces before the fallen monarch's eyes, while at the same time the rage of the assembly was vented in part upon Hormisdas himself, who was blinded, to make his restoration impossible. But a judicious critic will doubt the likelihood of rebels, committed as were Bindoës and Bostam, consenting to allow such an appeal as is described by Theophylact; and a perusal of the speeches assigned to the occasion will certainly not diminish his scepticism.<sup>65</sup> The probability would seem to be that Hormisdas was blinded as soon as committed to prison, and that shortly afterwards he suffered the general fate of deposed sovereigns, being assassinated in his place of confinement.<sup>66</sup>

The deposition of Hormisdas was followed almost immediately by the proclamation of his eldest son, Chosroës, the prince known in history as "Eberwiz" or "Parviz," the last great Persian monarch. The rebels at Ctesiphon had perhaps acted from first to last with his cognizance: at any rate, they calculated on his pardoning proceedings which had given him actual possession of a throne whereto, without their aid, he

might never have succeeded. They accordingly declared him king of Persia without binding him by conditions, and without negotiating with Bahrum, who was still in arms and at no great distance.

Before passing to the consideration of the eventful reign with which we shall now have to occupy ourselves, a glance at the personal character of the deceased monarch will perhaps be expected by the reader. Hormuzd is pronounced by the concurrent voice of the Greeks and the Orientals one of the worst princes that ever ruled over Persia.<sup>67</sup> The fair promise of his early years was quickly clouded over; and during the greater portion of his reign he was a jealous and capricious tyrant, influenced by unworthy favorites, and stimulated to ever-increasing severities by his fears. Eminence of whatsoever kind roused his suspicions; and among his victims were included, besides the noble and the great, a large number of philosophers and men of science.<sup>68</sup> His treatment of Bahram was at once a folly and a crime—an act of black ingratitude, and a rash step, whereof he had not counted the consequences. To his other vices he added those of indolence and effeminacy. From the time that he became king nothing could drag him from the soft life of the palace; in no single instance did he take the field, either against his country's enemies or his own. Miserable as was his end, we can scarcely deem him worthy of our pity, since there never lived a man whose misfortunes were more truly brought on him by his own conduct.

The coins of Hormisdas IV. are in no respect remarkable. The head seems modelled on that of Chosroës, his father, but is younger. The field of the coin within the border is somewhat unduly crowded with stars and crescents. Stars and crescents also occur outside the border, replacing the simple crescents of Chosroës,<sup>69</sup> and reproducing the combined stars and crescents of Zamasp.<sup>70</sup> The legend on the obverse is *Auhramazdi afzud*, or sometimes *Auhramazi afzun*;<sup>71</sup> on the reverse are commonly found, besides the usual fire-altar and supporters, a regnal year and a mint-mark. The regnal years range from one to thirteen;<sup>72</sup> the number of the mint-marks is about thirty.<sup>73</sup> [Pl. XXIII., Fig. 1.]

## CHAPTER XXIII.

*Accession of Chosroës II. (Eberwiz). Bahram rejects his Terms. Contest between Chosroës and Bahram. Flight of Chosroës. Short Reign of Bahram (Varahran VI.). Campaign of A.D. 591. Recovery of the Throne by Chosroës. Coins of Bahram.*

\*Εγκαθιστῶσιν [οἱ Πέρσαι] βασιλέα Χοσρόην . . . καθ' οὐ βάραμος ἐπιστρατεύει μετὰ τῶν ἀμφ' αὐτόν.—Euvagr. *Hist. Eccles.* vi. 17.

THE position of Chosroës II. on his accession was one of great difficulty. Whether actually guilty of parricide or not,<sup>1</sup> he was at any rate suspected by the greater part of his subjects of complicity in his father's murder. A rebel, who was the greatest Persian general of the time, at the head of a veteran army, stood arrayed against his authority. He had no established character to fall back upon, no merits to plead, nothing in fact to urge on his behalf but that he was the eldest son of his father, the legitimate representative of the ancient line of the Sassanidæ. A revolution had placed him on the throne in a hasty and irregular manner; nor is it clear that he had ventured on the usual formality of asking the consent of the general assembly of the nobles to his coronation.<sup>2</sup> Thus perils surrounded him on every side; but the most pressing danger of all, that which required to be immediately met and confronted, was the threatening attitude of Bahram, who had advanced from Adiabêné to Holwan,<sup>3</sup> and occupied a strong position not a hundred and fifty miles from the capital. Unless Bahram could be conciliated or defeated, the young king could not hope to maintain himself in power, or feel that he had any firm grasp of the sceptre.

Under these circumstances he took the resolution to try first the method of conciliation. There seemed to be a fair opening for such a course. It was not he, but his father, who had given the offence which drove Bahram into rebellion, and almost forced him to vindicate his manhood by challenging his detractor to a trial of strength. Bahram could have no personal ground of quarrel with *him*. Indeed that general had at the first, if we may believe the Oriental writers,<sup>4</sup> proclaimed Chos-

roës as king, and given out that he took up arms in order to place him upon the throne. It was thought, moreover, that the rebel might feel himself sufficiently avenged by the death of his enemy, and might be favorably disposed towards those who had first blinded Hormisdas and then despatched him by the bowstring.<sup>5</sup> Chosroës therefore composed a letter in which he invited Bahram to his court, and offered him the second place in the kingdom, if he would come in and make his submission. The message was accompanied by rich presents, and by an offer that if the terms proposed were accepted they should be confirmed by oath.<sup>6</sup>

The reply of Bahram was as follows: "Bahram, friend of the gods, conqueror, illustrious, enemy of tyrants, satrap of satraps, general of the Persian host, wise, apt for command, god-fearing, without reproach, noble, fortunate, successful, venerable, thrifty, provident, gentle, humane, to Chosroës the son of Hormisdas (sends greeting). I have received the letter which you wrote with such little wisdom, but have rejected the presents which you sent with such excessive boldness. It had been better that you should have abstained from sending either, more especially considering the irregularity of your appointment, and the fact that the noble and respectable took no part in the vote, which was carried by the disorderly and low-born. If then it is your wish to escape your father's fate, strip off the diadem which you have assumed and deposit it in some holy place, quit the palace, and restore to their prisons the criminals whom you have set at liberty,<sup>7</sup> and whom you had no right to release until they had undergone trial for their crimes. When you have done all this, come hither, and I will give you the government of a province. Be well advised, and so farewell. Else, be sure you will perish like your father." So insolent a missive might well have provoked the young prince to some hasty act or some unworthy show of temper. It is to the credit of Chosroës that he restrained himself, and even made another attempt to terminate the quarrel by a reconciliation. While striving to outdo Bahram in the grandeur of his titles,<sup>8</sup> he still addressed him as his friend. He complimented him on his courage, and felicitated him on his excellent health. "There were certain expressions," he said, "in the letter that he had received, which he was sure did not speak his friend's real feelings. The amanuensis had evidently drunk more wine than he ought, and, being half asleep when he wrote, had put down things that were foolish and indeed mon-

strous. But he was not disturbed by them. He must decline, however, to send back to their prisons those whom he had released, since favors granted by royalty could not with propriety be withdrawn; and he must protest that in the ceremony of his coronation all due formalities had been observed. As for stripping himself of his diadem, he was so far from contemplating it that he looked forward rather to extending his dominion over new worlds. As Bahram had invited him, he would certainly pay him a visit; but he would be obliged to come as a king, and if his persuasions did not produce submission he would have to compel it by force of arms. He hoped that Bahram would be wise in time, and would consent to be his friend and helper."

This second overture produced no reply; and it became tolerably evident that the quarrel could only be decided by the arbitrament of battle. Chosroës accordingly put himself at the head of such troops as he could collect,<sup>9</sup> and marched against his antagonist, whom he found encamped on the Holwan River.<sup>10</sup> The place was favorable for an engagement; but Chosroës had no confidence in his soldiers. He sought a personal interview with Bahram, and renewed his offers of pardon and favor; but the conference only led to mutual recriminations,<sup>11</sup> and at its close both sides appealed to arms. During six days the two armies merely skirmished, since Chosroës bent all his efforts towards avoiding a general engagement; but on the seventh day Bahram surprised him by an attack after night had fallen,<sup>12</sup> threw his troops into confusion, and then, by a skilful appeal to their feelings, induced them to desert their leader and come over to his side. Chosroës was forced to fly. He fell back on Ctesiphon;<sup>13</sup> but despairing of making a successful defence, with the few troops that remained faithful to him, against the overwhelming force which Bahram had at his disposal, he resolved to evacuate the capital, to quit Persia, and to throw himself on the generosity of some one of his neighbors. It is said that his choice was long undetermined between the Turks, the Arabs, the Khazars of the Caucasian region, and the Romans.<sup>14</sup> According to some writers, after leaving Ctesiphon, with his wives and children, his two uncles, and an escort of thirty men,<sup>15</sup> he laid his reins on his horse's neck, and left it to the instinct of the animal to determine in what direction he should flee.<sup>16</sup> The sagacious beast took the way to the Euphrates; and Chosroës, finding himself on its banks, crossed the river, and, following up its

course,<sup>17</sup> reached with much difficulty the well-known Roman station of Circesium.<sup>18</sup> He was not unmolested in his retreat. Bahram no sooner heard of his flight than he sent off a body of 4000 horse, with orders to pursue and capture the fugitive.<sup>19</sup> They would have succeeded, had not Bindoës devoted himself on behalf of his nephew, and, by tricking the officer in command,<sup>20</sup> enabled Chosroës to place such a distance between himself and his pursuers that the chase had to be given up, and the detachment to return, with no more valuable capture than Bindoes, to Ctesiphon.

Chosroës was received with all honor by Probus, the governor of Circesium,<sup>21</sup> who the next day communicated intelligence of what had happened to Comentiolus, Prefect of the East, then resident at Hierapolis. At the same time he sent to Comentiolus a letter which Chosroës had addressed to Maurice, imploring his aid against his enemies. Comentiolus approved what had been done, despatched a courier to bear the royal missive to Constantinople, and shortly afterwards, by the direction of the court, invited the illustrious refugee to remove to Hierapolis,<sup>22</sup> and there take up his abode, till his cause should be determined by the emperor. Meanwhile, at Constantinople, after the letter of Chosroës had been read, a serious debate arose as to what was fittest to be done.<sup>23</sup> While some urged with much show of reason that it was for the interest of the empire that the civil war should be prolonged, that Persia should be allowed to waste her strength and exhaust her resources in the contest, at the end of which it would be easy to conquer her, there were others whose views were less selfish or more far-sighted. The prospect of uniting the East and West into a single monarchy, which had been brought to the test of experiment by Alexander and had failed, did not present itself in a very tempting light to these minds. They doubted the ability of the declining empire to sway at once the sceptre of Europe and of Asia. They feared that if the appeal of Chosroës were rejected, the East would simply fall into anarchy, and the way would perhaps be prepared for some new power to rise up, more formidable than the kingdom of the Sassanidæ. The inclination of Maurice, who liked to think himself magnanimous,<sup>24</sup> coincided with the views of these persons: their counsels were accepted; and the reply was made to Chosroës that the Roman emperor accepted him as his guest and son,<sup>25</sup> undertook his quarrel, and would aid him with all the forces of the empire to recover his throne. At

the same time Maurice sent him some magnificent presents,<sup>26</sup> and releasing the Persian prisoners in confinement at Constantinople,<sup>27</sup> bade them accompany the envoys of Chosroës and resume the service of their master. Soon afterwards more substantial tokens of the Imperial friendship made their appearance. An army of 70,000 men<sup>28</sup> arrived under Narses; and a subsidy was advanced by the Imperial treasury, amounting (according to one writer)<sup>29</sup> to about two millions sterling.

But this valuable support to his cause was no free gift of a generous friend; on the contrary, it had to be purchased by great sacrifices. Chosroës had perhaps at first hoped that aid would be given him gratuitously, and had even regarded the cession of a single city as one that he might avoid making.<sup>30</sup> But he learnt by degrees that nothing was to be got from Rome without paying for it; and it was only by ceding Persarmenia and Eastern Mesopotamia, with its strong towns of Martyropolis and Daras,<sup>31</sup> that he obtained the men and money that were requisite.

Meanwhile Bahram, having occupied Ctesiphon, had proclaimed himself king,<sup>32</sup> and sent out messengers on all sides to acquaint the provinces with the change of rulers. The news was received without enthusiasm, but with a general acquiescence; and, had Maurice rejected the application of Chosroës, it is probable that the usurper might have enjoyed a long and quiet reign. As soon, however, as it came to be known that the Greek emperor had espoused the cause of his rival, Bahram found himself in difficulties: conspiracy arose in his own court, and had to be suppressed by executions;<sup>33</sup> murmurs were heard in some of the more distant provinces; Armenia openly revolted and declared for Chosroës;<sup>34</sup> and it soon appeared that in places the fidelity of the Persian troops was doubtful. This was especially the case in Mesopotamia,<sup>35</sup> which would have to bear the brunt of the attack when the Romans advanced. Bahram therefore thought it necessary, though it was now the depth of winter, to strengthen his hold on the wavering province, and sent out two detachments, under commanders upon whom he could rely, to occupy respectively Anatho and Nisibis, the two strongholds of greatest importance in the suspected region. Mir-aduris succeeded in entering and occupying Anatho.<sup>36</sup> Zadesprates was less fortunate; before he reached the neighborhood of Nisibis, the garrison which held that place had deserted the cause of the usurper and given in its adhesion to Chosroës; and, when he approached to reconnoitre, he

was made the victim of a stratagem and killed by an officer named Rosas.<sup>37</sup> Mir-aduris did not long survive him; the troops which he had introduced into Anatho caught the contagion of revolt, rose up against him, slew him, and sent his head to Chosroës.<sup>38</sup>

The spring was now approaching,<sup>39</sup> and the time for military operations on a grand scale drew near. Chosroës, besides his supporters in Mesopotamia, Roman and Persian, had a second army in Azerbaijan, raised by his uncles Bindoës and Bostam,<sup>40</sup> which was strengthened by an Armenian contingent.<sup>41</sup> The plan of campaign involved the co-operation of these two forces. With this object Chosroës proceeded early in the spring, from Hierapolis to Constantina,<sup>42</sup> from Constantina to Daras,<sup>43</sup> and thence by way of Ammodion<sup>44</sup> to the Tigris, across which he sent a detachment, probably in the neighborhood of Mosul. This force fell in with Bryzacious, who commanded in these parts for Bahram, and surprising him in the first watch of the night, defeated his army and took Bryzacious himself prisoner. The sequel, which Theophylact appears to relate from the information of an eye-witness, furnishes a remarkable evidence of the barbarity of the times. Those who captured Bryzacious cut off his nose and his ears, and in this condition sent him to Chosroës. The Persian prince was overjoyed at the success, which no doubt he accepted as a good omen; he at once led his whole army across the river, and having encamped for the night at a place called Dinabadôn, entertained the chief Persian and Roman nobles at a banquet. When the festivity was at its height, the unfortunate prisoner was brought in loaded with fetters, and was made sport of by the guests for a time, after which, at a signal from the king, the guards plunged their swords into his body, and despatched him in the sight of the feasters. Having amused his guests with this delectable interlude, the amiable monarch concluded the whole by anointing them with perfumed ointment, crowning them with flowers, and bidding them drink to the success of the war. "The guests," says Theophylact, "returned to their tents, delighted with the completeness of their entertainment, and told their friends how handsomely they had been treated, but the crown of all (they said) was the episode of Bryzacious."<sup>45</sup>

Chosroës next day advanced across the Greater Zab, and, after marching four days, reached Alexandriana,<sup>46</sup> a position probably not far from Arbela, after which, in two days more,

he arrived at Chnæthas,<sup>47</sup> which was a district upon the Zab Asfal, or Lesser Zab River. Here he found himself in the immediate vicinity of Bahram, who had taken up his position on the Lesser Zab, with the intention probably of blocking the route up its valley,<sup>48</sup> by which he expected that the Armenian army would endeavor to effect a junction with the army of Chosroës. Here the two forces watched each other for some days, and various manœuvres were executed, which it is impossible to follow, since Theophylact, our only authority, is not a good military historian. The result, however, is certain. Bahram was out-manceuvred by Chosroës and his Roman allies; the fords of the Zab were seized; and after five days of marching and countermarching, the longed-for junction took place.<sup>49</sup> Chosroës had the satisfaction of embracing his uncles Bindoës and Bostam, and of securing such a reinforcement as gave him a great superiority in numbers over his antagonist.<sup>50</sup>

About the same time he received intelligence of another most important success. Before quitting Daras, he had despatched Mebodes, at the head of a small body of Romans,<sup>51</sup> to create a diversion on the Mesopotomian side of the Tigris by a demonstration from Singara against Seleucia and Ctesiphon. He can hardly have expected to do more than distract his enemy and perhaps make him divide his forces. Bahram, however, was either indifferent as to the fate of the capital, or determined not to weaken the small army, which was all that he could muster, and on which his whole dependence was placed. He left Seleucia and Ctesiphon to their fate. Mebodes and his small force marched southward without meeting an enemy, obtained possession of Seleucia without a blow after the withdrawal of the garrison, received the unconditional surrender of Ctesiphon, made themselves masters of the royal palace and treasures, proclaimed Chosroës king, and sent to him in his camp the most precious emblems of the Persian sovereignty.<sup>52</sup> Thus, before engaging with his antagonist, Chosroës recovered his capital and found his authority once more recognized in the seat of government.


The great contest had, however, to be decided, not by the loss and gain of cities, nor by the fickle mood of a populace, but by trial of arms in the open field. Bahram was not of a temper to surrender his sovereignty unless compelled by defeat. He was one of the greatest generals of the age,<sup>53</sup> and, though compelled to fight under every disadvantage, greatly

outnumbered by the enemy, and with troops that were to a large extent disaffected, he was bent on resisting to the utmost, and doing his best to maintain his own rights. He seems to have fought two pitched battles with the combined Romans and Persians,<sup>54</sup> and not to have succumbed until treachery and desertion disheartened him and ruined his cause. The first battle was in the plain country of Adiabêné, at the foot of the Zagros range. Here the opposing armies were drawn out in the open field, each divided into a centre and two wings. In the army of Chosroës the Romans were in the middle, on the right the Persians, and the Armenians on the left. Narses, together with Chosroës, held the central position: Bahram was directly opposed to them. When the conflict began the Romans charged with such fierceness that Bahram's centre at once gave way; he was obliged to retreat to the foot of the hills, and take up a position on their slope. Here the Romans refused to attack him; and Chosroës very imprudently ordered the Persians who fought on his side to advance up the ascent. They were repulsed, and thrown into complete confusion; and the battle would infallibly have been lost, had not Narses come to their aid, and with his steady and solid battalions protected their retreat and restored the fight. Yet the day terminated with a feeling on both sides that Bahram had on the whole had the advantage in the engagement; the king *de facto* congratulated himself; the king *de jure* had to bear the insulting pity of his allies, and the reproaches of his own countrymen for occasioning them such a disaster.<sup>55</sup>


But though Bahram might feel that the glory of the day was his, he was not elated by his success, nor rendered blind to the difficulties of his position. Fighting with his back to the mountains, he was liable, if he suffered defeat, to be entangled in their defiles and lose his entire force. Moreover, now that Ctesiphon was no longer his, he had neither resources nor *point d'appui* in the low country, and by falling back he would at once be approaching nearer to the main source of his own supplies, which was the country about Rei,<sup>56</sup> south of the Caspian, and drawing his enemies to a greater distance from the sources of theirs. He may even have thought there was a chance of his being unpursued if he retired, since the Romans might not like to venture into the mountain region, and Chosroës might be impatient to make a triumphal entry into his capital. Accordingly, the use which Bahram made of his victory was quietly to evacuate his camp, to leave the low

plain region, rapidly pass the mountains, and take up his quarters in the fertile upland beyond them, the district where the Lesser Zab rises, south of Lake Urumiyeh.

If he had hoped that his enemies would not pursue him, Bahram was disappointed. Chosroës himself, and the whole of the mixed army which supported his cause, soon followed on his footsteps, and pressing forward to Canzaca,<sup>57</sup> or Shiz,<sup>58</sup> near which he had pitched his camp, offered him battle for the second time. Bahram declined the offer, and retreated to a position on the Balarathus, where, however, after a short time, he was forced to come to an engagement. He had received, it would seem, a reinforcement of elephants from the provinces bordering on India,<sup>59</sup> and hoped for some advantage from the employment of this new arm. He had perhaps augmented his forces,<sup>60</sup> though it must be doubted whether he really on this occasion outnumbered his antagonist. At any rate, the time seemed to have come when he must abide the issue of his appeal to arms, and secure or lose his crown by a supreme effort. Once more the armies were drawn up in three distinct bodies;<sup>61</sup> and once more the leaders held the established central position.<sup>62</sup> The engagement began along the whole line, and continued for a while without marked result. Bahram then strengthened his left, and, transferring himself to this part of the field, made an impression on the Roman right. But Narses brought up supports to their aid, and checked the retreat, which had already begun, and which might soon have become general. Hereupon Bahram suddenly fell upon the Roman centre and endeavored to break it and drive it from the field; but Narses was again a match for him, and met his assault without flinching, after which, charging in his turn, he threw the Persian centre into confusion. Seeing this, the wings also broke, and a general flight began,<sup>63</sup> whereupon 6000 of Bahram's troops deserted, and, drawing aside, allowed themselves to be captured.<sup>64</sup> The retreat then became a rout. Bahram himself fled with 4,000 men.<sup>65</sup> His camp, with all its rich furniture, and his wives and children, were taken.<sup>66</sup> The elephant corps still held out and fought valiantly; but it was surrounded and forced to surrender.<sup>67</sup> The battle was utterly lost; and the unfortunate chief, feeling that all hope was gone, gave the reins to his horse and fled for his life. Chosroës sent ten thousand men in pursuit,<sup>68</sup> under Bostam, his uncle; and this detachment overtook the fugitives, but was repulsed<sup>69</sup> and returned. Bahram continued his flight, and passing through Rei and Damaghan,<sup>70</sup>



CHOSROIS II. ENGAGED IN A STAG-HUNT.



CHOSROËS II. ENGAGED IN A BOAR-HUNT.

reached the Oxus and placed himself under the protection of the Turks. Chosroës, having dismissed his Roman allies, re-entered Ctesiphon after a year's absence, and for the second time took his place upon the throne of his ancestors.

The coins of Bahram possess a peculiar interest. While there is no numismatic evidence which confirms the statement that he struck money in the name of the younger Chosroës, there are extant three types of his coins, two of which appear to belong to the time before he seated himself upon the throne, while one—the last—belongs to the period of his actual sovereignty.<sup>71</sup> In his pre-regnal coins, he copied the devices of the last sovereign of his name who had ruled over Persia.<sup>72</sup> He adopted the mural crown in a decided form, omitted the stars and crescents, and placed his own head amid the flames of the fire-altar. His legends were either *Varahran Chub*, "Bahram of the mace,"<sup>73</sup> or *Varahran, malkan malka, mazdisn, bagi, ramashtri*, "Bahram, king of kings, Ormazd-worshipping, divine, peaceful." [Pl. XXIII., Fig. 2.]

The later coins follow closely the type of his predecessor, Hormisdas IV., differing only in the legend, which is, on the obverse, *Varahran afzun*, or "Varahran (may he be) greater;" and on the reverse the regnal year, with a mint-mark. The regnal year is uniformly "one;" the mint-marks are Zadracarta, Iran, and Nihach, an unknown locality. [Pl. XXIII., Fig 3.]

## CHAPTER XXIV.

*Second Reign of Chosroës II. (Eberwiz). His Rule at first Unpopular. His Treatment of his Uncles, Bindoës and Bostam. His vindictive Proceedings against Bahram. His supposed Leaning towards Christianity. His Wives, Shirin and Kurdiyeh. His early Wars. His Relations with the Emperor Maurice. His Attitude towards Phocas. Great War of Chosroës with Phocas, A.D. 603-610. War continued with Heraclius. Immense Successes of Chosroës, A.D. 611-620. Aggressive taken by Heraclius A.D. 622. His Campaigns in Persian Territory A.D. 622-628. Murder of Chosroës. His Character. His Coins.*

“Regnum ergò occupavit Cesra, filius Hormozi, qui Aperwiz cognominatus est, annos triginta novem.”—Eutychius, *Annales*, vol. ii. p. 207.

THE second reign of Chosroës II., who is commonly known as Chosroës Eberwiz or Parwiz,<sup>1</sup> lasted little short of thirty-seven years<sup>2</sup>—from the summer of A.D. 591 to the February of A.D. 628. Externally considered, it is the most remarkable reign in the entire Sassanian series, embracing as it does the extremes of elevation and depression. Never at any other time did the Neo-Persian kingdom extend itself so far, or so distinguish itself by military achievements, as in the twenty years intervening between A.D. 602 and A.D. 622. Seldom was it brought so low as in the years immediately anterior and immediately subsequent to this space, in the earlier and in the later portions of the reign whose central period was so glorious.

Victorious by the help of Rome, Chosroës began his second reign amid the scarcely disguised hostility of his subjects. So greatly did he mistrust their sentiments towards him that he begged and obtained of Maurice the support of a Roman body-guard,<sup>3</sup> to whom he committed the custody of his person. To the odium always attaching in the minds of a spirited people to the ruler whose yoke is imposed upon them by a foreign power, he added further the stain of a crime which is happily rare at all times, and of which (according to the general belief of his subjects) no Persian monarch had ever previously been

guilty. It was in vain that he protested his innocence: the popular belief held him an accomplice in his father's murder, and branded the young prince with the horrible name of "parricide."

It was no doubt mainly in the hope of purging himself from this imputation that, after putting to death the subordinate instruments<sup>4</sup> by whom his father's life had been actually taken, he went on to institute proceedings against the chief contrivers of the outrage—the two uncles who had ordered, and probably witnessed, the execution. So long as the success of his arms was doubtful, he had been happy to avail himself of their support, and to employ their talents in the struggle against his enemies. At one moment in his flight he had owed his life to the self-devotion of Bindoës;<sup>5</sup> and both the brothers had merited well of him by the efforts which they had made to bring Armenia over to his cause, and to levy a powerful army for him in that region.<sup>6</sup> But to clear his own character it was necessary that he should forget the ties both of blood and gratitude, that he should sink the kinsman in the sovereign, and the debtor in the stern avenger of blood. Accordingly, he seized Bindoës, who resided at the court, and had him drowned in the Tigris.<sup>7</sup> To Bostam, whom he had appointed governor of Rei and Khorassan,<sup>8</sup> he sent an order of recall, and would undoubtedly have executed him, had he obeyed; but Bostam, suspecting his intentions, deemed it the wisest course to revolt,<sup>9</sup> and proclaim himself independent monarch of the north country. Here he established himself in authority for some time, and is even said to have enlarged his territory at the expense of some of the border chieftains;<sup>10</sup> but the vengeance of his nephew pursued him unrelentingly, and ere long accomplished his destruction. According to the best authority,<sup>11</sup> the instrument employed was Bostam's wife, the sister of Bahram, whom Chosroës induced to murder her husband by a promise to make her the partner of his bed.

Intrigues not very dissimilar in their character had been previously employed to remove Bahram, whom the Persian monarch had not ceased to fear, notwithstanding that he was a fugitive and an exile. The Khan of the Turks had received him with honor on the occasion of his flight, and, according to some authors,<sup>12</sup> had given him his daughter in marriage. Chosroës lived in dread of the day when the great general might reappear in Persia, at the head of the Turkish hordes, and challenge him to renew the lately-terminated contest.<sup>13</sup>

He therefore sent an envoy into Turkestan, well supplied with rich gifts, whose instructions were to procure by some means or other the death of Bahram. Having sounded the Khan upon the business and met with a rebuff, the envoy addressed himself to the Khatûn, the Khan's wife, and by liberal presents induced her to come into his views. A slave was easily found who undertook to carry out his mistress's wishes, and Bahram was despatched the same day by means of a poisoned dagger.<sup>14</sup>

It is painful to find that one thus ungrateful to his friends and relentless to his enemies made, to a certain extent, profession of Christianity. Little as his heart can have been penetrated by its spirit, Chosroës seems certainly, in the earlier part of his reign, to have given occasion for the suspicion, which his subjects are said to have entertained,<sup>15</sup> that he designed to change his religion, and confess himself a convert to the creed of the Greeks. During the period of his exile, he was, it would seem, impressed by what he saw and heard of the Christian worship and faith; he learnt to feel or profess a high veneration for the Virgin;<sup>16</sup> and he adopted the practice, common at the time, of addressing his prayers and vows to the saints and martyrs, who were practically the principal objects of the Oriental Christians' devotions. Sergius, a martyr, held in high repute by the Christians of Osrhoêné and Mesopotamia, was adopted by the superstitious prince as a sort of patron saint; and it became his habit, in circumstances of difficulty, to vow some gift or other to the shrine of St. Sergius at Sergiopolis,<sup>17</sup> in case of the event corresponding to his wishes. Two occasions are recorded where, on sending his gift, he accompanied it with a letter explaining the circumstances of his vow and its fulfilment; and even the letters themselves have come down to us,<sup>18</sup> but in a Greek version. In one, Chosroës ascribes the success of his arms on a particular occasion to the influence of his self-chosen patron; in the other, he credits him with having procured by his prayers the pregnancy of Sira (*Shirin*), the most beautiful and best beloved of his wives.<sup>19</sup> It appears that Sira was a Christian, and that in marrying her Chosroës had contravened the laws of his country, which forbade the king to have a Christian wife.<sup>20</sup> Her influence over him was considerable,<sup>21</sup> and she is said to have been allowed to build numerous churches and monasteries in and about Ctesiphon.<sup>22</sup> When she died, Chosroës called in the aid of sculpture to perpetuate her image, and sent her statue to the Roman Emperor, to the Turkish Khan, and to various other potentates.<sup>23</sup>

Chosroës is said to have maintained an enormous seraglio;<sup>24</sup> but of these secondary wives, none is known to us even by name, except Kurdiyeh, the sister of Bahram and widow of Bostam, whom she murdered at Chosroës's suggestion.<sup>25</sup>

During the earlier portion of his reign Chosroës seems to have been engaged in but few wars, and those of no great importance. According to the Armenian writers,<sup>26</sup> he formed a design of depopulating that part of Armenia which he had not ceded to the Romans, by making a general levy of all the males, and marching them off to the East, to fight against the Ephthalites; but the design did not prosper, since the Armenians carried all before them, and under their native leader, Smbat, the Bagratunian, conquered Hyrcania and Tabaristan, defeated repeatedly the Koushans and the Ephthalites, and even engaged with success the Great Khan of the Turks, who came to the support of his vassals at the head of an army consisting of 300,000 men. By the valor and conduct of Smbat, the Persian dominion was re-established in the north-eastern mountain region, from Mount Demavend to the Hindu Kush; the Koushans, Turks, and Ephthalites were held in check; and the tide of barbarism, which had threatened to submerge the empire on this side, was effectually resisted and rolled back.

With Rome Chosroës maintained for eleven years the most friendly and cordial relations. Whatever humiliation he may have felt when he accepted the terms on which alone Maurice was willing to render him aid, having once agreed to them, he stifled all regrets, made no attempt to evade his obligations,<sup>27</sup> abstained from every endeavor to undo by intrigue what he had done, unwillingly indeed, but yet with his eyes open. Once only during the eleven years did a momentary cloud arise between him and his benefactor. In the year A.D. 600 some of the Saracenic tribes dependent on Rome made an incursion across the Euphrates into Persian territory, ravaged it far and wide, and returned with their booty into the desert.<sup>28</sup> Chosroës was justly offended, and might fairly have considered that a *casus belli* had arisen; but he allowed himself to be pacified by the representations of Maurice's envoy, George, and consented not to break the peace on account of so small a matter. George claimed the concession as a tribute to his own amiable qualities; but it is probable that the Persian monarch acted rather on the grounds of general policy than from any personal predilection.

Two years later the virtuous but perhaps over-rigid Maurice

was deposed and murdered by the centurion, Phocas, who, on the strength of his popularity with the army, boldly usurped the throne.<sup>29</sup> Chosroës heard with indignation of the execution of his ally and friend, of the insults offered to his remains,<sup>30</sup> and of the assassination of his numerous sons,<sup>31</sup> and of his brother.<sup>32</sup> One son, he heard, had been sent off by Maurice to implore aid from the Persians;<sup>33</sup> he had been overtaken and put to death by the emissaries of the usurper;<sup>34</sup> but rumor, always busy where royal personages are concerned, asserted that he lived, that he had escaped his pursuers, and had reached Ctesiphon. Chosroës was too much interested in the acceptance of the rumor to deny it; he gave out that Theodosius was at his court, and notified that it was his intention to assert his right to the succession.<sup>35</sup> When, five months after his coronation, Phocas sent an envoy to announce his occupation of the throne, and selected the actual murderer of Maurice to fill the post, Chosroës determined on an open rupture. He seized Lilius, the envoy, threw him into prison,<sup>36</sup> announced his intention of avenging his deceased benefactor, and openly declared war against Rome.

The war burst out the next year (A.D. 603). On the Roman side there was disagreement, and even civil war; for Narses, who had held high command in the East ever since he restored Chosroës to the throne of his ancestors, on hearing of the death of Maurice, took up arms against Phocas, and, throwing himself into Edessa, defied the forces of the usurper.<sup>37</sup> Germanus, who commanded at Daras, was a general of small capacity, and found himself quite unable to make head, either against Narses in Edessa, or against Chosroës, who led his troops in person into Mesopotamia. Defeated by Chosroës in a battle near Daras, in which he received a mortal wound, Germanus withdrew to Constantia, where he died eleven days afterwards.<sup>38</sup> A certain Leontius, a eunuch, took his place, but was equally unsuccessful. Chosroës defeated him at Arxamûs, and took a great portion of his army prisoners;<sup>39</sup> whereupon he was recalled by Phocas, and a third leader, Domentziolus, a nephew of the emperor, was appointed to the command. Against him the Persian monarch thought it enough to employ generals.<sup>40</sup> The war now languished for a short space; but in A.D. 605 Chosroës came up in person against Daras, the great Roman stronghold in these parts, and besieged it for the space of nine months,<sup>41</sup> at the end of which time it surrendered.<sup>42</sup> The loss was a severe blow to the

Roman prestige, and was followed in the next year by a long series of calamities. Chosroës took Tur-abdin, Hesen-Cephas, Mardin, Capher-tuta, and Amida.<sup>43</sup> Two years afterwards, A.D. 607, he captured Harran (Carrhæ<sup>44</sup>), Ras-el-ain (Resaina<sup>45</sup>), and Edessa, the capital of Osrhoêné, after which he pressed forward to the Euphrates, crossed with his army into Syria, and fell with fury on the Roman cities west of the river. Mabog or Hierapolis, Kenneserin, and Berhœa (now Aleppo), were invested and taken<sup>46</sup> in the course of one or at most two campaigns; while at the same time (A.D. 609) a second Persian army, under a general whose name is unknown, after operating in Armenia, and taking Satala and Theodosiopolis,<sup>47</sup> invaded Cappadocia and threatened the great city of Cæsarea Mazaca, which was the chief Roman stronghold in these parts. Bands of marauders wasted the open country, carrying terror through the fertile districts of Phrygia and Galatia, which had known nothing of the horrors of war for centuries, and were rich with the accumulated products of industry. According to Theophanes,<sup>48</sup> some of the ravages even penetrated as far as Chalcedon, on the opposite side of the straits from Constantinople; but this is probably the anticipation of an event belonging to a later time.<sup>49</sup> No movements of importance are assigned to A.D. 610; but in the May of the next year the Persians once more crossed the Euphrates, completely defeated and destroyed the Roman army which protected Syria, and sacked the two great cities of Apameia and Antioch.<sup>50</sup>

Meantime a change had occurred at Constantinople. The double revolt of Heraclius, prefect of Egypt, and Gregory, his lieutenant, had brought the reign of the brutal and incapable Phocas to an end, and placed upon the imperial throne a youth of promise, innocent of the blood of Maurice, and well inclined to avenge it.<sup>51</sup> Chosroës had to consider whether he should adhere to his original statement, that he took up arms to punish the murderer of his friend and benefactor, and consequently desist from further hostilities now that Phocas was dead, or whether, throwing consistency to the winds, he should continue to prosecute the war, notwithstanding the change of rulers, and endeavor to push to the utmost the advantage which he had already obtained. He resolved on this latter alternative. It was while the young Heraclius was still insecure in his seat that he sent his armies into Syria, defeated the Roman troops, and took Antioch and Apameia. Following up blow with blow, he the next year (A.D. 612) invaded

Cappadocia a second time and captured Cæsarea Mazaca.<sup>52</sup> Two years later (A.D. 614) he sent his general Shahr-Barz, into the region east of the Antilibanus, and took the ancient and famous city of Damascus.<sup>53</sup> From Damascus, in the ensuing year, Shahr-Barz advanced against Palestine,<sup>54</sup> and, summoning the Jews to his aid, proclaimed a Holy War against the Christian misbelievers, whom he threatened to enslave or exterminate. Twenty-six thousand of these fanatics flocked to his standard; and having occupied the Jordan region and Galilee, Shahr-Barz in A.D. 615 invested Jerusalem, and after a siege of eighteen days<sup>55</sup> forced his way into the town, and gave it over to plunder and rapine. The cruel hostility of the Jews had free vent. The churches of Helena, of Constantine, of the Holy Sepulchre, of the Resurrection, and many others, were burnt or ruined;<sup>56</sup> the greater part of the city was destroyed; the sacred treasures were plundered; the relics scattered or carried off; and a massacre of the inhabitants, in which the Jews took the chief part, raged throughout the whole city for some days. As many as seventeen thousand or, according to another account, *ninety* thousand, were slain.<sup>57</sup> Thirty-five thousand were made prisoners.<sup>58</sup> Among them was the aged Patriarch, Zacharius, who was carried captive into Persia, where he remained till his death.<sup>59</sup>

The Cross found by Helena, and believed to be "the True Cross," was at the same time transported to Ctesiphon, where it was preserved with care and duly venerated by the Christian wife of Chosroës.<sup>60</sup>

A still more important success followed. In A.D. 616 Shahr-Barz proceeded from Palestine into Egypt, which had enjoyed a respite from foreign war since the time of Julius Cæsar, surprised Pelusium, the key of the country, and, pressing forward across the Delta, easily made himself master of the rich and prosperous Alexandria.<sup>61</sup> John the Merciful, who was the Patriarch, and Nicêtas the Patrician, who was the governor, had quitted the city before his arrival, and had fled to Cyprus.<sup>62</sup> Hence scarcely any resistance was made. The fall of Alexandria was followed at once by the complete submission of the rest of Egypt.<sup>63</sup> Bands of Persians advanced up the Nile valley to the very confines of Ethiopia, and established the authority of Chosroës over the whole country—a country in which no Persian had set foot since it was wrested by Alexander of Macedon from Darius Codomannus.

While this remarkable conquest was made in the south-west, in the north-west another Persian army under another general, Saina or Shahên,<sup>64</sup> starting from Cappadocia, marched through Asia Minor to the shores of the Thracian Bosphorus, and laid siege to the strong city of Chalcedon, which lay upon the strait, just opposite Constantinople. Chalcedon made a vigorous resistance; and Heraclius, anxious to save it, had an interview with Shahên, and at his suggestion sent three of his highest nobles as ambassadors to Chosroës,<sup>65</sup> with a humble request for peace. The overture was ineffectual. Chosroës imprisoned the ambassadors and entreated them cruelly;<sup>66</sup> threatened Shahên with death for not bringing Heraclius in chains to the foot of his throne;<sup>67</sup> and declared in reply that he would grant no terms of peace—the empire was his, and Heraclius must descend from his throne.<sup>68</sup> Soon afterwards (A. D. 617) Chalcedon, which was besieged through the winter, fell;<sup>69</sup> and the Persians established themselves in this important stronghold, within a mile of Constantinople.<sup>70</sup> Three years afterwards, Ancyra (*Angora*), which had hitherto resisted the Persian arms, was taken;<sup>71</sup> and Rhodes, though inaccessible to an enemy who was without a naval force, submitted.<sup>72</sup>

Thus the whole of the Roman possessions in Asia and Eastern Africa were lost in the space of fifteen years.<sup>73</sup> The empire of Persia was extended from the Tigris and Euphrates to the Egean and the Nile, attaining once more almost the same dimensions that it had reached under the first and had kept until the third Darius. It is difficult to say how far their newly acquired provinces were really subdued, organized, and governed from Ctesiphon, how far they were merely overrun, plundered, and then left to themselves. On the one hand, we have indications of the existence of terrible disorders and of something approaching to anarchy in parts of the conquered territory during the time that it was held by the Persians; on the other, we seem to see an intention to retain, to govern, and even to beautify it. Euty chius relates<sup>74</sup> that, on the withdrawal of the Romans from Syria, the Jews resident in Tyre, who numbered four thousand, plotted with their co-religionists of Jerusalem, Cyprus, Damascus, and Galilee, a general massacre of the Tyrian Christians on a certain day. The plot was discovered; and the Jews of Tyre were arrested and imprisoned by their fellow-citizens, who put the city in a state of defence; and when the foreign Jews, to the number of 26,000, came at the appointed time, repulsed them from the walls,

and defeated them with great slaughter. This story suggests the idea of a complete and general disorganization. But on the other hand we hear of an augmentation of the revenue<sup>75</sup> under Chosroës II., which seems to imply the establishment in the regions conquered of a settled government; and the palace at Mashita, discovered by a recent traveller,<sup>76</sup> is a striking proof that no temporary occupation was contemplated, but that Chosroës regarded his conquests as permanent acquisitions, and meant to hold them and even visit them occasionally.

Heraclius was now well-nigh driven to despair. The loss of Egypt reduced Constantinople to want,<sup>77</sup> and its noisy populace clamored for food. The Avars overran Thrace, and continually approached nearer to the capital.<sup>78</sup> The glitter of the Persian arms was to be seen at any moment, if he looked from his palace windows across the Bosphorus. No prospect of assistance or relief appeared from any quarter. The empire was "reduced to the walls of Constantinople, with the remnant of Greece, Italy, and Africa, and some maritime cities, from Tyre to Trebizond, of the Asiatic Coast."<sup>79</sup> It is not surprising that under the circumstances the despondent monarch determined on flight, and secretly made arrangements for transporting himself and his treasures to the distant Carthage,<sup>80</sup> where he might hope at least to find himself in safety. His ships, laden with their precious freight, had put to sea, and he was about to follow them, when his intention became known or was suspected; the people rose; and the Patriarch, espousing their side, forced the reluctant prince to accompany him to the church of St. Sophia, and there make oath that, come what might, he would not separate his fortunes from those of the imperial city.<sup>81</sup>

Baffled in his design to escape from his difficulties by flight, Heraclius took a desperate resolution. He would leave Constantinople to its fate, trust its safety to the protection afforded by its walls and by the strait which separated it from Asia,<sup>82</sup> embark with such troops as he could collect, and carry the war into the enemy's country. The one advantage which he had over his adversary was his possession of an ample navy, and consequent command of the sea and power to strike his blows unexpectedly in different quarters. On making known his intention, it was not opposed, either by the people or by the Patriarch.<sup>83</sup> He was allowed to coin the treasures of the various churches into money,<sup>84</sup> to collect stores, enroll troops, and, on the Easter Monday<sup>85</sup> of A.D. 622, to set forth on his expedition.

His fleet was steered southward, and, though forced to contend with adverse gales,<sup>86</sup> made a speedy and successful voyage through the Propontis, the Hellespont, the Egean, and the Cilician Strait, to the Gulf of Issus,<sup>87</sup> in the angle between Asia Minor and Syria. The position was well chosen, as one where attack was difficult, where numbers would give little advantage, and where consequently a small but resolute force might easily maintain itself against a greatly superior enemy. At the same time it was a post from which an advance might conveniently be made in several directions, and which menaced almost equally Asia Minor, Syria, and Armenia. Moreover, the level tract between the mountains and the sea was broad enough for the manœuvres of such an army as Heraclius commanded, and allowed him to train his soldiers by exercises and sham fights to a familiarity with the sights and sounds and movements of a battle.<sup>88</sup> He conjectured, rightly enough, that he would not long be left unmolested by the enemy. Shahr-Barz, the conqueror of Jerusalem and Egypt, was very soon sent against him;<sup>89</sup> and, after various movements, which it is impossible to follow, a battle was fought between the two armies in the mountain country towards the Armenian frontier, in which the hero of a hundred fights was defeated.<sup>90</sup> and the Romans, for the first time since the death of Maurice, obtained a victory. After this, on the approach of winter, Heraclius, accompanied probably by a portion of his army, returned by sea to Constantinople.<sup>91</sup>

The next year the attack was made in a different quarter. Having concluded alliances with the Khan of the Khazars and some other chiefs of inferior power,<sup>92</sup> Heraclius in the month of March embarked with 5000 men,<sup>93</sup> and proceeded from Constantinople by way of the Black Sea first to Trebizond,<sup>94</sup> and then to Mingrelia or Lazica.<sup>95</sup> There he obtained contingents from his allies, which, added to the forces collected from Trebizond and the other maritime towns, may perhaps have raised his troops to the number of 120,000, at which we find them estimated.<sup>96</sup> With this army, he crossed the Araxes,<sup>97</sup> and invaded Armenia. Chosroës, on receiving the intelligence, proceeded into Azerbaijan with 40,000 men, and occupied the strong city of Canzaca,<sup>98</sup> the site of which is probably marked by the ruins known as Takht-i-Suleïman.<sup>99</sup> At the same time he ordered two other armies, which he had sent on in advance, one of them commanded by Shahr-Barz, the other by Shahên, to effect a junction and oppose themselves to the

further progress of the emperor.<sup>100</sup> The two generals were, however, tardy in their movements,<sup>101</sup> or at any rate were outstripped by the activity of Heraclius, who, pressing forward from Armenia into Azerbaijan, directed his march upon Canzaca, hoping to bring the Great King to a battle. His advance-guard of Saracens did actually surprise the picquets of Chosroës;<sup>102</sup> but the king himself hastily evacuated the Median stronghold, and retreated southwards through Ardelan towards the Zagros mountains, thus avoiding the engagement which was desired by his antagonist. The army, on witnessing the flight of their monarch, broke up and dispersed.<sup>103</sup> Heraclius pressed upon the flying host and slew all whom he caught, but did not suffer himself to be diverted from his main object, which was to overtake Chosroës. His pursuit, however, was unsuccessful. Chosroës availed himself of the rough and difficult country which lies between Azerbaijan and the Mesopotamian lowland, and by moving from place to place contrived to baffle his enemy.<sup>104</sup> Winter arrived, and Heraclius had to determine whether he would continue his quest at the risk of having to pass the cold season in the enemy's country, far from all his resources, or relinquish it and retreat to a safe position. Finding his soldiers divided in their wishes, he trusted the decision to chance, and opening the Gospel at random settled the doubt by applying the first passage that met his eye to its solution. The passage suggested retreat; and Heraclius, retracing his steps, recrossed the Araxes, and wintered in Albania.<sup>105</sup>

The return of Heraclius was not unmolested. He had excited the fanaticism of the Persians by destroying, wherever he went, the temples of the Magians,<sup>106</sup> and extinguishing the sacred fire, which it was a part of their religion to keep continually burning. He had also everywhere delivered the cities and villages to the flames, and carried off many thousands of the population. The exasperated enemy consequently hung upon his rear, impeded his march, and no doubt caused him considerable loss, though, when it came to fighting, Heraclius always gained the victory.<sup>107</sup> He reached Albania without sustaining any serious disaster, and even brought with him 50,000 captives; but motives of pity, or of self-interest, caused him soon afterwards to set these prisoners free.<sup>108</sup> It would have been difficult to feed and house them through the long and severe winter, and disgraceful to sell or massacre them.

In the year A.D. 624 Chosroës took the offensive, and, before Heraclius had quitted his winter quarters, sent a general, at the head of a force of picked troops, into Albania,<sup>109</sup> with the view of detaining him in that remote province during the season of military operations. But Sarablagas feared his adversary too much to be able very effectually to check his movements; he was content to guard the passes, and hold the high ground, without hazarding an engagement. Heraclius contrived after a time to avoid him, and penetrated into Persia through a series of plains, probably those along the course and about the mouth of the Araxes. It was now his wish to push rapidly southward; but the auxiliaries on whom he greatly depended<sup>110</sup> were unwilling; and, while he doubted what course to take, three Persian armies, under commanders of note,<sup>111</sup> closed in upon him, and threatened his small force with destruction. Heraclius feigned a disordered flight, and drew on him an attack from two out of the three chiefs, which he easily repelled. Then he fell upon the third, Shahên, and completely defeated him. A way seemed to be thus opened for him into the heart of Persia, and he once more set off to seek Chosroës; but now his allies began to desert his standard, and return to their homes;<sup>112</sup> the defeated Persians rallied and impeded his march; he was obliged to content himself with a third victory, at a place which Theophanes calls Salban,<sup>113</sup> where he surprised Shahr-Barz in the dead of the night, massacred his troops, his wives, his officers, and the mass of the population, which fought from the flat roofs of the houses, took the general's arms and equipage, and was within a little of capturing Shahr-barz himself.<sup>114</sup> The remnant of the Persian army fled in disorder, and was hunted down by Heraclius, who pursued the fugitives unceasingly till the cold season approached, and he had to retire into cantonments. The half-burnt Salban afforded a welcome shelter to his troops during the snows and storms of an Armenian winter.<sup>115</sup>

Early in the ensuing spring the indefatigable emperor again set his troops in motion, and, passing the lofty range<sup>116</sup> which separates the basin of Lake Van from the streams that flow into the upper Tigris, struck that river, or rather its large affluent, the Bitlis Chai,<sup>117</sup> in seven days from Salban, crossed into Arzanene, and proceeding westward recovered Martyropolis and Amida,<sup>118</sup> which had now been in the possession of the Persians for twenty years.<sup>119</sup> At Amida he made a halt, and wrote to inform the Senate of Constantinople of his position

and his victories, intelligence which they must have received gladly after having lost sight of him for above a twelvemonth. But he was not allowed to remain long undisturbed. Before the end of March Shahr-Barz had again taken the field in force, had occupied the usual passage of the Euphrates, and threatened the line of retreat which Heraclius had looked upon as open to him. Unable to cross the Euphrates by the bridge, which Shahr-barz had broken,<sup>120</sup> the emperor descended the stream till he found a ford, when he transported his army to the other bank, and hastened by way of Samosata and Germanicæ<sup>121</sup> into Cilicia. Here he was once more in his own territory, with the sea close at hand, ready to bring him supplies or afford him a safe retreat, in a position with whose advantages he was familiar,<sup>122</sup> where broad plains gave an opportunity for skilful maneuvers, and deep rapid rivers rendered defence easy. Heraclius took up a position on the right bank of the Sarus (*Syhun*), in the immediate vicinity of the fortified bridge by which alone the stream could be crossed.<sup>123</sup> Shahr-Barz followed, and ranged his troops along the left bank, placing the archers in the front line, while he made preparations to draw the enemy from the defence of the bridge into the plain on the other side. He was so far successful that the Roman occupation of the bridge was endangered; but Heraclius, by his personal valor and by almost superhuman exertions,<sup>124</sup> restored the day; with his own hand he struck down a Persian of gigantic stature and flung him from the bridge into the river; then pushing on with a few companions, he charged the Persian host in the plain, receiving undaunted a shower of blows, while he dealt destruction on all sides.<sup>125</sup> The fight was prolonged until the evening and even then was undecided; but Shahr-Barz had convinced himself that he could not renew the combat with any prospect of victory. He therefore retreated during the night, and withdrew from Cilicia.<sup>126</sup> Heraclius, finding himself free to march where he pleased, crossed the Taurus, and proceeded to Sebaste (Sivas), upon the Halys, where he wintered in the heart of Cappadocia, about half-way between the two seas. According to Theophanes,<sup>127</sup> the Persian monarch was so much enraged at this bold and adventurous march, and at the success which had attended it, that, by way of revenging himself on Heraclius, he seized the treasures of all the Christian churches in his dominions, and compelled the orthodox believers to embrace the Nestorian heresy.

The twenty-fourth year of the war had now arrived, and it

was difficult to say on which side lay the balance of advantage. If Chosroës still maintained his hold on Syria, Egypt, and Asia Minor as far as Chalcedon, if his troops still flaunted their banners within sight of Constantinople, yet on the other hand he had seen his hereditary dominions deeply penetrated by the armies of his adversary; he had had his best generals defeated, his cities and palaces burnt, his favorite provinces wasted; Heraclius had proved himself a most formidable opponent; and unless some vital blow could be dealt him at home, there was no forecasting the damage that he might not inflict on Persia by a fresh invasion. Chosroës therefore made a desperate attempt to bring the war to a close by an effort, the success of which would have changed the history of the world. Having enrolled as soldiers, besides Persians, a vast number of foreigners and slaves,<sup>128</sup> and having concluded a close alliance with the Khan of the Avars, he formed two great armies,<sup>129</sup> one of which was intended to watch Heraclius in Asia Minor, while the other co-operated with the Avars and forced Constantinople to surrender. The army destined to contend with the emperor was placed under the command of Shahên; that which was to bear a part in the siege of Constantinople was committed to Shahr-Barz. It is remarkable that Heraclius, though quite aware of his adversary's plans, instead of seeking to baffle them, made such arrangements as facilitated the attempt to put them into execution. He divided his own troops into three bodies, one only of which he sent to aid in the defence of his capital.<sup>130</sup> The second body he left with his brother Theodore, whom he regarded as a sufficient match for Shahên. With the third division he proceeded eastward to the remote province of Lazica,<sup>131</sup> and there engaged in operations which could but very slightly affect the general course of the war. The Khazars were once more called in as allies; and their Khan, Ziebel, who coveted the plunder of Tiflis, held an interview with the emperor in the sight of the Persians who guarded that town, adored his majesty, and received from his hands the diadem that adorned his own brow.<sup>132</sup> Richly entertained, and presented with all the plate used in the banquet, with a royal robe, and a pair of pearl earrings, promised moreover the daughter of the emperor (whose portrait he was shown) in marriage, the barbarian chief, dazzled and flattered, readily concluded an alliance, and associated his arms with those of the Romans.<sup>133</sup> A joint attack was made upon Tiflis,<sup>134</sup> and the town was reduced to extremities; when Sarablagas, with a thousand men, contrived

to throw himself into it, and the allies, disheartened thereby, raised the siege and retired.

Meanwhile, in Asia Minor, Theodore engaged the army of Shahên; and, a violent hailstorm raging at the time, which drove into the enemy's face, while the Romans were, comparatively speaking, sheltered from its force, he succeeded in defeating his antagonist with great slaughter. Choroës was infuriated; and the displeasure of his sovereign weighed so heavily upon the mind of Shahên that he shortly afterwards sickened and died. The barbarous monarch gave orders that his corpse should be embalmed and sent to the court, in order that he might gratify his spleen by treating it with the grossest indignity.<sup>135</sup>

At Constantinople the Persian cause was equally unsuccessful. Shahr-Barz, from Chalcedon, entered into negotiations with the Khan of the Avars, and found but little difficulty in persuading him to make an attempt upon the imperial city. From their seats beyond the Danube a host of barbarians—Avars, Slaves, Gepidæ, Bulgarians,<sup>136</sup> and others—advanced through the passes of Hæmus into the plains of Thrace, destroying and ravaging. The population fled before them and sought the protection of the city walls, which had been carefully strengthened in expectation of the attack, and were in good order.<sup>137</sup> The hordes forced the outer works; but all their efforts, though made both by land and sea, were unavailing against the main defences; their attempt to sap the wall failed; their artillery was met and crushed by engines of greater power;<sup>138</sup> a fleet of Slavonian canoes, which endeavored to force an entrance by the Golden Horn,<sup>139</sup> was destroyed or driven ashore;<sup>140</sup> the towers with which they sought to overtop the walls were burnt;<sup>141</sup> and, after ten days of constantly repeated assaults,<sup>142</sup> the barbarian leader became convinced that he had undertaken an impossible enterprise, and, having burnt his engines and his siege works,<sup>143</sup> he retired. The result might have been different had the Persians, who were experienced in the attack of walled places, been able to co-operate with him; but the narrow channel which flowed between Chalcedon and the Golden Horn proved an insurmountable barrier; the Persians had no ships, and the canoes of the Slavonians were quite unable to contend with the powerful galleys of the Byzantines, so that the transport of a body of Persian troops from Asia to Europe by their aid proved impracticable.<sup>144</sup> Shahr-Barz had the annoyance of witnessing the efforts and defeat of his allies,

without having it in his power to take any active steps towards assisting the one or hindering the other.

The war now approached its termination; for the last hope of the Persians had failed; and Heraclius, with his mind set at rest as regarded his capital, was free to strike at any part of Persia that he pleased, and, having the prestige of victory and the assistance of the Khazars, was likely to carry all before him. It is not clear<sup>145</sup> how he employed himself during the spring and summer of A.D. 627; but in the September of that year he started from Lazica<sup>146</sup> with a large Roman army and a contingent of 40,000 Khazar horse,<sup>147</sup> resolved to surprise his adversary by a winter campaign, and hoping to take him at a disadvantage. Passing rapidly through Armenia and Azerbaijan without meeting an enemy that dared to dispute his advance, suffering no loss except from the guerilla warfare of some bold spirits among the mountaineers of those regions,<sup>148</sup> he resolved, notwithstanding the defection of the Khazars,<sup>149</sup> who declined to accompany him further south than Azerbaijan, that he would cross the Zagros mountains into Assyria, and make a dash at the royal cities of the Mesopotamian region, thus retaliating upon Chosroës for the Avar attack upon Constantinople of the preceding year, undertaken at his instigation. Chosroës himself had for the last twenty-four years fixed his court at Dastagherd<sup>150</sup> in the plain country, about seventy miles to the north of Ctesiphon.<sup>151</sup> It seemed to Heraclius that this position might perhaps be reached, and an effective blow struck against the Persian power. He hastened, therefore, to cross the mountains; and the 9th of October saw him at Chnæthas,<sup>152</sup> in the low country, not far from Arbela, where he refreshed his army by a week's rest. He might now easily have advanced along the great post-road which connected Arbela with Dastagherd and Ctesiphon; but he had probably by this time received information of the movements of the Persians, and was aware that by so doing he would place himself between two fires, and run the chance of being intercepted in his retreat. For Chosroës, having collected a large force, had sent it, under Rhazates, a new general, into Azerbaijan;<sup>153</sup> and this force, having reached Canzaca, found itself in the rear of Heraclius, between him and Lazica. Heraclius appears not to have thought it safe to leave this enemy behind him, and therefore he idled away above a month in the Zab region, waiting for Rhazates to make his appearance. That general had strict orders from the Great

King to fight the Romans wherever he found them, whatever might be the consequence;<sup>154</sup> and he therefore followed, as quickly as he could, upon Heraclius's footsteps, and early in December came up with him in the neighborhood of Nineveh. Both parties were anxious for an immediate engagement, Rhazates to carry out his master's orders, Heraclius because he had heard that his adversary would soon receive a reinforcement. The battle took place on the 12th of December,<sup>155</sup> in the open plain to the north of Nineveh.<sup>156</sup> It was contested from early dawn to the eleventh hour of the day, and was finally decided, more by the accident that Rhazates and the other Persian commanders were slain, than by any defeat of the soldiers. Heraclius is said to have distinguished himself personally during the fight by many valiant exploits;<sup>157</sup> but he does not appear to have exhibited any remarkable strategy on the occasion. The Persians lost their generals, their chariots, and as many as twenty-eight standards;<sup>158</sup> but they were not routed, nor driven from the field. They merely drew off to the distance of two bowshots,<sup>159</sup> and there stood firm till after nightfall. During the night they fell back further upon their fortified camp, collected their baggage, and retired to a strong position at the foot of the mountains. Here they were joined by the reinforcement which Chosroës had sent to their aid;<sup>160</sup> and thus strengthened they ventured to approach Heraclius once more, to hang on his rear, and impede his movements. He, after his victory, had resumed his march southward, had occupied Nineveh, recrossed the Great Zab, advanced rapidly through Adiabêné to the Lesser Zab, seized its bridges by a forced march of forty-eight (Roman) miles, and conveyed his army safely to its left bank, where he pitched his camp at a place called Yesdem,<sup>161</sup> and once more allowed his soldiers a brief repose for the purpose of keeping Christmas. Chosroës had by this time heard of the defeat and death of Rhazates, and was in a state of extreme alarm. Hastily recalling Shahr-Barz from Chalcedon,<sup>162</sup> and ordering the troops lately commanded by Rhazates to outstrip the Romans, if possible, and interpose themselves between Heraclius and Dastagherd,<sup>163</sup> he took up a strong position near that place with his own army and a number of elephants, and expressed an intention of there awaiting his antagonist. A broad and deep river, or rather canal, known as the Baras-roth or Barazrud,<sup>164</sup> protected his front; while at some distance further in advance was the Torna, probably another canal,<sup>165</sup> where he expected

that the army of Rhazates would make a stand. But that force, demoralized by its recent defeat, fell back from the line of the Torna, without even destroying the bridge over it;<sup>166</sup> and Chosroës, finding the foe advancing on him, lost heart, and secretly fled from Dastagherd to Ctesiphon,<sup>167</sup> whence he crossed the Tigris to Guedeser or Seleucia, with his treasure and the best-loved of his wives and children.<sup>168</sup> The army lately under Rhazates rallied upon the line of the Nahr-wan<sup>169</sup> canal, three miles from Ctesiphon; and here it was largely reinforced, though with a mere worthless mob of slaves and domestics.<sup>170</sup> It made however a formidable show, supported by its elephants, which numbered two hundred; it had a deep and wide cutting in its front; and, this time, it had taken care to destroy all the bridges by which the cutting might have been crossed. Heraclius, having plundered the rich palace of Dastagherd,<sup>171</sup> together with several less splendid royal residences, and having on the 10th of January encamped within twelve miles of the Nahr-wan,<sup>172</sup> and learnt from the commander of the Armenian contingent, whom he sent forward to reconnoitre, that the canal was impassable, came to the conclusion that his expedition had reached its extreme limit, and that prudence required him to commence his retreat. The season had been, it would seem, exceptionally mild,<sup>173</sup> and the passes of the mountains were still open; but it was to be expected that in a few weeks they would be closed by the snow, which always falls heavily during some portion of the winter. Heraclius, therefore, like Julian,<sup>174</sup> having come within sight of Ctesiphon, shrank from the idea of besieging it, and, content with the punishment that he had inflicted on his enemy by wasting and devastation, desisted from his expedition, and retraced his steps. In his retreat he was more fortunate than his great predecessor. The defeat which he had inflicted on the main army of the Persians paralyzed their energies, and it would seem that his return march was unmolested. He reached Siazurus (*Shehrizur*) early in February,<sup>175</sup> Barzan (*Berozeh*) probably on the 1st of March,<sup>176</sup> and on the 11th of March Canzaca,<sup>177</sup> where he remained during the rest of the winter.

Chosroës had escaped a great danger, but he had incurred a terrible disgrace. He had fled before his adversary without venturing to give him battle. He had seen palace after palace destroyed, and had lost the magnificent residence where he had held his court for the last four-and-twenty years. The Romans

had recovered 300 standards,<sup>178</sup> trophies gained in the numerous victories of his early years. They had shown themselves able to penetrate into the heart of his empire, and to retire without suffering any loss. Still, had he possessed a moderate amount of prudence, Chosroës might even now have surmounted the perils of his position, and have terminated his reign in tranquillity, if not in glory. Heraclius was anxious for peace,<sup>179</sup> and willing to grant it on reasonable conditions. He did not aim at conquests, and would have been contented at any time with the restoration of Egypt, Syria, and Asia Minor. The Persians generally were weary of the war, and would have hailed with joy almost any terms of accommodation.<sup>180</sup> But Chosroës was obstinate; he did not know how to bear the frowns of fortune; the disasters of the late campaign, instead of bending his spirit, had simply exasperated him, and he vented upon his own subjects the ill-humor which the successes of his enemies had provoked. Lending a too ready ear to a whispered slander, he ordered the execution of Shahr-Barz, and thus mortally offended that general, to whom the despatch was communicated by the Romans.<sup>181</sup> He imprisoned the officers who had been defeated by, or had fled before Heraclius.<sup>182</sup> Several other tyrannical acts are alleged against him;<sup>183</sup> and it is said<sup>184</sup> that he was contemplating the setting aside of his legitimate successor, Siroës, in favor of a younger son, Merdasas, his offspring by his favorite wife, the Christian Shirin,<sup>185</sup> when a rebellion broke out against his authority. Gurdanaspa,<sup>186</sup> who was in command of the Persian troops at Ctesiphon, and twenty-two nobles of importance,<sup>187</sup> including two sons of Shahr-Barz,<sup>188</sup> embraced the cause of Siroës, and seizing Chosroës, who meditated flight,<sup>189</sup> committed him to "the House of Darkness," a strong place where he kept his money.<sup>190</sup> Here he was confined for four days, his jailers allowing him daily a morsel of bread and a small quantity of water; when he complained of hunger, they told him, by his son's orders, that he was welcome to satisfy his appetite by feasting upon his treasures. The officers whom he had confined were allowed free access to his prison, where they insulted him and spat upon him. Merdasas, the son whom he preferred, and several of his other children, were brought into his presence and put to death before his eyes. After suffering in this way for four days he was at last, on the fifth day from his arrest (February 28), put to death in some cruel fashion, perhaps, like St. Sebastian, by being transfixed with arrows.<sup>191</sup> Thus perished miserably the

second Chosroës, after having reigned thirty-seven years<sup>192</sup> (A.D. 591-628), a just but tardy Nemesis overtaking the parricide.

The Oriental writers represent the second Chosroës as a monarch whose character was originally admirable, but whose good disposition was gradually corrupted by the possession of sovereign power. "Parviz," says Mirkhond,<sup>193</sup> "holds a distinguished rank among the kings of Persia through the majesty and firmness of his government, the wisdom of his views, and his intrepidity in carrying them out, the size of his army, the amount of his treasure, the flourishing condition of the provinces during his reign, the security of the highways, the prompt and exact obedience which he enforced, and his unalterable adherence to the plans which he once formed." It is impossible that these praises can have been altogether undeserved; and we are bound to assign to this monarch, on the authority of the Orientals, a vigor of administration, a strength of will, and a capacity for governing, not very commonly possessed by princes born in the purple. To these merits we may add a certain grandeur of soul, and power of appreciating the beautiful and the magnificent, which, though not uncommon in the East, did not characterize many of the Sassanian sovereigns. The architectural remains of Chosroës, which will be noticed in a future chapter, the descriptions which have come down to us of his palaces at Dastagherd<sup>194</sup> and Canzaca,<sup>195</sup> the accounts which we have of his treasures,<sup>196</sup> his court,<sup>197</sup> his seraglio,<sup>198</sup> even his seals,<sup>199</sup> transcend all that is known of any other monarch of his line. The employment of Byzantine sculptors and architects, which his works are thought to indicate, implies an appreciation of artistic excellence very rare among Orientals. But against these merits must be set a number of most serious moral defects, which may have been aggravated as time went on, but of which we see something more than the germ, even while he was still a youth. The murder of his father was perhaps a state necessity, and he may not have commanded it, or have been accessory to it before the fact;<sup>200</sup> but his ingratitude towards his uncles, whom he deliberately put to death, is wholly unpardonable, and shows him to have been cruel, selfish, and utterly without natural affection, even in the earlier portion of his reign. In war he exhibited neither courage nor conduct; all his main military successes were due to his generals; and in his later years he seems never voluntarily to have exposed

himself to danger. In suspecting his generals, and ill-using them while living, he only followed the traditions of his house;<sup>201</sup> but the insults offered to the dead body of Shahên, whose only fault was that he had suffered a defeat, were unusual and outrageous. The accounts given of his seraglio imply either gross sensualism or extreme ostentation; perhaps we may be justified in inclining to the more lenient view, if we take into consideration the faithful attachment which he exhibited towards Shirin.<sup>202</sup> The cruelties which disgraced his later years are wholly without excuse; but in the act which deprived him of his throne, and brought him to a miserable end—his preference of Merdasas as his successor—he exhibited no worse fault than an amiable weakness, a partiality towards the son of a wife who possessed, and seems to have deserved,<sup>203</sup> his affection.

The coins of the second Chosroës are numerous in the extreme,<sup>204</sup> and present several peculiarities. The ordinary type has, on the obverse, the king's head in profile, covered by a tiara, of which the chief ornament is a crescent and star between two outstretched wings. The head is surrounded by a double pearl bordering, outside of which, in the margin, are three crescents and stars. The legend is *Khusrui afzud*, with a monogram of doubtful meaning.<sup>205</sup> The reverse shows the usual fire altar and supporters, in a rude form, enclosed by a triple pearl bordering. In the margin, outside the bordering, are four crescents and stars. The legend is merely the regnal year and a mint-mark. Thirty-four mint-marks<sup>206</sup> have been ascribed to Chosroës II. [Pl. XXIII., Fig. 4.]

A rarer and more curious type of coin,<sup>207</sup> belonging to this monarch, presents on the obverse the front face of the king, surmounted by a mural crown, having the star and crescent between outstretched wings at top. The legend is *Khusrui malkan malka—afzud*. "Chosroës, king of kings—increase (be his)." The reverse has a head like that of a woman, also fronting the spectator, and wearing a band enriched with pearls across the forehead, above which the hair gradually converges to a point. [Pl. XXIV., Fig. 1.] A head very similar to this is found on Indo-Sassanian coins.<sup>208</sup> Otherwise we might have supposed that the uxorious monarch had wished to circulate among his subjects the portrait of his beloved Shirin.

## CHAPTER XXV.

*Accession of Siroës, or Kobad II. His Letter to Heraclius. Peace made with Rome. Terms of the Peace. General Popularity of the new Reign. Dissatisfaction of Shahr-Barz. Kobad, by the advice of the Persian Lords, murders his Brothers. His Sisters reproach him with their Death. He falls into low spirits and dies. Pestilence in his Reign. His coins. Accession of Artaxerxes III. Revolt of Shahr-Barz. Reign of Shahr-Barz. His Murder. Reign of Purandocht. Rapid Succession of Pretenders. Accession of Isdigerd III.*

"Kobades, regno præfectus, justitiam præ se tulit, et injuriam qua oppressa fuerat amovit."—Euty chius, *Annales*, vol. ii. p. 252.

SIROËS, or Kobad the Second, as he is more properly termed,<sup>1</sup> was proclaimed king on the 25th of February,<sup>2</sup> A.D. 628, four days before the murder of his father. According to the Oriental writers,<sup>3</sup> he was very unwilling to put his father to death, and only gave a reluctant consent to his execution on the representations of his nobles that it was a state of necessity. His first care, after this urgent matter had been settled, was to make overtures of peace to Heraclius, who, having safely crossed the Zagros mountains,<sup>4</sup> was wintering at Canzaca. The letter which he addressed to the Roman Emperor on the occasion is partially extant; but the formal and official tone which it breathes renders it a somewhat disappointing document. Kobad begins by addressing Heraclius as his brother, and giving him the epithet of "most clement,"<sup>5</sup> thus assuming his pacific disposition. He then declares, that, having been elevated to the throne by the especial favor of God, he has resolved to do his utmost to benefit and serve the entire human race. He has therefore commenced his reign by throwing open the prison doors, and restoring liberty to all who were detained in custody.<sup>6</sup> With the same object in view, he is desirous of living in peace and friendship with the Roman emperor and state as well as with all other neighboring nations and kings. Assuming that his accession will be pleasing to the emperor, he has sent Phæak, one of his privy councillors, to express the

love and friendship that he feels towards his *brother*, and learn the terms upon which peace will be granted him.<sup>7</sup> The reply of Heraclius is lost; but we are able to gather from a short summary which has been preserved,<sup>8</sup> as well as from the subsequent course of events, that it was complimentary and favorable; that it expressed the willingness of the emperor to bring the war to a close, and suggested terms of accommodation that were moderate and equitable. The exact formulation of the treaty seems to have been left to Eustathius, who, after Heraclius had entertained Phæak royally for nearly a week,<sup>9</sup> accompanied the ambassador on his return to the Persian court.

The general principle upon which peace was concluded was evidently the *status quo ante bellum*. Persia was to surrender Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Asia Minor, Western Mesopotamia, and any other conquests that she might have made from Rome, to recall her troops from them,<sup>10</sup> and to give them back into the possession of the Romans. She was also to surrender all the captives whom she had carried off from the conquered countries;<sup>11</sup> and, above all, she was to give back to the Romans the precious relic which had been taken from Jerusalem,<sup>12</sup> and which was believed on all hands to be the veritable cross whereon Jesus Christ suffered death. As Rome had merely made inroads, but not conquests, she did not possess any territory to surrender; but she doubtless set her Persian prisoners free, and she made arrangements for the safe conduct and honorable treatment of the Persians, who evacuated Syria, Egypt, and Asia Minor, on their way to the frontier.<sup>13</sup> The evacuation was at once commenced; and the wood of the cross, which had been carefully preserved by the Persian queen, Shirin,<sup>14</sup> was restored. In the next year,<sup>15</sup> Heraclius made a grand pilgrimage to Jerusalem, and replaced the holy relic in the shrine from which it had been taken.

It is said that princes are always popular on their coronation day. Kobad was certainly no exception to the general rule.<sup>16</sup> His subjects rejoiced at the termination of a war which had always been a serious drain on the population, and which latterly had brought ruin and desolation upon the hearths and homes of thousands. The general emptying of the prisons was an act that cannot be called statesmanlike; but it had a specious appearance of liberality, and was probably viewed with favor by the mass of the people. A still more popular measure must have been the complete remission of taxes with which

Kobad inaugurated his reign<sup>17</sup>—a remission which, according to one authority, was to have continued for three years, had the generous prince lived so long. In addition to these somewhat questionable proceedings, Kobad adopted also a more legitimate mode of securing the regard of his subjects by a careful administration of justice,<sup>18</sup> and a mild treatment of those who had been the victims of his father's severities. He restored to their former rank the persons whom Chosroës had degraded or imprisoned, and compensated them for their injuries by a liberal donation of money.<sup>19</sup>

Thus far all seemed to promise well for the new reign, which, though it had commenced under unfavorable auspices, bid fair to be tranquil and prosperous. In one quarter only was there any indication of coming troubles.<sup>20</sup> Shahr-Barz, the great general, whose life Chosroës had attempted shortly before his own death,<sup>21</sup> appears to have been dissatisfied with the terms on which Kobad had concluded peace with Rome; and there is even reason to believe that he contrived to impede and delay the full execution of the treaty.<sup>22</sup> He held under Kobad the government of the western provinces,<sup>23</sup> and was at the head of an army which numbered sixty thousand men.<sup>24</sup> Kobad treated him with marked favor; but still he occupied a position almost beyond that of a subject, and one which could not fail to render him an object of fear and suspicion. For the present, however, though he may have nurtured ambitious thoughts, he made no movement, but bided his time, remaining quietly in his province, and cultivating friendly relations with the Roman emperor.<sup>25</sup>

Kobad had not been seated on the throne many months when he consented to a deed by which his character for justice and clemency was seriously compromised, if not wholly lost. This was the general massacre of all the other sons of Chosroës II., his own brothers or half-brothers—a numerous body, amounting to forty according to the highest estimate, and to fifteen according to the lowest.<sup>26</sup> We are not told of any circumstances of peril to justify the deed, or even account for it. There have been Oriental dynasties, where such a wholesale murder upon the accession of a sovereign has been a portion of the established system of government, and others where the milder but little less revolting expedient has obtained of blinding all the brothers of the reigning prince; but neither practice was in vogue among the Sassanians; and we look vainly for the reason which caused an act of the kind to be resorted

to at this conjuncture. Mirkhond<sup>27</sup> says that Firuz, the chief minister of Kobad, advised the deed; but even he assigns no motive for the massacre, unless a motive is implied in the statement that the brothers of Kobad were "all of them distinguished by their talents and their merit." Politically speaking, the measure might have been harmless, had Kobad enjoyed a long reign, and left behind him a number of sons. But as it was, the rash act, by almost extinguishing the race of Sassan, produced troubles which greatly helped to bring the empire into a condition of hopeless exhaustion and weakness.

While thus destroying all his brothers, Kobad allowed his sisters to live. Of these there were two, still unmarried, who resided in the palace, and had free access to the monarch. Their names were Purandocht and Azermidocht, Purandocht being the elder. Bitterly grieved at the loss of their kindred, these two princesses rushed into the royal presence, and reproached the king with words that cut him to the soul. "Thy ambition of ruling," they said,<sup>28</sup> "has induced thee to kill thy father and thy brothers. Thou hast accomplished thy purpose within the space of three or four months. Thou hast hoped thereby to preserve thy power forever. Even, however, if thou shouldst live long, thou must die at last. May God deprive thee of the enjoyment of this royalty!" His sisters' words sank deep into the king's mind. He acknowledged their justice, burst into tears, and flung his crown on the ground.<sup>29</sup> After this he fell into a profound melancholy, ceased to care for the exercise of power, and in a short time died. His death is ascribed by the Orientals to his mental sufferings; but the statement of a Christian bishop throws some doubt on this romantic story. Euty chius, Patriarch of Alexandria, tells us that, before Kobad had reigned many months, the plague broke out in his country. Vast numbers of his subjects died of it; and among the victims was the king himself,<sup>30</sup> who perished after a reign which is variously estimated at six, seven, eight, and eighteen months.<sup>31</sup>

There seems to be no doubt that a terrible pestilence did afflict Persia at this period. The Arabian writers are here in agreement with Euty chius of Alexandria,<sup>32</sup> and declare that the malady was of the most aggravated character, carrying off one half, or at any rate one third, of the inhabitants of the provinces which were affected, and diminishing the population of Persia by several hundreds of thousands.<sup>33</sup> Scourges of this kind are of no rare occurrence in the East; and the return of a

mixed multitude to Persia, under circumstances involving privation, from the cities of Asia Minor, Syria, and Palestine, was well calculated to engender such a calamity.

The reign of Kobad II. appears from his coins to have lasted above a year.<sup>34</sup> He ascended the throne in February, A.D. 628; he probably died about July,<sup>35</sup> A.D. 629. The coins which are attributed to him resemble in their principal features those of Chosroës II. and Artaxerxes III., but are without wings, and have the legend *Kavat-Firuz*. The bordering of pearls is single on both obverse and reverse, but the king wears a double pearl necklace. The eye is large, and the hair more carefully marked than had been usual since the time of Sapor II. [Pl. XXIV., Figs. 2 and 3].

At the death of Kobad the crown fell to his son, Artaxerxes III., a child of seven,<sup>36</sup> or (according to others) of one year only. The nobles who proclaimed him took care to place him under the direction of a governor or regent, and appointed to the office a certain Mihr-Hasis, who had been the chief purveyor of Kobad.<sup>37</sup> Mihr-Hasis is said to have ruled with justice and discretion; but he was not able to prevent the occurrence of those troubles and disorders which in the East almost invariably accompany the sovereignty of a minor, and render the task of a regent a hard one. Shahr-Barz, who had scarcely condescended to comport himself as a subject under Kobad, saw in the accession of a boy, and in the near extinction of the race of Sassan, an opportunity of gratifying his ambition, and at the same time of avenging the wrong which had been done him by Chosroës. Before committing himself, however, to the perils of rebellion, he negotiated with Heraclius, and secured his alliance and support by the promise of certain advantages. The friends met at Heraclea<sup>38</sup> on the Propontis. Shahr-Barz undertook to complete the evacuation of Egypt, Syria, and Asia Minor, which he had delayed hitherto, and promised, if he were successful in his enterprise, to pay Heraclius a large sum of money as compensation for the injuries inflicted on Rome during the recent war.<sup>39</sup> Heraclius conferred on Nicetas, the son of Shahr-Barz, the title of "Patrician," consented to a marriage between Shahr-Barz's daughter, Niké, and his own son, Theodosius, and accepted Gregoria, the daughter of Nicetas, and grand-daughter of Shahr-Barz, as a wife for Constantine, the heir to the empire.<sup>40</sup> He also, it is probable, supplied Shahr-Barz with a body of troops,<sup>41</sup> to assist him in his struggle with Artaxerxes and Mihr-Hasis.

Of the details of Shahr-Barz's expedition we know nothing. He is said to have marched on Ctesiphon with an army of sixty thousand men;<sup>42</sup> to have taken the city, put to death Artaxerxes, Mihr-Hasis, and a number of the nobles,<sup>42</sup> and then seized the throne. We are not told what resistance was made by the monarch in possession, or how it was overcome, or even whether there was a battle. It would seem certain, however, that the contest was brief. The young king was of course powerless; Mihr-Hasis, though well-meaning, must have been weak; Shahr-Barz had all the rude strength of the animal whose name he bore,<sup>44</sup> and had no scruples about using his strength to the utmost. The murder of a child of two, or at the most of eight, who could have done no ill, and was legitimately in possession of the throne, must be pronounced a brutal act, and one which sadly tarnishes the fair fame, previously unsullied, of one of Persia's greatest generals.

It was easy to obtain the crown, under the circumstances of the time; but it was not so easy to keep what had been wrongfully gained. Shahr-Barz enjoyed the royal authority less than two months.<sup>45</sup> During this period he completed the evacuation of the Roman provinces occupied by Chosroës II., restored perhaps some portions of the true cross which had been kept back by Kobad,<sup>46</sup> and sent an expeditionary force against the Khazars who had invaded Armenia, which was completely destroyed by the fierce barbarians.<sup>47</sup> He is said by the Armenians<sup>48</sup> to have married Purandocht, the eldest daughter of Chosroës, for the purpose of strengthening his hold on the crown; but this attempt to conciliate his subjects, if it was really made, proved unsuccessful. Ere he had been king for two months, his troops mutinied, drew their swords upon him, and killed him in the open court before the palace.<sup>49</sup> Having so done, they tied a cord to his feet and dragged his corpse through the streets of Ctesiphon, making proclamation everywhere as follows: "Whoever, not being of the blood-royal, seats himself upon the Persian throne, shall share the fate of Shahr-Barz." They then elevated to the royal dignity the princess Purandocht,<sup>50</sup> the first female who had ever sat in the seat of Cyrus.

The rule of a woman was ill calculated to restrain the turbulent Persian nobles. Two instances had now proved that a mere noble might ascend the throne of the son of Babek; and a fatal fascination was exercised on the grandees of the kingdom by the examples of Bahram-Chobin<sup>51</sup> and Shahr-Barz.

Pretenders sprang up in all quarters, generally asserting some connection, nearer or more remote, with the royal house, but relying on the arms of their partisans, and still more on the weakness of the government. It is uncertain whether Purandocht died a natural death;<sup>52</sup> her sister, Azermidocht, who reigned soon after her, was certainly murdered.<sup>53</sup> The crown passed rapidly from one noble to another, and in the course of the four or five years which immediately succeeded the death of Chosroës II. it was worn by nine or ten different persons. Of these the greater number reigned but a few days or a few months; no actions are ascribed to them; and it seems unnecessary to weary the reader with their obscure names, or with the still more obscure question concerning the order of their succession.<sup>54</sup> It may be suspected that in some cases two or more were contemporary, exercising royal functions in different portions of the empire at the same time. Of none does the history or the fate possess any interest; and the modern historical student may well be content with the general knowledge that for four years and a half after the death of Chosroës II. the government was in the highest degree unsettled; anarchy everywhere prevailed; the distracted kingdom was torn in pieces by the struggles of pretenders; and "every province, and almost each city of Persia, was the scene of independence, of discord, and of bloodshed."<sup>55</sup>

At length, in June,<sup>56</sup> A.D. 632, an end was put to the internal commotions by the election of a young prince, believed to be of the true blood of Sassan, in whose rule the whole nation acquiesced without much difficulty.<sup>57</sup> Yezdigerd (or Isdigerd) the Third was the son of Shahriar<sup>58</sup> and the grandson of Chosroës II.<sup>59</sup> He had been early banished from the Court,<sup>60</sup> and had been brought up in obscurity, his royal birth being perhaps concealed, since if known it might have caused his destruction.<sup>61</sup> The place of his residence was Istakr,<sup>62</sup> the ancient capital of Persia, but at this time a city of no great importance. Here he had lived unnoticed to the age of fifteen,<sup>63</sup> when his royal rank having somehow been discovered, and no other scion of the stock of Chosroës being known to exist, he was drawn forth from his retirement and invested with the sovereignty.

But the appointment of a sovereign in whose rule all could acquiesce came too late. While Rome and Persia, engaged in deadly struggle, had no thought for anything but how most to injure each other, a power began to grow up in an adjacent

country, which had for long ages been despised and thought incapable of doing any harm to its neighbors. Mohammed, half impostor, half enthusiast, enunciated a doctrine, and by degrees worked out a religion, which proved capable of uniting in one the scattered tribes of the Arabian desert, while at the same time it inspired them with a confidence, a contempt for death, and a fanatic valor, that rendered them irresistible by the surrounding nations. Mohammed's career as prophet began while Heraclius and Chosroës II. were flying at each other's throats;<sup>64</sup> by the year of the death of Chosroës (A.D. 628) he had acquired a strength greater than that of any other Arab chief;<sup>65</sup> two years later he challenged Rome to the combat by sending a hostile expedition into Syria;<sup>66</sup> and before his death (A.D. 632) he was able to take the field at the head of 30,000 men.<sup>67</sup> During the time of internal trouble in Persia he procured the submission of the Persian governor of the Yemen;<sup>68</sup> as well as that of Al Mondar,<sup>69</sup> or Alamundarus, King of Bahrein, on the west coast of the Persian Gulf.<sup>70</sup> Isdigerd, upon his accession, found himself menaced by a power which had already stretched out one arm towards the lower Euphrates, while with the other it was seeking to grasp Syria and Palestine. The danger was imminent; the means of meeting it insufficient, for Persia was exhausted by foreign war and internal contention; the monarch himself was but ill able to cope with the Arab chiefs, being youthful and inexperienced: we shall find, however, that he made a strenuous resistance. Though continually defeated, he prolonged the fight for nearly a score of years, and only succumbed finally when, to the hostility of open foes, was added the treachery of pretended friends and allies.<sup>71</sup>

## CHAPTER XXVI.

*Death of Mohammed and Collapse of Mohammedanism. Recovery under Abu-bekr. Conquest of the Kingdom of Hira. Conquest of Obolla. Invasion of Mesopotamia. Battle of the Bridge—the Arabs suffer a Reverse. Battle of El Bow-eib—Mihran defeated by El Mothanna. Fresh Effort made by Persia—Battle of Cadesia—Defeat of the Persians. Pause in the War. March of Sa'ad on Ctesiphon. Flight of Isdigerd. Capture of Ctesiphon. Battle of Jalula. Conquest of Susiana and invasion of Persia Proper. Recall of Sa'ad. Isdigerd assembles an Army at Nehawend. Battle of Nehawend. Flight of Isdigerd. Conquest of the various Persian Provinces. Isdigerd murdered. Character of Isdigerd. Coins of Isdigerd.*

“Yazdejird, Persarum rex . . . Rostamum misit oppugnatum Saadum . . . neque unquam bellorum et dissentionum expers fuit, donec occideretur. Regnavit autem annos viginti.”—Eutychius, *Annales*, vol. ii. pp. 295-6.


THE power which Mohammed had so rapidly built up fell to pieces at his decease. Isdigerd can scarcely have been well settled upon this throne when the welcome tidings must have reached him that the Prophet was dead, that the Arabs generally were in revolt, that Al Mondar had renounced Islamism, and resumed a position of independence.<sup>1</sup> For the time Mohammedanism was struck down. It remained to be seen whether the movement had derived its strength solely from the genius of the Prophet, or whether minds of inferior calibre would suffice to renew and sustain the impulse which had proceeded from him, and which under him had proved of such wonderful force and efficacy.

The companions of Mohammed lost no time in appointing his successor. Their choice fell upon Abu-bekr, his friend and father-in-law, who was a person of an energetic character, brave, chaste, and temperate. Abu-bekr proved himself quite equal to the difficulties of the situation. Being unfit for war himself, as he was above sixty years of age,<sup>2</sup> he employed able generals, and within a few months of his accession struck such a series of blows that rebellion collapsed everywhere,<sup>3</sup> and in


a short time the whole Arab nation, except the tribe of Gassan, acknowledged themselves his subjects. Among the rivals against whom he measured himself, the most important was Moseilama. Moseilama, who affected the prophetic character,<sup>4</sup> had a numerous following, and was able to fight a pitched battle with the forces of Abu-bekr, which numbered 40,000 men.<sup>5</sup> At the first encounter he even succeeded in repulsing this considerable army, which lost 1200 warriors; but in a second engagement the Mohammedans were victorious—Moseilama was slain—and Kaled, “the Sword of God,” carried back to Medina the news of his own triumph, and the spoils of the defeated enemy. Soon after the fall of Moseilama, the tribes still in rebellion submitted themselves, and the first of the Caliphs found himself at liberty to enter upon schemes of foreign conquest.

Distracted between the temptations offered to his arms by the East and by the West, Abu-bekr in his first year (A.D. 633) sent expeditions in both directions, against Syria, and against Hira, where Iyas, the Persian feudatory, who had succeeded Noman, son of Al Mondar,<sup>6</sup> held his court, on the western branch of the Euphrates. For this latter expedition the commander selected was the irresistible Kaled, who marched a body of 2000 men<sup>7</sup> across the desert to the branch stream,<sup>8</sup> which he reached in about latitude 30°. Assisted by Al Mothanna, chief of the Beni Sheiban, who had been a subject of Iyas, but had revolted and placed himself under the protection of Abu-bekr,<sup>9</sup> Kaled rapidly reduced the kingdom of Hira, took successively Banikiya, Barasuma, and El Lis,<sup>10</sup> descended the river to the capital,<sup>11</sup> and there fought an important battle with the combined Persian and Arab forces, the first trial of arms between the followers of Mohammed and those of Zoroaster. The Persian force consisted entirely of horse, and was commanded by a general whom the Arab writers call Asadsubeh.<sup>12</sup> Their number is not mentioned, but was probably small. Charged furiously by Al Mothanna, they immediately broke and fled; Hira was left with no other protection than its walls; and Iyas, yielding to necessity, made his submission to the conqueror, and consented to pay a tribute of 290,000 dirhems.<sup>13</sup>


The splendid success of his pioneer induced Abu-bekr to support the war in this quarter with vigor. Reinforcements joined Kaled from every side, and in a short time he found himself at the head of an army of 18,000 men.<sup>14</sup> With this



ROBED FIGURE, SHOWING SASSANIAN EMBROIDERY.



SECTION OF CENTRAL DOMED CHAMBER, FIRUZADAD (after Flandin).



EXTERNAL ORNAMENTATION OF PALACE AT FIRUZABAD.

force he proceeded southwards, bent on reducing the entire tract between the desert and the Eastern or real Euphrates. The most important city of the southern region was at the time Obolla, which was situated on a canal or backwater derived from the Euphrates, not far from the modern Busrah.<sup>15</sup> It was the great emporium for the Indian trade, and was known as the *limes Indorum*,<sup>16</sup> or "frontier city towards India." The Persian governor was a certain Hormuz or Hormisdas, who held the post with a body of 20,000 men.<sup>17</sup> Kaled fought his second great battle with this antagonist, and was once more completely victorious, killing Hormuz, according to the Arabian accounts, with his own hands.<sup>18</sup> Obolla surrendered; a vast booty was taken; and, after liberally rewarding his soldiers, Kaled sent the fifth part of the spoils, together with a captured elephant, to Abu-bekr at Medina. The strange animal astonished the simple natives, who asked one another wonderingly,<sup>19</sup> "Is this indeed one of God's works, or did human art make it?"

The victories of Kaled over Asadsubeh and Hormuz were followed by a number of other successes,<sup>20</sup> the entire result being that the whole of the fertile region on the right bank of the Euphrates, from Hit to the Persian Gulf, was for the time reduced, made a portion of Abu-bekr's dominions, and parcelled out among Mohammedan governors.<sup>21</sup> Persia was deprived of the protection which a dependent Arab kingdom to the west of the river had hitherto afforded her, and was brought into direct contact with the great Mohammedan monarchy along almost the whole of her western frontier. Henceforth she was open to attack on this side for a distance of above four hundred miles, with no better barrier than a couple of rivers interposed between her enemy and her capital.

Soon after his conquest of the kingdom of Hira, Kaled was recalled from the Euphrates to the Syrian war,<sup>22</sup> and was employed in the siege of Damascus,<sup>23</sup> while Persia enjoyed a breathing-space. Advantage was taken of this interval to stir up disaffection in the newly-conquered province. Rustam, appointed to the command against the Arabs by Isdigerd,<sup>24</sup> sent emissaries to the various towns of the Sawâd,<sup>25</sup> urging them to rise in revolt and promising to support such a movement with a Persian army.<sup>26</sup> The situation was critical; and if the Mohammedans had been less tenacious, or the Persians more skilfully handled, the whole of the Sawâd might have been recovered. But Rustam allowed his troops to be defeated in de-

tail. Al Mothanna and Abu Obediah, in three separate engagements, at Namârik, Sakatiya, and Barusma,<sup>27</sup> overcame the Persian leaders, Jaban, Narses, and Jalenus, and drove their shattered armies back on the Tigris. The Mohammedan authority was completely re-established in the tract between the desert and the Euphrates; it was even extended across the Euphrates into the tract watered by the Shat-el-Hie; and it soon became a question whether Persia would be able to hold the Mesopotamian region, or whether the irrepressible Arabs would not very shortly wrest it from her grasp. But at this point in the history the Arabs experienced a severe reverse. On learning the defeat of his lieutenants, Rustam sent an army to watch the enemy, under the command of Bahman-Dsulhadjib,<sup>28</sup> or "Bahman the beetle-browed," which encamped upon the Western Euphrates at Kossen-natek, not far from the site of Kufa. At the same time, to raise the courage of the soldiers, he entrusted to this leader the sacred standard of Persia, the famous *durufsh-kawani*, or leathern apron of the blacksmith Kawah,<sup>29</sup> which was richly adorned with silk and gems, and is said to have measured eighteen feet long by twelve feet broad.<sup>30</sup> Bahman had with him, according to the Persian tradition, 30,000 men and thirty elephants;<sup>31</sup> the Arabs under Abu Obediah numbered no more than 9000, or at the most 10,000.<sup>32</sup> Bahman is reported<sup>33</sup> to have given his adversary the alternative of passing the Euphrates or allowing the Persians to cross it. Abu Obediah preferred the bolder course, and, in spite of the dissuasions of his chief officers, threw a bridge of boats across the stream, and so conveyed his troops to the left bank. Here he found the Persian horse-archers covered with their scale armor,<sup>34</sup> and drawn up in a solid line behind their elephants. Galled severely by the successive flights of arrows, the Arab cavalry sought to come to close quarters; but their horses, terrified by the unwonted sight of the huge animals, and further alarmed by the tinkling of the bells hung round their necks,<sup>35</sup> refused to advance. It was found necessary to dismount, and assail the Persian line on foot. A considerable impression had been made, and it was thought that the Persians would take to flight,<sup>36</sup> when Abu Obediah, in attacking the most conspicuous of the elephants, was seized by the infuriated animal and trampled under his feet.<sup>37</sup> Inspired by this success, the Persians rushed upon their enemies, who, disheartened by the loss of their commander, began a retrograde movement, falling back upon their

newly-made bridge. This, however, was found to have been broken, either by the enemy,<sup>38</sup> or by a rash Arab who thought, by making retreat impossible, to give his own side the courage of despair. Before the damage done could be repaired, the retreating host suffered severely. The Persians pressed closely upon them, slew many, and drove others into the stream, where they were drowned. Out of the 9000 or 10,000 who originally passed the river, only 5000 returned, and of these 2000 at once dispersed to their homes.<sup>39</sup> Besides Abu Obediah, the veteran Salit was slain;<sup>40</sup> and Al Mothanna, who succeeded to the command on Abu Obediah's death, was severely wounded.<sup>41</sup> The last remnant of the defeated army might easily have been destroyed, had not a dissension arisen among the Persians, which induced Bahman to return to Ctesiphon.

The Arabs, upon this repulse, retired to El Lis;<sup>42</sup> and Al Mothanna sent to Omar for reinforcements, which speedily arrived under the command of Jarir, son of Abdallah.<sup>43</sup> Al Mothanna was preparing to resume the offensive when the Persians anticipated him. A body of picked troops, led by Mihran,<sup>44</sup> a general of reputation, crossed the Euphrates, and made a dash at Hira. Hastily collecting his men, who were widely dispersed, Al Mothanna gave the assailants battle on the canal El Boweib, in the near vicinity of the threatened town, and though the Persians fought with desperation from noon to sunset, succeeded in defeating them and in killing their commander.<sup>45</sup> The beaten army recrossed the Euphrates, and returned to Ctesiphon without suffering further losses, since the Arabs were content to have baffled their attack, and did not pursue them many miles from the field of battle.<sup>46</sup> All Mesopotamia, however, was by this defeat laid open to the invaders, whose ravages soon extended to the Tigris and the near vicinity of the capital.<sup>47</sup>

The year A.D. 636 now arrived, and the Persians resolved upon an extraordinary effort. An army of 120,000 men was enrolled,<sup>48</sup> and Rustam, reckoned the best general of the day, was placed at its head.<sup>49</sup> The Euphrates was once more crossed, the Sawâd entered, its inhabitants invited to revolt,<sup>50</sup> and the Arab force, which had been concentrated at Cadesia (Kadisiyeh), where it rested upon a fortified town, was sought out and challenged to the combat. The Caliph Omar had by great efforts contrived to raise his troops in the Sawâd to the number of 30,000,<sup>51</sup> and had entrusted the command of them to Sa'ad, the son of Wakas, since Al Mothanna had died of his

wound.<sup>52</sup> Sa'ad stood wholly on the defensive. His camp was pitched outside the walls of Cadesia, in a position protected on either side by a canal,<sup>53</sup> or branch stream, derived from the Euphrates, and flowing to the south-east out of the Sea of Nedjef. He himself, prevented by boils from sitting on his horse, looked down on his troops, and sent them directions from the Cadesian citadel.<sup>54</sup> Rustam, in order to come to blows, was obliged to fill up the more eastern of the branch streams (El Atik), with reeds and earth,<sup>55</sup> and in this way to cross the channel. The Arabs made no attempt to hinder the operation; and the Persian general, having brought his vast army directly opposite to the enemy, proceeded to array his troops as he thought most expedient. Dividing his army into a centre and two wings, he took himself the position of honor in the mid line<sup>56</sup> with nineteen elephants and three fifths of his forces,<sup>57</sup> while he gave the command of the right wing to Jalenus, and of the left to Bendsuwân;<sup>58</sup> each of whom we may suppose to have had 24 000 troops and seven elephants. The Arabs, on their side, made no such division. Kaled, son of Orfuta, was the sole leader in the fight, though Sa'ad from his watch-tower observed the battle and gave his orders. The engagement began at mid-day and continued till sunset. At the signal of *Allah akbar*, "God is great," shouted by Sa'ad from his tower, the Arabs rushed to the attack. Their cavalry charged; but the Persians advanced against them their line of elephants, repeating with excellent effect the tactics of the famous "Battle of the Bridge."<sup>59</sup> The Arab horse fled; the foot alone remained firm; victory seemed inclining to the Persians, who were especially successful on either wing;<sup>60</sup> Toleicha, with his "lions"<sup>61</sup> failed to re-establish the balance; and all would have been lost, had not Assem, at the command of Sa'ad, sent a body of archers and other footmen to close with the elephants, gall them with missiles, cut their girths, and so precipitate their riders to the ground. Relieved from this danger, the Arab horse succeeded in repulsing the Persians, who as evening approached retired in good order to their camp. The chief loss on this, the "day of concussion,"<sup>62</sup> was suffered by the Arabs, who admit that they had 500 killed,<sup>63</sup> and must have had a proportional number of wounded.

On the morning of the second day the site of the battle was somewhat changed, the Persians having retired a little during the night.<sup>64</sup> Reinforcements from Syria kept reaching the

Arab camp through most of the day;<sup>66</sup> and hence it is known to the Arab writers as the "day of succors."<sup>66</sup> The engagement seems for some time not to have been general, the Arabs waiting for more troops to reach them, while the Persians abstained because they had not yet repaired the furniture of their elephants.<sup>67</sup> Thus the morning passed in light skirmishes and single combats between the champions of either host, who went out singly before the lines and challenged each other to the encounter.<sup>68</sup> The result of the duels was adverse to the Persians, who lost in the course of them two of their best generals, Bendsuwân and Bahman-Dsulhadjib.<sup>69</sup> After a time the Arabs, regarding themselves as sufficiently reinforced, attacked the Persians along their whole line, partly with horse, and partly with camels, dressed up to resemble elephants.<sup>70</sup> The effect on the Persian cavalry was the same as had on the preceding day been produced by the real elephants on the horse of the Arabs; it was driven off the field and dispersed, suffering considerable losses. But the infantry stood firm, and after a while the cavalry rallied; Rustam, who had been in danger of suffering capture, was saved;<sup>71</sup> and night closing in, defeat was avoided, though the advantage of the day rested clearly with the Arabs. The Persians had lost 10,000 in killed and wounded, the Arabs no more than 2000.<sup>72</sup>

In the night which followed "the day of succors" great efforts were made by the Persians to re-equip their elephants, and when morning dawned they were enabled once more to bring the unwieldy beasts into line. But the Arabs and their horses had now grown more familiar with the strange animals; they no longer shrank from meeting them; and some Persian deserters gave the useful information that, in order to disable the brutes it was only necessary to wound them on the proboscis or in the eye. Thus instructed, the Arabs made the elephants the main object of their attack, and, having wounded the two which were accustomed to lead the rest, caused the whole body on a sudden to take to flight, cross the canal El Atik, and proceed at full speed to Ctesiphon. The armies then came to close quarters; and the foot and horse contended through the day with swords and spears, neither side being able to make any serious impression upon the other.<sup>73</sup> As night closed in, however, the Persians once more fell back, crossing the canal El Atik,<sup>74</sup> and so placing that barrier between themselves and their adversaries.

Their object in this manœuvre was probably to obtain the rest which they must have greatly needed. The Persians were altogether of a frame less robust, and of a constitution less hardy, than the Arabs. Their army at Kadisiyeh was, moreover, composed to a large extent of raw recruits; and three consecutive days of severe fighting must have sorely tried its endurance. The Persian generals hoped, it would seem, by crossing the Atik to refresh their troops with a quiet night before renewing the combat on the morrow. But the indefatigable Arabs, perhaps guessing their intention, determined to frustrate it, and prevented the tired host from enjoying a moment's respite. The "day of embittered war," as it was called,<sup>75</sup> was followed by the "night of snarling"—a time of horrid noise and tumult, during which the discordant cries of the troops on either side were thought to resemble the yells and barks of dogs and jackals. Two of the bravest of the Arabs, Toleicha and Amr, crossed the Atik with small bodies of troops, and under cover of the darkness entered the Persian camp, slew numbers, and caused the greatest confusion.<sup>76</sup> By degrees a general engagement was brought on, which continued into the succeeding day, so that the "night of snarling" can scarcely be separated<sup>77</sup> from the "day of cormorants"<sup>78</sup>—the last of the four days' Kadisiyeh fight.

It would seem that the Persians must on the fourth day have had for a time the advantage, since we find them once more fighting upon the old ground, in the tract between the two canals, with the Atik in their rear.<sup>79</sup> About noon, however, a wind arose from the west, bringing with it clouds of sand, which were blown into the faces and eyes of the Persians, while the Arabs, having their backs to the storm, suffered but little from its fury. Under these circumstances the Moslems made fresh efforts, and after a while a part of the Persian army was forced to give ground. Hormuzan, satrap of Susiana, and Firuzan, the general who afterwards commanded at Nehavend,<sup>80</sup> fell back. The line of battle was dislocated; the person of the commander became exposed to danger: and about the same time a sudden violent gust tore away the awning that shaded his seat,<sup>81</sup> and blew it into the Atik, which was not far off. Rustam sought a refuge from the violence of the storm among his baggage mules, and was probably meditating flight, when the Arabs were upon him. Hillal, son of Alkama, intent upon plunder, began to cut the cords of the baggage and strew it upon the ground. A bag falling severely injured Rustam,<sup>82</sup>

who threw himself into the Atik and attempted to swim across. Hillal, however, rushed after him, drew him to shore, and slew him; after which he mounted the vacant throne, and shouted as loudly as he could,<sup>63</sup> "By the lord of the Kaaba, I have killed Rustam." The words created a general panic. Everywhere the Persian courage fell; the most part despaired wholly, and at once took to flight; a few cohorts alone stood firm and were cut to pieces;<sup>64</sup> the greater number of the men rushed hastily to the Atik; some swam the stream others crossed where it had been filled up; but as many as 30,000 perished in the waves.<sup>65</sup> Ten thousand had fallen on the field of battle<sup>66</sup> in the course of the preceding night and day, while of the Mohammedans as many as 6000 had been slain. Thus the last day of the Kadisiyeh fight was stoutly contested; and the Persian defeat was occasioned by no deficiency of courage, but by the occurrence of a sand-storm and by the almost accidental death of the commander. Among the Persian losses in the battle that of the national standard,<sup>67</sup> the *durufsh-kawani* was reckoned the most serious.

The retreat of the defeated army was conducted by Jalenus. Sa'ad, anxious to complete his victory, sent three bodies of troops across the Atik, to press upon the flying foe. One of these, commanded by Sohra, came up with the Persian rear-guard under Jalenus at Harrar, and slaughtered it, together with its leader.<sup>68</sup> The other two seem to have returned without effecting much. The bulk of the fugitives traversed Mesopotamia in safety, and found a shelter behind the walls of Ctesiphon.

By the defeat of Kadisiyeh all hope of recovering the territory on the right bank of the Euphrates was lost; but Persia did not as yet despair of maintaining her independence. It was evident, indeed, that the permanent maintenance of the capital was henceforth precarious; and a wise forethought would have suggested the removal of the Court from so exposed a situation and its transference to some other position, either to Istakr, the ancient metropolis of Persia Proper, or to Hamadan, the capital city of Media. But probably it was considered that to retire voluntarily from the Tigris would be a confession of weakness, as fatal to the stability of the empire as to be driven back by the Arabs; and perhaps it may have been hoped that the restless nomads would be content with their existing conquests, or that they might receive a check at the hands of Rome which would put a stop to their aggressions elsewhere. It is remarkable that, during the pause of a year and a half

which intervened between the battle of Kadisiyeh and the resumption of hostilities by the Arabs, nothing seems to have been done by Persia in the way of preparation against her terrible assailants.

In the year A.D. 637 the Arabs again took the offensive. They had employed the intervening year and a half in the foundation of Busrah and Kufa,<sup>89</sup> and in the general consolidation of their sway on the right bank of the Euphrates.<sup>90</sup> They were now prepared for a further movement. The conduct of the war was once more entrusted to Sa'ad. Having collected an army of 20,000 men,<sup>91</sup> this general proceeded from Kufa to Anbar<sup>92</sup> (or Perisabor), where he crossed the Euphrates, and entered on the Mesopotamian region. Isdigerd, learning that he had put his forces in motion, and was bent upon attacking Ctesiphon, called a council of war, and asked its advice as to the best course to be pursued under the circumstances.<sup>93</sup> It was generally agreed that the capital must be evacuated, and a stronger situation in the more mountainous part of the country occupied; but Isdigerd was so unwilling to remove that he waited till the Arabian general, with a force now raised to 60,000, had reached Sâbât,<sup>94</sup> which was only a day's march from the capital, before he could be induced to commence his retreat. He then abandoned the town hastily, without carrying off more than a small portion of the treasures which his ancestors had during four centuries accumulated at the main seat of their power, and retired to Holwan, a strong place in the Zagros mountain-range.<sup>95</sup> Sa'ad, on learning his movement, sent a body of troops in pursuit, which came up with the rear-guard of the Persians, and cut it in pieces, but effected nothing really important. Isdigerd made good his retreat, and in a short time concentrated at Holwan an army of above 100,000 men.<sup>96</sup> Sa'ad, instead of pushing forward and engaging this force, was irresistibly attracted by the reputed wealth of the Great Ctesiphon, and, marching thither, entered the unresisting city,<sup>97</sup> with his troops, in the sixteenth year of the Hegira, the four hundred and eleventh from the foundation of the Sassanian kingdom by Artaxerxes, son of Babek.

Ctesiphon was, undoubtedly, a rich prize. Its palaces and its gardens, its opulent houses and its pleasant fields, its fountains and its flowers, are celebrated by the Arabian writers, who are never weary of rehearsing the beauty of its site, the elegance of the buildings, the magnificence and luxury of their furniture, or the amount of the treasures which were contained

in them.<sup>98</sup> The royal palace, now known as the Takht-i-Khosru,<sup>99</sup> especially provoked their admiration. It was built of polished stone, and had in front of it a portico of twelve marble pillars, each 150 feet high. The length of the edifice was 450 feet, its breadth 180, its height 150. In the centre was the hall of audience, a noble apartment, 115 feet long and 85 high,<sup>100</sup> with a magnificent vaulted roof, bedecked with golden stars, so arranged as to represent the motions of the planets among the twelve signs of the Zodiac,<sup>101</sup> where the monarch was accustomed to sit on a golden throne, hearing causes and dispensing justice to his subjects. The treasury and the various apartments were full of gold and silver, of costly robes and precious stones, of jewelled arms and dainty carpets. The glass vases of the spice magazine contained an abundance of musk, camphor,<sup>102</sup> amber, gums, drugs, and delicious perfumes. In one apartment was found a carpet of white brocade, 450 feet long and 90 broad, with a border worked in precious stones of various hues, to represent a garden of all kinds of beautiful flowers. The leaves were formed of emeralds, the blossoms and buds of pearls, rubies, sapphires, and other gems of immense value. Among the objects found in the treasury were a horse made entirely of gold, bearing a silver saddle set with a countless multitude of jewels, and a camel made of silver, accompanied by a foal of which the material was gold. A coffer belonging to Isdigerd was captured at the bridge over the Nahrwân canal as its guardians were endeavoring to carry it off. Among its contents were a robe of state embroidered with rubies and pearls, several garments made of tissue of gold, the crown and seal of Chosroës (Anushirwan?), and ten pieces of silk brocade. The armory of Chosroës also fell into the conqueror's hands. It contained his helmet, breastplate, greaves, and arm-pieces, all of solid gold adorned with pearls, six "cuirasses of Solomon," and ten costly scimitars. The works of art, and a fifth part of the entire booty, were set apart for the Caliph Omar, and sent by trusty messengers to Medina; the value of the remainder was so enormous<sup>103</sup> that when Sa'ad divided it among his 60,000 soldiers the share of each amounted to 12,000 dirhems (312*l.*).

It is said<sup>104</sup> that Sa'ad, after capturing Ctesiphon, was anxious to set out in pursuit of Isdigerd, but was restrained by despatches received from Omar, which commanded him to remain at the Persian capital, and to employ his brother Hashem, and the experienced general, El Kakâa, in the further prosecution

of the war. Hashem was, therefore, sent with 12,000 men, against the fugitive monarch, whose forces, said to have exceeded 100,000 men, and commanded by a Mihran, were drawn up at Jalula, not far from Holwan.<sup>106</sup> The disparity of numbers forced Hashem to condescend to maneuvering; and it was six months before he ventured on a general engagement with his antagonist. Again the Mohammedans proved victorious; and this time the carnage was excessive; 100,000 Persians are said to have lain dead on the battle-field; the commander was himself among the slain. Jalula at once surrendered; and fresh treasures were obtained. Among other precious articles, a figure of a camel, with its rider, in solid gold, was found in one of the tents.<sup>106</sup> Altogether the booty is reckoned at about four millions of our money—the share of each soldier engaged being 10,000 dirhems,<sup>107</sup> or about 260*l.* sterling.

Isdigerd, on learning the result of the battle of Jalula, quitted Holwan, and retired to Rei, a large town near the Caspian sea,<sup>108</sup> at a short distance from the modern Teheran, thus placing the entire Zagros range between himself and his irresistible foes. A general named Khosru-sum was left behind with a large body of troops, and was bidden to defend Holwan to the last extremity. Instead of remaining, however, within the walls of the stronghold, Khosru-sum rashly led his force to meet that of El Kakâa, who defeated him at Kasr-i-Shirin<sup>109</sup> and entirely dispersed his army. Holwan, being left without protection, surrendered; the conquest of Shirwan, Mah-sabadan, and Tekrit followed;<sup>110</sup> and by the close of the year A.D. 637 the banner of the Prophet waved over the whole tract west of Zagros, from Nineveh almost to Susa, or from the Kurnib to the Kuran river.

Another short pause in the Arabian aggressions upon Persia now occurred; but in the year A.D. 639 their attacks were resumed, and the Persians had to submit to further losses. Otba, governor of Busrah, sent an expedition across the Shat-el-Arab into Susiana,<sup>111</sup> and, supported by the Arab population of the province, which deserted the Persian side, engaged Hormuzan, the satrap, in two battles, defeated him, and forced him to cede a portion of his territory, including the important city of Ahwaz.<sup>112</sup> Soon afterwards, Ala, governor of Bahrein, conducted in person an expedition into Persia Proper, crossing the Gulf in the rude vessels of the time, and attacking Shehrek, the Persian satrap, who acknowledged the authority of Isdigerd. Here, the Arabs were for once unsuccessful. Shehrek

collected a force which Ala was afraid to encounter; the Arab chief retreated to the coast, but found his fleet engulfed by the waves; and it was only with great difficulty that he made his escape by land from the country which he had ventured to invade. He owed his escape to Otba, who sent troops from Busrah to his aid, defeated Shehrek, and rescued his fellow governor from the peril which threatened him.<sup>113</sup>

In the next year (A.D. 640) Hormuzan, incited by Isdigerd, made a desperate attempt to recover the territory which he had been compelled to cede. Assisted by Shehrek, governor of Persia Proper, he attacked the Arabs unawares, but was speedily met, driven from Ram-Hormuz to Shuster, and there besieged for the space of six months. As many as eighty engagements are said to have taken place before the walls,<sup>114</sup> with no decided advantage to either side. At length Al-Berâ, son of Mâlik, one of the companions of the Prophet, and believed by many to possess the prophetic spirit, announced that victory was about to incline to the Moslems, but that he himself would be slain. A chance arrow having fulfilled won half of the prediction, the Arabs felt an assurance that the other half would follow, and fought with such fanatic ardor that their expectations were soon fulfilled. The town was won; but Hormuzan retired into the citadel, and there successfully maintained himself, till Abu-Sabra, the Mohammedan general, consented to spare his life, and send him to Medina, where his fate should be determined by the Caliph. Hormuzan, on obtaining an audience, pretended thirst and asked for a cup of water, which was given him: he then looked suspiciously around, as if he expected to be stabbed while drinking. "Fear nothing," said Omar; "your life is safe till you have drunk the water." The crafty Persian flung the cup to the ground, and Omar felt that he had been outwitted, but that he must keep his word. Hormuzan became an Arab pensionary, and shortly afterwards embraced Islamism.<sup>115</sup> His territories were occupied by the Moslems, whose dominions were thereby extended from the Kuran to the Tab river.

The Arab conquests on the side of Persia had hitherto been effected and maintained by the presiding genius of one of the ablest of the Mohammedan commanders, the victor of Kadi-siyeh, Sa'ad Ibn Abi Wakas. From Kufa, where he built himself a magnificent palace, which Omar however caused to be destroyed,<sup>116</sup> this great general and skilful administrator directed the movements of armies, arranged the divisions of pro-

vinces, apportioned the sums to be paid to the revenue, dealt out justice, and generally superintended affairs throughout the entire region conquered by the Arabs to the east of the desert. A man in such a position necessarily made himself enemies; and complaints were frequently carried to Omar of his lieutenant's pride, luxury, and injustice.<sup>117</sup> What foundation there may have been for these charges is uncertain; but it seems that Omar was persuaded, towards the close of A.D. 640, or very early in A.D. 641, that they were of sufficient weight to make it necessary that they should be investigated. He accordingly recalled Sa'ad from his government to Medina, and replaced him at Kufa by Ammâr Ibn Yâser.<sup>118</sup>

The news of this change was carried to Isdigerd at Rei, and caused him to conceive hopes of recovering his lost territory. The event shows that he attributed too much to the personal ability of his great antagonist; but the mistake was not unnatural; and it was a noble impulse which led him to seize the first promising occasion, in order to renew the struggle and make a last desperate effort to save his empire and repulse the barbarous nomads. The facts are not as the Arabian historians represent them. There was no intention on the part of the Mohammedans to be content with the conquests which they made, or to remain within the boundary line of the mountains that separate the Mesopotamian region from the high plateau of Iran.<sup>119</sup> Mohammedanism had an insatiable ambition, and was certain to spread itself in all directions until its forces were expended, or a bound was set to it by resistance which it could not overcome. Isdigerd, by remaining quiet, might perhaps have prolonged the precarious existence of Persia for half a dozen years, though even this is uncertain, and it is perhaps as probable that the tide of conquest would have flowed eastward in A.D. 641 or 642, even had he attempted nothing. What alone we can be sure of his, that no acquiescence on his part, no abstention from warlike enterprise, no submission short of the acceptance of Islamism, would have availed to save his country for more than a very brief space from the tramp of the hordes that were bent on enriching themselves with the plunder of the whole civilized world, and imposing on all the nations of the earth their dominion and their religion.

From the citadel of Rei, Isdigerd, in A.D. 641, sounded the call to battle with no uncertain note. His envoys spread themselves through Media, Azerbaijan, Khorassan, Gurgan, Tabaristan, Merv, Bactria, Seistan, Kerman, and Farsistan<sup>120</sup>

(or Persia Proper), demanding contingents of troops, and appointing, as the place of rendezvous, the small town of Nehavend, which is in the mountain region, about fifty miles south of Hamadan. The call was responded to with zeal; and in a short time there was gathered together at the place named an army of 150,000 men.<sup>121</sup> Firuzan, one of the nobles who had commanded at Kadisiyeh,<sup>122</sup> was made general-in-chief. The design was entertained of descending on Holwan, and thence upon the lowland region, of re-taking Ctesiphon, crossing the great rivers, and destroying the rising cities of Kufa and Busrah.<sup>123</sup> But the Arabs were upon the alert, and anticipated the intended invasion. Noman, son of Mokarrin, who commanded at Ahwaz, was hastily commissioned by Omar to collect the Arab troops stationed in Irak, Khuzistan, and the Sawâd, to put himself at their head, and to prevent the outbreak by marching at once on Nehavend. He succeeded in uniting under his standard about 30,000 soldiers,<sup>124</sup> and with this moderate force entered the mountain tract, passed Holwan and Merj, and encamped at Tur, where he expected the attack of the enemy.<sup>125</sup> But Firuzan had now resolved to maintain the defensive. He had entrenched himself strongly in front of Nehavend and was bent on wearing out the patience of the Arabs by a prolonged resistance. Noman, finding himself unmolested, advanced from Tur to the immediate neighborhood of Nehavend, and endeavored to provoke his adversary to give battle, but without effect. For two months the two hosts faced each other without fighting. At last, the stores of the Arabs, as well as their patience, began to fail; and it was necessary to employ some device, or to give up the war altogether. Hereupon, Noman, by the advice of two of his captains, had recourse to a stratagem. He spread a report that Omar was dead, and breaking up from his camp began a hasty retreat. The plan succeeded. Firuzan quitted his entrenchments, and led his army on the traces of the flying foe. It was two days before he reached them, and on the third day the battle began. Noman, having addressed his soldiers and made arrangements concerning the command in case of his own death, mounted a milk-white steed,<sup>126</sup> and gave the signal for the fight by thrice shouting the famous *tekbir*, or battle-cry, "*Allah akbar.*" The Arabs charged with fury, and for a while, amid the clouds of dust which rose beneath their feet, nothing was heard but the clash of steel.<sup>127</sup> At length the Persians gave way; but, as Noman advanced his standard and led

the pursuit, a volley of arrows from the flying foe checked his movement, and at the same time terminated his career. A shaft had struck him in a vital part, and he fell at the moment of victory. For his men, maddened by the loss of their commander, pressed on more furiously than before; the Persians were unable to rally; and a promiscuous flight began. Then followed a dreadful slaughter. The numbers of the Persians must have impeded their retreat; and in the defiles of the mountains a rapid flight was impossible. Firuzan himself, who, instead of falling back on Nehavend, took the road leading north to Hamadan, was overtaken by El Kakâa in a narrow pass, and put to the sword. More than 100,000 Persians are said to have perished.<sup>128</sup> The victors, pressing onwards, easily took Nehavend. Hamadan surrendered to them shortly afterwards.<sup>129</sup>

The defeat of Nehavend terminated the Sassanian power.<sup>130</sup> Isdigerd indeed, escaping from Rei, and flying continually from place to place, prolonged an inglorious existence for the space of ten more years—from A.D. 641 to A.D. 651; but he had no longer a kingdom. Persia fell to pieces on the occasion of “the victory of victories,”<sup>131</sup> and made no other united effort against the Arabs. Province after province was occupied by the fierce invaders;<sup>132</sup> and, at length, in A.D. 651, their arms penetrated to Merv, where the last scion of the house of Babek had for some years found a refuge. It is said that during this interval he had made efforts to engage the Khan of the Turks and the Emperor of the Chinese to embrace his cause;<sup>132</sup> but, if this were so, it was without success. Though they may have lent him some encouragement, no real effort was made by either potentate on his behalf. Isdigerd, at Merv, during his later years, experienced the usual fate of sovereigns who have lost their kingdoms. He was alternately flattered and coerced by pretended friends among his own people—induced to cherish vain hopes, and driven to despair, by the fluctuating counsels of the monarchs of neighboring nations. At last he was murdered by a subject for the sake of his clothes, when he was flying from a combined attack of treacherous subjects and offended foreigners.<sup>134</sup>

It is difficult to form a decided opinion as to the character of Isdigerd III. He was but fifteen years of age at his accession, twenty-four at the time of the battle of Nehavend, and thirty-four at his decease, A.D. 651. It is in his favor that “history lays no crimes to his charge;”<sup>135</sup> for this can be said of very few

Sassanian sovereigns. It is also to his credit that he persevered so long in struggling against his fate, and in endeavoring to maintain, or restore, the independence of his nation. But, on the other hand, it must be confessed that there is little to be admired in the measures which he took to meet the perils of the time, and that personally he appears to have been weak and of luxurious habits. During the whole of his long struggle with the Arabs he seems never once to have placed himself at the head of his troops, much less to have crossed swords with the enemy. He intrusted the defence of Persia to generals, and did not even seek to inspire his soldiers with enthusiasm by his own presence in their camp. Always occupying some secure fortress far in the rear of his army, he fled from each as the enemy made a step in advance, quitting Ctesiphon for Holwan, Holwan for Rei, and Rei for Mery, never venturing upon a stand, never making an appeal to the loyalty which was amongst the best qualities of the Persians, and which would have caused them to fight with desperation in defence of a present king. Carrying with him in all his wanderings the miserable pageant of an Oriental court, he suffered his movements to be hampered and his resources crippled by a throng of 4000 useless retainers,<sup>136</sup> whom he could not bring himself to dismiss. Instead of donning the armor which befitted one who was struggling for his crown, he wore to the last the silken robes, the jewelled belt, the rings and bracelets that were only suited for the quiet inmate of a palace, and by this incongruous and misplaced splendor he provoked, and, perhaps we may say, deserved his fate. A monarch who loses his crown for the most part awakens interest and sympathy; but no historian has a word of commiseration for the last of the Sassanidæ, who is reproached with feebleness, cowardice, and effeminacy.<sup>137</sup> It must certainly be allowed that he was no hero; but considering his extreme youth when his perils began, the efforts which he made to meet them, and the impossibility of an effective resistance in the effete and exhausted condition of the Persian nation, history is scarcely justified in passing upon the unfortunate prince a severe judgment.

The coins assigned to Isdigerd III. are neither numerous nor very remarkable.<sup>138</sup> The head is in general very similar to that of Artaxerxes III. The pearl bordering around it is single, and in the margin are the usual stars and crescents of the later Sassanian kings. The margin, however, shows also in some instances a peculiar device behind the crown, and also a legend,

which has been read, but very doubtfully,<sup>189</sup> as "Ormazd." The king's name is given as Iskart or Iskarti. Among the regnal years marked on the reverse have been found the numbers "nineteen" and "twenty." Among the mint-marks are Azerbijan, Abiverd, and Merv. [Pl. XXIV., Fig. 4.]

## CHAPTER XXVII.

*Architecture of the Sassanians. Its Origin. Its Peculiarities. Oblong Square Plan. Arched Entrance Halls. Domes resting on Pendentives. Suites of Apartments. Ornamentation: Exterior, by Pilasters, Cornices, String-courses, and shallow arched Recesses, with Pilasters between them; Interior, by Pillars supporting Transverse Ribs, or by Doorways and False Windows, like the Persopolitan. Specimen Palaces at Serbistan, at Firuzbad, at Ctesiphon, at Mashita. Elaborate Decoration at the last-named Palace. Decoration Elsewhere. Arch of Takht-i-Bostan. Sassanian Statuary. Sassanian Bas-reliefs. [Estimate of their Artistic Value.] Question of the Employment by the Sassanians of Byzantine Artists. General Summary.*

"With the accession of the Sassanians, Persia regained much of that power and stability to which she had been so long a stranger. . . . The improvement in the fine arts at home indicates returning prosperity, and a degree of security unknown since the fall of the Achæmenidæ."—Fergusson, *History of Architecture*, vol. i. pp. 331-2, 2d edition.

WHEN Persia under the Sassanian princes shook off the barbarous yoke to which she had submitted for the space of almost five centuries, she found architecture and the other fine arts at almost the lowest possible ebb throughout the greater part of Western Asia.<sup>1</sup> The ruins of the Achæmenian edifices, which were still to be seen at Pasargadæ, Persopolis, and elsewhere,<sup>2</sup> bore witness to the grandeur of idea, and magnificence of construction, which had once formed part of the heritage of the Persian nation; but the intervening period was one during which the arts had well-nigh wholly disappeared from the Western Asiatic world; and when the early sovereigns of the house of Sassan felt the desire, common with powerful monarchs, to exhibit their greatness in their buildings, they found

you have no right to describe  
 & certainly no right to judge,  
 bas-reliefs which are familiar  
 to you only through (secretly  
 rates)

themselves at the first without artists to design, without artisans to construct, and almost without models to copy. The Parthians, who had ruled over Persia for nearly four hundred years, had preferred country to city life, tents to buildings, and had not themselves erected a single edifice of any pretension during the entire period of their dominion.<sup>4</sup> Nor had the nations subjected to their sway, for the most part, exhibited any constructive genius, or been successful in supplying the artistic deficiencies of their rulers. In one place alone was there an exception to this general paralysis of the artistic powers. At Hatra, in the middle Mesopotamian region, an Arab dynasty, which held under the Parthian kings, had thought its dignity to require that it should be lodged in a palace,<sup>5</sup> and had resuscitated a native architecture in Mesopotamia, after centuries of complete neglect. When the Sassanians looked about for a foundation on which they might work, and out of which they might form a style suitable to their needs and worthy of their power and opulence, they found what they sought in the Hatra edifice, which was within the limits of their kingdom, and at no great distance from one of the cities where they held their Court.

The early palaces of the Sassanians have ceased to exist. Artaxerxes, the son of Babek, Sapor the first, and their immediate successors, undoubtedly erected residences for themselves exceeding in size and richness the buildings which had contented the Parthians, as well as those in which their own ancestors, the tributary kings of Persia under Parthia, had passed their lives. But these residences have almost wholly disappeared.<sup>6</sup> The most ancient of the Sassanian buildings which admit of being measured and described are assigned<sup>7</sup> to the century between A.D. 350 and 450; and we are thus unable to trace the exact steps by which the Sassanian style was gradually elaborated. We come upon it when it is beyond the stage of infancy, when it has acquired a marked and decided character, when it no longer hesitates or falters, but knows what it wants, and goes straight to its ends. Its main features are simple, and are uniform from first to last, the later buildings being merely enlargements of the earlier,<sup>8</sup> by an addition to the number or to the size of the apartments. The principal peculiarities of the style are, first, that the plan of the entire building is an oblong square, without adjuncts or projections; secondly, that the main entrance is into a lofty vaulted porch or hall by an archway of the entire width of the

apartment; thirdly, that beside these oblong halls, the building contains square apartments, vaulted with domes, which are circular at their base, and elliptical in their section, and which rest on pendentives of an unusual character; fourthly, that the apartments are numerous and *en suite*, opening one into another, without the intervention of passages; and fifthly, that the palace comprises, as a matter of course, a court, placed towards the rear of the building, with apartments opening into it.

The oblong square is variously proportioned. The depth may be a little more than the breadth,<sup>9</sup> or it may be nearly twice as much.<sup>10</sup> In either case, the front occupies one of the shorter sides, or ends of the edifice. The outer wall is sometimes pierced by one entrance only;<sup>11</sup> but, more commonly, entrances are multiplied beyond the limit commonly observed in modern buildings.<sup>12</sup> The *great* entrance is in the exact centre of the front. This entrance, as already noticed, is commonly by a lofty arch which (if we set aside the domes) is of almost the full height of the building, and constitutes one of its most striking, and to Europeans most extraordinary, features. From the outer air, we look, as it were, straight into the heart of the edifice, in one instance<sup>13</sup> to the depth of 115 feet, a distance equal to the length of Henry VII.'s Chapel at Westminster. The effect is very strange when first seen by the inexperienced traveller; but similar entrances are common in the mosques of Armenia and Persia, and in the palaces of the latter country. In the mosques "lofty and deeply-recessed portals," "unrivalled for grandeur and appropriateness,"<sup>14</sup> are rather the rule than the exception; and, in the palaces, "Throne-rooms" are commonly mere deep recesses of this character, vaulted or supported by pillars, and open at one end to the full width and height of the apartment.<sup>15</sup> The height of the arch varies in Sassanian buildings from about fifty to eighty-five feet; it is generally plain, and without ornament; but in one case we meet with a foiling of small arches round the great one,<sup>16</sup> which has an effect that is not displeasing.

The domed apartments are squares of from twenty-five to forty feet, or a little more. The domes are circular at their base; but a section of them would exhibit a half ellipse, with its longest and shortest diameters proportioned as three to two.<sup>17</sup> The height to which they rise from the ground is not much above seventy feet.<sup>18</sup> A single building will have two or three

domes, either of the same size, or occasionally of different dimensions. It is a peculiarity of their construction that they rest, not on drums, but on pendentives of a curious character. A series of semi-circular arches is thrown across the angles of the apartment, each projecting further into it than the preceding, and in this way the corners are got rid of, and the square converted into the circular shape.<sup>19</sup> A cornice ran round the apartment, either above or below the pendentives, or sometimes both above and below.<sup>20</sup> The domes were pierced by a number of small holes, which admitted some light, and the upper part of the walls between the pendentives was also pierced by windows.

There are no passages or corridors in the Sassanian palaces. The rooms for the most part open one into the other. Where this is not the case, they give upon a common meeting-ground, which is either an open court, or a large vaulted apartment. The openings are in general doorways of moderate size, but sometimes they are arches of the full width of the subordinate room or apartment. As many as seventeen or eighteen rooms have been found in a palace.<sup>21</sup>

There is no appearance in any Sassanian edifice of a real second story. The famous Takht-i-Khosru presents externally the semblance of such an arrangement; but this seems to have been a mere feature of the external ornamentation, and to have had nothing to do with the interior.<sup>22</sup>

The exterior ornamentation of the Sassanian buildings was by pilasters, by arched recesses, by cornices, and sometimes by string-courses.<sup>23</sup> An ornamentation at once simple and elegant is that of the lateral faces of the palace at Firuzabad, where long reed-like pilasters are carried from the ground to the cornice, while between them are a series of tall narrow doubly recessed arches.<sup>24</sup> Far less satisfactory is the much more elaborate design adopted at Ctesiphon,<sup>25</sup> where six series of blind arches of different kinds are superimposed the one on the other, with string-courses between them, and with pilasters, placed singly or in pairs, separating the arches into groups, and not regularly superimposed, as pillars, whether real or seeming, ought to be.

The interior ornamentation was probably, in a great measure, by stucco, painting, and perhaps gilding.<sup>26</sup> All this, however, if it existed, has disappeared; and the interiors now present a bare and naked appearance, which is only slightly relieved by the occasional occurrence of windows, of ornamental door-

ways, and of niches, which recall well-known features at Persepolis. In some instances, however, the arrangement of the larger rooms was improved by means of short pillars, placed at some distance from the walls, and supporting a sort of transverse rib, which broke the uniformity of the roof.<sup>27</sup> The pillars were connected with the side walls by low arches.

Such are the main peculiarities of Sassanian palace architecture. The general effect of the great halls is grand, though scarcely beautiful; and, in the best specimens,<sup>28</sup> the entire palace has an air of simple severity which is striking and dignified. The internal arrangements do not appear to be very convenient. Too much is sacrificed to regularity; and the opening of each room into its neighbor must, one would think, have been unsatisfactory. Still, the edifices are regarded as "indicating considerable originality and power," though they "point to a state of society when attention to security hardly allowed the architect the free exercise of the more delicate ornaments of his art."<sup>29</sup>

From this general account of the main features of the architecture it is proposed now to proceed to a more particular description of the principal extant Sassanian buildings—the palaces at Serbistan, Firuzabad, Ctesiphon, and Mashita.

The palace at Serbistan is the smallest, and probably the earliest of the four. It has been assigned conjecturally to the middle of the fourth century,<sup>30</sup> or the reign of Sapor II. The ground plan is an oblong but little removed from a square, the length being 42 French mètres, and the breadth nearly 37 mètres.<sup>31</sup> [Pl. XXV., Fig. 1.] The building faces west, and is entered by three archways, between which are groups of three semi-circular pilasters, while beyond the two outer arches towards the angles of the building is a single similar pilaster. Within the archways are halls or porches of different depths, the central one of the three being the shallowest. [Pl. XXV., Fig. 2.] This opens by an arched doorway into a square chamber, the largest in the edifice. It is domed, and has a diameter of about 42 feet or, including recesses, of above 57 feet. The interior height of the dome from the floor is 65 feet. Beyond the domed chamber is a court, which measures 45 feet by 40, and has rooms of various sizes opening into it. One of these is domed; and others are for the most part vaulted. The great domed chamber opens towards the north, on a deep porch or hall, which was entered from without by the usual arched portal. On the south it communicates with a pillared

hall, above 60 feet long by 30 broad. There is another somewhat similar hall on the north side of the building, in width about equal, but in length not quite 50 feet. In both halls the pillars are short, not exceeding six feet. They support piers, which run up perpendicularly for a considerable height, and then become ribs of the vaulting.

The Firuzabad palace has a length of above 390 and a width of above 180 feet.<sup>32</sup> Its supposed date<sup>33</sup> is A.D. 450, or the reign of Isdigerd I. As usual the ground plan is an oblong square. [Pl. XXVI.] It is remarkable that the entire building had but a single entrance.<sup>34</sup> This was by a noble arch, above 50 feet in height, which faced north, and gave admission into a vaulted hall, nearly 90 feet long by 43 wide, having at either side two lesser halls of a similar character, opening into it by somewhat low semi-circular arches, of nearly the full width of the apartments. Beyond these rooms, and communicating with them by narrow, but elegant doorways, were three domed chambers precisely similar, occupying together the full width of the building, each about 43 feet square, and crowned by elliptical domes rising to the height of nearly 70 feet. [Pl. XXVII., Fig. 1.] The ornamentation of these chambers was by their doorways, and by false windows, on the Persepolitan model. The domed chambers opened into some small apartments, beyond which was a large court, about 90 feet square, surrounded by vaulted rooms of various sizes, which for the most part communicated directly with it. False windows, or recesses, relieved the interior of these apartments, but were of a less elaborate character than those of the domed chambers. Externally the whole building was chastely and tastefully ornamented by the tall narrow arches and reed-like pilasters already mentioned.<sup>35</sup> [Pl. XXVII., Fig. 2.] Its character, however, was upon the whole "simple and severe;" nor can we quarrel with the judgment which pronounces it "more like a gigantic bastile than the palace of a gay, pavilion-loving people like the Persians."<sup>36</sup>

It is difficult to form any very decided opinion upon the architectural merits of the third and grandest of the Sassanian palaces, the well known "Takht-i-Khosru," or palace of Chosroës Anushirwan, at Ctesiphon.<sup>37</sup> What remains of this massive erection is a mere fragment,<sup>38</sup> which, to judge from the other extant Sassanian ruins, cannot have formed so much as one fourth part of the original edifice. [Pl. XXVIII., Fig. 1.] Nothing has come down to our day but a single vaulted hall

on the grandest scale, 72 feet wide, 85 high, and 115 deep, together with the mere outer wall of what no doubt constituted the main façade of the building. The apartments, which, according to all analogy, must have existed at the two sides, and in the rear, of the great hall, some of which should have been vaulted, have wholly perished. Imagination may supply them from the Firuzabad, or the Mashita palace; but not a trace, even of their foundations, is extant; and the details, consequently, are uncertain, though the general plan can scarcely be doubted. At each side of the great hall were probably two lateral ones, communicating with each other, and capable of being entered either from the hall or from the outer air.<sup>39</sup> Beyond the great hall was probably a domed chamber, equalling it in width, and opening upon a court, round which were a number of moderate-sized apartments. The entire building was no doubt an oblong square, of which the shorter sides seem to have measured 370 feet.<sup>40</sup> It had at least three, and may not improbably have had a larger number of entrances, since it belongs to tranquil times and a secure locality.

The ornamentation of the existing façade of the palace is by doorways, doubly-arched recesses, pilasters, and string-courses. These last divide the building, externally, into an appearance of three or four distinct stories. The first and second stories are broken into portions by pilasters, which in the first or basement stories are in pairs, but in the second stand singly. It is remarkable that the pilasters of the second story are not arranged with any regard to those of the first, and are consequently in many cases not superimposed upon the lower pilasters. In the third and fourth stories there are no pilasters, the arched recesses being here continued without any interruption. Over the great arch of the central hall, a foiling of seventeen small semicircular arches constitutes a pleasing and unusual feature.

The Mashita palace, which was almost certainly built between A.D. 614 and A.D. 627, while on a smaller scale than that of Ctesiphon, was far more richly ornamented. [Pl. XXVIII., Fig. 2.] This construction of Chosroës II. (Parwiz) consisted of two distinct buildings (separated by a court-yard, in which was a fountain), extending each of them about 180 feet along the front, with a depth respectively of 140 and 150 feet.<sup>41</sup> The main building, which lay to the north, was entered from the court-yard by three archways, semicircular and standing side by side, separated only by columns of hard, white stone, of a

quality approaching to marble. These columns were surmounted by debased Corinthian capitals, of a type introduced by Justinian,<sup>42</sup> and supported arches which were very richly fluted, and which are said to have been "not unlike our own late Norman work."<sup>43</sup> [Pl. XXIX., Fig. 2.] The archways gave entrance into an oblong court or hall, about 80 feet long, by sixty feet wide, on which opened by a wide doorway the main room of the building. This was a triapsal hall, built of brick, and surmounted by a massive domed roof of the same material, which rested on pendentives like those employed at Serbistan and at Firuzabad.<sup>44</sup> The diameter of the hall was a little short of 60 feet. On either side of the triapsal hall, and in its rear, and again on either side of the court or hall on which it opened, were rooms of a smaller size, generally opening into each other, and arranged symmetrically, each side being the exact counterpart of the other. The number of these smaller apartments was twenty-five. [Pl. XXIX., Fig. 1.]

The other building, which lies towards the south, and is separated from the one just described by the whole length of the court-yard, a distance of nearly 200 feet, appears to have been for the most part of an inferior character. It comprised one large hall, or inner court, but otherwise contained only small apartments, which, it is thought, may have been "intended as guard-rooms for the soldiers."<sup>45</sup> Although, however, in most respects so unpretending, this edifice was adorned externally with a richness and magnificence unparalleled in the other remains of Sassanian times, and scarcely exceeded in the architecture of any age or nation. Forming, as it did, the only entrance by which the palace could be approached,<sup>46</sup> and possessing the only front which was presented to the gaze of the outer world, its ornamentation was clearly an object of Chosroës' special care, who seems to have lavished upon it all the known resources of art. The outer wall was built of finely-dressed hard stone;<sup>47</sup> and on this excellent material the sculptors of the time—whether Persian or Byzantine, it is impossible to determine—proceeded to carve in the most elaborate way, first a bold pattern of zigzags and rosettes, and then, over the entire surface, a most delicate tracery of foliage, animals, and fruits. The effect of the zigzags is to divide the wall into a number of triangular compartments, each of which is treated separately, covered with a decoration peculiar to itself, a fretwork of the richest kind, in which animal and vegetable forms are most happily intermingled. In one a vase of

an elegant shape stands midway in the triangle at its base; two doves are seated on it, back to back; from between them rises a vine, which spreads its luxuriant branches over the entire compartment, covering it with its graceful curves and abundant fruitage; on either side of the vase a lion and a wild boar confront the doves with a friendly air; while everywhere amid the leaves and grapes we see the forms of birds, half revealed, half hidden by the foliage. Among the birds, peacocks, parrots, and partridges have been recognized; among the beasts, besides lions and wild boars, buffaloes, panthers, lynxes, and gazelles. In another panel a winged lion, the "lineal descendant of those found at Nineveh and Persepolis,"<sup>48</sup> reflects the mythological symbolism of Assyria, and shows how tenacious was its hold on the West-Asian mind. Nor is the human form wholly wanting. In one place we perceive a man's head, in close juxtaposition with man's inseparable companion, the dog; in another, the entire figure of a man, who carries a basket of fruit.<sup>49</sup>

Besides the compartments within the zigzags, the zigzags themselves and the rosettes are ornamented with a patterning of large leaves, while the moulding below the zigzags and the cornice, or string-course, above them are covered with conventional designs, the interstices between them being filled in with very beautiful adaptations of lesser vegetable forms.<sup>50</sup>

Altogether, the ornamentation of this magnificent façade may be pronounced almost unrivalled for beauty and appropriateness; and the entire palace may well be called "a marvellous example of the sumptuousness and selfishness of ancient princes,"<sup>51</sup> who expended on the gratification of their own taste and love of display the riches which would have been better employed in the defence of their kingdoms, or in the relief of their poorer subjects.

The exquisite ornamentation of the Mashita palace exceeds anything which is found elsewhere in the Sassanian buildings, but it is not wholly different in kind from that of other remains of their architecture in Media and Persia Proper. The archivolte which adorns the arch of Takht-i-Bostan<sup>52</sup> [Pl. XXXI., Fig. 1.] possesses almost equal delicacy with the patterned cornice or string-course of the Mashita building; and its flowered panels may compare for beauty with the Mashita triangular compartments. [Pl. XXXI., Fig. 2.] Sassanian capitals are also in many instances of lovely design, sometimes delicately diapered (A, B), sometimes worked with a pattern of conven-

tional leaves and flowers (C) [Pl. XXXII.], occasionally exhibiting the human form (D, E), or a flowery patterning, like that of the Takht-i-Bostan (F, G). [Pl. XXXIII.] In the more elaborate specimens,<sup>53</sup> the four faces—for the capitals are square—present designs completely different; in other instances, two of the four faces are alike, but on the other two the design is varied.<sup>54</sup> The shafts of Sassanian columns, so far as we can judge, appear to have been fluted.<sup>55</sup>

A work not exactly architectural, yet possessing architectural features—the well-known arch of Chosroës II. above alluded to—seems to deserve description before we pass to another branch of our subject. [Pl. XXXIV., Fig. 1.] This is an archway or grotto cut in the rock at Takht-i-Bostan, near Kerman-shah, which is extremely curious and interesting. On the brink of a pool of clear water, the sloping face of the rock has been cut into, and a recess formed, presenting at its further end a perpendicular face. This face, which is about 34 feet broad, by 31 feet high, and which is ornamented at the top by some rather rude gradines, has been penetrated by an arch, cut into the solid stone to the depth of above 20 feet, and elaborately ornamented, both within and without. Externally, the arch is in the first place surmounted by the archivolt already spoken of, and then, in the spandrels on either side are introduced flying figures of angels or Victories, holding chaplets in one hand and cups or vases in the other, which are little inferior to the best Roman art.<sup>56</sup> [Pl. XXXIV., Fig. 2.] Between the figures is a crescent, perhaps originally enclosing a ball,<sup>57</sup> and thus presenting to the spectator, at the culminating point of the whole sculpture, the familiar emblems of two of the national divinities. Below the spandrels and archivolt, on either side of the arched entrance, are the flowered panels above-mentioned, alike in most respects, but varying in some of their details. Within the recess, its two sides, and its further end, are decorated with bas-reliefs, those on the sides representing Chosroës engaged in the chase of the wild boar and the stag,<sup>58</sup> while those at the end, which are in two lines, one over the other, show the monarch, above, in his robes of state, receiving wreaths from ideal beings; below, in his war costume, mounted upon his favorite charger, Sheb-Diz,<sup>59</sup> with his spear poised in his hand, awaiting the approach of the enemy. The modern critic regards<sup>60</sup> this figure as “original and interesting.” We shall have occasion to recur to it when we treat of the “Manners and Customs” of the Neo-Persian people.

The glyptic art of the Sassanian is seen chiefly in their bas-reliefs; but one figure "in the round" has come down to us from their times, which seems to deserve particular description. This is a colossal statue of Sapor I., hewn (it would seem) out of the natural rock,<sup>61</sup> which still exists, though overthrown and mutilated, in a natural grotto near the ruined city of Shapur. [Pl. XXXV.] The original height of the figure, according to M. Texier,<sup>62</sup> was 6 mètres 7 centimètres, or between 19 and 20 feet. It was well proportioned, and carefully wrought, representing the monarch in peaceful attire, but with a long sword at his left side, wearing the mural crown which characterizes him on the bas-reliefs,<sup>63</sup> and dressed in a tunic and trowsers of a light and flexible material, apparently either silk or muslin. The hair, beard, and mustachios, were neatly arranged and well rendered.<sup>64</sup> The attitude of the figure was natural and good. One hand, the right, rested upon the hip; the other touched, but without grasping it, the hilt of the long straight sword. If we may trust the representation of M. Texier's artist, the folds of the drapery were represented with much skill and delicacy; but the hands and feet of the figure, especially the latter, were somewhat roughly rendered.<sup>65</sup>

The bas-reliefs of the Sassanians are extremely numerous,<sup>66</sup> and though generally rude, and sometimes even grotesque,<sup>67</sup> are not without a certain amount of merit. Some of the earlier and coarser specimens have been already given in this volume; and one more of the same class is here appended [Pl. XXXVI., Fig. 1.] but we have now to notice some other and better examples, which seem to indicate that the Persians of this period attained a considerable proficiency in this branch of the glyptic art. The reliefs belonging to the time of Sapor I. are generally poor in conception and ill-executed; but in one instance, unless the modern artist has greatly flattered his original,<sup>68</sup> a work of this time is not devoid of some artistic excellence. This is a representation of the triumph of Sapor over Valerian, comprising only four figures—Sapor, an attendant, and two Romans—of which the three principal are boldly drawn, in attitudes natural, yet effective, and in good proportion. [Pl. XXXVII.] The horse on which Sapor rides is of the usual clumsy description, reminding us of those which draw our brewers' wains; and the exaggerated hair, floating ribbons and uncouth head-dress of the monarch give an *outré* and ridiculous air to the chief figure; but, if we deduct these defects, which are common to almost all the Sassanian artists, the rep-

resentation becomes pleasing and dignified. Sapor sits his horse well, and thinks not of himself, but of what he is doing. Cyriades, who is somewhat too short, receives the diadem from his benefactor with a calm satisfaction.<sup>69</sup> But the best figure is that of the captive emperor, who kneels on one knee, and, with outstretched arms, implores the mercy of the conqueror. The whole representation is colossal, the figures being at least three times the size of life; the execution seems to have been good; but the work has been considerably injured by the effects of time.

Another bas-relief of the age of Sapor I. is on too large a scale, and too complicated, to be represented here;<sup>70</sup> but a description may be given of it, and a specimen subjoined, from which the reader may judge of its character. On a surface of rock at Shapur, carefully smoothed and prepared for sculpture, the second Sassanian monarch appears in the centre of the tablet, mounted on horseback, and in his usual costume, with a dead Roman under his horse's feet, and holding another (Cyriades?), by the hand. In front of him, a third Roman, the representative of the defeated nation, makes submission; and then follow thirteen tribute-bearers, bringing rings of gold, shawls, bowls, and the like, and conducting also a horse and an elephant. Behind the monarch, on the same line, are thirteen mounted guardsmen. Directly above, and directly below the central group, the tablet is blank; but on either side the subject is continued, above in two lines, and below in one, the guardsmen towards the left amounting in all to fifty-six, and the tribute-bearers on the right to thirty-five. The whole tablet comprises ninety-five human and sixty-three animal figures, besides a Victory floating in the sky. The illustration [Pl. XXXVIII.] is a representation of the extreme right-hand portion of the second line.

After the time of Sapor I. there is a manifest decline in Sassanian art. The reliefs of Varahran II. and Varahran III., of Narses and Sapor III., fall considerably below those of Sapor, son of Artaxerxes.<sup>71</sup> It is not till we arrive at the time of Varahran IV. (A.D. 388-399) that we once more have works which possess real artistic merit. Indications have already appeared in an earlier chapter<sup>72</sup> of this monarch's encouragement of artists, and of a kind of art really meriting the name. We saw that his gems were exquisitely cut, and embodied designs of first-rate excellence. It has now to be observed further, that among the bas-reliefs of the greatest merit which belong to

Sassanian times, one at least must be ascribed to him; and that, this being so, there is considerable probability that two others of the same class belong also to his reign. The one which must undoubtedly be his, and which tends to fix the date of the other two, exists at Nakhsh-i-Rustam, near Persepolis, and has frequently been copied by travellers.<sup>73</sup> It represents a mounted warrior, *with the peculiar head-dress*<sup>74</sup> of *Varahran IV.*, charging another at full speed, striking him with his spear, and bearing both horse and rider to the ground. [Pl. XXXIX.] A standard-bearer marches a little behind; and a dead warrior lies underneath Varahran's horse, which is clearing the obstacle in his bound. The spirit of the entire composition is admirable; and though the stone is in a state of advanced decay, travellers never fail to admire the vigor of the design and the life and movement which characterize it.<sup>75</sup>

The other similar reliefs to which reference has been made exist, respectively, at Nakhsh-i-Rustam and at Firuzabad. The Nakhsh-i-Rustam tablet<sup>76</sup> is almost a duplicate of the one above described and represented, differing from it mainly in the omission of the prostrate figure, in the forms of the head-dresses borne by the two cavaliers, and in the shape of the standard. It is also in better preservation than the other, and presents some additional details. The head-dress of the Sassanian warrior is very remarkable, being quite unlike any other known example. It consists of a cap, which spreads as it rises, and breaks into three points, terminating in large striped balls.<sup>77</sup> [Pl. XXVI., Fig. 2.] His adversary wears a helmet crowned with a similar ball. The standard, which is in the form of a capital T, displays also five balls of the same sort, three rising from the cross-bar, and the other two hanging from it. Were it not for the head-dress of the principal figure, this sculpture might be confidently assigned to the monarch who set up the neighboring one. As it is, the point must be regarded as undecided, and the exact date of the relief as doubtful. It is, however, unlikely to be either much earlier, or much later, than the time of Varahran IV.

The third specimen of a Sassanian battle-scene exists at Firuzabad, in Persia Proper, and has been carefully rendered by M. Flandin.<sup>78</sup> It is in exceedingly bad condition, but appears to have comprised the figures of either five or six horsemen, of whom the two principal are a warrior whose helmet terminates in the head of a bird, and one who wears a crown, above which rises a cap, surmounted by a ball. [Pl. XL.] The

former of these, who is undoubtedly a Sassanian prince,<sup>79</sup> pierces with his spear the right side of the latter, who is represented in the act of falling to the ground. His horse tumbles at the same time, though why he does so is not quite clear, since he has not been touched by the other charger. His attitude is extravagantly absurd, his hind feet being on a level with the head of his rider. Still more absurd seems to have been the attitude of a horse at the extreme right, which turns in falling, and exposes to the spectator the inside of the near thigh and the belly. But, notwithstanding these drawbacks, the representation has great merit. The figures live and breathe—that of the dying king expresses horror and helplessness, that of his pursuer determined purpose and manly strength. Even the very horses are alive, and manifestly rejoice in the strife. The entire work is full of movement, of variety, and of artistic spirit. *what the hell is that?*

If we have regard to the highest qualities of glyptic art, Sassanian sculpture must be said here to culminate. There is a miserable falling off, when about a hundred and fifty years later the Great Chosroës (Anushirwan) represents himself at Shapur,<sup>80</sup> seated on his throne, and fronting to the spectator, with guards and attendants on one side, and soldiers bringing in prisoners, human heads, and booty, on the other. [Pl. XLI.] The style here recalls that of the tamer reliefs set up by the first Sapor,<sup>81</sup> but is less pleasing. Some of the prisoners appear to be well drawn; but the central figure, that of the monarch, is grotesque; the human heads are ghastly; and the soldiers and attendants have little merit. The animal forms are better—that of the elephant especially, though as compared with the men it is strangely out of proportion.

With Chosroës II. (Eberwiz or Parviz), the grandson of Anushirwan, who ascended the throne only twelve years after the death of his grandfather, and reigned from A.D. 591 to A.D. 628, a reaction set in. We have seen the splendor and good taste of his Mashita palace, the beauty of some of his coins,<sup>82</sup> and the general excellence of his ornamentation.<sup>83</sup> It remains to notice the character of his reliefs, found at present in one locality only, viz., at Takht-i-Bostan, where they constitute the main decorations of the great triumphal arch of this monarch. [Pl. XLII.]

These reliefs consist of two classes of works, colossal figures and hunting-pieces. The colossal figures, of which some account has been already given, and which are repre-

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sented in Pl. XLI., have but little merit. They are curious on account of their careful elaboration, and furnish important information with respect to Sassanian dress and armature, but they are poor in design, being heavy, awkward, and ungainly. Nothing can well be less beautiful than the three overstout personages, who stand with their heads nearly or quite touching the crown of the arch, at its further extremity, carefully drawn in detail, but in outline little short of hideous. The least bad is that to the left, whose drapery is tolerably well arranged, and whose face, judging by what remains of it, was not displeasing. Of the other two it is impossible to say a word in commendation.

The mounted cavalier below them—Chosroës himself on his black<sup>44</sup> war horse, Sheb-Diz—is somewhat better. The pose of horse and horseman has dignity; the general proportions are fairly correct, though (as usual) the horse is of a breed that recalls the modern dray-horse rather than the charger. The figure, being near the ground, has suffered much mutilation, probably at the hands of Moslem fanatics; the off hind leg of the horse is gone; his nose and mouth have disappeared; and the horseman has lost his right foot and a portion of his lower clothing. But nevertheless, the general effect is not altogether destroyed. Modern travellers admire the repose and dignity of the composition, its combination of simplicity with detail, and the delicacy and finish of some portions.<sup>65</sup> It may be added that the relief of the figure is high; the off legs of the horse were wholly detached; and the remainder of both horse and rider was nearly, though not quite, disengaged from the rock behind them.

The hunting-pieces, which ornament the interior of the arched recess on either side, are far superior to the colossal figures, and merit an exact description. On the right, the perpendicular space below the spring of the arch contains the representation of a stag hunt, in which the monarch and about a dozen other mounted horsemen take part, assisted by some ten or twelve footmen, and by a detachment mounted on elephants. [Pl. XLIII.] The elephants, which are nine in number, occupy the extreme right of the tablet, and seem to be employed in driving the deer into certain prepared enclosures. Each of the beasts is guided by three riders, sitting along their backs, of whom the central one alone has the support of a saddle or howdah. The enclosures into which the elephants drive the game are three in number; they are surrounded by nets;

and from the central one alone is there an exit. Through this exit, which is guarded by two footmen, the game passes into the central field, or main space of the sculpture, where the king awaits them. He is mounted on his steed, with his bow passed over his head, his sword at his side, and an attendant holding the royal parasol over him. It is not quite clear whether he himself does more than witness the chase. The game is in the main pursued and brought to the ground by horsemen without royal insignia,<sup>61</sup> and is then passed over into a further compartment—the extreme one towards the left, where it is properly arranged and placed upon camels for conveyance to the royal palace. During the whole proceeding a band of twenty-six musicians, some of whom occupy an elevated platform, delights with a “concord of sweet sounds” the assembled sportsmen.<sup>67</sup>

On the opposite, or left-hand, side of the recess, is represented a boar-hunt. [Pl. XLIV.] Here again, elephants, twelve in number, drive the game into an enclosure without exit. Within this space nearly a hundred boars and pigs may be counted. The ground being marshy, the monarch occupies a boat in the centre, and from this transfixes the game with his arrows. No one else takes part in the sport, unless it be the riders on a troop of five elephants, represented in the lower middle portion of the tablet. When the pigs fall, they are carried into a second enclosure, that on the right, where they are upturned, disembowelled, and placed across the backs of elephants, which convey them to the abode of the monarch. Once more, the scene is enlivened by music. Two bands of harpers occupy boats on either side of that which carries the king, while another harper sits with him in the boat from which he delivers his arrows. In the water about the boats are seen reeds, ducks, and numerous fishes. The oars by which the boats are propelled have a singular resemblance to those which are represented in some of the earliest Assyrian sculptures.<sup>68</sup> Two other features must also be noticed. Near the top of the tablet, towards the left, five figures standing in a boat seem to be clapping their hands in order to drive the pigs towards the monarch; while in the right centre of the picture there is another boat, more highly ornamented than the rest, in which we seem to have a second representation of the king, differing from the first only in the fact that his arrow has flown, and that he is in the act of taking another arrow from an attendant. In this second representation the king's head is sur-

rounded by a *nimbus* or "glory." Altogether there are in this tablet more than seventy-five human and nearly 150 animal forms. In the other, the human forms are about seventy, and the animal ones about a hundred.

The merit of the two reliefs above described, which would require to be engraved on a large scale, in order that justice should be done to them,<sup>89</sup> consists in the spirit and truth of the animal forms, elephants, camels, stags, boars, horses, and in the life and movement of the whole picture. The rush of the pigs, the bounds of the stags and hinds, the heavy march of the elephants, the ungainly movements of the camels, are well portrayed; and in one instance, the foreshortening of a horse, advancing diagonally, is respectably rendered.<sup>90</sup> In general, Sassanian sculpture, like most delineative art in its infancy, affects merely the profile; but here, and in the overturned horse already described,<sup>91</sup> and again in the Victories which ornament the spandrels of the arch of Chosroës, the mere profile is departed from with good effect, and a power is shown of drawing human and animal figures in front or at an angle. What is wanting in the entire Sassanian series is idealism, or the notion of elevating the representation in any respects above the object represented; the highest aim of the artist is to be true to nature; in this truthfulness is his triumph; but as he often falls short of his models, his whole result, even at the best, is unsatisfactory and disappointing.

Such must almost necessarily be the sentence of art critics, who judge the productions of this age and nation according to the abstract rules, or the accepted standards, of artistic effort. But if circumstances of time and country are taken into account, if comparison is limited to earlier and later attempts in the same region, or even in neighboring ones, a very much more favorable judgment will be passed. The Sassanian reliefs need not on the whole shrink from a comparison with those of the Achæmenian Persians. If they are ruder and more grotesque, they are also more spirited and more varied; and thus, though they fall short in some respects, still they must be pronounced superior to the Achæmenian in some of the most important artistic qualities. Nor do they fall greatly behind the earlier, and in many respects admirable, art of the Assyrians. They are less numerous and cover a less variety of subjects; they have less delicacy; but they have equal or greater fire. In the judgment of a traveller not given to extravagant praise, they are, in some cases at any rate, "exe-

cuted in the most masterly style." "I never saw," observes Sir R. Ker Porter, "the elephant, the stag, or the boar portrayed with greater truth and spirit. The attempts at detailed human form are," he adds, "far inferior."<sup>92</sup>

Before, however, we assign to the Sassanian monarchs, and to the people whom they governed, the merit of having produced results so worthy of admiration, it becomes necessary to inquire whether there is reason to believe that other than native artists were employed in their production. It has been very confidently stated that Chosroës the Second "brought Roman artists" to Takht-i-Bostan,<sup>93</sup> and by their aid eclipsed the glories of his great predecessors, Artaxerxes, son of Babek, and the two Sapers. Byzantine forms are declared to have been reproduced in the moldings of the Great Arch, and in the Victories.<sup>94</sup> The lovely tracery of the Mashita Palace is regarded as in the main the work of Greeks and Syrians.<sup>95</sup> No doubt it is quite possible that there may be some truth in these allegations; but we must not forget, or let it be forgotten, that they rest on conjecture and are without historical foundation. The works of the first Chosroës at Ctesiphon, according to a respectable Greek writer,<sup>96</sup> were produced for him by foreign artists, sent to his court by Justinian. But no such statement is made with respect to his grandson. On the contrary, it is declared by the native writers<sup>97</sup> that a certain Ferhad, a Persian, was the chief designer of them; and modern critics admit that his hand may perhaps be traced, not only at Takht-i-Bostan, but at the Mashita Palace also.<sup>98</sup> If then the merit of the design is conceded to a native artist, we need not too curiously inquire the nationality of the workmen employed by him.

At the worst, should it be thought that Byzantine influence appears so plainly in the later Sassanian works, that Rome rather than Persia must be credited with the buildings and sculptures of both the first and the second Chosroës, still it will have to be allowed that the earlier palaces—those at Serbistan and Firuzabad—and the spirited battle-scenes above described,<sup>99</sup> are wholly native; since they present no trace of any foreign element. But, it is in these battle-scenes, as already noticed,<sup>100</sup> that the delineative art of the Sassanians culminates; and it may further be questioned whether the Firuzabad palace is not the finest specimen of their architecture, severe though it be in the character of its ornamentation; so that, even should we surrender the whole of the later works

enough will still remain to show that the Sassanians, and the Persians of their day, had merit as artists and builders, a merit the more creditable to them inasmuch as for five centuries they had had no opportunity of cultivating their powers, having been crushed by the domination of a race singularly devoid of artistic aspirations. Even with regard to the works for which they may have been indebted to foreigners, it is to be remembered that, unless the monarchs had appreciated high art, and admired it, they would not have hired, at great expense, the services of these aliens. For my own part, I see no reason to doubt that the Sassanian remains of every period are predominantly, if not exclusively, native, not excepting those of the first Chosroës, for I mistrust the statement of Theophylact.<sup>101</sup>

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## CHAPTER XXVIII.

### ON THE RELIGION, MANNERS, CUSTOMS, ETC., OF THE LATER PERSIANS.

*Religion of the later Persians, Dualism of the extremest kind. Ideas entertained with respect to Ormazd and Ahriman. Representations of them. Ormazd the special Guardian of the Kings. Lesser Deities subject to Ormazd: Mithra, Serosh, Vayu, Airyanam, Vitraha, etc. The six Amshashpands: Bahman, Ardibehesht, Shahravar, Isfand-armat, Khordad, and Amerdat. Religion, how far idolatrous. Worship of Anaitis. Chief Evil Spirits subject to Ahri-man: Akomano, Indra, Çaurva, Naonhaitya, Taric, and Zaric. Position of Man between the two Worlds of Good and Evil. His Duties: Worship, Agriculture, Purity. Nature of the Worship. Hymns, Invocations, the Homa Ceremony, Sacrifice. Agriculture a part of Religion. Purity required: 1, Moral; 2, Legal. Nature of each. Man's future Prospects. Position of the Magi under the Sassanians; their Organization, Dress, etc. The Fire-temples and Altars. The Barsom. The Khrafçthraghna. Magnificence of the Sassanian Court; the Throne-room, the Scraglio, the Attendants, the Ministers. Multitude of Palaces. Dress of the Monarch: 1, in Peace; 2, in War.*

*Favorite Pastimes of the Kings. Hunting. Maintenance of Paradises. Stag and Boar-hunts. Music. Hawking. Games. Character of the Persian Warfare under the Sassanians. Sassanian Chariots. The Elephant Corps. The Cavalry. The Archers. The ordinary Infantry. Officers. Standards. Tactics. Private Life of the later Persians. Agricultural Employment of the Men. Non-seclusion of the Women. General Freedom from Oppression of all Classes except the highest.*

Πέρσας οἶδα νόμοισι τοῖσδε χρωμένους.—Herod. i. 131.

THE general character of the Persian religion, as revived by the founder of the Sassanian dynasty, has been described in a former chapter;<sup>1</sup> but it is felt that the present work would be incomplete if it failed to furnish the reader with a tolerably full account of so interesting a matter; more especially, since the religious question lay at the root of the original rebellion and revolution which raised the Sassanidæ to power, and was to a considerable extent the basis and foundation of their authority. An access of religious fervor gave the Persians of the third century after Christ the strength which enabled them to throw off the yoke of their Parthian lords and recover the sceptre of Western Asia. A strong—almost fanatical—religious spirit animated the greater number of the Sassanian monarchs. When the end of the kingdom came, the old faith was still flourishing; and, though its star paled before that of Mohammedanism, the faith itself survived, and still survives at the present day.<sup>2</sup>

It has been observed that Dualism constituted the most noticeable feature of the religion.<sup>3</sup> It may now be added that the Dualism professed was of the most extreme and pronounced kind. Ormazd and Ahriman, the principles of Good and Evil, were expressly declared to be “twins.”<sup>4</sup> They had “in the beginning come together to create Life and Death,” and to settle “how the world was to be.”<sup>5</sup> There was no priority of existence of the one over the other, and no decided superiority. The two, being coeval, had contended from all eternity, and would, it was almost certain, continue to contend to all eternity, neither being able to vanquish the other. Thus an eternal struggle was postulated between good and evil; and the issue was doubtful, neither side possessing any clear and manifest advantage.

The two principles were Persons. Ormazd was "the creator of life, the earthly and the spiritual,"<sup>6</sup> he who "made the celestial bodies, earth, water, and trees."<sup>7</sup> He was "good,"<sup>8</sup> "holy,"<sup>9</sup> "pure,"<sup>10</sup> "true,"<sup>11</sup> "the Holy God,"<sup>12</sup> "the Holiest,"<sup>13</sup> "the Essence of Truth,"<sup>14</sup> "the father of all truth,"<sup>15</sup> "the being best of all,"<sup>16</sup> "the master of purity."<sup>17</sup> He was supremely "happy,"<sup>18</sup> being possessed of every blessing, "health, wealth, virtue, wisdom, immortality."<sup>19</sup> From him came every good gift enjoyed by man; on the pious and the righteous he bestowed, not only earthly advantages, but precious spiritual gifts, truth, devotion, "the good mind," and everlasting happiness;<sup>20</sup> and, as he rewarded the good, so he also punished the bad,<sup>21</sup> though this was an aspect in which he was but seldom represented.

While Ormazd, thus far, would seem to be a presentation of the Supreme Being in a form not greatly different from that wherein it has pleased him to reveal Himself to mankind through the Jewish and Christian scriptures, there are certain points of deficiency in the representation, which are rightly viewed as placing the Persian very considerably below the Jewish and Christian idea.<sup>22</sup> Besides the limitation on the power and freedom of Ormazd implied in the eternal co-existence with him of another and a hostile principle, he is also limited by the independent existence of space, time, and light, which appear in the Zendavesta as "self-created," or "without beginning,"<sup>23</sup> and must therefore be regarded as "conditioning" the Supreme Being, who has to work, as best he may, under circumstances not caused by himself. Again, Ormazd is not a purely spiritual being. He is conceived of as possessing a sort of physical nature. The "light," which is one of his properties, seems to be a material radiance.<sup>24</sup> He can be spoken of as possessing health.<sup>25</sup> The whole conception of him, though not grossly material, is far from being wholly immaterial. His nature is complex, not simple.<sup>26</sup> He may not have a body, in the ordinary sense of the word;<sup>27</sup> but he is entangled with material accidents, and is far from answering to the pure spirit, "without body, parts, or passions," which forms the Christian conception of the Deity.

Ahriman, the Evil Principle, is of course far more powerful and terrible than the Christian and Jewish Satan. He is uncaused, co-eternal with Ormazd, engaged in a perpetual warfare with him. Whatever good thing Ormazd creates, Ahriman corrupts and ruins it. Moral and physical evils are

alike at his disposal. He blasts the earth with barrenness, or makes it produce thorns, thistles, and poisonous plants; his are the earthquake, the storm, the plague of hail, the thunderbolt; he causes disease and death, sweeps off a nation's flocks and herds by murrain, or depopulates a continent by pestilence; ferocious wild beasts, serpents, toads, mice, hornets, mosquitoes, are his creation; he invented and introduced into the world the sins of witchcraft, murder, unbelief, cannibalism, sodomy; he excites wars and tumults, stirs up the bad against the good, and labors by every possible expedient to make vice triumph over virtue. Ormazd can exercise no control over him; the utmost that he can do is to keep a perpetual watch on his rival, and seek to baffle and defeat him. This he is not always able to do. Despite his best endeavors, Ahriman is not unfrequently victorious.<sup>28</sup>

In the purer times of the Zoroastrian religion it would seem that neither Ormazd nor Ahriman was represented by sculptured forms.<sup>29</sup> A symbolism alone was permitted, which none could mistake for a real attempt to portray these august beings.<sup>30</sup> But by the date of the Sassanian revival, the original spirit of the religion had suffered considerable modification; and it was no longer thought impious, or perilous, to exhibit the heads of the Pantheon, in the forms regarded as appropriate to them, upon public monuments. The great Artaxerxes, probably soon after his accession, set up a memorial of his exploits, in which he represented himself as receiving the insignia of royalty from Ormazd himself, while Ahriman, prostrate and seemingly, though of course not really, dead, lay at the feet of the steed on which Ormazd was mounted.<sup>31</sup> In the form of Ormazd there is nothing very remarkable; he is attired like the king, has a long beard and flowing locks, and carries in his left hand a huge staff or baton, which he holds erect in a slanting position. The figure of Ahriman possesses more interest. The face wears an expression of pain and suffering; but the features are calm, and in no way disturbed. They are regular, and at least as handsome as those of Artaxerxes and his divine patron. He wears a band or diadem across the brow, above which we see a low cap or crown. From this escape the heads and necks of a number of vipers or snakes, fit emblems of the poisonous and "death-dealing"<sup>32</sup> Evil One.

Some further representations of Ormazd occur in the Sassanian sculptures; but Ahriman seems not to be portrayed else-

where. Ormazd appears on foot in a relief of the Great Artaxerxes, which contains two figures only, those of himself and his divine patron.<sup>33</sup> He is also to be seen in a sculpture which belongs probably to Sapor I., and represents that monarch in the act of receiving the diadem from Artaxerxes, his father.<sup>34</sup> In the former of these two tablets the type exhibited in the bas-relief just described is followed without any variation; in the latter, the type is considerably modified. Ormazd still carries his huge baton, and is attired in royal fashion; but otherwise his appearance is altogether new and singular. His head bears no crown, but is surrounded by a halo of streaming rays; he has not much beard, but his hair, bushy and abundant, flows down on his two shoulders; he faces the spectator, and holds his baton in both his hands; finally, he stands upon a blossom, which is thought to be that of a sun-flower. Perhaps the conjecture is allowable that here we have Ormazd exhibited to us in a solar character,<sup>35</sup> with the attributes of Mithra, from whom, in the olden time, he was carefully distinguished.

Ormazd seems to have been regarded by the kings as their special guardian and protector. No other deity (unless in one instance<sup>36</sup>) is brought into close proximity with them; no other obtains mention in their inscriptions; from no other do they allow that they receive the blessing of offspring.<sup>37</sup> Whatever the religion of the common people, that of the kings would seem to have been, in the main, the worship of this god, whom they perhaps sometimes confused with Mithra, or associated with Anaitis, but whom they never neglected, or failed openly to acknowledge.<sup>38</sup>

Under the great Ormazd were a number of subordinate deities, the principal of whom were Mithra and Serosh. Mithra, the Sun-God, had been from a very early date an object of adoration in Persia, only second to Ormazd.<sup>39</sup> The Achæmenian kings<sup>40</sup> joined him occasionally with Ormazd in their invocations. In processions his chariot, drawn by milk-white horses, followed closely on that of Ormazd.<sup>41</sup> He was often associated with Ormazd, as if an equal,<sup>42</sup> though a real equality was probably not intended. He was "great," "pure," "imperishable," "the beneficent protector of all creatures,"<sup>43</sup> and "the beneficent preserver of all creatures."<sup>44</sup> He had a thousand ears and ten thousand eyes.<sup>45</sup> His worship was probably more widely extended than that of Ormazd himself, and was connected in general with a material representation.

In the early times this was a simple disk, or circle; <sup>46</sup> but from the reign of Artaxerxes Mnemon, a human image seems to have been substituted. <sup>47</sup> Prayer was offered to Mithra three times a day, <sup>48</sup> at dawn, at noon, and at sunset; and it was usual to worship him with sacrifice. The horse appears to have been the victim which he was supposed to prefer. <sup>49</sup>

Sraosha, or Serosh, was an angel of great power and dignity. He was the special messenger of Ormazd, and the head of his celestial army. He was "tall, well-formed, beautiful, swift, victorious, happy, sincere, true, the master of truth." It was his office to deliver revelations, to show men the paths of happiness, and to bring them the blessings which Ormazd had assigned to each. He invented the music for the five most ancient Gathas, discovered the *barsom* or divining-rod, and first taught its use to mankind. From his palace on the highest summit of the Elburz range, he watched the proceedings of the evil genii, and guarded the world from their attempts. The Iranians were his special care; but he lost no opportunity of injuring the Powers of Darkness, and lessening their dominion by teaching everywhere the true religion. In the other world it was his business to conduct the souls of the faithful through the dangers of the middle passage, and to bring them before the golden throne of Ormazd. <sup>50</sup>

Among minor angelic powers were Vayu, "the wind," <sup>51</sup> who is found also in the Vedic system; Airyanam, a god presiding over marriages; <sup>52</sup> Vitrahâ, a good genius; <sup>53</sup> Tistrya, <sup>54</sup> the Dog Star, etc. The number of the minor deities was not, however, great; nor do they seem, as in so many other polytheistic religions, to have advanced in course of time from a subordinate to a leading position. From first to last they are of small account; and it seems, therefore, unnecessary to detain the reader by an elaborate description of them.

From the mass, however, of the lower deities or genii must be distinguished (besides Mithra and Serosh) the six *Amesha Spentas*, or Amshashpands, who formed the council of Ormazd, and in a certain sense reflected his glory. These were Vohu-mano or Bahman, Ashavahista or Ardibehesht, Khshathra-vairya or Shahravar, Spenta-Armaiti or Isfandarmat, Haurvatat or Khordâd, and Ameretat or Amerdât. <sup>55</sup> Vohu-mano, "the Good Mind," originally a mere attribute of Ormazd, came to be considered a distinct being, created by him to be his attendant and his councillor. He was, as it were, the Grand Vizier of the Almighty King, the chief of the heavenly

conclave. Ormazd entrusted to him especially the care of animal life; and thus, as presiding over cattle, he is the patron deity of the agriculturist.<sup>56</sup> Asha-vahista, "the best truth," or "the best purity," is the Light of the universe, subtle, pervading, omnipresent. He maintains the splendor of the various luminaries, and presides over the element of fire.<sup>57</sup> Khshathra-vairyā, "wealth," has the goods of this world at his disposal, and specially presides over metals, the conventional signs of wealth; he is sometimes identified with the metal which he dispenses.<sup>58</sup> Spenta-Armaiti, "Holy Armaiti," is at once the genius of the Earth, and the goddess of piety. She has the charge of "the good creation," watches over it, and labors to convert the desolate and unproductive portions of it into fruitful fields and gardens.<sup>59</sup> Together with Vohu-mano, she protects the agriculturist,<sup>60</sup> blessing his land with increase, as Vohu-mano does his cattle. She is called "the daughter of Ormazd,"<sup>61</sup> and is regarded as the agent through whom Ormazd created the earth.<sup>62</sup> Moreover, "she tells men the everlasting laws, which no one may abolish,"<sup>63</sup> or, in other words, imparts to them the eternal principles of morality. She is sometimes represented as standing next to Ormazd in the mythology, as in the profession of faith required of converts to Zoroastrianism.<sup>64</sup> The two remaining Amshashpands, Haurvatat and Ameretat, "Health" and "Immortality," have the charge of the vegetable creation; Haurvatat causes the flow of water, so necessary to the support of vegetable life in countries where little rain falls; Ameretat protects orchards and gardens, and enables trees to bring their fruits to perfection.

Another deity, practically perhaps as much worshipped as Ormazd and Mithra, was Anāitis or Anahit. Anāitis was originally an Assyrian and Babylonian,<sup>65</sup> not a Zoroastrian goddess; but her worship spread to the Persians at a date anterior to Herodotus,<sup>66</sup> and became in a short time exceedingly popular. It was in connection with this worship that idolatry seems first to have crept in, Artaxerxes Mnemon (ab. B.C. 400) having introduced images of Anāitis into Persia, and set them up at Susa, the capital, at Persepolis, Ecbatana, Bactra, Babylon, Damascus, and Sardis.<sup>67</sup> Anāitis was the Babylonian Venus; and her rites at Babylon were undoubtedly of a revolting character.<sup>68</sup> It is to be feared that they were introduced in all their grossness into Persia, and that this was the cause of Anahit's great popularity. Her cult "was pro-

vided with priests and hieroduli, and connected with mysteries, feasts, and unchaste ways."<sup>69</sup>

The Persian system was further tainted with idolatry in respect of the worship of Mithra,<sup>70</sup> and possibly of Vohu-mano (Bahman), and of Amerdat;<sup>71</sup> but on the whole, and especially as compared with other Oriental cults, the religion, even of the later Zoroastrians, must be regarded as retaining a non-materialistic and anti-idolatrous character, which elevated it above other neighboring religions, above Brahminism on the one hand and Syro-Chaldæan nature-worship on the other.

In the kingdom of Darkness, the principal powers, besides Ahriman, were Ako-mano, Indra, Çaurva, Naonhaitya, Taric, and Zaric.<sup>72</sup> These six together formed the Council of the Evil One, as the six Amshashpands formed the council of Ormazd. Ako-mano, "the bad mind," or (literally) "the naught mind,"<sup>73</sup> was set over against Vohu-mano, "the good mind," and was Ahriman's Grand Vizier. His special sphere was the mind of man, where he suggested evil thoughts, and prompted to bad words and wicked deeds. Indra, identical with the Vedic deity, but made a demon by the Zoroastrians, presided over storm and tempest, and governed the issues of war and battle. Çaurva and Naonhaitya were also Vedic deities turned into devils.<sup>74</sup> It is difficult to assign them any distinct sphere. Taric and Zaric, "Darkness" and "Poison," had no doubt occupations corresponding with their names. Besides these chief demons, a countless host of evil genii (*divs*) and fairies (*pairikas*) awaited the orders and executed the behests of Ahriman.

Placed between the two contending worlds of good and evil, man's position was one of extreme danger and difficulty. Originally set upon the earth by Ormazd in order to maintain the good creation, he was liable to the continual temptations and seductions of the *divs* or *devas*, who were "wicked, bad, false, untrue, the originators of mischief, most baneful, destructive, the basest of all things."<sup>75</sup> A single act of sin gave them a hold upon him, and each subsequent act increased their power, until ultimately he became their mere tool and slave.<sup>76</sup> It was however possible to resist temptation, to cling to the side of right, to defy and overcome the *devas*. Man might maintain his uprightness, walk in the path of duty, and by the help of the *asuras*, or "good spirits," attain to a blissful paradise.

To arrive at this result, man had carefully to observe three

principal duties. These were worship, agriculture, and purity. Worship consisted in the acknowledgment of the One True God, Ormazd, and of his Holy Angels, the Amesha Spentas or Amshashpands, in the frequent offering of prayers, praises, and thanksgivings, in the recitation of set hymns, the performance of a certain ceremony called the Homa, and in the occasional sacrifice of animals. The set hymns form a large portion of the Zendavesta, where they occur in the shape of *Gâthâs*,<sup>77</sup> or *Yashts*,<sup>78</sup> sometimes possessing considerable beauty.<sup>79</sup> They are sometimes general, addressed to Ormazd and the Amesha Spentas in common, sometimes special, containing the praises of a particular deity. The Homa ceremony consisted in the extraction of the juice of the Homa plant by the priests during the recitation of prayers, the formal presentation of the liquor extracted to the sacrificial fire, the consumption of a small portion of it by one of the officiating priests, and the division of the remainder among the worshippers. As the juice was drunk immediately after extraction and before fermentation had set in, it was not intoxicating. The ceremony seems to have been regarded, in part, as having a mystic force, securing the favor of heaven; in part, as exerting a beneficial effect upon the body of the worshipper through the curative power inherent in the Homa plant.<sup>80</sup> The animals which might be sacrificed were the horse, the ox, the sheep, and the goat, the horse being the favorite victim. A priest always performed the sacrifice,<sup>81</sup> slaying the animal, and showing the flesh to the sacred fire by way of consecration, after which it was eaten at a solemn feast by the priest and people.

It is one of the chief peculiarities of Zoroastrianism that it regarded agriculture as a religious duty. Man had been placed upon the earth especially "to maintain the good creation," and resist the endeavors of Ahriman to injure, and if possible, ruin it. This could only be done by careful tilling of the soil, eradication of thorns and weeds, and reclamation of the tracts over which Ahriman had spread the curse of barrenness. To cultivate the soil was thus incumbent upon all men; the whole community was required to be agricultural; and either as proprietor, as farmer, or as laboring man, each Zoroastrian was bound to "further the works of life" by advancing tillage.<sup>82</sup>

The purity which was required of the Zoroastrian was of two kinds, moral and legal. Moral purity comprised all that Chris-

tianity includes under it—truth, justice, chastity, and general sinlessness. It was coextensive with the whole sphere of human activity, embracing not only words and acts, but even the secret thoughts of the heart.<sup>63</sup> Legal purity was to be obtained only by the observance of a multitude of trifling ceremonies and the abstinence from ten thousand acts in their nature wholly indifferent.<sup>64</sup> Especially, everything was to be avoided which could be thought to pollute the four elements—all of them sacred to the Zoroastrian of Sassanian times—fire, water, earth, and air.<sup>65</sup>

Man's struggle after holiness and purity was sustained in the Zoroastrian system by the confident hope of a futurity of happiness. It was taught<sup>66</sup> that the soul of man was immortal, and would continue to possess for ever a separate conscious existence. Immediately after death the spirits of both good and bad had to proceed along an appointed path to "the bridge of the gatherer" (*chinvat peretu*). This was a narrow road conducting to heaven or paradise, over which the souls of the pious alone could pass, while the wicked fell from it into the gulf below, where they found themselves in the place of punishment. The steps of the good were guided and supported by the angel Serosh—the "happy, well-formed, swift, tall Serosh"—who conducted them across the difficult passage into the heavenly region. There Bahman, rising from his throne, greeted them on their entrance with the salutation, "Happy thou who art come here to us from the mortality to the immortality!" Then they proceeded joyfully onward to the presence of Ormazd, to the immortal saints, to the golden throne, to paradise. As for the wicked, when they fell into the gulf, they found themselves in outer darkness, in the kingdom of Ahriman, where they were forced to remain and to feed on poisoned banquets.

The priests of the Zoroastrians, from a time not long subsequent to Darius Hystaspis,<sup>67</sup> were the Magi. This tribe, or caste, originally perhaps external to Zoroastrianism, had come to be recognized as a true priestly order; and was intrusted by the Sassanian princes with the whole control and direction of the religion of the state.<sup>68</sup> Its chief was a personage holding a rank but very little inferior to the king. He bore the title of *Tenpet*,<sup>69</sup> "Head of the Religion," or *Movpetan Movpet*,<sup>70</sup> "Head of the Chief Magi." In times of difficulty and danger he was sometimes called upon to conduct a revolution;<sup>71</sup> and in the ordinary course of things he was always reckoned among the

monarch's chief counsellors.<sup>92</sup> Next in rank to him were a number of *Movpets*, or "Chief Magi," called also *destoors* or "rulers," who scarcely perhaps constituted an order, but still held an exalted position.<sup>93</sup> Under these were, finally, a large body of ordinary Magi, dispersed throughout the empire, but especially congregated in the chief towns.

The Magi officiated in a peculiar dress. This consisted of a tall peaked cap of felt or some similar material, having deep lappets at the side, which concealed the jaw and even the lips, and a long white robe, or cloak, descending to the ankles.<sup>94</sup> They assembled often in large numbers, and marched in stately processions, impressing the multitude by a grand and striking ceremonial. Besides the offerings which were lavished upon them by the faithful, they possessed considerable endowments in land,<sup>95</sup> which furnished them with an assured subsistence. They were allowed by Chosroës the First a certain administrative power in civil matters; the collection of the revenue was to take place under their supervision; they were empowered to interfere in cases of oppression, and protect the subject against the tax-gatherer.<sup>96</sup>

The Zoroastrian worship was intimately connected with fire-temples<sup>97</sup> and fire-altars. A fire-temple was maintained in every important city throughout the empire; and in these a sacred flame, believed to have been lighted from heaven, was kept up perpetually, by the care of the priests, and was spoken of as "unextinguishable."<sup>98</sup> Fire-altars probably also existed, independently of temples; and an erection of this kind maintained from first to last an honorable position on the Sassanian coins, being the main impress upon the reverse.<sup>99</sup> It was represented with the flame rising from it, and sometimes with a head in the flame;<sup>100</sup> its stem was ornamented with garlands or fillets; and on either side, as protectors or as worshippers, were represented two figures, sometimes watching the flame, sometimes turned from it, guarding it apparently from external enemies.<sup>101</sup>

Besides the sacerdotal, the Magi claimed to exercise the prophetic office. From a very early date they had made themselves conspicuous as omen-readers and dream-expounders;<sup>102</sup> but, not content with such occasional exhibitions of prophetic power, they ultimately reduced divination to a system, and, by the help of the *barsom* or bundle of divining rods, undertook to return a true answer on all points connected with the future, upon which they might be consulted.<sup>103</sup> Credulity is

never wanting among Orientals; and the power of the priesthood was no doubt greatly increased by a pretension which was easily made, readily believed, and not generally discredited by failures, however numerous.

The Magian priest was commonly seen with the *barsom* in his hand; but occasionally he exchanged that instrument for another, known as the *khrafĕthraghna*.<sup>104</sup> It was among the duties of the pious Zoroastrian, and more especially of those who were entrusted with the priestly office, to wage perpetual war with Ahriman, and to destroy his works whenever opportunity offered. Now among these, constituting a portion of "the bad creation," were all such animals as frogs, toads, snakes, newts, mice, lizards, flies, and the like. The Magi took every opportunity of killing such creatures; <sup>105</sup> and the *khrafĕthraghna* was an implement which they invented for the sake of carrying out this pious purpose.

The court of the Sassanian kings, especially in the later period of the empire, was arranged upon a scale of almost unexampled grandeur and magnificence. The robes worn by the Great King were beautifully embroidered, and covered with gems and pearls, which in some representations may be counted by hundreds.<sup>106</sup> [Pl. XLV.] The royal crown, which could not be worn, but was hung from the ceiling by a gold chain exactly over the head of the king when he took his seat in his throne-room, is said to have been adorned with a thousand pearls, each as large as an egg.<sup>107</sup> The throne itself was of gold, and was supported on four feet, each formed of a single enormous ruby.<sup>108</sup> The great throne-room was ornamented with enormous columns of silver, between which were hangings of rich silk or brocade.<sup>109</sup> The vaulted roof presented to the eye representations of the heavenly bodies, the sun, the moon, and the stars;<sup>110</sup> while globes, probably of crystal, or of burnished metal, hung suspended from it<sup>111</sup> at various heights, lighting up the dark space as with a thousand lustres.

The state observed at the court resembled that of the most formal and stately of the Oriental monarchies. The courtiers were organized in seven ranks. Foremost came the Ministers of the crown; next the *Mobeds*, or chief Magi; after them, the *hirbeds*, or judges; then the *sipehbeds*, or commanders-in-chief, of whom there were commonly four; last of all the singers, musicians, and men of science, arranged in three orders. The king sat apart even from the highest nobles, who, unless summoned, might not approach nearer than thirty feet from him.

A low curtain separated him from them, which was under the charge of an officer, who drew it for those only with whom the king had expressed a desire to converse.<sup>112</sup>

An important part of the palace was the seraglio. The polygamy practised by the Sassanian princes was on the largest scale that has ever been heard of, Chosroës II. having maintained, we are told, three thousand concubines.<sup>113</sup> The modest requirements of so many secondary wives necessitated the lodging and sustenance of twelve thousand additional females,<sup>114</sup> chiefly slaves, whose office was to attend on these royal favorites, attire them, and obey their behests. Eunuchs are not mentioned as employed to any large extent; but in the sculptures of the early princes they seem to be represented as holding offices of importance,<sup>115</sup> and the analogy of Oriental courts does not allow us to doubt that the seraglio was, to some extent at any rate, under their superintendence. Each Sassanian monarch had one sultana or principal wife, who was generally a princess by birth, but might legally be of any origin. In one or two instances the monarch sets the effigy of his principal wife upon his coins;<sup>116</sup> but this is unusual, and when, towards the close of the empire, females were allowed to ascend the throne, it is thought that they refrained from parading themselves in this way, and stamped their coins with the head of a male.<sup>117</sup>

In attendance upon the monarch were usually his parasol-bearer, his fan-bearer, who appears to have been a eunuch,<sup>118</sup> the *Senekapan*,<sup>119</sup> or "Lord Chamberlain," the *Maypet*, or "Chief Butler," the *Andertzapet*, or "Master of the Wardrobe," the *Akhorapet*, or "Master of the Horse," the *Taharhapet* or "Chief Cupbearer," the *Shahpan*, or "Chief Falconer," and the *Krhogpet*, or "Master of the Workmen." Except the parasol-bearer and fan-bearer, these officials all presided over departments, and had under them a numerous body of subordinates. If the royal stables contained even 8000 horses, which one monarch is said to have kept for his own riding,<sup>120</sup> the grooms and stable-boys must have been counted by hundreds; and an equal or greater number of attendants must have been required for the camels and elephants, which are estimated<sup>121</sup> respectively at 1200 and 12,000. The "workmen" were also probably a corps of considerable size, continually engaged in repairs or in temporary or permanent erections.

Other great officials, corresponding more nearly to the "Ministers" of a modern sovereign, were the *Vzourkhramanatar*,<sup>122</sup>

or "Grand Keeper of the Royal Orders," who held the post now known as that of Grand Vizier; the *Dprapet Ariats*, or "Chief of the Scribes of Iran," a sort of Chancellor; the *Hazarapet dran Ariats*, or "Chiliarch of the Gate of Iran," a principal Minister; the *Hamarakar*, a "Chief Cashier" or "Paymaster;" and the *Khohrdean dpir*, or "Secretary of Council," a sort of Privy Council clerk or registrar. The native names of these officers are known to us chiefly through the Armenian writers of the fifth and seventh centuries.<sup>123</sup>

The Sassanian court, though generally held at Ctesiphon, migrated to other cities, if the king so pleased, and is found established, at one time in the old Persian capital, Persepolis,<sup>124</sup> at another in the comparatively modern city of Dastagherd.<sup>125</sup> The monarchs maintained from first to last numerous palaces, which they visited at their pleasure and made their residence for a longer or a shorter period. Four such palaces have been already described;<sup>126</sup> and there is reason to believe that many others existed in various parts of the empire. There was certainly one of great magnificence at Canzaca;<sup>127</sup> and several are mentioned as occupied by Heraclius in the country between the Lower Zab and Ctesiphon.<sup>128</sup> Chosroës II. undoubtedly built one near Takht-i-Bostan; and Sapor the First must have had one at Shapur, where he set up the greater portion of his monuments. The discovery of the Mashita palace, in a position so little inviting as the land of Moab, seems to imply a very general establishment of royal residences in the remote provinces of the empire.

The costume of the later Persians is known to us chiefly from the representations of the kings, on whose figures alone have the native artists bestowed much attention. In peace, the monarch seems to have worn a sort of pelisse or long coat, partially open in front, and with close-fitting sleeves reaching to the wrist,<sup>129</sup> under which he had a pair of loose trousers descending to the feet and sometimes even covering<sup>130</sup> them. A belt or girdle encircled his waist. His feet were encased in patterned shoes,<sup>131</sup> tied with long flowing ribbons. Over his pelisse he wore occasionally a long cape or short cloak, which was fastened with a brooch or strings across the breast and flowed over the back and shoulders.<sup>132</sup> The material composing the cloak was in general exceedingly light and flimsy. The head-dress commonly worn seems to have been a round cap, which was perhaps ornamented with jewels.<sup>133</sup> The vest and trousers were also in some cases richly jewelled.<sup>134</sup> Every

king wore ear-rings,<sup>135</sup> with one, two, or three pendants. A collar or necklace was also commonly worn round the neck; and this had sometimes two or more pendants in front. Occasionally the beard was brought to a point and had a jewel hanging from it.<sup>136</sup> The hair seems always to have been worn long; it was elaborately curled, and hung down on either shoulder in numerous ringlets. When the monarch rode out in state, an attendant held the royal parasol over him.<sup>137</sup>

In war<sup>138</sup> the monarch encased the upper part of his person in a coat of mail, composed of scales or links. Over this he wore three belts; the first, which crossed the breast diagonally, was probably attached to his shield, which might be hung from it; the second supported his sword; and the third his quiver, and perhaps his bow-case.<sup>139</sup> A stiff, embroidered trouser of great fulness protected the leg, while the head was guarded by a helmet, and a vizor of chain mail hid all the face but the eyes. The head and fore-quarters of the royal charger were also covered with armor, which descended below the animal's knees in front, but was not carried back behind the rider. The monarch's shield was round, and carried on the left arm; his main offensive weapon was a heavy spear, which he brandished in his right hand.

One of the favorite pastimes of the kings was hunting. The Sassanian remains show us the royal sportsmen engaged in the pursuit of the stag, the wild boar, the ibex, the antelope, and the buffalo.<sup>140</sup> To this catalogue of their beasts of chase the classical writers add the lion, the tiger, the wild ass, and the bear. Lions, tigers, bears, and wild asses were, it appears, collected for the purpose of sport, and kept in royal parks or paradises<sup>141</sup> until a hunt was determined on. The monarchs then engaged in the sport in person, either singly or in conjunction with a royal ambassador,<sup>142</sup> or perhaps of a favorite minister, or a few friends.<sup>143</sup> The lion was engaged hand to hand with sword or spear; the more dangerous tiger was attacked from a distance with arrows.<sup>144</sup> Stags and wild boars were sufficiently abundant to make the keeping of them in paradises unnecessary. When the king desired to hunt them, it was only requisite to beat a certain extent of country in order to make sure of finding the game. This appears to have been done generally by elephants, which entered the marshes or the woodlands, and, spreading themselves wide, drove the animals before them towards an enclosed space, surrounded by a net or a fence, where the king was stationed with his friends and attendants. If the

tract was a marsh, the monarch occupied a boat, from which he quietly took aim at the beasts that came within shot. Otherwise he pursued the game on horseback,<sup>145</sup> and transfixed it while riding at full speed. In either case he seems to have joined to the pleasures of the chase the delights of music. Bands of harpers and other musicians were placed near him within the enclosure, and he could listen to their strains while he took his pastime.<sup>146</sup>

The musical instruments which appear distinctly on the Sassanian sculptures are the harp, the horn, the drum, and the flute or pipe. The harp is triangular, and has seven strings; it is held in the lap, and played apparently by both hands. The drum is of small size. The horns and pipes are too rudely represented for their exact character to be apparent. Concerted pieces seem to have been sometimes played by harpers only, of whom as many as ten or twelve joined in the execution. Mixed bands were more numerous. In one instance<sup>147</sup> the number of performers amounts to twenty-six, of whom seven play the harp, an equal number the flute or pipe, three the horn, one the drum, while eight are too slightly rendered for their instruments to be recognized. A portion of the musicians occupy an elevated orchestra, to which there is access by a flight of steps.

There is reason to believe that the Sassanian monarchs took a pleasure also in the pastime of hawking. It has been already noticed that among the officers of the court was a "Head Falconer," who must have presided over this species of sport.<sup>148</sup> Hawking was of great antiquity in the East,<sup>149</sup> and appears to have been handed down uninterruptedly from remote times to the present day. We may reasonably conjecture that the ostriches and pheasants, if not the peacocks also, kept in the royal preserves,<sup>150</sup> were intended to be used in this pastime, the hawks being flown at them if other game proved to be scarce.

The monarchs also occasionally amused themselves in their leisure hours by games. The introduction of chess from India by the great Chosroës (Anushirwan) has already been noticed;<sup>151</sup> and some authorities state that the same monarch brought into use also a species of tric-trac or draughts.<sup>152</sup> Unfortunately we have no materials for determining the exact form of the game in either case, the Sassanian remains containing no representation of such trivial matters.

In the character of their warfare, the Persians of the Sassanian period did not greatly differ from the same people under

the Achæmenian kings. The principal changes which time had brought about were an almost entire disuse of the war chariot,<sup>153</sup> [Pl. XLVI. Fig.,3.] and the advance of the elephant corps into a very prominent and important position. Four main arms of the service were recognized, each standing on a different level: viz. the elephants, the horse, the archers, and the ordinary footmen. The elephant corps held the first position.<sup>154</sup> It was recruited from India, but was at no time very numerous. Great store was set by it; and in some of the earlier battles against the Arabs the victory was regarded as gained mainly by this arm of the service.<sup>155</sup> It acted with best effect in an open and level district; but the value put upon it was such that, however rough, mountainous, and woody the country into which the Persian arms penetrated, the elephant always accompanied the march of the Persian troops, and care was taken to make roads by which it could travel.<sup>156</sup> The elephant corps was under a special chief, known as the *Zendkapet*, or "Commander of the *Indians*,"<sup>157</sup> either because the beasts came from that country, or because they were managed by natives of Hindustan.

The Persian cavalry in the Sassanian period seems to have been almost entirely of the heavy kind. [Pl. XLVI., Fig. 4.] We hear nothing during these centuries of those clouds of light horse which, under the earlier Persian and under the Parthian monarchy, hung about invading or retreating armies, countless in their numbers, agile in their movements, a terrible annoyance at the best of times, and a fearful peril under certain circumstances. The Persian troops which pursued Julian were composed of heavily armed cavalry, foot archers, and elephants;<sup>158</sup> and the only light horse of which we have any mention during the disastrous retreat of his army are the Saracenic allies of Sapor.<sup>159</sup> In these auxiliaries, and in the Cadusians from the Caspian region, the Persians had always, when they wished it, a cavalry excellently suited for light service; but their own horse during the Sassanian period seems to have been entirely of the heavy kind, armed and equipped, that is, very much as Chosroës II. is seen to be at Takht-i-Bostan.<sup>160</sup> The horses themselves were heavily armored about their head, neck, and chest; the rider wore a coat of mail which completely covered his body as far as the hips, and a strong helmet, with a vizor, which left no part of the face exposed but the eyes. He carried a small round shield on his left arm, and had for weapons a heavy spear, a sword,

and a bow and arrows. He did not fear a collision with the best Roman troops. The Sassanian horse often charged the infantry of the legions with success, and drove it headlong from the field of battle. In time of peace, the royal guards were more simply accoutred. [See Pl. XLVI.]

The archers formed the *élite* of the Persian infantry.<sup>161</sup> They were trained to deliver their arrows with extreme rapidity, and with an aim that was almost unerring. The huge wattled shields, adopted by the Achæmenian Persians from the Assyrians, still remained in use;<sup>162</sup> and from behind a row of these, rested upon the ground and forming a sort of loop-holed wall, the Sassanian bowmen shot their weapons with great effect; nor was it until their store of arrows was exhausted that the Romans, ordinarily, felt themselves upon even terms with their enemy. Sometimes the archers, instead of thus fighting in line, were intermixed with the heavy horse,<sup>163</sup> with which it was not difficult for them to keep pace. They galled the foe with their constant discharges from between the ranks of the horsemen, remaining themselves in comparative security, as the legions rarely ventured to charge the Persian mailed cavalry. If they were forced to retreat, they still shot backwards as they fled;<sup>164</sup> and it was a proverbial saying with the Romans that they were then especially formidable.<sup>165</sup>

The ordinary footmen seem to have been armed with swords and spears, perhaps also with darts. They were generally stationed behind the archers,<sup>166</sup> who, however, retired through their ranks when close fighting began. They had little defensive armor; but still seem to have fought with spirit and tenacity, being a fair match for the legionaries under ordinary circumstances, and superior to most other adversaries.

It is uncertain how the various arms of the service were organized internally. We do not hear of any divisions corresponding to the Roman legions or to modern regiments; yet it is difficult to suppose that there were not some such bodies.<sup>167</sup> Perhaps each satrap<sup>168</sup> of a province commanded the troops raised within his government, taking the actual lead of the cavalry or the infantry at his discretion. The Crown doubtless appointed the commanders-in-chief—the *Sparapets*, *Spahapets*, or *Sipehbeds*,<sup>169</sup> as well as the other generals (*arzbeds*), the head of the commissariat (*hambarapet* or *hambarakapet*), and the commander of the elephants (*zendkapet*). The satraps may have acted as colonels of regiments under the *arzbeds*.

and may probably have had the nomination of the subordinate (regimental) officers.

The great national standard was the famous "leathern apron of the blacksmith," originally unadorned, but ultimately covered with jewels, which has been described in a former chapter.<sup>170</sup> This precious palladium was, however, but rarely used, its place being supplied for the most part by standards of a more ordinary character. These appear by the monuments<sup>171</sup> to have been of two kinds. Both consisted primarily of a pole and a cross-bar; but in the one kind the cross-bar sustained a single ring with a bar athwart it, while below depended two woolly tassels; in the other, three striated balls rose from the cross-bar, while below the place of the tassels was taken by two similar balls. It is difficult to say what these emblems symbolized,<sup>172</sup> or why they were varied. In both the representations where they appear the standards accompany cavalry, so that they cannot reasonably be assigned to different arms of the service. That the number of standards carried into battle was considerable may be gathered from the fact that on one occasion, when the defeat sustained was not very complete, a Persian army left in the enemy's hands as many as twenty-eight of them.<sup>173</sup>

During the Sassanian period there was nothing very remarkable in the Persian tactics. The size of armies generally varied from 30,000 to 60,000 men,<sup>174</sup> though sometimes<sup>175</sup> 100,000, and on one occasion<sup>176</sup> as many as 140,000, are said to have been assembled. The bulk of the troops were footmen, the proportion of the horse probably never equalling one third of a mixed army.<sup>177</sup> Plundering expeditions were sometimes undertaken by bodies of horse alone;<sup>178</sup> but serious invasions were seldom or never attempted unless by a force complete in all arms; comprising, that is, horse, foot, elephants, and artillery. To attack the Romans to any purpose, it was always necessary to engage in the siege of towns; and although, in the earlier period of the Sassanian monarchy, a certain weakness and inefficiency in respect of sieges manifested itself,<sup>179</sup> yet ultimately the difficulty was overcome, and the Persian expeditionary armies, well provided with siege trains, compelled the Roman fortresses to surrender within a reasonable time. It is remarkable that in the later period so many fortresses were taken with apparently so little difficulty—Daras, Mardin, Amida, Carrhæ, Edessa, Hierapolis, Berhæa, Theodosiopolis, Antioch, Damascus, Jerusalem, Alexandria, Cæsaræa Mazaca, Chalce-


don; the siege of none lasting more than a few months, or costing the assailants very dear. The method used in sieges was to open trenches at a certain distance from the walls, and to advance along them under cover of hurdles to the ditch, and fill it up with earth and fascines.<sup>180</sup> Escalade might then be attempted; or movable towers, armed with rams or *balistæ*, might be brought up close to the walls,<sup>181</sup> and the defences battered till a breach was effected. Sometimes mounds were raised against the walls<sup>182</sup> to a certain height, so that their upper portion, which was their weakest part, might be attacked, and either demolished or escaladed. If towns resisted prolonged attacks of this kind, the siege was turned into a blockade,<sup>183</sup> lines of circumvallation being drawn round the place, water cut off, and provisions prevented from entering. Unless a strong relieving army appeared in the field, and drove off the assailants, this plan was tolerably sure to be successful.

Not much is known of the private life of the later Persians. Besides the great nobles and court officials, the strength of the nation consisted in its *dikhans* or landed proprietors, who for the most part lived on their estates, seeing after the cultivation of the soil, and employing thereon the free labor of the peasants. It was from these classes chiefly that the standing army was recruited, and that great levies might always be made in time of need. Simple habits appear to have prevailed among them; polygamy, though lawful, was not greatly in use;<sup>184</sup> the maxims of Zoroaster, which commanded industry, purity, and piety, were fairly observed. Women seem not to have been kept in seclusion,<sup>185</sup> or at any rate not in such seclusion as had been the custom under the Parthians, and as again became usual under the Arabs. The general condition of the population was satisfactory. Most of the Sassanian monarchs seem to have been desirous of governing well; and the system inaugurated by Anushirwan,<sup>186</sup> and maintained by his successors, secured the subjects of the Great King from oppression, so far as was possible without representative government. Provincial rulers were well watched and well checked; tax-gatherers were prevented from exacting more than their due by a wholesale dread that their conduct would be reported and punished; great pains were taken that justice should be honestly administered; and in all cases where an individual felt aggrieved at a sentence an appeal lay to the king. On such occasions the cause was re-tried in open court, at the gate, or in the great

square; the king, the Magi, and the great lords hearing it, while the people were also present.<sup>187</sup> The entire result seems to have been that, so far as was possible under a despotism, oppression was prevented, and the ordinary citizen had rarely any ground for serious complaint.

But it was otherwise with the highest class of all. The near relations of the monarch, the great officers of the court, the generals who commanded armies, were exposed without defence to the monarch's caprice, and held their lives and liberties at his pleasure.<sup>188</sup> At a mere word or sign from him they were arrested, committed to prison, tortured, blinded, or put to death, no trial being thought necessary where the king chose to pronounce sentence. The intrinsic evils of despotism thus showed themselves even under the comparatively mild government of the Sassanians;<sup>189</sup> but the class exposed to them was a small one, and enjoyed permanent advantages, which may have been felt as some compensation to it for its occasional sufferings.

ROYAL HOUSE OF THE SASSANIANS.





# NOTES TO THE SIXTH MONARCHY.

## PREFACE.

<sup>1</sup> Gibbon (*Decline and Fall*, vol. i. ch. iii. sub fin.)

<sup>2</sup> The ancient writers are liberal in their admission of this fact. (See Justin, xli. 1. § 7; Dio Cass. xl. 14; Strab. xi. 9. § 2; Plin. *H. N.* v. 25; and Herodian, iv. 18.) It is surprising that moderns have so generally overlooked these passages.

<sup>3</sup> *History and Coinage of the Parthians*, published at Cork in 1852.

## CHAPTER I.

<sup>1</sup> The limit, eastward, of the region here described is the course of the Herirud, which pierces the mountain chain in long. 61° E. nearly.

<sup>2</sup> The chief of these are known as the *Daman-i-Koh*, the *Ala Yagh*, and the *Jaghetai* or *Djuvein* mountains.

<sup>3</sup> See Fraser's *Khorasan*, pp. 433, 434, 598, &c.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 380, 405, 406, &c.

<sup>5</sup> Herodotus unites the Parthians with the Chorasmians (*Kharesm*), the Sogdians, and the Arians (*Heratæes*), and again with the Hyrcanians (*Gurghan*), the Sarangians, and the Thamanæans (Herod. iii. 93, 117). In the Inscriptions of Darius, Parthia is connected with Sarangia, Aria, Sagartia (the Iranian desert), and Hyrcania. (See the author's *Herodotus*, vol. iv. p. 162, 2nd edition.)

<sup>6</sup> Arrian, *Exp. Alex.* iii. 25.

<sup>7</sup> Isid. Char. *Mans. Parth.* § 12. Compare Plin. *H. N.* vi. 25.

<sup>8</sup> Hecatompylos. (See Polyb. x. 25; Strab. ix. 9, § 1; Diod. Sic. xvii. 57.)

<sup>9</sup> See especially Arrian, *Exp. Alex.* iii. 23-25; Plin. *H. N.*, l. s. c.; and Isid. Char. § 10-12.

<sup>10</sup> According to Strabo (l. s. c.), the western boundary of Parthia was at the Caspian Gates, or more than a hundred miles further west than Damaghan; but the region immediately east of the Gates is more commonly assigned either to Hyrcania or to Media.

<sup>11</sup> Shah Abbas the First transplanted about 15,000 Kurds from the Turkish frontier to Khorasan, and settled them in the mountain region, that they might guard it against the Usbeks and other Tatar tribes. The descendants of these colonists still occupy most of the range between the Meshed valley and the Kharesmian desert.

<sup>12</sup> Fraser, *Khorasan*, p. 554.

<sup>13</sup> One of the chief of these conveys to the Tejend the waters of the *Tcheshma Gilass*, a small lake beautifully clear, on the western side of the valley, about twenty-five miles above Meshed.

<sup>14</sup> Vambéry, *Travels in Central Asia*, Map.

<sup>15</sup> In this respect the mountains of ancient Parthia present a strong contrast to those of the neighboring Hyrcania. The banks of the Gurghan and Etrek are richly wooded (Fraser, pp. 599-602; Arrian, *Exp. Alex.* iii. 23); while the mountains of eastern Khorasan are almost destitute of trees. (Fraser, pp. 407, 470, &c.)

<sup>16</sup> Even where the surface was gravel, Mr. Fraser noticed "a richer stratum beneath" (p. 550).

<sup>17</sup> Kinneir, *Persian Empire*, pp. 185, 186; Fraser, *Khorasan*, pp. 405, 406.

<sup>18</sup> Plin. *H. N.* vi. 25.

<sup>19</sup> As Bostam (Fraser, p. 336), Khyzabad (*Ibid.* p. 359), and others. (*Ibid.* pp. 373, 374, 380, &c.)

<sup>20</sup> Kinneir, p. 185; Fraser, pp. 343, 379, &c.

<sup>21</sup> The name "Atak" is given to the skirts of the mountains both north and south of Parthia. It is the Turanian correspondent of the Arian *daman*, which has the same application and meaning. (Fraser, p. 245.)

<sup>22</sup> See above, note 15. Yet Strabo says (xi. 9, § 1) that it was "thickly wooded" (*δαρεια*).

<sup>23</sup> Fraser, pp. 401, 405, 432, 433, 436, &c.; Kinneir, p. 175.

<sup>24</sup> Kinneir, p. 185; Fraser, Appendix, p. 25.

<sup>25</sup> Fraser, pp. 319, 379, &c.

<sup>26</sup> So Fraser, p. 335. Macdonald Kinneir, with unwonted extravagance, speaks of the return from dry grain being a hundred, and from rice four hundred fold! (*Persian Empire*, p. 173.)

<sup>27</sup> Fraser, pp. 388 and 406.

<sup>28</sup> Kinneir, p. 184; Fraser, pp. 367, 371, 413, 421, &c.

<sup>29</sup> On the turquoise mines of Nishapur, see Fraser, ch. xvi. pp. 407-417.

<sup>30</sup> See the passage quoted at the head of the chapter.

<sup>31</sup> Fraser, Appendix, p. 134.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 303, 343, and 581.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 436, 552, and 554.

<sup>34</sup> Kinneir, p. 170.

<sup>36</sup> Fraser, p. 557.

<sup>36</sup> Vambéry calls it "that immense awful desert where the traveller may wander about for weeks and weeks without finding a drop of sweet water, or the shelter of a single tree" (*Travels*, p. 302). Mouravieff says: "This country exhibits the image of death, or rather of the desolation left behind by a great convulsion of nature. Neither birds nor quadrupeds are found in it; no verdure nor vegetation cheers the sight, except here and there at long intervals some spots on which there grow a few stunted shrubs." (See De Hell's *Travels in the Steppes of the Caspian Sea*, p. 326, E. T.)

<sup>37</sup> M. Vambéry reckons the entire Turkoman population south of the Oxus from the Caspian to Balkh at 196,500 tents, or 982,500 souls. (*Travels*, p. 309.) Chorasmia was not more than about one-half of this region.

<sup>38</sup> In the Behistun Inscription Darius evidently includes Margiana (*Margush*) in Bactria (col. iii. par. 3, 4). Strabo, however (xi. 10, § 2), Ptolemy (vi. 11), and Isidore (*Mans. Parth.* § 14) make it a separate country.

<sup>39</sup> See the Map to Vambéry's *Travels*.

<sup>40</sup> Strab. xi. 10, § 2. There seems no reason to doubt this statement, though Mr. Fraser supposes that the irrigation could never have been carried to a much greater distance than twelve or fourteen miles. (*Khorasan*, App. p. 56.)

<sup>41</sup> Strab. l. s. c.

<sup>42</sup> See Ferrier, *Caravan Journeys*, pp. 139, 165; Fraser, *Khorasan*, App. pp. 30-32; Vambéry, pp. 257-270.

<sup>43</sup> Strabo gives Aria a length of 2,000 stades (230 miles), and a breadth of 300 stades (35 miles). This would make its area about 8,000 square miles, or less than one-third of the area of Parthia (see text, p. 2).

<sup>44</sup> Ferrier, *Caravan Journeys*, pp. 273, 274.

<sup>45</sup> Fraser, p. 246, and App. p. 24.

<sup>46</sup> Vambéry, p. 288.

<sup>47</sup> Herod. vii. 85. If the Sagartians used the lasso in war, we may be sure that, like the inhabitants of the Pampas, they employed it also in peace, to capture the animals which they hunted.

<sup>48</sup> Eight thousand is the largest number which we find brought into the field by the Sagartians. (Herod. l. s. c.)

<sup>49</sup> See text, p. 2.

<sup>50</sup> See the graphic descriptions of Mr. Fraser (*Khorasan*, pp. 599, 600, 608, &c.)

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.* p. 616.

<sup>52</sup> Vambéry, p. 72.

<sup>53</sup> Σφόδρα ἐνδαίμων (Strab. xi. 7, § 2). According to this writer, a single vine in Hyrcania produced a *metretes* (nine gallons) of wine, a single fig-tree produced sixty *medimni* (ninety bushels) of figs, and corn did not require to be sown, but sprang from the casual droppings of the last year's crop.

<sup>54</sup> When Hyrcania is called by Strabo "large" (πολλή), he intends to compare

it, not with Parthia, but with the small districts occupied by separate tribes along the south coast of the Caspian Sea (Strabo, xi. 7, § 1, 2). A comparison of it with Parthia is difficult, owing to the uncertainty of their respective boundaries; but if we regard the line of demarcation as running along the mountains south of the Gurghan, thence passing to the Alatagh, and proceeding along the water-shed south of Kooshan to the Kurdish range about Mohammedabad, the proportions of the two will be as stated in the text.

<sup>54</sup> See Justin, xli. 1. "Hi et Assyriorum et Medorum temporibus inter Orientis populos obscurissimi fuerunt. Postea quoque cum imperium Orientis a Medis ad Persas translatum est, veluti vulgus sine nomine, præda victorum fuerunt. Postremo Macedonibus, triumphato Oriente, servierunt: ut cuius mirum videatur ad tantam eos felicitatem protractos, ut imperent gentibus, sub quorum imperio veluti servile vulgus fuerunt."

## CHAPTER II.

<sup>1</sup> Diodorus enumerates the Parthians among the nations conquered by Ninus (ii. 2, § 3), and also says that in the time of Cyaxares they revolted from the Medes and placed themselves under Scythian protection. But no value can be set upon these stories, which he adopted from the untrustworthy Ctesias.

<sup>2</sup> See *Behist. Ins.* col. i. par. 6, and *Nakhsh-i-Rustam Ins.* par. 3.

<sup>3</sup> See the great inscription of Darius at Persepolis, par. 2, § 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Behist. Ins.* col. ii. par. 16, and col. iii. par. 1.

<sup>5</sup> Fr. 173.

<sup>6</sup> Herod. iii. 93.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* vii. 66. Compare chap. 64.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.* iii. 117.

<sup>9</sup> As Trogus Pompeius, who is followed by Justin (xli. 1).

<sup>10</sup> Strab. xi. 9, § 3. Compare xi. 8, § 2.

<sup>11</sup> Arrian, Fr. 1.

<sup>12</sup> See Herod. ii. 103.

<sup>13</sup> Diod. ic. Si. 55, § 4.

<sup>14</sup> Herod. ii. 104; Diod. Sic. l. s. c.

<sup>15</sup> John of Malala knows the number of the colonists (15,000), that they were all youths, and all warriors (p. 26; ed. Niebuhr).

<sup>16</sup> Strab. xi. 9, § 3. Οὐ πάντ' ὁμολογεῖται Δάας εἶναι τινὰς τῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς Μαιώτιδος Σκυθῶν.

<sup>17</sup> Dahæ or Dai are found in a great variety of places, as in Persia Proper (Herod. i. 125), in Samaria (Ezr. iv. 9), in Thrace (Thuc. ii. 96), in the tract east of the Caspian (Strab. ix. 8, § 2), &c. It is not probable that they were all really the same people.

<sup>18</sup> The Greeks did not come into contact with the Parthians till B.C. 331. Probably they did not care much to inquire into their origin till after B.C. 255.

<sup>19</sup> Justin, xli. 1; Eustath. ad Dionys. Per. l. 1047.

<sup>20</sup> Strab. xi. 9. § 2. Τὰ ἔθνη τὰ ἔχοντα πολὺ μὲν τὸ βάρβαρον καὶ τὸ Σκυθικόν. Compare Plin. *H. N.* vi. 25.

<sup>21</sup> Justin, xli. 2. "Sermo his inter Scythicum Medicumque medius, et ex utrisque mixtus."

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. "Arimorum patrius ac Scythicus mos."

<sup>23</sup> Strabo calls the Massagetæ Scyths (xi. 8, § 2). Pliny not only includes under the name all the tribes between Armenia and Northern India (*H. N.* vi. 25), but regards it as having originally extended to the Sarmatians and the Germans (ib. iv. 81). According to Strabo, some of the older Greek geographers called all the nations of the north either Scythians or Celto-Scythians (xi. 6, § 2).

<sup>24</sup> See the article on Parthia in Dr. Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Geography*.

<sup>25</sup> The Etruscans in Italy, the Galatians in Asia Minor, the Basques in Spain, are cases in point. It would be easy to adduce others.

<sup>26</sup> Priapatus has indeed been explained as equivalent to the Zendic *Frijapaitis*, "lover of his father" (Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde*, vol. ii. p. 285, note 3). But the etymology is uncertain.

<sup>27</sup> Julian, *Or. de Constant. gest.* ii. p. 63. A.

<sup>28</sup> See Ritter's *Erdkunde*, vol. viii. p. 56.

<sup>29</sup> Justin says that the word "Parthi" meant "exiles" in the Scythic speech (xli. 1), but this derivation assumes the proper original form of the name to be *Parada* (Sanskrit *pardes*, = "of another country"), whereas the earliest and probably most correct form is *Parthwa*. (Compare Greek Παρθυήνη and Παρθυαίοι.) Lassen translates the word "Parthi" by "those who march over the borders" (*Ind. Alt.* l. s. c.), but gives explanation of his etymology. Amianus tells us that a commander of the cavalry was called *vitaxa* by the Parthians; but Hesychius alters both the word and the meaning, making the former *βίσταξ*, and the latter "king."

<sup>30</sup> The Persian form seems to have been *garda*, as in Parsagarda (Plin. *H. N.* vi. 26), which became corrupted into Pasargadæ. The Parthian is, like the Armenian, *certa*, as in Vologesocerta (ib. l. s. c.).

<sup>31</sup> Justin, xli. 3. "Equis omni tempore vectantur: illis bella, illis convivia, illis publica ac privata negotia obeunt." Compare Vambéry's account of the modern Usbeqs (*Travels in Central Asia*, p. 345 and plate opposite).

<sup>32</sup> Ibid. "In cibum parci."

<sup>33</sup> Plin. *H. N.* xiv. 22.

<sup>34</sup> Justin, l. s. c. "Semper aut in externos aut in domesticos motus inquieti; natura taciti."

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. xli. 2. Compare the case of

the Mongols, where the "Golden Horde" alone was free.

<sup>36</sup> Plin. *H. N.* vi. 25.

<sup>37</sup> *Decline and Fall*, vol. i. p. 341. (Smith's edition.)

<sup>38</sup> *Lectures on Roman History*, vol. iii. p. 276; E. T.

<sup>39</sup> On the modern Tadjiks, the settled Iranian population of Bokhara and Kokand, see Vambéry's *Travels*, pp. 357, 381. & c.

<sup>40</sup> Diod. Sic. ii. 2. § 3; 34, § 1 and § 6.

<sup>41</sup> See *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. ii. pp. 234 and 428; 2nd ed.

<sup>42</sup> Herod. i. 153.

<sup>43</sup> Herod. i. 177. Τὰ μὲν νῦν κάτω τῆς Ἀσίης Ἀρταγος ἀνάστατα ἐποίησε· τὰ δὲ ἄνω αὐτῆς αὐτὸς Κύρος πᾶν ἔθνος καταστρεφόμενος καὶ οὐδὲν παριεῖς.

<sup>44</sup> Arrian. *Exp. Al.* iii. 25; Q. Curt. *Hist. Al.* vi. 2.

<sup>45</sup> Herod. iii. 93.

<sup>46</sup> Strab. xi. 9, § 1. Συντελεῖ μετὰ τῶν Ὑρκανῶν κατὰ τὰ Περσικά.

<sup>47</sup> See text, p. 8.

<sup>48</sup> *Behist. Ins.* col. ii. par. 2. Compare *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. iii. pp. 411-413; 2nd ed.

<sup>49</sup> Arrian, iii. 8; Q. Curt. iv. 12.

### CHAPTER III.

<sup>1</sup> Seleucus is rarely mentioned by Arrian. His name occurs only in v. 13, 16; vii. 4 and 26.

<sup>2</sup> See Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece*, vol. vii. pp. 139, 140; Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, vol. viii. p. 517.

<sup>3</sup> Thirlwall, vol. vii. p. 245.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. p. 308.

<sup>5</sup> Thirlwall, vol. vii. p. 401; Grote, vol. viii. p. 576.

<sup>6</sup> Bishop Thirlwall notes that Armenia, shortly before the battle of Ipsus, was independent under Ardoates, a native king (vol. vii. p. 402, and compare Diod. Sic. xxxi. 19, § 5), and suggests that after Ipsus Seleucus was too much engaged with other affairs to bring Armenia under. But either Seleucus or one of his early successors must have reconquered Armenia, for it did not permanently establish its independence till B.C. 190. (Strab. xi. 14, § 5.)

<sup>7</sup> Its limits eastward are somewhat doubtful. Seleucus appears to have ceded a portion, at any rate, of his Indian possessions to Sandracottus before Ipsus. (Thirlwall, vol. vii. p. 395.)

<sup>8</sup> Sandracottus presented Seleucus with 500 of these animals (Strab. xv. 2, § 9). They were largely used both by him and by his successors in their wars.

<sup>9</sup> See, for details of the localities, *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. iii. pp. 158-162, 2nd ed.

<sup>10</sup> Thirlwall, *Hist. of Greece*, vol. vii. p. 120.

<sup>11</sup> This is rather indicated by the pains which he took to improve Babylon (Arr. *Exp. Al.* vii. 17, 19, 21) than distinctly declared by any important authorities. It has been recognized as tolerably cer

tain by modern writers. (See Dr. Smith's *Dict. of Biography*, vol. i. p. 122, &c.)

<sup>12</sup> Strab. xvi. 1, § 5; Plin. *H. N.* vi. 26.

<sup>13</sup> Strab. xvi. 2, § 4.

<sup>14</sup> On the views and intentions of Alexander, see the excellent remarks of Bishop Thirlwall (*History of Greece*, vol. vii. pp. 119-125).

<sup>15</sup> See text, p. 25.

<sup>16</sup> Diod. Sic. xxi. 5.

<sup>17</sup> Pausan. i. 7, § 3.

<sup>18</sup> On this war, see Niebuhr, *Lectures on Auct. History*, vol. iii. p. 286, E. T.

<sup>19</sup> Memnon, *De rebus Heracl.* xx. 3.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.* xvi.

<sup>21</sup> Antiochus I. obtained his name of *Soter* (Saviour) from a victory over the Gauls (Appian, *Syriaca*, p. 130, C.) He was slain in a battle against the same enemy (Phylarch. ap. Plin. *H. N.* viii. 42; Ælian, *H. An.* vi. 44).

<sup>22</sup> Strab. xiii. 4, § 2.

<sup>23</sup> Appian, *Syr.* p. 130, D.

<sup>24</sup> Strab. xi. 9, § 2.

<sup>25</sup> The title was conferred by the Milesians on the expulsion of Timarchus. (See above, note 21.)

<sup>26</sup> See Niebuhr's *Lectures*, vol. iii. pp. 286, 287; and compare Athen. *Deipnosoph.* ii. p. 45; x. p. 428; Hieronym. *ad. Dan.* xi. &c.

<sup>27</sup> Justin gives the name as Theodotus (Justin. xli. 4); but Diodotus, which is the form used by Strabo (xi. 9, § 3), appears upon the Bactrian coins [Pl. 1, Fig. 1] (Lassen, *Indische Alterthumsk.* vol. i. p. 284; *Num. Chr.* New Series, vol. viii. p. 278).

<sup>28</sup> Justin's "thousand Bactrian cities" (xli. 1) are no doubt an exaggeration, but they indicate a truth—that the country was populous and flourishing.

<sup>29</sup> The Bactrians were among the nations selected by Mardonius to continue the struggle with the Greeks when the bulk of Xerxes' army returned home (Herod. viii. 113). They fought well at Arbela (Arr. *Exp. Al.* iii. 13; Q. Curt. iv. 15, § 18), and offered a strenuous resistance to Alexander (Arr. iv. 1-22).

<sup>30</sup> Bactria was made generally a sort of royal appanage. It was conferred by Cyrus on his second son, Smerdis (Ctes. *Exc. Pers.* § 8). In the reign of Xerxes it was first held by his brother, Masistes (Herod. ix. 113), and afterwards by another brother, Hystaspes (Diod. Sic. xi. 69).

<sup>31</sup> See *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. iii. p. 380, 2nd edit.

<sup>32</sup> It is true that the Parthians used the Greek language on their coins and for inscriptions, and also that some of their kings took the title of Φιλέλλην. Still I believe the statement in the text to be a correct one. It applies especially to the early kingdom—from b. c. 250 to b. c. 127.

<sup>33</sup> Strabo (xi. 9, § 3) mentions this view, but implies his own dissent from it.

<sup>34</sup> Arr. Fr. I. Compare Syncell. p. 284, B. and Zosimus, i. 18. The latter says: Ἀρσάκης ὁ Παρθαῖος, διὰ τὴν εἰς τὸν ἀδελ-

φὸν Τηριδάτην ὕβριν ἀγανακτήσας, πόλεμον πρὸς τὸν Ἀντιόχου σατραπὴν ἀράμενος, αἰτίαν ἔδωκε τοῖς Παρθαῖοις ἐκβαλοῦσι Μακεδόνας, εἰς ἐαυτοὺς τὴν ἀρχὴν περιστήσας.

<sup>35</sup> Strab. xi. 9, § 2.

<sup>36</sup> Justin, xli. 4.

<sup>37</sup> See text, p. 10.

<sup>38</sup> Frölich, *Annales Regum Syriæ*, p. 26; Heeren, *Manual of Ancient History*, p. 299, E. T. Mr. P. Smith (*Ancient History*, vol. ii. p. 92), and Mr. Lindsay (*History and Coinage of the Parthians*, p. 4), taking the later part of the same Olympic year, make the Bactrian kingdom to have been founded in b. c. 255.

Major Cunningham has recently argued for the low date of b. c. 246 (*Num. Chron.* New Series, vol. vii. pp. 261-265); by which the Bactrian revolt is made to fall four years later than the Parthian. But Strabo, whom he confesses to be the main authority, is clear that Bactria set the example of revolt, which Parthia followed (*Geograph.* xi. 9, § 2 and § 3).

<sup>39</sup> See Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua*, p. 216, n. 1.

<sup>40</sup> Justin says, after speaking of the Parthian revolt: "Eodem tempore, etiam Theodotus, mille urbium Bactrianarum prefectus, deficit" (xli. 4).

<sup>41</sup> Strabo says: Πρῶτον μὲν τὴν Βακτριανὴν ἀπέστησαν οἱ πεπιστευμένοι . . . ἔπειτα Ἀρσάκης . . . ἐπήλθεν ἐπὶ τὴν Παρθαίαν καὶ ἐκράτησεν αὐτῆς. This authority is followed by Droysen (*Geschichte des Hellenismus*, vol. ii. § 331), Lassen (*Indische Alterthumskunde*, vol. ii. p. 284), Mr. P. Smith (*Ancient History*, vol. ii. pp. 91, 92), and most moderns.

<sup>42</sup> Justin places it in the consulship of L. Manlius Vulso and M. Atilius Regulus, which was b. c. 256. But M. Atilius is probably an error for C. Atilius, who was consul with L. Manlius Vulso in b. c. 250. Eusebius distinctly places the revolt of the Parthians in this year (*Chron. Can.* ii. p. 352); and Moses of Chorene exactly agrees, when he assigns it to the eleven<sup>th</sup> year of Antiochus Theus. (*Hist. Armen.* ii. 1. *ad fin.*) Compare Samuel Aniens. *Sum. Temp.* i. 7, § 13.

<sup>43</sup> See text, p. 23.

<sup>44</sup> Strab. xi. 9, § 2. Κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν οὖν ἀσθενὴς ἦ διαπολεμῶν πρὸς τοὺς ἀφαιρεθέντας τὴν χώραν.

<sup>45</sup> Q. Curt. vi. 2.

<sup>46</sup> Suidas ad voc. Ἀρσάκης. Syncellus indicates that his death was violent (vol. i. p. 540).

<sup>47</sup> See Justin, xli. 5; Strab. xv. 1, § 36; Mos. Chor. ii. 1; Amm. Marc. xxiii. 6, &c.

<sup>48</sup> All the Parthian coins bear the name of Arsaces. A few comparatively have the special name of the monarch in addition. (See Clinton, *F. R.* vol. ii. p. 252; Lindsay, *History of the Parthians*, pp. 134-163, and plates 1-10.) In the public documents also it would seem that the special designation of the monarch was omitted (Dio Cass. lxxvi. 11).

<sup>49</sup> The practice is not that of the Pto-

lemies, who bore the name of Ptolemy as a family appellation, and took some further designation for distinction's sake.

<sup>50</sup> Syncellus (p. 284, B) says 37 years; but the synchronisms in the Parthian history scarcely allow so much.

<sup>51</sup> As by Justin, Ammianus (l. s. c.), and others.

<sup>52</sup> See the inscription of Adule (Böckh, *Corp. Inscr. Gr.* vol. iii. p. 509).

<sup>53</sup> Justin, xli. 4. (On the situation and general character of Hyrcania, see ch. i. p. 12.)

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> Strab. xi. 8, § 8. Ἀρσάκης τὸν Καλλιῆνικον φεύγων Σέλευκον εἰς τοὺς Ἀσπασιακάς ἐχώρησε. Major Cunningham places the flight of Tiridates in B.C. 246, the first year of Callinicus (*Num. Chron. New Series*, vol. ix. p. 33); but there seems to be no reason for supposing that that monarch threatened the eastern provinces until B.C. 237, his tenth year, nor any probability that Tiridates would desert his kingdom until the Syrian monarch actually made his expedition.

<sup>56</sup> On the character and geographical position of the Aspasiasæ, see Polyb. x. 47. This writer assigns them the whole region between the Oxus and the Tanais; but such an extension of their country can only have rested on conjecture. What Polybius *knew* was that they dwelt north of the Oxus, which they were in the habit of crossing to make raids into Hyrcania.

<sup>57</sup> Justin, l. s. c.: "Sed cito, morte Theodoti metu liberatus, cum filio ejus — et ipso Theodoto — fœdus ac pacem fecit; nec multo post cum Seleuco rege, ad defectores persequendos veniente, congressus victor fuit." Major Cunningham concludes, on the strength of a fragment of Posidonius (ap. Athen. *Deipn.* iv. p. 153, A), that Seleucus was not only defeated by Tiridates, but made prisoner (*Num. Chron.* vol. ix. p. 34). But this would make Posidonius expressly contradict Justin, who says that Seleucus after his defeat was recalled to his own kingdom by fresh troubles. (See note 1 on the next chapter.) Others, as Vaillant, Clinton, and H. H. Wilson, have concluded from the fragment of Posidonius that Callinicus must have subsequently made a second expedition against the Parthians, and have then been made prisoner — an expedition of which the Posidonian fragment is the only trace. But it has been well pointed out by Mr. Bunbury that that fragment belongs to the history, not of Seleucus Callinicus, but of Seleucus, the eldest son of Antiochus Sidetes, who was taken prisoner by Phraates II. in B.C. 129 (*Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography*, vol. iii. p. 774). The *sixteenth* book of Posidonius, which contained the passage, treated of this period, and the passage itself, which speaks of a Syrian expedition against *Media*, is inappro-

priate to the time of Tiridates. The objection taken to Mr. Bunbury's view, that Seleucus is called "king" in the passage, has no force. The word βασιλεύς is constantly applied to princes by the Greek writers; and, moreover, Seleucus, the eldest surviving son of Callinicus (Euseb. *Chron. Civ.* i. 40, § 19), would have been *de jure* "king" on his father's death.

<sup>58</sup> "Velut initium libertatis." (Justin, xli. 4, *ad fin.*)

<sup>59</sup> See text, pp. 2 and 19. The conquest of Hyrcania may have raised the Parthian territory from 33,000 to 50,000 square miles.

<sup>60</sup> Justin, no doubt, reports the actual words of Trognus when he says (l. s. c.), "quem diem Parthi exinde solemnem, velut initium libertatis, observant."

#### CHAPTER IV.

<sup>1</sup> Justin, xli. 5. "Revocato Seleuco novis motibus in Asiam."

<sup>2</sup> See note 57, Chapter III.

<sup>3</sup> Justin, l. s. c. "Dato lavamento, regnum Parthicum formavit, militem legit, castella munit, civitates firmat; urbem quoque nomine Dara in monte Zaportenon condidit; cujus loci ea conditio est, ut neque munitus quidquam esse, neque amœnius possit. Ita enim et præruptis rupibus undique cingitur, ut tutela loci nullis defensoribus egeat; et soli circumjacentis tanta ubertas est, ut propriis opibus expleatur. Jam fontium ac sylvarum ea copia est, ut et aquarum abundantia irrigetur, et venationum voluptatibus exornetur."

<sup>4</sup> See Plin. *H. N.* vi. 16. The double resemblance of Apavortene (Zapavortene in one MS.) to Zaportenon, and of Dareium to Dara, is enough to show that Pliny and Justin are speaking of the same locality. The description of Dareium in Pliny as "fertilissimæ inclutæ locus" is a confirmation, if one were needed.

<sup>5</sup> This emplacement depends especially on the identification of Justin's Zaportenon with the Apavortica of Isidore of Charax (*Muns. Parth.* § 13), which lay between Parthyene and Margiana.

<sup>6</sup> See Polyb. x. 23, § 7; Plin. *H. N.* vi. 15; Strab. xi. 9, § 1.

<sup>7</sup> See Vaillant, *Hist. Arsacid.* p. 16; Heeren, *Manual*, p. 300. E. T.; Plate in Smith's *Dict. of Gk. and Rom. Biography*, vol. i. p. 354; Lindsay, *History and Coinage of the Parthians*, p. 4; &c. Mr. Clinton questions the existence of any such king (*F. R. vol. ii. p. 241, note c*); but the name is given in the Epitome of Trognus Pompeius, and the actions are those wrongly assigned by Mr. Clinton to Tiridates.

<sup>8</sup> This is implied in the account of Polybius, especially in the fact recorded, that Antiochus, in reconquering the place, *plundered it* (Polyb. x. 27, § 13).

<sup>9</sup> Justin (xli. 5) makes the number of his troops 100,000 foot and 20,000 horse,

which is not at all an extravagant estimate.

<sup>10</sup> This is the easiest pass from Mesopotamia into Media, and the one which is open the earliest.

<sup>11</sup> Ἀτείχιστος. Polyb. x. 27, § 6.

<sup>12</sup> Ὑπόνομοι. Polyb. x. 28, § 2. On the extensive use of *kanats* in Persia, see text, p. 4.

<sup>13</sup> Polyb. (l. s. c.) Φρεατίας ἀγνοουμένης τοῖς ἀπείροις.

<sup>14</sup> Polyb. x. 28, § 5. Compare the conduct of the European Scyths at the time of the invasion of their country by Darius (Herod. iv. 120).

<sup>15</sup> Polyb. x. 28, § 6.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. § 7.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid. x. 29, § 1.

<sup>18</sup> Διὰ χαράδρας χεμαῖרון. (Ib. x. 30, § 2.) The situation of the Parthian and Hyrcanian towns is, unfortunately, still so uncertain that it is impossible to follow the march of Antiochus upon the map. Hecatompylos probably lay between the Jaghetai and the Alatagh; and it was this latter chain which Antiochus had to cross in order to enter Hyrcania. Polybius calls it Mount Labrus.

<sup>19</sup> As Tambraca and Syrinx.

<sup>20</sup> Justin, xli. 5; "Adversus Antiochum Seleuci filium *mira virtute pugnauit.*"

<sup>21</sup> The expression used by Justin—"ad postremum in *societatem* ejus (sc. Antiochi) adsumptus est"—seems to imply something more than a mere peace.

<sup>22</sup> Polyb. xi. 34, § 9, 10. The terms were the following:—Euthydemus supplied Antiochus with provisions for his army, and surrendered to him all his elephants. Antiochus allowed Euthydemus to retain his government, and recognized his title of "king." A marriage was arranged between Demetrius, the eldest son of Euthydemus, and a daughter of Antiochus, probably not of marriageable age. Finally, an alliance, offensive and defensive (*συμμαχία*), was concluded between the two powers. These favorable terms were granted to the Bactrian monarch, chiefly on account of his representations that a strong Bactria was needed in order to keep in check the northern nomads, who were continually threatening an irruption, which, if it once took place, would barbarize the whole country. This is the first we hear of an aggressive attitude being assumed by the Scythic hordes across the Jaxartes.

<sup>23</sup> Appian, *Syriac.* p. 86 A. Ἀντίοχος . . . ἐσβαλὼν ἐς Μηδίαν τε καὶ Παρθυήνην, καὶ ἕτερα ἔθνη ἀφίστάμενα ἐπὶ πρὸ αὐτοῦ, καὶ πολλὰ δράσας, καὶ μέγας Ἀντίοχος ἐπικληθεὶς. Compare Polyb. xi. 34, § 16.

<sup>24</sup> Justin, xli. 5.

<sup>25</sup> See text, p. 25.

<sup>26</sup> On the Greek cities founded by Alexander in Bactria, see Strabo, xi. 11, § 4; in Sogdiana, see Arrian, *Exp. Al.* iv. 3, ad fin.; in the Paropamisus, ib. iv. 22; on the Indus and its tributaries, Strab. xv. 2, § 9; Arrian, v. 19; vi. 15, 21, &c.

<sup>27</sup> That the Hindoo civilization of the time was not altogether contemptible is shown by Lassen in the second book of his *Indische Alterthumskunde* (vol. ii. pp. 1-111).

<sup>28</sup> See especially the account of Justin, xv. 4, § 12-19. "Transitum deinde in India fecit, quæ post mortem Alexandri, veluti cervicibus jugo servitutis excusso, præfectos ejus occiderat. Auctor libertatis Sandrocottus fuerat; sed titulum libertatis post victoriam in servitutem verterat; siquidem occupato regno, populum, quem ab externa dominatione vindicaverat, ipse servitio premebat."

<sup>29</sup> Palibothra, on the Ganges, is made the head of the kingdom of Sandracottus by Strabo, who follows the eye-witness, Megasthenes (xv. 1, § 36). Plutarch (*Vit. Alex.* § 62) extends the Præsin Indians, over whom he ruled, to the "Altars of Alexander," which were on the Hyphasis, or Sutlej (Diod. Sic. xvii. 95, § 1). Seleucus must have come into contact with Sandracottus in the Punjaub region.

<sup>30</sup> Strabo (l. s. c.) gives as the amount of his force 400,000; Plutarch (l. s. c.), 600,000.

<sup>31</sup> Appian mentions hostilities (τὸν Ἰνδὸν περάσας ἐπολέμησεν Ἀνδροκότῳ βασιλεὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ Ἰνδῶν. *Syriac.* p. 123, B); but Strabo (xv. 2, § 9) and Justin (xv. 1, § 21) speak merely of an alliance.

<sup>32</sup> Strabo, l. s. c. Plutarch (*Vit. Alex.* § 62) mentions the elephants, but not the cession of territory.

<sup>33</sup> On this dynastic appellation, see Lassen, *Indische Alterthumskunde*, vol. ii. p. 196.

<sup>34</sup> Polyb. x. 34, § 11. Lassen has shown that Sophagesenus (*Subhagasena*) was probably a title of *Jaloka*, the son of *Asoka*, and grandson of *Chandragupta* (Sandracottus).

<sup>35</sup> So Wilson (*Ariana Antiqua*, p. 229); but I do not find any statement of the fact by any ancient writer.

<sup>36</sup> Strab. xi. 11, § 1.

<sup>37</sup> Demetrius is called by Justin "King of the Indians" (xli. 6, § 4). He is reasonably regarded as the founder of the city called Demetrias in Arachosia (*Isid. Char.* § 19). His Indian conquests are attested by Strabo (l. s. c.)

<sup>38</sup> This has been questioned by Wilson (*Ar. Ant.* p. 230); but Lassen (*Ind. Alt.* vol. ii. p. 300) regards the evidence as, on the whole, conclusive.

<sup>39</sup> Ptol. *Geograph.* vii. 1; p. 171.

<sup>40</sup> The coins of Euthydemus are found over a wide space, and show his empire to have included the provinces of Sogdiana, Bactria, Margiana, Aria, the Paropamisus, Drangiana, and Arachosia.

<sup>41</sup> See text, p. 33.

<sup>42</sup> Justin says, "Phraates Mardos, validam gentem, bello domuit" (xli. 5). Arrian notes that at the time of Alexander they were "poor" (*πένητες*), but "brave in their penury" (*μάχιοι ἐπὶ τῇ πενίᾳ*. *Exp. Al.* iii. 24).

<sup>43</sup> The position of the Mardians has been much disputed. I am induced to assign them this locality at this time from a consideration of Arrian (l. s. c.) compared with Strabo (xi. 8, § 1 and § 8).

<sup>44</sup> Arrian, l. s. c.; Q. Curt. *Hist. Alex.* vi. 5. The latter writers say: "Interiora regionis ejus haud sane adire sine magna vexatione [Alexandri] exercitus poterat. Juga montium, præaltæ sylvæ, rupesque inviæ sepiunt."

<sup>45</sup> Niebuhr, *Lectures on Ancient History*, vol. iii. p. 445, E. T.

<sup>46</sup> The Mardians were a robber tribe, whose allegiance to Persia had sat very lightly on them. They submitted to Alexander, but probably reverted soon after to their old condition.

<sup>47</sup> Isid. *Char. Mans. Parth.* § 7. Compare Strab. xi. 13, § 7; Diod. Sic. xix. 44, § 5; Ptol. *Geogr.* vi. 2.

<sup>48</sup> See the descriptions of Fraser (*Khorasan*, pp. 287, 288), and Kinneir (*Persian Empire*, p. 119).

<sup>49</sup> Rhages appears in the Zendavesta under the form of *Raha*. It is mentioned in the Behistun inscription (col. ii. par. 13), and in the Books of Tobit (i. 14; vi. 9) and Judith (i. 5).

<sup>50</sup> See *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. ii. p. 273; 2nd ed.

<sup>51</sup> Isid. *Char. Mans. Parth.* § 7. Ἐντεῦθεν Ῥαγιανὴ Μηδία, ἐν ἣ . . . Ῥάγα καὶ Χάραξ, ὧν μεγίστη τῶν κατὰ τὴν Μηδίαν ἡ Ῥάγα. Εἰς δὲ τὴν Χάρακα πρῶτος βασιλεὺς Φραάτης τοὺς Μάρδους ὤκισεν.

<sup>52</sup> Fraser, *Khorasan*, p. 291.

<sup>53</sup> *Ancient Monarchies*, l. s. c. The more northern pass is called the *Girduni Siyaluk*. It is perhaps the "Pylæ Caspiæ" of Pliny (*H. N.* vi. 14).

<sup>54</sup> See above, note 51. Mr. Lindsay (*History of the Parthians*, p. 7) has strangely confounded the Median Charax with Charax Spasini at the mouth of the Tigris, and has imagined that Phraates I. extended his dominion to the Persian Gulf.

<sup>55</sup> So Droysen, *Geschichte des Hellenismus*, vol. ii. p. 716. Isidore's description (ἔστιν ὑπὸ τὸ ὄρος δὲ καλεῖται Κάσπιος) would lead one to place it somewhat nearer the "Gates."

<sup>56</sup> The word "Charax" properly means "palisade," and applied to a town indicates that it was guarded by a palisaded earthwork. On the strength of such palisaded places under the Parthians, see Polyb. x. 31, § 8. Τάφροι γὰρ ἦσαν τριπταί, πλάτος μὲν οὐχ ἕλαττον ἔχουσαι τριάντονα πηχῶν, βάθος δὲ πεντεκαίδεκα· ἐπὶ δὲ τοῖς χεῖλεσιν ἐκάστης χαρακώματα διπλὰ ἐπέκειτο, καὶ τελευταῖον προτείχισμα δυνατον.

<sup>57</sup> Unless this had been the case, Justin would scarcely have dwelt so much upon the meritorious character of Phraates' action (*Hist. Phil.* xli. 5, *ad fin.*).

<sup>58</sup> See Lindsay's *Parthians*, p. 136. The figure is from a coin of this monarch. [Pl. 1, Fig. 2.]

## CHAPTER V.

<sup>1</sup> See text, ch. iv. p. 35.

<sup>2</sup> Bactria appears to have been from the first less centralized than Parthia. Strabo's expression that "those who were intrusted with its government" (οἱ πεπιστευμένοι) caused it to revolt, is remarkable, and implies a plurality of princes. The early coins are in accordance. Those of Diodotus II. show us two other contemporary princes, Antimachus and Agathocles, who at one time held their principalities under him, and at another time were independent. (See *Num. Chron.* New Series, vol. viii. Pl. 8, Nos. 5-7; Pl. 9, Nos. 1-8.) Major Cunningham believes that about B.C. 230-225 there were four contemporary princes of what is commonly known as the Bactrian series. (*Ibid.* vol. ix. p. 128.) According to him, the union of the Greek power in the countries east of Parthia was first effected by Euthydemus, ab. B.C. 225.

<sup>3</sup> Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua*, pp. 229, 234, &c. Lassen agrees, though a little doubtfully (*Indische Alterthumskunde*, vol. ii. pp. 304, 305).

<sup>4</sup> According to Major Cunningham, the Indian provinces remained in the possession of the family of Demetrius, falling to his son (?), Lysias, who had for successors Antialcidas, Amyntas, and Hermæus. (*Num. Chron.* New Series, vol. ix. p. 150. Compare vol. viii. p. 274.)

<sup>5</sup> Justin. xli. 6.

<sup>6</sup> Strab. xi. 8, § 2. Μάλιστα δὲ γνώριμοι γεγόνασι τῶν νομαδῶν οἱ τοὺς Ἕλληνας ἀφελόμενοι τὴν Βακτριανήν. Strabo does not fix the date, but it can scarcely have been either earlier or later than the reign of Eucratidas. (Compare Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua*, p. 236.)

<sup>7</sup> The accession of Epiphanes is fixed to B.C. 175 by the best chronologers. (See Clinton, *F. H.* vol. iii. pp. 317-322.) Mithridates probably became king in B.C. 174.

<sup>8</sup> See 1 Maccab. i. 21-64; and compare Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xii. 5, 6; Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 1, § 3, 4.

<sup>9</sup> 1 Mac. ii.-vi.

<sup>10</sup> Appian, *Syriac.* p. 131, B.; Liv. xli. 25.

<sup>11</sup> Polyb. xxxi. 11; 1 Mac. vi. 1-4. Appian makes him succeed in plundering the Temple (*Syriac.* p. 131, C.), but he is to be corrected from Polybius.

<sup>12</sup> Polyb. l. s. c. The Jews naturally regarded their own wrongs as the cause of their oppressor's untimely end. (1 Mac. vi. 13.)

<sup>13</sup> *Syriac.* p. 117, B.

<sup>14</sup> Porphyr. ap. Euseb. *Chron. Can.* i. 40, § 15.

<sup>15</sup> 1 Mac. vi. 17-62.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* vi. 15, 55, 63.

<sup>17</sup> He was in his twenty-third year. (See Polyb. xxxi. 12, § 5.)

<sup>18</sup> The circumstances of this secret departure are given in detail by Polybius,

who was a friend of Demetrius and privy to his escape. (See Polyb. xxxi. 19-23.)

<sup>19</sup> Strab. xi. 11. § 2. Mithridates is not named by Strabo, but must have been the conqueror, as the contemporary of Eucratidas.

<sup>20</sup> Lassen. *Indische Alterthumskunde*, vol. ii p. 294.

<sup>21</sup> See note 56, Chapter III.

<sup>22</sup> The names furnish but an uncertain ground. Lassen seems to assume the identity of *Turiða* with *Turon*, which is no doubt possible, but still very doubtful, the word *Turon* not otherwise occurring till the time of the Sassanians. Aspionus is not very close to Aspasiacæ. Professor H. H. Wilson placed Aspionus at Andkhuy, and *Turiða* in the Hazareh Mountains, to the south of Maymenê. (See his Map, *Ariana Antiqua*, opp. p. 214.)

<sup>23</sup> The quasi-independence of Media is implied in the account of Justin, who represents the war simply as one between the Medes and the Parthians (xli. 6).

<sup>24</sup> Justin, l. s. c. "Cum varius utriusque populi casus fuisset, ad postremum victoria penes Parthos fuit."

<sup>25</sup> Justin's words ("Mithridates Mediæ Facasin præponit") point rather to an appointment as satrap; but the ordinary system of the Parthians was to govern by means of tributary monarchs.

<sup>26</sup> Justin, l. s. c.

<sup>27</sup> Q. Curt. *Hist. Alex.* vi. 4, § 15.

<sup>28</sup> Xen. *Cyrop.* iv. 2, § 8.

<sup>29</sup> See the author's *Herodotus*, vol. i. p. 345, 2nd edit.

<sup>30</sup> Justin, l. s. c. "Bellum cum Elymæorum rege gessit [Mithridates]."

<sup>31</sup> If the Persians and Babylonians had been reduced by force of arms, Justin would probably have mentioned their reduction in Bk. xli. ch. 6. As it is, we must regard the submission of Babylonians as implied in that chapter, and that of the Persians in Bk. xxxvi. ch. 1.

<sup>32</sup> The reduction of the Babylonians is assigned by Orosius (v. 5) to the time of the contest between Demetrius and Alexander Balas, B. C. 153-151. But the authority is not very good, and it is probable that they submitted earlier.

<sup>33</sup> The reduction of the Bactrians by Mithridates is implied in the statement of Justin, that they were among the people who welcomed the expedition of Demetrius, having experienced the cruelty of the Parthians (xxxvi. 1). The exact time of the invasion and the Bactrian monarch who resisted it, are uncertain.

<sup>34</sup> This relation of Heliocles to Eucratidas is proved by a coin, which shows him to have been associated with that monarch, agreeably to the statement of Justin. (See Wilson, *Ar. Ant.* p. 264; Lassen. *Ind. Alt.* ii. p. 313.) Major Cunningham's idea, that the effigies on the obverse of this coin represent the father

and mother of Eucratidas, seems to me quite untenable.

<sup>35</sup> Justin. xli. 6, § 5.

<sup>36</sup> Wilson, p. 264.

<sup>37</sup> Justin, l. s. c. It may have been in the same spirit that Heliocles took the epithet of *Δίκαιος*, which appears upon his coins.

<sup>38</sup> Justin, xli. 6.

<sup>39</sup> Orosius, v. 5. Compare Diod. Sic. xxxiii. 20. These conquests are somewhat doubtful, since Justin seems to have known nothing of them.

<sup>40</sup> See Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua*, pp. 268-300.

<sup>41</sup> Moses of Chorene makes Assyria subject to Mithridates, whom he calls "the great Arsaces" (*Hist. Armen.* ii. 4, § 1).

<sup>42</sup> See text, pp. 4, 6, and 7.

<sup>43</sup> Q. Curt. *Hist. Alex.* vii. 4, § 26: "Bactriana terra multiplex et varia natura est. Alibi multa arbor, et vitis largos mitesque fructus alit; solum pingue crebri fontes rigant; quæ mitiora sunt frumento conseruntur; cætera armentorum pabulo cedunt."

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.* vi. 5.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.* vi. 4.

<sup>46</sup> Polyb. x. 28, § 3.

<sup>47</sup> Especially the district called Nisæa, where the Nisæan horses were bred. (Arrian, *Exp. Al.* vii. 13; Diod. Sic. xvii. 110, § 6; Am. Marc. xxiii. 6.)

<sup>48</sup> See *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. ii. pp. 289, 290, 2nd ed.

<sup>49</sup> Strab. xv. 3, § 11.

<sup>50</sup> Herod. i. 193; Perosus, Fr. 1, § 2.

<sup>51</sup> Theophrast. *Hist. Plant.* viii. 7; Plin. *H. N.* xviii. 17.

<sup>52</sup> Strab. xvi. 1, § 14.

<sup>53</sup> Theophrast. *Hist. Plant.* ii. 2.

<sup>54</sup> Herod. l. s. c.; Strab. l. s. c.; Amm. Marc. xxiv. 3; Zosim. iii. p. 173.

<sup>55</sup> The troubles of the reign of Demetrius are given with much fulness in the first book of Maccabees, ch. xi.-xiii.

<sup>56</sup> The provinces complained of his cruelty ("propter Arsacidæ regis Parthorum crudelitatem.")—Justin, xxxvi. 1, § 3.

<sup>57</sup> See text, p. 40.

<sup>58</sup> Justin. xxxvi. 1, § 2: "ad abolendam segnitie maculam."

<sup>59</sup> "Quod veteri Macedonum imperio admoti, novi populi superbiam indignè ferebant." (Justin, xxxvi. 1, § 3.)

<sup>60</sup> "Cum et Persarum, et Elymæorum, et Bactrianorum auxiliis iuvaretur, multis proeliis Parthos fudit." (Ib. § 4. Compare xxxviii. 9, § 2.)

<sup>61</sup> "Ad postremum tamen pacis simulatione deceptus capitur" (Ib. xxxvi. 1, § 5.) "Repente insidiis circumventus" (Ib. xxxviii. 9, § 2.)

<sup>62</sup> Justin, l. s. c.; Appian, *Syriac.* p. 132. A.; Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 15; Oros. v. 4.

<sup>63</sup> "Amisso exercitu" (Justin, xxxviii. 9, 2). Comp. 1 Mac. xiv. 3.

<sup>64</sup> Justin. xxxvi. 1, § 5: "Traductus per ora civitatum, populis, qui desciverant, in ludibrium favoris ostenditur."

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.* l. s. c.: "Missus deinde in Hyrcaniam, benigne et juxta cultum pristinæ fortunæ habetur." Compare xxxviii. 9, § 3. "Cui Arsacides Parthorum rex, magno et regio animo, misso in Hyrcaniam non cultum tantum regium præstitit, sed et filiam in matrimonium dedit," &c.

<sup>66</sup> App. *Syriac.* l. s. c.

<sup>67</sup> *Adversa valetudine correptus*" (*Justin.* xli. 6, § 9).

## CHAPTER VI.

<sup>1</sup> Posidonius ap. *Strab.* xi. 9, § 3. Τῶν Παρθαίων συνέδριόν φησιν εἶναι Ποσειδώνιος διττόν, τὸ μὲν συγγενῶν, τὸ δὲ σοφῶν καὶ μάχων, ἐξ ὧν ἀμφοῖν τοὺς βασιλεῖς καθίστασθαι.

<sup>2</sup> There are five instances of brothers succeeding—viz. those of Mithridates I., Orodes I., Gotarzes, Chosroës, and Artabanus III. One of these, however, that of Mithridates I., is ascribed to the will of the previous monarch.

<sup>3</sup> As in the case of Artabanus I., the successor of Phraates II.

<sup>4</sup> *Tacit. Ann.* vi. 42; *Appian. Parth.* p. 141, A. According to this latter writer, the right was hereditary in the family to which the Surena who opposed Crassus belonged.

<sup>5</sup> Phraates IV., on his accession, put to death his twenty-nine brothers.

<sup>6</sup> The high position of the Magi under the Parthian kings is strongly marked by their place in the Great Council. (See above, note 1.)

<sup>7</sup> *Gibbon, Decline and Fall*, vol. i. p. 333 (Smith's edition).

<sup>8</sup> *Amm. Marc.* xxiii. 6; p. 405.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* p. 406.

<sup>10</sup> Agathias, ii. 25. Τὸ μαγικὸν φῶλον ἐγκρατές ἐξ ἐκείνου [τοῦ Ἀρταξάρου] γέγονε καὶ ἀγέρωχον, ὃν μὲν ἦδη καὶ πρότερον, οὕτω δὲ ἐς τοῦτο τιμῆς τε καὶ παρρησίας ἠμμένον, ἀλλ' ὅποιοι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν τέλει ἐστὶν ἢ καὶ περιεράσθαι.

<sup>11</sup> Pliny correctly calls the Parthian provinces "kingdoms." ("Regna Parthorum octodecim sunt omnia," *H. N.* vi. 25.) The Greek writers most commonly call them "satrapies," but incor-

<sup>12</sup> *Strab.* xv. 3, § 24.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* xvi. 1, § 19 This monarch appears to have had special privileges.

<sup>14</sup> *Joseph. Ant. Jud.* xx. 2; *Oros.* vii. 6; *Dio Cass.* lxxviii. 19.

<sup>15</sup> *Dio Cass.* xl. 20; lxxviii. 18.

<sup>16</sup> Ammianus makes the *vitaxæ* eighteen in number, but includes among them the "kings" of Persia, Susiana, &c. He explains the term as signifying "Masters of the Horse and Royal Satraps;" but Hesychius says more briefly, and probably more correctly, βίσαξ ὁ βασιλεὺς παρὰ Πέρσας (i.e. Παρθοί).

<sup>17</sup> *Decline and Fall*, vol. i. p. 339, Smith's edition.

<sup>18</sup> See Lindsay, *History of the Parthians*, p. 213. In one instance the

phrase is exchanged for βασιλεύοντος βασιλέων.

<sup>19</sup> The phrase "Satrap of Satraps" occurs only in one inscription, that of Gotarzes at Behistun, and has been thought to throw some doubt on the identification of the Gotarzes who set it up with the twenty-first Arsaces. But the doubt is scarcely reasonable; and it does not seem unlikely that under the Parthian system the distinct force of the word "satrap" would be lost, and it would come to be regarded as a title equivalent to king.

<sup>20</sup> Appian enumerates twenty-five besides those that Seleucus Nicator built and named after himself or his relations, which he estimates at thirty-five more. (*Syriaca.* pp. 124, 125.) Isidor of Charax finds, upon a single line of route, sixteen (*Mans. Parth.* § 1-19). On the general subject, see Grote, *History of Greece*, vol. viii. p. 474, ed. of 1862.

<sup>21</sup> *Plin. H. N.* vi. 26.

<sup>22</sup> "Civitas potens, septa muris." (*Tac. Ann.* vi. 42.)

<sup>23</sup> "Ager totius Orientis fertilissimus." (*Plin. l. s. c.*)

<sup>24</sup> "Recenti, opibus aut sapientia detecti, ut Senatus." (*Iacit. l. s. c.*)

<sup>25</sup> See what Dio says of the Greek and Macedonian colonies in Mesopotamia at the time of the invasion of Crassus (xl. 13). Compare Appian, *Parthica*, p. 136, D.

<sup>26</sup> *Diod. Sic.* xxxiii. 20.

<sup>27</sup> See text. p. 49.

<sup>28</sup> See *Tiglath-Pileser Inscription*, p. 20; *Behist. Ins.* col. i. par. 1; *Persep. Ins.* passim.

<sup>29</sup> The Seleucidæ from first to last retain the modest ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ. The Græco-Bactrian kings use the same style at first, but afterwards change it for ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΜΕΓΑΛΟΥ. (See Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua*, pp. 237-241.) Tigranes of Armenia, like the later Parthian monarchs, claims to be βασιλεὺς βασιλέων.

<sup>30</sup> Herodian, vi. 6.

<sup>31</sup> On the ordinary Scythic cap, see the author's *Herodotus*, vol. iii. p. 3, and vol. iv. p. 53.

<sup>32</sup> Herodian, vi. 6.

<sup>33</sup> *Amm. Marc.* xxiii. 6: "Ad id tempus reges ejusdem gentis pertumidi appellari se patiuntur Solis fratres atque Lunæ." The same title is borne by the modern Shahs of Persia.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* "In qualibet civili concertatione, quæ assidue apud eos eveniunt, velut sacrilegium quisque cavet ne dextera sua Arsacidem arma gestantem feriat vel privatum."

<sup>35</sup> According to Mr. Lindsay, Priapatus was the first "Theopator" (*History of the Parthians*, p. 213). Others make the first to have been Phraates II., the son and successor of Mithridates (Clinton, *Fasti Romani*, vol. ii. p. 252). The first king who took the epithet of Θεός is thought to be Phraates III. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>36</sup> See *Mos. Chor. Hist. Armen.* ii. 74.

"Fanorum religiones præcipue instauravit. . . Statuas autem, quas Valaraces majoribus suis staturat, Solisque et Lunæ simulachra, quæ ille . . . Artaxata deportaverat, ea Artasires contregit."

<sup>37</sup> Pliny calls it "caput regnorum" (*H. N.* vi. 26); Tacitus, "sedes imperii" (*Ann.* vi. 26); Dio Cassius describes it as πόλις ἐν ἡ βασιλεία [οἱ Πάρθοι] ἔχουσι (*Hist. Rom.* xl. 45); Ammianus (xxiii. 6, p. 402), as "Persidis specimen summum."

<sup>38</sup> Εἰώθασιν ἐνταῦθα τοῦ χειμῶνος διάγειν οἱ βασιλεῖς διὰ τὸ εὐάερον (xvi. 1, § 16).

<sup>39</sup> *H. N.* vi. 26; § 122.

<sup>40</sup> Strab. l. s. c. Ταύτην ἐπιποιούντο χειμάδιον οἱ τῶν Παρθυαίων βασιλεῖς, φειδόμενοι τῶν Σελευκῶν, ἵνα μὴ κατασθαμβεῖντο ὑπὸ τοῦ Σκυθικοῦ φύλου καὶ στρατιωτικοῦ.

<sup>41</sup> Strab. l. s. c. Compare xi. 13, § 1.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.* xi. 7, § 2.

<sup>43</sup> *Deipnosoph.* xii. 8; p. 514.

<sup>44</sup> *Mans. Parth.* § 7.

<sup>45</sup> An occasional flying visit may have been paid to Hecatompylos, where the old palace of the early kings was maintained at least to the time of Strabo (xi. 9, § 1); but the province was not rich enough to furnish food for the vast numbers of the later Court. (*Ibid.*)

<sup>46</sup> Isid. Char. *Mans. Parth.* § 12. In later times Arbela appears to have become the royal burying-place (D. Cass. lxxviii. 1).

<sup>47</sup> Plutarch, *Vit. Crass.* § 21. Comp. Appian, *Parthica.* p. 141. A.

<sup>48</sup> *Plut. Vit. Crass.* § 24.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.* § 21.

<sup>50</sup> *Diod. Sic.* xxxiii. 20.

<sup>51</sup> See Agathias, who, writing under the Byzantine emperors, ab. A.D. 560-580, thus sums up the Parthian period: Παρθυαῖοι, ἔθνος κατήκοον καὶ ἥκιστα ἐν τῷ πρὸ τοῦ ὀνομαστότατον, παρέλυσαν τῆς ἀρχῆς τοὺς Μακεδόνας. Καὶ εἰτα ἐκείνοι τῶν ὀλίγων πλὴν Λιγύπτου ἠγοῦντο, Ἀρσάκου μὲν πρότερον τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἀρξαμένου, ὡς καὶ Ἀρσακίδας τοὺς μετ' αὐτὸν ὀνομάζεσθαι, Μιθριδάτου δὲ οὐ πολλῶ ὕστερον ἐς μέγα τι κλέος τὸ Πασθυαίων ὀνομα εὐεργκότος. (*Hist.* ii. 25, ad fin.)

## CHAPTER VII.

<sup>1</sup> Justin, xxxviii. 9, § 10.

<sup>2</sup> Appian, *Syriac.* p. 132. A. Justin, however, makes the marriage take place in the reign of Mithridates (xxxviii. 9, § 3).

<sup>3</sup> Justin, § 4-8.

<sup>4</sup> "Ut invisus a conspectu submoveretur" (*Ibid.*).

<sup>5</sup> "Talis aureis ad exprobrationem puerilis levitatis donatur" (*Ibid.*).

<sup>6</sup> *Mac.* xv. 10-25; Appian, *Syriac.* p. 132. B.

<sup>7</sup> *Mac.* xiii. 36-42.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.* xv. 26.

<sup>9</sup> *Mac.* xv. 28-36.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* xvi. 8-10.

<sup>11</sup> Euseb. *Chron. Can.* i. 40, § 18; Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xiii. 8, § 2.

<sup>12</sup> Justin, xxxviii. 10, § 2.

<sup>13</sup> See Herod. vii. 186; Tacit. *Hist.* iii. 33, &c.

<sup>14</sup> Orosius wrote about A.D. 420: His chronology is exceedingly confused, but he occasionally preserves in his details important facts, which he has obtained from earlier writers. The passage here referred to is in Book v. ch. 10.

<sup>15</sup> See text, p. 58.

<sup>16</sup> Porphy. ap. Euseb. *Chron. Can.* i. 40, § 18; Mos. Chor. *Hist. Armen.* ii. 2.

<sup>17</sup> Justin, xlii. 1, § 2.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* xxxviii. 10, § 5.

<sup>19</sup> According to Justin, the common soldiers had their military boots fastened with gold (compare Val. Max. ix. 1), and their cooking utensils were of silver.

<sup>20</sup> Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xiii. 8. The presence of Hyrcanus is confirmed by Nicolas of Damascus (Fr. 74).

<sup>21</sup> "Cum execratione superbæ Parthicæ" (Justin, xxxviii. 10, § 5).

<sup>22</sup> *Nic. Dam. Fr.* 74.

<sup>23</sup> Justin, xxxviii. 10, § 6.

<sup>24</sup> Porphy. ap. Euseb. *Chron. Can.* i. s. c.; Appian, *Syriac.* p. 132, B; Justin xxxviii. 10, § 7.

<sup>25</sup> Justin, § 8.

<sup>26</sup> Dio (xl. 46) speaks of the Parthians as disinclined to make war in winter, because a damp air relaxed their bowstrings. But physically, they were as capable of enduring the winter cold as the summer heats.

<sup>27</sup> According to Posidonius, Antiochus in this expedition "feasted daily vast crowds of his men, and allowed his guests not only to consume as much as they would, but even to carry away with them from the banquet, birds, beasts, and fish that had not been touched, to the extent of a wagon-load each banquet; in addition to which he presented them with honey-cakes and garlands scented with myrrh and frankincense tied with golden strings six feet long" (Fr. 17).

<sup>28</sup> See Justin, xxxviii. 10, § 8; and compare Diodorus (xxxv. 17, § 2), where Athenæus, one of the generals of Antiochus, is said to have distinguished himself by behaving worse than others towards those on whom he was quartered, and to have suffered for it afterwards.

<sup>29</sup> Justin, l. s. c.

<sup>30</sup> This seems the only way of reconciling Diodorus (xxxv. 15) with Porphyry (ap. Euseb. l. s. c.) and Moses of Chorene (ii. 2). The last two distinctly state that the battle in which Antiochus fell was fought in the winter. Diodorus, on the other hand, speaks of the spring warmth as having begun to melt the snow, when Phraates sent his embassy.

<sup>31</sup> It would appear from this that Demetrius was either not yet released, or not known to be at large by his brother. Probably the order to release him was sent to Hyrcania at the beginning of the winter; but it may well be that it could not be executed immediately. The se-

verity of the weather makes travelling very difficult on the high plateau during December and January; and it would have been especially hard to cross the Zagros range during this season. Demetrius may not have reached Syria till February, and Antiochus may, therefore, not have known that he was at liberty.

<sup>32</sup> Justin, xxxviii. 10, § 8. "Die statuta omnes apud se divisum exercitum per insidias, ne invicem ferre auxilia possent, aggrediuntur."

<sup>33</sup> Justin, xxxviii. 10, § 9; Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 16.

<sup>34</sup> Diod. Sic. l. s. c.

<sup>35</sup> Ἀνεδέχετο τὴν τῶν βαρβάρων ἐφοδὸν εὐρώστως, says Diodorus. "Fortius, quam exercitus ejus, dimicavit," says Justin.

<sup>36</sup> "Metu suorum desertus occiditur" (Justin, xxxviii. 10, § 10). Athenæus, the general who had advised retreat, was the first to fly. (Diod. Sic. l. s. c.)

<sup>37</sup> Justin, Porphyry, Josephus, and Orosius say that he was slain; Appian (*Syriac.* p. 132, B) and Elian (*Hist. An.* x. 34) declare that he killed himself.

<sup>38</sup> Porphyr. ap. Euseb. *Chron. Can.* xl. 18.

<sup>39</sup> Justin, l. s. c.

<sup>40</sup> Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 17, § 1.

<sup>41</sup> Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xlii. 9.

<sup>42</sup> Cilicia was lost B.C. 102. The towns on the coast, Tyre, Sidon, Seleucia, &c., about the same time assumed independence.

<sup>43</sup> The exact time was sixty-three years, from the spring of B.C. 128 to B.C. 65.

<sup>44</sup> Justin, xxxviii. 10, § 11.

<sup>45</sup> Justin, l. s. c.

<sup>46</sup> See text, p. 53.

<sup>47</sup> Justin, xxxviii. 9, § 8.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. xxxviii. 10, § 10.

<sup>49</sup> Porphyr. ap. Euseb. *Chron. Can.* i. 40, § 18. "Seleucus Arsaces captivum abduxit, regioque more custodiendum curavit."

<sup>50</sup> Justin, l. s. c. "Exsequias regio more fecit."

<sup>51</sup> Ibid. xxxix. 1, § 6.

<sup>52</sup> Ibid. xlii. 1, § 1. The statement is confirmed by Diodorus (xxxiv. 18), who says that Phraates expected to make himself master of Syria with ease (ἐλπίζων ῥδίως αὐτῆς κυριεύσειν).

<sup>53</sup> Justin, xlii. 1, § 2.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. § 3; Posidon. Fr. 21.

<sup>55</sup> Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 21.

<sup>56</sup> Himerus is called "king of the Parthians" by Diodorus—an expression which requires explanation rather than correction. Posidonius speaks of him as ὁν τυραννῆσαντα Βαβυλωνίων (Fr. 21). According to Justin (xlii. 2, § 3), he was Phraates' vicarius.

<sup>57</sup> Justin, xlii. 1, § 4.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. § 5.

<sup>59</sup> The accession of Phraates II. is fixed by various considerations to about the year B.C. 136. His death must have taken place in B.C. 128 or B.C. 127.

<sup>60</sup> Indications of this are his relations with Himerus (see text, p. 60), and the rapidity with which he fell in love with Demetrius' daughter (Justin, xxxviii. 10, § 10).

<sup>61</sup> The natural cruelty of Phraates is shown, 1, in his treatment of his Greek captives ("exercitum Græcorum superbe crudeliterque tractaverat," Justin, xlii. 1, § 4; 2, in his feelings towards the people of Seleucia (ἀλλοτρίως πρὸς Σελευκείας διακείμενος καὶ μνησικακῶν, Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 19); and perhaps, 3, in his appointment of Himerus, whose severities he must have countenanced or at least permitted.

<sup>62</sup> Note especially his winter campaign against Antiochus (see text, p. 58).

<sup>63</sup> As in his treatment of Demetrius after his two escapes, in his conduct towards Seleucus, Antiochus' son, and (in a less degree) in his treatment of Antiochus' body.

<sup>64</sup> This is the impression raised by the story which Diodorus tells about the Seleucenses. "The Seleucenses," he says, "understanding that Arsaces was angry with them, sent ambassadors to deprecate his wrath, and bade them be sure to bring back an answer from the king. So Arsaces took the ambassadors to the place where Pitthides, a man whose eyes had been put out, was wont to sit, and said—'Tell the men of Seleucia that they all deserve the fate of Pitthides!'" As it does not appear that Phraates took any steps to carry out his threat, it can scarcely have been serious.

<sup>65</sup> Besides the above story, there is an anecdote of Phraates told by Posidonius, which deserves to be noticed. "When Antiochus, who made war upon Arsaces," he says, "was dead, and the latter was occupying himself about his funeral, he exclaimed, 'Oh, Antiochus, thy rashness and thy intemperance were thy ruin; in thy mighty cups thou thoughtest to swallow down the kingdom of the Arsacidae!'" (Posid. Fr. 20.)

## CHAPTER VIII.

<sup>1</sup> Justin, xlii. 2, § 1.

<sup>2</sup> Justin's phrase ("In hujus locum Artabanus, pater ejus, rex substituitur") implies their election, which, besides, we know to have been the regular course of procedure. (See text, p. 48.)

<sup>3</sup> As Priapatius died in or about B.C. 181, Artabanus could not in B.C. 127 be less than 54 years of age.

<sup>4</sup> The tyranny of this governor is witnessed to in a general way by Justin (xlii. 1, § 3), and Posidonius (Fr. 21). Some particulars of it are given by Diodorus. "Evemerus," he says, "the Parthian king, was a Hyrcanian by race, and exceeded in cruelty all other tyrants on record. There was no form of punishment which he omitted to use. On accusations of a trivial character he condemned many of the Babylonians to slavery, and sent them with their fami-

lies into Media to be publicly sold. He burnt the market-place of Babylon, and several of the temples, destroying at the same time the finest portion of the city."

<sup>5</sup> Trog. Pomp. Prolog. lib. xlii. "Ut præfectus Parthis a Phraate Mesensis bellum intulit." Meséné was the tract between Babylonia and the sea; it had probably not yet been made subject to Parthia.

<sup>6</sup> Justin, xlii. 2, § 1. "Scythæ autem contenti victoria, depopulata Parthia, in patriam revertuntur."

<sup>7</sup> Strab. xi. 8, § 3.

<sup>8</sup> That the pressure of the nomadic hordes on Bactria began as early as the reign of Euthydemus (B.C. 220-200), appears from his representations to Antiochus (Polyb. xi. 34, § 5).

<sup>9</sup> Strab. l. s. c. Οἱ δὲ συνέθεντο φόρους φόρος δ' ἦν τὸ ἐπιτρέπειν τακτοῖς τισι χῆρνοῖς τὴν χώραν κατατρέχειν καὶ φέρεσθαι λείαν. I understand this as a pasture right similar to that claimed by the Samnites in Campania (Arnold, *Hist. of Rome*, vol. ii. p. 118), only enjoyed at a different time of the year.

<sup>10</sup> Strab. xi. 8, § 2 and § 4; Trog. Pomp. Prolog. lib. xli.

<sup>11</sup> This is the date given. (See Wilson, *Ariana Ant.* p. 303) It does not pretend to exactness; and we may perhaps conclude from the words of Euthydemus (see above, note 8), which were spoken B.C. 205, that the movement commenced seven or eight years earlier.

<sup>12</sup> Wilson, l. s. c.

<sup>13</sup> The Chinese authority for the history of this migration is a certain Changkian, who was sent on a mission from China to the Yuechi in B.C. 139, and returned to his native country in B.C. 126.

<sup>14</sup> The great Scythian invasion in the reign of Cyaxares (ab. B.C. 630) is a well-attested fact of history. (See Herod. i. 103-5; iv. 1; Strab. i. 3, § 21; xi. 8, § 4; Euseb. *Chron. Can.* ii. p. 227; Oros. i. 19; Syncell. p. 214. C; &c.) It is the first invasion of the kind that can be regarded as certain. Justin's story of a Scythic conquest of Asia in the time of Sesostris (ii. 3, § 15; cf. Strab. xv. 1, § 6) being probably apocryphal.

<sup>15</sup> The attack made by Cyrus on the Massagetæ belongs to the year B.C. 559.

<sup>16</sup> The Chinese regard the conquests as made by the Su and the Yue-chi. In migratory movements, the expelled people are constantly led by individuals of the race that has expelled them.

<sup>17</sup> See text, p. 64.

<sup>18</sup> This name is first found in Isidore of Charax, who belongs probably to the Augustan age.

<sup>19</sup> Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua*, pp. 302, 305, 347, &c.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. p. 302.

<sup>21</sup> Strab. xi. 8, § 8.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. § 2.

<sup>23</sup> See Trog. Pomp. Prolog. lib. xlii.; Justin, xlii. 2, § 2; Strab. l. s. c.; Dionys. Perieg. 752.

<sup>24</sup> Trogus said that the Asiani at one time furnished kings to the Tochari. (Prolog. lib. xlii. *ad fin.*)

<sup>25</sup> Strab. l. s. c.; Trog. Pomp. Prolog. lib. xli.

<sup>26</sup> Strab. l. s. c.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. xi. 8, § 8.

<sup>28</sup> Herod. i. 215, 216.

<sup>29</sup> Strab. xi. 8, § 6.

<sup>30</sup> That the Massagetæ were not the only cannibals among the nomadic hordes of these parts, appears from Pliny, who notes the same feature in the Tochari ("Tochari . . . humanis corporibus vescuntur." *H. N.* vi. 17).

<sup>31</sup> See Plin. *H. N.* xi. 53.

<sup>32</sup> Herod. i. 216. Ἐθῶν μόνον ἤλιον σέβονται. Strabo repeats the statement (l. s. c.).

<sup>33</sup> "Bello Tocharis illato" (*Hist. Phil.* xlii. 2, § 2).

<sup>34</sup> See text, p. 64.

<sup>35</sup> "In brachio vulneratus, statim cecidit." (Justin, l. s. c.) The immediate death consequent upon a wound in the fore-arm raises a painful suspicion that the weapon which dealt the wound had been poisoned. (See above, note 31.)

#### CHAPTER IX.

<sup>1</sup> See the passage quoted at the head of the chapter. Compare Trog. Pomp. Prolog. lib. xlii.

<sup>2</sup> Justin, xlii. 4, § 1. That Trogus did not make the mistake appears from the Prologue to book xlii., where we are told that he placed several kings between Mithridates II. and Orodes.

<sup>3</sup> "Cum Scythis prospere aliquoties dimicavit, ultorque injuriæ parentum fuit." (Justin, xlii. 2, § 5.)

<sup>4</sup> Strab. xi. 9, § 2. Ἀφείλοντο τῆς Βακτριανῆς μέρος [οἱ Πάρθηβοι] βία σάμενοι τοὺς Σκύθας.

<sup>5</sup> Isid. *Char. Mans. Parth.* § 18.

<sup>6</sup> "Multos populos Parthico regno addidit." (xlii. 2, § 4.)

<sup>7</sup> Justin, xlii. 2, § 6. Some of the MSS. have "Arthoadisti," others "Artadisti." It may be suspected that the true reading is "Artavadsis."

<sup>8</sup> Appian makes Tigranes the son of a Tigranes (*Syr.* p. 118, 1); but his authority is not very great. Moses of Chorene calls his father Ardashes.

<sup>9</sup> Justin, xlii. 2, §§ 7, 8.

<sup>10</sup> Gen. viii. 4. The geographical term used is Ararat, Երր, which is etymologically quite distinct from Armenia, but which designates the same country.

<sup>11</sup> See Beros. Fr. 7, § 6.

<sup>12</sup> Lenormant, *Manuel d'Histoire Antiqua de l'Orient*, vol. i. pp. 379, 385, &c. The conclusion is based on the etymological identity of a word read as *Lemannen* or *Remanen* with *Armina* (Old Pers) or Armenia. The etymology is, of course, quite possible; but it is against the identification that the word *Armina* seems not to have been known in the country till the times of the Medo-Perians.

<sup>13</sup> See *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. ii. pp. 101, 112, 150, 210, &c. (2nd edit.)

<sup>14</sup> For an account of these inscriptions, see Layard, *Nineveh and Babylon*, pp. 391-403. They have been published by Schulz.

<sup>15</sup> Arghistis contended with Sargon, ab. b.c. 720-700, and the second Bilat-Duri (Milidduris of Layard) with Asshur-bani-pal, ab. b.c. 640.

<sup>16</sup> They style themselves "kings of the Nairi," and relate their successful expeditions into the Minni country. Their inscriptions at Malatiyeh, Pêlu, and in the Miyadab, south of Lake Urumiyeh, indicate the extent of their sway.

<sup>17</sup> *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. ii. p. 210, 2nd edit.

<sup>18</sup> Sir H. Rawlinson in the author's *Herodotus*, vol. iv. p. 206, 2nd edit.

<sup>19</sup> Herod. vii. 73.

<sup>20</sup> See the *Beh. Ins.* col. i. par. 6; col. ii. par. 7, &c. The term 'Αρμένιοι seems to have been first introduced into Greece by Hecatæus (Fr. 195).

<sup>21</sup> In the Behistun Inscription we have three Armenian names, Dadarshish, Arakha, and Handita. Of these Dadarshish is manifestly Arian, being a reduplicated form from *darsh*, "to dare." Arakha has the root *Ar* (= *ariya*, "noble") with the Scythic termination *akh* suffixed to it. Handita has the same participial ending as Khshathrita (Xathritis), Arshita (Arsites), and the like, but its etymology is otherwise obscure. To these undoubted Armenian names we may add from Moses of Choréné Tigranes, Tigrania, Eryandus (= Aryandes), and Zaria; and from Xenophon, Sabaris (= Sybares). Of these, Tigranes, Aryandes, and Sybares are well-known Persian names; Tigrania is a feminine form of Tigranes (compare Roxané); Zaria is from *zara*, "gold," and would mean "golden-haired." Compare the Greek Chrysé and Chrysis.

<sup>22</sup> The later Armenian religion was like the Persian (Strab. xi. 14, § 16). The religion of the Urarda was entirely different.

<sup>23</sup> Steph. Byz. ad voc. 'Αρμενία.

<sup>24</sup> *Hist. Armen.* i. 21.

<sup>25</sup> *Behist. Ins.* col. i. par. 6; Herod. iii. 93; Xen. *An.* iv. 3, § 4; 4, § 4; Arrian, *Exp. Alex.* iii. 8.

<sup>26</sup> *Beh. Inscr.* col. ii. par. 2-13.

<sup>27</sup> Strab. xi. 14, § 9. 'Ο σατράπης τῆς Ἀρμενίας τῷ Πέρσῃ κατ' ἔτος δισμυρίου πῶλους τοῖς Μιθρακίαις ἔπεμπεν.

<sup>28</sup> Herod. vii. 73; Arrian, l. s. c.

<sup>29</sup> Arrian, iii. 16.

<sup>30</sup> Strab. xi. 14, § 15.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.* 'Ἦχρον οὗτοι [Ἀρταξίας τε καὶ Ζαριάδρις] τοῦ βασιλέως ἐπιτρέψαντος.

<sup>32</sup> Appian, *Syriaca*, p. 117, B.

<sup>33</sup> See Mos. Chor. *Hist. Arm.* ii. 3.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* chs. 4-7.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.* ch. 8.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.* ch. 9, § 1.

<sup>37</sup> Ardashes is made by Moses the

father and predecessor of Tigranes, and is given a reign of twenty-five years. (Compare ii. 10, § 1. with ii. 13, § 1.) This would bring his accession to b.c. 121, and would make the expedition of Mithridates II. (ab. b.c. 100) certainly fall in his time.

<sup>38</sup> Strab. xi. 14, § 15. Κατ' ἀρχᾶς μὲν ὤμῆθευσ παρά Ἰάρθοις. Compare Justin, xxxviii. 3, § 1.

<sup>39</sup> As Tigranes lived to b.c. 55, and was eighty-five at his death (Lucian, *Maec.* § 15), he must have been born b.c. 140; in which case he can scarcely have been given as a hostage till b.c. 120. His accession to the throne is generally placed b.c. 96.

<sup>40</sup> The chief use which Rome made of her victory at Magnesia was to augment the territory of her ally, Eumenes of Pergamus, whose dominions she more than doubled on the occasion. (See Niebuhr, *Lectures on Ancient History*, vol. iii. p. 403, E. T.)

<sup>41</sup> Justin, xxxvi. 4, §§ 6-9; Vell. Patere. ii. 4, &c.

<sup>42</sup> Justin, xxxvii. 1, § 2.

<sup>43</sup> Mennon, Fr. 30; Justin, xxxvii. 3; Strab. vii. 4, § 3, &c.

<sup>44</sup> Appian, *Mithridat.* p. 180, C. Plut. *Lucull.* § 14; Justin, xxxviii. 3, § 2; Mennon, Fr. 43, § 2.

<sup>45</sup> Plut. *Sull.* § 5; Liv. *Epit.* lxx.

<sup>46</sup> Plut. l. s. c. Πλείωνας Ἀρμενίων προβοηθοῦντας ἀποκτείναι, Γόρδιον μὲν ἐξήλασεν, Ἀριοβαρζάνην δ' ἀπέδειξε βασιλεῖα.

<sup>47</sup> Strab. xi. 14, § 15; Justin, xxxviii. 3, § 1.

<sup>48</sup> Strab. l. s. c. The district ravaged was that about Nineveh and Arbela (ἐπόρθησε τὴν τε περὶ Νίνου καὶ τὴν περὶ Ἀρβηλα). There is a difficulty in fixing the time of these events, and I have been guided by probability in placing them at this exact period.

<sup>49</sup> Plutarch speaks of the Parthians as *συμμαχίας καὶ φιλίας δεομένους*. Livy's epitomizer says: "Parthorum legati, a rege Arsace missi, venerunt ad Sullam, ut amicitiam populi Romani peterent." Velleius puts the embassy nine years later (i. 24, § 3), when Sulla was in Asia for the second time; but the combined authority of Livy and Plutarch outweighs his.

<sup>50</sup> We find no mention in any author of a treaty being made at this time. That friendly relations were regarded as established is implied in the expression of Livy's epitomizer, under b.c. 66. "Cn. Pompeius cum rege Parthorum Phraate amicitiam renovavit." (Ep. c.)

<sup>51</sup> See Plut. *Lucull.* § 14. Τυγράνης, ἔχων δύναμιν ἢ Παρθοῦς περικόπτει τῆς Ἀσίας.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.* § 21. Τὴν Πάρθων, ὡς ἄλλος οὐδείς, δύναμιν ἐταπεινώσεν.

<sup>53</sup> Cf. Strab. xi. 14, § 15, with Plut. *Lucull.* § 21.

<sup>54</sup> See text, p. 69.

<sup>55</sup> As related by Plutarch, *Sull.* § 5.

## CHAPTER X.

<sup>1</sup> Clinton, *Fasti Romani*, vol. ii. p. 245, note 1.

<sup>2</sup> The known kings between Mithridates II. and Orodes are three only—viz., Sanatroeces, Phraates III., and Mithridates III. The succession of these three and of Orodes to Mithridates III. is certain. Thus the only possible gap is between Mithridates II. and Sanatroeces.

<sup>3</sup> Lucian, *Macrobi.* § 15.

<sup>4</sup> "Varia Complurium regum successionem." A varied succession implies irregularity, which is naturally accompanied by disturbance.

<sup>5</sup> Plut. *Lucull.* § 36. Τῆς Πάρθων ἐννάμεως ὕπ' ἐμφυλίῳ καὶ προσοίκῳ πολέμῳ οὐδ' Ἀρμενίου ὑβρίζοντα ἐρρωμένης ἀμύνεσθαι.

<sup>6</sup> Sanatroeces and Mnasciras, who were respectively eighty and about ninety at their accession.

<sup>7</sup> So Phlegon (*Fr.* 12), who is more definite in his statement than Mr. Clinton, represents (*F. R.* vol. ii. p. 245). Dio (*Hist. Rom.* xxxv. 3; xxxvi. 28) and Appian (*Mithridat.* p. 242, E.) are less exact, but on the whole confirm Phlegon.

<sup>8</sup> Sanatroeces (ΣΑΝΑΤΡΟΙΚΗΣ) is the form found upon the coins; Sinatroces is that of the best MSS. of Lucian; Sinitricus occurs in Appian (l. s. c.) Phlegon gives Sinatruces (Σινατρούκης).

<sup>9</sup> Or, strictly speaking, seventy-nine (ὀδοηκοστὸν ἔτος γεγονός. Lucian, l. s. c.)

<sup>10</sup> The suspicion arises from the fact that, like Phraates II., he takes the epithet of θεοπάτωρ upon his coins, which implies the divinity of his father. It is doubtful if any Parthian monarch besides Mithridates I. had yet been deified. The age of Sanatroeces is suitable. As he was seventy-nine in B.C. 76, he must have been born B.C. 155, or about twenty years before Mithridates I. died.

<sup>11</sup> Lucian, l. s. c. The "Sacauracæ" are not otherwise known, unless we regard them as identical with the Sacarauli (see text, p. 66).

<sup>12</sup> Gordyéné and Adiabéné. (See Plut. *Lucull.* § 21 and § 26.) It is uncertain whether Media Atropaténé, which had also been conquered by Tigranes (Strab. xi. 14, § 15; Plut. *Lucull.* § 26), had up to this time ever formed a portion of the Parthian dominions. Most probably it had not.

<sup>13</sup> Strab. xi. 14, § 15.

<sup>14</sup> Plutarch. *Lucull.* § 26; Strab. l. s. c.

<sup>15</sup> Ὑπκόου ἐσχέ καὶ τὸν Ἀτροματινὸν καὶ τὸν Γορδναίον. Strab. l. s. c. Compare Plut. *Lucull.* §§ 26 and 27.

<sup>16</sup> Appian, *Syr.* p. 183; Plut. *Lucull.* § 14; Justin, xl. 1; Eutrop. vi. 8.

<sup>17</sup> The exact position of Tigranocerta is unknown, but it was probably not far from the modern Mardin. (See Strab. xvi. 1, § 23; Tac. *Ann.* xv. 5.)

<sup>18</sup> According to Strabo, twelve Greek cities were depopulated to furnish Tigranocerta with inhabitants (xi. 14, § 15).

According to Appian, 300,000 Cappadocians were transplanted thither (*Mithrid.* p. 216, C). Plutarch speaks of the population as having been drawn from Cilicia, Cappadocia, Gordyéné, Assyria, and Adiabéné (*Lucull.* § 26).

<sup>19</sup> See Appian, *Mithrid.* p. 229, A. Καὶ βασιλεία καὶ παραδείους κατὰ τὸ πρόσθειον ἐποίει μακροῦς, καὶ κυνηγέσια πολλὰ καὶ λίμνας.

<sup>20</sup> Appian says the walls were seventy-five feet high (*ib.* p. 228, E.). The height of those seen by Xenophon in Assyria was 100 or 150 feet. (*Anab.* iii. 4. §§ 7-11.)

<sup>21</sup> A threat was also implied in the assumption by Tigranes of the title "King of kings" (Plut. *Lucull.* §§ 14 and 21), hitherto only borne by the Parthian monarchs.

<sup>22</sup> One of the predecessors of Sanatroeces had, it would seem, allied himself with Mithridates about B.C. 88 (Appian, *Mithr.* p. 180, C.; Memnon, *Fr.* 30, § 3); but Parthia does not appear to have ever lent him any aid.

<sup>23</sup> The existence of these feelings is indicated, 1, by the speech which Troguus put into the mouth of Mithridates (Justin, xxxviii. 4-7); and, 2, by the alleged letter of Mithridates to the Parthian king. (Sallust, *Hist. Rom.* ix. *Fr.* 12.)

<sup>24</sup> Justin, xxxviii. 5, § 3; Memnon, *Fr.* 30, § 2.

<sup>25</sup> As Ariobarzanes in Cappadocia, and the third Nicomedes in Bithynia.

<sup>26</sup> Memnon, *Fr.* 43, § 2.

<sup>27</sup> Appian, *Mithr.* p. 230, D; Dio. Cass. xxxv. 1 and 3; Memnon, *Fr.* 58, § 2. This last writer calls the Parthian monarch, by mistake, Phradates (*i.e.* Phraates). It is evident from Dio Cass. xxxv. 3, compared with xxxvi. 28, that it was Sanatroeces, and not his son, Phraates, who amused Lucullus and Mithridates with promises.

<sup>28</sup> Plut. *Lucull.* § 30.

<sup>29</sup> Appian, p. 242, E; Dio Cass. xxxvii. 28, B.

<sup>30</sup> Dio Cass. l. s. c. Ὁ Πομπήσιος τὴν φιλίαν τῷ Φράατῃ ἐπὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς προσυνειθέτο. This can only mean that Pompey and Mithridates offered the same terms. What these were is best learnt from Memnon, *Fr.* 58, § 2 (διεπρεβεύετο παραχωρεῖν αὐτῷ τὴν Μεσοποταμίαν καὶ τὴν Ἀδιαβηνὴν καὶ τοὺς Μεγάλους Ἀδύωνας).

<sup>31</sup> Appian, p. 242, E; Dio Cass. xxxvii. 34, C.

<sup>32</sup> Dio Cass. l. s. c.

<sup>33</sup> Dio Cass. xxxvi. 35; App. *Mithr.* p. 243, B.

<sup>34</sup> Appian, *Mithr.* p. 243, C.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.* p. 243, E.

<sup>36</sup> Plut. *Pomp.* § 36; Dio Cass. xxxvii. 5, C.

<sup>37</sup> Plut. *Pomp.* § 28; Dio Cass. xxxvii. 6.

<sup>38</sup> Dio Cass. l. s. c. πέμψας πρέσβεις πάντα ὅσα ἠόκητο ἐπέκαλει οἱ— and again, πρέσβεις τε αὐτὴν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀπέστειλε καὶ πολλὰ μὲν τοῦ Τιγράνου κατηγορήσασκε, πολλὰ δὲ καὶ ἐς τοὺς Ῥωμαίους ὑπεστήμησεν. This

writer evidently feels the injustice with which Phraates was treated.

<sup>32</sup> See the account which Dio gives of Pompey's motives (xxxvii. 7).

<sup>40</sup> Φήσας ὑπὲρ ὀρίων τινῶν τὴν διαφορὰν αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸν Τιγράνη εἶναι. (Dio Cass. xxxvii. 7, D)

<sup>41</sup> Both Dio (xxxvii. 6, A.) and Plutarch (*Pomp.* § 33, *ad fin.*) record Phraates' demand, but the latter alone gives Pompey's reply—ὄρω χρῆσθαι τῷ δικαίῳ.

<sup>42</sup> Plut. *Pomp.* § 33; Dio Cass. xxxvii. 7, D.

<sup>43</sup> Dio Cass. xxxvii. 7. Εὐ ἡπίσταντο ἀμφοτέροι, says Dio, ὅτι ὀπότερος ἂν αὐτῶν τοῦ ἑτέρου κρατήσῃ, τῶν τε πραγμάτων τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις προσκόψει (leg. προσκόψει), καὶ αὐτοὶ μὲν εὐχειρότερος σφίσι γενήσεται. Ἐκείνοι μὲν δὲ διὰ ταῦτα κατηλλάγησαν.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. xxxix. 56.

<sup>45</sup> Justin, xlii. 4, § 1. The fact that both Mithridates II. and III. were engaged in Armenian wars seems to have been among the reasons of Justin's confusing them.

<sup>46</sup> This was clearly the case at the time of the invasion of Crassus, when the Parthians were masters of the whole of Mesopotamia as far as the Euphrates.

<sup>47</sup> Plutarch tells us that the Parthian general who defeated Crassus had previously brought back Orodes from banishment (*Vit. Crass.* § 21). Appian follows him (*Parth.* p. 141, A).

<sup>48</sup> Justin, l. s. c. "Propter crudelitatem a senatu Parthico regno pellitur."

<sup>49</sup> Dio Cass. xxxix. 56. Μιθριδάτην τὸν ἀδελφὸν ἐκ τῆς Μηδίας, ἧς ἤρχεν, ἐξέβαλε.

<sup>50</sup> App. *Syriac.* p. 120, A; *Parthic.* p. 134, A.

<sup>51</sup> Justin, xlii. 4, § 2.

<sup>52</sup> That Seleucia had been in rebellion against Orodes before b.c. 54, and had been recovered for him by the general whom he employed against Crassus, is related by Plutarch (*Crass.* § 21). It is reasonable to connect this rebellion with the civil war between the brothers. Mommsen, however, does so too positively. (*Röm. Geschichte*, vol. iii. p. 323.)

<sup>53</sup> Justin incorrectly says, "*Babyloniam*, quo Mithridates confugerat, diu obsidet, et fame coactos in deditionem oppidanos compellit." (l. s. c.) But it is evident that the town, Babylon ("Babylonem") is intended.

<sup>54</sup> "Plus hostem quam fratrem cogitans." (Justin, xlii. 4, § 4.)

## CHAPTER XI.

<sup>1</sup> Gabinius, to whom Mithridates fled was not proconsul of Syria till b.c. 56, and Mithridates therefore cannot have applied to him till that year. As the civil war followed on this application, and the siege of Babylon is expressly said to have occupied a long time (Justin), Mithridates can scarcely have submitted until b.c. 55.

<sup>2</sup> Liv. *Epit.* cv.; Dio Cass. xxxix. 33.

<sup>3</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 16.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. Ὡς παιδιὰν ἀποφάνων τὰ Λου-

κούλλου πρὸς Τιγράνην καὶ Πομπηίου πρὸς Μιθριδάτην, ἄχρι Βακτρίων καὶ Ἰνδῶν καὶ τῆς ἐξω θαλάσσης ἀνήγεν αὐτὸν ταῖς ἐλπίσι. Compare App. *Parth.* p. 135, C.

<sup>5</sup> The name is given variously, as Abgarus, Acbarus, and Avgarus (Ἀύγαρος); but the first form is the only one used upon the coins of Edessa. Otherwise the form Acbarus might seem preferable, as the representative of the Arabic Akbar. All the princes of Edessa seem to have been called either Abgarus or Mannus.

<sup>6</sup> Dio Cass. xl. 20; App. *Parth.* p. 140, A.

<sup>7</sup> Dio Cass. xxxv. 2, *ad fin.*

<sup>8</sup> Ibid. l. 20.

<sup>9</sup> Crassus left Rome in the year of his consulship b.c. 55, later than Nov. 15 (Cic. *Ep. ad Att.* iv. 13). He took ship from Brundisium before the storms of winter were over (Plut. *Crass.* § 17), proceeded to Asia Minor, and marched rapidly through Galatia (*ἡπειρογο διὰ Γαλατίας, ib.*) into Syria, where he must have arrived as early as April or May. Mommsen, however, overstates the case, when he makes him reach Syria "at the very beginning of 700" (bereits Anfang 700).

<sup>10</sup> Dio Cass. xl. 13. Compare Isid. *Char. Mans. Parth.* § 1. The chief of these cities were Apameia, Anthemusias or Charax Sidæ, Ichneæ, and Nicephorium.

<sup>11</sup> Dio Cass. xl. 12. This engagement took place near Ichneæ, which was on the Belik, about seventeen miles north of Rakkah (Nicephorium).

<sup>12</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 17; Dio Cass. xl. 13.

<sup>13</sup> Seven thousand foot and a thousand horse. (Plut. l. s. c.)

<sup>14</sup> It is certain that Crassus plundered the ancient shrine of Atargatis or Derceto at Hierapolis (Plut. *Crass.* § 17; App. *Parth.* p. 137, B). According to Josephus (*Ant. Jud.* xiv. 7, § 1), he also made a journey to Jerusalem for the express purpose of plundering the Jewish Temple. (Compare Orosius, vi. 13.)

<sup>15</sup> Ἐπιγράφων καὶ δήμοις καὶ δυναστείαις στρατιωτῶν καταλόγους, εἴτ' ἀνείεις ἀργύριον διδόντας. (Plut. *Crass.* l. s. c.)

<sup>16</sup> The intention of Crassus to attack the Parthians was well known at Rome, and was opposed by a powerful party. (See Plut. *Crass.* § 16; Cic. *Ep. ad Div.* v. 8; &c.)

<sup>17</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 18; Dio Cass. xl. 16.

<sup>18</sup> Dean Merivale speaks of some of the Roman detachments in Mesopotamia as "compelled to abandon their posts" (*Roman Empire*, vol. ii. p. 11); but I find no such statement in the authorities. Dio says that a Parthian army was sent against the places that had been taken and those that had fallen away (l. s. c.); Plutarch adds that attacks and combats took place, and that some of the soldiers in garrison, escaping from the beleaguered towns, brought Crassus an exaggerated account of the difficulties of Parthian warfare (l. s. c.).

<sup>19</sup> Artavasdes offered a contingent of

30,000 foot and 16,000 horse, of whom 10,000 should be heavily armed. Crassus replied "that his march would lie through Mesopotamia, as he had left there many good soldiers." (Plut. l. s. c.)

<sup>20</sup> This point, as already stated, was probably the modern Bir, or Bireh-jik, which best answers on the whole to the Roman "Zeugma." (See the note of C. Müller on Isid. Char. *Mans. Parth.* § 1.) It is not to be confounded with *Rum-kaleh* (twenty-six miles higher up the river), nor with Thapsacus (160 miles lower down), where Alexander crossed. Dio (xl. 17) has misled Dean Merivale. (*R. E.* vol. ii. page 13, note.)

<sup>21</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 20. The seven legions of this writer may be estimated roughly at 35,000 footmen. Florus (iii. 11) raises the number of legions to eleven, and Appian (*Bell. Civ.* iii. 18) makes the entire force amount to 100,000 men.

<sup>22</sup> Ἄμα φύλακα τοῦ μὴ κυκλωθῆναι τὸν ποταμὸν σχόντας. (Plut. *Crass.* l. s. c.)

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* § 22. Artavasdes is said to have suggested this route.

<sup>24</sup> Arrian. *Exp. Alex.* iii. 7.

<sup>25</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 21.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* § 20 and § 22.

<sup>27</sup> See Chesney, *Euphrates Expedition*, vol. i. pp. 46-49; Niebuhr, *Voyage en Arabie*, pp. 320-334; Pocock, *Description of the East*, vol. ii. pp. 158-163.

<sup>28</sup> On the line of route between Zeugma and Nicephorium, which must have nearly coincided with the march of Crassus, Isidore places three cities, one village, and four fortified posts. (*Mans. Parth.* § 1.)

<sup>29</sup> Plut. *Crass.* 21; Dio Cass. xl. 16.

<sup>30</sup> It has been already observed that Surenas, or Surena, was properly an official title. (See text, p. 48.) Plutarch, however, Dio, and the Pseudo-Appian use it as a proper name.

<sup>31</sup> This account is taken from Plutarch (*Crass.* § 21).

<sup>32</sup> Mommsen regards the employment of cavalry only against Crassus as a "brilliant idea" (genialen Gedanken) of the Parthian commander (*Geschichte*, vol. iii. p. 328).

<sup>33</sup> See *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. iii. pp. 178-179, 2nd edit.

<sup>34</sup> On the ordinary Scythic equipment of a light horseman, see the author's *Herodotus*, vol. iii. p. 34, 2nd edit. There is no reason to suppose that the Parthian was different.

<sup>35</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 24, *ad fin.*; Virg. *Georg.* iii. 31; Hor. *Od.* i. 19, 11; ii. 13, 16; Justin, xli. 2; Tac. *An.* vi. 35, &c.

<sup>36</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 25.

<sup>37</sup> Plutarch speaks of the "barbed points" (ἡγκιστρωμένας ἀκίδας) of the Parthian arrows. (l. s. c.)

<sup>38</sup> The Greeks called these horsemen *καταφράκτους*, "protected, covered up." They are best described by Heliodorus (*Æthiop.* ix. pp. 431-433).

<sup>39</sup> See Justin, xli. 2, § 10. "Munimentum ipsis equisque loriceæ plumatæ sunt,

quæ utrumque toto corpore tegunt." Compare Virg. *Æn.* xi. 710.

<sup>40</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 24. Κράνεσι τοῦ Μαρ-γιανοῦ σιδήρου στιλβοντος ἐξὺ καὶ πυριλαμπές.

<sup>41</sup> The *contus* (κόντος) of the Greeks and Romans.

<sup>42</sup> See *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. iii. p. 178, 2nd edit.

<sup>43</sup> They are called "a vast number" (πλήθος πολύ, Plut. *Crass.* § 23), and "an immense body" (*copiæ immanes*, Vell. Pat. ii. 46). The Parthians brought 50,000 horse into the field against Antony (Justin, xli. 2, § 6).

<sup>44</sup> Dio Cass. xl. 21.

<sup>45</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 22.

<sup>46</sup> The arguments of Dean Merivale are conclusive (*Roman Empire*, vol. ii. pp. 18, 19); but he somewhat mars their effect by suggesting that Plutarch may have confounded the Belik with the Khabour, and that the battle may have really been fought on the latter stream. The general tradition that the scene of the fight was near Carrhæ, and the special mention of Ichnæ as also in the neighborhood (Plut. *Crass.* § 25), make it certain that the scene is rightly placed on the Belik, since both those cities were on that river.

<sup>47</sup> See Mommsen, *Röm. Geschichte*, vol. iii. p. 327. This writer shows no knowledge of the real character of the country.

<sup>48</sup> Dio has no mention of sands or deserts. On the contrary, he makes the scene of the battle hilly ground, partly covered with trees (xl. 21).

<sup>49</sup> The direct distance from Zeugma to the probable scene of the engagement (half-way between Carrhæ and Ichnæ) is less than eighty miles. The army, however, did not take this line, but marched at first along the left bank of the Euphrates. From the nearest bend of the Euphrates to the scene of action is less than fifty miles.

<sup>50</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 23; Dio Cass. xl. 23.

<sup>51</sup> Plut. *Crass.* p. 22, *ad fin.* This account is more probable than that of Dio, that he remained with the Romans till after the death of the young Crassus, and then fell upon their rear while the Parthians attacked in front. (Dio Cass. xl. 23.)

<sup>52</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 23.

<sup>53</sup> Dio Cass. xl. 21. Ἡ τε χώρα ἀνώμαλος πη ἦν καὶ δένδρα εἶχε.

<sup>54</sup> Plut. *Crass.* l. s. c.

<sup>55</sup> So Plut. (*Crass.* § 24). But it may be doubted if the intention really existed.

<sup>56</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 23.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.* § 24.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.* § 25. Compare Lucan, *Phars.* viii. 386-387.

<sup>59</sup> "Fight cohorts" (Plutarch) would be about this number.

<sup>60</sup> Dio says that not a single prisoner was taken on the first day (xl. 24); but Plutarch allows the capture of 500 (*Crass.* § 25, *ad fin.*).

<sup>61</sup> On the position of Ichnæ, see Is. Char. *Mans. Parth.* § 1; and compare Mons. C. Müller's note *ad loc.*

<sup>62</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 26.

<sup>63</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 27; Dio Cass. xl. 22.

<sup>64</sup> Dio Cass. xl. 24. Οἱ τε κοιτοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων οἱ μὲν ἀπαστραφῆσαν, οἱ δὲ ἐκλάσθησαν, καὶ αἱ νευραὶ . . . ἐρράγησαν· τὰ τε βίλη ἐξετοξεύθη, καὶ τὰ ξιφῆ πάντα ἀπμυβλύθη· τό τε μέγιστον, οἱ ἄνδρες αὐτοὶ φονεύοντες ἐξέκαμον.

<sup>65</sup> On the Persian practice, see *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. iii. p. 191, 2nd edit. Fear of a night attack, and the difficulty of unfastening and caparisoning their horses in a hurry, were at the root of the custom.

<sup>66</sup> Plut. *Crass.* l. s. c.

<sup>67</sup> So Plutarch (§ 28). Οἱ Πάρθοι, νυκτὸς μὲν αἰσθημένοι τὴν ἀπόδρασιν, οὐκ ἐδίωκον. Dean Merivale has, I think, misunderstood a somewhat obscure passage in the preceding section—where the retreating army is said to have *thought* the enemy was upon them (ὡς ἐπιφερομένων τῶν πολεμίων)—and has made the Parthians start in pursuit, but soon give up the attempt, because "their horses, after a long day's service, were unable to keep pace with the headlong rush of desperate men." This is not very probable, and it is certainly not contained in the authorities.

<sup>68</sup> See Lucan, *Pharsalia*, viii. 377-379: "Non aries illis, non ulla est machina belli:

Haud fossas implere valent; Parthoque sequente

Murus erit, quodcunque potest obstrare sagittæ."

Compare Tacit. *Ann.* xv. 4.

<sup>69</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 29.

<sup>70</sup> I do not understand why Dr. Mommsen speaks of Sinnaca as a "fort" (*Festung*, vol. iii. p. 330). Plutarch seems to regard it as a mere hill) note the expression ἄλλον λόφον, ὑποκείμενον τοῖς Σιννάκοις; and Strabo only calls it a "place" (χωρίον, xvi. 1, § 23).

<sup>71</sup> See text, p. 86.

<sup>72</sup> Mommsen seems to doubt whether the Parthians really intended any treachery (*Geschichte*, vol. iii. p. 330). But the Romans can scarcely have been mistaken upon the point. Such treachery has been constant in the East from the time of the Ten Thousand to the Afghan war of 1841.

<sup>73</sup> Plutarch makes him killed by a Parthian named Pomaxæthres, but confesses that the exact truth was not known (*Crass.* § 31). Dio gives both accounts (xl. 27).

<sup>74</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 31, *ad fin.*

<sup>75</sup> Plin. *H. N.* vi. 16.

<sup>76</sup> See the well known passage of Horace (*Od.* iii. 5, 5):—

"Milesne Crassi conjuge barbara," &c.

<sup>77</sup> The Roman captives served as soldiers in the Parthian armies (Vell. Pat. ii. 82; Florus, iv. 10).

<sup>78</sup> "Romanos rerum dominos" (Virg. *Æn.* i. 282).

<sup>79</sup> As Julian did (Amm. Marc. xxiii. 5).

<sup>80</sup> See Justin. xli. 1, § 7:—"Parthi, a Romanis trinis bellis, per maximos duces florentissimis temporibus lacessiti, soli ex omnibus gentibus non pares solunt, verum etiam victores fuere." And Dio (xl. 14):—τελευτώντες δὲ, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτο καὶ τῆς δόξης καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ἐχώρησαν, ὥστε καὶ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις τότε ἀντιπολεμήσας, καὶ δειῦρο ἀεὶ ἰντίπαλοι νομίζεσθαι.

<sup>81</sup> Compare besides the passages above quoted, Strab. xi. 9, § 2; Plin. *H. N.* v. 25; and Herodian, iv. 18.

<sup>82</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 33.

<sup>83</sup> Eurip. *Bacch.* 1169-1200 (ed. Dindorf).

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.* 1170-1172:—

Φέρομεν ἐξ ὄρους  
ἔλικα νεότερον ἐπὶ μέλαθρα,  
μακαρίαν θήραν.

<sup>86</sup> Compare the proceedings of Tomyris with the head of Cyrus, as related in Herodotus, i. 214; and for more exact parallels see Appian, *Mithridat.* p. 184, C; and Mich. Palæol. ii. 24.

<sup>86</sup> So Florus (iii. 11, § 11) and Dio (xl. 27). Plutarch omits the circumstance; but I think, with Dean Merivale, that there is no reason why we should disbelieve it. (*Roman Empire*, vol. ii. p. 26.)

<sup>87</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 32. Οὔτοι ταυτὰ γε καταφεισάμενος.

<sup>88</sup> Josephus. *Ant. Jud.* xiv. 7, § 3.

<sup>89</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 33.

<sup>90</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 21. Compare Dio Cass. xl. 12; Oros. vi. 13.

<sup>91</sup> Dio Cass. xl. 28.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibid.* Compare Cic. *Ep. ad Att.* v. 18, 20; *ad Div.* xv. 1; &c.

<sup>93</sup> See, on this point, the interesting despatch of Cicero to the Roman Senate (*Ep. ad Div.* xv. 1).

<sup>94</sup> See the complaints of Cicero in the despatch above referred to; and note that Cicero himself had for his large province not two complete legions (*Ep. ad Div.* iii. 6).

<sup>95</sup> Dio Cass. xl. 28, *ad fin.* Τῶν δῆμων τῇ τε Ῥωμαίων δεσποτεῖα ἀχθόμενων, καὶ πρὸς αὐτοὺς (i.e. τοὺς Πάρθους), ἅτε καὶ γείτονας καὶ συνήθεις σφίσιν ὄντας, ἀποκλινόντων.

<sup>96</sup> Cic. *Ep. ad Div.* xv. 1.

<sup>97</sup> "Cappadocia est inanis." (Cic. l. s. c.).

<sup>98</sup> Cic. *Ep. ad Div.* xv. 3; *ad Att.* v. 20.

<sup>99</sup> *Ep. ad Div.* xv. 4.

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.* xv. 1. "Hoc autem tempore res sese ita habet, ut, nisi exercitum tantum quantum ad maximum bellum mittere voletis, mature in has provincias miseritis, summum periculum sit, ne amittendæ sint omnes hæc provincie."

<sup>101</sup> Dio Cass. xl. 29; Cic. *Ep. ad Att.* v. 20.

<sup>102</sup> Cicero tells us that his cavalry defeated a Parthian detachment within the limits of Cilicia (*Ep. ad Div.* xv. 4).

<sup>103</sup> Dio Cass. xl. 29.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid. Κάσσιος ἰσχυρῶς αὐτοὺς ἀπεκρούσατο.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid. Compare Cic. *Ep. ad Att.* v. 20; *ad Div.* ii. 10.

<sup>106</sup> Cic. *Ep. ad Att.* v. 21; vi. 1.

<sup>107</sup> Cic. *Ep. ad Att.* v. 21: "Maximum bellum impendit." Compare *ad Att.* vi. 1 (p. 91a); *ad Div.* ii. 10.

<sup>108</sup> Dio Cass. xl. 30.

<sup>109</sup> Justin, xlii. 4, § 5. The time of the recall is misplaced by Justin, but the fact may be accepted on his authority.

#### CHAPTER XII.

<sup>1</sup> See text, p. 105. It appears from several coins of Orodes, which bear the legend ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΝ ΑΡΣΑΚΟΥ ΦΙΛΕΛΛΗΝΟΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΡΣΑΚΟΥ ΠΑΚΟΡΟΥ, that Pacorus was associated by his father in the government during the later years of his reign. Hence he is correctly called "king" by Livy (*Epit.* cxxviii.), Justin (xlii. 4, § 10), and Tacitus (*Hist.* v. 9). See upon these coins Lindsay, *History and Coinage of the Parthians*, pp. 147, 148, and compare Pl. 3. Nos. 49 and 50.

<sup>2</sup> Dio Cass. xli. 55. Compare Justin, xlii. 4, § 6 (which, however, is an overstatement) and Cæs. *Bell. Civ.* iii. 82.

<sup>3</sup> Dio Cass. xlii. 2.

<sup>4</sup> Plut. *Pomp.* § 76; Appian, *Bell. Civ.* ii. p. 480, A; Vell. Pat. ii. 53. Dio questions the truth of the report. (l. s. c.)

<sup>5</sup> The design is attributed to him at this time by Dio, or rather by Antony, as reported by Dio (xlii. 46).

<sup>6</sup> Dio Cass. xliii. 51.

<sup>7</sup> Suetonius represents him as intending to enter Parthia by way of the Lesser Armenia, and to proceed cautiously to try the strength of the Parthians before engaging them in battle (*Jul.* § 44). Plutarch says that he meant, after conquering the Parthians, to proceed by the Caspian and the Caucasus into Scythia, from Scythia to assail the Germans, and when he had overrun Germany, to return into Italy by way of Gaul (*Jul.* § 58).

<sup>8</sup> No attempt was made seriously to curtail the Parthian power, much less to conquer the Parthian State, until the time of Trajan (A.D. 115), a hundred and sixty years later. Antony's invasion was a mere ostentatious raid without serious object.

<sup>9</sup> Dio Cass. xlvii. 27.

<sup>10</sup> Appian, *Bell. Civ.* iv. pp. 623, 624.

<sup>11</sup> Appian, *Bell. Civ.* iv. p. 625, D, E.

<sup>12</sup> The authorities are not altogether agreed on this point. Dio says (xlviii. 24) that Orodes temporized, and neither refused the overtures of Cassius nor accepted them. But Justin distinctly states that the Parthians helped Brutus and Cassius (xlii. 4, § 7) and Appian mentions them thrice among the troops who fought at Philippî (*Bell. Civ.* p. 640, C, D).

<sup>13</sup> Octavian, Antony, and Lepidus. There was also a fourth, Sext. Pompeius,

who forced himself into partnership with the other three a little later.

<sup>14</sup> Appian, *Bell. Civ.* v. p. 674.

<sup>15</sup> Q. Labienus, the son of Titus, Cæsar's legate in Gaul, had been sent as envoy to Orodes by Brutus and Cassius (Dio Cass. xlviii. 24), and was at the Parthian Court when news of the defeat at Philippî arrived. Dreading the "proscription" of the victors, he determined to continue with the Parthians, and to put his services at their disposal.

<sup>16</sup> Perusia was taken in January, B.C. 40; but the news of its capture would not reach Ctesiphon for some months.

<sup>17</sup> Strab. xvi. 2, § 10.

<sup>18</sup> Dio Cass. xlviii. 25 (§ 108).

<sup>19</sup> Dio Cass. xlviii. §§ 108-110.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. xlviii. 26 (§ 111). Compare Appian, *Bell. Civ.* v. p. 701, B.

<sup>21</sup> Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xiv. 13; *Bell. Jud.* i. 13.

<sup>22</sup> Joseph. *Bell. Jud.* i. 13, § 1.

<sup>23</sup> Dio Cass. xlviii. 25, *ad fin.*

<sup>24</sup> Ibid. xlviii. 26. Compare Strab. xiv. 2, § 24.

<sup>25</sup> Plut. *Anton.* § 30; Appian, *Parth.* p. 156, A.

<sup>26</sup> Dio Cass. xlviii. 39; Plut. *Anton.* § 33.

<sup>27</sup> Dio Cass. xlviii. 40.

<sup>28</sup> Labieus styled himself "Imperator Parthicus" (Strab. l. s. c.; Dio Cass. xlviii. 26, *ad fin.*); and even put this ridiculous title upon his coins. [Pl. II. Fig. 1.]

<sup>29</sup> Dio Cass. xlviii. 40, *ad fin.*; Plut. *Anton.* § 33.

<sup>30</sup> For the position of this pass, see Strabo, xv. 2, § 8.

<sup>31</sup> Dio Cass. xlviii. 41; Plut. l. s. c.; Strab. l. s. c.

<sup>32</sup> Dio Cass. xlix. 20. Τὸν Πάκορον ὁμοία τοῖς μάλιστα τῶν ποτε βασιλευσάντων καὶ ἐπὶ δικαιοσύνη καὶ ἐπὶ πραότητι [οἱ Σύροι] ἐπιηγάτων.

<sup>33</sup> As Antiochus, king of Commagéné; Lysanias, tetrarch of Ituræa; Malchus, sheikh of the Nabatean Arabs; Chav-næus, Antigonus, and others. (Dio Cass. xlviii. 41; xlix. 19, 32, &c.)

<sup>34</sup> Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xiv. 15; *Bell. Jud.* i. 15, 16.

<sup>35</sup> Dio Cass. xlix. 19.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid. 20.

<sup>37</sup> See text, p. 93.

<sup>38</sup> In describing this battle, I have followed Dio's account (xlix. 20), rather than Justin's (xlii. 4) as at once more graphic and more probable.

<sup>39</sup> See text, p. 14.

<sup>40</sup> Compare on this point Dio Cass. xlix. 20. and 26, with Plut. *Anton.* § 41. Note especially the statement of Dio:—οἱ σφενδονῆται, πολλοὶ τεόντες, καὶ μακροτέρω τῶν τόξων ἰέντες, πάντα καὶ τὸν κατάφρακτον ἰσχυρῶς ἐλυμαίνοντο—and the fact implied in Plutarch that the slingers used leaden bullets (μολυβδεῖς) instead of stones.

<sup>41</sup> Justin. xlii. 4, §§ 12-13. Compare Dio Cass. xlix. 23.

<sup>42</sup> Justin, xlii. 4. § 14.

<sup>43</sup> Dio Cass. xlix. 23.

<sup>44</sup> Orodes had married a daughter of Antiochus, king of Commagéné (Dio Cass. l. s. c.)

<sup>45</sup> According to Plutarch (*Crass.* § 33) Phraates first attempted his father's destruction by means of poison, but the poison failing to take effect, he then smothered him with his pillow.

### CHAPTER XIII.

<sup>1</sup> To reconcile Dio (xlix. 23) with Justin (xlii. 4, § 14), it is necessary to suppose that the grandsons of Antiochus were murdered first, the sons of Orodes by his concubines afterwards.

<sup>2</sup> Dio Cass. l. s. c.

<sup>3</sup> Plut. *Anton.* § 37. Ἄνῆρ ἐπιφανὴς καὶ δυνατός.

<sup>4</sup> Hor. *Od.* iii. 6, 9.

<sup>5</sup> Dio Cass. xlix. 24.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* c. 25.

<sup>7</sup> Dio Cass. xlix. 24. *ad fin.*

<sup>8</sup> The "Fasti triumphales" give under the year A.U.C. 715 (= B.C. 38) the entry "P. VENTIDIUS PRO COS. EX TAVRO MONTE ET PARTHEIS."

<sup>9</sup> See text, p. 109.

<sup>10</sup> So Florus (iv. 10) and Justin (xlii. 5, § 3). Livy says eighteen (*Epit.* cxxx.); Velleius (ii. 82, § 1), thirteen.

<sup>11</sup> These numbers are taken from Plutarch (*Anton.* § 37), whose account is the most circumstantial, and (on the whole) the one most to be depended upon.

<sup>12</sup> Dio Cass. xlix. 25.

<sup>13</sup> Media Atropaténé was sometimes subject to Parthia, sometimes independent. That at this time it was dependent appears from the whole narrative of the war in Plutarch and Dio.

<sup>14</sup> Dio Cass. l. s. c.

<sup>15</sup> See text, p. 115. On the identity of Dio's Praaspa (the Vera of Strabo, xi. 13, § 3) with the modern Takht-i-Suleiman, see a paper by Sir H. Rawlinson in the *Geographical Journal*, vol. x. pp. 113-117.

<sup>16</sup> Plut. *Anton.* § 38, *ad fin.*; Dio Cass. xlix. 25.

<sup>17</sup> So Plutarch (l. s. c.). The "two legions" of Livy ("duabus legionibus amissis," *Epit.* cxxx.) seem to refer to this battle. Compare Vell. Pat. ii. 82, § 2.

<sup>18</sup> Plut. *Anton.* § 39.

<sup>19</sup> Dio Cass. xlix. 26.

<sup>20</sup> Plut. *Anton.* § 39, *ad fin.*; Dio Cass. xlix. 27.

<sup>21</sup> Dio Cass. xlix. 27; Plut. *Anton.* § 40.

<sup>22</sup> Plut. *Anton.* § 41.

<sup>23</sup> If Praasda was, as is probable, the modern Takht-i-Suleiman, this would be the route along the course of the Jaghetu and the eastern shores of Lake Urumi-yeh, which is the road an army would naturally follow. (See *Geograph. Journ.* vol. x. p. 115.)

<sup>24</sup> Plut. l. s. c. Compare Dio Cass. xlix. 28.

<sup>25</sup> Sir H. Rawlinson has shown that

this route corresponds in every particular to that described by Plutarch. (*Geograph. Journ.* vol. x. pp. 115-117.)

<sup>26</sup> Merivale, *Roman Empire*, vol. ii. p. 289.

<sup>27</sup> Dio Cass. xlix. 31.

<sup>28</sup> Plut. *Anton.* § 51.

<sup>29</sup> Florus says that not more than one-third of the legionaries escaped (iv. 10); Velleius, that one-fourth of the soldiers and one-third of the attendants perished (ii. 82). Plutarch estimates the loss in Media at 24,000 men (*Anton.* § 50); but it is doubtful whether he means to include in this the 10,000 destroyed with Statianus. If not, he would regard the army as reduced on its return to Armenia from 100,000 to 66,000.

<sup>30</sup> Plut. *Anton.* § 45, *ad fin.* Φθειρομένων δὲ πολλῶν, καὶ τῶν Πάρθων οὐκ ἀφίσταμένων πολλὰκις ἀναφθέγγασθαι τὸν Ἄντωνιον ἱστοροῦσιν, Ὡ μύριοι.

<sup>31</sup> Dio Cass. xlix. 33. Plut. *Anton.* § 52.

<sup>32</sup> Polemo, who is called "king of Pontus" (Dio Cass. xlix. 23)—that is, of the portion which had not been absorbed into the Roman Empire. On the history of this Polemo, see Clinton, *F. H.* vol. iii. p. 428, note m.

<sup>33</sup> Plut. *Anton.* § 52.

<sup>34</sup> Dio Cass. xlix. 33. Τῷ Πολέμωνι μισθὸν τῆς κραυκίας τὴν μικροτέραν Ἀρμενίαν δοῦναι.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.* xlix. 39.

<sup>36</sup> These are said to have been at first of silver (Dio Cass. xlix. 33, *ad fin.*), and afterwards of gold (*ib.* 40; Vell. Pat. ii. 82).

<sup>37</sup> This king had the same name as the Armenian monarch—viz., Artavasdes. He has, therefore, to prevent confusion, not been named in the text.

<sup>38</sup> Compare Tacit. *Ann.* ii. 3: "Armenia inter Parthorum et Romanas opes infida ob scelus Antonii."

<sup>39</sup> Dio Cass. xlix. 44.

<sup>40</sup> See Plut. *Anton.* § 54; Dio Cass. xlix. 41.

<sup>41</sup> Dio Cass. xlix. 44.

<sup>42</sup> Dio Cass. li. 16.

<sup>43</sup> Justin, xlii. 5, § 4. It was probably now that Phraates, fearing that his seraglio would fall into the hands of Tiridates, murdered all his concubines. (*Isid. Char. M. P.* § 1.)

<sup>44</sup> Tiridates cannot have reigned in Parthia more than about three years (from B.C. 33 to 30); but he continued to claim the title of king and to issue coins till, at any rate, B.C. 26. Coins which seem rightly assigned to him in the British Museum Collection (arranged by the late Mr. De Salis) bear the dates ΕΠΣ and ΣΠΣ, or B.C. 27 and 26. The earliest coin of a similar type which is dated, bears the letters ΟΟΣ, or B.C. 33.

<sup>45</sup> Justin makes these events take place later, when Augustus was in Spain (B.C. 27-24); but it seems impossible that the circumstantial account of Dio (li. 18) can be a mere fiction.

<sup>46</sup> Dio Cass. liii. 33.

<sup>47</sup> The standards were surrendered to Tiberius (Suet. *Tib.* § 9), who was commissioned by Augustus to receive them. Their recovery is celebrated in jubilant chorus by the Roman writers. (Suet. *Octav.* § 21; Liv. *Epit.* cxxxix.; Vell. Pat. ii. 91; Florus, *iv.* 12. § 63; Justin, xlii. 5, § 11; Eutrop. vii. 5; Oros. vi. 21, *ad fin.*; Hor. *Od.* iv. 15, 6-8; Ovid. *Trist.* ii. 227, 228, &c.)

<sup>48</sup> See Tacit. *Ann.* i. 11, *ad fin.*; Dio Cass. *lv.* 33, &c.

<sup>49</sup> As when she assisted Mēherdates against Gotarzes (see text, p. 145).

<sup>50</sup> This date is fixed by the mention in Strabo (xvi. 1. § 28) of Titus as the governor of Syria at the time when the youths were sent to Rome. M. Titus ruled Syria as legate from B.C. 11 to B.C. 7.

<sup>51</sup> Strab. xvi. 1. § 28; Tac. *Ann.* ii. 1; Vell. Pat. ii. 94; Justin, xlii. 5. § 12.

<sup>52</sup> Strabo. l. s. c. The names of two of these youths appear in an inscription found at Rome and published by Gruter (*Corp. Inscr.* p. cclxxviii. 2), part of which runs thus:

SERASPADANES . PHRAATIS  
ARSACIS . REGVM . REGIS . F  
PARTHVS  
RHODASPES . PHRAATIS  
ARSACIS . REGVM . REGIS . F  
PARTHVS

<sup>53</sup> Strab. l. s. c. Τῶν μὲν οὖν παίδων ὅσοι περίεσαν ἐν Ῥώμῃ δημοσίᾳ βασιλικῶς τημελοῦνται.

<sup>54</sup> Among the Latin writers, the idea commences with Velleius, the flatterer of Tiberius (ii. 94, *ad fin.*). From him it passes to Suetonius (*Octav.* § 21), Justin (l. s. c.), Eutropius (vii. 5), Orosius (vi. 21, *ad fin.*), &c. We find it, however, even previously to Velleius, in Strabo. The good sense of Tacitus prevents him from accepting the view.

<sup>55</sup> Tac. *Ann.* ii. 3; Suet. *Tib.* § 9; Dio Cass. *liv.* 9. By a strange mistake, Velleius calls the king whom Tiberius set up Artavasdes (ii. 94).

<sup>56</sup> Tac. *Ann.* l. s. c.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid. Coins of the year B.C. 5 (A.U.C. 749) have the legend

ARMENIA RECEPTA.

<sup>58</sup> Dio Cass. *lv.* 9.

<sup>59</sup> This Tigranes is, I believe, mentioned only in a fragment of Dio (lv. 11), the exact place of which is uncertain.

<sup>60</sup> It has been usual to regard Phraates IV. as having reigned till A.D. 4 (Heeren, *Manual*, p. 303, E. T.; Plate in Smith's *Biographical Dictionary*, vol. i. p. 357; Lindsay, *History and Coinage*, pp. 48, 49); or even till A.D. 15 (Clinton's *Fasti Romani*, vol. ii. p. 246). But the dates on the coins of Phraataces prove that he was king in B.C. 2, and there is no reason to think that he was associated by his father. The difficulty on the point has been in part owing to Dio's calling the son "Phraates" (lv. 11) as well as the father.

<sup>61</sup> Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xviii. 2, § 4 gives

the name as Thermusa; but it appears as "Musa" (ΜΟΥΣΑ) invariably upon the coins.

<sup>62</sup> Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* l. s. c.

<sup>63</sup> Pacorus, the eldest son of Orodes, was of age to receive a military command in B.C. 51, and must therefore have been born as early as B.C. 69 or 70. Phraates, the second son, is likely to have been but a few years younger. He would therefore be sixty-five or sixty-six in B.C. 2.

<sup>64</sup> From the year of the campaign of Antony (B.C. 36) to the commencement of the war between Vologeses I. and Nero (A.D. 58) was a period of ninety-four years.

<sup>65</sup> Till the attack of Trajan. A.D. 114, fifty-two years after the end of the war with Nero.

#### CHAPTER XIV.

<sup>1</sup> Dio Cass. *lv.* 11. It has been usual to regard this passage of Dio (recovered from the *Excerpt. de Legationibus*) as belonging to the reign of Phraates IV., and not of Phraataces; but I have no doubt that it refers to the latter. The phrase τοὺς ἀδελφοὺς ἐπὶ εἰρήνῃ ἀπαιτῶν is by itself decisive. There were no brothers of Phraates at Rome whom he could demand. Neither could Augustus have called in question the royal title of Phraates, with whom he had kept up diplomatic intercourse as unquestioned King of Parthia for nearly thirty years. The misconception has arisen from the name. But it should be remembered that the form Phraataces is a mere diminutive of Phraates, and that it is found only in Josephus, whose Parthian names are not always to be depended upon. (See note 61, Chapter XIII.)

<sup>2</sup> Dio Cass. *lv.* 11. Τό τε ὄνομα τῷ βασιλικὸν καταθέσθαι, καὶ τῆς Ἀρμενίας ἀποστῆναι προσέταξε.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid. Ὁ Πάρθος οὐχ ὅσον οὐ κατέπηξεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀντέγραφεν οἱ τὰ τε ἄλλα ὑπερφρονῶς, καὶ αὐτὸν μὲν βασιλέα βασιλέων ἐκείνου δὲ Καίσαρα μόνον ὀνομάσας.

<sup>4</sup> Vell. Pat. ii. 101. This interview is placed by some in A.D. 2 (Clinton, *F. H.* vol. iii. p. 202; Merivale, *Roman Empire*, vol. iv. pp. 285, 286); but it seems unlikely that Caius would have delayed so long the main purpose of his Eastern expedition. In the Tauchnitz edition of Velleius, the date A.D. 1 is given for it.

<sup>5</sup> Velleius, who gives these details, was himself present at the meeting, and evidently regards it as an event of first-rate importance. "Quod spectaculum," he says, "stantis ex diverso, hinc Romani, illinc Parthorum exercitus, cum duo inter se eminentissima imperiorum et hominum coirent capita, perquam clarum et memorabile, sub iniuria stipendiorum meorum, tribuno militum mihi visere contigit." That Phraataces, and not Phraates, was the Parthian monarch present appears from the MS. reading of the preceding sentence, which

runs thus: "Cum rege Parthorum, eminentissimo juvene, in insula quam amnis Euphrates ambiabat, æquato utriusque partis numero, coit." Recent editors have altered "eminentissimo juvene" into "eminentissimus juvenis."

<sup>6</sup> Dio Cass. lv. 11. "Ὁ δὲ δὴ Φραάτης καθ' ἑαυτὴν ἐπὶ τῷ τῆς Ἀρμενίας ἀποστήναί."

<sup>7</sup> Vell. Pat. ii. 102; Suet. Octav. § 65; Tacit. Ann. i. 3; Zonaras, p. 539, D.

<sup>8</sup> Dio (l. s. c.) notes this, assigning two reasons for the withdrawal of the Parthian claims to Armenia, the presence of Caius in Syria, and the Parthian king's expectation of disturbances among his subjects (τὰ οἰκεία παραττόμενα μίσει αὐτοῦ ὑπετόπασε).

<sup>9</sup> Joseph. Ant. Jud. xviii. 2, § 4.

<sup>10</sup> It is perhaps doubtful whether Phraates IV. had not done the same during his later years, as Mionnet (*Médailles*, supplément. tom. viii. pp. 441-443) and Mr. Lindsay (*History and Coinage*, p. 149) imagine. On the whole, however, I incline to the belief that the Musa coins belong wholly to Phraataces.

<sup>11</sup> The coins of Phraataces have on the one side his head, which is being crowned by two Victories; on the other the head of Musa, with the legend ΜΟΥΣΗΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΙΣΣΗΣ ΘΕΑΣ ΟΥΡΑΝΙΑΣ [Pl. II Fig. 2.] They bear the three dates IT, AIT, and EIT, or B.C. 2, B.C. 1, and A.D. 4. (See for the last-mentioned dates, *Numismatic Chronicle*, New Series, No. xliii p. 218.)

<sup>12</sup> Joseph. Ant. Jud. xviii. 2, § 4.

<sup>13</sup> This seems to follow from the expression used by Josephus, οἱ γενναϊότατοι Πάρθων . . . Ὁρώδην ἐκάλουσαν πρεσβεύσαντες.

<sup>14</sup> Joseph. l. s. c. The violent deaths of at least two kings between Phraates IV. and Artabanus III. are attested by Tacitus (Ann. ii. 2), who says: "Post finem Phraatis et sequentium regum ob internas cædes," &c.

<sup>15</sup> Tacit. Ann. l. s. c.; Joseph. l. s. c.; Suet. Tib. § 16.

<sup>16</sup> "Ignotæ Parthis virtutes nova vitia." (Tacit. l. s. c.)

<sup>17</sup> Tacit. Ann. ii. 3. "Apud Dahas adultus." Joseph. Ant. Jud. l. s. c. Ἀρτάβατον Μηδείας Βασιλεύοντα, γένος Ἀρτακιδῶν.

<sup>18</sup> Vonones commemorated his victory in the Roman fashion by striking coins which bore upon the one side his head, with the legend ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΟΝΩΝΗΣ; and on the other a Victory, with the legend ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΟΝΩΝΗΣ ΝΕΙΚΗΣΑΣ ΑΡΤΑΒΑΝΟΝ. [Pl. II Fig. 3]

<sup>19</sup> Joseph. l. s. c.

<sup>20</sup> Tacit. Ann. ii. 4.

<sup>21</sup> Οἱ περὶ Νεφάντην δυνατοὶ τῶν Ἀρμενίων Ἀρταβάνῳ προστίθενται. (Joseph. l. s. c.)

<sup>22</sup> Josephus expresses this broadly. Ὁ Τιβέριος αὐτῷ ἀπέειπε, πρὸς . . . τοῦ Πάρθου τὰς ἀπειλάς. Tacitus implies it when he says: "Si nostra vi defenderetur, bellum adversus Parthos sumendum erat."

<sup>23</sup> Tacit. Ann. ii. 4, ad fin.

<sup>24</sup> Joseph. Ant. Jud. xviii. 2, § 4, ad fin. It is supposed by some that Josephus in this passage refers to the establishment of Arsaces, another son of Artabanus, on the throne of Armenia, nearly twenty years afterwards. But the close connection of the clause with one in which he speaks of Vonones as guarded in Syria, limits the date to A. D. 16-18. That Artabanus had a son, Orodēs, distinct from Arsaces, king of Armenia, appears from Tacit. Ann. vi. 23.

<sup>25</sup> "Permissæ Germanicæ provinciae, quæ mari dividuntur." Tac. Ann. ii. 43.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. ii. 56.

<sup>27</sup> See note 32, Chapter XIII.

<sup>28</sup> Tacitus says (l. s. c.) that the name was taken from that of the city Artaxata, which is absurd; for Artaxata is *Artaxia-sata*, "Artaxias's city" (compare Samosata, and see Strab. xi. 14, § 6), and itself took its name from the first Artaxias. Dean Merivale observes that the word "signified greatness or sovereignty" (vol. v p. 192); which is true, but not of much importance, since the derivation would scarcely occur to either Zeno or his subjects. What was needed was that the new king should exchange his Greek name for a native one. He chose Artaxias as that of two previous monarchs who had distinguished themselves.

<sup>29</sup> Tacit. Ann. ii. 58.

<sup>30</sup> Germanicus was believed to be actuated on this occasion in part by his hostility to the governor of Syria, Piso, and his wife, Plancina, whom Vonones had courted. But it may be doubted whether he allowed motives of this kind to influence him.

<sup>31</sup> Tacit. Ann. ii. 68.

<sup>32</sup> Tacit. Ann. vi. 31.

<sup>33</sup> Tiberius was seventy-five in A.D. 34.

<sup>34</sup> Vitellius, who was made consul at the beginning of A.D. 34, appears (like Germanicus) to have at once set out for his province. (See Joseph. Ant. Jud. xviii. 4, § 2, and compare Burton, *Hist. of First Three Centuries*, vol. i. p. 125.)

<sup>35</sup> It is almost certain that this prince must have had some real personal name besides the family title of Arsaces. (See Strab. xv. 1, § 26.)

<sup>36</sup> Tacit. Ann. vi. 31.

<sup>37</sup> Dio Cass. lviii. 26.

<sup>38</sup> Joseph. Ant. Jud. xviii. 4, § 4. Πέμπει δὲ καὶ Τιβέριος ὡς Ὀβιτέλλιον γράμματα, κελεύων αὐτὸν πράσσειν φιλιαν πρὸς Ἀρτάβατον τὸν Πάρθων βασιλεῖα· ἐφόβει γὰρ αὐτὸν ἕχθρὸς ὢν, καὶ Ἀρμενίαν παρεσπασμένος, μὴ ἐπὶ πλέον κακοῦργη.

<sup>39</sup> Tacit. Ann. l. s. c.

<sup>40</sup> "Destinata retinens, consiliis et astu res externas moliri; arma procul habere." Tacit. Ann. vi. 32.

<sup>41</sup> Tacit. l. s. c.; Dio Cass. lviii. 26.

<sup>42</sup> Sueton. Tib. § 66:—"Quin et Artabani, Parthorum regis, laceratus est literis, parricidia et cædes et ignaviam et luxuriam objicientis, monentisque ut

voluntaria morte maximo justissimoque civium odio quamprimum satisfaceret."

<sup>43</sup> Dean Merivale calls Tiridates "the son of Phraates" (*Rom. Empire*, vol. v. p. 416); but, if this had been so, Tacitus would most certainly have mentioned it. Tacitus calls him "sanguinis ejusdem" (of the same family), and speaks of the elder Phraates (Phraates IV.) as his grandfather (*Ann.* vi. 37), but leaves us to guess which son of this king was his father. I suspect it was either Rhodaspes or Seraspades.

<sup>44</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* vi. 32; Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xviii. 4, § 4.

<sup>45</sup> Tiberius had suggested this candidate. (Tacit. *Ann.* l. s. c.)

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.* vi. 33.

<sup>47</sup> Tacitus calls them Sarmatians (*Ann.* vi. 33); Josephus, Scyths (*Ant. Jud.* xviii. 4, § 4). Both writers absurdly bring them through "the Caspian Gates"; but it is clear that the Mozdok pass of the Caucasus is meant.

<sup>48</sup> The Sarmatians were ready to have sold their services to both sides; but the Iberians guarded the main pass through the Caucasus; and the Derbend pass, between the mountains and the Caspian, was (according to Tacitus) impassable during the summer time, being then flooded by the sea. (*Ann.* l. s. c.)

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.* vi. 34.

<sup>50</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* vi. 35.

<sup>51</sup> *Ant. Jud.* l. s. c.

<sup>52</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* vi. 36.

<sup>53</sup> Πομπῆ χρημάτων εἰς τε συγγενεῖς καὶ φίλους τοὺς ἐκέλευον. (Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* l. s. c.) Tacitus omits this feature.

<sup>54</sup> "Interim posse Parthos, absentium æquos, præsentibus mobiles, ad poenitentiam mutari." Tac. *Ann.* vi. 36, *ad fin.*

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.* vi. 37. The Roman general almost immediately retired.

<sup>56</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* vi. 41. Artemita was in Sittacéné, not far from Ctesiphon (Strab. xvi. 1, § 7). The site of Halus is unknown.

<sup>57</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* vi. 42.

<sup>58</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* vi. 43.

<sup>59</sup> "Sensit vetus regnandi, falsos in amore, odia non fingere." (Tacit. *Ann.* vi. 44.)

<sup>60</sup> Tacitus says "Scyths" only ("auxilia Scytharum"); Josephus, "Dahæ and Sacæ" (στρατίαν Δαῶν τε καὶ Σακῶν). The early connection of Artabanus with the Dahæ (Tac. *Ann.* ii. 3) makes it probable that he would obtain aid from them.

<sup>61</sup> Tacitus says "the Armenians and Elymæans" (vi. 44); but the latter lay exactly in the opposite quarter to Armenia, and seem to be wrongly mentioned.

<sup>62</sup> "Principio a gente Arabum facto." (Tacit. *Ann.* l. s. c.) The Arabians of the Mesopotamian Desert are probably intended.

<sup>63</sup> Josephus says: Πολεμήσας τοὺς ἀθησσηκότας κάτεσχε τὴν ἀρχήν (*Ant. Jud.* xviii. 4, § 4, *ad fin.*); but the fuller nar-

ative of Tacitus shows that there was no actual fighting.

<sup>64</sup> Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xviii. 4, § 5.

<sup>65</sup> Josephus describes this interview at some length. The Euphrates was bridged in the usual way, by a bridge of boats, and the two chiefs met, each accompanied by a guard, midway on the bridge. After the conditions of peace had been settled, Herod Antipas, who was present as a Roman ally, entertained the Parthian king and Roman governor at a banquet, held in a magnificent tent erected midway between the two shores.

<sup>66</sup> The term "hostage" is used by Josephus (l. s. c.), Suetonius (*Calig.* § 19), and Dio (lix. 27). One would be glad to know whether the Parthians themselves regarded the transaction in the same light as the Romans appear to have done.

<sup>67</sup> Sueton. *Calig.* § 14; Dio Cass. l. s. c.

<sup>68</sup> This seems to me the best mode of reconciling Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xviii. 4, § 5 with Dio Cass. lix. 27 and Sueton. *Calig.* l. s. c.; *Vitell.* § 2.

<sup>69</sup> Compare Acts ii. 9; Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xvi. 6, § 1; xviii. 9, § 1; Philo. *Leg. ad Caium.* p. 1032; Mos. Chor. *Hist. Armen.* ii. 3, 7; &c.

<sup>70</sup> On the transfer of Jews from Babylonia to Antioch, see Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xii. 3, § 1; *contr. Ap.* ii. 4.

<sup>71</sup> Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xviii. 9, § 1.

<sup>72</sup> This narrative rests wholly upon the authority of Josephus. Its internal probability, its thoroughly Oriental coloring, and its general harmony with what we otherwise know of Parthia at this time, have led to its acceptance by Milman and other writers not inclined to credulity.

<sup>73</sup> Probably from about A.D. 19 to 34.

<sup>74</sup> Mithridates was stripped naked and set upon an ass, and in this guise was conveyed from the battle-field to the camp of the victors. (Joseph. *A. J.* xviii. 9, § 6.)

<sup>75</sup> Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xviii. 9, § 8. Ἄει ὡς ἐπὶ πολὺ διάφοροι καθεστήκεσαν, καὶ ὀπότεροις παραγένοιτο θαρρῆναι πρότερον ἀλλήλων ἤπτονοντο.

<sup>76</sup> The words of Josephus (τῷ ἔκτῳ εἶει φθορὰ ἐν Βαβυλῶνι ἐγένετο αὐτῶν) are ambiguous. Dean Milman understood them to intend a pestilence. (*History of the Jews*, vol. ii. p. 189, 12mo edit.)

<sup>77</sup> Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xviii. 9, § 9.

<sup>78</sup> See text, pp. 14 and 109.

<sup>79</sup> Strabo (xi. 9, § 2) praises the Parthian rule as salutary and vigorous (χρησίμιον πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν). There can be no doubt that the nation showed something of that aptitude for command and government which distinguishes the Turks.

<sup>80</sup> The Jewish troubles precede in Josephus his account of the death of Caligula, so that apparently they fall into the year A.D. 40. The death of Artabanus, which followed closely upon his

second expulsion and restoration (Joseph. *A. J.* xx. 3, § 4), is shown by the series of Parthian coins to have happened in A.D. 42.

<sup>61</sup> This portion of the history depends wholly on the authority of Josephus, who is not perhaps to be implicitly trusted. (See *Ant. Jud.* xx. 3, § 1-3.)

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.* xx. 2, § 3.

<sup>63</sup> The reduction of Seleucia appears from Tacitus to have fallen into the year A.D. 46. This was, he says (xi. 9), the seventh year after it revolted. The revolt must therefore have taken place in A.D. 40. That it fell in the reign of Artabanus appears from Tacit. *Ann.* xi. 8.

<sup>64</sup> This date is earlier than that generally assigned, which is A.D. 41 (Heeren, *Manual*, p. 303, E. T.; Lewis, *History of the Parthian Empire*, p. 231; Vailant, *Arsac. Imperium*, p. 220). But it is rendered certain by the coins, which have for the last year of Artabanus the date ΓΝΤ Δωόν (= Aug. A.D. 42), and for the first of Vardanes ΓΝΤ Γαρπιαί. (= September of the same year).

#### CHAPTER XV.

<sup>1</sup> *Ant. Jud.* xx. 3, § 4. Τὴν βασιλείαν τῶ παιδὶ Οὐαρδάνη καταλιπών.

<sup>2</sup> *Ann.* xi. 8. The true meaning of Tacitus in the passage has been questioned (see Walther's *Tacitus*, note *ad loc.*); but, for my own part, I cannot feel a doubt that he regards Gotarzes as king before Vardanes.

<sup>3</sup> Some suppose the Artabanus intended to be Artabanus III., the preceding king; but he was the father, not the brother, of Gotarzes. (See Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* l. s. c., where Vardanes is called the son of Artabanus III. and Gotarzes the brother of Vardanes.)

<sup>4</sup> The possibility of this feat has been questioned, and it has been proposed to alter the text of Tacitus from "biduo tria M. passuum" to "triduo duo M. passuum" (see Walther's *Tacitus*, vol. ii. p. 13). But the feat of Vardanes does not come up to that of Tiberius, who travelled in one night and day 200 Roman (or 184 British) miles to visit his sick brother, Drusus (Plin. *H. N.* vii. 20).

<sup>5</sup> Coins of a uniform type, differing altogether from those of Gotarzes, and reasonably ascribed to Vardanes, bear the dates ΓΝΤ, ΔΝΤ, ΕΝΤ, ΣΝΤ and ΖΝΤ, or A.D. 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46.

<sup>6</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* xi. 8.

<sup>7</sup> "Bactrianos apud campos." Tacit. l. s. c.

<sup>8</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* xi. 9.

<sup>9</sup> Compare Tac. *Ann.* xi. 10 with Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xx. 3, § 4. The intended "Roman War" of the latter writer is the projected "Armenian expedition" of the former.

<sup>10</sup> See text, p. 131.

<sup>11</sup> Dio Cass. lx. 8; Tac. *Ann.* xi. 8.

<sup>12</sup> Dio Cass. l. s. c.; Senec. *De Tranquill.* § 11.

<sup>13</sup> "Cuncta in Mithridatem fluxere, atrociores quam novo regno conduce-ret" (Tacit. *Ann.* xi. 9).

<sup>14</sup> A Parthian king could, no doubt, command the services of his feudatories; but it depended very much upon themselves what forces they should bring into the field. To obtain any real success, the hearty co-operation of the feudatories was necessary.

<sup>15</sup> Artabanus rewarded Izates by adding this tract to his dominions. (Joseph. *A. J.* xx. 3, § 3.)

<sup>16</sup> See text, p. 140.

<sup>17</sup> Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xx. 3, § 4. Πόλεμον πρὸς Ἰζάτην κατήγγειλεν. Compare the remark of Tacitus—"Exin validissimas prefecturas invasit" (*Ann.* xi. 10).

<sup>18</sup> I cannot follow this campaign in detail, as the rivers "Erinde" and "Sinde," mentioned by Tacitus, are unknown to the geographers.

<sup>19</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* xi. 10. Josephus gives no details, but says simply ἀναίρουσι αὐτόν.

<sup>20</sup> So Tacitus (l. s. c.). "Nece Bardanis turbatæ Parthorum res, inter ambiguos, quis in regnum acciperetur. Multi ad Gotarzem inclinabant; quidam ad Meherdatem, prolem Phraatis." But it may be doubted whether Meherdates was thought of until Gotarzes had rendered himself obnoxious to his subjects.

<sup>21</sup> Coins of Vardanes bear the date ΖΝΤ, or A.D. 45-46. A coin of Gotarzes is dated ΖΝΤ, Πανέμμον, or July, A.D. 46.

<sup>22</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* xi. 10: "Gotarzes . . . per sævitiam ac luxum adegit Parthos nuiteræ ad Principem Romanum occultas preces." Compare the expression "socors domi," in *Ann.* xii. 10.

<sup>23</sup> This speech is given by Tacitus with his usual brevity (*Ann.* xii. 10). He adds that the envoys said more to the same effect.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.* xii. 11.

<sup>25</sup> See text, pp. 85, 88, 93.

<sup>26</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* xii. 13.

<sup>27</sup> The notices of Tacitus do not enable us to follow with any exactness the movements of Gotarzes; but I think there cannot be a doubt that he was protecting Ctesiphon, and that the scene of his manoeuvres and of the final engagement was the tract south of Nineveh, between the Tigris and the Zagros mountain range. If the reading "Arbela" be allowed to stand in *Ann.* xii. 13, we may limit the scene of action a little more, and say that it lay between *Arbil* and Baghdad. Sambulos, the mountain which Gotarzes at first occupied, is probably the modern Mount Sunbulah, between the plains of Ghilan and Deira, in lat. 34° 25', long. 46° 10' nearly. This is a "very remarkable range, far exceeding in height all others at the foot of Zagros" (*Journal of Geograph. Society*, vol. ix. p. 41). On the summit is "a fine table-land, wooded with dwarf oak," while the sides are in most places bounded by "naked and precipitous

crags like those of Behistun" (ibid. p. 42). But the second position of Gotarzes, behind the river Corma, cannot be identified, since there are scarcely sufficient grounds for regarding that stream as the Kara-Su, or river of Kirmanshah.

<sup>28</sup> In the East, mutilation of any kind is regarded as incapacitating a man from the exercise of sovereignty. Hence the Persian kings were in the habit, until recently, of blinding all their brothers upon their accession.

<sup>29</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* xii. 14. "Ostentui clementiæ suæ, et in nos dehonestamento."

<sup>30</sup> See note 18, Chapter XIV.

<sup>31</sup> Flandin, *Voyage en Perse*, p. 8. "On y reconnoît néanmoins les silhouettes de plusieurs personnages de haute taille, surmontés d'autres plus petits, parmi lesquels se distinguent un cavalier armé d'une lance, et une espèce de gloire ou de renommée couronnant un autre guerrier à cheval."

<sup>32</sup> Some account of this inscription has been given by Sir R. K. Porter (*Travels*, vol. ii. p. 151), by Sir H. Rawlinson (*Geograph. Journal*, vol. ix. p. 115), and by MM. Flandin and Coste (*Voyage en Perse*, Planches anciennes, pl. 119). The best account is that of the second-named traveller, who transcribed the inscription as follows: ΑΛΦΑΣΑΤΗΣ ΜΙΘΡΑΤΗΣΠΕΠ . . . ΓΩΤΑΡΖΗΣ ΣΑΤΡΑΠΗΗΣΤΩΝΣΑΤΡΑΠΩΝ . . . He also refers in a corner of the tablet the words ΓΩΤΑΡΖΗΣ ΓΕΟΠΟΘΡΟΣ. It has been argued that the inscription cannot have been set up by King Gotarzes, on account of the title "Satrap of Satraps"; but this argument is not convincing. See note 19, Chapter VI.) The combination of the names Gotarzes and Meherdates (Mithrates) with the locality, certainly near the scene of the battle, and the winged Victory, common on Parthian coins at exactly this time, is a far more weighty one in favor of the inscription being rightly assigned to the monarch.

<sup>33</sup> A coin of Gotarzes bears the date ΒΕΤ, or A.D. 50-51. One of Vonones II. has ΓΕΤ, or A.D. 51-52.

<sup>34</sup> "Dein Gotarzes morbo obiit" (*Ann.* xii. 14).

<sup>35</sup> Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xx. 3. § 4. Μετ' οὐ πολὺν χρόνον ἐξ ἐπιβουλήs τελεωθήσαντα.

<sup>36</sup> Philostratus is quoted as calling him "the younger brother of Artabanus III." (Lindsay, *History and Coinage*, p. 70.) But the authority of Philostratus on a point of this kind is worthless.

<sup>37</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* l. s. c.

<sup>38</sup> The date in question is ΓΕΤ, which corresponds to the last three months of A.D. 51 and the first nine of A.D. 52.

<sup>39</sup> This appears from Tacitus (*Ann.* xii. 44 and 50).

#### CHAPTER XVI.

<sup>1</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* xii. 44. "Compassu fratrum regnum adeptus." The names of

the two brothers are given by Josephus (*Ant. Jud.* xx. 2, § 4), and Dio Cassius (lxiii. 5). The former tells us that Pacorus was older than Tiridates.

<sup>2</sup> The government bestowed on Pacorus was that of Media; whether Media Magna or Atropaténis is uncertain.

<sup>3</sup> See text, p. 131.

<sup>4</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* l. s. c.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. xii. 47. Mithridates and his wife, who was the sister of Rhadamistus, were first smothered. The children were then killed for lamenting their parents.

<sup>6</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* xii. 50. The first invasion of Volagases falls into the latter part of A.D. 51, which was the year that he became king, according to the coins.

<sup>7</sup> Compare Tacit. *Ann.* xii. 50, 51, with xiii. 6.

<sup>8</sup> As Volagases was descended from a branch of the Arsacidæ quite distinct from that whereto Artabanus had belonged, there was not the "ingratitude" in this demand which some writers have seen in it.

<sup>9</sup> Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xx. 4, § 2.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. § 3.

<sup>11</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* xiii. 6.

<sup>12</sup> The Lesser Armenia was assigned to Aristobulus, a son of Herod, king of Chalcis, and a first cousin of Agrippa II. Sophênê, the more southern portion of the Greater Armenia, was entrusted to a certain Sohemus. (*Tac. Ann.* xiii. 7.)

<sup>13</sup> It is characteristic of Roman vanity, which could not bear to admit a loss, that Corbulo's appointment was said to be not "reciperandæ," but "retinendæ Armeniae." (*Tacit. Ann.* xiii. 8.)

<sup>14</sup> Tacitus (*Ann.* xiii. 9) does not clearly express this; but it seems to follow from his silence as to any recovery of Armenia in A.D. 55, joined to his admission that Tiridates possessed the country in A.D. 58 (ibid. xiii. 34, 37).

<sup>15</sup> Tac. *Ann.* xiii. 7.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid. Tacitus is confirmed by the coins, which show that Vardanes was proclaimed at least as early as A.D. 55.

<sup>17</sup> Tac. *Ann.* xiii. 9.

<sup>18</sup> The coins ascribed to Vardanes II. bear the dates ΖΕΤ, ΗΖΤ, and ΘΖΤ, or A.D. 55, 56, and 57-55.

<sup>19</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* xii. 31. It would seem that when the hostages were given in A.D. 55, ambassadors were sent to Rome to endeavor to effect some arrangement. It was long before any answer was vouchsafed them (Dio Cass. lxii. 20). When a reply came, it appears to have been to the effect that Tiridates must either relinquish Armenia, or consent to receive it at the hands of the Romans, and hold it as a Roman fief.

<sup>20</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* xiii. 37.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. ch. 35.

<sup>22</sup> "Tunc primum illecti Isichi, gens haud alias socia Romanis." (Ibid. ch. 37.)

<sup>23</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* l. s. c. Compare xiv. 25 and xv. 1.

<sup>24</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* xiii. 38-40.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.* xiv. 26.

<sup>26</sup> Tacitus says of the Armenians, "Ambigua fide utraque arma invitabant, situ terrarum, similitudine morum Parthis propiores, connubisque permixti ac libertate ignota, *illuc magis ad servitium inclinabant.*" (*Ann.* xiii. 34.)

<sup>27</sup> We know, unfortunately, nothing of these wars but the mere fact of their occurrence. Some have supposed them to have been stirred up and assisted by Rome (Merivale, *Roman Empire*, vol. vii. p. 23); but there is no evidence of this. On one occasion, a Hyrcanian embassy made its way to Rome, and solicited aid from Nero (*Tac. Ann.* xiv. 25), but apparently without any result. On their return to the East, these envoys were protected by Corbulo, who sent them home by the circuitous route of the Indian Ocean and the Indus (?).

<sup>28</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* xv. 1; Dio Cass. lxii. 20.

<sup>29</sup> This seems to be implied in the reflection ascribed to Monobazus by Tacitus (l. s. c.), "Levius servitium apud Romanos deditis quam captis."

<sup>30</sup> The Latin *ignavia* (the term used by Tiridates in Tacitus) unites these two notions.

<sup>31</sup> See Tacit. *Ann.* xv. 2. It has been thought best not to overload this history with the speeches which Greek and Roman writers put into the mouths of their historical characters on all possible occasions. In the present instance an exception is made on account of the suitability of the sentiments to the occasion.

<sup>32</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* xv. 2.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.* ch. 4.

<sup>34</sup> See text, p. 154.

<sup>35</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* xv. 5.

<sup>36</sup> "Imbecillum equitem pabuli inopia; nam exorta vis locustarum ambederat quicquid herbidum aut frondosum" (*Tac. l. s. c.*). On the ravages committed by these insects in Mesopotamia and the adjacent regions, see *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. ii. pp. 299, 493, 2nd edit.

<sup>37</sup> Tacitus does not expressly mention this condition, but implies it in *Ann.* xv. 6. ("Cur enim exercitum Romanum a Tigranocertis deluctum? Cur deserta per otium quæ bello defenderant?")

<sup>38</sup> Tac. *Ann.* xv. 3.

<sup>39</sup> This is clearly the meaning of the threat—"Se tributa et leges, et pro umbra regis Romanum jus victis impositurum." It was not likely to conciliate the Armenians.

<sup>40</sup> Tac. *Ann.* xv. 7.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.* ch. 9.

<sup>42</sup> See text, pp. 56-58.

<sup>43</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* xv. 10. The infantry had the support of some troops of Parthian horse, which fled, however, on the approach of Volagases.

<sup>44</sup> "Hostem instare." (*Tacit. l. s. c.*)

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.* xv. 11.

<sup>46</sup> Arsamosata must not be confounded with Samosata, now Sumeisat. Samo-

sata was situated on the Euphrates (*Strab. xvi. 2. § 3*), from which Arsamosata was at least forty (Roman) miles distant (*Tac. Ann.* xv. 16).

<sup>47</sup> Tac. *Ann.* xv. 13.

<sup>48</sup> "Veniret prope: signa et aquilas, et nomen reliquum infelicis exercitus tueretur." (*Ibid.* ch. 11.)

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.* ch. 16.

<sup>50</sup> Dio Cass. lxii. 21. Compare Tac. *Ann.* xv. 15.

<sup>51</sup> Tac. *Ann.* xv. 15.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.* ch. 16.

<sup>53</sup> Dio Cass. lxii. 22; Tac. *Ann.* xv. 17.

<sup>54</sup> Tac. *Ann.* xv. 24.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.* ch. 25.

<sup>56</sup> Tacitus compares the powers now granted to Corbulo with those which were entrusted to Pompey by the Gabinian law. (See on this Merivale, *Roman Empire*, vol. i. p. 66.)

<sup>57</sup> Dio attributes to Nero at this time the proposal of exactly those conditions of peace which he rejected (*Dio Cass.* lxii. 22). He is to be corrected from Tacitus (*Ann.* xv. 25).

<sup>58</sup> See Tac. *Ann.* xv. 26, where there is mention of his obtaining picked cohorts from Egypt and Illyricum.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.* ch. 27.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.* ch. 28.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.* chs. 29-31.

<sup>62</sup> The arrangement was made in the summer of A.D. 63. Tiridates did not make his appearance at Rome till the spring of A.D. 66. (See Clinton, *F. R.*, vol. i. p. 48.)

<sup>63</sup> Dio Cass. lxiii. 1, 2.

<sup>64</sup> This is the meaning of Dio (lxiii. 7), where *ὑπὲρ τῶν Ἰόνιον* has been generally translated "across the Adriatic," instead of "above" or "round the head of the Adriatic," which is the true meaning.

<sup>65</sup> Sueton. *Neron.* § 30. Dio agrees (lxiii. 2).

<sup>66</sup> Dio Cass. l. s. c.

<sup>67</sup> According to this author, Tiridates said—"Master, I am a descendant of Arsaces, a brother of the kings Volagases and Pacorus; but I am thy slave. I have come hither to thee, who art my God, to worship thee, as I would Mithras; and from henceforth my fate will be whatever thou makest it. For thou art my Fate and my Fortune." (*Dio Cass.* lxiii. 5.)

<sup>68</sup> Dio Cass. l. s. c.; Sueton. *Ner.* § 13.

<sup>69</sup> Dio Cass. lxiii. 7.

<sup>70</sup> Writers on Roman history have not always seen this. But Dean Merivale well observes, in concluding his notice of the events—"While Tiridates did homage for his kingdom to Nero, he was suffered to place himself really under the protection of Volagases" (*Roman Empire*, vol. vii. p. 26).

<sup>71</sup> Pacorus is mentioned as king of Parthia by Martial in an epigram written under Domitian, probably towards the close of his reign, which was from A.D. 81 to A.D. 96. (*Mart. Epig.* ix. 35, 3.)

Clinton dates the epigram A.D. 94 or 95 (*F. R.* vol. i. p. 79).

<sup>72</sup> See Sueton. *Ner.* § 57; *Vesp.* § 6; *Domit.* § 2; Tac. *Hist.* iv. 51; Dio Cass. lxxvi. 11; Joseph. *Bell. Jud.* vii. 5, § 2, and 7, § 2

<sup>73</sup> Vaillant, *Arsacid. Imper.* pp. 249-292; Heeren, *Manual of Ancient History*, p. 303, E. T.; Plate in Smith's *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography*, vol. i. pp. 358, 359.

<sup>74</sup> A coin of Pacorus, bearing his name, has the date ΘΗΤ Δασιου, or June, A.D. 78.

<sup>75</sup> The coins which run from ΔΕΤ (A.D. 52) to ΗΗΤ (A.D. 76) are thought to present two distinct types of face, one of which is found always before A.D. 62, and the other always after that date. This seems to be the opinion of the best numismatologists, as MM. Longperier and De Bartholomei, Mr. Lindsay, and the late Mr. De Salis. For my own part, I confess I am unable to detect any clear difference.

<sup>76</sup> Lindsay, *History and Coinage*, p. 87.

<sup>77</sup> In the British Museum Collection, arranged by the late Mr. De Salis, these names are adopted.

<sup>78</sup> By Mr. Lindsay (*History and Coinage*, pp. 71-101).

<sup>79</sup> Lindsay, *History and Coinage*, p. 87.

<sup>80</sup> See text, pp. 153, 154. The revolt appears to have broken out in A.D. 58 (*Tac. Ann.* xiii. 37). We hear of it as continuing in A.D. 60 (*ibid.* xiv. 25), and again in A.D. 62 (*ibid.* xv. 1). From this time we have no distinct mention of it until A.D. 75, when it appears from Josephus (*Bell. Jud.* vii. 7, § 4) that the revolt had succeeded, and that a king ruled in Hyrcania who was completely independent.

#### CHAPTER XVII.

<sup>1</sup> The peace dates from the year A.D. 62, when the arrangement was made with Corbulo (see text, pp. 159, 160). It was not infringed until the great expedition of Trajan in A.D. 115.

<sup>2</sup> See text, p. 161.

<sup>3</sup> Tacit. *Hist.* ii. 82.

<sup>4</sup> Sueton. *Vesp.* § 6; Tac. *Hist.* iv. 51.

<sup>5</sup> Tacit. *Hist.* l. s. c.

<sup>6</sup> Joseph. *Bell. Jud.* vii. 5, § 2.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.* vii. 7, § 1.

<sup>8</sup> Joseph. *Bell. Jud.* vii. 7, § 2.

<sup>9</sup> This may possibly have been the letter to which Dio Cassius alludes (lxxvi. 11), wherein Volagases addressed the Roman emperor thus:—"Arsaces, King of Kings, to Flavius Vespasianus, sends greeting"; whereto Vespasian was content to reply with very palpable irony, "Flavius Vespasianus to Arsaces, King of Kings, sends greeting." It is, however, on the whole more likely that the letter with this heading was provoked by the refusal of Vespasian to help the Parthian monarch against the Alani.

<sup>10</sup> A.D. 75.

<sup>11</sup> The Alani are first mentioned by

Dionysius the Geographer (B.C. 30-10), who joins them with the Daci and the Tauri (*Perieg.* 305, 306), and again places them between the latter and the Agathyrsi (308, 309). A similar position (in the south of Russia in Europe, the modern Ukraine) is assigned to them by Pliny (*H. N.* iv. 12, § 25) and Josephus *Bell. Jud.* vii. 7, § 4). Seneca (*Thyest.* 629) places them further west, upon the Ister. Ptolemy has two bodies of Alani, one in the position above described, the other in Scythia within the Imaus, north and partly east of the Caspian (*Geograph.* ii. 14, iii. 5, vi. 14). It must have been from these last, the successors, and, according to some (Amm. Marc. xxxi. 2), the descendants of the ancient Massagetæ, that the Alani came who attacked Pacorus and Tiridates. Their alliance with the Hyrcanians shows that they rounded the south-east corner of the Caspian, and their passage through the Gates into Media and Armenia equally indicates that they invaded those countries from the East. The ethnology of the Alani has been much disputed. Some regard them as Medes, some as Teutons, others as Turks or Fins. It is in favor of their Finnish origin that Alani and Rhox-alani are significant in Finnish. Alani (*alain*) meaning "men," and Rhox-alani (*ruots-alain*) "red-haired men." A special connection is traced between the Alani and the Os or Osethi of the Caucasus.

<sup>12</sup> This implies a development of Hyrcanian power not otherwise recorded, but in itself not improbable. The "Gates" were beyond the limits of Hyrcania Proper, but closely adjoined upon it, and would be likely to fall into the hands of the power which held the adjacent mountain-tract.

<sup>13</sup> Joseph. *B. J.* vii. 7, § 2. On the use of the lasso by Asiatics, see Herod. vii. 85; Pausan. i. 21, § 8; Suidas, *ad voc. Σείρά*, &c.

<sup>14</sup> Sueton. *Domit.* § 2. Compare Dio Cass. lxxvi. 15.

<sup>15</sup> Joseph. l. s. c.

<sup>16</sup> The earliest known coin of Pacorus bears date ΘΗΤ, Δασιου. It has the legend [Π]ακόρο . . . δικαίου [ἐ]πιφανου[ς] φιλ[ε]λληνο[ς].

<sup>17</sup> The first period of struggle, in which either state sought to conquer territory from the other, lasted from B.C. 55 to 36, and was succeeded by seventy years of peace—from B.C. 35 to A.D. 35. The second, for supremacy over Armenia, commenced A.D. 35, and terminated A.D. 63 by Rome's acceptance of Tiridates. This was followed by a peace which lasted fifty-three years—from A.D. 63 to A.D. 115.

<sup>18</sup> Vaillant, *Arsac. Imp.* p. 296; Plate in Smith's *Biogr. Dict.*, vol. i. p. 359; Lewis, *History of the Parthian Empire*, p. 318. Lindsay (*History and Coinage*, p. 101) suggests that he was not the son of Volagases I. but his grandson.

<sup>19</sup> Amm. Marc. xxiii. 6. "Ctesiphon, quam . . . rex Pacorus, incolarum viribus amplificatam et mœnibus, Græco indito nomine, Persidis effecit specimen summum."

<sup>20</sup> Sueton. *Neron.* § 57. "Denique, cum post viginti annos, adolescente me, exitisset conditionis incertæ, qui se Neronem esse jactaret, tam favorabile nomen ejus apud Parthos fuit, ut vehementer adjutus, et vix redditus sit." The "twenty years" of this passage, dating from the death of Nero, A.D. 69, fix the appearance of *this Pseudo-Nero* to A.D. 89, the ninth year of Domitian.

<sup>21</sup> Plin. *Ep.* x. 16. "Callidromum . . . captum a Susag in Mœsia, &c.

<sup>22</sup> Suidas ad voc. *ωνητή*.  
<sup>23</sup> Zonaras, p. 578, B. The date is fixed by the mention immediately afterwards of the great eruption of Vesuvius in the reign of Titus, which belongs to A.D. 79.

<sup>24</sup> One of these, of whom there is a coin in the Brit. Mus. dated BOT, or A.D. 81, 81, is thought by some to be the Artabanus of Zonaras. The other, whose head is entirely different, has been identified with the Lagasēs who succeeded Chosroës.

<sup>25</sup> This legend (מלכא מטרדה מלכא) is read as *Mitradat malcha*, i.e. "King Mithridates." (See *Numism. Chron.* vol. xi. Pl. vii. No. 4.) Legends in the same character are frequent on the coins of the later Parthian kings.

<sup>26</sup> We have, however, an indication of them in Dio Cassius, who, speaking of the slight resistance offered to Trajan in his advance upon Babylon, says, "There were few to hinder him, since the power of Parthia had been brought low through the civil wars, and there were still unsubdued rebellions" (lxviii. 26).

<sup>27</sup> Dio Cass. lxviii. 17.

<sup>28</sup> Pacorus had had occasion before his death to make various complaints to Trajan (Suidas ad voc. *ἐπίκλημα*). This would imply that Rome had already taken an aggressive attitude, and was preparing the way for a rupture.

## CHAPTER XVIII.

<sup>1</sup> The date here is uncertain; and it is even not quite clear whether Exedares was placed on the Armenian throne by Pacorus or Chosroës. It seems, however, scarcely likely that Tiridates should have lived much beyond A.D. 100, or that Chosroës, if he had established Exedares, should have so readily deposed him.

<sup>2</sup> Dio Cass. lxviii. 17.

<sup>3</sup> The Dacian War occupied Trajan from A.D. 101 to A.D. 106. The year A.D. 107 was spent in securing possession of the Dacian territory. (Clinton, *F. R.*, vol. i. pp. 88-94.)

<sup>4</sup> Some good remarks on these sub-

jects will be found in Dean Merivale's *Roman Empire*, vol. viii. pp. 134-153.

<sup>6</sup> Dio Cass. lxviii. 29.

<sup>6</sup> See text, p. 81.

<sup>7</sup> Dio Cass. lxviii. 17.

<sup>8</sup> Dio calls the Armenian matter a mere pretext, and Trajan's love of glory the real cause of the war (lxviii. 17).

<sup>9</sup> Πάντα τὰ προσήκοντα ποιήσει (ibid. l. s. c.)

<sup>10</sup> Clinton, *F. R.*, vol. i. p. 98.

<sup>11</sup> See text, p. 168.

<sup>12</sup> Dio Cass. lxviii. 18.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. ch. 19.

<sup>14</sup> Fronto, *Princip. Hist.* in his *Opera inedita*, vol. ii. p. 340.

<sup>15</sup> Νίκην ἀναίμων ὀνομαζον (Dio Cass. lxviii. 19).

<sup>16</sup> Dio Cass. lxviii. 20.

<sup>17</sup> Eutrop. *Breviar.* viii. 3; Fronto, *Princip. Hist.* vol. ii. p. 349; Arrian, *Fr.* 16. Fronto and Arrian were contemporary with Trajan.

<sup>18</sup> Ὅτι πρῶτος παραβαίων τὰ ξυγκείμενα ἔτυχε τῆς δίκης. (Arrian, l. s. c.)

<sup>19</sup> See Fronto, l. s. c.

<sup>20</sup> See the fragment of Arrian given by Suidas, ad voc. *γνώσις*, which consists of words that Arrian must have put into the mouth of Trajan:—Περὶ Παρθαμασίρου δὲ, οὐχὶ Ἀξιδάρων εἶναι, ἀλλ' ἐαυτοῦ τὴν γνῶσιν· ὅτι πρῶτος, κ.τ.λ. (See above, note 18.)

<sup>21</sup> Dio Cass. lxviii. 21.

<sup>22</sup> Arrian, ap. Suid. ad voc. *ἀμφίλογος*.

<sup>23</sup> Eutrop. *Breviar.* viii. 2; *Hist. Miscell.* x. 3, p. 206 (ed. Eyssenhardt, Berlin, 1868).

<sup>24</sup> Dio Cass. lxviii. 19.

<sup>25</sup> Eutrop. l. s. c.; *Hist. Misc.* l. s. c.; Plin. *Ep.* x. 13-15.

<sup>26</sup> Dio Cass. lxviii. 21.

<sup>27</sup> Dio Cass. (l. s. c.) Compare ch. 18.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. ch. 22.

<sup>29</sup> Suidas ad voc. *ὕψηλίσονται*.

<sup>30</sup> The captures of Nisibis and Batnæ are mentioned by Dio (lxviii. 23). The general reduction of the Cardueni (Kurds), or inhabitants of Gordyêné, is attested by Eutropius (l. s. c.) and the *Historia Miscella* (l. s. c.)

<sup>31</sup> Dio Cass. lxviii. 22.

<sup>32</sup> See a representation in Vaillant's *Hist. Arsac.* p. 312, and compare Eckhel, *Doct. Num.* vol. vi. p. 438.

<sup>33</sup> Dio Cass. lxviii. 23.

<sup>34</sup> So Dean Merivale (*Rom. Empire*, vol. viii. p. 162), following Francke. I differ with reluctance and hesitation; but, on the whole, Dio, as reported by Xiphilinus, seems to me our safest guide for the general course of the events of this period.

<sup>35</sup> Dio distinctly places the earthquake at Antioch and Trajan's escape from its perils at the close of the campaign of A.D. 115, which he terminates with the captures of Nisibis and Batnæ (Xiphil. *Epit. Dion.* p. 249). Malala also assigns the earthquake to this winter, Dec 15 (xi. p. 353). I do not understand the argument of Clinton, that the death of

Pedo (the consul of A.D. 115) in the earthquake proves it to have occurred in the preceding winter (*F. R.* vol. i. p. 100). Whether the earthquake was in January, A.D. 115, or in December of that year, it would equally fall within Pedo's consulate.

<sup>36</sup> Dio Cass. lxxviii. 26. Compare Taylor in *Geograph. Journal*, vol. xxxv. p. 56.

<sup>37</sup> Κατὰ τὸ Κάρδυνον ὄρος. (Dio Cass. l. s. c.) The Cardunian mountain of Dio is the Mons Masius of Strabo, which runs parallel with the course of the Upper Tigris from Diarbekr to Tilleh, and meets the river at Jezireh.

<sup>38</sup> Joh. Malal. l. s. c.

<sup>39</sup> Dio Cass. lxxviii. 24. 25.

<sup>40</sup> *Hist. Misc.* x. 5; Oros. vii. 12; Euseb. *Chron. Can.* ii. pp. 380, 381.

<sup>41</sup> Dio Cass. lxxviii. 26.

<sup>42</sup> See above, note 37.

<sup>43</sup> These are alluded to by Dio at the close of ch. 26. A passage in John of Malala (*Chron.* xi. p. 273) sets them forth more at large. His account of them, however, cannot be accepted, since it contradicts Dio and Victor.

<sup>44</sup> Dio Cass. lxxviii. 22. This fragment is misplaced in Fabricius's generally excellent edition of Dio (Hamburg, 1752). It belongs to the period covered by ch. 26.

<sup>45</sup> The capture of Hatra is implied in the mention of its *revolt* (Dio Cass. lxxviii. 31).

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.* ch. 27. The only bitumen-pits in Babylonia are at Hit (the 'Is of Herodotus. i. 179).

<sup>47</sup> Dean Merivale supposes Seleucus to have held out after the fall of Ctesiphon (*Rom. Empire*, vol. vii. p. 163), and says its reduction was left to Trajan's generals. To me this seems unlikely, and I find no authority for the statement.

<sup>48</sup> Few writers notice the employment by Trajan of two fleets, one on each river; and not one attempts to account for the transfer of the Euphrates fleet to the Tigris when there was already a flotilla upon the latter stream. Fabricius alone notices the difficulty (note on § 172). I should imagine that the artificial dams and natural reefs which cross the bed of the Tigris between Mosul and Tekrit (Layard. *Nin. and Babylon*, p. 466) rendered the descent of the vessels in the later months of summer impracticable. That the vessels were of a large size appears from Arrian, Fr. 19.

<sup>49</sup> Dio Cass. lxxviii. 28.

<sup>50</sup> This appears from the capture of his daughter and his golden throne; which were taken by the Romans who went in pursuit of him, at Susa. (See Spartian. *Hadr.* § 13; *Capit. Ant. Pl.* § 9, &c.)

<sup>51</sup> Dio Cass. lxxviii. 28 and 29.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.* chs. 30 and 31.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.* ch. 30.

<sup>54</sup> Fronto, *Princip. Hist.* p. 338. "Legatus cum exercitu caesus."

<sup>55</sup> This is so probable, that we may accept the evidence of John of Malala on

the point (l. s. c.), notwithstanding the general untrustworthiness of his narrative.

<sup>56</sup> Dio Cass. lxxviii. 30.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.* lxxviii. 31. Μετὰ ταῦτα εἰς τὴν Ἀραβίαν ἦλθε καὶ τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις ἐπέχειρθησε. (Compare lxxv. 11, 12; Herodian, iii. 28, &c.)

<sup>58</sup> Herodian. iii. 1.

<sup>59</sup> Dio Cass. l. s. c.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.* lxxviii. 33. Trajan was about to make another expedition into Southern Mesopotamia, when his last illness prevented him.

<sup>61</sup> Eutrop. *Breviar.* viii. 3; *Hist. Miscell.* x. 7.

<sup>62</sup> *Æl. Spart. Hadrian.* § 5. Spartian by mistake calls him Partamo-siris.

<sup>63</sup> See Vaillant, *Hist. Arsac.* p. 319.

<sup>64</sup> There is, I believe, only a single coin which is thought to support the view that Osrhoëné became a kingdom dependent on the Romans at the accession of Hadrian. This is described by Eckhel (*Doct. Num.* vol. iii. p. 512) and Mionnet (*Description de Médailles*, vol. v. p. 613), who both view it with suspicion.

<sup>65</sup> Dio Cass. lxxviii. 33. Οὕτω μὲν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι, τῆς τε Ἀρμενίας καὶ τῆς Μεσοποταμίας τῆς πλείονος τῶν τε Πάρθων κρατήσαντες, μάτην ἐπόνθησαν καὶ μάτην ἐκινδύνευσαν.

<sup>66</sup> *Æl. Spart. Hadrian.* § 12, ad fin.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.* § 13.

<sup>68</sup> A coin of Chosroës in the Brit. Museum bears the date ΘΛΥ, which corresponds to A.D. 127-8. A coin ascribed to Volagases II. by Mr. Lindsay, with the date ΗΜΥ (A.D. 136-7), has a head exactly like that of Chosroës upon it. (See Lindsay. Pl. ix. No. 77.)

<sup>69</sup> Dio Cass. lxxix. 15; Xiphil. *Ep. Dion.* xv. (p. 264).

<sup>70</sup> Vaillant, *Hist. Arsac.* p. 323; Eckhel, *Doct. Num.* vol. iii. p. 537; Lewis, *Hist. of the Parthian Empire*, p. 332; Lindsay, *History and Coinage*, p. 116; Plate in Smith's *Dict. of Greek and Roman Biography*, vol. i. p. 359.

<sup>71</sup> The usual legend on a tetradrachm of Volagases II. is ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΝ ΑΡΣΑΚΟΥ ΟΛΑΓΑΣΟΥ ΔΙΚΑΙΟΥ ΕΠΙΦΑΝΟΥΣ ΦΙΛΕΛΛΗΝΟΣ. His drachms bear almost universally the inscription  $\text{𐎧𐎡𐎴𐎠𐎹}$ , or מלכא וולגסו, *Volgasu Malcha*, "King Volagases."

## CHAPTER XIX.

<sup>1</sup> If we allow Volagases to have been even twenty years of age when he first came forward as a claimant of the Parthian crown (A.D. 77-8), he must have been seventy-two at the death of Chosroës in A.D. 130.

<sup>2</sup> Volagases II. wears a tiara, ornamented at the edge with hooks or feathers. His nose is prominent, his eye large, his hair curled, his beard pointed and wavy.

- <sup>3</sup> Dio Cass. lxxix. 15; Zonaras, p. 590, C.  
<sup>4</sup> Æl. Spart. *Hadrian.* § 13.  
<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* § 17, ad fin.  
<sup>6</sup> Dio Cass. l. s. c.  
<sup>7</sup> In the case of the Dacians. (Dio Cass. lxxviii. 6; Plin. *Panegy.* 11, 12.)  
<sup>8</sup> Dio Cass. lxxix. 15.  
<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*  
<sup>10</sup> This appears from a coin struck in the first year of Antoninus, having on the obverse the head of the Emperor, and on the reverse a female figure, holding a bow and quiver with the left hand, and presenting a crown with the right, with the inscription PARTHIA.  
<sup>11</sup> Æl. Spart. *Hadrian.* § 13.  
<sup>12</sup> Jul. Capit. *Anton. Pi.* § 9.  
<sup>13</sup> Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. i. p. 205; Smith's ed.  
<sup>14</sup> See Lindsay, *History and Coinage*, pp. 186, 187.  
<sup>15</sup> Jul. Capit. *Anton. Phil.* § 8. "Parthicum bellum, paratum sub Pio, Marci et Veri tempore indixit Volagessus."  
<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* *Anton. Pi.* § 9. "Parthorum regem ab Armeniorum expugnatione solis litteris reppulit [Pius]."  
<sup>17</sup> See Jamblich. ap. Phot. *Bibliothec. Cod.* xciv. p. 241; Dio Cass. ap. Suid. ad voc. Μάρτιος; Fronto, *Epist. ad Verum*, ii. 1 (p. 127, ed. Naber).  
<sup>18</sup> Mos. Choren. *Hist. Armen.* ii. 61.  
<sup>19</sup> Lucian. *Alex. Pseudo-Mant.* § 27.  
<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.* *Quomodo Hist. sit conscribend.* § 21.  
<sup>21</sup> Dio Cass. lxxi. 2.  
<sup>22</sup> According to some, he starved himself (Lucian, l. s. c.); according to others he cut his throat with a piece of glass (*ibid.* § 27). The true account of his death is given by Dio. (l. s. c. Οὐολόγαισος . . . στρατόπεδον ὅλον Ῥωμαϊκὸν αὐτοῖς ἠγεμόσι κατετόξευσε καὶ διέφθερε.)  
<sup>23</sup> Dio Cass. lxxi. 2; Oros. vii. 15.  
<sup>24</sup> Jul. Capit. *Anton. Phil.* § 8.  
<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.* *Ver. Imperat.* § 6. "Syris defectionem cogitantibus."  
<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* l. s. c.  
<sup>27</sup> Fronto, *Princip. Hist.* p. 208, ed. Naber.  
<sup>28</sup> Dio Cass. lxi. 2; Jul. Capit. *Ver. Imp.* § 7.  
<sup>29</sup> Vulc. Gall. *Avid. Cass.* §§ 5, 6. Compare Fronto, *Princip. Hist.* pp. 206-208; where, however, the credit of establishing a proper discipline is assigned by the polite courtier to Verus.  
<sup>30</sup> Dio Cass. l. s. c. Ἐπιόντα τὸν Οὐολόγαισον γενναίως ὑπέμεινε.  
<sup>31</sup> Lucian. *Quomodo historia sit conscrib.* § 20 and § 28.  
<sup>32</sup> Jul. Capit. *Ant. Phil.* § 9; Suidas ad voc. Βῆρος.  
<sup>33</sup> Suidas, l. s. c. Comp. Jamblich. ap. Phot. *Bibl.* xciv. p. 241.  
<sup>34</sup> Vulc. Gall. *Avid. Cass.* § 7; Dio Cass. lxxi. 22-27.  
<sup>35</sup> Dio Cass. lxxi. 3; Vulc. Gall. *Avid. Cass.* § 6.  
<sup>36</sup> Dio Cass. Fr. ap. Suidam, sub voc. Ζεύγμα.  
<sup>37</sup> Fronto, *Epist.* ii. 1, p. 121.

- <sup>38</sup> Lucian. *Quomodo, &c.*, § 29.  
<sup>39</sup> Jul. Capit. *Ver. Imp.* § 7.  
<sup>40</sup> Dio Cass. lxxi. 2; Jul. Capit. *Ver. Imp.* § 8; Eutrop. *Brev.* viii. 5; Oros. vii. 15; Amm. Marc. xxiii. 6. Capitolinus disbelieves the charge made against the Seleucians.  
<sup>41</sup> Dio Cass. l. s. c.  
<sup>42</sup> Jul. Capit. *Ver. Imp.* § 7. Compare Eckhel, *Doct. Num.* vol. vii. pp. 51 and 92.  
<sup>43</sup> See Ammian. Marc. xxiii. 6, § 24. Compare Jul. Capit. *Ver. Imp.* § 8.  
<sup>44</sup> Dio Cass. lxxi. 2.  
<sup>45</sup> Amm. Marc. l. s. c.  
<sup>46</sup> Eutrop. *Brev.* viii. 6:—"Tantus casus pestilentiae fuit, ut . . . per Italiam provinciasque maxima hominum pars, militum omnes fere copiae languore defecerint." Compare Oros. vii. 15.  
<sup>47</sup> This is seen most clearly in the series of Mesopotamian coins, especially those of Carrhæ and Edessa, which bear on the obverse the head of a Roman Emperor from the time of Aurelius and Verus. (See Mionnet, *Description de Méd. Ant.* tom. v. pp. 593-625.  
<sup>48</sup> See text, p. 110.  
<sup>49</sup> See text, p. 167.  
<sup>50</sup> Jul. Capit. *Avid. Cass.* § 7; Dio Cass. lxxi. 22.

- <sup>51</sup> Jul. Capit. *Ant. Phil.* § 22. "Imminebat et Parthicum bellum et Britannicum."  
<sup>52</sup> Jul. Capit. *Ant. Phil.* § 26, ad init. The "Persian ambassadors" of this passage are undoubtedly envoys from Volagases.  
<sup>53</sup> A. D. 180. (See Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. p. 178.)  
<sup>54</sup> Our authorities for the time of Commodus are three only: Dio in the *Epitome* of Xiphilinus. Herodian (book i.), and Lampridius in the *Historie Auguste Scriptores*. These writers are almost silent as to the condition of the East at the period.  
<sup>55</sup> The latest coins of Volagases III. bear the date ΒΦ, which corresponds to the latter part of A. D. 190 and the earlier of A. D. 191.

## CHAPTER XX.

<sup>1</sup> Reimar and others have supposed that Volagases, the adversary of Severus, was the son of a Sanatruces, or Sanatruces, on the strength of a fragment of Dio Cassius (lxxv. 9, *ad fin.*). But it is more probable that the fragment refers to a different Volagases, an Armenian prince, contemporary with the Parthian Volagases IV.

<sup>2</sup> Herodian, ii. 31. The expressions used are somewhat vague—οἱ τε ἐπέκεινα Τίγριδος καὶ Εὐφράτου σατραπαὶ καὶ βασιλεῖς ἐπέστελλον, κ. τ. λ.

<sup>3</sup> Herodian, iii. 1.

<sup>4</sup> Arab tribes from a very early period held portions of Mesopotamia. Xenophon calls the tract between the Khabour and the Babylonian alluvium "Arabia" (Anab. i. 5, § 1). Strabo as-

signs the same region to "Scenite Arabs" (xvi. 1, § 26). Arabs appear in Upper Mesopotamia about the time of Pompey (Dio Cass. xxxv. 2). Osrhoëné is reckoned as Arabian by Plutarch (*Crass.* § 21), and Appian (*Parth.* p. 140, A). Hatra, or Atra (now el-Hadhr), is first mentioned in the wars of Trajan, and is always said to be Arabian. (See Dio Cass. lxxviii. 31; lxxv. 10-12; Herodian. iii. 28; &c.)

<sup>5</sup> Herodian. iii. 1 and 27.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* iii. 1.

<sup>7</sup> Dio Cass. lxxv. 1.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, Οἱ μὲν Ὀσροηνοὶ καὶ οἱ Ἄδι-  
αβηνοὶ ἀποστάτες καὶ Νισίβιν πολιορ-  
κοῦντες, κ.τ.λ.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>10</sup> Dio tells a story, which has a somewhat apocryphal air, to illustrate the sufferings of the army. An especially dry summer had, he tells us, caused the springs generally to fail, and the troops on their way through the desert were so parched with drought, and so choked with dust, that they could no longer converse, but could barely articulate "Water, water." At length they reached a well, but the water was so foul that at first none would drink it. Seeing this, Severus caused a goblet to be filled for himself, and in the sight of the troops swallowed the whole at a draught. The men then consented to drink and were refreshed. (Dio Cass. lxxv. 2.)

<sup>11</sup> Dio says vaguely that Severus "gave dignity" to Nisibis (lxxv. 3, ἀξίωμα τῇ Νισίβει δούς). The nature of the dignity appears from the coins, which give Nisibis the titles of ΚΟΛΩΝΙΑ and ΜΗΤΡΟΠΟΛΙΣ. (See Mionnet, *Description*, tom. v. pp. 625-628.)

<sup>12</sup> Dio Cass. l. s. c. Compare Spartian. *Sev. Imp.* § 9. In commemoration of these successes Severus took the epithets of Arabicus and Adiabenicus, which are frequent in his inscriptions and on his coins. (See Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. p. 196.)

<sup>13</sup> See Dio Cass. lxxv. 9.

<sup>14</sup> Spartianus. See his "Life of Severus," § 15, where we are told that Severus, as soon as he arrived in Syria, "*Parthos summovit.*"

<sup>15</sup> "Æstate igitur jam exeunte ingressus," &c. (Spartian. *Sev. Imp.* § 15, ad init.)

<sup>16</sup> Herodian. iii. 1.

<sup>17</sup> Compare on this subject Herodian, iii. 27 with Dio Cass. lxxv. 9.

<sup>18</sup> This is to be gathered from the expression of Dio (lxxv. 9, ad fin. μέρος τε τῆς Ἀρμενίας ἐπὶ τῇ εἰρήνῃ χάρισατο), which must denote the cession to Volagases of some part of the Roman Armenia (Armenia Minor).

<sup>19</sup> Herodian. iii. 27, ad fin.

<sup>20</sup> Dio Cass. lxxv. 9.

<sup>21</sup> This seems to be the only way of reconciling Dio (lxxv. 9) with Herodian (iii. 28, ad init.)

<sup>22</sup> See text, p. 176.

<sup>23</sup> Dio Cass. l. s. c.

<sup>24</sup> Herodian's narrative is absurd as it stands; but there may be some truth in his statement that the Romans found the Parthians unprepared (προσπεσόντες οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι ἀπαρασκευάστοι τοῖς βαρβάροις, iii. 30).

<sup>25</sup> Spartianus (*Sev. Imp.* § 16. "Ctesiphontem pulso rege pervenit").

<sup>26</sup> Herodian. l. s. c. Dio implies the flight of Volagases, when he says οὐ μόντοι οὔτε τὸν Οὐλογάσιον ἐπεδίωξεν [ὁ Σεβήρος].

<sup>27</sup> Compare Dio Cass. lxxv. 9 with Herodian. iii. 30; and see also Spartian. *Sev. Imp.* § 16: "Oppidum cepit, et regem fugavit, et plurimos interemit."

<sup>28</sup> Spartian. *Sev. Imp.* § 16.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* "Longius ire non potuit." Dio, however, expresses surprise that no pursuit was attempted.

<sup>30</sup> Dio Cass. lxxv. 9.

<sup>31</sup> See text, p. 179.

<sup>32</sup> Dio Cass. lxxv. 10. It is uncertain whether Herodian means to describe the first or second attack. He mentions one siege only, and places it before that of Ctesiphon (iii. 28, 29); but the narrative of Dio, which is at once more minute, and internally more probable, seems preferable.

<sup>33</sup> One of these was Lætus, who a little earlier had saved Nisibis (see above, note 13). Severus (according to Dio) grew jealous of him, because the soldiers declared that they would follow no other leader. Marius Maximus, however, assigned his death to a different cause, and placed it earlier. (See Spartian. *Sev. Imp.* § 15.)

<sup>34</sup> Dio Cass. lxxv. 11.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.* lxxv. 12. The ruins of this temple still exist at El Hadhr.

<sup>36</sup> The combustible material used is said to have been naphtha, the flame of which was thought to be almost inextinguishable. (Dio Cass. Fr. 175, § 2; lxxv. 11. Compare Amm. Marc. xxiii. 6, p. 406.)

<sup>37</sup> Herodian. iii. 28.

<sup>38</sup> Dio Cass. lxxv. 11, ad fin.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.* ch. 12.

<sup>40</sup> Spartian tells us (*Sev. Imp.* § 16) that Ctesiphon was taken at the beginning of winter ("hiemali prope tempore"). Herodian places the siege of Hatra at the time of the great heats (iii. 28).

<sup>41</sup> Dio says that one of the officers of Severus offered to take Hatra if 550 European troops were placed at his disposal. The reply of Severus was, "Whence am I to get such a number of soldiers?"

<sup>42</sup> Dio Cass. lxxv. 13.

<sup>43</sup> Spartian. *Sev. Imp.* § 18:—"Adiabenos in tributarios coegit." This authority is superior to that of Aurelius Victor, who says—"Adiabena quoque, ni terrarum macies despectaretur, in tributarios concessisset. (*De Cæs.* § 20.)

<sup>44</sup> See Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. pp. 204-208.

<sup>45</sup> See text, p. 24.<sup>46</sup> Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. p. 218.

## CHAPTER XXI.

<sup>1</sup> The negotiations between Caracallus and Artabanus, which Herodian describes (iv. 18-20), must have taken place in the course of this year. (See Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. p. 224.)

<sup>2</sup> See Lindsay, *History and Coinage*, pp. 113, 114.

<sup>3</sup> Dio Cass. lxxvii. 12.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.* lxxvii. 19 and 21. The Πάρθος of the latter chapter must, it would seem, be the Ουλολόγαρος of the former.

<sup>5</sup> Herodian. l. s. c. Dio Cass. lxxviii. 1.

<sup>6</sup> Dio Cass. lxxvii. 22; Herodian. iv. 13; Spanheim, *De Usu Numism.* Diss. xii.

<sup>7</sup> Dio Cass. lxxvii. 12. (Compare Gibbon, vol. i. p. 343; Smith's edition.)

<sup>8</sup> Dio Cass. l. s. c.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* lxxvii. 21.

<sup>10</sup> These were a certain Tiridates, who seems to have been an Armenian prince, and a Cynic philosopher, named Antiochus (Dio Cass. lxxvii. 19).

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* lxxvii. 21.

<sup>12</sup> Herodian. iv. 18:—Πέμπει δὲ προβαίαν καὶ δῶρα πάσης ὕλης τε πολυτελοῦς καὶ τέχνης ποικίλης.

<sup>13</sup> Herodian. iv. 18.

<sup>14</sup> See Dio Cass. lv. 23, 24.

<sup>15</sup> Τὰ μὲν πρῶτα τοιαῦτα ἐπιστέλλων, παρητέϊτο. (Herodian. iv. 19.)

<sup>16</sup> Dio Cass. lxxviii. 1.

<sup>17</sup> Herodian. iv. 20. The full passage in Herodian is as follows:—"But when Antoninus urged his request, and added fresh gifts and oaths in confirmation of his serious meaning and real friendliness, the Barbarian yielded, and promised to give him his daughter, and addressed him as his future son-in-law. Now, when this was noised abroad, the Parthians made ready to receive the Roman monarch, and were transported with joy at the prospect of an eternal peace. Antoninus thereupon crossed the rivers without hindrance, and entered Parthia, just as if it were his own land. Everywhere along his route the people greeted him with sacrifices, and dressing their altars with garlands, offered upon them all manner of spices and incense; whereat he made pretence of being vastly pleased. As his journey now approached its close, and he drew near to the Parthian Court, Artabanus, instead of awaiting his arrival, went out and met him in the spacious plain before the city, with intent to entertain his daughter's bridegroom and his own son-in-law. Meanwhile the whole multitude of the barbarians, crowned with freshly gathered flowers, and clad in garments worked with gold and variously dyed, were keeping holiday, and dancing gracefully to the sound of the flute, the pipe, and the drum, an amusement wherein they take great delight

after they have indulged freely in wine. Now, after all the people had come together, they got off their horses, hung their quivers and their bows, and gave themselves wholly to libations and revels. The concourse of barbarians was very great, and they stood arranged in no order, since they did not apprehend any danger, but were all endeavoring to catch a sight of the bridegroom. Suddenly Antoninus gives his men the signal to fall on, and massacre the barbarians. These, amazed at the attack, and finding themselves struck and wounded, forthwith took to flight. Artabanus was hurried away by his guards, and put on a horse, whereby he escaped with a few followers. The rest of the barbarians were cut to pieces, since they could not reach their horses, which, when they dismounted, they had allowed to graze freely over the plain; nor were they able to make use of their legs, since these were entangled in the long flowing garments which descended to their heels. Many too had come without quivers or bows, as they were not wanted at a wedding. Antoninus, when he had made a vast slaughter, and taken a multitude of prisoners, and a rich booty, moved off without meeting any resistance. He allowed his soldiers to burn all the cities and villages, and to carry away as plunder whatever they chose." No doubt this passage contains a good deal of rhetoric; but it describes a scene which we can scarcely suppose to be imaginary.

<sup>18</sup> Ramsay in Smith's *Biog. Dict.* vol. i. p. 608; Champagny, *Les Césars du 3me. Siècle*, vol. i. p. 335, &c.

<sup>19</sup> There is something suspicious in the extreme brevity of Dio's narrative (lxxviii. 1), and in his statement that he has nothing important to tell of the war beyond the fact that when two soldiers were quarrelling over a wine-skin, Caracallus ordered them to cut it in two with their swords, and they obeyed him. His account of the war in this place does not harmonize with his statement in ch. 26, that Artabanus was violently angry at the treatment which he had received and determined to resent it. Again, the price which he allows that Macrinus paid for peace (ch. 27), is altogether exorbitant unless it was agreed to as compensation for some extraordinary outrage.

<sup>20</sup> Dio says that there was no engagement at all between the Parthians and the Romans (lxxviii. 1). Spartianus speaks of a battle in which Caracallus defeated the Satraps of Artabanus (*Ant. Caracall.* § 6). Dio makes the countries invaded Adiabéné and Media. Spartianus indicates a more southern locality by saying that the invading army passed through Babylonia. ("per Babylonios," l. s. c.)

<sup>21</sup> Spartianus says "per Cadusios et

Babylonios" (*Ant. Caracall.* § 6); but this is impossible, since the Cadusii lay upon the Caspian.

<sup>22</sup> Dio Cass. lxxviii. 1. The mention of Arbela indicates this route.

<sup>23</sup> Assyrian and Persian monarchs constantly conveyed to Arbela great criminals to be executed there. (See the *Journal of As. Society* for 1865, p. 195, note 17.) Rabbinical tradition placed there the tomb of Seth. (Schindler's *Pentaglott.* col. 144.)

<sup>24</sup> See Gibbon, vol. i. p. 272 (Smith's edition). Both the phrases quoted are used by this writer.

<sup>25</sup> Herodian. iv. 21; Spartan. *Ant. Car.* § 6.

<sup>26</sup> Dio Cass. lxxviii. 3.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* lxxviii. 5; Herodian. iv. 24; Spart. l. s. c.; Eutrop. *Brev.* viii. 11.

<sup>28</sup> Herodian. iv. 27; Dio Cass. lxxviii. 26.

<sup>29</sup> Dio Cass. lxxviii. 26.

<sup>30</sup> I follow here the narrative of Herodian (iv. 30), since the passage of Dio which contained an account of the struggle is too much mutilated to be intelligible.

<sup>31</sup> Herodian. iv. 28.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.* iv. 30 (p. 172).

<sup>33</sup> Dio Cass. lxxviii. 26.

<sup>34</sup> Herodian. iv. 30 (p. 173).

<sup>35</sup> So Herodian, l. s. c.

<sup>36</sup> Herodian makes the third day's battle terminate, like those of the two preceding days, without decisive result; but Dio evidently regarded the Romans as vanquished.

<sup>37</sup> See the fragment of Dio, which (as restored by Fabricius) reads thus:—τῆ τοῦ Μακρίνου φυγῆ ἀθυρησάμενοι ἠτήθησαν.

<sup>38</sup> See Dio Cass. lxxviii. 27.

<sup>39</sup> The ignominy was cloaked under the transparent fiction that the payment was by way of presents to the Parthian monarch and his lords (Dio Cass. l. s. c.).

<sup>40</sup> Agathias, ii. 26.

<sup>41</sup> Agathias, ii. 25. Ἦν δέ γε οὗτος τῆ μαγικῆ κάτοχος ἱερουργία, καὶ αὐτουργός τῶν ἀπορόρητων.

<sup>42</sup> See Malcolm's *History of Persia*, vol. i. pp. 94, 95. Compare Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. i. pp. 322, 323, Smith's edition.

<sup>43</sup> Malcolm, p. 95.

<sup>44</sup> See text, pp. 199, 200.

<sup>45</sup> Mos. Choren. *Hist. Amen.* ii. 68.

<sup>46</sup> Strab. xv. 3, § 24.

<sup>47</sup> See text, p. 48.

<sup>48</sup> Agathias, ii. 25.

<sup>49</sup> Herodian, iv. 30, p. 174.

<sup>50</sup> Herodian (vi. 6) says:—Ἀρταξέρξης ὁ Περσῶν βασιλεὺς, μετὰ τὸ Παρθναίους καθελεῖν καὶ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀνατολὴν ἀρχῆς παρὰ λῦσαι, Ἀρτάβανον τὸν πρότερον καλούμενον τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα καὶ ὄνσι διαδήμασι χρώμενον ἀπέκτεινε. Dio, it is true, seems to have called him merely "a certain Persian" (Ἀρταξέρξης τις Πέρσης); and later writers indulged in various tales as to his low birth. (Agathias, ii. 27; Gib-

bon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. i. p. 331; Malcolm, *History of Persia*, vol. i. pp. 89, 90.) But these stories are probably myths, which clustered about the founder of the second Persian kingdom as so many similar ones did about the founder of the first, Cyrus. (Herod. i. 107-128.) On the abundance of such myths in connection with the person of Artaxerxes, see Moses of Chorene (*Hist. Arm.* ii. 67), who speaks of "the dream of desire, and the judgment, and the fire that sprang from Sassan, the imprisoned flock and the white eye, the predictions of the soothsayers, and all that follows them—Artaxerxes' incest and his murders, the wild eloquence of the Magian damsel owing to the calf, &c.; the she-goat, which, protected by the Eagle, suckled the boy; the information of the Crow, and the Lion's remiss defence, the service rendered by the Wolf, and the strange trial of strength, and all the other silly fables which are related in the books, but which I do not intend to repeat."

<sup>51</sup> The exact date of the rebellion of Artaxerxes is unknown. Roman writers only tell us that he conquered Artabanus and began to threaten Rome in A.D. 226. The coins confirm this, but add nothing. Abulpharagius, the Arabian writer, says that Artaxerxes founded the New Persian kingdom in the third year of Alexander Severus, or A.D. 224 (p. 80).

<sup>52</sup> Malcolm, *History of Persia*, vol. i. p. 91.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> Dio. Cass. lxxx. 3.

<sup>55</sup> So Malcolm, following Persian authorities. (*History of Persia*, l. s. c.)

<sup>56</sup> Dio Cass. l. s. c.; Herodian, vi. 6, 7; Agathias, ii. 25, &c.

<sup>57</sup> Dio Cass. l. s. c.

<sup>58</sup> A coin of Artavasdes has been figured and described by Mr. Taylor in the *Numismatic Chronicle* for 1871, p. 226, and pl. ii. No. 7. The same coin is figured also, but very poorly, in Lindsay (*History and Coinage*, pl. iv. No. 95), and is there assigned wrongly to Volagases V. The legend upon it can be read as

ΑΡΤΑΒΑΖΟΥ (Artabazu) or Artavasdes.

Some coins of this king bear the date ΘΛΦ, or A.D. 227.

<sup>59</sup> Procopius de *Ædific. Justinian.* iii. 1. The native historians give this prince the name of Chosroes, but do not acknowledge his close relationship to Artabanus. (See Mos. Chor. *Hist. Arm.* ii. 64-70.)

<sup>60</sup> Dio Cass. l. s. c. On the efforts which were made by the Armenian king to help Artabanus, see Mos. Chor. *H. A.* ii. 68, 70.

<sup>61</sup> Dio Cass. ut supra. Compare Herodian. vi. 15.

<sup>62</sup> Mos. Chor. *H. A.* ii. 70.

<sup>63</sup> Malcolm, *History of Persia*, vol. i. p. 96, note.

<sup>64</sup> See text, p. 130.

<sup>65</sup> See text, p. 163.

## CHAPTER XXII.

<sup>1</sup> Fergusson, *History of Architecture*, vol. ii. p. 422.

<sup>2</sup> See Art. xxii. pp. 467-470.

<sup>3</sup> Vol. ii. pp. 423-425.

<sup>4</sup> See Arrian, Fr. 15: Ἄτραι, πόλις με-  
ταῦν Εὐφράτου καὶ Τίγρητος. Compare Dio  
Cass. lxxviii. 31; lxxv. 10; Herodian. iii.  
1 and 23; Arrian, Fr. 6.

<sup>5</sup> Amm. Marc. xxv. 8. "Hatram . . .  
oppidum, quod diruendum adorti tem-  
poribus variis Trajanus et Severus, prin-  
cipes bellicosi, cum exercitibus pæne  
deleti sunt." See above, pp. 179 and 197.

<sup>6</sup> Herodian. iii. 23.

<sup>7</sup> Dio Cass. lxxv. 12.

<sup>8</sup> Herodian. iii. 1 and 27.

<sup>9</sup> Amm. Marc. l. s. c. "Hatram . . .  
vetus oppidum in media solitudine posi-  
tum, olimque desertum."

<sup>10</sup> In this description I follow especi-  
ally the account given by Mr. Ross, (*Geog-  
raph Journal*, l. s. c.) On some points  
I am further indebted to Mr. Ainsworth  
(*Geographical Journal*, vol. xi. pp. 13 *et*  
*seq.*; *Researches in Mesopotamia*, vol. ii.  
pp. 165 *et seqq.*), and one to Mr.  
Fergusson (*History of Architecture*, vol.  
ii. pp. 423-425).

<sup>11</sup> The width was a little more than ten  
feet.

<sup>12</sup> Mr. Ross's plan shows one gateway  
only—viz., the eastern one. Mr. Ains-  
worth, however, states that there were  
four. The plan which the latter travel-  
ler sent with his memoir to the Royal  
Geographical Society was, unfortu-  
nately, not published.

<sup>13</sup> Mr. Ross represents the watercourse  
as straight, but Mr. Ainsworth says it  
is tortuous. (*Researches*, vol. ii. p. 167.)

<sup>14</sup> In the East the Temple was com-  
monly, or at any rate frequently, an ad-  
junct of the palace. Two temples form-  
ed part of the old Assyrian palace at Ca-  
lah or Nimrud. (See *Ancient Monarchies*,  
vol. i. pp. 319-320, 2nd edition.) A tem-  
ple was included within Sargon's palace  
at Khorsabad (*ibid.* p. 296). Mr. Fergus-  
son regards the grand buildings at Per-  
sepolis as "Palace-Temples."

<sup>15</sup> These measurements were furnish-  
ed to Mr. Fergusson by Mr. Layard.  
(*Hist. of Architecture*, vol. ii. pp. 433-4.)  
Mr. Ross regarded the enclosure as "a  
square of 300 good paces" (query, yards?)  
See the *Geograph. Journal*, vol. ix. p.  
463.

<sup>16</sup> Ainsworth, *Researches*, &c., vol. ii.  
p. 166. At the southern extremity of the  
row of small chambers was a hall of  
some size.

<sup>17</sup> So Mr. Ross (*Geograph. Journal*, l.  
s. c.) But from the drawing it would  
seem that the estimate is insufficient.

<sup>18</sup> Mr. Ross says "32 long paces," by  
which he seems to mean "steps." Mr.  
Ainsworth says "31 yards."

<sup>19</sup> "Twelve long paces" (Ross). "Four-  
teen yards" (Ainsworth).

<sup>20</sup> Mr. Ross and Mr. Ainsworth agree in  
this estimate.

<sup>21</sup> The "female form floating in air"  
was confined to the hall marked No. II.  
on the plan [see Pl. IV. Fig. 2]. The  
stones of the other arches bore heads  
both male and female, some with "very  
curious curling bagwigs." (Compare the  
bushy wigs on many of the Parthian  
coins.)

<sup>22</sup> In the Hall marked No. II. on the  
plan [see Pl. IV. Fig. 2], the heads were  
uniformly three, as in Plate V. Fig. 1.  
In Hall No. V. each pillar bore two  
heads. Hall No. VII. seems to have  
had no pillars. The north side is in ruins;  
the south is ornamented with a row of  
eight human-headed bulls, standing out  
from the walls as far as their shoulders  
at a distance from the ground of about  
ten feet. (Ross in *Geographical Journal*,  
vol. ix. p. 469.)

<sup>23</sup> See above, note 21.

<sup>24</sup> Ainsworth, *Researches*, vol. ii. p.  
165. Mr. Ross believed that he found  
traces of a staircase leading to the upper  
rooms at the southern end of the build-  
ing. (*Geograph. Journal*, vol. ix. p.  
470.)

<sup>25</sup> See the ground plan in Mr. Fergus-  
son's *History of Architecture*, vol. ii. p.  
430.

<sup>26</sup> Ross in *Geograph. Journal*, vol. ix.  
p. 468.

<sup>27</sup> See Plate V. Fig. 1.

<sup>28</sup> Layard, *Nineveh and Babylon*, p.  
571.

<sup>29</sup> See text, p. 187.

<sup>30</sup> Ross in *Geograph. Journal*, vol. ix.  
p. 370. Mr. Ainsworth regards some of  
these buildings as dwelling houses, and  
thinks that only upon a very cursory  
inspection could they have been con-  
sidered in all cases tombs (*Researches*,  
vol. ii. p. 171). He does not, however,  
question the sepulchral character of the  
greater number.

<sup>31</sup> As especially those at Serbistan and  
Firuzabad, described by Mr. Fergusson  
in his *History of Architecture*, vol. ii.  
pp. 428-430.

<sup>32</sup> See Loftus, *Chaldæa and Susiana*,  
pp. 202-214.

<sup>33</sup> Loftus, *Chaldæa and Susiana*, p.  
226.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* p. 225. (See Pl. V. Fig. 1.)

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.* p. 227. Mr. Loftus argues that  
the peculiarities of Saracenic architec-  
ture, its richly wrought tracing and geo-  
metric ornamentation, originated with  
the Parthians, were disused by the Sas-  
sanians, and after the Mohammedan  
conquest were revived by the Arabs.  
(*Chaldæa and Susiana*, p. 228.)

<sup>36</sup> On these coffins, see Loftus, pp.  
203-206; Layard, *Nineveh and Babylon*,  
p. 558; Rawlinson, *Herodotus*, vol. i. p.  
272, 2nd edition.

<sup>37</sup> Loftus, p. 213.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.* p. 214.

<sup>39</sup> Similar ideas existed among the  
early Babylonians (*Ancient Monarch-  
ies*, vol. i. pp. 86-89, 2nd edition), and had  
probably been passed on to the mixed

race which inhabited the same tract of country under the Parthians.

<sup>40</sup> As Mr. Loftus supposed (*Chaldæa and Susiana*, p. 211).

<sup>41</sup> See *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. i. p. 389; vol. ii. p. 570, 2nd edit.

<sup>42</sup> Compare the note of Sir D. Brewster at the end of Mr. Layard's *Nineveh and Babylon*, pp. 674-676.

<sup>43</sup> Loftus, *Chaldæa and Susiana*, p. 211.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> On this inscription, see text, p. 147.

<sup>46</sup> This monument was seen by Sir H. Rawlinson in 1838. and described in the *Journal of the Geographical Society*, vol. ix. p. 115. It was carefully copied by M. Coste and inserted in the great work of M. Flandin (*Voyage en Perse*, Planches Anciennes, No. 119). The accompanying [Pl. VII.] is taken from this engraving.

<sup>47</sup> Flandin, *Voyage en Perse*, tom. iv. pl. 208.

<sup>48</sup> If the inscription were copied by a person versed in the character, it is probable that there would be little difficulty in deciphering it. But the differences between several of the Parthian letters are so slight that it is extremely hard for a person unskilled in the character to make a correct transcript. Still the word "satrap" seems to be traceable at the commencement of the left-hand inscription.

<sup>49</sup> These reliefs were communicated by the Baron to M. Flandin, and will be found represented in the *Voyage en Perse*, tom. iv. plates 224 and 226. They exist on an isolated mass of black rock, near Tengeh-i-Saoulek in the Bakhtyari mountains (*Voyage*, tom. i. pp. 184, 185).

<sup>50</sup> Strab. xv. 3, § 15.

<sup>51</sup> M. Flandin doubts whether the animal is intended for a bear or a lion (*Voyage*, p. 185); but his representation fairly resembles the former, while it presents no likeness to the latter animal.

<sup>52</sup> Compare a representation of a Parthian warrior in M. Flandin's work (pl. 225); and see also the coin of Labienus, which represents him equipped in Parthian fashion (see Pl. II. Fig. 1.)

<sup>53</sup> The sculptures at Persepolis, Nakhsh-i-Rustam, Behistun, &c., must always have been exposed to view, and would have sufficed to form a better taste than that which is actually found among the Parthians had they possessed fair æsthetic capacity. That, besides these, they possessed Greek models appears from the emblems upon their coins.

#### CHAPTER XXIII.

<sup>1</sup> By "the Zoroastrian system" must be here understood, not the original teaching of Zoroaster as exhibited to us in the more ancient portions of the *Zendavesta* (see the author's *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. ii. pp. 322-344), but the

mixed religion produced by the contact of Zoroastrianism with Magism, which was adopted by the Achæmenian monarchs from Xerxes downwards. (*Ibid.* pp. 344-354.)

<sup>2</sup> *Amm. Marc. xxiii. 6*, p. 405, ed. Gro-nov.

<sup>3</sup> Herodian. iv. 30. Ἀσπασάμενοι τὸν Ἥλιον, ὡς ἔθος αὐτοῖς.

<sup>4</sup> The worship at Hatra (see text, p. 196) is probably a fair specimen of the Parthian cult of the Sun at other places. The Hatrene worship may have had an Arabian tinge, but, on the whole, it is probable that it conformed itself to that of the dominant people.

<sup>5</sup> *Mos. Chor. Hist. Arm. ii. 74.*

<sup>6</sup> *Percep. Inscr. H. ll. 14, 22, 24.*

<sup>7</sup> See *Mos. Choren. l. s. c.*

<sup>8</sup> *Joseph. Ant. Jud. xviii. 9, § 3.*

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid. § 6.*

<sup>10</sup> We have an account of this worship only in Josephus (*Ant. Jud. xviii. 9, § 5*); he, however, appears to be perfectly familiar with it. He calls the images ἀφιδρύματα τῶν θεῶν and σεβάσματα, and the worship offered to them θεραπείαν or θρησκείαν.

<sup>11</sup> *Justin, xli. 3.*

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> *Strab. xi. 9, § 3.*

<sup>14</sup> *Mos. Choren. Hist. Arm. l. s. c.*

<sup>15</sup> *Herodian. iv. 30.*

<sup>16</sup> *Agathias, ii. 26.*

<sup>17</sup> See text, p. 209.

<sup>18</sup> *Amm. Marc. xxiii. 6*, p. 403; *Jul. Capit. Vit. Ver. Imp. § 8.*

<sup>19</sup> *Joseph. Ant. Jud. xviii. 9, § 1, et seq.*

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>21</sup> See Bayer, *Hist. Edess. e numis illustrata*, iii. p. 173, and Asseman, *Bibliotheca Orientalis*, vol. i. p. 423.

<sup>22</sup> On the supposed letter of Abgarus, king of Edessa, to our Lord, and the reply to it, his cure by Thaddæus, and the conversion of his subjects, see Euseb. *Hist. Eccl. i. 13.* and compare Lardner, *Credibility*, vol. vi. p. 596, and Burton, *Eccles. Hist. of First Three Centuries*, vol. i. pp. 328, 329.

<sup>23</sup> A council was held in Edessa on the proper time for keeping Easter in the year A.D. 198. (Burton, vol. ii. p. 216.) The Syriac (Peshito) version of the Scriptures was probably made for the Edessene Christians before the end of the first century (ib. vol. i. p. 328; Michaelis, *Introduction*, vii. § 8).

<sup>24</sup> *Acts, ii. 9.*

<sup>25</sup> *Hist. Eccles. iii. 1.* Rufinus, who wrote in the fourth century, says that St. Thomas was buried at Edessa. (*Hist. Eccl. ii. 5.* Compare *Socrat. iv. 18* and *Sozom. vi. 18.*)

<sup>26</sup> *Bardanes ap. Euseb. Præp. Ev. vi. 10.* Bardanes was a native of Edessa, and wrote a little after the middle of the second century.

<sup>27</sup> *Herodian. iii. 1.*

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* Ὁ Παρθναῖος ἐπιστελεῖν ἔφη τοῖς σατράπαις δύναμιν ἀθροῖζειν· οὕτω γὰρ εἴωθεν, ὀηνηκῆ ἀν δεσηῆ στρατὸν συλλέγειν.

τῶ μὴ ἔχειν μισθοφόρους καὶ συνεστὸς στρατιωτικόν.

<sup>29</sup> These auxiliary forces are not often mentioned by the Greek and Latin writers. Still occasionally we catch a glimpse of them. (See Joseph. xviii. 9, § 2; xx. 3, § 4, &c.)

<sup>30</sup> Justin, xli. 2.

<sup>31</sup> Plutarch, *Crass.* § 21. Ἐἶχε δὲ τοὺς σύμπαντας ἱππεῖς [ὁ Σουρήνας], ὁμοῦ πελάτας τε καὶ δούλους, μυρίων οὐκ ἀποδέοντας.

<sup>32</sup> Justin (l. s. c.) estimates the nobles in the Parthian army which fought against Antony at 400, the army itself at 50,000. This would give to each noble an average of 125 followers.

<sup>33</sup> This, at any rate, was the proportion in the case mentioned in note 31, where the 10,000 slaves and retainers of Surenas were accompanied by a thousand baggage-camels. (Plut. l. s. c.; Appian, *Parth.* p. 141.)

<sup>34</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 19; Appian, *Parth.* p. 138.

<sup>35</sup> As that employed against Crassus. (See text, p. 89.)

<sup>36</sup> Ὠράκας ὠμοβύρσους καὶ σιδηροῦς. Plut. *Crass.* § 25. Compare Justin, xli. 2, *ad fin.*

<sup>37</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 24.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.* §§ 18, 25.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.* § 24. Κράνη τοῦ Μαργιανοῦ σιδηροῦ στίλβοντος ὄξυ καὶ πυριλαμπές.

<sup>40</sup> Herodian. iv. 30, p. 173. The representation of a mailed warrior thus attired at Takht-i-Bostan (Ker Porter, vol. ii. Pl. 62), though of the Sassanian period, lends force to the statement of Herodian.

<sup>41</sup> Dio Cass. xl. 15. Compare Justin, xli. 2, *ad fin.*

<sup>42</sup> Plut. *Ant.* § 45; *Crass.* § 27; Dio Cass. xl. 22; Appian, *Parth.* p. 148; Herodian. iv. 30.

<sup>43</sup> App. *Parth.* p. 144. The size and strength of the bow which they used enabled the Parthians to deliver their arrows at a speed which was very unusual, and which made them most formidable archers. (See Plut. *Crass.* §§ 18 and 24.) The arrow was not seen till it struck, and it pierced easily through all customary armor.

<sup>44</sup> The knife, which was worn in private life (Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xviii. 2, § 4), was certainly not laid aside in war. It was frequently employed to cut off the head of a dead enemy. (Plut. *Crass.* §§ 25 and 31.)

<sup>45</sup> Justin, l. s. c.

<sup>46</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 24, *ad init.*

<sup>47</sup> Justin, l. s. c. "Hos pari ac liberos suos cura habent, et equitare et sagittare magna industria docent."

<sup>48</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 24, *ad fin.*; Justin, xli. 2; Virg. *Georg.* iii. 31; Hor. *Od.* i. 19, 11; ii. 13, 16; Tacit. *Ann.* vi. 35.

<sup>49</sup> Dio Cass. xl. 24.

<sup>50</sup> Dio Cass. l. s. c.

<sup>51</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 21; Appian, *Parthica*, p. 144.

<sup>52</sup> Herodian. iv. 28, 30.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.* p. 172.

<sup>54</sup> Dio Cass. xl. 15, *ad fin.*

<sup>55</sup> Justin, xli. 2:—"Obsessas expugnare urbes nesciunt." Compare Dio Cass. xl. 29 (Ἀδύνατοι πολιορκησαί τι ἦσαν) and Tacit. *Ann.* xv. 4 ("Partho ad exsequendas obsidiones nulla cominus audacia").

<sup>56</sup> They were ready to have besieged Crassus in Carrhæ, if he had shut himself up in it (Plut. *Crass.* § 28). They actually besieged Antioch in B.C. 52, and Apamæa in B.C. 40. See text, pp. 101 and 106.)

<sup>57</sup> See Plut. *Anton.* § 49. Their persistency against Macrinus is noticed as something strange and unusual (Herodian. iv. 30; pp. 173, 174).

<sup>58</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 29:—"Νυκτομαχεῖν οὐ πάτριον αὐτοῖς ἔστιν." Compare *Anton.* § 47.

<sup>59</sup> So Dio (xl. 24). But the real grounds of their usage, a usage common to them with the Persians, are better seen from what Xenophon says of the latter. *Anab.* iii. 4, § 34. Compare *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. iv. p. 135.)

<sup>60</sup> Παρά τὸ εἰωθὸς ἔτι νυκτὸς ἐδίωκον. (Plut. *Ant.* § 47.)

<sup>61</sup> Dio Cass. xl. 15; Plut. *Anton.* § 40.

<sup>62</sup> See text, p. 57.

<sup>63</sup> See text, p. 157.

<sup>64</sup> Τὸν ἥλιον φλογυδέστατον ὄντα ἀνέχοντα τῇ συνθηγῆ. (Dio Cass. l. s. c.)

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>66</sup> Plutarch says that the general employed against Crassus was accompanied by 200 chariots containing his concubines (*Crass.* § 21).

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.* § 32. Κατ' οὐρανὸν τῆς φάλαγγος εἰς πόρνας καὶ κρόταλα καὶ ψαλμούς καὶ παννυχίδας ἀκολούτους μετὰ γυναικῶν τελευτῶσαν.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.* Σελευκιάδες ἐταῖραι μουσουργοί.

<sup>69</sup> Dio Cass. xl. 15, *ad fin.*

<sup>70</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 21. If the general employed against Crassus had a thousand baggage camels for his own slaves and retainers, the entire army may be presumed to have been accompanied by several thousands.

<sup>71</sup> *Ibid.* § 25, *ad init.*

<sup>72</sup> Polyb. x. 34, § 11; xxxi. 3, § 11; Strab. xv. 1, § 36; Plut. *Alex.* § 62.

<sup>73</sup> The elephant occurs on the coins of the Bactrian kings (Mionnet, *Supplément*, tom. viii. pp. 482, 485). One monarch, Demetrius, wears a head-dress made out of the head of an elephant (*ibid.* p. 473).

<sup>74</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* xv. 15.

<sup>75</sup> See Amm. Marc. xxv. 3, 6, &c.; and compare Malcolm, *History of Persia*, vol. i. p. 170; Ockley, *History of the Saracens*, p. 143; Ker Porter, *Travels*, vol. ii. Pl. 63 and 64.

<sup>76</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 26; Herodian. iv. 30.

<sup>77</sup> Justin, xli. 2; Plut. *Crass.* § 23, *sub fin.*; Appian, *Parth.* p. 143.

<sup>78</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 27.

<sup>79</sup> Compare Dio Cass. xl. 15; Plut. *Ant.* §§ 29, 42, 45; Herodian. iv. 30. Justin's summary expresses a fair judgment:—

"Pugnant procurentibus equis, aut terga dantibus; sæpe etiam fugam simulant, ut incautiores adversum vulnera insequentes habeant. . . . Nec pugnare diu possunt; cæterum intolerandi forent, si quantus his impetus est, vis tanta et perseverantia esset" (xl. 2).

<sup>80</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 30; *Anton.* §§ 46 and 49.

<sup>81</sup> Plutarch, l. s. c.

<sup>82</sup> Vell. Patern. ii. 101; Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xviii. 4, § 5.

<sup>83</sup> On the Parthian knowledge of Greek, see Plut. *Crass.* § 33. I gather from Dio and Herodian that Greek was the language used in the diplomatic intercourse of the Parthians and Romans.

<sup>84</sup> See the passages cited in note 82.

<sup>85</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 31. Δείν δὲ γράψασθαι τὰς συνθήκας. Compare Herodian. iv. 18 and 30.

<sup>86</sup> Hence such phrases as "renovari dextas" (Tac. *Ann.* ii. 58), and the like.

<sup>87</sup> Herodian. iv. 30.

<sup>88</sup> Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xviii. 2, § 4; 4, § 5; Tacit. *Ann.* xv. 25; Herodian. iv. 18.

<sup>89</sup> See text, p. 121.

<sup>90</sup> Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xviii. 4, § 5.

<sup>91</sup> On these letters, see Tacit. *Ann.* xv. 24; Dio Cass. lv. 11; Sueton. *Tiber.* § 66; Herodian. iv. 18, 19, 30, &c.

<sup>92</sup> Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xx. 2, § 3.

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.* xviii. 2, § 4; Tacit. *Ann.* ii. 1; Strab. xvi. 1, § 28.

<sup>94</sup> Joseph. xviii. 4, § 5.

<sup>95</sup> See text, p. 5.

<sup>96</sup> Strab. xi. 9, § 1.

<sup>97</sup> Herodian. iv. 19.

<sup>98</sup> Strab. xi. 13, § 1.

<sup>99</sup> Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xvii. 2, § 4.

<sup>100</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 32, *ad fin.*

<sup>101</sup> See text, p. 124.

<sup>102</sup> Philostratus is, so far as I know, the only writer who mentions the employment of eunuchs by the Parthians. According to him, eunuchs occupied that position in the royal harem which is usual in the East (*Vit. Apoll.* i. 37), and held sometimes the office of satrap in the provinces (ib. i. 21).

<sup>103</sup> See Justin, xli. 2. The obverse of Parthian coins frequently exhibits the monarch thus apparelled. [Pl. X. Fig. 2.]

<sup>104</sup> Compare the engravings on Pl. II.

<sup>105</sup> See Pl. I. Fig. 4.

<sup>106</sup> See Pl. I. Fig. 4 and III. Fig. 4.

<sup>107</sup> See Pl. II. Fig. 4.

<sup>108</sup> On the obverse of the early Parthian coins the monarch is usually represented in this attire. [Pl. X. Fig. 3.]

<sup>109</sup> See text, p. 229.

<sup>110</sup> Plut. *Anton.* § 44.

<sup>111</sup> Ἀναβολαίς. See Plut. *Crass.* § 31.

<sup>112</sup> See Pl. II. Fig. 2.

<sup>113</sup> Philostratus was born about A.D. 172, and lived to about A.D. 244, or a little later. He was thus contemporary with the Parthian kings Volagases III., Volagases IV., Volagases V., and Artabanus, the last monarch. His life of Apollonius of Tyana, which contains

the description given in the text, as well as other curious information about Parthia, is no doubt an historical romance; but its local coloring seems intended to be correct, and is probably not far from the truth.

<sup>114</sup> Philostr., *Vit. Apoll. Tyana.* i. 25.

<sup>115</sup> Amm. Marc. xxiii. 6; p. 397.

<sup>116</sup> See the narrative in Josephus (*Ant. Jud.* xx. 3, §§ 1, 2); and compare text, p. 140.

<sup>117</sup> Posidon. ap. Athen. *Deipn.* iv. 13; p. 152, F.

<sup>118</sup> *Ibid.* p. 153, A.

<sup>119</sup> Philostrat. *Vit. Apoll. Tyana.* i. 21 and 28.

<sup>120</sup> Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xx. 3, § 3.

<sup>121</sup> Philostrat. *Vit. Ap. Tyana.* i. 28.

<sup>122</sup> *Ibid.* i. 34.

<sup>123</sup> See text, p. 48.

<sup>124</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 21. Κατὰ γένος μὲν οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐκέκτητο βασιλεῖ γινομένῳ Πάρθων ἐπιτιθέμενοι τὸ διάδημα πρῶτον.

<sup>125</sup> *Ibid.* l. s. c.

\*<sup>126</sup> This appears especially in the case of the officer employed against Crassus, who was attended in the field by 200 litters containing his wives and concubines. In a less degree, it appears also in the case of the Mithridates attacked by Anilai. (See text, p. 137.)

<sup>127</sup> See Philostr. *Vit. Ap. Tyana.* i. 22 and 38; Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xviii. 2, § 4; Justin, xli. 5; Suet. *Caii Vit.* § 5.

<sup>128</sup> Philostr. i. 22.

<sup>129</sup> The tiger has always been a native of Hyrcania and the low tract south of the Caspian. Bears have always inhabited Mount Zagros, while leopards abound in Mesopotamia.

<sup>130</sup> Philostr. i. 38. Θῆρια βεβασανισμένα καὶ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν τῆν ἐαυτῶν δεδουλωμένα.

<sup>131</sup> Gen. x. 9.

<sup>132</sup> Justin, xli. ii. "Vestis perlucida et fluida." Cf. Herodian. iv. 20.

<sup>133</sup> Lucian. *De conscrib. hist.* § 19.

<sup>134</sup> Herodian. l. s. c.

<sup>135</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>136</sup> Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xviii. 2, § 4. Μαχαροφορεῖν ἔθος ἄσασιν.

<sup>137</sup> Justin, xli. 3, *ad fin.* "In cibo parcus."

<sup>138</sup> Pliny, *H. N.* xi. 53.

<sup>139</sup> *Ibid.* xiv. 22. According to Pliny, the Parthians of his time (A.D. 50-70) ate and drank so immoderately as to render their breath unpleasant. To remedy this defect, the nobles were in the habit of munching the pips of citrons (*H. N.* xi. 53; xii. 3).

<sup>140</sup> Justin says—"Carne non nisi venatibus quæsita vescuntur" (l. s. c.); but we must correct him as to the later period of the Empire from Philostratus (*Vit. Ap. Tyana.* i. 21).

<sup>141</sup> Philostr. l. s. c.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>143</sup> Plin. *H. N.* xviii. 11.

<sup>144</sup> Philostr. l. s. c.

<sup>145</sup> Compare Plin. *H. N.* xiv. 16 with Philostr. *Vit. Ap. Tyana.* i. 21; p. 27.

<sup>146</sup> Philostr. l. s. c.

<sup>147</sup> Herodian. iv. 20; Athen. *Deipn.* xiv. 8.

<sup>148</sup> Philostr. l. s. c.

<sup>149</sup> Justin, xli. 3. "Feminae non convivia tantum virorum, verum etiam conspectum interdiciunt."

<sup>150</sup> Justin, l. s. c. "Nec ulla delicta adulterio gravius vindicant."

<sup>151</sup> See the story told by Josephus, *Ant. Jud.* xviii. 9, § 6.

<sup>152</sup> Justin. xli. 3, ad init. "Uxores . . . singuli plures habent."

<sup>153</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 21.

<sup>154</sup> See text, p. 222.

<sup>155</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 32.

<sup>156</sup> See *Num. Chron.* vi. p. 104; Lindsay, *History and Coinage*, &c., p. 208; and, for the Bactrian writing, compare Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua*, plates.

<sup>157</sup> *Bell. Jud.* Proem. § 1 and § 2.

<sup>158</sup> See text, p. 231.

<sup>159</sup> Philostr. *Vit. Ap. Tyan.* i. 20.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.* i. 27, ad fin. "ἤρετο ὄνομά τε αὐτοῦ, καὶ ὅ τι ἐπιτηδεύων, καὶ ὅ τι φοιτῶν; καὶ ἀπογραφάμενος ταῦτα εἰς γραμματεῖον, στολήν τε αὐτοῦ καὶ εἶδος, ἐκείνους μὲν περιμείνας κελύειν."

<sup>161</sup> Herodian. iii. 1. "Ὁ δὲ Παρθναῖος ἐπιστέλλειν ἐφη τοῖς σατραπαῖς. Herodian uses ἐπιστέλλειν in the sense of ἐπιστολάς πέμπειν constantly. Compare iv. 18. ἐπιστέλλει τῷ βασιλεῖ Παρθναίων . . . τὰ δὲ γραμματα ἔλεγεν. iv. 21. ἐπιστέλλει τῇ συγκλήτῳ. v. 1. ἐπιστέλλει τῷ δῆμῳ Ῥωμαίων καὶ τῇ συγκλήτῳ . . . ἀναγνωθεῖς ἰσῆς δὲ τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιστολῆς."

<sup>162</sup> Plin. *H. N.* xiii. 11, ad fin.

<sup>163</sup> Herodian. iv. 18. Δι' ἐμπορών.

<sup>164</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>165</sup> Compare Plin. *H. N.* viii. 48; xi. 22, 23; and Athen. *Deipn.* v. p. 197. Strabo's statement that Borsippa was in his day "a great staple of the linen trade" (*Λινουγείον μέγα*, xvi. i. § 7) is also an indication that manufactures flourished under the Parthians.

<sup>166</sup> Plin. *H. N.* xi. 23. The use of silk in Parthia is noted as early as B.C. 54, when the flags attached to their standards are said to have been made of it (*Florus*, iii. 11).

<sup>167</sup> Plin. *H. N.* viii. 48.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.* xii. 9; xxi. 18.

<sup>169</sup> See text, p. 225.

<sup>170</sup> Euseb. *Chron. Can.* i. 40, § 18, ad fin.

<sup>171</sup> Note, as instances, the employment of Labienus in high command (see text, p. 105) and the satrapial dignity of the Jews, Asinai and Anilai (Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xviii. 9, §§ 4-7).

<sup>172</sup> Dio Cass. xlvi. 24; Joseph. *Bell. Jud.* vii. 7, § 2.

<sup>173</sup> Joseph. *Ant. Jud.* xviii. 9, § 3. Οὐ γὰρ ἂν ψεύσαιτό τις δεξιῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ δόσεως γενομένης.

<sup>174</sup> The opposite statement of Justin ("Fides dictis promissisque nulla nisi quatenus expedit," xli. 3, ad fin.), and the sneer of Horace ("Parthis mendacior," *Ep.* I. ii. 112) are contradicted by the whole tenor of Parthian history, and must be considered as merely parallel to the charges of "Punic perfidy," alleged by Livy and others.

<sup>175</sup> Philostr. *Vit. Ap. Tyan.* i. 21.

<sup>176</sup> Posid. ap. Athen. *Deipn.* iv. 13; p. 152, F.

<sup>177</sup> Plut. *Crass.* § 31.

<sup>178</sup> Compare the remarks of Strabo—αἴτιος δ' ὁ βίος αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἔθη τὰ ἔχοντα πολὺ μὲν τὸ βάρβαρον καὶ τὸ Σκυθικόν, πλεον μέντοι τὸ χρήσιμον πρὸς ἡγεμονίαν. xi. 9, § 2.

<sup>179</sup> See text, pp. 210, 211.

<sup>180</sup> Eckhel thought that the entire series of tetradrachms was Greek and not Parthian, being the issue of the semi-independent Greek towns in the Parthian dominions (*Doctr. Num. Vet.* vol. iii. pp. 549, 550). M. Lenormant, in his work on the early Parthian coins, went further, and maintained (p. 3) that all the good coins were of Greek workmanship, and only the barbarous ones native. But the best authorities seem now convinced that (excepting a few tetradrachms of Mithridates I.; see Pl. I. Fig. 3.) the coins are all, in the strictest sense, Parthian.

<sup>181</sup> E.g. ΑΠΗΦΑΙΝΟΥΣ appears for ΕΠΗΦΑΝΟΥΣ on a coin ascribed to Mithridates I. (Lindsay, p. 166); ΠΑΚΟΥΡ for ΠΑΚΟΥΡΟΥ on coins of Orodes I. (*ib.* p. 170), &c.

<sup>182</sup> The famous legend of Gotarzes, which should have run (as is supposed) ΓΩΤΕΡΖΗΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΥΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΝ ΑΡΣΑΚΗΣ ΥΙΟΣ ΚΕΚΑΗΜΕΝΟΣ ΑΡΤΑΒΑΝΟΥ appears under the form of ΓΩΤΕΡΗΣ ΒΑΣΙΛΕ . . . ΒΑΣΙΛΕΩΝ ΑΡΣΑΚΟΥ ΥΟΣ ΚΕΚΑΛΥΣΝΟΣ ΑΡΤΑΒΑΝΟΥ (Lindsay, p. 153).

<sup>183</sup> Among these, one of the most remarkable is the corruption of the family title ΑΡΣΑΚΟΥ (Arsaces) into a form which is either actually or nearly ΑΡΙΑΝΟΥ a geographical or ethnic appellative. Other errors merely orthographic, are the substitution of X for K in ΔΙΚΑΙΟΥ, which, from the time of Phraates IV., is almost uniformly written ΔΙΧΑΙΟΥ; of X for N in ΦΙΛΕΛΛΗΝΟΣ, which is often written ΦΙΛΕΛΛΗΧΟΣ, and the like.

## NOTES TO THE SEVENTH MONARCHY.

## CHAPTER I.

<sup>1</sup> See, on this point, Bishop Thirlwall's excellent remarks, *Hist. of Greece*, vol. vii. pp. 121-124, which are incompletely met by Mr. Grote, *Hist. of Greece*, vol. xii. pp. 352-366.

<sup>2</sup> Arrian, *Exp. Al.* vii. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Compare the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, p. 21.

<sup>4</sup> Arrian, iii. 16, 22, 23; vi. 27, 29, &c.

<sup>5</sup> See Xen. *Cyrop.* viii. 6, §§ 3-16; and compare the Author's *Herodotus*, vol. ii. pp. 462-3, 2nd ed., and his *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. iii. p. 424, 2nd ed.

<sup>6</sup> Arrian, Fr. 1; Zosim i. 18; Syncell. p. 284, B. Compare the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, p. 25.

<sup>7</sup> Some were no doubt plundered under Alexander, and others by his early successors (Arrian, vi. 29, 30; Polyb. x. 27, § 12; &c.). But many remained untouched.

<sup>8</sup> See Polyb. xxxi. 11; 1 Macab. vi. 1-4; Appian, *Syr.* p. 161, C.

<sup>9</sup> Polyb. i. s. c.

<sup>10</sup> Compare the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, p. 43.

<sup>11</sup> Justin, xxxvi. 1, § 3.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* § 4, and xxxviii. 9, § 2.

<sup>13</sup> Strabo, xv. 3, §§ 3 and 24.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.* § 17. Βασιλεύονται ὑπὸ τῶν ἀπὸ γένους ὁ δ' ἀπειθῶν ἀποτμηθεὶς κεφαλῆν καὶ βραχίονα ρίπτεται.

<sup>15</sup> Tabari, *Chronique*, tom. ii. p. 5.

<sup>16</sup> Having obtained the writings, Alexander is said to have *burned* them; but the whole character of his policy makes this incredible.

<sup>17</sup> Strabo, xi. 9, § 3.

<sup>18</sup> Agathias, ii. 26.

<sup>19</sup> See the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, p. 224.

<sup>20</sup> Moses of Chorênê tells us that, when Artaxerxes conquered Armenia, he found the sacred fire extinguished, and caused it to be rekindled (*Hist. Armen.* ii. 94).

<sup>21</sup> Herodian, iv. 30.

<sup>22</sup> Compare the domestic image-worship, witnessed to by Josephus (*Ant. Jud.* xviii. 9, § 5), with the *teraphim*-worship of the ancient Syrians (*Gen.* xxxi. 19-35).

<sup>23</sup> The coins of the Sassanians exhibit from the first the fire-altar upon their reverse. (Pl. XI. Fig. 1. and Pl. XV. Figs 2 and 7.)

<sup>24</sup> Agathias, ii. 26; Nicephorus, *Hist. Eccl.* i. 6; p. 55, B.

<sup>25</sup> These forms appear on the earliest Sassanian bas-reliefs, and would scarce-

ly have been thus used unless previously familiar to the people.

<sup>26</sup> Mos. Chor. l. s. c.

<sup>27</sup> See text, p. 244.

<sup>28</sup> See, on this point, the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, pp. 11-14.

<sup>29</sup> Julian, *Orat.* ii. p. 63.

<sup>30</sup> See the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, pp. 222, 223 and 238-240.

<sup>31</sup> See the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, pp. 166, 167.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 163 and 167.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.* p. 167.

<sup>34</sup> By Trajan A.D. 116; by Avidius Cassius A.D. 165; and by Sept. Severus A.D. 198.

<sup>35</sup> Dio Cassius, lxxi. 2.

<sup>36</sup> See the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, pp. 188 and 197.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.* p. 178.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 162-3, 169-70, 181, 199, 200.

<sup>39</sup> See Mos. Chor. *Hist. Armen.* ii. 65 and 68.

<sup>40</sup> Herodian, vi. 6 and 11. See below, p. 263.

<sup>41</sup> The generally historical character of Firdusi's *Shah-nameh*, or "Book of the Kings," is well known. The best critics admit that Firdusi wrote from materials belonging to Sassanian times (Max Müller in Bunsen's *Philosophy of History*, vol. iii. p. 121).

<sup>42</sup> See the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, pp. 202, 203.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 199, 200.

<sup>44</sup> The Roman war terminated A.D. 217. The first revolt of Artaxerxes probably occurred ab. A.D. 220.

<sup>45</sup> Agathangelus, the Armenian historian, makes Artaxerxes tax Artabanus and the Parthians generally with cruelty and oppression (ii. § 5); but he *gives no instances of either*.

<sup>46</sup> *Ahura-mazda* is "the much-giving Spirit." *Mazda*, "much-giving," was often used as a name by itself, instead of the longer *Ahura-mazda*.

<sup>47</sup> Agathangelus makes Artaxerxes say Ὁρήσωμεν πρὸς παράταξιν κρείττον γὰρ θανεῖν ἢ εἶναι δοῦλοι δεσπότου ἀδικοῦντος (i. 5, *ad fin.*)

## CHAPTER II.

<sup>1</sup> The area of France was estimated in 1868 at 213,324 square miles. It is now not much over 200,000 sq. miles. That of Great Britain is about 90,000 sq. miles; that of Italy, without the islands, under 100,000.

<sup>2</sup> Strabo says: Σχεδὸν δέ τι καὶ ἡ Σουσίς μέρος γεγνηται τῆς Περσίδος—"Susiana

has almost become a part of Persia" (xv. 3, § 2).

<sup>3</sup> Carmania was in ancient times reckoned a part of Persia (Herod. i. 125); but the later classical writers (Strabo, Arrian) and the Persian authorities for the Sassanian period make it a distinct country.

<sup>4</sup> Arrian, *Hist. Ind.* xl. 1.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* xxxviii. 1.

<sup>6</sup> See Strab. xv. 3, § 1, and Nearch. ap. *Arr. Hist. Ind.* xl. 2-4. The latter writer says: Τὴν δὲ Περσίδα γῆν τριχῇ νεμεμηῆσθαι τῶν ὠρέων λόγος κατέχει. Τὸ μὲν αὐτῆς πρὸς τῇ Ἐρυθρῇ θαλάσῃ οἰκεόμενον ἀμυδάδες τε εἶναι καὶ ἄκαρτον ὑπὸ καύματος· τὸ δ' ἐπὶ τῆδε ὡς πρὸς ἄρκτον τε καὶ βορέην ἀνεμον ἰόντων καλῶς κεκράσθαι τῶν ὠρέων· καὶ τὴν χώραν ποιῶδὰ τε εἶναι καὶ λιμῶνας ὑδρῆλους καὶ ἄμπελον πολλὴν φέρειν, καὶ ὅσοι ἄλλοι καρποὶ πλὴν ἐλαίης· παραβέουσιοι τε παντοίοισι τεθηλέναι, καὶ ποταμοῖσι καθαροῖσι διαρρέεσθαι καὶ λιμνησι, καὶ ὄρνισιν ὀκόσιοισιν ἀμφὶ ποταμούς τε καὶ λίμνας ἐστί τὰ ἡθεα, ἵπποισί τε ἀγαθὴν εἶναι, καὶ τοῖσιν ἄλλοισιν ὑποζυγίοισι νέμεσθαι, καὶ ὑλώδῃ τε πολλᾷ καὶ πολὺθρον· τὴν τε πρόσω ἐπὶ ἐπ' ἄρκτον ἰόντων χειμερίην καὶ νιφετώδεα.

<sup>7</sup> The natives speak of a *ghermsir* or "warm district," and a *serdsir* or "cold region" (Kinneir's *Persian Empire*, pp. 44, 200, Pottinger, *Travels*, p. 221; *Geograph. Journal*, vol. xxvii. p. 184). The "warm region" is known also as the *Deshtistan*, or "low country."

<sup>8</sup> See Pottinger, *Travels*, p. 54; Fraser, *Khorasan*, p. 71; Kinneir, pp. 54, 70, 81, 201.

<sup>9</sup> Malcolm, *History of Persia*, vol. i. p. 2.

<sup>10</sup> It is curious that Strabo should characterize the middle region as "flat" (πεδινή). His authority, Nearchus, did not make this mistake.

<sup>11</sup> Contributions towards a map of Persia Proper have been made by Mr. Abbott, General Monteith, the Baron de Bode, and others (see *Geograph. Journal*, vols. xiii., xxv., and xxvii.); but much still remains to be done, especially towards the east and south-east.

<sup>12</sup> See the Author's *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. iii. p. 87, 2nd ed.

<sup>13</sup> See Kinneir, *Persian Empire*, pp. 195-200; Ker Porter, *Travels*, vol. i. pp. 459, 472; Morier, *First Journey*, pp. 92, 147, 148; *Geograph. Journal*, vol. xxv. pp. 29-78, vol. xxvii. pp. 149-184.

<sup>14</sup> Fraser, *Khorasan*, p. 79; Morier, *First Journey*, p. 150.

<sup>15</sup> Ker Porter, vol. i. pp. 455-463.

<sup>16</sup> Ker Porter, vol. i. p. 462.

<sup>17</sup> Called also Lake Kheir. The name Bakhtigan, which maintains its place in our maps, is said to be at present unknown to the natives (Abbott, in *Geograph. Journal*, vol. xxv. p. 71).

<sup>18</sup> Moore, *Lalla Rookh*, "Veiled Prophet," p. 77; "Fire-Worshippers," p. 232; &c.

<sup>19</sup> Ker Porter, *Travels*, vol. i. p. 683.

<sup>20</sup> Abbott, in *Geograph. Journal*, vol. xxv. pp. 72-75.

<sup>21</sup> Kinneir, *Persian Empire*, p. 60.

<sup>22</sup> The ancient capital, Pasargadae, was situated in the valley of the Pulwar (or Cyrus), a tributary of the Bendamisr. Persepolis, which superseded Pasargadae, was at the opening of the Pulwar into the Bendamisr valley. Remains of Cyrus, Darius, Xerxes, and other Achæmenian kings abound in these two vales.

<sup>23</sup> Ouseley, *Travels*, vol. ii. pp. 69, 70; Abbott, in *Geograph. Journal*, vol. xxvii. p. 151.

<sup>24</sup> Ker Porter, vol. i. p. 686.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 689, 693, 697, &c.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* p. 709.

<sup>27</sup> Herod. ix. 122. Compare Plat. *Leg.* iii. p. 695, A; *Arr. Exp. Alex.* v. 4.

<sup>28</sup> Arrian, *Hist. Ind.* xxxvii. 2, xxxviii. 9.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* xxxviii. 6; Strab. xv. 3, § 1.

<sup>30</sup> See text, p. 251.

<sup>31</sup> Plin. *H. N.* xix. 3.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.* xxiv. 17, xxvii. 13.

<sup>33</sup> See *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. iii. p. 140, note 18.

<sup>34</sup> Plin. xv. 13 and 14. The word "peach" is corrupted from the Latin *persica*. (Compare Germ. *Pfirsche*, Russ. *perskie*, and French *pêche*.)

<sup>35</sup> Plin. *H. N.* xii. 3.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.* xv. 22.

<sup>37</sup> Arrian, *Hist. Ind.* xl. 4. Compare Herod. i. 136; Nic. *Damasc.* Fr. 66; Strab. xv. 3, § 18. The statement of Xenophon, that anciently a horse was a rarity in Persia Proper (*Cyrop.* i. 3, § 3), is one of the many to be found in the work known as the *Cyropædia*, on which no dependence can be placed.

<sup>38</sup> Kinneir, *Persian Empire*, p. 41; Fraser, *Khorasan*, p. 72.

<sup>39</sup> Strab. xv. 3, § 1: πρὸς ταῖς ἐσχαταῖς εἰσιν οἱ καμηλοβοσκοί.

<sup>40</sup> Arrian, *Hist. Ind.* xxxvii. 10; Herod. i. 136.

<sup>41</sup> Horned cattle are, however, mentioned among the domestic animals of Persia Proper, both by Herodotus (l. s. c.) and Nicolas of Damascus (Fr. 66).

<sup>42</sup> Arrian, *Hist. Ind.* xl. 4: χώρην πολὺθρον.

<sup>43</sup> *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. iii. p. 142.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 141-2.

<sup>45</sup> Nearch. ap. *Arr. Hist. Ind.* xxxix. 4.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.* xxxix. 5.

<sup>47</sup> Ouseley, *Travels*, vol. i. pp. 261, 446, &c.

<sup>48</sup> Plin. *H. N.* vi. 23.

<sup>49</sup> As the *iritis*, a species of rock-crystal (Plin. *H. N.* xxxvii. 9, *sub fin.*); the *atizoë*, a white stone which had a pleasant odor (ib. xxxvii. 10); the *mithrax*, a gem of many hues (ibid.); the *nipparréné*, which resembled ivory (ibid.); and the *thelycardios* or *mulc*, which was in special favor among the natives of the country (ibid.).

<sup>50</sup> Arrian, *Hist. Ind.* xxxviii. 3. The account of pearl-fishing given by Isidore (see Müller's *Geographi Minores*, vol. i.

pp 254, 255) is probably a description of the Persian practice, with which, as a native of Charax Spasini, on the Persian Gulf, he is likely to have been familiar. The pearls were obtained wholly by means of divers.

<sup>51</sup> Herod. ix. 122.

<sup>52</sup> Dr. Prichard says of the Persian physiognomy, as represented in the ancient sculptures: "The outline of the countenance is not strictly Grecian, for it is peculiar; but it is noble and dignified; and if the expression is not full of life and genius, it is intellectual and indicative of reflection. The shape of the head is entirely Indo-European, and has nothing that recalls the Tartar or Mongolian." (*Natural History of Man*, p. 173.)

<sup>53</sup> Herod. i. 71.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.* vii. 61: *περὶ τῆσι κεφαλῆσι εἶχον πῖλους ἀπαγέας.*

<sup>55</sup> Xen. *Cyrop.* i. 2, §§ 8 and 11.

<sup>56</sup> Herod. i. 71; Xen. *Cyrop.* i. 2, § 8; Strab. xv. 3. § 18.

<sup>57</sup> Herod. i. 135; Xen. *Cyrop.* viii. 1, § 40.

<sup>58</sup> Herod. i. 133; Heraclid. Cuman. ap. Athen. *Deipn.* iv. p. 145, F.

<sup>59</sup> Herod. i. s. c.; Xen. *Cyrop.* viii. 8, § 10.

<sup>60</sup> Xen. *Cyrop.* viii. 8, § 9.

<sup>61</sup> Herod. vi. 112, ix. 62, 71.

<sup>62</sup> As at the Granicus (Arrian, *Exp. Alex.* i. 15).

<sup>63</sup> Those of Issus and Arbela. The engagement at the Granicus was, comparatively speaking, unimportant.

<sup>64</sup> See Pl. XV. Figs. 1 and 2, and compare them with the Achæmenian countenances on Pl. XI. Fig. 1.

<sup>65</sup> See the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, pp. 212-223.

### CHAPTER III.

<sup>1</sup> Herod. i. 95 and 214.

<sup>2</sup> Agathangelus, the earliest of those Armenian historians whose works have come down to us, was the secretary of Tiridates the Great (of Armenia), and lived consequently in the earlier half of the fourth century, or about a hundred years later than Artaxerxes. Moses of Chorêné wrote a century later (ab. A.D. 440). Agathias is still later; he did not write till about A.D. 580.

<sup>3</sup> Agathias, ii. p. 65.

<sup>4</sup> Gibbon calls Babek a "tanner" (*Decline and Fall*, ch. viii. vol. i. p. 331), and De Sacy a "currier" (*corroyeur*: *Mémoire sur les Inscriptions de Nakhsh-i-Rustam*, p. 33, note 49) But Agathias, their authority, has σκυτοτόμος.

<sup>5</sup> So Agathias, ii. p. 65. C.

<sup>6</sup> Παντάπασι μὲν ἀσημότατος. (Agathias, i. s. c.)

<sup>7</sup> Agathangelus, i. 9.

<sup>8</sup> See Moses of Chorêné (*Hist. Armen.* ii. 67), who declines to repeat these fables, remarking: "Alienum est fabulas commemorare, de somno cupidinis, de judicio, et igne ab Sasane orto, de grege concluso, atque oculi albugine, et divi-

*norum seu Chodiorum prædictione, cæterisque quæ sequuntur, nempe de stuprosa Artasiris inente, et cæde, de vesana magi filiæ ob vitulum eloquentia, &c."* Compare the story of Heftwad and the worm, related in the *Modjmel-al-Tewarikh* (*Journal Asiatique* for 1841, p. 501).

<sup>9</sup> Agathangelus, i. § 3; Mos. Chor. *Hist. Armen.* ii. 54, 66, &c.

<sup>10</sup> De Sacy, *Mémoire*, &c., p. 30; Thomas, in *As. Society's Journal*, New Series, vol. iii. p. 269; Spiegel, *Grammatik der Huzvaresch-Sprache*, p. 172; Haug, *Old Pahlavi-Pazand Glossary*, p. 5. The inscription of Artaxerxes is confirmed by those of his son, Sapor, who calls Papak (Babek) his grandfather (De Sacy, p. 31; Thomas, in *Journal of the Asiatic Society*, New Series, vol. iii. pp. 301, 314; Haug, *Glossary*, p. 46). There are also coins of Artaxerxes which have his head on the obverse, with the legend *Artahshetr.* and on the other side the head of his father, with the legend *Mazdaïn bag Papak*, "the Ormazd-worshipping divine Papak." (See Mordtmann's article in the *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft*, vol. viii. p. 29; compare Thomas in *Num. Chron.* for 1872, p. 48.)

<sup>11</sup> See Malcolm. *Hist. of Persia*, i. p. 89; Thomas in *Num. Chron.*, New Series, No. xiv. p. 47. The variety, however, of the Persian accounts is almost infinite. The *Lebtarikh* makes Artaxerxes the son of Sasan, and calls Babek his maternal grandfather (D'Herbelot, *Bibl. Orient.* tom. i. p. 375). The *Tarikh-Kozideh* and *Bina-Kiti* agree on the latter point, but make Sasan the other (paternal) grandfather (ibid.). The *Zeenut-al-Tuarikh* has two Sasans, one of whom is the father and the other the grandfather of Babek. Magoudi gives two genealogies of Artaxerxes, each containing three Sasans, and one of them two, the other three Babeks (*Prairies d'Or*, tom. ii. p. 151):—

Lohrasp	Lohrasp
Gustasp	Gustasp
Isfendiar	Isfendiar
Bahman	Bahman
Sassan	Sassan
Dara	Mehrémas
Behawend	Babek
Sassan	Sassan
Babek	Babek
Sassan	Sassan
Babek (Shah)	Babek
Ardêshir	Ardêshir

<sup>12</sup> The term seems to have been first used by the Armenian writers, who regarded Artaxerxes as the son of Sasan. (See Agathang. i. § 3, *ad fin.*) Adopted from them by the Byzantines, it passed into the languages of modern Europe.

<sup>13</sup> This term (*Hakhâmanishiya*) was actually used by the kings of the Great Persian Empire from Cyrus to Artaxerxes Mnemon, as appears from their inscriptions. (See Sir H. Rawlinson's *Cuneiform Inscriptions*, vol. i. pp. 270, 271, 279, 320, 342, &c.; and Loftus, *Chaldea and Susiana*, p. 372.) It appears from the Behistun monument that Darius Hystaspis connected the name with a certain Achæmenes (*Hakhâmanish*), whom he regarded as his ancestor in the fifth degree. (Compare Herod. i. 125; iii. 75; vii. 11.)

<sup>14</sup> Patkanian (*Journ. Asiatique* for 1866, p. 128) notes that, according to native Persian accounts, the first Sassan was a son of Artaxerxes Longimanus. The Sassanian kings undoubtedly claimed to descend from the Achæmenidæ; but it is very unlikely that they could really trace their descent, nor has Sasan the form of an old Persian name.

<sup>15</sup> Ἐκ τῆς πατρίδος τῆς Ἀσσυρίας (i. § 3).

<sup>16</sup> See §§ 5 and 8.

<sup>17</sup> Sasan, according to Agathias, was travelling through the Cadusian country (διὰ τῆς Καδουσαιῶν χώρας) when he fell in with Babek who lived there (ii. p. 65).

<sup>18</sup> Dio Cass. lxxx. 3.

<sup>19</sup> Herodian, vi. 9.

<sup>20</sup> *Hist. Armen.* ii. 66. The statement is repeated by Eutychius (vol. i. p. 367): "Anno imperii (Commodi) decimo exorti Persæ Babelem, Amidum, et Persiam occuparunt, duce nempe Ardashiro, filio Babeci filii Sasani. *Estochrista.*"

<sup>21</sup> Οὗτος ὁ Ἀρτασιράς τῆς τῶν Σταχυριτῶν πατρίδος σατράπης ὑπῆρχεν (i. 9).

<sup>22</sup> Tabari says he was a native of a city called Tirouzé, which was in the government of Istakr. (*Chronique*, ii. p. 67.)

<sup>23</sup> See text, p. 258.

<sup>24</sup> See D'Herbelot, *Bibliothèque Orientale*, tom. i. p. 375, ad voc. ARDSCHIR-BABEGAN.

<sup>25</sup> Malcolm, *History of Persia*, vol. i. p. 89. Tabari calls him "Governor of Darab-gird." (*Chronique*, tom. ii. p. 68.)

<sup>26</sup> These inscriptions were first copied by Carsten Niebuhr, the father of the historian of Rome, and are given in his *Voyages*, tom. ii. pl. xxvii. They may be found also in Chardin, *Voyages en Perse*, tom. ii. pl. lxxiii.; De Sacy, *Mémoire*, pl. i.; Ker Porter, *Travels*, vol. i. pl. 23; and Flandin, *Voyage en Perse*, tom. iv. pl. 180. Papak is called *malika* in the Persian, and βασιλεὺς in the Greek version.

<sup>27</sup> Τῶν μεγιστάνων τις Ἀρτασιράς (i. 3).

<sup>28</sup> See note 21.

<sup>29</sup> Herodian, vi. 2.

<sup>30</sup> Strabo, xv. 8, § 24; Isid. Char. § 34.

<sup>31</sup> Herod. i. 107. In an inscription of Cyrus he calls his father Cambyses "the powerful king" (*khashayathiya vazarka*).

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.* i. 110-118.

<sup>33</sup> Dio Cass. lxxx. 3.

<sup>34</sup> Agathangelus, i. §§ 8-9. The three battles are witnessed to by both writers.

<sup>35</sup> The Persian accounts will be found condensed in Malcolm, *Hist. of Persia*, vol. i. pp. 90-92. Their authority is but slight.

<sup>36</sup> Malcolm, p. 91.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.* l. s. c.; Tabari, ii. p. 70. Thomas (*Num. Chron.* No. xiv., New Series, p. 54) assigns the earliest coins of Artaxerxes to the period when he was King of Fars only, or perhaps of Fars and Kerman.

<sup>38</sup> So Agathangelus: ὠπλίετο Ἀρταβάτης μετὰ Πάρθων, ἔχων καὶ οὐκ ὀλίγους Πέρσας, μὴ κεκοινωνήκotas τῇ τῶν ὁμοφύλων βουλή (i. § 8).

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.* l. s. c.

<sup>40</sup> Dio Cassius (lxxx. 3) and Agathangelus (l. s. c.) alike note the three engagements, but give no indications of locality. We are indebted to the Persian writers for the mention of the "plain of Hormuz." (See Malcolm, *History of Persia*, vol. i. p. 91.) They are not, however, all agreed upon the point, for the *Modjmel-al-Tewarikh* places the battle at *Nehavend* near *Ecbatana*. (See the *Journal Asiatique* for 1841, p. 501.)

<sup>41</sup> Metaphrastus, quoted by M. Langlois in his edition of Agathangelus, published in the *Fragm. Hist. Gr. of Mons. C. Müller*, vol. v. pars 2nda, p. 113; *Modjmel-al-Tewarikh*, l. s. c.; Tabari, ii. p. 73.

<sup>42</sup> Dio Cass. l. s. c.

<sup>43</sup> Agathang. Pref. § 2; *Hist. Regn. Tiridat.* i. § 9; Mos. Choren. *Hist. Armen.* ii. 65-69.

<sup>44</sup> Agathang. *Hist.* i. § 9 (Greek version); Procop. *De Edif. Justinian.* iii. 1.

<sup>45</sup> Mos. Chor. ii. 68; Agathang. l. s. c.

<sup>46</sup> Mos. Chor. ii. 69. Compare Herodian, vi. 5.

<sup>47</sup> Mos. Chor. l. s. c.

<sup>48</sup> Dio Cass. l. s. c.

<sup>49</sup> According to Agathangelus (ii. § 1), Chosroës called in the aid of the Albanians, the Iberians, the Lepones, the Silvani, the Caspians, and the Huns (l.). He was also helped by the Saracens (ii. § 4).

<sup>50</sup> Agathang. ii. § 2; Mos. Chor. ii. 69.

<sup>51</sup> So Moses (*Hist. Arm.* ii. 70, *ad fin.*). Agathangelus, however, the earlier writer, makes no such extreme assertion. According to him Artaxerxes maintained the struggle, but with constant ill success, for twelve years (*Hist.* ii. §§ 2 and 3). Patkaman believes Chosroës to have ravaged the Persian territory as far as *Ctesiphon*; to have there quarrelled with his allies, who quitted him; and after this to have had no great success, though he continued the war

for ten years, from A.D. 227 to A.D. 237 (*Journal Asiatique*, 1866, pp. 142-3).

<sup>52</sup> We might doubt whether any reverses at all were sustained, were it not for the statement of Dio: ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀρμενίαν ἦλασε, κἀνταῦθα πρὸς τε τῶν ἐπιχωρίων καὶ πρὸς Μῆδων τινῶν τῶν τε τοῦ Ἀρταβάνου παίδων πταίσας, ὡς μὲν τινες λέγουσιν, ἔφυγεν, ὡς δ' ἕτεροι, ἀνεχώρησε πρὸς παρασκευὴν δυνάμεως μείζονος (lxxx. 3).

<sup>53</sup> Mos. Chor. ii. 58-59.

<sup>54</sup> See the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, p. 206.

<sup>55</sup> They had recently murdered their general, Flavius Heracleon (Dio Cass. lxxx. 4).

<sup>56</sup> Herodian, vi. 2; Dio Cass. lxxx. 3.

<sup>57</sup> Herodian, l. s. c. Compare Lampridius (*Vit. Al. Sev.* § 56): "Terras interamnanas ab impura illa belua *receptimus*."

<sup>58</sup> Herodian, l. s. c.

<sup>59</sup> Four hundred youths, selected from the tallest and most beautiful of the Persians, dressed in rich apparel, and with golden ornaments, mounted moreover on fine steeds, and armed with bows, carried the message of the Persian monarch to Rome (Herodian, vi. 4).

<sup>60</sup> Κελεύει μέγας βασιλεὺς Ἀρταξέρξης ἀφίστασθαι Ῥωμαίους τε καὶ τὸν ἀρχοντα αὐτῶν Συρίας τε ἀπάσης Ἀσίας τε τῆς Εὐρώπῃ ἀντικειμένης. (Ibid.)

<sup>61</sup> εἶναι γὰρ αὐτὰ Περσῶν προγονικὰ κτήματα. (Ibid.)

<sup>62</sup> Especially from Illyria, where some of the best Roman troops were always stationed to defend the frontier of the Danube.

<sup>63</sup> There is some little doubt as to the exact chronology. I follow Clinton (*F. R.* vol. i. pp. 244-246). De Champagny makes Severus arrive in Antioch two years later—A.D. 233 (*Les Césars du troisième Siècle*, tom. ii. p. 115).

<sup>64</sup> Herodian, vi. 4, *sub fin.*

<sup>65</sup> See the speech of Severus in the Senate on his return from the East, recorded by Lampridius (*Vit. Alex. Sev.* § 56).

<sup>66</sup> So Gibbon (*Decline and Fall*, ch. viii. vol. i. p. 253). The numbers of the chariots and of the elephants are especially improbable. Though in the more ancient period of Oriental history we find instances of kings possessing 1,200 (Shishak, Benhadad), 1,400 (Solomon), and even 2,000 chariots (Ahab, according to the Black Obelisk), yet in later times only very moderate numbers were brought into the field. Xenophon reckons the chariots of an Oriental army at 300 (*Cyrop.* vi. 1, § 28); and the actual number employed at Arbela was only 200 (Arrian, *Exp. Al.* iii. 11; Q. Curt. iv. 12; Diod. Sic. xvii. 53). The Arsacid monarchs do not seem to have used chariots at all in warfare (*Sixth Monarchy*, p. 229). Nothing can well be more unlikely than that Artaxerxes should, within six years of his establishment as "great king," have collected a

force of 1,800 war chariots. On the improbability of the "seven hundred elephants," see the excellent note of Gibbon.

<sup>67</sup> On the Parthian incapacity, see the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, note 54, Chapter xxiii. The early Persians had shown no such weakness (*Ancient Monarchies*, vol. iv. p. 130); but the warfare of the later Persians far more resembles that of the Parthians than the more scientific method of their own ancestors.

<sup>68</sup> Herodian, vi. 5. Compare Lampridius, § 55.

<sup>69</sup> "Terras interamnanas . . . receptimus." (Sever. ap. Lamprid. § 56.) The series of Mesopotamian coins shows this boast to have been true. (See Mionnet, *Médailles*, tom. v. pp. 593-637; *Supplément*, tom. viii. pp. 391-416.)

<sup>70</sup> Whatever judgment we form of the result of the campaign, it seems to me uncritical to set aside the *minute* details of Herodian with respect to Alexander's plans and intentions. The fact that Lampridius is completely silent with respect to all the details of the war ("indique aucun des détails de la guerre." De Champagny, ii. p. 122) is almost conclusive against the veracity of his story.

<sup>71</sup> The present text of Herodian has "north" for "south" here; but the context clearly shows that either he or one of his copyists has made a mistake.

<sup>72</sup> Σκεψάμενος σὺν τοῖς φίλοις ἔνευε τὸ στρατιωτικὸν εἰς τρεῖς μοῖρας. (Herodian, vi. 5.)

<sup>73</sup> The relative credibility of Herodian and Lampridius in their respective accounts of Alexander's Persian campaign has long formed a subject of dispute with historical critics. Among important names on either side are Gibbon and Niebuhr for Herodian; Eckhel, Professor Ramsay, and De Champagny for his impugner. The main points in favor of Herodian are, first, his being a contemporary; secondly, his general moderation and good sense; and, thirdly, the minuteness and circumstantiality of his account, which stands in strong contrast with the vague boasts of Alexander himself and his biographer. It is sought to discredit Herodian by imputing to him a prejudice against Alexander; but, on the whole, his account of that prince is not an unflattering portrait. Again, it is said (De Champagny, ii. p. 121) to be inconceivable that, if Herodian's account of the campaign had been true, the general result of the contest should have been so absolutely without injury to Rome as he himself admits it to have been. Certainly there is a difficulty here; but it is not insuperable. We, with our Western notions, should have expected Artaxerxes to have followed up his successes in A.D. 232 by a great invasion of the Roman territory in A.D. 233. But we find him absolutely passive. This appears strange until we reflect that an Eastern army

after a victory demands a time for rest and enjoyment; that it has almost of necessity to be disbanded, and can only be collected again after a considerable interval. Eastern kings, moreover, are often lazy or capricious. Orodes did not follow up his victory over Crassus by any serious attack on the Roman territory until two years had passed (*Sixth Monarchy*, pp. 100, 101). And a similar neglect of favorable opportunities is observable throughout Oriental history. It may be added that there is at least one expression in Lampridius which betrays the truth that he endeavors to conceal. The universal cry of the Romans who accompanied Alexander's triumphal procession from the Capitol to the Palace was, Lampridius tells us (§ 57), this—"Rome is saved, since Alexander is safe." Safety is only a subject of congratulation after imminent danger.

<sup>74</sup> There is some difficulty in understanding Herodian here, since his geographical ideas are confused (Gibbon, ch. viii. note 51). He speaks of the second army as threatening both Parthia and Persia. The real Parthia, between the Caspian and Bactria, cannot, it seems to me, be intended. I suspect that he means by Parthia the tract about Ctesiphon, recently the headquarters of Parthian power.

<sup>75</sup> Μεγίστη αὐτῆ συμφορᾷ . . . Ῥωμαῖοις ἐπέσχε, δυνάμει μείστης διαφθοαίης, γνώμη καὶ ῥώμῃ μηδεμίας τῶν ἀρχαίων ἀποδούσης. (v. 5, *sub fin.*)

<sup>76</sup> Herodian, vi. 6, *sub init.*

<sup>77</sup> Lampridius thus sums up the account of Herodian and his followers:—"Amisisse illum (sc. Alexandrum) exercitum dicunt fame, frigore, ac morbo" (§ 57); but Herodian says nothing about famine. His words are: τῶν τριῶν μοιρῶν τοῦ στρατοῦ, ὧν ἐνειμε, τὸ πλείστον ἀποβαλόντι διάφοροις συμφοραῖς, νόσῳ, πολέμῳ, κρύει. Lampridius seems to have read λίμῳ for πολέμῳ.

<sup>78</sup> The Persians had, however, lost a large number of their best troops. The Romans of the southern army had fought well, and their defeat had cost their enemy dear. (See Herodian, vi. 6, *sub fin.*)

<sup>79</sup> Persepolis seems to have now become the main Persian capital, under the native name of Istakr or Stakr. (Agathang. i. § 9. *sub fin.*) It was threatened when the southern army of Severus was expected to invade Persia Proper (see text, p. 265).

<sup>80</sup> *Lectures on Ancient History*, vol. iii. p. 278.

<sup>81</sup> "Rome must on that occasion have lost many parts of her Eastern possessions" (Niebuhr, l. s. c.) The numismatic evidence is in favor of there having been no loss. The effigy of the Roman emperor continues upon the coins of the Mesopotamian cities and states

after the expedition of Alexander just as before.

<sup>82</sup> Herodian, vi. 5; Mos. Chor. ii. 69. Moses, it is true, calls the Roman emperor, who was the ally of Chosroës, Philip (!); but it is evident that he has been misled by a false view of Roman chronology.

<sup>83</sup> See text, p. 265.

<sup>84</sup> Mos. Chor. ii. 71: "Ut dimidiam partem Ariorum in sua ditione teneret."

<sup>85</sup> Ἀνακ in the Greek text of Agathangelus, *Anag* in the Armenian (§ 13); *Anacus* in Whiston's version of Moses of Chorené (ii. 71); *Anak* in Sêpêos (iii. 1).

<sup>86</sup> Agathang. § 14.

<sup>87</sup> Ἐν τοῖς στενοῖς περικυκλώσαντες [οἱ σατραπαὶ] τοὺς φυγάδας ἐν μέσῳ τῶν γεφυρῶν ἐνθεν καὶ ἐνθεν, ποταμοβρυχίους πεποιήκασιν. (Ibid. § 15.)

<sup>88</sup> Ibid. c. iii. § 16.

<sup>89</sup> Mos. Chor. ii. 73. Agathangelus is silent on this point.

<sup>90</sup> Agathang. l. s. c.; Mos. Chor. ii. 74.

<sup>91</sup> Tacitus, according to Moses (ii. 73); but really, it is probable, the third Gordian.

<sup>92</sup> *Decline and Fall*, ch. viii. (vol. i. p. 249).

<sup>93</sup> Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua*, p. 383. This writer notes that the assertion of Gibbon is "somewhat unwarrantable."

<sup>94</sup> See text, pp. 245, 246.

<sup>95</sup> Agath. ii. p. 64.

<sup>96</sup> A critical analysis of the Zendavesta into its earlier and later portions seems to show that Dualism was a development out of an earlier Monotheism. (See the Author's *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. iii. pp. 104-107.) But we only know the Persian religion historically from the time of Darius Hystaspis, when Dualism was certainly a part of it.

<sup>97</sup> Especially Mithra, the sun-god, whose worship may be traced back to the earliest Iranian times.

<sup>98</sup> See the Author's *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. iii. pp. 122-128.

<sup>99</sup> Strabo, xv. 3, §§ 14 and 15; Dio Chrysost. *Orat. Borysth.* p. 449, A; Amm. Marc. xxiii. 6; Agathias, ii. 25.

<sup>100</sup> Herod. i. 132; Strab. xv. 3, § 13; Amm. Marc. l. s. c. The early priests of the Zoroastrians were called *kavi*, "seers," *karapan*, "sacrificers," or *usikhs*, "wise men" (Haug, *Essays on the Sacred Language, Writings, and Religion of the Parsees*, pp. 245-247); never Magi. A term which some identify with Magus (*maga* or *maghava*) occurs twice, but twice only, in the Zendavesta. (See Westergaard, *Introduction to Zendavesta*, p. 17.)

<sup>101</sup> Dino, Fr. 8; Schol. ad. Nicandr. *Ther.* 613; Cic. *De Div.* i. 23, 41; Val. Max. i. 6.

<sup>102</sup> Agathias, ii. p. 65.

<sup>103</sup> Mos. Chor. ii. 74.

<sup>104</sup> Herodian, iv. 30.

<sup>105</sup> Mos. Chor. l. s. c.; Dio Cass. lxxv. 12.

<sup>108</sup> Mos. Chor. l. s. c.

<sup>107</sup> "Whether," says Professor Max Müller, "on the revival of the Persian religion and literature, 500 years after Alexander, the works of Zoroaster were collected and restored from extant MSS. or from oral tradition, must remain uncertain; and the disturbed state of the phonetic system would rather lead us to suppose a long-continued influence of oral tradition." (Bunsen's *Philosophy of History*, vol. iii. pp. 116-117.)

<sup>108</sup> Mos. Chor. l. s. c.: "Statuas . . . Solisque et Lunæ simulachra, Artasires confregit."

<sup>109</sup> Agathias, l. s. c.

<sup>110</sup> Amm. Marc. xxiii. 6; p. 373. The "Magian lands" mentioned in this passage may have been in the possession of the caste under the Parthians; but at any rate Artaxerxes must have sanctioned the arrangement.

<sup>111</sup> Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. i. p. 338.

<sup>112</sup> Mos. Chor. ii. 74.

<sup>113</sup> Seventy, according to the Oriental writers (see Gibbon, vol. i. p. 332); but this round number, a multiple of seven, is suspicious.

<sup>114</sup> Milman, *History of Christianity*, vol. ii. p. 251. (Compare the dissertation of Bredow, prefixed to Syncellus, vol. ii., in the *Corpus Hist. Byzant.* of B. G. Niebuhr, Bonn, 1829.)

<sup>115</sup> Anquetil Duperron, who, towards the close of the last century, professed to translate the Zendavesta into French, was incompetent to the task, and gave a wrong impression of the true character of the volume. Burnouf first edited with correctness a portion of the text, which has since been published in its entirety by Westergaard (1852-1854) and Spiegel (1851-1858).

<sup>116</sup> See his *Translation of the Avesta*, Berlin, 1861.

<sup>117</sup> On this point the reader may consult Haug's *Essays on the Sacred Language, &c., of the Parsees*, Bombay, 1862.

<sup>118</sup> Max Müller, in Bunsen's *Philosophy of History*, vol. iii. p. 116.

<sup>119</sup> The Aryan character of the Zend was first proved by Rask, and is now admitted by all scholars. Zend and Sanskrit were two ancient sister forms of speech. From Zend came, first, Achæmenian Persian, or the language of the Persian cuneiform inscriptions; then Pehlevi or Huzvaresch, Persian in its soul (Max Müller, p. 119), but to a large extent Semitic in its vocabulary; next, Parsî, which is Huzvaresch purified from its Semitic ingredients; and finally, the language of Firdusi, which continues to be spoken at the present day.

<sup>120</sup> See the account given by Malcolm, from Persian sources, of the dying speech of Artaxerxes (*History of Persia*, vol. i. p. 95). Compare Maçoudi, *Prairies d'Or*, vol. ii. 162.

<sup>121</sup> So Milman (*Hist. of Christianity*,

vol. ii. p. 254), whom I venture to follow, though I have not found ancient authority for the statement.

<sup>122</sup> Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. i. p. 338; Milman, vol. ii. p. 252.

<sup>123</sup> Hyde, *De Religione Persarum*, c. 21.

<sup>124</sup> The account which Maçoudi gives of the Court and governmental system of Artaxerxes (*Prairies d'Or*, tom. ii. pp. 153-157) is curious and interesting, but can scarcely be regarded as authentic. Maçoudi did not write till about A.D. 950; and the picture which he draws represents probably the later rather than the earlier period of the Sassanian kingdom.

<sup>125</sup> Gibbon declares, but incorrectly, that "the prudent Artaxerxes, suffering no person except himself to assume the title of king, abolished every intermediary power between the throne and the people" (*Decline and Fall*, vol. i. p. 340). Agathangelus tells us that he called a council of "all the kings, the rulers, and the generals" (§ 12); and we see from Moses that he was willing to have granted the kingly title to Anak (*Hist. Armen.* ii. 71). The very retention of the title "King of kings," so frequent on the coins and in the inscriptions, indicates a state of things exactly the opposite of that described by Gibbon. Note further the mention of the subject "king of the Cadusians," by Jul. Capitolinus (*Valer.* § 5).

<sup>126</sup> Agathang. l. s. c.: προσκαλεσάμενος παντας τοὺς βασιλεῖς, καὶ τοπάρχας, καὶ στρατηγούς.

<sup>127</sup> So Malcolm (*Hist. of Persia*, vol. i. p. 94). Gibbon paraphrases thus: "The authority of the prince must be defended by a military force; that force can only be maintained by taxes; all taxes must, at last, fall upon agriculture; and agriculture can never flourish except under the protection of justice and moderation" (*Decline and Fall*, vol. i. p. 346).

<sup>128</sup> Malcolm, *Hist. of Persia*, vol. i. p. 94.

<sup>129</sup> Malcolm, *Hist. of Persia*, vol. i. p. 96. There is a remarkable consensus of authors on the point of Artaxerxes' love of justice. Agathangelus, the Armenian historian, says: ἐβασίλευσε πάντα πράττων ἐπιεικῶς, εὐνομία χαίρων καὶ πολιτεία δικαιοσάτη (§ 9). Eutychius, the Latin writer, notes of him: "Quanta fieri potuit cum justitia inter homines versatus est" (vol. i. p. 373). The Persian historians make the assertions given in the text. (See Mohl's extracts from the *Modjmel-al-Tewarikh*, in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1841, p. 502.)

<sup>130</sup> D'Herbelot, *Bibliothèque Orientale*, tom. i. p. 380.

<sup>131</sup> See Mos. Chor. ii. 70 and 75.

<sup>132</sup> See the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, p. 48.

<sup>133</sup> Agathang. § 12.

<sup>134</sup> This is probably what Dean Milman

meant when he said that "the Magian hierarchy formed the great council of the state" (*History of Christianity*, vol. ii. p. 254.) It is implied in the terms of the "testament," as given in the text.

<sup>135</sup> See Malcolm, *Hist. of Persia*, vol. i. pp. 95-96, who in this follows Firdusi. Firdusi wrote, according to Malcolm, from trustworthy Pehlevi materials. Milman regards the record as authentic (*History of Christianity*, vol. ii. p. 253).

<sup>136</sup> Maçoudi, *Prairies d'Or*, vol. ii. pp. 150, 160.

<sup>137</sup> Tabari, *Chronique*, vol. ii. p. 74.

<sup>138</sup> See Pl. XV. Fig. 1.

<sup>139</sup> See Flandin, *Voyage en Perse*, tom. i. pl. 14; Ker Porter, *Travels*, vol. ii. pl. 66.

<sup>140</sup> Sir R. Ker Porter regarded the two main figures as Artaxerxes and Ormazd, the prostrate figure as a symbol of the fallen Arsacidæ, and the radiated personage as either Zoroaster (!) or "a personification of the Mithratic religion" (*Travels*, vol. ii. p. 193). Flandin also thought the radiated figure to be Zoroaster (*Voyage en Perse*, tom. i. p. 442). Mr. Thomas takes the view of the matter which is followed in the text. (*Journal of As. Society*, New Series, vol. iii. p. 267, note 3.)

<sup>141</sup> See Pl. XV. Figs. 2 and 4; and compare Ker Porter, vol. i. pls. 21 and 28; Flandin, vol. i. pls. 31 and 33; vol. ii. pls. 49 and 53; vol. iv. pl. 185; Texier, pl. 129.

<sup>142</sup> See Mordtmann, in the *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenländischen Gesellschaft* (vol. viii. pp. 29-34; and vol. xix. pp. 415-6, 477-8); and Thomas, in the *Numismatic Chronicle* for 1872 (No. xlv. pp. 48-55).

<sup>143</sup> Thomas, *Num. Chron.* 1872, p. 54.

<sup>144</sup> Mr. Thomas regards these coins as the *third* in order (*ibid.*); but Mordtmann is, I think, right in giving them the second place (*Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. pp. 31-33).

<sup>145</sup> Mr. Thomas renders the phrase by "Ardeshir's fire-altar," comparing *nuvazi* with the Pehlevi *naus*, which has this meaning (*Num. Chron.* 1872, p. 51). Mordtmann thinks this translation impossible, and suggests "Artaxerxes the chanter" (*der Anrufende*). (See the *Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. p. 32.) De Sacy originally read *iezdani* for *nuvazi*; but this reading is now generally regarded as mistaken.

<sup>146</sup> See Longpérier, *Médailles des Sassanides*, pl. 2, Nos. 4 and 5.

<sup>147</sup> As Sapor II., Varahran IV., Izdegird I., and others.

<sup>148</sup> Thomas, in *Num. Chron.* for 1872, p. 55, and pl. 2, No. 12; Mordtmann, in the *Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. p. 34, and pl. 10, No. 6.

<sup>149</sup> See the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, pp. 212-223.

<sup>150</sup> Longpérier, *Médailles des Sassanides*, p. 2.

<sup>151</sup> For a representation of this Nakhsh-

i-Rustam tablet, see the Chapter on the Art of the Sassanians.

<sup>152</sup> Besides the bas-relief described (p. 277), Artaxerxes has left either three or four others. One, also at Nakhsh-i-Rustam, represents Ormazd, giving Artaxerxes the diadem, on foot (Ker Porter, vol. i. pl. 27, No. 2; Flandin, *Voyage en Perse*, pl. 193). Another, at Firuzabad, is similar, but shows us Artaxerxes accompanied by four attendants (Flandin, pl. 44). A third, at Takht-i-Bostan, exhibits Artaxerxes handing the diadem to his son, Sapor (Ker Porter, pl. 66; Flandin, pl. 14). The fourth, at Salmos, to the west of Lake Urumiye, which may have been the work of Sapor, represents Artaxerxes and Sapor on horseback, receiving the submission of the Armenians (Ker Porter, vol. ii. pl. 82).

<sup>153</sup> Longpérier, *Médailles de Sassanides*, Preface, p. iv. and also p. 14. The *areus* of Macrinus weighs from 135 to 136 grains; the gold coins of the early Sassanians weigh exactly 136 grains.

<sup>154</sup> *Ibid.* p. 14.

<sup>155</sup> Bactrian gold coins are rare, but have been found (Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua*, pp. 218, 223); Indian are common (*ibid.* pp. 347-380).

<sup>156</sup> Dio Cassius, lxxviii. 27. Compare the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, p. 206.

<sup>157</sup> See text, p. 277.

<sup>158</sup> This inscription, which was first copied with any accuracy by Carsten Niebuhr, will be found in his *Voyages*, tom. ii. pl. 27. It is also represented in the work of Ker Porter, vol. i. pl. 22, opp. p. 548. Though bilingual only, it is trilateral; the Persian transcript being given, with only slight differences, in the two sets of characters, which have been recently distinguished as "Chaldæo-Pehlevi" and "Sassanian Pehlevi" (Taylor, in *Journal of Asiatic Society*, vol. xii. pp. 264-266). The latter and simpler character was successfully deciphered by M. De Sacy, who was thus enabled to translate the inscription (*Mémoire sur les Inscriptions de Nakhsh-i-Roustan*, pp. 76 et seq.). The other character has been satisfactorily read by Mr. Thomas, and, more recently, by Dr. Martin Haug.

<sup>159</sup> Ker Porter's drawing shows us that this figure was represented with snakes at the front of the helmet. The connection of the serpent or snake with Ahriman is a well-known feature of the Zoroastrian religion (*Vendidad*. i. 3; xviii. 1-6; Herod. i. 140; &c.).

<sup>160</sup> *Baga* is the term used for "god" throughout the Achæmenian inscriptions. It is there applied both to Ormazd and the inferior deities. That the *bag* or *bagi* of the early Sassanians represents this word is generally agreed upon.

<sup>161</sup> ALHA is used as an equivalent term for BAGI in the Chaldæo-Pehlevi transcript of this and other inscriptions of

the early Sassanian kings. It clearly represents the Jewish *El*, or *Elohim*, and the Arabic *Allah*.

## CHAPTER IV.

<sup>1</sup>The *Modjmel-al-Tewarikh* agrees with Agathias (iv. 24; p. 259. A) and Eutychius (vol. i. p. 375) in giving Artaxerxes a reign of fourteen years only. (See the *Journal Asiatique* for 1841, p. 502; and compare Maçoudi, tom. ii. p. 159.) When the Armenian writers give him forty, forty-five, or even fifty years (Patakian, in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 145), they perhaps include the time during which he was tributary king of Persia. (See Tabari, *Chronique*, ii. p. 75: "Ardeschir régna quatorze ans après la mort d'Ardewan; puis il mourut, après avoir régné en tout quarante-quatre ans.")

<sup>2</sup>This is the form of the name on the coins of Sapor, and in his inscriptions. The word means "prince"—literally "king's son"—from *Shah* (contracted form of *khshayathiya*, "king") and *puhr* (=Achaemenian *putra*), "son." See Mos. Choren. *Hist. Armen.* ii. 74.)

<sup>3</sup>Malcolm, *History of Persia*, vol. i. p. 96, note; D'Herbelot, *Bibliothèque Orientale*, tom. ii. pp. 378-9. Some writers are content to make her an Arsacid princess (Tabari, ii. p. 76).

<sup>4</sup>As Artaxerxes only reigned fourteen years after his last victory over Artabanus, if he then married that king's daughter, and Sapor was their son, he (Sapor) could not have been more than thirteen at his father's death. But the wars in which he is at once engaged do not suit this age.

<sup>5</sup>Compare the stories that Cambyses was the son of Nitetis, a daughter of Amasis (Herod. iii. 2); that Cyrus was a son of Mandané, daughter of Astyages (ib. i. 108); and that Alexander the Great was the son of Darius Codomannus, the last Achaemenian monarch (Malcolm, vol. i. p. 70).

<sup>6</sup>The tale that his mother was condemned to death, but spared by the chief vizier because she was with child, and that her offspring was brought up secretly by the minister, who after a time revealed the matter to Artaxerxes (Tabari, ii. pp. 75-79; Malcolm, i. 96, note; D'Herbelot, l. s. c.), deserves no credence. Its details are contradictory.

<sup>7</sup>Malcolm, vol. i. p. 97, note.

<sup>8</sup>Tabari calls this king Sâtiroun, and places the siege of Hatra after the capture of Valerian (*Chronique*, ii. pp. 80-82). Sâtiroun is also given as the name of the Hatra monarch by Maçoudi (tom. iv. pp. 81-82).

<sup>9</sup>See the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, pp. 179 and 196.

<sup>10</sup>Malcolm, i. pp. 96-7. Maçoudi (iv. p. 84) and Tabari make Sapor marry this princess; but say that shortly afterwards he put her to death (*Chronique*, ii. p. 84).

<sup>11</sup>Gordian's journey to the East is placed by Clinton in this year (*F. R.* i. p. 256). Sapor's aggressions certainly preceded this journey. They must have occurred in the earlier months of A.D. 241, or the later ones of A.D. 240.

<sup>12</sup>See Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. i. pp. 307-8; De Champagny, *Césars du 3me Siècle*, tom. ii. pp. 134-136.

<sup>13</sup>The two Gordians, father and son, who were shortly afterwards put down by Capelianus (Gibbon, vol. i. pp. 213-218)

<sup>14</sup>Maximus and Balbinus (ibid. p. 219).  
<sup>15</sup>M. Antonius Gordianus, a grandson of the elder and a nephew of the younger Gordian. He was only thirteen years of age when he was proclaimed, in A.D. 238 (Herodian, viii. 8).

<sup>16</sup>See the coins (Mionnet, *Médailles*, tom. v. pp. 625-628; and Supplément, tom. viii. pp. 415, 416).

<sup>17</sup>According to Persian authorities, the wall fell down in answer to the prayers of the besiegers (Malcolm, vol. i. p. 93. Compare Tabari, *Chronique*, ii. p. 79).

<sup>18</sup>*Hist. August.* Gordiani, § 27.

<sup>19</sup>Ibid. § 26.

<sup>20</sup>The name is given as Misitheus in the *Historia Augusta* (which is followed by Gibbon and others), as Timesicles by Zosimus (i. 17). But inscriptions show that the true form was Timesitheus (Eckhel, *Doctr. Num. Vet.* vii. p. 319; De Champagny, *Césars du 3me Siècle*, tom. ii. p. 204, note).

<sup>21</sup>See the inscription (No. 5530 in the collection of Henzen) summarized by De Champagny, l. s. c.

<sup>22</sup>"Frequentibus praeliis pugnavit et vicit" (*Hist. Aug. Gord.* § 26).

<sup>23</sup>Amm. Marc. xxiii. 5: "Apud Resai nam fuso fugatoque Persarum rege."

<sup>24</sup>*Hist. Aug. Gord.* § 27.

<sup>25</sup>In the letter which he wrote to the senate from Mesopotamia, Gordian said: "Nisibin usque pervenimus, et, si di faverint, Ctesiphonta usque veniemus" (*Hist. Aug.* l. s. c.)

<sup>26</sup>*Hist. Aug. Gord.* § 28.

<sup>27</sup>John of Antioch makes the Roman army penetrate to the "mouths of the Tigris" (εις τὰ τοῦ Τίγρητος στόματα, Fr. 147); but this is very improbable. An advance into Southern Mesopotamia is, however, distinctly implied in the position of Gordian's tomb, which was some way south of the Khabour (Amm. Marc. xxiii. 5).

<sup>28</sup>*Hist. August.* Gord. § 29.

<sup>29</sup>De Champagny represents the peace made as altogether favorable to Rome (tom. ii. p. 216), and speaks of Armenia as having become Roman in consequence. But this was certainly not so. Armenia did not cease to be Persian till the third year of Diocletian, A.D. 286 (Mos. Chor. ii. 79). Some ancient writers called the peace "very disgraceful to Rome" (Zosim. iii. 32: εἰρήνην αἰσχίστην); but Niebuhr's conclusion seems to be just, viz.

that "Philip concluded a peace with the Persians, which was as honourable to the Romans as circumstances would allow" (*Lectures on Anc. Hist.*, vol. iii. p. 234, E. T.).

<sup>30</sup> From A.D. 244 to A.D. 258.

<sup>31</sup> Mos. Chor. ii. 69, 71, &c.

<sup>32</sup> See the statement in the *Historia Augusta* that the Bactrians, among others made to them by Sapor after his defeat of Valerian, and placed their services at the disposal of the Romans (*Jul. Capit. Valer.* § 7).

<sup>33</sup> See the Author's *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. iv. p. 369.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* vol. iv. p. 487; Herod. ix. 113.

<sup>35</sup> See text, p. 248.

<sup>36</sup> Philip, Decius, Gallus, Æmilianus, Valerian, and Gallienus, whom he associated. Of these the first four perished within the space of five years (A.D. 249-254).

<sup>37</sup> Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. i. pp. 298-326; Niebuhr, *Lectures on Ancient History*, vol. iii. pp. 290-294, E. T.

<sup>38</sup> Amm. Marc. xxiii. 5. Some place this capture later, as Gibbon (vol. i. p. 328) and Clinton (*F. R.* vol. i. p. 288); but it seems to me that the capture of the city by a sudden surprise (as related by Ammianus) is to be distinguished from the capture of which the inhabitants had due notice (mentioned by the anonymous author of the *Tà μετὰ Δίωνα*, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* vol. iv. p. 192), and that the former preceded the other. The fact that Ammianus refers the surprise to the reign of Gallienus is not conclusive against this view, since Gallienus was associated in the empire as early as A.D. 253.

<sup>39</sup> Zosim. i. 32-34. A coin of Valerian, assigned to this year, has the legend "VICT. PARTHICA" (Clinton, *F. R.* i. p. 282).

<sup>40</sup> See the letter of Valerian to the Senate, written from Mesopotamia, and preserved in the *Historia Augusta*, Macrian. § 12:—"Ego, Patres Conscripti, bellum Persicum gerens, Macriano totam rempublicam credidi quidem a parte militari. Ille nobis fidelis, ille mihi devotus, &c."

<sup>41</sup> *Hist. August.* Valerian. § 3: "Victus est a Sapore rege Persarum, dum ductu *cujusdam sui ductis*, cui summam omnium bellicarum rerum agendarum commiserat, seu fraude seu adversa fortuna, in ea esset loca deductus, ubi nec vigor nec disciplina militaris, quin caperetur, quidquam valere potuit." I do not know why the recent editors, Jordan and Eysenhardt, reject this passage (ed. of 1864, p. 70).

<sup>42</sup> Eutrop. ix. 7.

<sup>43</sup> Petrus Patric. Fr. 9; Zosim. i. 36.

<sup>44</sup> Zosim. l. s. c. Zonaras (xii. 23) has a different account. According to him, Valerian was simply captured as he tried to escape.

<sup>45</sup> Gibbon speaks of the whole army

laying down its arms (vol. i. p. 328); but the position of Macrianus at the head of a considerable force, expressly said to be the remnant of the lost army, implies the escape of a certain number (*Hist. Aug. Gallien.* § 1).

<sup>46</sup> The Miriades (Mariades) of Malala (xii. p. 295) can scarcely be a different person from the Cyriades of the *Historia Augusta*, Triginta Tyranni, § 2. Whether he was brought forward as a pretender before the death of Valerian or after is perhaps doubtful (*De Champagny, Césars du 3me Siècle*, tom. ii. p. 436). But on the whole Gibbon's *nexus* of the events has the greatest probability.

<sup>47</sup> The setting up of Miriades as emperor is thought to be represented on more than one of Sapor's bas-reliefs. A tablet on a large scale at Darabgerd (Flandin, pl. 33) seems to exhibit the Persian king on horseback, with Valerian prostrate beneath his charger's feet, in the act of designating Miriades as monarch to the assembled Romans; Sapor's guards stand behind him with their hands upon their sword-hilts, while in front of him the Roman soldiers accept their new ruler with acclamations. He himself raises his right arm as he takes an oath of fidelity to his suzerain.

<sup>48</sup> See the fragment of the anonymous continuator of Dio's Roman History, in the *Fr. Hist. Gr.* vol. iv. p. 192.

<sup>49</sup> The simile is used by Niebuhr (*Lectures*, vol. iii. p. 294, E. T.).

<sup>50</sup> Zonaras, xii. 23; p. 630.

<sup>51</sup> See Zosim. i. 27 *ad fin.*, and the comment of Gibbon (vol. i. pp. 329, 330).

<sup>52</sup> Agathias, iv. 24; p. 259, B.

<sup>53</sup> Zonar. l. s. c.

<sup>54</sup> Johann. Malal. *Chronographia*, xii. p. 296.

<sup>55</sup> See the fragments of Peter Patricius in the *Fragmenta Hist. Græc.* of C. Müller, vol. iv. p. 187, Fr. 10.

<sup>56</sup> *Hist. August.* Valer. § 7; Gallien. § 10; Odenat. § 15; Agath. l. s. c.; &c.

<sup>57</sup> Sext. Rufus, c. 23. Compare Hieronym. *Chron.* anno 231.

<sup>58</sup> Odenathus is called "Prince of the Saracens" by Procopius (*Bell. Pers.* ii. 5), and John of Malala (xii. p. 297).

<sup>59</sup> *Hist. August.* Valerian, § 7. (Compare, however, the life of Odenathus, where the capture of the concubines is referred to a later date.)

<sup>60</sup> Pet. Patric. Fr. 11.

<sup>61</sup> Pet. Patric. Fr. 11.

<sup>62</sup> *Historia Augusta*, Valer. § 7: "Valeriano apud Persas consenscente." Macrian. § 12: "Infelicissimo, quod senex apud Persas consenuit."

<sup>63</sup> *Ibid.* Gallien. § 1: "Erat ingens omnibus mœror, quod imperator Romanus in Perside serviliter teneretur."

<sup>64</sup> The stories of the extreme ill treatment of Valerian start with Lactantius, or the author of the treatise *De Morte Persecutorum*, whoever he may be. This author wrote between A.D. 312 and

315 (Smith's *Dict. of Biography*, ad voc. Cæcilius), or above fifty years after the capture of Valerian. He asserts positively (c. s.) the use of Valerian as a footstool by Sapor, and the hanging of his skin in a temple, where it was often seen by Roman ambassadors. Lactantius is followed by Eusebius of Cæsarea, excepting with regard to the employment of Valerian as a footstool; and then the tales are repeated by Aurelius Victor (*De Cæsaribus*, c. 33), by his epitomator (*Epit.* c. 32), by Orosius (viii. 22), and by Petrus Patricius (Fr. 13). On the whole it seems to me that the preservation of the skin is probably true (Euseb. *Vit. Constant.* iv. 11; *Orat. Constant.* xxiv. 2; Lactant. *De M. P.* c. 5); but that the employment of the captive emperor as a stool from which Sapor mounted his horse is a rhetorical invention of Lactantius, fifty years after the time, from whom alone later writers received it.

<sup>65</sup> Euseb. *Orat. Constant.* xxiv. 2.

<sup>66</sup> Lactant. l. s. c.; Victor, *Epit.* 32; Oros. vii. 22.

<sup>67</sup> Lactant. l. s. c.; Euseb. l. s. c.; Agath. iv. p. 133, A.

<sup>68</sup> *Decline and Fall*, vol. i. p. 331.

<sup>69</sup> De Champagny, *Césars*, &c. tom. ii. p. 437.

<sup>70</sup> See the bas-reliefs of Sargon (Botta, *Monument de Ninive*, pls. 83, 118, 120) and Asshur-bani-pal (Layard, *Monuments of Nineveh*, 2nd series, pls. 45 and 47); and compare the Behistun Inscription (col. ii. par. 13 and 14; col. iii. par. 8) and the Sassanian relief described by Malcolm (*Hist. of Persia*, vol. i. p. 254).

<sup>71</sup> See Flandin, pls. 33, 49, 53, &c.; Texier, pl. 129, &c.

<sup>72</sup> It has been said that there is one exception (Thomas in *As Soc. Journal*, vol. iii. N. S. p. 304). But the figure referred to represents, I believe, Miriades. (See Pl. XIV.)

<sup>73</sup> Tabari is the only Oriental writer who reports that Valerian was used cruelly; but his statement that Sapor cut off his prisoner's nose and then set him at liberty (*Chronique*, tom. ii. p. 80) can scarcely be thought worthy of credit.

<sup>74</sup> Niebuhr, *Lectures on Ancient History*, vol. iii. p. 295.

<sup>75</sup> *Hist. August.* Gallien. § 3; Quietus, § 14.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.* Odenath. § 15. Compare the letter of Aurelian preserved in this valuable compilation (Zenob. § 30).

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.* Gallien. § 10: "Ad Ctesiphontem Parthorum multitudinem obsedit." Zosim. i. p. 39: Πέρσας τοῖς οἰκείοις ἐναπέκλεισεν. Syncellus makes him succeed in taking the city (Κτησιφῶντα πολιορκία παρασησάμενος); but this is an exaggeration. (See his *Chronographia*. pp. 716-7.)

<sup>78</sup> *Hist. August.* Gallien. § 10: "Fuerunt longa et varia prælia."

<sup>79</sup> *Ib.* "Locorum difficultatibus in

alieno solo imperator optimus laborabat."

<sup>80</sup> Of these he sent some to Gallienus, whom that weak monarch led in triumph (*Hist. August.* l. s. c.).

<sup>81</sup> "Odenathum, participato imperio, Augustum vocavit" (*Hist. Aug.* Gallien. § 12).

<sup>82</sup> See De Champagny, *Césars*, &c. tom. iii. p. 45.

<sup>83</sup> *Hist. Aug.* Gallien. § 13.

<sup>84</sup> "Zenobia Palmyrenis et orientali-bus plerisque viriliter imperante," *ibid.* (Compare the letter of Aurelian to the Senate, preserved in the *Hist. August.*, Triginta Tyranni, Zenob. § 30.)

<sup>85</sup> See above, note 83; and compare *Hist. Aug.* Claud. § 4.

<sup>86</sup> Malcolm, *Hist. of Persia*, vol. i. p. 98; Texier, *Description de l'Arménie, de la Perse*, &c. pp. 205-208; pls. 146 to 151; Flandin, *Voyage en Perse*, tom. ii. pp. 248-281, pls. 45-54.

<sup>87</sup> The sculptures at Shahpur are generally Sapor the First's. They may be identified by the resemblance of the chief figure to the head upon Sapor's coins, and to the figure declared by an inscription to be Sapor at Nakhsh-i-Rajab (Ker Porter, pl. 28).

<sup>88</sup> See Malcolm, vol. i. opp. p. 255; Texier, pl. 146; Flandin, pl. 49.

<sup>89</sup> Texier, pl. 147; Flandin, pl. 53.

<sup>90</sup> See the *Journal of the Geographical Society*, vol. ix. pp. 73-4; vol. xvi. pp. 27-8; Loftus, *Chaldæa and Susiana*, p. 298.

<sup>91</sup> Tabari, *Chronique*, tom. ii. p. 80.

<sup>92</sup> Loftus, p. 299. Compare *Geograph. Journal*, vol. ix. p. 75; vol. xvi. p. 28.

<sup>93</sup> Niebuhr, C., *Voyages*, tom. ii. p. 129; Ker Porter, *Travels*, vol. i. pp. 540-575; Malcolm, *Hist. of Persia*, vol. i. p. 254; Flandin, *Voyage en Perse*, tom. ii. pp. 97-135, &c.; Texier, *Description de l'Arménie*, &c. tom. ii. pp. 226-231, &c.

<sup>94</sup> Ker Porter, vol. i. pl. 21; Texier, pl. 129.

<sup>95</sup> Texier, pl. 139.

<sup>96</sup> See Thomas in *Journal of As. Society*, iii. N. S. p. 301; and compare De Sacy, *Inscriptions de Nakschi-Roustant*, pp. 31 and 105; Spiegel, *Grammatik*, p. 169. The inscription may be thus rendered:—"This is the representation of the Ormazd-worshipping divine Sapor, king of kings Arian and non-Arian, heaven-descended, of the race of the gods, son of the Ormazd-worshipping divine Artaxerxes, king of the kings of Aria, heaven-descended, of the race of the gods, grandson of the divine Papak, the king." See Haug on the Haji-abad Inscription, which commences in exactly the same way. (*Old Pahlavi-Pazand Glossary*, pp. 48-51.)

<sup>97</sup> Compare the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, p. 64.

<sup>98</sup> See Longpérier, *Médailles des Sassanides*, pl. 2 and pp. 13-18.

<sup>99</sup> A few coins of Sapor I. have, on the reverse, a fire-altar without supporters,

like the coins of his father. [Pl. XV. Fig. 7.]

<sup>100</sup> For the meaning of these legends, see text, p. 276.

<sup>101</sup> See Böhlen, *Das alte Indien*, vol. i. pp. 369, et seq.

<sup>102</sup> Milman, *History of the Jews*, vol. ii. p. 485.

<sup>103</sup> Routh, *Reliquiæ, Sacræ*, vol. iv. pp. 147, 153, &c.; Augustin, *De Nat. Boni*, p. 515; *Contr. Faust.* passim; Epiphan. *Adv. Hæres.* lxvi.

<sup>104</sup> Burton, *Eccles. Hist. of First Three Centuries*, vol. ii. p. 408.

<sup>105</sup> Epiphan. *Adv. Hæres.* lxvi. §§ 1-3. Compare Milman, *History of Christianity*, vol. ii. pp. 259, 260, 261, &c.

<sup>106</sup> Burton, p. 409; Milman, p. 263.

<sup>107</sup> Milman, pp. 259-271.

<sup>108</sup> Burton, p. 410.

<sup>109</sup> According to the interpretation of one writer, Sapor has left a record which sufficiently indicates his adoption at one time in his life of a species of mongrel Christianity. Mr. Thomas finds the name of JESUS in the Haji-abad inscription, accompanied by the epithet "the Lord," and the statement that He "mercifully brought joy to the people of the world." (See his explanation of the inscription in the *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society*, vol. iii., New Series, pp. 338-9.) Another interpreter, however, with at least equal claims to attention, Dr. Martin Haug, finds no reference at all to Jesus or to religion in the record, which describes, according to him, Sapor's shooting of an arrow from the Haji-abad cave at a target placed without it, and his failure to hit the mark, thence proceeding to give a mystical account of the failure, which is ascribed to the existence of an *invisible* target at the spot where the arrow fell. (*Old Pahlavi-Pazand Glossary*, pp. 45-65.) It seems to result from the extreme difference between the interpretations of these two scholars, that the language of the early Sassanian inscriptions is as yet too imperfectly known to allow of any conclusions being drawn from them, excepting where they are accompanied by a Greek transcript. Maçoudi says that, on the first preaching of Manes, Sapor "abjured the doctrine of the Magi to embrace that of the new teacher," but that he afterwards returned to the worship of his ancestors (tom. ii. p. 164).

<sup>110</sup> Burton, l. s. c.; Milman, p. 263.

<sup>111</sup> Augustin. *Contr. Fortunat.* ad init.; *Contr. Faust.* v. 1.

<sup>112</sup> See text, p. 287.

<sup>113</sup> See text, p. 290.

<sup>114</sup> Besides the works of usefulness already mentioned (p. 289), Sapor is said to have constructed the great bridge of Dizful, which has 22 arches, and is 450 paces long. (See M. Mohl's translation of the *Modjmel-al-Tewarikh* in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1841, p. 511.)

<sup>115</sup> Longpérier thinks that the hand of

Greek artists is to be recognized in the heads and emblems upon early Sassanian coins (*Médailles des Sassanides*, p. 5).

<sup>116</sup> Tabari, *Chronique*, tom. ii. p. 81; Maçoudi, *Prairies d'Or*, tom. ii. p. 160, tom. iv. p. 83; Mirkhond, *Histoire des Sassanides*, pp. 285-7. The portrait on the gem given [Pl. XV. Fig. 5] tends to confirm the testimony.

<sup>117</sup> Malcolm, *History of Persia*, vol. i. p. 99.

## CHAPTER V.

<sup>1</sup> See Agathias, iv. p. 134; Eutychius, vol. i. pp. 384, 387, 395.

<sup>2</sup> The full form is Hormisdates or Ormisdates, "given by Ormazd." This is first contracted into Hormisdas, and then by the later Persians into Hormuz. The form of the name on the coins of Hormisdas II. is *Auhmazdi*.

<sup>3</sup> Agath. l. s. c. Compare Tabari, ii. p. 89; Maçoudi, ii. p. 166.

<sup>4</sup> So Milman (*History of Christianity*, vol. ii. p. 272); but Malcolm places his return to Persia under Varahan I. (*Hist. of Persia*, vol. i. p. 101). So Mirkhond, *Histoire des Sassanides*, p. 295.

<sup>5</sup> Maçoudi, tom. ii. p. 166; Malcolm, *Hist. of Persia*, vol. i. p. 100; Mirkhond, *Histoire des Sassanides*, p. 293.

<sup>6</sup> Maçoudi tells us (tom. ii. p. 238) that, according to Abu Obeïdah, Varahan was the son of Sapor and brother of Hormisdas; but all other authorities, so far as I know, make him the son of Hormisdas.

<sup>7</sup> The orthography of the name upon the coins is Varahan (Longpérier, *Médailles*, p. 20). This the Greeks expressed by *Ὀυαράνης*, or *Ὀυαπαράνης*. The later Persians corrupted the name into Bahram. That the Achæmenian Persians had some similar contracted form of the word appears from the name *Pharandates*, or *Pherendates*. (See Sir H. Rawlinson's remarks on this name in the Author's *Herodotus*, vol. iii. p. 452, 2nd ed.)

<sup>8</sup> Mr. Thomas does not allow that any of the extant coins belong to Hormisdas the First (see *Num. Chron.* for 1872, p. 105). Mordtmann (*Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. pp. 37-9; vol. xix. pp. 423, 478) regards as his the coins having the lion-crested cap with a flower rising from the summit. These coins, however, must, from the Indian emblems on some of them (Thomas, l. s. c.), belong to Hormisdas II. As the portraits on these coins and on those with the eagle cap are wholly different, I suspect that the latter may be coins of the first Hormisdas. [Pl. XV. Fig. 3.] The gem regarded by Mordtmann as bearing the name and head of the first Hormisdas (*Zeitschrift*, vol. xviii. p. 7; pl. i. fig. 5) must be assigned to the second prince of the name, from the resemblance of the head to the portraits on the lion coins.

<sup>9</sup> Agath. iv. p. 134, D: *τρίσιν ἑτέροι βασι-*

λέουσας. So Maçoudi (ii. p. 167). Eutyeh. vol. i. p. 384: "Tres annos cum tribus mensibus regnavit."

<sup>10</sup> Malcolm, *History of Persia*, l. s. c.; Tabari, tom. ii. p. 89; Mirkhond, *Histoire des Sassanides*, l. s. c.

<sup>11</sup> So Milman (*Hist. of Christianity*, vol. ii. p. 272). Compare Maçoudi, tom. ii. p. 167.

<sup>12</sup> Milman, l. s. c.; Mirkhond, p. 296; Suidas ad voc. &c.

<sup>13</sup> Besides Valerian (who, according to some, was flayed *alive*) and Manes, we hear of a certain Nachoragan being flayed alive by Chosroës (Agath. iv. p. 132, D). Some of the ecclesiastical writers call flaying alive "the Persian punishment" (Theodoret, *Adv. Hæreses*, l. 26; Cyrill. *Catech.* vii.). It is also mentioned as a Persian custom by Faustus (*Bibl. Hist.* iv. 21).

<sup>14</sup> In early times the Achæmenian Persians flayed men *after* killing them (Herod. v. 25, σφάξας ἀπέδειρε). The same was the practice of the European Scythians (ibid. iv. 64). It may be suspected that the flaying process which is represented in the Assyrian sculptures was performed on dead bodies (*Ancient Monarchies*, vol. i. p. 244, 2nd edition). Malcolm cautiously says of Mani: "Mani and almost all his disciples were put to death by order of Baharam; and the skin of the impostor was hung up;" which does not imply flaying *alive* (see *Hist. of Persia*, vol. i. p. 101).

<sup>15</sup> Malcolm, l. s. c.; Mirkhond, l. s. c.; Tabari, tom. ii. p. 90.

<sup>16</sup> Burton says: "Manes was put to death, either by crucifixion or by excoaration" (*Lectures on the First Three Centuries*, vol. ii. p. 410), which shows that two accounts were known to him. Eutyehus gives a different account from either of these. According to him, Varahran "cut Manes asunder" ("Manem prehensum medium divisit Bahram," vol. i. p. 301).

<sup>17</sup> Milman, vol. ii. p. 273.

<sup>18</sup> Vopisc. *Vit. Aurelian.* (in the *Historia Augusta*), § 27.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. § 28.

<sup>20</sup> "Zenobia, cum fugeret camelis quos dromadas vocitant, atque ad Persas iter tenderet, equitibus est capta." (Vopisc. l. s. c.)

<sup>21</sup> "Hoc munus [sc. pallium breve purpureum lanestre, ad quod cum matronæ atque ipse Aurelianus jungerent purpura suas, aureis specie decolorari videbantur cæteræ divini comparatione fulgoris] rex Persarum ab Indis interioribus sumptum Aureliano dedisse perhibetur, scribens, 'Sume purpuram, qualis apud nos est.'" (Vopisc. *Aurel.* § 29.)

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. § 33: "Currus regii tres fuerunt . . . unus Odenati argento, auro, gemmis operosus atque distinctus; alter, quem rex Persarum Aureliano dono dedit." De Champagne has represented this as a chariot which the Persian king

had given to Odenathus (*Césars du 3<sup>m</sup>e Siècle*, tom. iii. p. 119).

<sup>23</sup> Vopisc. l. s. c.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid. § 35: "Persis . . . bellum indixit [Aurelianus]."

<sup>25</sup> See Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. i. p. 382.

<sup>26</sup> "Parato magno potius quam ingenti exercitu." (Vopisc. *Aurel.* § 35.)

<sup>27</sup> "Mansionem quæ est inter Heracliam et Byzantium." (Vopisc. § 36.) For the exact situation, see *Itiner. Antonin.* (p. 153, ed. Parthey et Pinder), where we find that it was 18 Roman miles from Heraclea (Perinthus), and 47 from Byzantium.

<sup>28</sup> Agath. iv. p. 134, C; Eutyeh. i. p. 387; Mirkhond, p. 297; Tabari, ii. p. 90.

<sup>29</sup> Malcolm, *Hist. of Persia*, vol. i. p. 102; Mirkhond, *Histoire des Sassanides*, pp. 297-8. Maçoudi says that he abandoned himself to pleasure and idleness, passed his time in hunting and other amusements, gave the management of the empire to unworthy favorites, and allowed hundreds of towns and villages to fall into ruin (tom. ii. pp. 168-173). It is perhaps a sign of his soft and pleasure-loving temperament that he alone of the Sassanian kings places the effigy of his wife upon his coins. This emplacement implies association in the kingdom. [Pl. XV. Fig. 4.]

<sup>30</sup> Is the bas-relief at Naklish-i-Rustam, represented by Ker Porter (vol. i. pl. 24), intended to commemorate this scene? It "consists of a king" (wearing the peculiar headdress of Varahran II.) "standing in a niche or rostrum, as if delivering a harangue" (ibid. vol. i. p. 557. [See Pl. XVI.]

<sup>31</sup> Agath. iv. p. 135, A.

<sup>32</sup> Saca-stan is "the country of the Saka" (Sacæ or Scythæ). It received the name probably at the time of the great invasion of the Yue-Chi. (See the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, p. 65.)

<sup>33</sup> The subjection of the Segestani is perhaps the subject of the bas-relief represented by Flandin (pl. 51), where the monarch wears the peculiar headdress of Varahran II.

<sup>34</sup> The bulk of the Persian forces were "detained on the frontiers of India" when Carus crossed the Euphrates (Gibbon, vol. ii. p. 55).

<sup>35</sup> Probus, in A.D. 279, dismissed a Persian embassy with threats (Vopisc. *prob.* § 17). Soon afterwards, however, he "made peace with the Persians" (ibid. § 18). But a little before his death, in A.D. 282, we hear of his meditating a Persian expedition (ibid. § 20).

<sup>36</sup> Vopisc. *Car.* § 8.

<sup>37</sup> Gibbon, l. s. c.

<sup>38</sup> Vopisc. l. s. c.; Eutrop. ix. 18; Aurel. *Vict. Cæs.* xxxviii. Compare Mos. *Chor. Hist. Arm.* ii. 76.

<sup>39</sup> See the letter of the secretary, Julius Calpurnius, preserved by Vopiscus (l. s. c.), and translated by Gibbon (*Decline and Fall*, vol. ii. pp. 55-6).

<sup>40</sup> Gibbon seems to believe that Carus was killed by lightning (vol. ii. p. 56). Niebuhr wavers between lightning and assassination (*Lectures*, vol. iii. p. 305, E. T.). De Champagny says that the whole matter is shrouded in impenetrable mystery (*Césars du 3me Siècle*, tom. iii. p. 186).

<sup>41</sup> See Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. p. 324; and compare De Champagny, tom. iii. p. 186, note 1.

<sup>42</sup> It was an old Roman superstition that "places or persons struck with lightning were singularly devoted to the wrath of heaven" (Gibbon, vol. i. p. 413). There was also a special belief that "when the prætorium was struck, it foreboded the destruction of the army itself" (Niebuhr, *Lectures*, vol. iii. p. 305, E. T.).

<sup>43</sup> When Numerian is credited with Persian victories (Nemes. *Cyneget.* 71-2), it is on the notion that, having been associated by Carus, he had part in the successes of A.D. 283. That Numerian retreated upon the death of his father without tempting fortune any further, is clear from Aur. Vict. *Cæs.* xxxviii., and Vopiscus, *Numer.* § 11.

<sup>44</sup> During this interval Numerian was killed, Diocletian invested with the purple, Carinus defeated and slain, and Maximian associated. (Gibbon, vol. ii. pp. 60-66.)

<sup>45</sup> Moses of Chorêné makes the subjection of Armenia to Persia last twenty-six years (*Hist. Arm.* ii. 74, *sub fin.*). But if he is right in making Artaxerxes the king who reduced Armenia, and in stating that Tiridates regained the throne in the third year of Diocletian (ii. 79), the duration of the subjection must have been, at least, forty-six years, since Artaxerxes died in A.D. 241, and the third of Diocletian was A.D. 286.

<sup>46</sup> Mos. Chor. ii. 77.

<sup>47</sup> Moses omits this feature of the struggle, but Agathangelus supplies it. (Agathang. *Hist. Regn. Tiridat.* c. iii. § 21: ὁ βασιλεὺς τὸν Τηρηδάτην, . . . στρατεύμα εἰς βοήθειαν ἐγχειρίσας, ἀπέλυσεν εἰς τὴν ἰδίαν χώραν.)

<sup>48</sup> Mos. Chor. ii. 79.

<sup>49</sup> Agathang. iii. § 21; Mos. Chor. l. s. c.

<sup>50</sup> Especially in Assyria. (Agathang. iv. § 55: τὴν ἐπαρχίαν τῆς Ἀσσυρίας ἐπάταξε δεινότηταις πληγαῖς. Mos. Chor. ii. 79, *ad fin.*)

<sup>51</sup> So Moses. Agathangelus, while praising highly the warlike qualities of Tiridates (l. s. c.), avoids these improbable details.

<sup>52</sup> Agathias, iv. p. 134, D; Eutych. vol. i. p. 387. Mirkhond agrees (*Histoire des Sassanides*, p. 299), but notes that his authorities varied. Malcolm says that some of the native writers allow him only thirteen years (*History of Persia*, vol. i. p. 103, note). Tabari gives him no more than four! (*Chronique*, ii. p. 90).

<sup>53</sup> Tabari says (l. s. c.) that Varahran II. had no son, but was succeeded by his

brother Narses. Narses himself says that he was the son of Sapor and grandson of Artaxerxes. It is thought that he may have omitted his immediate ancestors as persons of small account (Thomas in *Num. Chron.* for 1872, p. 113); but such omission is very unusual.

<sup>54</sup> Mirkhond, p. 300. A bas-relief at Nakhsh-i-Rustam seems to represent him as receiving the crown from his mother. (Ker Porter, pl. 19.)

<sup>55</sup> The inaugural address of Varahran III. is reported as follows: "I ascend this throne by right, as the issue of your kings; but the sole end which I propose to myself in ruling is to obtain for the people who shall be subject to me a happy and quiet life. I place all my trust in the goodness of God, through whose help all things may end happily. If God preserves my life, I will conduct myself towards you in such a way that all who hear me spoken of will load me with blessings. *If, on the contrary, the angel of death comes and carries me away*, I hope that God will not forsake you or suffer you to perish." (Mirkhond, *Hist. des Sassanides*, l. s. c.)

<sup>56</sup> Agathias, l. s. c.; Eutych. vol. i. p. 395. So also Firdusi in the *Shah-nameh*. Some Oriental writers, however, gave him a reign of nine years. (Mirkhond, l. s. c.)

<sup>57</sup> Agathang. iv. §§ 55 and 57.

## CHAPTER VI.

<sup>1</sup> The relationship of Narses to his predecessor is exceedingly doubtful. He himself declares in an inscription that he was the son of Sapor and the grandson of Artaxerxes (see note 53, Chapter V.); and his statement is confirmed by the Arabian writer, Abu Obeïdah (Mağoudi, tom. ii. p. 238), and by the Armenian historian, Sêpêos. (See the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 149.) Tabari, however, makes him the son of Varahran I. (*Chronique*, tom. ii. p. 90.) So Mağoudi (tom. ii. p. 174). Agathias avoids the question of relationship. Mirkhond (p. 301) and the Persian writers generally say that he was the son of Varahran II. For my own part, I should incline to accept his own statement, and to suppose that, Varahran III. having died without issue, the crown reverted to his great-great-uncle, a man of years and experience, who, however, was not allowed to enjoy the throne without a struggle with another prince of the royal house, a certain Hormisdas.

<sup>2</sup> This passage of history rests entirely on a single sentence in a Latin writer of uncertain date, the author of the "Panegyric" quoted by Gibbon (*Decline and Fall*, vol. ii. p. 81, note 61).

<sup>3</sup> "Ipsos Persas ipsumque regem adscitis Saccis, et Russis, et Gellis. petit frater Ormies." (*Paneg. Vet.* ii. 17.) The Gelli are well identified by Gibbon with the inhabitants of Ghilan, the Gelæ of earlier writers. The Saccæ (Saccæ)

are undoubtedly Scythians. They may have dwelt on the Oxus, or possibly in Afghanistan. The Russi should, by their name, be "Russians;" but it must be admitted that we have otherwise no mention of them by the classical writers till the ninth century A.D. If, however, they are intended in Ezek. xxxviii. 2, 3, xxxix. 1 (as Gesenius and Dean Stanley argue), they may be meant also in the present passage.

<sup>4</sup> See Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. p. 340, where it is proved that the first campaign of Galerius was as early as A.D. 297. If so, the movements which provoked it must have fallen, at the latest, in A.D. 296.

<sup>5</sup> See text, p. 300.

<sup>6</sup> Mos. Chor. ii. 79, *ad fin.*: "Etiam ultra Ctesiphontem incursionem fecit."

<sup>7</sup> Amm. Marc. xxiii. 5. Compare the treatise *De Morte Persecutorum*, § 9.

<sup>8</sup> Aurel. Vict. *Cæsar.* § 39; Zonar. xii. 31.

<sup>9</sup> Amm. Marc. xxiii. 5; Zonar. l. s. c.; Eutrop. ix. 24; &c.

<sup>10</sup> First at Alexandria (Aurel. Vict. l. s. c.); then at Antioch (Lactant. *De Morte Persec.* l. s. c.).

<sup>11</sup> Lactant. *De Morte Persecutor.* § 9; Aurel. Vict. *De Cæsariibus*, § 39. Zonaras makes him actually invade Syria (τοῦ Νάρσου τοίνυν τούτου τότε τὴν Συρίαν ἐπιζόμενον, xii. 31).

<sup>12</sup> See Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, ch. xiii. (vol. ii. p. 82). On the real character of the region see the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, pp. 91, 92.

<sup>13</sup> Victor expresses the commission of Galerius as follows: "Provincia credita Maximiano Cæsari, uti relictis finibus in Mesopotamiam progrediretur, ad arcedos Persarum impetus." (l. s. c.)

<sup>14</sup> Oros. vii. 25: "Cum duobus jam præliis adversus Narseum conflixisset, tertio inter Callinicum et Carras congressus et victus, amissis copiis, ad Diocletianum refugit."

<sup>15</sup> Aurel. Vict. *Cæs.* § 39; Zonar. l. s. c.; Eutrop. ix. 24; Julian, *Paneg. Constant.* p. 18, A.

<sup>16</sup> Gibbon's description of the battle (l. s. c.) is wholly imaginary, no classical writer having left us any account of it. He transfers to the conflict between Galerius and Narses all that Plutarch and Dio relate of Crassus and Surenas. This is scarcely an allowable mode of writing history.

<sup>17</sup> In transferring to this occasion an anecdote related of Tiridates by Moses of Choréné, and attached by him to a defeat of Carus by the Persians, which never took place, our great historian does not perhaps transcend the limits of a sound historical criticism.

<sup>18</sup> Mos. Chor. ii. 76.

<sup>19</sup> Eutrop. l. s. c.; Amm. Marc. xiv. 11. The "mille almost" of Ammianus becomes "several miles" in Eutropius, Festus (§ 25), and Orosius (vii. 25); and "several leagues" in Tillemont (*Hist. des Empereurs*, iv. p. 37).

<sup>20</sup> Oros. l. s. c.: "Per Illyricum et Mœsiam undique copias contraxit."

<sup>21</sup> Jordanes, *De Gothorum rebus gestis*, c. 21.

<sup>22</sup> Aurel. Vict. *Cæs.* § 39: "Per Armeniam in hostes contendit, quæ sola, seu facilius, vincendi via est."

<sup>23</sup> Festus, § 25.

<sup>24</sup> Synes, *Reg.* p. 19, A. Compare Festus, l. s. c., and Eutropius, ix. 25.

<sup>25</sup> Festus, l. s. c. Compare Amm. Marc. xxii. 4: "Sub Maximiano Cæsare vallo regis Persarum direpto."

<sup>26</sup> Zonaras, xii. 31.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* Compare Eutrop. ix. 25; Oros. vii. 25.

<sup>28</sup> "Captivos quamplurimos Persarum nobilium abduxit." (Oros. l. s. c.)

<sup>29</sup> Zonaras makes him pursue Narses "into the inner parts of Persia" (μέχρι τῆς ἐνδοτέρας Περσίδος); and Eutropius speaks of Narses as betaking himself to the remotest solitudes of his kingdom (ix. 25). But it may be questioned whether the defeated monarch ever fled further than Media, where we find him when an ambassador is sent to him by Diocletian (Pet. Patric. Fr. 14).

<sup>30</sup> Zonaras, l. s. c.

<sup>31</sup> Petrus Patricius. Although this author did not write till towards the close of the sixth century, he is generally allowed by historical critics to be among the best authorities even for the events of three centuries previously. (See Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, ch. xiii. vol. ii. p. 84, note 74; C. Müller, *Fr. Hist. Gr.* vol. iv. pp. 181-4; Niebuhr, Preface to the Bonn edition of the *Excerpta de Legationibus*.)

<sup>32</sup> I have been content to translate Patricius. Gibbon, by recasting the entire oration and changing the position of all its parts, produces a fine result; but I have not felt at liberty to work up the ancient materials after his fashion.

<sup>33</sup> Note the absence here of any allusion to fetters, or to the employment of Valerian by his captor as a horseblock; and remark that the flaying is distinctly made subsequent to his decease.

<sup>34</sup> Gibbon (l. s. c.) has incorrectly placed the embassy of Apharban after the meeting of Galerius with Diocletian at Nisibis, and has made both monarchs present at the interview. De Champagny has seen the true order of the events (*Césars du 3me Siècle*, tom. iii. pp. 304-5).

<sup>35</sup> Eutrop. ix. 25; Julian, *Orat.* i. p. 18, A.

<sup>36</sup> Pet. Patric. Fr. 14.

<sup>37</sup> Gibbon, ch. xiii. (vol. ii. p. 84).

<sup>38</sup> Aurel. Vict. l. s. c.: "Adeo victor [Galerius erat], ut, ni Valerius, cujus nutu omnia gerebantur, incertum qua causa, abnuisset, Romani fasces in provinciam novam ferrentur."

<sup>39</sup> Patricius (l. s. c.) calls him ἀντιγραφέα τῆς μνήμης, a sort of "Secretary of State."

<sup>40</sup> Ἐν τοῖς ἐνδοτέρω τῶν βασιλείων. (Pet.

Patric. l. s. c.) The palace seems to have been on the river Asprudis, which cannot be identified.

<sup>41</sup> Patricius calls him "governor of Symium." Gibbon identifies Symium with Synia, a tract east of Mount Ararat (*Armen. Geograph.* § 74).

<sup>42</sup> Patricius, l. s. c.

<sup>43</sup> Ammianus Marcellinus, xxv. 7. Gibbon has strangely intermixed the statements of the two writers, ascribing the mention of Intilene to Ammianus, and that of Rehimene to Patricius (vol. ii. p. 87, note 79), which is the reverse of the truth.

<sup>44</sup> Pet. Patric. Fr. 14.

<sup>45</sup> This was the view of Valesius (ad Amm. Marc. xxv. 7), of Tillemont (*Histoire des Empereurs*, tom. iv. p. 40), and of most writers anterior to Gibbon. It was argued that the provinces were called "Transtigritanæ," because they were so to the *Persians!*

<sup>46</sup> De Champagny places them all "west of Lake Van and south of Armenia." (*Césars du 3<sup>me</sup> Siècle*, tom. iii. p. 305, note.)

<sup>47</sup> As Gibbon, vol. ii. p. 87; Niebuhr, *Lectures on Roman History*, vol. iii. p. 311, E. T.; and Mr. James in Smith's *Dict. of Geography*, ad voc. CORDYENE.

<sup>48</sup> See notes 42 and 43.

<sup>49</sup> Menander Protect. Fr. 55, p. 257.

<sup>50</sup> See Layard's *Nineveh and Babylon*, p. 39, and compare the map of Armenia, Assyria, and Kurdistan at the end of the book.

<sup>51</sup> The most important are Eutrop. vi. 7; Procop. *De Bell. Pers.* i. 8; *De Edific.* iii. 2; Menand. Protect. Fr. 55, 57, and 60; Johann. Epiphan. Fr. 1, § 3; *Armen. Geogr.* § 68.

<sup>52</sup> It is remarkable that the appellation has changed so little in the course of centuries. The Assyrian monarchs call the country *Kirzan*.

<sup>53</sup> Amm. Marc. xx. 7.

<sup>54</sup> Layard, *Nineveh and Babylon*, p. 53.

<sup>55</sup> Strab. xi. 12, § 4, xvi. 1, § 24; Plutarch, *Lucull.* 26; &c.

<sup>56</sup> Xen. *Anab.* iv. i. §§ 2-3; Strab. xvi. 1, § 8; Arrian, *Exp. Alex.* iii. 7; Plin. *H. N.* vi. 15; Ptol. v. 13.

<sup>57</sup> The "Sophene" of Patricius may safely be set aside, since it had long been Roman. His "Intilené" some would change into Ingilene, a district mentioned as "lying beyond Mesopotamia" by Epiphanius (*De Hæres.* lx. vol. i. p. 505, ed Vales.). The "Rehimene" of Ammianus is confirmed by Zosimus, who mentions "Remenians" among the tribes ceded by Jovian (iii. 31). The "Moxoene" of Ammianus does not elsewhere occur. Is it the modern "district of Mokus" (Layard, *Nin. and Bab.* p. 417, note)? Zosimus has in its place "Zalene," a name of which I can make nothing.

<sup>58</sup> Corduena, *uberis* regionis et nostræ." (Amm. Marc. xxv. 7.)

<sup>59</sup> Ibid. Compare Zosim. iii. 31.

<sup>60</sup> Amm. Marc. l. s. c.: "Petebat rex *obstinatus* sua dudum a Maximiano erepta."

<sup>61</sup> Pace facta, Mesopotamia est restituta; et super ripam *Tigridis limes est confirmatus*, ut ("with the further condition that") quinq; gentium trans Tigridem constitutum ditionem assequeremur." (Festus, § 14.)

<sup>62</sup> *Decline and Fall*, ch. xiii. (vol. ii. p. 87, note 77).

<sup>63</sup> *Decline and Fall*, ch. xiii. (vol. ii. p. 88).

<sup>64</sup> Mos. Chor. ii. 84.

<sup>65</sup> We can only say with De Champagny: "L'Arménie, vassale de Rome, fut agrandie" (*Césars*, tom. iii. p. 305), and that the augmentation was on the side of Media.

<sup>66</sup> Tacit. *Ann.* vi. 33: "Iberi, locorum potentes, Caspia via Sarmatam in Armenios raptim effundunt." Compare Dio Cass. lxi. 15.

<sup>67</sup> Nineveh, which was now once more a place of importance (see Tac. *Ann.* xii. 13; Amm. Marc. xviii. 7, *ad init.*; Layard, *Nin. and Bab.* pp. 590-1), and which was nearer Nisibis than any other Persian town of consequence, lay at the distance of nearly 120 miles. Arbela was nearly 60 miles further off.

<sup>68</sup> On the trade between Rome and Parthia, see Herodian, iv. 18; and compare the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, p. 238. It is probable that the exchange of Persian for Parthian rule had made but little difference in the course or character of the traffic.

<sup>69</sup> See text, p. 307.

<sup>70</sup> Lacant. *De Morte Persec.* § 9: "Concitus domesticis exemplis avi sui Saporis, ad occupandum Orientem magnis copiis [Narses] inhiabat."

<sup>71</sup> The abdication of Narses rests wholly upon the authority of the Oriental writers. (See Mirkhond, *Histoire des Sassanides*, p. 302; Malcolm, *History of Persia*, vol. i. p. 104.) It is accepted, however, as a fact by most moderns. See Malcolm, l. s. c.; Plate in Smith's *Dict. of Biography*, vol. iii. p. 717, &c.)

<sup>72</sup> Mirkhond, l. s. c.

<sup>73</sup> He is said to have been surnamed *Nakhdjirkan*, or "Hunter of wild beasts" (Mirkhond, p. 303). It is remarkable that the headdress which distinguishes him on his coins is adorned with horns, either of the ibex or the stag. [Pl. XVIII. Fig. 2.] This ornamentation is quite peculiar to him; and it adds a weight to the other statements of the native writers as to his predilections.

<sup>74</sup> Dr. Plate says he died in the year that he abdicated; but I know no authority for this. That he did not outlive A.D. 309, the year of his son's death, seems to follow from the difficulty then felt about the succession. Perhaps it is most probable that he died in A.D. 306, since the Armenians regard him as king up to this date. (See Patkanian in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 150.)

## CHAPTER VII.

<sup>1</sup> See Clinton, *F. R.* vol. ii. p. 260. Agathias declares that both Narses and Hormisdas reigned *exactly* seven years and five months (p. 135, A.). So Maçoudi, ii. p. 174.

<sup>2</sup> Mirkhond, *Histoire des Sassanides*, pp. 303-4. Compare Tabari, ii. p. 90.

<sup>3</sup> Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, ch. iii. (vol. i. p. 215).

<sup>4</sup> Mirkhond, p. 304; D'Herbelot, *Bibliothèque Orientale*, tom. iii. p. 221.

<sup>5</sup> D'Herbelot, l. s. c.

<sup>6</sup> D'Herbelot quotes the *Lebtarikh* and the *Tarikh-Cozideh* to this effect.

<sup>7</sup> Mirkhond, p. 293; Malcolm, *Hist. of Persia*, vol. i. p. 100.

<sup>8</sup> D'Herbelot, l. s. c.

<sup>9</sup> Mirkhond, p. 304; Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua*, p. 385, note 5.

<sup>10</sup> See text, p. 297.

<sup>11</sup> See Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua*, pp. 347-381.

<sup>12</sup> The coins of Hormisdas II. not unfrequently show signs of Indian influence. On the reverses of some we see the Indian deity Siva and his Bull (Thomas in *Num. Chron.* vol. xv. p. 180; New Series, No. 45, p. 115), as in the coins of Kadphises (Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua*, p. 350-7). On others we observe an Indian altar (*Num. Chron.* vol. xv. p. 180, fig. 10).

<sup>13</sup> Mirkhond, *Histoire des Sassanides*, p. 304.

<sup>14</sup> The relationship of the "Prince Hormisdas," who took refuge at the court of Constantine in the year A. D. 323, to Hormisdas II. rests on the authority of Zosimus, from whom all the details here given are derived. (See Zosim. *Hist. Nov.* ii. 27.) The account given by Zonaras (xiii. 5) is different.

<sup>15</sup> The latter part of the story in Zosimus implies that he had this inclination. How offensive such tastes might be to the Asiatics, we see from the history of Vonones in Tacitus (*Ann.* ii. 2).

<sup>16</sup> Herod. i. 133. Compare ix. 110.

<sup>17</sup> Compare Mordecai's treatment of Haman (*Esther* iii. 2, v. 9).

<sup>18</sup> See text, p. 294.

<sup>19</sup> Some writers give him another son, the Artaxerxes who succeeded Sapor II. But it is impossible to accept this view. See text, ch. xii.

<sup>20</sup> Agathias, iv. p. 135; Mirkhond, pp. 305-6; Tabari, tom. ii. p. 91; Malcolm, *History of Persia*, vol. i. p. 106. Gibbon suggests that Agathias obtained the history from the Persian Chronicles (*Decline and Fall*, ch. xviii. vol. ii. p. 367, note 54).

<sup>21</sup> Sapor (Shah-puhr) means "King's son," as has been already noted (see note 2, Chapter IV.).

<sup>22</sup> Abulpharagius in one place has sixty-nine years (p. 85), in another (p. 90) seventy. Agathias (p. 135, D) and Theophanes (p. 7) have seventy. Sir John Malcolm, following Oriental authorities, gives seventy-one (*Hist. of Persia*, vol.

i. p. 110.) Eutychius (vol. i. p. 472), Mirkhond (*Hist. des Sassanides*, p. 306), Tabari (*Chronique*, tom. ii. p. 101), and Maçoudi (tom. ii. p. 175) say seventy-two.

<sup>23</sup> Abulpharagius, p. 90.

<sup>24</sup> Mirkhond makes Sapor begin to exercise some of the offices of government at eight years (p. 307), but admits that he did not undertake the direction of military expeditions till he was sixteen (*ibid.*). So Tabari (tom. ii. p. 93).

<sup>25</sup> Mirkhond, l. s. c.; Tabari, vol. ii. pp. 91-2; Malcolm, vol. i. p. 106.

<sup>26</sup> D'Herbelot, *Bibliothèque Orientale*, tom. v. p. 143; Gibbon, *Decline and Fall* ch. xviii. (vol. ii. p. 367). These writers make Thair a king of Yemen or Arabia proper; but Sir J. Malcolm says he was a mere sheikh of some of the tribes of Mesopotamia (vol. i. p. 107, note).

<sup>27</sup> Mirkhond, p. 307; Tabari, tom. ii. pp. 92-3.

<sup>28</sup> Fourteen is generally regarded as the age of manhood in the East (Layard, *Nin. and Babylon*, p. 205); and minorities usually come to an end at this age. (See Malcolm, *Hist. of Persia*, vol. i. pp. 499, 506, &c.)

<sup>29</sup> Mirkhond, l. s. c.; Tabari, p. 93; Maçoudi, p. 176.

<sup>30</sup> Mirkhond, p. 308; Tabari, p. 94.

<sup>31</sup> This is Mirkhond's account. Other authorities say that he dislocated (Malcolm, vol. i. p. 107; Maçoudi, vol. ii. p. 177) or broke (D'Herbelot, *Bibl. Orient.* tom. v. p. 141) the shoulders of his prisoners, to disqualify them for military service.

<sup>32</sup> Gibbon, following an apocryphal tale related by D'Herbelot, but not adopted by him, gives the name as *Dhoulacnaf*, and translates it "Protector of the Nation" (vol. ii. p. 367). The best authorities are, however, all agreed that the real epithet was *Dhoulactaf*, not *Dhoulacnaf*. (See D'Herbelot, l. s. c.; Mirkhond, p. 308; Tabari, tom. ii. p. 91; Malcolm, vol. i. p. 107, note; Maçoudi, tom. ii. p. 175.)

<sup>33</sup> Sozomen, *Hist. Eccles.* ii. 9, 10.

<sup>34</sup> Tillemont, *Hist. des Empereurs*, tom. iv. p. 255: "Constantin se regardait comme le protecteur général de tous les serviteurs de Jésus-Christ."

<sup>35</sup> Eusebius (*Vit. Constant. Magn.* iv. 9 et seq.) and Theodoret (i. 25) give the terms of a letter written by Constantine to Sapor at this time in favor of the Christians. It is a verbose production, and possesses but little interest. The greater part is an account of his own religious principles and feelings. The concluding portion, which alone touches the case of the Persian Christians, runs as follows: "You can imagine then how delighted I am to hear that Persia, too, in some of its best regions, is adorned and illustrated by this class of men, on whose behalf I write to you—I mean the Christians—a thing most agreeable to my wishes. All prosperity then be

yours, and all prosperity be theirs—may both flourish alike! Thus will you make God the Father, the Lord of all, propitious and friendly towards you. These persons then, seeing that you are so great, I commend to you—I put them into your hand, seeing that you are so conspicuous for your piety. Love them with that love which befits your known benevolence. For thus you will confer both on us and on yourself an immeasurable benefit.”

<sup>36</sup> Libanius, *Orat.* iii. pp. 118, 120; Aurel. Vict. *De Cæsaribus*, § 41.

<sup>37</sup> Compare Liban. l. s. c. with Festus (§ 26) and Euseb. *Vit. Constant.* iv. 8.

<sup>38</sup> Some writers make the hostilities commence in the lifetime of Constantine. (See Eutrop. x. 8; *Chronic. Pasch.* p. 286, C.) But Ammianus, who is almost a contemporary, assigns the outbreak to the reign of Constantius (xxv. 4).

<sup>39</sup> Sapor is said to have sent a friendly embassy to Constantine in A.D. 333 (Euseb. *Vit. Const.* iv. 8; Liban. *Or.* iii. p. 118). In A.D. 337 he suddenly threatened war, and demanded the restoration of the five provinces ceded by Narses (Liban. *Or.* iii. p. 120). Having received a refusal, he sent another embassy, about Easter, to express his desire for peace (Euseb. iv. 57).

<sup>40</sup> See the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, pp. 130, 132, 145, &c.

<sup>41</sup> If Prince Hormisdas was a son of Hormisdas II. and thrown into prison at his death (see text, p. 315), he must have passed fourteen years in confinement before he made his escape.

<sup>42</sup> Zosim. ii. 27.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.* ii. 27, *ad fin.*; and iii. 13, *ad fin.*

<sup>44</sup> Suidas *ad voc. Μαρούας*.

<sup>45</sup> From A.D. 333 to A.D. 337.

#### CHAPTER VIII.

<sup>1</sup> At first the partition was into five kingdoms; but the dominions of Dalmatius and Hannibalianus were soon absorbed into those of the sons of Constantine.

<sup>2</sup> Constantius was not quite twenty at the death of his father. He was born in August, A.D. 317. Constantine died May 22, A.D. 337.

<sup>3</sup> The natives of the voluptuous East were never a match for those of the hardy West. Roman legions recruited in Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt were always poor soldiers.

<sup>4</sup> Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, ch. xviii. (vol. ii. pp. 98–100).

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* p. 103.

<sup>6</sup> Mos. Chor. *Hist. Armen.* ii. 77; Agathangelus, §§ 110–132.

<sup>7</sup> See Milman, *Hist. of Christianity*, vol. ii. p. 258, and the authorities there cited.

<sup>8</sup> Chosroës II., who was placed on the throne by Rome in A.D. 316, and Tiranus, his son, who succeeded Chosroës in A.D. 325.

<sup>9</sup> This distinctly appears from Faustus, iii. 20. The cession seems to have been made by Chosroës II. (Mos. Chor. iii. 8).

<sup>10</sup> See note 38, Chapter VII.; and compare Liban. *Orat.* iii. p. 117, B.

<sup>11</sup> Liban. *Orat.* iii. p. 121, B.

<sup>12</sup> Julian. *Orat.* i. pp. 33 and 36.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 36–38. Among other improvements introduced by Constantius at this time was the equipment of a portion of the Roman cavalry after the fashion of the Persian *cataphracti*, or mailed horsemen.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 33 and 37. Compare St. Martin's additions to Le Beau, *Bas-Empire*, vol. i. pp. 406 et seqq.

<sup>15</sup> Julian. *Orat.* i. p. 37.

<sup>16</sup> There must be some foundation for the statements of Libanius and Julian, that Sapor at first avoided a conflict, even though they are contained in panegyrics. (See Liban. p. 122, A; Τοῖς ὀρίοις ἐφείσθηκε τοῖς Περσικοῖς, ἐπιθυμῶν αἰμάξαι τὴν δεξίαν· καὶ ὁ τὸν θυμὸν δεξάμενος οὐκ ἦν· ἀλλ' οἱ τὸν πόλεμον εἰσάγοντες ἐν φυγῇ τὸν πόλεμον διέφερον, κ.τ.λ. Julian. *Orat.* i. p. 39: Τῶν πολεμίων οὐδεὶς ἐτόλμησεν ἀμῦναι τῇ χῆρᾳ πορθουμένη· πάντα δὲ παρ' ἡμᾶς ἤγετο τακείων ἀγαθῶν· τῶν μὲν οὐδὲ εἰς χεῖρας ἰέναι τολμῶντων.)

<sup>17</sup> Julian. *Orat.* i. p. 37.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* p. 38.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* p. 39.

<sup>20</sup> This is well urged by Gibbon (*Decline and Fall*, vol. ii. p. 372).

<sup>21</sup> See the *Assyrian Canon*, *passim*; and compare *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. i. p. 258.

<sup>22</sup> Plutarch, *Lucull.* § 32.

<sup>23</sup> This river, now called the *Jerujer*, anciently the Mygdonius (river of Gozan?), joins the main stream of the Khabour in lat. 36° 20', near the volcanic hill of Koukab. (Layard, *Nin. and Bab.* pp. 309, 322, &c.)

<sup>24</sup> As appears from the coins of Nisibis (Mionnet, *Description des Médailles*, tom. v. pp. 625–8).

<sup>25</sup> This is evident from the persistence of his attacks. Ammianus says (xxv. 8): “Constabat orbem Eoum in ditio-nem potius transire Persidis, nisi hæc civitas (sc. Nisibis) habili situ et magnitudine mœnium restitisset.”

<sup>26</sup> On the date of the first siege of Nisibis, see Tillemont, *Hist. des Empereurs*, tom. iv. p. 668; Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. p. 396.

<sup>27</sup> *Chron. Pasch.* p. 287, B; Theophanes, p. 28, D.

<sup>28</sup> So Tillemont, tom. iv. p. 319.

<sup>29</sup> Theodoret, ii. 30. The miracles ascribed by this writer to St. James are justly ridiculed by Gibbon (vol. ii. p. 372, note 65).

<sup>30</sup> *Chron. Pasch.* l. s. c.; Hieronym. *Chron.* anno 2354.

<sup>31</sup> Eutropius, Festus, Zosimus, Zonaras.

<sup>32</sup> The first and second speeches of Julian and the third of Libanius belong to the latter class; the Epistle of Julian

to the Athenian Senate and People, and the tenth oration of Libanius belong (so far as Constantius is concerned) to the former. The later writings of these two authors to a great extent invalidate the earlier.

<sup>33</sup> Nine times, according to Festus (§ 27); frequently, according to Eutropius (x. 10); whenever he engaged the Persians, according to Ammianus (xx. 11, *ad fin.*) and Socrates (*Hist. Eccles.* ii. 25).

<sup>34</sup> See the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, p. 228.

<sup>35</sup> Mos. Chor. *Hist. Armen.* iii. 10; Faustus, iii. 21. The Persian prince seems to have been named Narses. Moses calls him Sapor's brother; but this is very improbable.

<sup>36</sup> Faustus, l. s. c.

<sup>37</sup> Hence the practice of blinding their near relatives upon their accession, which the Shahs of Persia regularly pursued till within the present century.

<sup>38</sup> Faustus, iv. 1.

<sup>39</sup> On the friendly relations which subsisted at this time between Persia and Armenia, see Faustus, iv. 16.

<sup>40</sup> Jerome says: "Sapor tribus mensibus obsedit Nisibin;" but Theophanes gives the exact duration of the siege as seventy-eight days (p. 31 D).

<sup>41</sup> Liban. *Orat.* iii. p. 129, A, B.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.* p. 130, A.

<sup>43</sup> On the position of Sinjar and the character of the surrounding country, see Layard (*Nin. and Bab.* pp. 246-249).

<sup>44</sup> Liban. p. 129, D. This writer pretends that it was not through fear of meeting the enemy in the open that Constantius held back, but because he wanted to draw his adversary on and prevent him from recrossing the Tigris without fighting. Perhaps it is most probable that the passage of the river took Constantius by surprise, that he was too weak to prevent it, and was obliged to remain on the defensive until his troops could be concentrated.

<sup>45</sup> Libanius represents the entire arrangement as a plan carefully laid (*Orat.* iii. p. 130, C); Julian, on the contrary, regards the flight of the Persians as a real panic, and their victory at the camp as a mere piece of good fortune (*Orat.* i. pp. 42-44).

<sup>46</sup> Liban. *Orat.* iii. p. 131, A.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.* p. 131, D, and p. 132, A. Each legionary, we are told, stepped aside out of the way of the horseman who bore down upon him, and then struck him, as he passed, with a club.

<sup>48</sup> Julian. *Orat.* i. pp. 42-3; Liban. p. 130, D.

<sup>49</sup> Liban. p. 132, B; Julian, p. 44. The latter writer appears to ascribe the Roman disaster mainly to the troops exposing themselves as they drank at the Persian cisterns (λάκκοις ὕδατος ἐνδον ἐντυχόντες, τὴν καλλίστην νίκην διέφθειραν).

<sup>50</sup> The Roman writers touch lightly the condition of the Roman troops when

the Persians fell upon them. I follow probably when I describe them as "sleepy or drunken."

<sup>51</sup> See Amm. Marc. xviii. 5: "Apud Singaram . . . acerrime nocturna concertatione pugnatum est, nostrorum copiis ingenti strage confossis." Compare Hieronym. anno 2364; and Liban. *Orat.* iii. p. 132, C. Even Julian admits that the battle was commonly regarded as the greatest victory gained by the Persians during the war (*Orat.* i. p. 41).

<sup>52</sup> Liban. p. 133, D: "Ἐπειδὴν [οἱ Πέρσαι] τὸν τοῦ βασιλέως παῖδα, τὸν τῆς ἀρχῆς διάδοχον, ἐζωγρημένον, καὶ μαστιγοῦμενον, καὶ κεντούμενον, καὶ μικρὸν ὑστερον κατακοπτόμενον. Tillemont has seen that this treatment could not have been possible till the troops were half-maddened with despair and fury. (*Histoire des Empereurs*, tom. iv. p. 347.)

<sup>53</sup> So much we may accept from the boasts of Julian (*Orat.* i. p. 45) and Libanius (*Orat.* iii. p. 133, A), corroborated as they are by the testimony of Ammianus, who says (l. s. c.) that the Persians made no use of their victory at Singara; but it is impossible to believe the statement of Libanius, that the whole Persian army fled in disorder from Singara and hastily recrossed the Tigris (p. 133, D).

<sup>54</sup> Julian maintains that both sides suffered equally in the battle (p. 41).

<sup>55</sup> Compare the grief of Orodes on the death of Pacorus (*Sixth Monarchy*, p. 110).

<sup>56</sup> Jerome's statement that Amida and Bezabde were taken by Sapor shortly after the battle of Singara arises apparently from some confusion between the events of the year A.D. 349 and those of A.D. 359.

<sup>57</sup> Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. ii. p. 377.

<sup>58</sup> Julian. *Orat.* i. p. 48.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.* ii. p. 115.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.* p. 116.

<sup>61</sup> Zosimus, iii. 8.

<sup>62</sup> Theodoret, i. 30.

<sup>63</sup> Julian. *Orat.* ii. p. 115; "Ὁ Παρθαίων βασιλεὺς . . . ἐπιτεχνίζων τὴν πόλεν χῶμασιν, εἶτα εἰς ταῦτα δεχόμενος τὸν Μυγδόσιον, λίμνην ἀπεφάνετο τὸ περὶ τῷ ἄσπει χωρίον, καὶ ὡς περ νῆσον ἐν αὐτῇ ξυνεῖχε τὴν πόλιν, μικρὸν ὑπερεχούσων καὶ ὑπερχαινομένων τῶν ἐπάλλεων. Compare *Orat.* i. p. 49.

<sup>64</sup> Compare Trajan's construction of a fleet in this same region in the winter of A.D. 115-116. (*Sixth Monarchy*, p. 176.)

<sup>65</sup> Julian, l. s. c. Gibbon appears to have understood Julian to state that the *balistæ* discharging these huge stones (stones weighing more than five hundred-weight) were carried by the ships (*Decline and Fall*, vol. ii. p. 108). But Julian's meaning is clearly that stated above in the text.

<sup>66</sup> A similar danger not unfrequently threatens Baghdad from the swell of the Euphrates, which is brought to its walls through the Saklawiyeh canal. Mr.

Loftus gives a graphic account of the risk run in May 1849 (*Chaldæa and Susiana*, pp. 7-8).

<sup>67</sup> Julian, p. 116.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.* p. 120.

<sup>69</sup> See text, p. 327. The weakness here spoken of did not extend to the ancient Persians, who were fairly successful in their sieges (*Ancient Monarchies*, vol. iv. p. 130).

<sup>70</sup> Ammianus tells us that, either now or at some other time in the siege, the Persians suffered much by the elephants turning against their own side and trampling the footmen under their feet (xxv. 1).

<sup>71</sup> Julian, p. 122.

<sup>72</sup> Zonaras, xiii.

<sup>73</sup> *Chron. Pasch.* p. 290, A. Julian exaggerates when he says the time wasted was "four months" (*Orat.* i. p. 51).

<sup>74</sup> See Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua*, p. 386.

<sup>75</sup> Zonaras, xiii. 7. The original ethnic character of the Massagetæ is perhaps doubtful. They may have been degenerated Arians; but in their habits they are, even from the first, scarcely to be distinguished from the Tatar or Turanian hordes. By Sapor's time they had probably intermixed largely with Tatars.

<sup>76</sup> Julian. *Orat.* i. p. 51; *Orat.* ii. p. 123: (ἀγεί προς ἡμᾶς εἰρήνην ἐκ τούτου, καὶ οὔτε ὄρκων οὔτε συνθηκῶν ἐδέχθησεν· ἀγαπᾷ δὲ οἰκοὶ μὲνων, κ.τ.λ.)

## CHAPTER IX.

<sup>1</sup> See text, p. 323.

<sup>2</sup> The alliance of Arsaces with Rome is misdated both by Faustus and by Moses of Chorœuë. The former places it in the reign of Valens, A.D. 364-379 (*Bibliothèque*, iv. 5), the latter in that of Valentinian I., A.D. 364-375 (*Hist. Armen.* iii. 21). But it is clear from Ammianus (xx. 11), whose authority exceeds that of all the Armenian historians united, that the alliance was made with Constantius. It could not have been earlier than A.D. 351, since Constans did not die till A.D. 350; and it could not have been later than A.D. 359, since it is spoken of as existing in that year (Amm. Marc. xvii. 14).

<sup>3</sup> That is between A.D. 350 and 357.

<sup>4</sup> Faustus, iv. 15.

<sup>5</sup> Amm. Marc. xx. 11; Athanas. *Ep. ad Solitar.* p. 856; Mos. Chor. iii. 21.

<sup>6</sup> Phrandzem was the daughter of a certain Antor, prince of Siunia, and was first married to Gnel or Knel, a nephew of Arsaces, whom he put to death. Her jealousy impelled her to contrive the murder of Olympias, who is said to have been killed by poison introduced into the sacred elements at the Eucharist. (See Faustus, l. s. c.; Mos. Chor. iii. 23, 24.)

<sup>7</sup> Amm. Marc. xx. 11: "Audiebat sæpium eum tentatum a rege Persarum fal-

laciis, et minis, et dolis." Compare Faustus, iv. 16, 20.

<sup>8</sup> Amm. Marc. xvii. 5, § 1: "Rex Persarum, in confiniis agens adhuc gentium extimarum, jamque cum Chionitis et Gelanis, omnium acerrimis bellatoribus, pignore icto societatis," &c.

<sup>9</sup> The Chionites are mentioned repeatedly (Amm. Marc. xvi. 9; xvii. 5; xviii. 6; xix. 1, 2, &c.); the Vertæ twice (xix. 2 and 5); the Euseni and Gelani once each (xvi. 9, and xvii. 5). It is not distinctly said that the Euseni or Vertæ had fought against Sapor.

<sup>10</sup> Wilson, *Ariana Antiqua*, p. 386.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* p. 303. Compare the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, p. 64.

<sup>12</sup> So Gibbon (*Decline and Fall*, vol. ii. p. 408, note 58).

<sup>13</sup> Amm. Marc. xvii. 5.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.* xvi. 8.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*: "Tamsapor . . . refert ad regem, quod acerrimis bellis Constantius implicatus pacem postulat precativam." Compare xvii. 5.

<sup>16</sup> Pet. Patric. Fr. 17. Ammianus calls the ambassador Narseus. The Persian name was *Narsehi*.

<sup>17</sup> See Amm. Marc. xvii. 5.

<sup>18</sup> Themistius, *Orat.* iv. in laudem Constantii, p. 57, B.

<sup>19</sup> Pet. Patric. l. s. c.

<sup>20</sup> Amm. Marc. l. s. c. I have somewhat abbreviated the reply of Constantius, but have endeavored to preserve all the points which are of any importance.

<sup>21</sup> Amm. Marc. xvii. 5, *sub fin.*

<sup>22</sup> Eunap. *Vit. Jamblich.* p. 23.

<sup>23</sup> Basil. Ep. i. (*Opera*, vol. iii. pp. 69, 70).

<sup>24</sup> See the history of the war in Ammianus (xvii. 6-10) and Gibbon (*Decline and Fall*, vol. ii. pp. 412-418).

<sup>25</sup> Amm. Marc. xvii. 5, and xviii. 4.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* xviii. 5.

<sup>27</sup> "Ipse quoque in multis ac necessariis operam suam fidenter promittens." (Amm. Marc. xviii. 5, *ad fin.*)

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* xviii. 6.

<sup>29</sup> *Ibid.* Ammianus himself witnessed the passage of the river.

<sup>30</sup> Carrhæ alone is expressly mentioned.

<sup>31</sup> Amm. Marc. xviii. 7.

<sup>32</sup> Amm. Marc. xviii. 8.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.* xviii. 10.

<sup>34</sup> "A latere australi, geniculato Tigridis meatu subluitur" (*ibid.* xviii. 9). The plan given by the elder Niebuhr in his *Voyage en Arabie* (tom. ii. pl. xlviii.) shows this bend very clearly. The modern town, however, is not washed by the river.

<sup>35</sup> It is often mentioned in the Assyrian inscriptions. (*Ancient Monarchies*, vol. ii. pp. 345, 371, &c.) Its prefect appears as eponym in the Assyrian Canon frequently.

<sup>36</sup> Amm. Marc. l. s. c.

<sup>37</sup> The legion of Constantine contained from 1,000 to 1,500 men. Seven legions

would therefore give a force of from 8,000 to 9,000.

<sup>38</sup> Amm. Marc. xviii. 9, *sub fin.*

<sup>39</sup> "Parte indumenti tragulæ ictu disscissa" (ib. xix. 1). I do not know why Gibbon speaks of the dart as "glancing against the royal tiara" (*Decline and Fall*, vol. ii. p. 407).

<sup>40</sup> Amm. Marc. xix. 1.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. xix. 2: "Agitata summa consiliorum placuerat, busto urbis subversæ expiare perempti juvenis manes."

<sup>42</sup> Inhabitants of Seistan, probably of Scythic origin. (See text, p. 297.)

<sup>43</sup> Amm. Marc. xix. 6.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. xix. 2, *sub fin.* The legionaries were about 8,000 or 9,000 (see above, note 37); the other soldiers and the unarmed multitude were reckoned at 20,000.

<sup>45</sup> The comparison is made by Ammianus: "Ubi Grumbates hastam infectam sanguine ritu patrio nostrique more conjecerat fetialis." (ix. 2.)

<sup>46</sup> Ibid. l. s. c. It is not clear when this capture took place; but it can scarcely have been in this year, since Rome holds Singara in A.D. 360.

<sup>47</sup> Amm. Marc. xix. 5, *ad init.*

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. xix. 3.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. xviii. 5.

<sup>50</sup> "Visebatur ut leo magnitudine corporis et torvitate terribilis. inclusos inter retia catulos periculo ereptum ire non audens, unguibus ademptis et dentibus." (Amm. Marc. xix. 3, *ad fin.*)

<sup>51</sup> Four hundred were killed out of probably about 2,500. (Ibid. xix. 6.)

<sup>52</sup> Ibid. xix. 4.

<sup>53</sup> Amm. Marc. xix. 5, *ad fin.*

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. xix. 9, *ad init.*

<sup>55</sup> "Nulla quies certaminibus data." (Ibid. xix. 7.)

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. *sub fin.*

<sup>57</sup> Gibbon says "a large breach was made by the battering-ram" (*Decline and Fall*, vol. ii. p. 409); but he has apparently confused the capture of Singara, related by Ammianus (xx. 6), with that of Amida, which is expressly ascribed to the spontaneous crumbling of a mound in bk. xix. ch. viii. ("diu laborata moles illa nostrorum, velut terræ quodam tremore quassata, procubuit").

<sup>58</sup> *Pecorum ritu* armati et imbelles sine sexus discrimine trucidabantur." (Amm. Marc. l. s. c.)

<sup>59</sup> Ibid. xix. 9, *sub fin.*

<sup>60</sup> As when, on the capture of one of the fortified posts outside Amida, he sent the wife of Craugasius unharmed to her husband, and at the same time ordered a number of Christian virgins, found among the captives, to be protected from insult and allowed the free exercise of their religion. (Ibid. xix. 10, *sub fin.*)

<sup>61</sup> Ibid. xix. 9.

<sup>62</sup> See text, p. 334.

<sup>63</sup> Amm. Marc. xix. 9, *sub init.*

<sup>64</sup> Gibbon conjectures that Sapor's allies now deserted him (l. s. c.), and says

"the spirit as well as the strength of the army with which he took the field was no longer equal to the unbounded views of his ambition;" but Ammianus tells us that he crossed the Tigris in A.D. 360 "armis multiplicatis et viribus" (xx. 6, *ad init.*).

<sup>65</sup> "Glandes." (See Amm. Marc. xx. 6.)

<sup>66</sup> See *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. ii. pp. 397, 410, 423, 528; vol. iii. pp. 496, 497; vol. iv. pp. 440, 448, &c. The practice was common to the Assyrians, the Babylonians, and the Achæmenian Persians.

<sup>67</sup> "Ad regiones Persidis ultimas sunt asportati." (Amm. Marc. l. s. c.) The regions "furthest" from Mesopotamia would be those of the extreme East.

<sup>68</sup> See the remarks of Ammianus at the close of bk. xx. ch. 6.

<sup>69</sup> Amm. Marc. xx. 7. Compare ch. 11.

<sup>70</sup> See text, p. 308.

<sup>71</sup> Some geographers identify Bezabde with Jezireh (*Dict. of Gk. and Roman Geography*, sub voc. BEZABDA); but the name *Fynyk* is almost certain evidence of the real site. *Fynyk* is about ten miles from Jezireh to the north-west.

<sup>72</sup> Amm. Marc. xx. 7.

<sup>73</sup> "Christianæ legis antistes exire se velle gestibus ostentabat et nutu, &c." Ammianus afterwards calls him "episcopum," and says that his intercession brought on him an unjust suspicion of collusion with the enemy. (l. s. c.)

<sup>74</sup> "Interceptis aliis castellis vilioribus." (Amm. Marc. xx. 7, *sub fin.*)

<sup>75</sup> As D'Anville (*Géographie Ancienne*, tom. ii. p. 201). Gibbon (*Decline and Fall*, vol. ii. p. 410, note 61), and Mr. E. B. James (*Dict. of Gk. and R. Geography*, ad voc. BIRTHA). It is difficult, however, to suppose that a position so low down the Tigris as Tekrit was held by the Romans. I am almost inclined to suspect that the *Virta* of Ammianus is Bir on the Euphrates (lat. 37° 5'. long. 38° 5'), and that, when he speaks of it as situated in the remotest part of Mesopotamia, he means the part most remote from Persia.

<sup>76</sup> Amm. Marc. xx. 7, *ad fin.*

<sup>77</sup> Ibid. xx. 8.

<sup>78</sup> We find him at Cæsarea Mazaca about the middle of the year (ib. xx. 9), then at Melitina (*Malatijeh*), Lacotina, and Samosata (ib. xx. 11); finally at Edessa (ibid.).

<sup>79</sup> Ibid. xx. 11, *ad init.*

<sup>80</sup> "Post equinoctium egreditur autumnale." (Ibid.)

<sup>81</sup> "Assiduis imbribus ita immaduerat solum, ut luti glutinosa mollietas per eas regiones pinguiissimi cæspitis omnia perturbaret." (Amm. Marc. xx. 11.)

<sup>82</sup> According to Moses of Choréné, Tiranus was still king at the time of the invasion of Julian (*Hist. Armen.* iii. 15), and Arsaces (Ardshag) did not succeed him till after the death of Jovian (iii. 17). But Ammianus calls the king con-

temporary with the later years of Constantius, Arsaces (xx. 11; xxi. 6). So also Sozomen (*Hist. Eccles.* vi. 1).

<sup>83</sup> Amm. Marc. xxi. 6.

<sup>84</sup> Faustus makes Arsaces lend aid to Sapor in one of his attacks on Nisibis (iv. 20), and declares that he completely defeated a large Roman army in the immediate vicinity of the place. But the entire silence of Ammianus renders his narrative incredible.

<sup>85</sup> Amm. Marc. xxi. 7, *ad fin.*

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.* xxi. 13.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.* xxi. 7, *ad init.*

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.* xxi. 13.

<sup>90</sup> See Gibbon (*Decline and Fall*, vol. ii. pp. 102-118).

<sup>91</sup> Amm. Marc. xxi. 13: "Tardante trans Tigridem rege dum moveri permitterent sacra;" and again, further on in the same chapter: "Nuntiator regem ad propria revertisse, auspiciis dirimentibus." It must be admitted that the Persians were believers in a sort of divination—that by means of the *barsom* or divining-rod (*Ancient Monarchies*, vol. iii. pp. 130-1); but on no other occasion do we find it even said that their military operations were dependent on "auspices."

<sup>92</sup> See text, p. 328.

<sup>93</sup> Amm. Marc. xxi. 15; Aurel. Vict. *Epit.* § 42. Some writers substitute Mopsuestia for Mopsucene (Mos. Chor. iii. 12; Johann. Mal. ii. p. 14; Patkanian in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 151).

## CHAPTER X.

<sup>1</sup> Julian was born in the latter half of the year A.D. 331, and was therefore under thirty at his accession in A.D. 360. (See Tillemont, *Hist. des Empereurs*, tom. iv. p. 198; and Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. p. 386.)

<sup>2</sup> From A.D. 356 to 359. (Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. ii. pp. 414-421.)

<sup>3</sup> See his *Cæsares, passim*. But compare the *Orat. ad Themist.*, where the palm is assigned to Socrates over Alexander (*Op.* p. 264).

<sup>4</sup> This appears from the position assigned to these two emperors in the "Cæsars."

<sup>5</sup> The expedition of L. Verus (A.D. 162-164) was sent out by M. Aurelius. (See the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, p. 185.)

<sup>6</sup> Ammianus tells us that soon after his arrival at Constantinople, on being asked to lead an expedition against the Goths, Julian replied "hostes querere se meliores" (xxii. 7)—an expression which clearly points at the Persians.

<sup>7</sup> Ammianus says "Parthicus" (xxii. 12). But Julian himself would scarcely have made this confusion.

<sup>8</sup> See Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. iii. p. 181.

<sup>9</sup> Compare the *Cæsares*, p. 324, C, where Alexander is made to observe that the Romans, in a war of 300 years,

had not subdued the single province of Mesopotamia.

<sup>10</sup> Ammianus says: "Urebatur bellandi gemino desiderio: primò, quod impatientis otii lituos somniabat et proelia; dein, quod . . . ornamentis illustrium gloriarum inserere Parthici cognomen tum ardebat" (xxii. 12).

<sup>11</sup> Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. iii. p. 209.

<sup>12</sup> Tillemont, *Hist. des Empereurs*, tom. iv. p. 213. "After May 12" (Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. p. 448).

<sup>13</sup> See Zosimus, iii. 11; and, on the subject of Prince Hormisdas, compare text, p. 319.

<sup>14</sup> Gibbon places his arrival in August (*Decline and Fall*, vol. iii. p. 181); but Tillemont argues strongly in favor of July (*Hist. des Empereurs*, tom. iv. p. 297, note vi. upon the reign of Julian). Clinton shows that he was certainly at Antioch before August 1 (*F. R.* vol. i. p. 448). He concludes, as most probable, that he arrived at Antioch "about Midsummer."

<sup>15</sup> Amm. Marc. xxii. 12.

<sup>16</sup> Zosim. iii. 12, *ad init.*, and 13.

<sup>17</sup> See the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, pp. 177-179 and 194-197.

<sup>18</sup> Both Trajan and Severus had had to build ships. (Dio Cass. lxxviii. 26; lxxxv. 9.) It seems scarcely possible that Julian shou'd have collected the number that he did (at least 1,100) without building. (See Zosim. iii. 13; and Amm. Marc. xxiii. 3, *ad fin.*)

<sup>19</sup> Amm. Marc. xxii. 14; Zosim. iii. 11; Libanius, *Orat.* x. p. 307, B.

<sup>20</sup> The employment of spies by the Persians is often noticed by the Oriental historians (Tabari, tom. ii. p. 96; Mirkhond, p. 311). The tale that Sapor disguised himself and visited Constantinople in person (Tabari, ii. p. 99; Magoudi, ii. p. 181) is, of course, not true; but we may well believe that his emissaries went as far as that city.

<sup>21</sup> Libanius, *Orat.* viii. p. 245, A.

<sup>22</sup> Socrat. *Hist. Eccles.* iii. 19, *ad fin.*

<sup>23</sup> Amm. Marc. xxii. 2, *ad init.*

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.*: "Principe respondente, Nequaquam decere adventiciis adjumentis rem vindicari Romanam, ejuis opibus foveri conveniat amicos et socios, si auxilium eos adegerit necessitas implorare."

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.* xxiii. 2; Zosim. iii. 25. Tabari calls these auxiliaries Khazars (vol. ii. pp. 95-97).

<sup>26</sup> Amm. Marc. xxiii. 5, *ad init.*; Julian, *Ep. ad Liban.* p. 401, D.

<sup>27</sup> See text, p. 365.

<sup>28</sup> See text, p. 329.

<sup>29</sup> Amm. Marc. xxiii. 2: "Solum Arsacem monnerat. Armenice regem, ut collectis copiis validis jubenda opperiretur, quo tendere, quid deberet urgere, prope cogniturus."

<sup>30</sup> According to the Armenian historians, Arsaces was cruel and profligate. He put to death, without reason, his re-

lations and satraps, persecuted the ecclesiastics who reproved him, and established an asylum for criminals. (Mos. Chor. iii. 20-32; Faustus, iv. 13-50.)

<sup>31</sup> Faustus, iii. 13.

<sup>32</sup> Mos. Chor. iii. 13. Moses says that Julian required the Armenian monarch to hang up in the chancel of the metropolitan church a portrait, which he sent him, of himself, containing also "representations of devils"—i.e. of the heathen gods. It was pointed out by the Armenian patriarch that this was an insult to Christianity (iii. 14).

<sup>33</sup> The letter ascribed to Julian on this occasion (Fabric. *Bibliothec. Græc.* vol. vii. p. 86) may not be genuine, although it is accepted by St. Martin (*Notes on Le Beau.* vol. iii. p. 37). But, even apart from this, the insolent tone of Julian towards the Armenian king is sufficiently apparent.

<sup>34</sup> Zosimus is the only writer who gives an estimate of the whole force, which he makes to consist of—

65,000 taken with him by Julian,  
18,000 detached to act under Procopius.

Total 83,000

Sozomen raises the number of the forces under Procopius to "about 20,000" (*Hist. Eccles.* vi. 1), and Ammianus to 30,000 (xxiii. 3). Libanius says 20,000 (*Orat.* x. p. 312), John of Malala 16,000 (p. 328). If we add the 30,000 of Ammianus to the 65,000 who accompanied Julian, we get a total of 95,000, which is Gibbon's estimate (*Decline and Fall*, vol. iii. pp. 189, 190).

<sup>35</sup> Armenia furnished 7,000 foot and 6,000 horse to Antony (Plut. *Anton.* § 37). It was calculated that the horse might have been increased to 16,000 (ibid. § 50).

<sup>36</sup> Julian left Antioch on March 5, A. D. 363. (See Ammianus, xxiii. 2: "Tertio Nonas Martias profectus.")

<sup>37</sup> Amm. Marc. xxiii. 2, 3. Zosimus makes him visit Edessa from Batnæ (iii. 12); but the expression used by Ammianus ("venit cursu proprio Carrhas") contradicts this.

<sup>38</sup> The identity of Carrhæ with the Haran of Genesis is allowed by almost all critics.

<sup>39</sup> Ammianus says that he had carefully provisioned the line of the Tigris in order to make the Persians think that it was the line which he intended to follow (xxiii. 3); but it is perhaps as probable that he wished to be able to pursue the Tigris line if circumstances proved favorable.

<sup>40</sup> Zosimus says 18,000 (iii. 12); Sozomen (vi. 1) and Libanius (*Orat. Funer.* p. 312, A) say 20,000; Ammianus says 30,000 (l. s. c.).

<sup>41</sup> See Amm. Marc. l. s. c. Zosimus regards the force as left merely for the protection of Roman Mesopotamia.

<sup>42</sup> Amm. Marc. l. s. c.

<sup>43</sup> This is the estimate of Ammianus.

Zosimus makes the number considerably exceed 1,150 (iii. 13).

<sup>44</sup> Circesium is the ordinary form, and is that given by Zosimus, but Ammianus has "Circusium" (xxiii. 5); and so the Nubian Geography.

<sup>45</sup> "Principio mensis Aprilis." (Amm. Marc. l. s. c.)

<sup>46</sup> Amm. Marc. xxiv. 1. Compare Zosim. iii. 14.

<sup>47</sup> Amm. Marc. xxiii. 5: "Pontem aveli jussit, ne cui militum ab agminibus pro priis revertendi fiducia remaneret."

<sup>48</sup> "Classis, licet per flumen ferebatur assiduis flexibus tortuosum, nec residere, nec præcurrere sinebatur." Ibid. xxvi. 1.)

<sup>49</sup> Called Zautha by Zosimus (iii. 14), perhaps the Asicha of Isidore (*Mans. Parth.* § 1).

<sup>50</sup> Zosimus places the tomb at Dura, two days' march from Zaitha (Amm. Marc. xxiv. 1); but Ammianus, who accompanied the army, can scarcely have been mistaken in the fact that the tomb was at any rate distinctly visible from Zaitha.

<sup>51</sup> Gibbon supposes the speech to have been made as soon as the Khabour was crossed (*Decline and Fall*, vol. iii. p. 191); but Ammianus makes Zaitha the scene of it. In the course of it Julian used the expression: "Gordianus, cujus monumentum nunc vidimus" (Amm. Marc. xxiii. 5).

<sup>52</sup> "Emenso itinere bidui civitatem venimus Duram" (ib. xxiv. 1).

<sup>53</sup> "Dierum quatuor itinere levi peracto." (Ibid.) Anathan was known to the Assyrians as Anat, to the Greeks of Augustus's time as Anatho (see Isid. Char. *Mans. Parth.* § 1). It is perhaps the "Hena" of Isaiah (xxxvii. 13).

<sup>54</sup> Amm. Marc. xxiv. 1; Zosim. iii. 14, *ad fin.*

<sup>55</sup> Amm. Marc. l. s. c.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid. xxiv. 2, *ad init.*; Zosim. iii. 15: φρούριον ὀχυρώτατον.

<sup>57</sup> See Arrian, *Exp. Alex.* iv. 21, 26, 29, &c.

<sup>58</sup> Ammianus mentions only one other, Achañachala; but Zosimus speaks of ἕτερα φρούρια (l. s. c.).

<sup>59</sup> This site is certainly identified by the mention of bitumen springs in its neighborhood (Zosim. iii. 15; Amm. Marc. xxiv. 2). There are no bitumen springs in this part of Mesopotamia except those of Hit.

<sup>60</sup> Hit is thought to be mentioned under the name of Ist in a hieroglyphical inscription set up by Thothmes III. of Egypt B.C. 1450. It is probably the Ahava of Ezra (viii. 15, 21).

<sup>61</sup> The words used are Gibbon's (*Decline and Fall*, vol. iii. p. 193). The fact is recorded both by Zosimus and Ammianus.

<sup>62</sup> "Qua" (i.e. Diacira) "incensa, cæsique mulieribus pancis quæ repertæ sunt, Ozogardana occupavimus" (Amm. Marc. xxiv. 2).

<sup>63</sup> These places are only mentioned by Zosimus (iii. 15).

<sup>64</sup> Gibbon implies the contrary of this, when he says in the most general way, "During the march the Surenas, or Persian general, and Malik Rodosaces incessantly hovered round the army; every straggler was intercepted; every detachment was attacked," &c. (*Decline and Fall*, vol. iii. p. 194.) But Zosimus strongly notes the absence of any Persian army up to this point: θαυμάσας δ' ὁ βασιλεὺς ὅτι τσαυάντην τοῦ στρατοῦ διαδραμόντος ὁδὸν οὐδεὶς ἐκ Περσῶν οὔτε λόχος ἐξ ἐνέδρας, οὔτε ἐκ τοῦ προφανοῦς ἀπήντησέ τι πολέμιον, κ.τ.λ. (l. s. c.)

<sup>65</sup> See Amm. Marc. xxiv. 1, *ad fin.*

<sup>66</sup> *Ibid.* Compare Liban. *Orat. Funebr.* p. 313, D.

<sup>67</sup> Gibbon, following Herodotus (i. 192), calls this tract Assyria (*Decline and Fall*, vol. iii. pp. 194-199); but, strictly speaking, it is only the upper, rolling, slightly elevated plain to which that name belongs. The alluvial plain is properly Babylonia.

<sup>68</sup> Amm. Marc. xxiv. 2; Zosim. iii. 16, *ad init.*

<sup>69</sup> It has been argued by some that Surenā is not a name of office, but a Persian family appellation. (St. Martin, *Notes on Le Beau*, vol. iii. p. 79; Patkian in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 130.) There was certainly a family called *Suren-Pahlav* at the close of the Parthian and beginning of the Neo-Persian period (Mos. Chor. ii. 65, 67). But we find the word *surenā* in the classical writers before the time when the *Suren-Pahlav* family is said to have originated. (See the historians of Crassus, *passim*.)

<sup>70</sup> Gibbon calls him "the renowned emir of the tribe of Gassan" (vol. iii. p. 194). But it is questionable whether this tribe had settlements on the Euphrates. Moreover, the tribe name in Ammianus is not Gassan, but *Assan*.

<sup>71</sup> Zosimus, iii. 15; Amm. Marc. xxiv. 2.

<sup>72</sup> Zosim. iii. 16.

<sup>73</sup> So Ammianus (l. s. c.). Zosimus (iii. 17) gives the name as Beersabōra (Βηρσαβώρα). Libanius says it was named after the reigning monarch (τοῦ τότε βασιλεύοντος ἐπώνυμος. *Orat. Funebr.* p. 315, A).

<sup>74</sup> Zosim. iii. 18; πόλεως μεγάλης καὶ τῶν ἐν Ἀσσυρία μετὰ Κτησιφῶντα μεγίστης.

<sup>75</sup> Ammianus speaks of this method of construction as especially strong ("quo ædificii genere nihil esse tutius constat"). But the speedy fall of the corner tower should have taught him better. Bitumen, though useful in keeping out damp, is not really a good cement.

<sup>76</sup> "Evasit . . . verecundo rubore suffusus." (Amm. Marc. l. s. c.)

<sup>77</sup> So Ammianus. Zosimus speaks of the terrible engine having been brought into operation (iii. 18, pp. 149-150).

<sup>78</sup> Zosimus, iii. 19; Amm. Marc. xxiv. 8.

<sup>79</sup> The distance across is not more than about 15 miles a little below Babylon; in the latitude of Ctesiphon it is about 20 miles.

<sup>80</sup> Amm. Marc. xxiv. 4.

<sup>81</sup> Zosim. iii. 20; p. 153.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.* p. 154; Οἱ ἐν τῷ φρουρίῳ πολωροῦμενοι . . . ἀσφάλτῳ βῶλους πεπυρωμένους ἠκόντιζον.

<sup>83</sup> Liban. *Orat. Funebr.* p. 317, D; Amm. Marc. xxiv. 4; Zosim. iii. 21; p. 155.

<sup>84</sup> The Mattiarii, the Laccinarii, and the Victores. (Zosim. iii. 22; p. 156.)

<sup>85</sup> Liban. p. 317, B; Zosim. l. s. c.

<sup>86</sup> The Sophist of Antioch endeavors to defend his hero from the charge of cruelty by taxing the soldiers with disobedience to their general's orders (*Or. Funebr.* p. 318, C); but the narratives of Ammianus and Zosimus contradict him.

<sup>87</sup> "Sine sexus discrimine vel ætatis, quidquid impetus reperit, potestas iratorum absumpsit" (Amm. Marc. l. s. c.) Τοὺς ἐν χερσὶν ἀήρουν, οὔτε γυναικῶν οὔτε παίδων ἀνεχόμενοι (Zosim. iii. 22; p. 157).

<sup>88</sup> Nabdates was accused of having defended Maogamalcha to the last, after having promised to surrender it. He had also called Hormisdas a traitor. For these crimes (?) he was burned alive! (Amm. Marc. xxiv. 5.)

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.* xxiv. 4, *sub fin.*

<sup>90</sup> The similar measures adopted by Marshal Bugeaud against the Arabs of Algeria some thirty years ago were generally reprobated.

<sup>91</sup> Ammianus speaks of "pictures" ("diversorium opacum et amœnum, gentiles picturas per omnes ædium partes ostendens," xxiv. 5). But the wall decoration of the Sassanians was ordinarily effected by bas-reliefs.

<sup>92</sup> "Ursos (ut sunt Persici) ultra omnem rabiem sævientes." (Amm. Marc. xxiv. 5, *sub init.*)

<sup>93</sup> Zosim. xxiii. 24; Amm. Marc. l. s. c.

<sup>94</sup> Amm. Marc. xxiv. 4, *ad fin.*

<sup>95</sup> So Ammianus (xxiv. 5). Zosimus calls the suburb Zochase (iii. 23). Originally Coché and Seleucia had been distinct towns (Arrian, Fr. 8); but it would seem that they had, by this time, grown into one.

<sup>96</sup> Libanius gives the best account of Julian's difficulty with respect to his fleet and his mode of meeting it. (*Orat. Funebr.* p. 319, D. and p. 320, A, B.) Gibbon has, I think, rightly apprehended his meaning.

<sup>97</sup> Gibbon supposes Trajan to be meant (*Decline and Fall*, vol. iii. p. 202); and so Zosimus (iii. 24). Ammianus mentions both Trajan and Severus (xxiv. 6, *ad init.*); but it seems clear from Dio that the former monarch at any rate conveyed his ships from the Euphrates to the Tigris, by means of rollers, across the land. (Dio Cass. xviii. 23.)

<sup>98</sup> The "catarractæ" of Ammianus ("avulsis catarractis undarum magnitudine classis œcura . . . in alveum ejecta

est Tigridis" l. s. c.), are clearly sluices, which can only have had this object.

<sup>99</sup> The troops under Rodosaces and the Surena (see text, p. 351) had been a mere detachment, consisting entirely of horse, and had been intended merely to harass the Romans, not to engage them.

<sup>100</sup> Zosimus, iii. 25: Τὴν ἀντιπέρας ὄχθην θεωροῦντες ὑψηλοτέραν, καὶ ἅμα θριγκόν τινα συμπαρτεινόμενον, εἰς ἔρμα μὲν παραδείσου βασιλικῆς τὴν ἀρχὴν φηκοδομημένον.

<sup>101</sup> "Turmæ sic confertæ, ut laminis coaptati corporum flexus splendore præstringenter occurrentes obtutus." (Amm. Marc. xxiv. 6.)

<sup>102</sup> "Contacti scutis oblongis et curvis, quæ texta vimine et coriis crudis gestantes densius se commovebant." (Ibid.)

<sup>103</sup> "Gradientium collium specie." (Ibid. l. s. c.) Compare Libanius, p. 320, B: Κατεῖχον τὴν ὄχθην . . . μεγέθειν ἐλεφάντων, οἷς ἴσον ἔργον διὰ σταχυῶν ἐλθεῖν καὶ φάλαγγος.

<sup>104</sup> Ammianus says they all opposed him ("duces concordī precatu fieri prohibere tentabant"). Libanius speaks of one in particular as remonstrating (p. 321, A: ὑφ' ᾧ δ' ἦν τῆς δυνάμεως τὸ πλεόν, ἀντέλεγε).

<sup>105</sup> Compare Zosim. iii. 25 with Amm. Marc. xxiv. 6.

<sup>106</sup> Ammianus alone (l. s. c.) mentions this fact, which he compares with the swimming of the Rhone by Sertorius.

<sup>107</sup> Ammianus makes the battle begin with the dawn and last all the day. Zosimus says it lasted from midnight to midday. We may best reconcile the two by supposing that the passage of the Tigris and the landing were at midnight—that then there was a pause—that the battle recommenced at dawn—that at midday the Persians were beaten and took to flight—and that then the pursuit lasted almost to nightfall.

<sup>108</sup> The names are uncertain. Instead of Tigranes and Narseus, Zosimus has Pigraxes and Anareus. Some MSS. of Ammianus have Pigranes.

<sup>109</sup> Zosim. ii. 25: Τῆς φυγῆς ἠγροσαμένων τῶν στρατηγῶν.

<sup>110</sup> Amm. Marc. xxiv. 6; Rufus, § 28; Libanius, *Or. Funebr.* p. 322, A.

<sup>111</sup> The fleet was formed in three divisions, and only one had crossed. The rest of the army passed the river on the day after the battle and the day following (Zosim. iii. 26).

<sup>112</sup> These are the numbers of Zosimus (iii. 25, *sub fin.*). Ammianus agrees as to the Persians, but makes the Roman loss only seventy (l. s. c.). Libanius raises the loss on the Persian side to 6,000 (*Orat. Funebr.* p. 322, A).

<sup>113</sup> Zosim. l. s. c.

<sup>114</sup> Eunapius, p. 68, ed. Niebuhr.

<sup>115</sup> See text, p. 348.

<sup>116</sup> Ammianus speaks of Ctesiphon as "situ ipso inexpugnabilis" (xxiv. 7, *ad init.*); but it occupied a piece of alluvial plain, and had been taken three times

by the Romans. Gibbon says: "It is not easy for us to conceive by what arts of fortification a city thrice besieged and taken by the predecessors of Julian could be rendered impregnable against an army of 60,000 Romans" (*Decline and Fall*, vol. iii. p. 205). I should doubt if any special pains had been taken by the Persians to strengthen the defences.

<sup>117</sup> That it was the fear of attack from Sapor's army which caused the retreat of Julian is confessed by Ammianus. ("Itum est in sententia quorundam, facinus audax et importunum noscentium id agredi, quod et civitas situ ipso inexpugnabilis defendebatur, et cum metuenda multitudo protinus rex affore credebatur," l. s. c.)

<sup>118</sup> It was already the month of June (Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. p. 456).

<sup>119</sup> Libanius confesses the want of provisions (*Orat. Funebr.* p. 320, C). Ammianus does not distinctly mention it; but his narrative shows that, from the time of the passage of the Tigris, Julian's army depended mainly on the food which it took from the enemy. (Amm. Marc. xxiv. 7.)

<sup>120</sup> Twenty-two, according to Zosimus (iii. 26); but Ammianus twice gives the number as twelve.

<sup>121</sup> Amm. Marc. xxiv. 7.

<sup>122</sup> Ibid. xxiv. 8.

<sup>123</sup> Gibbon overstates the case when he says "The Tigris overflows in March, the Euphrates in July" (*Decline and Fall*, vol. iii. p. 208, note 84). The Tigris flood does indeed begin in March, but it is greatest in May; and the river only returns to its natural level about the middle of June. The Euphrates is in full flood from the middle of June to the middle of July, but begins to swell before the end of March. (See the Author's *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. i. p. 12.)

<sup>124</sup> This is allowing Cordyene to have extended southwards as far as the point where the Greater Zab issues from the mountains.

<sup>125</sup> Libanius, *Orat. Funebr.* p. 301, A, B; p. 322, D; Socrates, *Hist. Eccles.* iii. 21.

<sup>126</sup> Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. iii. p. 206.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> Tabari says it was gathered from all parts of Irak, Persia, and Khorassan (*Chronique*, vol. ii. p. 97). Gibbon tells us that "the satraps, as far as the confines of India and Scythia, had been ordered to assemble their troops" (vol. iii. p. 205).

<sup>129</sup> Amm. Marc. xxiv. 8. Some writers, as Tillemont (*Hist. des Empereurs*, tom. iv. p. 543) and Gibbon (*Decline and Fall*, vol. iii. p. 206), interpose at this point an expedition on the part of Julian into the interior provinces of Persia, with the object of meeting Sapor and forcing him to an engagement, which they consider

to have been frustrated by the treachery of his guides. No doubt there are in Libanius, Gregory of Nazianzen, and Sozomen, statements on which such a view may be based—and we cannot but suppose some foundation for the story of the treacherous guides—but the plain narratives of Ammianus and Zosimus, and considerations of time, preclude the possibility of anything important having been undertaken between the battle of the Tigris and the commencement of the retreat. Some raids into the rich country on either side of the Diyaleh, with the object of obtaining provisions, seem to have been all that Julian really attempted in this short interval.

<sup>130</sup> Amm. Marc. l. s. c.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid. xxv. 1.

<sup>132</sup> Zosimus, iii. 26-7; Amm. Marc. l. s. c.; Greg. Naz. p. 154. B.

<sup>133</sup> The distance from Ctesiphon to Samarah, a little south of which Julian died, is, by the shortest route upon the eastern side of the Tigris, about 100 miles. The route followed was probably somewhat longer; and the march appears to have occupied exactly ten days.

<sup>134</sup> Amm. Marc. xxv. 1.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid. Some suppose Meranes not to be a name, but (like Surena) a title. See Dr. W. Smith's note in his edition of Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*, vol. iii. p. 210, and compare Procop. *De Bell. Pers.* i. 13; p. 62.

<sup>136</sup> "Cum ad tractum Maranga nominatum omnis venisset exercitus." (Amm. Marc. l. s. c.) Zosimus changes the "tract called Maranga" (iii. 28).

<sup>137</sup> "Triduo indutiis destinato, dum suo quisque vulneri medetur vel proximi." (Amm. Marc. xxv. 2, *ad init.*)

<sup>138</sup> Ibid.

<sup>139</sup> Amm. Marc. xxiv. 6, *ad fin.* On account of unpropitious omens Julian had sworn that he would never sacrifice to Mars again.

<sup>140</sup> "Exorto jam die." (Ibid. xxv. 2, *ad fin.*)

<sup>141</sup> Ammianus calls them "lofty hills" ("celsos colles"); but there are none such in the vicinity of Samarah.

<sup>142</sup> Ammianus is confused on this point, in one place making it the right, in another the left wing that suffered (xxv. 3: "sinistro cornu inclinato . . . exercitus cornu dextero defatigato"). I conceive that the entire attack was made from a line of low hills, perhaps the embankment of an old canal, on Julian's right, and that it was therefore on this side that his army suffered its main losses.

<sup>143</sup> Libanius, *Orat. Funer.* pp. 303-4; Amm. Marc. xxv. 3. It is curious what different accounts are given of Julian's wound. Zosimus says, *πλήττεται ξίφει* (iii. 29); Aurelius Victor, "*conto percussus*" (*Epit.* 43). Libanius in one place

declares that the blow was not dealt by one of the enemy, but by a Christian of Julian's army (*Orat. Funer.* p. 324). But this is a manifest calumny.

<sup>144</sup> Amm. Marc. l. s. c.: "Hastas ad scuta concrepans, miles ad vindictam . . . involabat."

<sup>145</sup> Zosim. iii. 29-30; Amm. Marc. xxv. 3.

<sup>146</sup> Amm. Marc. l. s. c.

<sup>147</sup> Μέχρι νυκτός μέσης ἀρκίσας ἀπέθανεν. (Zos. iii. 29.)

<sup>148</sup> Amm. Marc. xxv. 5.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid. l. s. c. Zosimus gives no details, but simply says that the council by common consent elected Jovian (iii. 30).

<sup>150</sup> Jovian was "first of the domestics," or Comptroller of the Royal Household. His military rank was perhaps that of tribune. (See Zonaras, xiii. p. 29: Ἰοβιανὸς εἰς τὴν αὐταρκίαν προέκρινται, τότε ἐχίλιάρχων.)

<sup>151</sup> "Inertem et mollem." (Amm. Marc. l. s. c. *sub fin.*)

<sup>152</sup> Ibid.

<sup>153</sup> Amm. Marc. xxv. 6, *ad init.*

<sup>154</sup> The "Jovians" and "Herculians" had been instituted by Diocletian, and received their names from the titles "Jovius" and "Herculius" assumed by that emperor and his son-in-law, Galerius.

<sup>155</sup> Zosimus (iii. 30) is here fuller and more exact than Ammianus. His narrative has all the appearance of truth.

<sup>156</sup> Μετὰ βρυχηθμόν. (Zosim. l. s. c.)

<sup>157</sup> Amm. Marc. xxv. 6: "Prope confinia noctis, cum ad castellum *Sumere* nomine citis passibus tenderemus." Zosimus seems to intend the same place by his Σοῦμα τὸ φρούριον, which, however, he makes the Romans pass early in the day.

<sup>158</sup> Samarah became a flourishing and important city under the Caliphs of the Abasside dynasty. The 8th Caliph of this line, Al-Motassem-Billah, made it his capital. It is now once more reduced to insignificance.

<sup>159</sup> Zosimus, iii. 30: Ἡμέρας τέσσερας προελθόντες.

<sup>160</sup> As Dura (*Dur*) is but eighteen miles above Samarah, the average progress per day must have been under five miles. Ammianus gives the last day's march as thirty stades, or little more than three miles (xxv. 6).

<sup>161</sup> Amm. Marc. l. s. c.

<sup>162</sup> Julian had subsidized them for a time, but, finding that his supply of cash was becoming exhausted, stopped the customary payment. The Sarcens complained, whereupon he replied that he had no more gold, but plenty of steel, at their service.

<sup>163</sup> There can be no doubt of the identity of Dura (Δούρα) with the modern Dur, a small place on the Tigris between Tekrit and Samarah. (Rich, *Kurdistan*, vol. ii. ch. xviii.; Layard, *Nineveh and*

*Babylon*, p. 469.) It was a town of some importance in the wars of the successors of Alexander (Polyb. v. 48 and 52).

<sup>164</sup> Amm. Marc. xxv. 6: "Fama circumlata, fines haud procul limitum esse nostrorum."

<sup>165</sup> *Ibid.* Rafts of this description had been used on the Mesopotamian rivers from very early times. They are represented frequently in the Assyrian sculptures. (See Layard, *Monuments of Nineveh*, Second Series, pl. 13; *Nineveh and Babylon*, p. 231, &c.)

<sup>166</sup> The distance from Dur to Sinjar (Singara), the nearest Roman post, is, as the crow flies, about 175 miles. Slight deflections from the straight line, necessitated by the position of the wells upon the route, would raise the distance to 200 miles.

<sup>167</sup> Amm. Marc. xxv. 8, *ad init.*

<sup>168</sup> This is not stated by the authorities; but, *after* the peace was made, we hear of a bridge which the Persians were accused of constructing in order to pursue Jovian and break the terms of the treaty. (See Amm. Marc. xxv. 8.) As Sapor, if wicked enough, can scarcely have been foolish enough, to contemplate breaking the very advantageous treaty which he had just concluded, I suspect that the bridge was begun while the negotiations were in progress, to be used if they failed.

<sup>169</sup> I have given the considerations which, *it seems to me*, must have weighed with Sapor. Ammianus represents him as impelled to desire peace: 1, by the losses that he had sustained; 2, by fear of what the Roman army might do if driven to desperation; and 3, by a general dread of the Roman power and a special fear of the army of Mesopotamia under Procopius. He admits, however, that the successful passage of the river by the 500 Gauls and Sarmatians was the circumstance which principally moved him: "*Super omnia hebetatus ejus anxiam mentem . . . quingenti viri transgressi tumidum flumen incolumes*," &c. (Amm. Marc. xxv. 7.)

<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.* l. s. c.; Zosim. iii. 31.

<sup>171</sup> "Humanorum respectu reliquias exercitus redire sinere clementissimum regem, quæ jubet si impleverit cum primatibus Cæsar." (Amm. Marc. l. s. c.)

<sup>172</sup> *Ibid.* l. s. c.

<sup>173</sup> The only concessions made were the permission of withdrawal given to all the inhabitants of Nisibis and Singara, and the allowance of a similar right to Roman citizens located in any part of the ceded territories.

<sup>174</sup> See text, pp. 308, 309.

<sup>175</sup> This is not distinctly stated as a condition, but appears from what is related of the actual evacuation (Amm. Marc. xxv. 9).

<sup>176</sup> Orosius sees this, and therefore says: "Nisibin oppidum, *et partem superioris Mesopotamiæ*, Persis concessit" (vii. 31).

<sup>177</sup> Amm. Marc. xxv. 7, *ad fin.*; Zosim. iii. 31.

<sup>178</sup> "Cum pugnari decies expediret, ne horum quiddam dederetur." (Amm. Marc. xxv. 7.)

<sup>179</sup> This point is well argued by Tillemont (*Hist. des Empereurs*, tom. iv. p. 583). It is slurred over by Gibbon, who blames Jovian, but leaves it doubtful what he would have had him do (*Decline and Fall*, vol. iii. p. 219).

<sup>180</sup> Gibbon admits as much in a note (note 110), but in his text reproduces the absurdity of Ammianus.

<sup>181</sup> Eutrop. *Breviar.* x. 17, § 9: "Pacem fecit necessariam quidem, sed ignobilem." Compare Orosius, vii. 31: "Fœdus, etsi parum putaret dignum, satis tamen necessarium, pepigit."

<sup>182</sup> Ammianus graphically describes the passage (xxv. 8). Its difficulties showed that, had the Persians been hostile, it would have been impossible.

<sup>183</sup> Ammianus says "a Saracenis *vel Persis* cædebantur;" but it is not clear that there were really any Persians on the right bank of the river.

<sup>184</sup> Zosim. iii. 33; Amm. Marc. l. s. c.

<sup>185</sup> Gibbon denies this (p. 221, note 116); but it seems to me that the statements of Rufinus (ii. 1; p. 177) and Theodoret (iv. 2; p. 661, B) have some weight.

<sup>186</sup> Amm. Marc. xxv. 8. The important words "Persicum castellum" have not generally been noticed. A reader of Gibbon would suppose "the castle of Ur" to be a Roman post.

<sup>187</sup> The MSS. vary between "ad Ur nomine Persicum venire castellum" and "Adur nomine Persicum v. cast." Ammianus commonly omits "ad" after "venio."

<sup>188</sup> Amm. Marc. xxv. 9; Zosim. iii. 33, *sub fin.*

<sup>189</sup> The reproach addressed by the Parthian chief to Crassus, "You Romans are not very apt to remember your engagements" (Plut. *Crass.* § 31), was well deserved, and is echoed by the general voice of history. It is saddening to find a modern writer and an *Englishman* approving the ordinary Roman practice, and suggesting that Jovian ought to have "redeemed his pusillanimous behavior by a *splendid* act of patriotic perfidy" (Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. iii. p. 223).

<sup>190</sup> See text, p. 311.

<sup>191</sup> Zosimus maintains (iii. 32) that Rome never gave up Nisibis from the time of its capture by Lucullus (B.C. 68). And it may be true that she never relinquished it by treaty. But Nisibis and Mesopotamia generally were Parthian until the great expedition of Avidius Cassius (A.D. 165).

<sup>192</sup> "Constabat orbem Eoum in dittonem potuisse transire Persidis, nisi hæc civitas habili situ et mœnium magnitudine restitisset." (Amm. Marc. xxv. 8.)

<sup>193</sup> Zosim. iii. 34, *sub init.*; Johann. Ant. Fr. 181.

<sup>194</sup> Chosroës Anushirwan, who reigned from A.D. 531 to A.D. 579.

## CHAPTER XI.

<sup>1</sup> See text, p. 348.

<sup>2</sup> Zosim. iv. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Amm. Marc. xxiv. 7, *ad fin.*

<sup>4</sup> Mos. Chor. *Hist. Armen.* iii. 15; Amm. Marc. xxv. 7.

<sup>5</sup> This was part of Julian's original plan. (See Amm. Marc. xxiii. 3.) That it was executed appears from the same writer (xxv. 7).

<sup>6</sup> Mos. Chor. iii. 15.

<sup>7</sup> Liban. *Orat. Funèbr.* p. 301, D. The passage is obscure, but appears to refer to the troops under Procopius and Sebastian.

<sup>8</sup> Mos. Chor. l. s. c.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Mos. Chor. iii. 17. Moses makes the letter to be addressed to Tiranus; but he ceased to reign A.D. 341.

<sup>11</sup> Some think that this is the true account of the matter—that Arsaces ordered his general to withdraw the troops, but, that he might not be compromised, made him pretend to act on his own authority.

<sup>12</sup> Amm. Marc. xxvii. 12. The seizure is also recorded by the Armenian historians, Faustus (iv. 54) and Moses (iii. 34); and also by Procopius (*Bell. Pers.* i. 5).

<sup>13</sup> "Vinctum catenis argenteis, quod apud eos honoratis vanum suppliciorum æstimatur esse solatium." (Amm. Marc. l. s. c.) Moses, however, gives him fetters of iron (iii. 35).

<sup>14</sup> Mos. Chor. iii. 35; Faustus, iv. 54; Procop. *B. P.* i. 5, p. 29.

<sup>15</sup> Mos. Chor. l. s. c.; Amm. Marc. xxvii. 12; Faustus, iv. 55.

<sup>16</sup> Amm. Marc. xxvii. 12.

<sup>17</sup> Faustus, iv. 55.

<sup>18</sup> "Per Terentium ducem Para reducit in Armeniam." (Amm. Marc. l. s. c. Compare Faustus, v. 1.)

<sup>19</sup> Amm. Marc. xxvii. 12; Faustus, iv. 55; Mos. Chor. iii. 35.

<sup>20</sup> See text, p. 318.

<sup>21</sup> Valentinian and Valens. Jovian had died in A.D. 364, after a reign of little more than eight months. Valentinian had been elected his successor, and had associated his brother Valens in the empire. To Valens had been assigned the government of the eastern provinces.

<sup>22</sup> Amm. Marc. xxvii. 12: "Sauro-maces, pulsus . . . Hiberiæ regno, cum duodecim legionibus et Terentio remittitur."

<sup>23</sup> "His percitus Sapor, pati se indigna clamans," &c. (Ibid. l. s. c.)

<sup>24</sup> Sapor seems to have considered that, in a certain sense, Iberia was included in Armenia. When Rome replaced Sauro-maces upon the Iberian throne, he complained that "the Armenias were assisted against the text of

the treaty." (Ibid. l. s. c.) Rome, no doubt, contested this interpretation.

<sup>25</sup> Amm. Marc. xxii. 12, *ad fin.*

<sup>26</sup> Ibid. xxix. 1.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> See Amm. Marc. xxx. 2: "Sapor vero, post suorum pristinum cladem."

<sup>29</sup> "Tentatis aliquoties levibus præliis, varioque finitis eventu." (Ibid. xxix. 1.)

<sup>30</sup> Ibid. Compare Zosim. iv. 13.

<sup>31</sup> Into this interval fell the death of Para, whom the Persians entrapped and murdered (Amm. Marc. xxx. 1; Faustus, v. 32).

<sup>32</sup> Amm. Marc. xxx. 2.

<sup>33</sup> Zosim. iv. 21, *sub init.* Compare Amm. Marc. xxxi. 7.

<sup>34</sup> Mos. Chor. iii. 40; Faustus, v. 34.

<sup>35</sup> Clinton places his death in A.D. 379 (*F. R.* vol. i. p. 356); but Patkanian (*Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 234) and Thomas (*Num. Chron.* for 1872, p. 45) prefer the date A.D. 380.

<sup>36</sup> *Zeitschrift d. deutsches morgenländ. Gesellschaft*, vol. viii. pp. 46-7.

<sup>37</sup> M. Longpérier agrees with Mordtmann on this point. (See his *Médailles des Sassanides*, p. 42.)

<sup>38</sup> They are commonly either "Mazdisn bag Shapuhri malkan malka," or "Mazdisn bag Shapuhri malkan malka Airan ve Aniran."

<sup>39</sup> Mordtmann in the *Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. p. 47. Toham is the Sassanian equivalent of the Zend *takhma*, "strong," which is found also in Achæmænian Persian.

## CHAPTER XII.

<sup>1</sup> See the passage of Syncellus at the head of the chapter. Agathias agrees (iv. 26), as do Tabari (*Chronique*, vol. ii. pp. 102-3), Maçoudi (*Prairies d'Or*, vol. ii. pp. 189-190) and the *Modjmel-al-Tevarikh*. (See the *Journal Asiatique* for 1811, p. 513.)

<sup>2</sup> Faustus does not mention any Persian king by name after Sapor II. The Roman writers do not seem even to know the name of the prince who sent the embassy of A.D. 384. See Oros. vii. 34; Pacat. *Paneg.* xxii. § 4; Socrat. *H. E.* v. 12; &c.)

<sup>3</sup> All the authorities assign four years to Artaxerxes II., except the *Modjmel-al-Tevarikh*, which gives "four or five, or twelve" (*Journ. Asiat.* for 1841, p. 513). Some of the Armenian writers give Sapor III. no more than two years (Patkanian in the *Journ. Asiat.* for 1866, p. 157).

<sup>4</sup> Artaxerxes is made to be Sapor's brother by Agathias (iv. 26), Mirkhond (*Hist. des Sassanides*, p. 318), Tabari (*Chronique*, ii. p. 102), Maçoudi (*Prairies d'Or*, ii. p. 189), and the *Modjmel-al-Tevarikh* (p. 513). The Armenian writers alone make him Sapor's son. (See Mos. Chor. iii. 51, and compare Patkanian in *Journ. As.* for 1866, p. 155.) The history of the mode in which Sapor II. became

king (see text, p. 316), and the great length of his reign, make it very improbable that he was succeeded by a brother. Add to this that the coins of Artaxerxes II. bear the head of a youngish man.

<sup>5</sup> *Modjmel-al-Tewarikh*, l. s. c.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>7</sup> Mirkhond, *Hist. des Sassanides*, p. 317, note. Malcolm has, by mistake, transferred these qualities to his successor (*Hist. of Persia*, vol. i. p. 112).

<sup>8</sup> The Armenian synchronisms are exceedingly doubtful; but, on the whole, it seems to me that the expulsion of Varaztad by Manuel must have happened about five years after the death of Para. If that event occurred, as Ammianus (xxx. 1) places it, in A.D. 374, the revolution effected by Manuel (Faustus, v. 37) must belong to the year A.D. 379, which is the year of Artaxerxes' accession, probably.

<sup>9</sup> Faustus, v. 34.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* c. 35.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* c. 37.

<sup>12</sup> Faustus, c. 38.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* l. s. c.

<sup>14</sup> The death of Para (A.D. 374) and the conclusion of the treaty with Rome (A.D. 384) are two fixed dates known positively from the Roman writers. Into the ten years between these events must fall the entire reign of Varaztad (four years according to Moses of Choréné, iii. 40), the revolt of Manuel, the joint reign of Arsaces and Valarsaces (one year, Mos. Chor. iii. 41), and the sole reign of Arsaces from his brother's death to the partition of Armenia (five years, Mos. Chor. iii. 46).

<sup>15</sup> *I.e.* between A.D. 379 and A.D. 383.

<sup>16</sup> Faustus, v. 38.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* v. 39-43.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* vi. 1. Compare Mos. Chor. iii. 42.

<sup>19</sup> Faustus, v. 37. The "Koushans" of this passage are probably Scythians or Tartars of the Oxianian or Transoxianian country. (See M. Vivien St. Martin's essay, entitled *Les Huns Blancs ou Ephthalites*, pp. 48-52.)

<sup>20</sup> Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. iii. pp. 346-350.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 352-5.

<sup>22</sup> See the *Chronicles* of Idatius and Marcellinus, and compare *Chron. Pasch.* p. 304, D; Socrat. *H. E.* v. 12; Oros. vii. 34; and Pacat. *Paneg.* xxii. 3-5.

<sup>23</sup> The terms of the treaty are given unusual accord by Moses (iii. 42) and Faustus (vi. 1). The latter writer is somewhat the fuller and more exact of the two. Procopius (*De Æd. Justinian.* iii. 1) has quite a different account of the matter; but, as he writes a century and a half after Faustus, we cannot accept his narrative against that of the earlier writer.

<sup>24</sup> Orosius, writing in A.D. 417, says: "Ictum tunc foedus est, quo universus Oriens usque ad nunc tranquillissime

fruitur." (l. s. c.) The peace lasted only three years longer. (See Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. p. 596.)

<sup>25</sup> Tabari, *Chronique*, ii. p. 102; Maçoudi, *Prairies d'Or*, ii. p. 189.

<sup>26</sup> See text, p. 378.

<sup>27</sup> Agath. iv. 26, *ad init.*; Eutych. vol. i. p. 399: "Regnavit post ipsum in Persas filius ipsius Ardsliir Saporis filius annos quatuor; dein mortuus est."

<sup>28</sup> Maçoudi, vol. ii. p. 189.

<sup>29</sup> Mirkhond, *Histoire des Sassanides*, p. 319.

<sup>30</sup> De Sacy read *Varahran* for *Shah-puhri* in the third line of the right-hand inscription, and concluded that the right-hand figure was that of Varahran IV. (*Mémoire*, p. 263). Many writers have copied this mistake. (Malcolm, *Hist. of Persia*, vol. i. p. 258; Clinton, *F. R.* vol. ii. p. 260, note 12; Patkanian in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 159, note 1.)

<sup>31</sup> See Thomas in the *Journal of the R. Asiatic Society*, New Series, vol. iii. p. 343. The meaning is—"This is the image of the Ormazd-worshipping kingly Sapor, king of the kings of Iran and Turan, heaven-descended of the race of the gods, son of the Ormazd-worshipping kingly Hormisdas, king of the kings of Iran and Turan, heaven-descended of the race of the gods, grandson of the kingly Narses, king of kings." The other inscription is identical except in the names, and the omission of the second word, *zani*, "this."

<sup>32</sup> So Thomas in the number of the *Journal of the R. Asiatic Society*, quoted above (p. 346). Ker Porter ascribed the erection of the monument to Varahran IV. (*Travels*, vol. ii. p. 190). But the only basis of this is the local tradition, a very insecure foundation.

<sup>33</sup> Mordtmann in the *Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. p. 51.

<sup>34</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 51-2.

<sup>35</sup> Longpérier, *Médailles des Sassanides*, pl. 7, fig. 4.

<sup>36</sup> Mordtmann, *Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. p. 52.

<sup>37</sup> Longpérier, pl. 7, fig. 5; Mordtmann, pp. 52-7.

<sup>38</sup> Mordtmann, p. 53. The old Persian name for Assyria was Athura, whence probably the *Aturia* (*Ἀτροπία*) of the Greeks (Strab. xvi. 1, § 2; Steph. Byz. ad voc. *Nivos*; &c.).

<sup>39</sup> The term *atur*, or *aturi*, is found occasionally in combination with decided mint-marks, denoting places, as *Baba*, "The Porte," *i.e.* Ctesiphon (Mordtmann in the *Zeitschrift*, Nos. 108 and 134); *Kir*, for Kirman (*ibid.* No. 114); and *As*, which is probably for Aspadan or Isfahan (Nos. 101, 110, and 144). And these places are *not* in Assyria.

<sup>40</sup> Five years, according to Agathias (iv. 26) and Mirkhond (p. 319); four years and five months, according to Eutychius (vol. i. p. 472), Tabari (vol. ii. p. 102), and Maçoudi (vol. ii. p. 189).

<sup>41</sup> Mirkhond (p. 320): "Schapour était un roi d'une simplicité extrême."

<sup>42</sup> So Maçoudi (l. s. c.). Tabari assigns his death to a revolt of his troops; Mirkhond to accident, or to a conspiracy among his chief officers (p. 319)

<sup>43</sup> Varahran is made the son of Sapor III. by Agathias (l. s. c.), the son of Sapor II. and brother of Sapor III. by Tabari and Mirkhond. Eutychius and Maçoudi leave the point doubtful. Patkianian (*Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 158), following Armenian authorities, mentions both views, but inclines to believe him Sapor III.'s brother.

<sup>44</sup> Agathias, iv. 26; p. 136, C. Compare Tabari, vol. ii. p. 103; Mirkhond, p. 320; and the *Modjmel-al-Tewarikh* (*Journ. As.* 1841, p. 513). Varahran, we are told, gave his name of Kerman-shah to a town which he built in Media, and which still bears the appellation (Malcolm, *Hist. of Persia*, vol. i. p. 113; Ker Porter, *Travels*, vol. ii. p. 190).

<sup>45</sup> Thomas in *Journal of R. As. Society*, New Series, vol. iii. p. 350.

<sup>46</sup> This seal is without inscription, but is identified by the headdress, which is the same as that upon Varahran's coins. [Pl. XIX. Fig. 4.]

<sup>47</sup> Thomas in *R. As. Soc. J.* p. 352.

<sup>48</sup> Oros. vii. 34. Compare Mos. Chorên. *Hist. Arm.* iii. 51: "Pax fuit inter Veramum (qui Cermanus appellatus est) et Arcadium."

<sup>49</sup> Mos. Chor. iii. 46.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.*; and compare Procop. *De Æd. Justinian.* iii. 1; p. 53, B: Τὸ λοιπὸν ὁ Ῥωμαίων βασιλεὺς ἀρχοντα τοῖς Ἀρμενίοις ἀεὶ καθίστη, ὄντινά ποτε καὶ ὀπηγίκα ἂν αὐτῷ βουλευμένῳ εἴη· κόμητὰ τε τῆς Ἀρμενίας ἐκάλον καὶ εἰς ἐμὲ τὸν ἀρχοντα τοῦτον.

<sup>51</sup> Mos. Chor. iii. 49. This writer calls the Roman emperor of the time Arcadius, and the Persian monarch Sapor; but, if he is right in assigning to Chosroës a reign of five years only (iii. 50), they must have been, as represented in the text, Theodosius the Great and Varahran IV.

<sup>52</sup> The Armenian patriarch, Aspuraces (Asbourag), having died, Chosroës appointed his successor without consulting Varahran.

<sup>53</sup> Mos. Chor. iii. 50.

<sup>54</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>55</sup> If the "five years" of Chosroës are counted from the division of Armenia, A. D. 384, his revolt and deposition would fall into the year A. D. 389, the year after the accession of Varahran. But it is more probable that they date from the commencement of his sole reign, which was two years later, A. D. 386.

<sup>56</sup> Mirkhond, *Hist. des Sassanides*, p. 320.

<sup>57</sup> *Modjmel-al-Tewarikh*, as translated by M. Mohl in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1841, p. 513.

<sup>58</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 103; Mirkhond,

l. s. c.; Malcolm, *Hist. of Persia*. vol. I. p. 113.

## CHAPTER XIII.

<sup>1</sup> The name upon his coins is read as יִזְדְּגֵרְד. The Greek writers call him "Isdigerdes," the Armenian "Yazgerd." Eutychius (vol. i. p. 548; vol. ii. p. 79) uses the form "Yasdejerd."

<sup>2</sup> Mordtmann interpolates after Varahran IV. a monarch whom he calls "Isdigerd I.," to whom he assigns a reign of a year over a portion of Persia (*Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. p. 63). This prince he makes succeeded by his son, Isdigerd II., who is the "Isdigerd I." of all other writers. I cannot find any sufficient reason for this interpolation. (The numismatic evidence does, perhaps, show that an Isdigerd, distinct from the three known Persian monarchs, once reigned in Seistan; but there is nothing to fix the time of this reign.)

<sup>3</sup> That Varahran IV. was the father of Isdigerd is asserted by Eutychius (vol. i. p. 548), Tabari (ii. p. 103), Abu Obeïdah (quoted by Maçoudi, vol. ii. p. 238), Sêpêos (p. 20), and others. Lazare de Parbe makes him the brother of Isdigerd (p. 33). Agathias (iv. 26) is ambiguous. Mirkhond (p. 321) and Tabari (l. s. c.) mention both views.

<sup>4</sup> Mirkhond, l. s. c.; Tabari, l. s. c.

<sup>5</sup> Several of these are given by Mirkhond (pp. 321-2). If authentic, they would be remarkable as indicating a consciousness that there lay in his disposition the germs of evil, which the possession of supreme power would be likely to develop.

<sup>6</sup> Εἰρήνη ἀφθόνῳ χρώμενος διαγάγονεν ἐν Ῥωμαίων τὸν πάντα χρόνον (Procop. *De Bell. Pers.* i. 2). Οὐδένα ποπότε κατὰ Ῥωμαίων ἤρατο πόλεμον . . . ἀλλὰ μεμένηκεν ἐσαεὶ ἐννοῦ τε ὦν καὶ εἰρηναῖος (Agath. iv. 26; p. 137, B).

<sup>7</sup> See Tillemont, *Hist. des Empereurs*, tom. v. pp. 104-6, 211-221; Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. iii. pp. 351-402; vol. iv. pp. 23-31.

<sup>8</sup> Gibbon, vol. iv. pp. 29, 57, &c.; Tillemont, tom. v. p. 193.

<sup>9</sup> Gibbon, vol. iv. pp. 140-6. The death of Eutropius occurred in the same year with the accession of Isdigerd (Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. pp. 542-6). It probably fell late in the year.

<sup>10</sup> Gibbon, vol. iv. pp. 144-6.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* p. 145.

<sup>12</sup> See Mordtmann, in the *Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. pp. 64-7. The title "Ramashtrās" is wholly new when Isdigerd takes it. Mordtmann regards it as a superlative form, equivalent to "Quietissimus."

<sup>13</sup> Procop. *De Bell. Pers.* i. 2; Agath. iv. 26; p. 136, C, D; Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 69, A, B.

<sup>14</sup> Πολλὰ ἐν ταῖς διαθήκαις ἐπέσκηψε, Θεοδοσίῳ τὴν βασιλείαν σθενεὶ τε καὶ προνοίᾳ πάσῃ συνδίασάσασθαι. (Procop. l. s. c.)

<sup>15</sup> Cedrenus, p. 334, C.

<sup>16</sup> Theophan. p. 69, B.

<sup>17</sup> Theophan. p. 69, B. Compare Cedrenus, p. 335, A.

<sup>18</sup> The phrase used by Theophanes and Cedrenus (ἐκποδῶν γέγονεν) is ambiguous. (See Theophan. p. 70, D; Cedrenus, p. 336, C.)

<sup>19</sup> Agath. l. s. c.: Οὐδένα πάποτε τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις ἤρατο πόλεμον, οὐδέ ἄλλο τι κατ' αὐτῶν ἀχαρι εἰδρασε.

<sup>20</sup> Procopius wrote about A.D. 553; Agathias after A.D. 578; Theophanes after A.D. 812.

<sup>21</sup> Tillemont, *Hist. des Empereurs*, tom. vi. p. 1, and note; Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. iv. p. 159; Smith's *Dict. of Gk. and Rom. Biography*, vol. iii. p. 1068, &c.

<sup>22</sup> They consist of Philostorgius (B.C. 425), Socrates (ab. A.D. 440), Sozomen (ab. A.D. 445), Theodoret (ab. A.D. 450), and Prosper (ab. A.D. 460); all of whom are ecclesiastical writers, rather than writers of civil history. Zosimus is so brief in his notices of the *Eastern Empire*, that his silence as to the will of Arcadius cannot be regarded as of much consequence.

<sup>23</sup> Agathias speaks of him as ὡς πλειοῖστα μεμαθηκότα, καὶ πᾶσαν, ὡς εἰπεῖν, ἱστορίαν ἀναλεξάμενον.

<sup>24</sup> Synes. *Ep.* 110.

<sup>25</sup> The Persian to whose *suite* Antiochus had belonged is called Narses. (Synes. l. s. c.) This was the name of the favorite minister of Isdigerd (Tabari, vol. ii. p. 104).

<sup>26</sup> Tillemont, l. s. c.

<sup>27</sup> Theophan. p. 71, A: Εἰς ἄκρον θεοσεβῆς γέγονεν, ὥστε ἐμελλε σχεδὸν βαπτισέσθαι. Compare Socrat. *H. E.* vii. 8.

<sup>28</sup> Theophan. p. 69, C; Cedrenus, p. 334, D.

<sup>29</sup> Ἐπ' αὐτὴν ἐν Περσίδι ὁ χριστιανισμός. (Theoph. l. s. c.)

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.* p. 71, A.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*: Τοὺς Μάγους ὡς ἀπατεῶνας ἐκόλαζεν. Compare Socrat. *Hist. Eccl.* vii. 8; Περιοργῆς γενόμενος ὁ βασιλεὺς τὸ τῶν Μάγων γένος ἀπεδεκάτωσε.

<sup>32</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 104; Maçoudi, vol. ii. p. 190; Mirkhond, p. 321; Malcolm, *Hist. of Persia*, vol. i. p. 113.

<sup>33</sup> Theophan. p. 71, B; Theodoret, v. 39.

<sup>34</sup> Cyrill. Monach. in the *Analecta Græca*, p. 20; Theophan. l. s. c.; Cedrenus, p. 336, C; Theodoret, v. 38.

<sup>35</sup> Theophan. l. s. c.

<sup>36</sup> Οἱ Μάγοι κατὰ πόλεις καὶ χώρας ἐπιμελῶς ἐθήρευον τοὺς λαθάνοντας. (Theoph. l. s. c.) Βουλόμενοι οἱ Μάγοι πάντας θηρεύσαι τοὺς Χριστιανούς. (Cyrill. Monach. l. s. c.)

<sup>37</sup> These are described, with much detail, by Theodoret (*H. E.* v. 39); but the modern reader will be glad to be spared all particulars.

<sup>38</sup> Πλείστοι καὶ ἐν αὐταῖς ταῖς Βασάνοις ἀνηρέθησαν. (Theophan. l. s. c.)

<sup>39</sup> Mos. Chor. iii. 55, *ad init.*

<sup>40</sup> Mos. Chor. iii. 55, *ad init.*

<sup>41</sup> "In castello Olivionis libera custodia tenebatur."—*Ibid.* l. s. c. (Whiston's translation).

<sup>42</sup> Mos. Chor. iii. 56, *ad init.*

<sup>43</sup> Clinton places the death of Isdigerd in A.D. 420 (*F. R.* vol. i. p. 596; vol. ii. p. 261); Mordtmann in the same year (*Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. p. 64); Thomas in A.D. 417 (*Num. Chron.* No. xlvii., New Series, p. 45).

<sup>44</sup> Mos. Chor. iii. 56.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.* iii. 58, *ad fin.*

<sup>46</sup> Mordtmann gives as mint-marks of Isdigerd I. (his Isdigerd II.) Assyria, Ctesiphon, Ispahan, and Herat (*Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. pp. 65-7).

<sup>47</sup> See Longpérier, *Médailles des Sassanides*, pl. vii., Nos. 2 and 3 (wrongly ascribed to Artaxerxes II.); Mordtmann, in the *Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. pl. vii., No. 17.

<sup>48</sup> Mordtmann, *Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. p. 64, No. 132; vol. xii. p. 11, No. 25.

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.* vol. viii. p. 67, No. 139.

<sup>50</sup> Mordtmann, *Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. p. 65.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.* p. 67.

<sup>52</sup> Mirkhond, *Histoire des Sassanides*, pp. 321-2; Tabari, *Chronique*, vol. ii. p. 103.

<sup>53</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 104.

<sup>54</sup> Procop. *De Bell. Pers.* i. 2: Ἰσδιγέρδης, ὁ Περσῶν βασιλεὺς . . . ὦν καὶ πρῶτον ἐπὶ τῷ μέγαλοφροσύνῃ διαβόητος εἰς τὰ μάλιστα, ἀρετὴν ἐπεδείξατο θαύματός τε καὶ λόγον ἀξίαν.

<sup>55</sup> Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 71, A: Ἰσδιγέρδης . . . εἰς ἄκρον θεοσεβῆς γέγονεν.

<sup>56</sup> Malcolm, *Hist. of Persia*, vol. i. pp. 114-5.

<sup>57</sup> Socrat. *H. E.* vii. 8; Cedrenus, p. 336, C; Theophan. l. s. c.; Cyrill. Monach. *Vit. Euthym.* in the *Analecta Græca*, p. 20.

<sup>58</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 104; Mirkhond, p. 328.

<sup>59</sup> Malcolm, *History of Persia*, vol. i. p. 114.

<sup>60</sup> Tabari, l. s. c.

#### CHAPTER XIV.

<sup>1</sup> See text, p. 391.

<sup>2</sup> Mos. Chor. iii. 56.

<sup>3</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. pp. 105-112; Maçoudi, vol. ii. p. 191; Mirkhond, pp. 323-8; *Modjmel-al-Tewarikh* (in *Journ. Asiatique* for 1841, p. 515).

<sup>4</sup> Tabari, p. 113.

<sup>5</sup> Mos. Chor. iii. 55. He had failed either to conciliate or overawe the great Armenian chiefs.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.* iii. 56.

<sup>7</sup> Tabari, l. s. c.; Mirkhond, p. 329.

<sup>8</sup> In this part of the history Fabari has replaced fact. According to Tabari and others, Varahran made no use of his Arab troops, but effected his purpose by persuading the nobles and challenging Chosroës to a trial of a strange character. "Let the Persian crown," he said, "be placed between two hungry lions, chained one on either side of it,

and let that one of us who dares to approach the lions and take the crown be acknowledged as king." The proposal pleased the nobles and Magi; and what Varahran had suggested was done. Chosroës was asked if he would make the attempt first, but declined. Varahran then took a club, and, approaching the lions, jumped on the back of one, seated himself, and, when the other was about to spring on him, with two blows dashed out the brains of both! He then took the crown, and was acknowledged king, Chosroës being the first to swear allegiance. (See Tabari, vol. ii. pp. 117-8; Maçoudi, vol. ii. p. 515; Mirkhond, pp. 330-1; &c.) We may perhaps conclude with safety from the Persian accounts that there was no actual civil war, but that Varahran established himself without having to fight

<sup>9</sup> The date of A. D. 417, which Patkarian (*Journ. As.* 1866, p. 161) and Thomas (*Num. Chron.* 1872, p. 45) obtain from the Armenian writers, is less probable. It contradicts Abulpharagius (p. 91), Agathias (iv. 26), Theophanes (p. 73, D) and others. See Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. p. 546.

<sup>10</sup> Socrat. *H. E.* vii. 18; Theodoret, *H. E.* v. 39.

<sup>11</sup> Socrates speaks of *τιμωρίας καὶ στρέβλας Περσικᾶς διαφόρους*. Theodoret is painfully diffuse on the subject.

<sup>12</sup> Socrat. *H. E.* l. s. c.

<sup>13</sup> Socrat. *H. E.* l. s. c.

<sup>14</sup> This is the first that is heard of Ardaburius. He was of Alanian descent, and was afterwards employed to put down the pretender, Johannes (Socr. vii. 24; Olympiodor. ap. Phot. *Bibliothec.* p. 197; Philostorg. *H. E.* xii. 13), whom he made prisoner (A. D. 425). In A. D. 427 he was consul.

<sup>15</sup> The form used by Socrates is Azazene; but Theophanes has "Arzane" (p. 74, A), whence we may conclude that the district intended was that called Arzanene by Ammianus (xxv. 7), which has been already identified with the modern *Kherzan*. (See text, p. 308.)

<sup>16</sup> The name is given as Arses (Arsæus) by Theophanes (l. s. c.), but as Narses (Narsæus) by Socrates. Tabari says that Narses was a brother of Varahran (*Chronique*, vol. ii. pp. 119 and 125).

<sup>17</sup> See text, pp. 367-369.

<sup>18</sup> Moundsir was at the head of the Mesopotamian or Saracenic Arabs at this time, according to the Oriental writers (Tabari, vol. ii. pp. 110-116; Mirkhond, p. 323, who gives the name as Mondar, a form easily traceable in *Al-Amundarus*).

<sup>19</sup> Socrat. *H. E.* vii. 18, *sub fin.*

<sup>20</sup> This tale is related both by Socrates (l. s. c.) and by Theophanes (p. 74, B). It must have had some foundation; but no doubt the loss is greatly exaggerated.

<sup>21</sup> See the *Chronicle* of Marcellinus, p. 19; and compare Theophanes (pp. 74-5), who, however, makes the war last three years, and Socrat. *H. E.* vii. 18-20.

<sup>22</sup> Mos. Chor. iii. 59.

<sup>23</sup> The authority of Moses as to the strength of Theodosiopolis (*Hist. Arm.* l. s. c.) is preferable to that of Procopius, who wrote a century later. Procopius makes the place one of small account in the time of Theodosius (*De Æd. Justinian.* iii. 5).

<sup>24</sup> Mos. Chor. iii. 59.

<sup>25</sup> Theodoret, *H. E.* v. 37.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>27</sup> Johann. Malal. xiv. p. 25, A.

<sup>28</sup> These details are given by Johann. Malal. only; but the combat is mentioned also by Socrates (*H. E.* vii. 18, *ad fin.*).

<sup>29</sup> Socrat. l. s. c.; Marcellin. *Chronicon*, p. 23.

<sup>30</sup> Socrat. l. s. c.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> John of Malala makes Varahran propose peace immediately after the single combat. Theodoret makes peace follow from the repulse suffered at Theodosiopolis.

<sup>33</sup> Socrat. vii. 20.

<sup>34</sup> Socrat. vii. 20.

<sup>35</sup> Socrates. The destruction of the "Immortals" is mentioned also by Theophanes (p. 74, B), but vaguely and without any details.

<sup>36</sup> The actual negotiator was, according to Socrates, Maximus only. Others mention, as concerned in the negotiations, Heliou, Anatolius, and Procopius. (See Theophan. p. 75, B; Cedren. p. 341, D; Sidon. Apollin. *Paneg. Anthem.* l. 75.)

<sup>37</sup> Theophan. l. s. c.; Socrat. *H. E.* vii. 21.

<sup>38</sup> Socrat. l. s. c.

<sup>39</sup> Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. iv. p. 167.

<sup>40</sup> See text, p. 390.

<sup>41</sup> Mos. Chor. iii. 56: "Fiebat ut regio nostra, propter tumultuosa atque turbulentissima tempora, per tres annos ab rectore vacua fuerit, et misere spoliata, adeo ut vectigalia regia deficerent, et plebis itinera intercluderentur, omnisque omnium rerum ordo perturbaretur." (Whiston's translation.)

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.* iii. 57.

<sup>43</sup> Mos. Chor. iii. 58: "Rex Persarum Veramus, sine satrapis Armeniis regionem eam se tenere non posse intelligens, de pace egerat."

<sup>44</sup> See St. Martin, *Mémoires sur l'Arménie*, vol. i. p. 410; Notes to Le Beau's *Bas-Empire*, vol. vi. p. 32.

<sup>45</sup> Mos. Chor. iii. 63.

<sup>46</sup> The reply of Isaac to the nobles is not ill rendered by Gibbon: "Our king is too much addicted to licentious pleasures; but he has been purified in the holy waters of baptism. He is a lover of women; but he does not adore the fire

or the elements. He may deserve the reproach of lewdness; but he is an undoubted Catholic, and his faith is pure though his manners are flagitious. I will never consent to abandon my sheep to the rage of devouring wolves; and you will soon repent your rash exchange of the infirmities of a believer for the specious virtues of a heathen." (*Decline and Fall*, vol. iv. p. 169.)

<sup>47</sup> Mos. Chor. iii. 64.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. The name of the first governor, according to Moses, was Vimiher-Sapor.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. iii. 65.

<sup>50</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 119; Maçoudi, vol. ii. p. 190; Mirkhond, p. 335; *Modjmel-al-Tewarikh*, p. 516.

<sup>51</sup> Procop. *De Bell. Pers.* i. 3; Cosmas Indicopleust. in Montfaucon's *Collectio nova Patrum*, tom. ii. pp. 337-9; Abulpharag. *Chronicon*, tom. ii. p. 77; Elisée, p. 12.

<sup>52</sup> Mirkhond calls the invader "the Khacan of China" (p. 334), though he speaks of the army as composed of Turks.

<sup>53</sup> Mirkhond, p. 343; *Modjmel-al-Tewarikh*, p. 517; Tabari, vol. ii. p. 128.

<sup>54</sup> Mos. Chor. *Geogr. Armen.* § 92. I take this form from M. Vivien St. Martin, to whose little work on the Ephthalites (*Les Huns Blancs ou Ephthalites*, Paris, 1849) I own myself much indebted. Whiston's translation gives the word as Hephthal [ii].

<sup>55</sup> Both readings occur in the MSS. of Procopius. (See the note of Dindorf in the edition of Niebuhr, p. 15.) Theophanes has *Νεφθαλιται* only (*Chronograph.* pp. 105-6). *Νεφθαλιται* is also the form used by Agathias (iv. 27). Menander Protector has *Ἐφθαλιται* (Frs. 9 and 18).

<sup>56</sup> M. Vivien St. Martin seeks to identify the Ephthalites with the Yue-chi, one form of whose name he believes to have been *Yi-ta*, or *Ye-tha* (*Les Huns Blancs*, pp. 37-69). Others, e. g., De-guignes, have seen in the word Ephthalite a root *Tié-lé*, which they regard as equivalent to Turk.

<sup>57</sup> As Procopius (l. s. c.), Theophanes (p. 105. C), and Cosmas (l. s. c.).

<sup>58</sup> Procop. l. s. c.

<sup>59</sup> Jornandes, *De Gothorum rebus gestis.* § 35.

<sup>60</sup> "Khan" is the modern contracted form of the word which is found in the middle ages as *Khagan* or *Chagan*, and in the Persian and Arabic writers as *Khakan* or *Khacan*. Its original root is probably the *Khak*, which meant "King" in ancient Susianian, in Ethiopic (*Tir-hakah*), and in Egyptian (*Hyk-sos*).

<sup>61</sup> The moderate estimate of 25,000 is found in Mirkhond (p. 334) and in the *Fozut-ul-Suffa* (Malcolm, vol. i. p. 117). Tabari (vol. ii. p. 119) and the *Zeenut-al-Tewarikh* have 250,000.

<sup>62</sup> Mirkhond, pp. 334 and 336.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid. p. 334. Compare Maçoudi, vol. ii. p. 190.

<sup>64</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 119; *Modjmel-al-Tewarikh*, p. 516; Mirkhond, p. 334.

<sup>65</sup> Tabari, l. s. c.; Mirkhond, p. 335.

<sup>66</sup> Tabari makes the number only 300 (vol. ii. p. 119); but Mirkhond gives the more probable figure of 7,000 (p. 336).

<sup>67</sup> Mirkhond, p. 335.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid. p. 336.

<sup>69</sup> The noise was made, we are told, by filling the dried skins of oxen with pebbles, and attaching them to the necks of the horses, which, as they charged, made the stones rattle (Mirkhond, l. s. c.; Malcolm, vol. i. p. 118). Some authors make Varahan catch a number of wild beasts and let them loose upon the Tatars (*Modjmel-al-Tewarikh*, p. 517).

<sup>70</sup> Maçoudi, vol. ii. p. 190; Mirkhond, p. 337.

<sup>71</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 121.

<sup>72</sup> According to Tabari (p. 120), the crown was ornamented with several thousands of pearls. Compare the pearl ornamentation of the Sassanian crowns upon the coins, especially those of Sapor II.

<sup>73</sup> Tabari, l. s. c.; *Modjmel-al-Tewarikh*, p. 517. The latter work expressly calls this an invasion of the country of *Heyathelah* (i. e. of the Ephthalites).

<sup>74</sup> *Modjmel-al-Tewarikh*, p. 517; Tabari, vol. ii. p. 120; Mirkhond, p. 337.

<sup>75</sup> Tabari, l. s. c.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid. vol. ii. pp. 124-5. Compare Maçoudi, vol. ii. p. 191; *Modjmel-al-Tewarikh*, p. 516; Mirkhond, pp. 337-340.

<sup>77</sup> *Modjmel-al-Tewarikh*, p. 515.

<sup>78</sup> Eutychius (vol. i. p. 80) says eighteen years and eleven months; the *Modjmel-al-Tewarikh* mentions nineteen years, but prefers twenty-three (p. 514); Agathias (iv. 27) Theophanes (p. 71, D), and Abulpharagius (p. 91) say twenty; Patkanian (*Journ. Asiatique* for 1866, p. 161) prefers twenty-one; Maçoudi (vol. ii. p. 190) and Tabari (vol. ii. p. 126) agree with the *Modjmel-al-Tewarikh* in giving the number as twenty-three.

<sup>79</sup> Tabari, p. 126; Mirkhond, p. 341.

<sup>80</sup> Malcolm, *History of Persia*, vol. i. p. 121, note.

<sup>81</sup> Mordtmann, in the *Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. pp. 68-70.

<sup>82</sup> *Modjmel-al-Tewarikh*, p. 515; Tabari, vol. ii. p. 118; Mirkhond, pp. 332-3; Maçoudi, vol. ii. p. 190.

<sup>83</sup> The wild ass is called by the Persians *gur* or *gour*. Eutychius, in speaking of Varahan V., writes the word *jaur* (vol. ii. pp. 80 and 83).

<sup>84</sup> Mirkhond, p. 334.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid. p. 333; Tabari, p. 118.

<sup>86</sup> The sculptures which Ker Porter assigned to this prince (*Travels*, vol. i. pp. 533-540) have nothing that really connects them with him. In none of them is the head-dress of the king that which appears on the coins of Varahan V.

<sup>87</sup> Mirkhond, p. 332.

## CHAPTER XV.

<sup>1</sup> See Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. p. 546. Mordtmann puts his accession in A.D. 441 (*Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. p. 70); Patkanian (*Journ. Asiatique*, 1866, p. 167) in A.D. 438. But a comparison of Marcellinus (p. 25) with Moses of Choréné (iii. 67, *ad init.*) shows Clinton to be right.

<sup>2</sup> Mos. Chor. l. s. c.

<sup>3</sup> Marcellinus, *Chron.* l. s. c.

<sup>4</sup> Theodoret, *H. E.* v. 37. The invasion is wrongly assigned by this writer to the reign of Varahran V., which was just ended.

<sup>5</sup> Procop. *De Bell. Pers.* i. 2. Anatolius is also mentioned as concluding the peace by Marcellinus (l. s. c.).

<sup>6</sup> Procop. l. s. c.: Τὴν εἰρήνην ξυνηχώρησεν οὕτως ὡσπερ Ἀνατόλιος πρὸς αὐτοῦ ἐχρήσεν.

<sup>7</sup> Ἐδρασε δὲ οὐδὲν ἄχαρι. (Procop. l. s. c.)

<sup>8</sup> So Tillemonst suspects (*Hist. des Empereurs*, tom. vi. pp. 39-40).

<sup>9</sup> See text, p. 396.

<sup>10</sup> Patkanian in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, pp. 164-6.

<sup>11</sup> Patkanian in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 164.

<sup>12</sup> See text, p. 376.

<sup>13</sup> The entrance of the army is noted by Moses of Choréné (*Hist. Armen.* iii. 68). We can scarcely be mistaken in regarding its entrance as required on account of Roman intrigues.

<sup>14</sup> St. Martin, *Recherches sur l'Arménie*, tom. i. p. 322.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* p. 323.

<sup>16</sup> The Armenian term is *Marzpan*, "Protector of the Border," with which Patkanian well compares "Margrave" (*Journ. Asiatique*, 1866, p. 114).

<sup>17</sup> St. Martin, *Recherches*, p. 324.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* p. 326.

<sup>19</sup> Marcian became emperor in August, A.D. 450. The application to him for aid was made, according to St. Martin, towards the end of A.D. 450, or early in A.D. 451.

<sup>20</sup> The battle of Chalons was fought in the autumn of A.D. 451 (Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. p. 642). On the power of Attila at this time, see Gibbon (*Decline and Fall*, vol. iv. pp. 231-6).

<sup>21</sup> St. Martin, *Recherches sur l'Arménie*, vol. i. p. 327.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>23</sup> Patkanian, in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 165.

<sup>24</sup> Tabari (vol. ii. p. 127) says he reigned eighteen years; Maçoudi (vol. ii. p. 195) nineteen; Agathias (iv. 27) seventeen. The statement of Agathias is preferred by Clinton (*F. R.* vol. i. p. 546); that of Maçoudi by Patkanian (p. 167) and Thomas (*Num. Chron.* New Series, No. xlv. p. 45). All moderns agree that he died A.D. 457.

<sup>25</sup> So Tabari, l. s. c.

<sup>26</sup> See Mordtmann in the *Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. pp. 70-1. Longpérier has mistakenly assigned to Isdigerd I. two coins

(Pl. viii., Nos. 3 and 4) which really belong to Isdigerd II.

<sup>27</sup> Mordtmann, l. s. c.

## CHAPTER XVI.

<sup>1</sup> The Armenian historians make Hormisdas the elder, and Perozes the younger son (Patkanian in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 169); but Tabari (*Chronique*, vol. ii. p. 127), Mirkhond (p. 312), and the Persian writers generally, declare the reverse to have been the case. They give details which support their view.

<sup>2</sup> Tabari, l. s. c. Mirkhond says that Isdigerd regarded Hormisdas as better qualified to govern than Perozes, since he had more sweetness, modesty, and intelligence, whereas, in favor of Perozes were only his age and his advantages of person (pp. 312-3).

<sup>3</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 137.

<sup>4</sup> The Greeks shortened the name into Cunchas (Κούγγας). See Priscus Panites, Fr. 33.

<sup>5</sup> So explained by Mirkhond (p. 344).

<sup>6</sup> Amounting, according to Mirkhond, to no fewer than 30,000 men (*ibid.*).

<sup>7</sup> Patkanian in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 168.

<sup>8</sup> Elisée, p. 153; Moyse de Kaghank, i.

10. These writers are supported by Tabari, who says briefly, "Firouz combattit son frère Hormouz, et le tua" (p. 138).

<sup>9</sup> Mirkhond, p. 344.

<sup>10</sup> On the identity of Aghouank with Albania, see St. Martin's *Recherches sur l'Arménie*, tom. i. p. 214, and tom. ii. pp. 358-9.

<sup>11</sup> Patkanian, p. 168.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* p. 170.

<sup>13</sup> Mirkhond, p. 345; Tabari, p. 128.

<sup>14</sup> Mirkhond, p. 344; Tabari, l. s. c.

<sup>15</sup> So Tabari. The statement is confirmed by the remarkable fact that his coins, which are abundant up to his seventh year, then fail entirely for five years, after which they reappear and are once more plentiful. (See Thomas in *Numismatic Chronicle* for 1873, vol. xiii., No. 51, p. 224.)

<sup>16</sup> Tabari, *Chronique*, ii. p. 130.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* Compare Mirkhond, p. 345.

<sup>18</sup> Tabari says in one place that no one died of want during the famine (ii. p. 130); but in another, admits that one died (*ib.* p. 129). So Mirkhond, p. 346.

<sup>19</sup> See Tabari, ii. pp. 129, 130.

<sup>20</sup> Priscus Panites, Fr. 31.

<sup>21</sup> On the superiority of Priscus to the general run of Byzantine historians, see the remarks of Niebuhr in his collection of the Byzantine historians (Bonn, 1829): "Longe optimus omnium sequioris avi historicorum [Priscus]; ingenio, fide, sapientia, nulli vel optimorum posthabendus: elegans quoque et sermone satis puro usus, laudem atque gloriam quum apud coævus tum inter postero merito adeptus est; cui etiam a Valesio et Gibbono, summis viris, laudari con-

tigit." Compare Smith's *Dict. of Biography*, vol. iii. p. 526.

<sup>22</sup> Priscus Panites, Fr. 39.

<sup>23</sup> Compare with this trick the somewhat similar one said to have been played off by Amasis upon Cambyses (Herod. iii. 1).

<sup>24</sup> Priscus Panites, Fr. 33.

<sup>25</sup> Called Gorgo by Priscus (l. s. c.) and Procopius (*Bell. Pers.* i. 4). The old Persian *Varkana* and the Greek Hrycania are variants of the same word. Some ruins of Gurgán still exist in the valley of the Gurgán river (lat. 37° 20', long. 55° 15') not far from Asterabad.

<sup>26</sup> So Procopius, *Bell. Pers.* i. 3. Priscus makes the patrician Constantius ambassador from Zeno to Perozes about this period (Fr. 31, 32, and 33); probably Eusebius succeeded him.

<sup>27</sup> Such is the account given by Procopius (l. s. c.). The Persian writers, Tabari (vol. ii. pp. 132-136) and Mirkhond (pp. 348, 349); substitute a story in which the old myth of Zopyrus (Herod. iii. 151-158) is reproduced with little alteration from the traditions of a thousand years earlier. According to this tale, Perozes was guided to his destruction in the desert of Merv by an Ephthalite chief, who mutilated himself in order to deceive the Persians and secure the success of his own sovereign.

<sup>28</sup> The first Ephthalite war of Perozes cannot have terminated earlier than A. D. 469, since in A. D. 468 we hear of the Persians as still having the advantage in the struggle (Priscus, Fr. 41). The troubles in Armenia, which led to the revolt in A. D. 481 (Lazare Parbe, *Vie de Vahan le Mamigonien*, p. 10), must have commenced several years previously—probably about A. D. 475.

<sup>29</sup> See text, pp. 406-408.

<sup>30</sup> Patkianian in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 173.

<sup>31</sup> Lazare Parbe, *Vie de Vahan*, p. 6. The exodus had begun even earlier in his reign, before B. C. 464 (Priscus, Fr. 31).

<sup>32</sup> See Faustus, iv. 2, 11, 15, &c.; Zenob. de Glag, p. 337; Mos. Chor. ii. 81, 85; St. Martin, *Recherches sur l'Arménie*, vol. ii. p. 23, &c. Compare above, pp. 256, 306, &c.

<sup>33</sup> Lazare Parbe, p. 8.

<sup>34</sup> Lazare Parbe, p. 9.

<sup>35</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 10-14.

<sup>36</sup> Lazare Parbe, pp. 15 and 16.

<sup>37</sup> Compare the "Meranes" of Ammianus (xxv. 1); and on the supposed force of the word, see note 135, Chapter X.

<sup>38</sup> Lazare Parbe, pp. 18-28.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.* p. 31.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.* p. 32.

<sup>41</sup> This expression must be understood relatively. Nothing is more remarkable in Lazare Parbe's account of this war than the smallness of the numbers which he represents as engaged on either side. Persian armies rarely exceed 5,000 men. Armenian are still smaller, and are generally counted by hundreds!

<sup>42</sup> Lazare Parbe, p. 33.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.* p. 35.

<sup>44</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 137; Mirkhond, pp. 349-350; Malcolm, *History of Persia*, vol. i. p. 129.\*

<sup>45</sup> Wars of Perozes with the Sagaruri, Acatiri, and others, are indicated by Priscus Panites (Fr. 37). A great war with the Koushans is witnessed to by Lazare Parbe (p. 10).

<sup>46</sup> Χρόνῳ οὐ πολλῷ ὕστερον (Procop. *Bell. Pers.* i. 4). The first war seems to have terminated about A. D. 470, the second to have commenced in A. D. 481. (See Lazare Parbe, l. s. c.)

<sup>47</sup> Tabari, l. s. c.

<sup>48</sup> Patkianian, from the Armenian authorities, *Journal Asiatique*, 1866, p. 171.

<sup>49</sup> "Une armée aguerrie." (Mirkhond in De Sacy's translation, p. 350.)

<sup>50</sup> Tabari, p. 138.

<sup>51</sup> On the true relation of Balas to Perozes, see text, p. 331.

<sup>52</sup> As Tabari, p. 139.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> Τάφρον βαθείαν τε καὶ εὖρους ἰκανῶς ἔχουσαν. (Procop. *B. P.* i. 4.) Tabari says it was fifteen feet deep and thirty wide (vol. ii. p. 129).

<sup>55</sup> So Tabari (l. s. c.). Neither Procopius nor Mirkhond mentions this circumstance.

<sup>56</sup> Mirkhond, p. 350; Tabari, ii. p. 141. Procopius states, instead of this, that the *salt* by which Perozes had sworn, was suspended from the extreme point of the royal standard.

<sup>57</sup> Tabari, l. s. c.

<sup>58</sup> Thirty, according to Procopius, i. 4 (p. 19).

<sup>59</sup> A magnificent pearl which Perozes wore as an earring, and an amulet which he carried as a bracelet, are particularly mentioned (Procop. i. 4, pp. 21-24; Tabari, ii. p. 142).

<sup>60</sup> Tabari (l. s. c.) makes the exact length of his reign twenty-six years and five months. Mirkhond says twenty-six years (p. 351); Eutychius (vol. i. p. 100; vol. ii. p. 127) twenty-seven; Maçoudi (vol. ii. p. 195) twenty-nine; Agathias (iv. 27) twenty-four. The "twenty-four years" of Agathias have perhaps come from a writer who assigned the first two years after the death of Isdigerd II. to Hormisdas. The true chronology appears to be the following:—Isdigerd II. died early in A. D. 457. Both Perozes and Hormisdas claimed the throne and reckoned themselves kings from this time. Hormisdas succumbed in A. D. 459. Perozes was killed late in A. D. 483, twenty-six years and five months after the death of his father, twenty-four years after the death (or dethronement) of Hormisdas.

<sup>61</sup> Mirkhond, p. 351; Malcolm, *History of Persia*, vol. i. p. 130.

<sup>62</sup> Compare Agathias (l. s. c.):—ἀνὴρ τολμητίας μὲν ἄγαν καὶ φιλοπόλεμος— and ἀγαπᾷ πλέον ἢν αὐτῷ τοῦ βουλευομένου τὸ θρασύνον.

<sup>63</sup> Tabari, ii. p. 138; Mirkhond, p. 345.

<sup>64</sup> See text, pp. 411-412.

<sup>65</sup> Malcolm, vol. i. pp. 129-130; Gibbon, vol. v. p. 85.

<sup>66</sup> *Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. p. 71; vol. xii. p. 12. The name on these coins is read as Chodad-Varda, Chodar-Varda, or Chatar-Varda.

<sup>67</sup> *Num. Chron.* for 1873, No. 51 (New Series), pp. 225-7.

<sup>68</sup> See text, p. 411. Mr. Thomas speaks of Ram (or Raham) as "the paternally nominated guardian and administrator" of Hormisdas (p. 226). But the authors whom he quotes, Elisée and Moysé de Kaghank, state exactly the reverse—that he governed for Perozes, defeated Hormisdas, and put him to death.

<sup>69</sup> *Médailles des Sassanides*, pl. ix. fig. 1.

<sup>70</sup> Mordtmann denies this (*Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. p. 71), but, as it appears to me, without sufficient reason.

<sup>71</sup> These wings, which were now first introduced, became the distinguishing feature of the later coinage from Chosroës II. downwards, and passed to the Arabs. Some coins of Perozes are without the wings (see Mordtmann in the *Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. No. 172; Longpérier, *Médailles*, pl. ix. fig. 2).

<sup>72</sup> Mordtmann, *Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. pp. 93 *et seqq.* On the meaning of *kadi*, compare Thomas in *Num. Chron.* for 1873, pp. 229-230.

<sup>73</sup> Longpérier, *Médailles*, p. 62.

<sup>74</sup> *Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. pp. 73-78; vol. xii. p. 12.

<sup>75</sup> *Num. Chron.* for 1873, p. 223. The abbreviated form of most of the mintmarks renders their attribution more or less doubtful; hence much of the diversity in the lists (see text, p. 420). The general tendency to extend more and more widely the principle of local mints, as time went on, is, however, quite beyond dispute.

<sup>76</sup> See the *Annales de l'Institut Archéologique* for 1843, vol. xv. p. 105.

#### CHAPTER XVII.

<sup>1</sup> This is M. Longpérier's reading of the legend upon the coin which he ascribes to Balas (*Médailles*, p. 65). M. Bartholomæi substantially agrees with him. Mordtmann differs (*Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. p. 71). It is generally allowed, however, that the name, whatever its native form, represented the old Parthian Volgasu or Volagases.

<sup>2</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. pp. 138, 142, 144; Mirkhond, p. 351. So Maçoudi, vol. ii. p. 195.

<sup>3</sup> Agathias, iv. 27; p. 137, D; Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 106, A.

<sup>4</sup> Patkanian in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 177.

<sup>5</sup> Compare Malcolm, *History of Persia*, vol. i. p. 131, note; Patkanian (l. s. c.), &c.

<sup>6</sup> The Greeks make him father of a numerous family of grown-up sons,

whom he took with him to the Ephthalite war (Procop. *B. P.* i. 4; p. 11, A), and who perished there (ibid. p. 12, C); but the existence of these persons is unknown to the native historians.

<sup>7</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 142; Mirkhond, p. 351.

<sup>8</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 143.

<sup>9</sup> Procop. *Bell. Pers.* i. 4, *ad fin.* Compare Theophanes, *Chronograph.* p. 106, A; Cedrenus, p. 355, D.

<sup>10</sup> Lazare Parbe, p. 38.

<sup>11</sup> Sapor and Hazaravougd had been both required to march with all their forces to Ctesiphon (ib. p. 36).

<sup>12</sup> See Lazare Parbe, pp. 38-39.

<sup>13</sup> Patkanian (*Journal Asiatique*, 1866, p. 176).

<sup>14</sup> Lazare Parbe, p. 39.

<sup>15</sup> The revolt of Zareh, and his relationship to Perozes, rest wholly on the testimony of the Armenian writers, who, however, can hardly have been mistaken in the matter. (See Lazare Parbe, p. 42; and compare Patkanian, *ut supra*, p. 175.)

<sup>16</sup> Patkanian, p. 176.

<sup>17</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 145; Mirkhond, p. 352.

<sup>18</sup> See text, pp. 422-423.

<sup>19</sup> Lazare Parbe, p. 44.

<sup>20</sup> Lazare Parbe, p. 45.

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. p. 46.

<sup>22</sup> Agathias, iv. 27, p. 138, A; Eutyech. ii. p. 127; Syncellus, p. 360, D; Tabari, vol. ii. p. 144; Mirkhond, p. 352; Maçoudi, vol. ii. p. 195; Lazare Parbe, p. 46; Patkanian, p. 176, &c. The four years were probably not complete, Balas ascending the throne in A. D. 484, and dying before the termination of A. D. 487.

<sup>23</sup> There is not the same universal agreement here. Tabari (p. 144), Mirkhond (p. 352), Eutyechius (l. s. c.), and Agathias (l. s. c.), speak of Balas as dying a natural death. Lazare Parbe makes him dethroned by his subjects as too peaceful (p. 46). Procopius (*B. P.* i. 5 and 6) and others (Theophan. p. 106, A; Cedrenus, p. 356, C) confound Balas with Zamaspes, and say that he was dethroned and blinded by Kobad.

<sup>24</sup> Mirkhond, p. 351; Tabari, ii. p. 144.

<sup>25</sup> Agathias, iv. 27: Πράος τοὺς τρόπους καὶ ἤπιος.

<sup>26</sup> Agathias, iv. 27. See the passage prefixed to this chapter.

<sup>27</sup> Tabari, l. s. c.; Mirkhond, p. 352.

<sup>28</sup> See above, note 9.

<sup>29</sup> As Tabari (ii. p. 146) and Mirkhond (l. s. c.) relate.

<sup>30</sup> Longpérier, *Médailles des Sassanides*, p. 65, and pl. ix. fig. 5; Thomas, *Num. Chron.* 1873, pp. 228-9.

#### CHAPTER XVIII.

<sup>1</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 146; Mirkhond, p. 352.

<sup>2</sup> See text, p. 425.

<sup>3</sup> Tabari, l. s. c.

<sup>4</sup> Sufraî is the form used by the Per-

sians, Sukhra that employed by the Arabs (Mirkhond, p. 353).

<sup>5</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. pp. 145-6; Mirkhond, p. 352.

<sup>6</sup> Tabari, p. 147.

<sup>7</sup> Tabari, p. 148.

<sup>8</sup> See Frähn, *De Chasaris, Excerpta ex Hist. Arab.*; and compare St. Martin's Notes to the *Bas-Empire* of Le Beau, tom. xi. p. 115; Theophanes, *Chronograph.* p. 298, B; Zeuss, *Die Deutschen und die Nachbarstämme*, pp. 721-742; Neumann, *Die Völker des südlichen Russlands*, p. 99; &c.

<sup>9</sup> Theoph. *Chron.* p. 263, C: τοὺς Τούρκους ἀπὸ τῆς ἑώας, οὓς Χαζάρους ὀνομάζουσιν. Prichard, *Physical History of Mankind*, vol. iv. p. 322; Smith's Notes on Gibbon's *Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 407, &c.

<sup>10</sup> See a paper by Mr. H. H. Howorth in the *Ethnological Journal* for 1870, vol. ii. pp. 182-192.

<sup>11</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 148.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>13</sup> So Mirkhond (p. 353), who is followed by Malcolm (*Hist. of Persia*, vol. i. p. 132).

<sup>14</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 148; *Modjmel-al-Tewarikh*, quoted by St. Martin in his notes to Le Beau, vol. vii. p. 322.

<sup>15</sup> For the teaching of Mazdak, see Tabari, vol. ii. pp. 148-9; Mirkhond, pp. 353-4; Agathias, iv. 27; p. 138, B; Procop. *Bell. Pers.* i. 5; Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 106, A; Cedrenus, *Hist. Compend.* p. 356, C. Among modern writers who have treated of the subject are Gibbon (*Decline and Fall*, vol. v. pp. 181-2), Malcolm (*Hist. of Persia*, vol. i. p. 132), and St. Martin (Notes to Le Beau, vol. vii. pp. 322-338).

<sup>16</sup> See especially Mirkhond, p. 354.

<sup>17</sup> Compare the case of Eudoxus, the predecessor of Epicurus, as reported by Aristotle (*Eth. Nic.* x. 2. § 1).

<sup>18</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 149: "Cette doctrine plut aux jeunes gens, aux débauchés et à la populace."

<sup>19</sup> Mirkhond, p. 354.

<sup>20</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 149; Mirkhond, p. 354.

<sup>21</sup> See St. Martin's Notes to Le Beau's *Bas-Empire*, vol. vii. p. 338; and compare Gesenius, *De Inscript. Phœnicogrecæ in Cyrenaica nuper reperta*, Halle, 1825.

<sup>22</sup> St. Martin, *Recherches sur l'Arménie*, vol. i. pp. 328-9; Lazare Parbe, *Vie de Vahan*, p. 47.

<sup>23</sup> As it was, Kobad retraced his steps in Armenia, recalled the proselytizing Marzpan, and reinstated Vahan in the office. (Lazare Parbe, p. 48.)

<sup>24</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 149.

<sup>25</sup> Agathias (iv. 28; p. 138, C) calls him Zamasphes, and so Theophanes (*Chronograph.* p. 117, C; p. 119, B). But Syncellus has the more correct Zamaspes (p. 360, D). Zamasp is the form upon the coins (Mordtmann in the *Zeitschrift*,

vol. viii. p. 78). Maçoudi (vol. ii. p. 195), Mirkhond (p. 355), and Tabari (vol. ii. p. 149), have Djamasp; Eutyclus, corruptly, Ramasph (vol. ii. p. 176).

<sup>26</sup> So Agathias: *πραότητός τε καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἀρίστα ἔχειν δοκοῦντα* (l. s. c.) Tabari, however, notes that he did not administer justice satisfactorily (p. 151).

<sup>27</sup> Procop. *Bell. Pers.* i. 5; p. 15, B; Agathias, l. s. c.

<sup>28</sup> Zamasp is assigned two years only by Maçoudi (vol. ii. p. 196), by Procopius, who, however, calls him Blases (*B. P.* i. 7), and by most of the Armenian writers (Patkanian in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 178); but four years by Agathias (p. 139, A), Theophanes (p. 117, C), Syncellus (l. s. c.), and some of the Armenians. The coins have a notice of the third regnal year (Mordtmann in the *Zeitschrift*, vol. xii. p. 13).

<sup>29</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 150. Procopius tells us that when the fate of Kobad was being debated, an officer named Gusastades drew out the knife with which he was accustomed to cut his nai's, and, showing it to the assembled chiefs, exclaimed—"You see how small this knife is; yet it is big enough to accomplish a deed which a little while hence not twenty thousand armed men will be able to manage." (*Bell. Pers.* i. 5; p. 15, B). His meaning was understood, but the advice implied was not adopted.

<sup>30</sup> The story is told with certain variations; but all the accounts agree in attributing the escape of the king to the assistance lent him by his wife. According to some, she changed clothes with him, and took his place in the prison (Procop. *Bell. Pers.* i. 6; p. 18, B); according to others, she carried him out of the prison concealed in a bundle of bedclothes and coverlets (Mirkhond, p. 356; Tabari, vol. ii. p. 151).

<sup>31</sup> See text, p. 410. Other instances will occur in the later history.

<sup>32</sup> Procop. *Bell. Pers.* i. 6; p. 18, D; Agathias, iv. 28; p. 138, D.

<sup>33</sup> Mirkhond, p. 356; Tabari, vol. ii. 151.

<sup>34</sup> Tabari, l. s. c.

<sup>35</sup> Agathias, iv. 28; p. 139, A: ὁ Ζαμάσσης ἐκὼν ἀπέστη τοῦ θάκου καὶ μεθεῖναι μάλλον ἐγνώ τὴν βασιλείαν.

<sup>36</sup> *Bell. Pers.* i. 6; p. 19, B.

<sup>37</sup> *Histoire des Sassanides*, p. 357: "Kobad pardonna à son frère et dissipa toutes ses craintes en lui prodiguant les marques de sa tendresse" (De Sacy's translation).

<sup>38</sup> See Longpérier, *Médailles des Sassanides*, pp. 70-71; Mordtmann in the *Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. p. 78; xii. p. 13.

<sup>39</sup> Coins of Kobad, dated in his *eleventh* year, which have this device (*Num. Chron.* for 1873, p. 231), are perhaps earlier than those of Zamasp, who, however, ascended the throne this same year (A. D. 498). The device was continued on most of the later coins, and was adopted by the Arabs.

## CHAPTER XIX.

<sup>1</sup> So Agathias, in direct terms (iv. 28). Eutychius (vol. ii. pp. 131, 176), Maçoudi (vol. ii. p. 195), Mirkhond (p. 358), and Tabari (vol. ii. p. 151) make his two reigns, together with that of Zamasp, cover forty-three years. This number involves a second reign of twenty-nine or thirty years, since the first reign of Kobad lasted eleven years, and that of Zamasp between two and three years.

<sup>2</sup> See Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. pp. 716 and 752.

<sup>3</sup> See Smith's *Dict. of Gk. and Rom. Biography*, vol. iii. p. 539.

<sup>4</sup> Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. p. 745; *Dict. of Gk. and Rom. Biogr.* l. s. c.

<sup>5</sup> *Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 40.

<sup>6</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 151.

<sup>7</sup> The main authority for the statements in the text is Johannes Lydus (*De Magistrat.* iii. 51-53), an earlier and even more painstaking writer than Procopius. He lived from A.D. 491 to about A.D. 553, Procopius from about A.D. 500 to A.D. 560. He is confirmed in the matter by Priscus Panites, who wrote about B.C. 470.

<sup>8</sup> So Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 87. It is perhaps not quite clear whether the Derbend pass or that of Mozdok is intended by Lydus.

<sup>9</sup> Juroipach is the form used by Priscus (Fr. 31 and 37); Biraparach that given by Lydus (iii. 52). The initial element is plainly the Bir or Vera, which was the common Persian word for "castle," and which probably passed from Persian into Hebrew, becoming *birah* (בִּירָה).

<sup>10</sup> Δι ἧς ἐσβάλλοντες τὰ τε πρὸς Εὐρον Πέρσας τὰ τε πρὸς Βορέαν Ῥωμαίους ἀήκοτα ἐδῆουν. (Lydus, l. s. c.)

<sup>11</sup> See the demand made on Leo in A.D. 464 (Priscus, Fr. 31), repeated in A.D. 466 (Fr. 37). One payment seems to have been made by Theodosius II. (Cf. Lydus, *De Magistrat.* iii. 53, where I conceive that we ought to read *μικροῦ* for *μείζονος*.)

<sup>12</sup> The statement of Procopius to this effect (*Bell. Pers.* i. 7, *ad init.*) is quite compatible with the account given by Lydus, and explains why the demand was pressed just at this time.

<sup>13</sup> Procopius, l. s. c.

<sup>14</sup> Theophanes, *Chronograph.* p. 124. C.

<sup>15</sup> These grounds are stated by Procopius as determining the conduct of Anastasius.

<sup>16</sup> Procop. *B. P.* i. 7; p. 20, A; Theophan. *Chronograph.* l. s. c.

<sup>17</sup> On the foundation and strength of Theodosiopolis, see text, p. 396.

<sup>18</sup> Procop. *B. P.* l. s. c.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>20</sup> Vol. i. p. 175.

<sup>21</sup> Theophan. p. 124, D.

<sup>22</sup> Procop. *Bell. Pers.* i. 7; p. 21, B.

<sup>23</sup> Procop. *B. P.* p. 21, D. In later

times the monks were accused of treacherously surrendering their trust (Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 125, A; Marcellin. *Chronic.* p. 48); but Procopius imputes to them no worse crime than remissness.

<sup>24</sup> According to Procopius, he drew his scimitar, and threatened with instant death every soldier who hesitated to mount the scaling ladders.

<sup>25</sup> Procop. p. 22, C.

<sup>26</sup> Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 125, A: Ἐσω τῆς πόλεως γεγόνότες, λήξουσιν πᾶσαν καὶ καθαίρουσιν καὶ πλοῦτον λαμβάνουσι πολὺν.

<sup>27</sup> Procop. l. s. c. Of these Kobad afterwards released a large number (*ibid.* p. 22, D).

<sup>28</sup> *Ibid.* p. 22, B. Theophanes calls the time "three months," which is speaking roundly. Marcellinus speaks of the city as taken "in the fifth month," which is clearly incorrect.

<sup>29</sup> See Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. p. 718.

<sup>30</sup> Procop. *B. P.* i. 8; p. 23, A. Celer, who arrived on the scene the latest of the four, is omitted from the list of commanders by some writers. (Johann. Lydus, *De Magistr.* iii. 53; Marcellin. *Chron.* p. 48; Johann. Malal. xvi. p. 114, B.)

<sup>31</sup> See text, pp. 396-7.

<sup>32</sup> Procop. *B. P.* i. 8; p. 23, C: Στράτευμα τοιοῦτό φασιν οὔτε πρότερον οὔτε ὕστερον ἐπὶ Πέρσας Ῥωμαίους ἐυστήναι.

<sup>33</sup> Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 125, B; Procop. *B. P.* p. 23, D.

<sup>34</sup> The phrase used by Procopius is ἐστρατοπεδεύσαντο ἐν χωρίῳ Ἀρζαμένων (p. 24, A). I suspect that Arzanene is here intended.

<sup>35</sup> Procop. *B. P.* p. 24, B.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.* p. 24, D.

<sup>37</sup> Procop. *B. P.* i. 9; p. 25, B.

<sup>38</sup> Theophanes tells us that, after capturing Amida, Kobad sent out plundering expeditions which ravaged all Mesopotamia as far as Syria (*Chronograph.* p. 126, B). Edessa was threatened (Procop. *B. P.* ii. 13; p. 12<sup>1</sup>, B); Constantia submitted (*ibid.*).

<sup>39</sup> Procop. *B. P.* i. 8; p. 24, D. Theophanes speaks of the invaders as "Cadusians and others" (*Chron.* p. 127, B). But Procopius calls them "Huns," which is his ordinary name for the Ephthalites.

<sup>40</sup> Theophan. *Chron.* p. 127, A; Procop. *B. P.* p. 25, A; Marcellin. *Chron.* p. 49.

<sup>41</sup> Theophan. l. s. c.

<sup>42</sup> Procop. *B. P.* p. 25, B.

<sup>43</sup> The capture of Glones is related at length by Procopius (*B. P.* i. 9; pp. 25-6); alluded to by Theophanes (*Chron.* p. 126, B).

<sup>44</sup> From Procopius alone we should have concluded that the surrender of Amida and the conclusion of the seven years' peace were two separate transactions. (See the *Bell. Pers.* i. 9; p. 27.) But Theophanes distinctly regards the

two matters as parts of a single arrangement (*Chron.* p. 127, B, C); and probability is on his side.

<sup>45</sup> Procopius gives "Aspebedes" as the name of the ambassador. But Aspebedes is clearly the modern *Espebad*, a title of office, corresponding to the Armenian *Sparapet* (or *Spahapet*), "commander-in-chief." (See Patkanian in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 114.) The ambassador's sister was married to Kobad, and was the mother of Chosroës. (Procop. *B. P.* i. 11; p. 30, A.)

<sup>46</sup> Procop. *B. P.* i. 9; p. 25, C.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.* p. 27, D.

<sup>48</sup> See the expression of Procopius (l. s. c.); τοῦ πρὸς Οὐννοῦς πολέμου μηκνυομένου, and compare p. 29, B, D, whence it appears that Kobad complained of the conduct of the Romans as soon as his war with the Huns was ended, and that almost immediately afterwards Anastasius died.

<sup>49</sup> See text, pp. 396 and 404.

<sup>50</sup> Procop. *B. P.* i. 10; p. 29, C.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.* p. 29, A; Johann. Malal. xvi. p. 41, C; Johann. Lydus, *De Magistrat.* iii. 47, *ad fin.*; Theophan. p. 129, A.

<sup>52</sup> Johann. Malal. l. s. c.; Evagrius, *H. E.* iii. 37.

<sup>53</sup> Procopius well says of Daras and Theodosiopolis, ἐπιτεχνίσματα τῇ αὐτῶν (s. c. τῶν Περσῶν) χώρα γέγονεν ἀμφω. (*B. P.* i. 10, *ad fin.*)

<sup>54</sup> See text, p. 404.

<sup>55</sup> Procop. *B. P.* p. 29, B.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.* p. 29, C.

<sup>57</sup> Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 36.

<sup>58</sup> Zilgibis is the form used by J. Malalas (*Chronogr.* xvii. p. 48, C, D); Ziligdes that found in Theophanes (*Chron.* p. 143, A).

<sup>59</sup> So the contemporary, J. Malalas (xvii. p. 47, C, D). Theophanes makes Tzath receive his crown from Kobad and then desert to the Romans (p. 144, B). The Paschal Chronicle follows J. Malalas (vol. i. p. 332, A).

<sup>60</sup> The figure of Justin was embroidered upon Tzath's robes. His diadem was of Roman fashion. (See J. Malal. p. 47, D, E.)

<sup>61</sup> Theophan. p. 143, A.

<sup>62</sup> Justin was sixty-eight at his accession (A. D. 518), and would consequently be seventy-two in A. D. 522. If Kobad was eighty-two at his death in A. D. 531, as John of Malala declares (xviii. p. 211, D), he would be seventy-three in A. D. 522. I suspect that he was really older, since he is called an old man in A. D. 502 by J. Lydus (*De Magistrat.* iii. 53).

<sup>63</sup> So the Roman writers (Procop. *B. P.* i. 11; p. 30, A; compared with Theophan. *Chron.* p. 145, C). Tabari gives him ten sons (*Chronique*, vol. ii. p. 148).

<sup>64</sup> Procop. *B. P.* i. 11; pp. 30-32; Theophan. *Chron.* p. 143, C, D.

<sup>65</sup> The ground of the refusal is said to have been, that, as Justin had no natural son, a son by adoption might have

claimed to be his heir, and therefore to inherit from him the Roman Empire!

<sup>66</sup> See text, p. 433.

<sup>67</sup> The only ancient writer who gives this history at length, Theophanes, calls the sectaries "Manichees;" but there can be little doubt that the Mazdakites are intended. (See Dr. Plate's article on the SASSANIDÆ in Smith's *Dict. of Gk. and Rom. Biography*, vol. iii. p. 719.)

<sup>68</sup> Procop. *B. P.* i. 11; p. 30, A.

<sup>69</sup> As a Mazdakite (Theophan. *Chron.* p. 145, C).

<sup>70</sup> John of Malala places the destruction of the Mazdakites (Manichees) somewhat later, apparently in A. D. 529. (See his *Chronographia*, xviii. p. 61, C.)

<sup>71</sup> Procop. *B. P.* i. 12; p. 33, B.

<sup>72</sup> See Herod. i. 140; Strab. xv. 3, § 20; Agathias, ii. p. 60. Compare *Vendidâd*, Farg. v. to Farg. viii.

<sup>73</sup> These people are called "Huns" by the Byzantines (Procop. *B. P.* i. 12; p. 33, D; Joh. Malal. xviii. p. 56, A), who, however, use the term too vaguely for us to be sure that real Huns are intended.

<sup>74</sup> Procop. *B. P.* p. 34, C.

<sup>75</sup> Procop. *B. P.* p. 34, D.

<sup>76</sup> Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. p. 746.

<sup>77</sup> See Joh. Malal. *Chronograph.* xviii. p. 60, B.

<sup>78</sup> To the Lazic war of this period seem to belong the notices in Johann. Malal. xviii. p. 153, C; *Chron. Paschale*, vol. i. p. 335, and Theophanes, p. 149, A. The Roman generals quarrelled among themselves, and finally the Roman troops were withdrawn from the country.

<sup>79</sup> See text, p. 435.

<sup>80</sup> Joh. Malal. xviii. p. 54, B.

<sup>81</sup> Procop. *B. P.* i. 13; p. 35, B. For the position of Martyropolis, see *ibid.* i. 21; p. 62, C.

<sup>82</sup> John of Malala supplies here many facts not noted by Procopius, but quite consistent with his narrative (*Chronograph.* xviii. p. 60, B, C).

<sup>83</sup> Johann. Malal. xviii. p. 60, C; Procop. *B. P.* i. 13; p. 35, C, D.

<sup>84</sup> Procop. *B. P.* p. 35, D.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.* p. 37, A.

<sup>87</sup> The name Perozes is given by Procopius only (*B. P.* p. 36, C). The title Mihran is given, as if a proper name, by John of Malala (*Chronograph.* xviii. p. 60, C).

<sup>88</sup> Procop. *B. P.* p. 37, A.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.* p. 36, C.

<sup>90</sup> See the narrative of Procopius (*B. P.* pp. 37-8).

<sup>91</sup> Procop. i. 14, *ad init.*

<sup>92</sup> The following were the letters which passed between the two leaders, if we may trust Procopius. Belisarius wrote: "It is admitted by all those who have even the smallest share of wisdom, that peace is a good which excels all others. Wherefore, if a man be a disturber of peace, he will cause evil not only to neighboring nations, but also to his own

lith and kin. And he truly is the best general who proves himself capable of bringing peace out of war. But thou, when Rome and Persia were on the best of terms, didst force upon us a war for which there was no reason, since our respective kings were peaceably disposed towards each other, and ambassadors had come and were at no great distance, empowered to reconcile our differences—ambassadors, I say, who will even now arrange terms of peace between us, if no insurmountable impediment arise from this invasion. I pray thee, withdraw thy force instantly into Persian territory, and be not an obstacle to the prosperity of thy country, lest peradventure thy countrymen shall cast on thee the blame of what they may hereafter suffer." Perozes replied: "I would have done that which is requested of me, convinced by what thou hadst written, if I had not bethought myself that the letter came from Romans, who are always ready to promise, but little inclined to perform their promises, even when they have sworn to them. It is on account of the deceits which you have practised upon us that we have been compelled to take up arms; therefore, my Roman friends, you may be sure that you will have to meet the Persians in battle. Our resolution is taken either to compel you to do us justice, or else to hold our present position till death or old age disable us." Belisarius made the following rejoinder:—"It is wrong, most excellent Mirrhanes, to indulge in vain boasting, and wrong, moreover, to tax one's neighbors with crimes to which they are strangers. We said with truth that Rufinus was near at hand, and had brought with him terms of peace—you yourself will not be able to deny this much longer. If, however, you are bent on fighting, we shall meet you confidently in the belief that God is on our side. We have conciliated His favor by the fairness of our proceedings, while your arrogance and rejection of the conditions of peace which we offered must have offended Him. To mark the justice of our cause, we shall attach to our standards, ere we engage, the documents which we have exchanged recently." Perozes answered to this:—"We, too, believe that we have not begun this war without the sanction of our own gods; under their protection we shall attack you; and we trust that their aid will enable us to take Daras to-morrow. Have my bath and my breakfast in readiness for me within the walls." (See Procop. *B. P.* i. 14; pp. 38-9.)

<sup>93</sup> Procop. p. 40, D.

<sup>94</sup> Procop. *B. P.* p. 41, B, C, D.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.* p. 42, A.

<sup>96</sup> Ἰκανὸν αὐτοῖς κατεφαίνετο τὴν νίκην ἀκραφινῇ διασώσασθαι· μακροῦ γὰρ χρόνου Ῥωμαίων τῇ μάχῃ ἐκείνῃ τῇ ἡμέρᾳ ἠσσήθησαν Πέρσαι. (Procop. *B. P.* i. 14, *sub fin.*)

<sup>97</sup> See text, p. 441.

<sup>98</sup> The Persians are estimated at 50,000, the Romans at less than half that number (Procop. i. 15; p. 43, D).

<sup>99</sup> A fort named Bólou, not far from Theodosiopolis, and a district called Pharangium, which lay between Persarmenia and Tzania, and had gold mines in it, are the gains mentioned (*ibid.* p. 44, C; p. 45, D).

<sup>100</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 46-7. Kobad required that either Daras should be evacuated and destroyed, or that the trouble and expense of defending the pass of Derbend should be shared between the two nations.

<sup>101</sup> Procop. *B. P.* i. 17; p. 50, D, and p. 51, A; Johann Malal. xviii. p. 69, B; Theophan. vol. i. p. 151, D.

<sup>102</sup> Theophanes says "Chalcedon" (l. s. c.), but probably means "Chalcis," since there was no "Chalcedon" in Syria.

<sup>103</sup> Procop. *B. P.* p. 50, A; p. 51, B.

<sup>104</sup> Procop. *B. P.* i. 18, *ad init.*

<sup>105</sup> So Procopius (l. s. c.). John of Malala calls him Exarath (xviii. p. 69, B).

<sup>106</sup> John of Malala speaks of the Persian army as passing *διὰ τοῦ Κιρκησίου*, which in classical Greek would mean "through Circesium;" but his language is so impure that we may understand him to mean "passing *by it*," on the other side of the Euphrates. So the Latin translator renders the passage "*Circesium prætergressus.*"

<sup>107</sup> Procop. *B. P.* p. 52, C; Johann. Mal. l. s. c. It is curious that Procopius speaks of the country invaded as *Commagene*. Commagene was properly the small tract at the extreme N.E. of Syria, having Samosata for its capital, and not extending further south than lat. 37°. The tract invaded by Azarethes was evidently Chalybonitis, all the towns that are mentioned (Hierapolis, Batnæ, Barbalissus, Gabbula, &c.) lying in that region. The line of the Persian march is given best by J. Malalas, who names successively Circesium, Callinicus, and Gabbula, and places Roman troops in Hierapolis and Barbalissus.

<sup>108</sup> See the Author's *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. ii. p. 466, 2nd edition.

<sup>109</sup> It appears from John of Malala that the expeditionary force was seen as it passed Callinicus, and that intelligence was at once conveyed to Belisarius at Daras.

<sup>110</sup> Procop. *B. P.* p. 52, B.

<sup>111</sup> *Ibid.* p. 55, C.

<sup>112</sup> So Procopius (p. 52, C), whose authority on such a point must be preferred to that of J. Malalas. The latter places Belisarius at Barbalissus, thirty miles east of Gabbula.

<sup>113</sup> Procop. p. 53, A.

<sup>114</sup> *Ibid.* Compare Jo. Malal. xviii. p.

70, C.

<sup>115</sup> The battle was fought upon Eas-

ter Eve, when the Christians of the sixth century fasted till after nightfall (Procop. p. 53, B).

<sup>116</sup> Procop. p. 56, D.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid. p. 62, C. Compare Jo. Malal. xviii. p. 73, A, B.

<sup>118</sup> Procop. p. 64, B.

<sup>119</sup> Jo. Malal. xviii. p. 73, C.

<sup>120</sup> Procop. p. 63, B; Mirkhond, p. 359.

<sup>121</sup> Jo. Malal. l. s. c.

<sup>122</sup> Procop. i. 11; p. 30, A; Mirkhond, p. 352.

<sup>123</sup> See Mordtmann in the *Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. pp. 78-83; vol. xii. pp. 13-19; and Thomas in the *Numismatic Chronicle* for 1873, pp. 230-232. Both authorities agree as to the meaning of *afzui* or *afzu*. (See *Zeitschr.* viii. p. 79; *Num. Chron.* p. 231, note 21.)

<sup>124</sup> Kobad, it is evident, counted to his reign the two years during which Zamasp was king, as well as those during which he actually reigned. His two reigns (11+30) comprised really but forty-one years. Forty-three, however, is the number usually assigned to him. (See Tabari, vol. ii. p. 151; Mirkhond, p. 358; Jo. Malal. xviii. p. 73, D; Eutyech. vol. ii. p. 176.)

<sup>125</sup> Mordtmann in the *Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. pp. 78-83; Thomas in *Num. Chron.* for 1873, p. 232.

## CHAPTER XX.

<sup>1</sup> Procop. *B. P.* i. 21; p. 63, C.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid. *Φάσκων οὐδένα χρῆναι αὐτόματων ἐς τὴν βασιλείαν ἰέναι, ἀλλὰ ψήφῳ Περσῶν τῶν λογίμων.*

<sup>3</sup> Zames (see p. 440). It is uncertain what had become of Phthasuarsas.

<sup>4</sup> Procop. *B. P.* i. 23; p. 66, B. *Χοσρόης ὁ Καβαδὸν ἀτακτὸς τε ἦν τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ νεώτερον πραγμάτων ἀτοπος ἐραστής.*

<sup>5</sup> Ibid. p. 30, A.

<sup>6</sup> Ibid. *Ἐτερόφθαλμον ἢ ἄλλη τινὶ λῶβῃ ἐχόμενον οὐ θεμὶς Πέρσαις Βασιλέα καθίστασθαι.* Compare Herod. iii. 73.

<sup>7</sup> Procop. i. 23; p. 66, C.

<sup>8</sup> Procop. p. 66, D.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid. pp. 67-8.

<sup>10</sup> Mirkhond, pp. 62-3; Tabari, vol. ii. p. 159.

<sup>11</sup> Mebodes was "commanded to repair to the iron tripod which stood before the gate of the palace, where it was death to relieve or approach the victim, and languished there several days before his sentence was pronounced by the son of Kobad." (See Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 183; and compare Procop. i. 23; p. 68, D.)

<sup>12</sup> Procop. p. 68, B.

<sup>13</sup> J. Malal. xviii. p. 213, *ad init.*

<sup>14</sup> Τὴν ἀπέραντον καλουμένην εἰρήνην. (Procop. *B. P.* i. 22; p. 65, D. Compare ii. 3; p. 94, B, D; *B. Goth.* iv. 14; p. 607, B.)

<sup>15</sup> For the terms of the peace, compare J. Malal. xviii. p. 219 with Procop. *B. P.* i. 22; pp. 65-6.

<sup>16</sup> See text, p. 434.

<sup>17</sup> Marcellin. *Chron.* p. 64.

<sup>18</sup> See Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. v. pp. 101-114.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. pp. 121-123.

<sup>20</sup> Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. v. pp. 132-154.

<sup>21</sup> See Procop. *B. P.* i. 26, *ad init.*; ii. 1, 2, &c.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. i. 26; p. 79, C, D. Chosroës cloaked his insolence under a mask of facetiousness; but it can scarcely have been the less offensive on that account.

<sup>23</sup> Ibid. ii. 2; pp. 89-90; ii. 3; pp. 93-4.

<sup>24</sup> The allusion here was to certain transactions between Justinian and Alamundarus, the sheikh of the Saracens dependent on Persia, who, at the instigation of Chosroës, had commenced hostilities against one of the Roman vassal-kings, about A.D. 538 (Procop. *B. P.* ii. 1).

<sup>25</sup> He had been killed by the rebels in Armenia. (Procop. *B. P.* ii. 3; p. 92, C.)

<sup>26</sup> See text, p. 445.

<sup>27</sup> Zenobia was in the Arabian desert, to the west of the Euphrates; the other towns mentioned were on the opposite, or Roman, side.

<sup>28</sup> Gibbon turns Surôn into Dura; but Dura was on the Tigris. Surôn appears as a Roman town on the Euphrates, not only in Procop. *B. P.* ii. 5, but also in i. 18; p. 53, B, and in Agathias, *Prefat.* p. 9, A.

<sup>29</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 5; pp. 98-9.

<sup>30</sup> *Εἶτε φιλανθρωπία εἰ-εὶ φιλοχρηματία ἐχόμενος* (ibid. p. 99, C).

<sup>31</sup> Ibid. ii. 6; p. 102, B.

<sup>32</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 6; p. 102, C.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. p. 103, D.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. ii. 7; p. 102, D.

<sup>35</sup> See text, p. 283.

<sup>36</sup> J. Malal. xvii. p. 143; Procop. *B. P.* ii. 14; p. 122, C; Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 147, C; Evagrius, *H. E.* iv. 5, 6; Marcellin. *Chron.* p. 61.

<sup>37</sup> J. Lydus, *De Magistrat.* iii. 54. This feature has not been commonly noticed.

<sup>38</sup> Theophan. p. 151, D. Justin had also subscribed largely to the restoration (ibid. p. 148, A, B).

<sup>39</sup> J. Lydus, l. s. c.

<sup>40</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 6; p. 101, B. The defect was observed by Germanus on his arrival, and plans were proposed by him for remedying it; but it was thought imprudent to call attention to the weak point, and so nothing was done.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid. p. 101, A.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid. ii. 3; p. 92, C, D.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. ii. 6; p. 100, B.

<sup>44</sup> Ibid. 7; p. 103, D.

<sup>45</sup> Βούζης . . . ἀπὼν ὄχετο καὶ ποτὲ γῆς ἐτύγγανεν οὐτε τις τῶν ἐν Ἱερραπόλει Ῥωμαίων οὐτε ὁ τῶν πολεμίων στρατὸς μαθεῖν ἴσχυσεν. (Procop. *B. P.* ii. 6; p. 101, A.)

<sup>46</sup> Ibid. ii. 8; p. 105, C.

<sup>47</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 8; pp. 106-108.

<sup>48</sup> The cathedral was spared on the ground that the riches found in it might be considered its ransom. The church of St. Julian and some neighboring houses were left standing as forming

the residence of Justinian's ambassadors (*ibid.* ii. 10; p. 111, B).

<sup>49</sup> *Ibid.* p. 112, D.

<sup>50</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 11; p. 113, A. So, fourteen centuries earlier, the great Ashur-izir-pal, on first reaching the Mediterranean, "erected altars and offered sacrifices to the gods of Assyria." (*Ancient Monarchies*, vol. ii. p. 89, 2nd ed.)

<sup>51</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 11; p. 114, A, B. Gibbon gives the impression that the sacred relic itself was adorned with gold and gems (*Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 190); but Procopius distinctly states that the adornment was confined to the case (Θήκη) containing it.

<sup>52</sup> This is probably the meaning of Procopius (*B. P.* ii. 11; p. 115, A), since he makes Chosroës propose the terms to the *bishop*; but otherwise he might be understood as speaking of all the valuables within the town.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.* p. 115, C.

<sup>54</sup> On the factions of the amphitheatre, which, beginning at Constantinople, spread to the provincial capitals, see Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. v. pp. 48-55. The presidency of Chosroës, in the Antiochian hippodrome is related by Procopius (*B. P.* ii. 11; p. 115, C, D).

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.* ii. 12; p. 116, B.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.* p. 116, D.

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.* p. 119, A, B.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.* ii. 13; p. 120, A.

<sup>59</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 120-1.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.* p. 119, C.

<sup>61</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 13; p. 121, D.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>63</sup> Here the Oriental accounts are in entire accord with the Greek. Mirkhond (p. 366) and Tabari (ii. p. 160) relate at length the construction of this new Antioch in the vicinity of Al Modain, adding that the name given to it was Rumia (Rome), and that it was an exact copy of the town upon the Orontes.

<sup>64</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 14; p. 122, A, B.

<sup>65</sup> See text, p. 439.

<sup>66</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 15; p. 123, D.

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.* p. 124, B.

<sup>68</sup> The Lazi imported salt, corn, and other necessities from abroad (*ib.* p. 123, D); the Roman governor under Justinian, John Tzibus, required that these commodities should be purchased from none but himself (*ib.* p. 124, C).

<sup>69</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 15; pp. 124-6.

<sup>70</sup> The Argonautic myth implies the early importance of Colchis, either as a gold-producing, or possibly merely as a gold-exporting country. The story of the Egyptian colony settled there by Sesostrius (Herod. ii. 103-5) is one on which it would be uncritical to place much reliance. But there is satisfactory evidence of the trading importance of Colchis from the fourth to the first century B.C. in the later classical writers. (See Strab. *Geograph.* xi. 2, § 17; Ptoleol. Fr. 7; and Plin. *H. N.* vi. 17.)

<sup>71</sup> See above, note 63.

<sup>72</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 15; p. 123, D, and *ib.* 17; p. 128, B.

<sup>73</sup> So Procopius (*B. P.* ii. 15; p. 125, D). Gibbon supposes the idea to have originated with Chosroës (*Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 200). That the Romans took the same view of the importance of Lazica as Chosroës appears from Agathias (*Hist.* ii. 18; p. 56, A).

<sup>74</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 15, *ad fin.*

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.* ii. 17; pp. 128-9.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.* ii. 16; p. 126, D.

<sup>77</sup> *Ibid.* ii. 18, *ad init.*

<sup>78</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 18; pp. 131-2.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.* ii. 19, *sub init.*

<sup>80</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 19, *ad fin.*

<sup>81</sup> Ἄμα ἦρι ἀρχομένη Χοσρόης ὁ Καβάδου τὸ τρίτον στρατὸν μεγάλῳ ἐς γῆν τὴν Ῥωμαίων ἐσέβαλλε. (*Ibid.* ii. 20, *ad init.*) And a little later: ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐς τὴν Κομμαγενῶν χώραν ὁ Χοσρόης ἀφίκετο. Commagene was now the name given to Upper Syria generally. (See note 107, Chapter XIX.)

<sup>82</sup> Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 186, A; Cedrenus. *Hist. Compend.* p. 372, B.

<sup>83</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 21, *ad init.*

<sup>84</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 21, *sub fin.*

<sup>85</sup> See Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. p. 778.

<sup>86</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 24, *ad init.*

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.* ii. 21, *ad fin.*

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.* ii. 24; p. 148, C.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibid.* p. 149, A.

<sup>90</sup> Gibbon speaks of "the camp of Dubis" (*Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 193); but Anglon was 120 stades (fourteen miles) from Dubis (Procop. ii. 25; p. 149, D).

<sup>91</sup> Procop. p. 151, C.

<sup>92</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 26; p. 152, A.

<sup>93</sup> See text, p. 367.

<sup>94</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 26-7.

<sup>95</sup> Procop. *B. P.* p. 159, B.

<sup>96</sup> *Ibid.* ii. 28; p. 159, D.

<sup>97</sup> *Ibid.* p. 160, A. Compare Marcellin. *Chron.* p. 74.

<sup>98</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 28; pp. 160-1.

<sup>99</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 161-2.

<sup>100</sup> The tale is, that Chosroës professing to send an ambassador to Justinian, who was to pass through Daras, gave him a train of 500 picked soldiers, with orders that these men should fire the houses in which they slept, and then, in the confusion that was sure to follow, should open the gates and admit a large Persian force. The Romans, suspecting the design, refused to receive more than twenty of the 500 into the town. It is evident that here the basis of *fact* is the arrival of a Persian ambassador at the gates of Daras with a train of unusual size. The rest is mere Roman (or rather Greek) suspicion.

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.* ii. 29; p. 163, D.

<sup>102</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 29; p. 161, B. Salt, wine, and corn are especially mentioned among the commodities required. Yet at present Mingrelia, though wretchedly cultivated, produces maize, millet, and barley in abundance (Haxthausen, *Transcaucasia*, p. 19); the trees are

everywhere festooned with vines, which grow naturally (ib. p. 18); and "yield a very tolerable wine" (p. 31); while salt is one of the main products of the neighboring Georgia (ib. p. 81).

<sup>103</sup> Procop. l. s. c.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid. p. 160, C, and p. 161, C.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid. ii. 29; p. 163, C, D.

<sup>106</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 29, 30; *B. Goth.* iv. 8-16; Agath. ii. 18-22; iii. 2-28; iv. 1-23.

<sup>107</sup> Agath. ii. 18; p. 56, A; Procop. *B. P.* ii. 15; p. 125, D; ii. 28; p. 161, A; *B. Goth.* iv. 7; p. 582, B.

<sup>108</sup> Haxthausen, p. 22, note: "The soil is incredibly rich and prolific."

<sup>109</sup> "During the whole day our road lay through forests, and what noble forests! In the southern acclivities of the Caucasus, the tree-vegetation of the north is found together with that of the south; and I have rarely seen finer beeches, oaks, elms, fir-trees, interspersed with planes, chestnuts, walnuts, olives, laurels, and cherry-trees, the native *habitat* of which last may be said to be Mingrelia." (Ibid. p. 17.)

<sup>110</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 29; *B. G.* iv. 2.

<sup>111</sup> As especially the Khopi, which forms the port of Redout-Kaleh (Haxthausen, p. 16).

<sup>112</sup> Procop. *B. P.* p. 163, A.

<sup>113</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 17; p. 128, C.

<sup>114</sup> Procop. *B. Goth.* iv. 12; p. 599, B. Among the most remarkable of these was a conduit, with three channels placed one *under* the other, which continued to supply the town with water after the upper and middle courses had been obstructed.

<sup>115</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 29; p. 164, A. Gibbon (*Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 201) confuses the original victualling of Petra with its revictualling (see text, p. 467). The great supplies found when the Romans took the place (Procop. *B. G.* p. 599, A) must be ascribed to the revictualling.

<sup>116</sup> Procop. *B. P.* p. 165, D.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid. ii. 29; p. 166, B.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid. ii. 30; p. 166, D.

<sup>119</sup> Ibid. p. 168, A.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid. p. 169, B.

<sup>121</sup> Procop. *B. P.* ii. 30; pp. 169-170.

<sup>122</sup> Procop. *B. Goth.* iv. 1.

<sup>123</sup> Ibid. iv. 8.

<sup>124</sup> Procop. *B. G.* iv. 9, *ad init.*

<sup>125</sup> Ibid. iv. 11; p. 593, B.

<sup>126</sup> Ibid. iv. 12; p. 599, A.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid. iv. 11; p. 592, C.

<sup>128</sup> The chief difference in the construction seems to have been, that, whereas the ordinary engines were formed of solid beams, in the new ones the beams were replaced by a number of light rods tied together. (Procop. *B. G.* iv. 11; p. 593, D.)

<sup>129</sup> Ibid. p. 594, C.

<sup>130</sup> Ibid. p. 595, A.

<sup>131</sup> These were Armenian mountaineers (ibid. p. 596, B).

<sup>132</sup> Ibid. p. 596, A.

<sup>133</sup> Ibid. p. 596, C, D.

<sup>134</sup> Procop. *B. G.* iv. 12; pp. 597-8.

<sup>135</sup> Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. p. 792.

<sup>136</sup> See text, p. 466.

<sup>137</sup> Procop. *B. G.* iv. 13; p. 601, A. The writer justly admires the Persian skill and industry in making the wild and mountainous Lazica practicable, not only for cavalry, but for the ponderous elephant.

<sup>138</sup> Ὁ Βέσσας τὸν Πέτρας περιβόλον ἐς ἔδαφος καθέλειν. (Ibid. p. 599, D.)

<sup>139</sup> Ibid. p. 602, D. Compare iv. 16; p. 611, C.

<sup>140</sup> Procop. *B. G.* iv. 14; Agath. *Hist.* ii. 19, *ad init.*

<sup>141</sup> Procop. *B. G.* p. 611, D.

<sup>142</sup> The modern Kutaïs is undoubtedly the ancient Cotyæum, Cutatisium, or Cotaïs of Procopius and Agathias. The similarity of name is supported by the descriptions given of the locality. (See Procop. *B. G.* iv. 14; p. 607, A; Agath. ii. 19; p. 56, B; and compare Haxthausen, *Transcaucasia*, p. 28.)

<sup>143</sup> The position of Scymnia is uncertain. Suania appears to have lain N. E. of Lazica, on the flanks of the Caucasus. The inhabitants of this region still call themselves Suans. (Max Müller, *Languages of the Seat of War*, p. 114.)

<sup>144</sup> Procop. *B. G.* iv. 16, *sub fin.*

<sup>145</sup> Ibid. iv. 11; p. 591, D. Procopius specifies one of these alleged infractions only, viz. the encouragement given to Arethas to attack Alamundarus; but he admits that Isdigunas made other charges.

<sup>146</sup> Ibid. iv. 15, *sub init.* This was at the rate of 400 pounds for each year of peace, and included a year and a half of negotiations.

<sup>147</sup> Compare Procop. l. s. c. with Agath. ii. 18. The latter writer says: Ὀλίγω ἐμπροσθεν ἐκεχειρίαν ἐπεποίητο [Ῥωμαῖοι καὶ Πέρσαι], ἐφ' ᾧ μέντοι οὐ τελειοτάτην ἄγειν εἰρήνην, οὐδὲ ὥστε πάντοθι τῶν κινδύνων πεπαύσθαι, ἀλλ' ὅσον μόνον ἀνὰ τὴν ἔσω, καὶ τὰ τῆς Ἀρμενίας ὄρια ἐκατέρω γένοι εσπείσθαι, ἀμφὶ δὲ τὴν Κολχίδα γῆν τὸν πόλεμον διαφέρειν.

<sup>148</sup> Procop. *B. G.* iv. 15; pp. 608-9.

<sup>149</sup> Agathias, ii. 19; p. 56, D.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid. ii. 20; p. 58, B.

<sup>151</sup> Ibid. ii. 21; p. 59, A.

<sup>152</sup> Ibid. ii. 22; p. 60, A.

<sup>153</sup> Agath. ii. 22; p. 60, B.

<sup>154</sup> Ἄνδρα τῶν σφόδρα λογίμων καὶ ὀνομαστοτάτων. (Ibid. iii. 2; p. 73, C.)

<sup>155</sup> Ibid. p. 73, D.

<sup>156</sup> Ibid. iii. 3; p. 75.

<sup>157</sup> Agath. iii. 4; p. 76, B.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid. iii. 9-11.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid. iii. 8; p. 80, D.

<sup>160</sup> Ibid. iii. 6; p. 78, B.

<sup>161</sup> Ibid. iii. 14; p. 89, C.

<sup>162</sup> Ibid. iii. 15; pp. 90-1.

<sup>163</sup> Agath. iii. 15, *ad init.*; 17; p. 92, C.

<sup>164</sup> Ibid. iii. 18; p. 94, C.

<sup>165</sup> Ibid.

<sup>166</sup> Ibid. iii. 20.

<sup>167</sup> Ibid. iii. 21; p. 96, D.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid. p. 97, A, B.

- <sup>169</sup> Agath. iii. 23, *ad init.* .  
<sup>170</sup> *Ibid.* iii. 24.  
<sup>171</sup> Agathias makes Justin lead these troops out of the city of his own accord, and without any military purpose; but it seems almost certain that what he ascribes to accident was the result of design.  
<sup>172</sup> Agath. iii. 25-27.  
<sup>173</sup> Two thousand near Archæopolis (see text, p. 471), ten thousand in the battle before Phasis (Agath. iii. 27, *ad fin.*), and two thousand more on the day following (*ib.* iii. 28).  
<sup>174</sup> *Ibid.* iii. 28, *ad fin.*  
<sup>175</sup> Agath. iv. 23. Agathias seems to suppose that Nachoragan was flayed alive; but he does not actually assert it; and we have already shown (see text, p. 294) that it was the flaying of criminals after death which was customary in Persia.  
<sup>176</sup> J. Malal. xviii. p. 81, A; Theophan. *Chronograph.* vol. i. p. 195, B.  
<sup>177</sup> See Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. p. 808.  
<sup>178</sup> Agath. iv. 30; p. 141, D.  
<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.* p. 142, A.  
<sup>180</sup> *Ibid.* Compare Menand. *Protect. Fr.* 11, *ad init.*  
<sup>181</sup> See Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. pp. 812-3.  
<sup>182</sup> According to Menander (*Fr.* 11, pp. 209-210), the ambassador of Chosroës spoke of him in the negotiations of A.D. 562 as having already reduced to subjection ten nations, and crushed the power of the Ephthalites. These wars could scarcely have been carried on simultaneously with the war with Rome.  
<sup>183</sup> Menander wrote under the Emperor Maurice, who reigned from A.D. 582 to A.D. 602.  
<sup>184</sup> See Menand. *Prot. Fr.* 11; pp. 208 and 212-3.  
<sup>185</sup> There was a further provision that, at the end of the seven years, a second payment in advance should be made, but only for three years. Afterwards the payments were to be annual (*ibid.* p. 209).  
<sup>186</sup> Gibbon says: "The smallness of the sum revealed the disgrace of a tribute in its naked deformity" (*Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 205); and again he speaks of "the annual tribute which was poorly disguised by the name of pension" (*ib.* p. 364).  
<sup>187</sup> Tabari speaks of Rome as paying tribute to Chosroës (*Chronique.* vol. ii. p. 161). So also Abu-Hanifah Deinavari, quoted by Mirkhond (p. 367).  
<sup>188</sup> See text, pp. 459 and 465.  
<sup>189</sup> See text, p. 450.  
<sup>190</sup> That the Ephthalite war preceded A.D. 562 appears from Menand. *Prot. Fr.* 11; p. 210. It is not likely to have been begun while the war with Rome continued.  
<sup>191</sup> Tabari, *Chronique*, vol. ii. p. 162.  
<sup>192</sup> *Ibid.* p. 161.  
<sup>193</sup> The remarkable fulfilment of the prophecy in Gen. xvi. 12 is certainly not invalidated by the occasional dominion

of foreigners in Arabia during the space of 4,000 years. (See the remarks of Dean Milman in Smith's *Gibbon*, vol. v. p. 364, note a.)

<sup>194</sup> Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 206.

<sup>195</sup> Gibbon calls Abraha "the slave of a Roman merchant of Adulis" (*Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 208); but the Oriental writers unanimously represent him as an Abyssinian of high rank. (See Johannsen, *Hist. Yemææ*, p. 94.) Tabari makes him a member of the royal family (*Chronique*, vol. ii. p. 181).

<sup>196</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 188.

<sup>197</sup> *Ibid.* p. 202. Yaksoum was succeeded by his younger brother, Masrouq.

<sup>198</sup> Procop. *B. P.* i. 19, 20; Jo. Malal. *Chronograph.* xviii. pp. 57, 67, 68.

<sup>199</sup> Tabari, *Chronique*, vol. ii. p. 203.

<sup>200</sup> *Ibid.* p. 208. Masrouq cursed Saïf and his father. Saïf knew by this that he could not be the son of the same father with Masrouq, and forced his mother to tell him the truth.

<sup>201</sup> Only eight hundred, according to Tabari (vol. ii. p. 210); but this is improbable. Ibn-Kutaiba, as quoted by Ibn-Khallikan (*Biogr. Dict.*, vol. iii. p. 672, E. T.), made the number of men sent by Chosroës with Saïf 7,500.

<sup>202</sup> Tabari, p. 211.

<sup>203</sup> Tabari makes the Persians 600, the Homerites 5,000. Masrouq sends 10,000 men against them, who are defeated. He then leads against them an army of 100,000, who are equally unsuccessful. He himself is killed by the commander of the Persian contingent. The success of the Persians is attributed to their use of the bow, an arm previously unknown in Yemen!

<sup>204</sup> St. Martin, *Notes to Le Beau*, vol. x. p. 78; Tabari, *Chronique*, vol. ii. p. 215.

<sup>205</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 218.

<sup>206</sup> Tabari (l. s. c.) makes Wahraz succeed Saïf, and gives him "a son called Merzeban." No one can fail to recognize in this pretended name the favorite Persian title.

<sup>207</sup> Tabari, p. 221; Mirkhond, p. 372.

<sup>208</sup> Serendib (Ceylon) is said to have been the residence of the monarch. The provinces ceded are declared to have been those which were previously ceded to Bahramgur! (Tabari, vol. ii. p. 221.)

<sup>209</sup> On the Indian embassy, see Mirkhond, p. 375; Maçoudi, vol. ii. p. 202; Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 206.

<sup>210</sup> In the division of his empire ascribed to Chosroës, the most eastern of his provinces appear to have been Khorasan, Seistan, and Kirman (Mirkhond, p. 364). Gibbon adds to these "Cabul and Zablestan" (l. s. c.), but without much reason.

<sup>211</sup> Menand. *Protect. Fr.* 18; p. 226.

<sup>212</sup> *Ibid.* p. 225; 'Ο Κάτουλφος ὁ Ἐφθαλίτης . . . διὰ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ καὶ αὐτὸν βασιλέως γεγεννημένην βίασαν μείξιν τῆ γυναικὶ προῦδωκε τὸ δόμοφυλον τοῖς Τούρκοις. Compare *Fr.* 10.

<sup>213</sup> Ibid. Fr. 18; Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 207, D; Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. p. 824.

<sup>214</sup> Ἐνθεν τοιγαροῦν ἡ δυσμένεια ἤρξατο Περσῶν τε καὶ Τούρκων. (Menand. Prot. l. s. c.)

<sup>215</sup> So Clinton understands the words of Menander (Fr. 20: ἐν ὄρει τινὶ λεγομένῳ Ἐκτάῳ, ὡς ἂν εἴποι χρυσοῦν ὄρος Ἑλλην ἀνήρ). And certainly the explanation of the name points in this direction. Otherwise the name itself might seem to point to the modern Ak Tagh (or Ak Tai), the "White Mountains" directly north of Samarkand. With this location would, I think, agree best the return march of the ambassadors as described in Fr. 21.

<sup>216</sup> Menand. Protect. Fr. 20.

<sup>217</sup> *Histoire des Sassanides*, p. 365.

<sup>218</sup> Menand. Protect. Fr. 32; Theophylact. Sim. iii. 9.

<sup>219</sup> Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 208, A: Ὁ Ἰουστίνος ἔλυσε τὴν εἰρήνην, φάσκων ἑνοειδίστον εἶναι φορολογεῖσθαι ὑπὸ τῶν Περσῶν τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις. Compare Theophylact. Sim. iii. 9, *sub fin.*

<sup>220</sup> Menand. Prot. Fr. 15.

<sup>221</sup> Ibid. Fr. 17, *ad fin.*

<sup>222</sup> The weight of the various causes of war is differently estimated by different writers. Menander considers the invitation of the Turks to have been the chief cause (Fr. 32). Theophylact puts in the foreground the Arabian expedition and the injuries of the Abyssinians or Homerites (iii. 9). So Theophanes (*Chronograph.* p. 206, D). Evagrius, Johannes Biclár, and others give the preference to the state of affairs in Armenia. (See Evagr. *Hist. Eccl.*, v. 7.)

<sup>223</sup> St. Martin, *Mémoires sur l'Arménie*, vol. ii. p. 331; Menand. Protect. Fr. 35 a; Evagr. *H. E.* v. 7. The leader of the insurrection was Vartan, the Mamigonian, the son of Vart. (See text, p. 424.)

<sup>224</sup> Eighty years old, according to Gibbon (*Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 365); but I do not know his authority. Menander Protector uses the inexact phrase, εἰς ἑσχοτον γῆρας ἑλληκως (Fr. 36). He had been on the throne above forty years.

<sup>225</sup> The Arabian expedition to Saïf; the Turkish war to his eldest son, Hormisdas. (See text, pp. 476, 477.)

<sup>226</sup> Menand. Protect. Fr. 36: Ἐφθ δὲ, ὡς εἰ παραθείη δάκτυλον ἓνα, κινήσεται, καὶ ὡς ἐς τὴν Περσῶν ἐλάσοι.

<sup>227</sup> Evagr. *H. E.* v. 8; Theophylact. Simocatt. iii. 10; Joh. Epiph. § 3; Theophan. Byz. § 4. The other Theophanes (*Chronograph.* p. 208, A) and Zonaras (vol. ii. p. 71, C) wrongly call him Martinus.

<sup>228</sup> Jo. Epiph. § 4; Theophylact. Sim. iii. 10.

<sup>229</sup> The Romans were delighted with any gleam of success, and the battle of Sargathon is celebrated by the whole chorus of Byzantine writers. The Romans claimed to have killed 1,200 of the

enemy, while their own loss was seven! (Theophan. Byz. § 4.)

<sup>230</sup> The siege was commenced by Marcian; but, as it made no progress, he was shortly superseded by Acacius (Jo. Epiph. § 4; Theophylact. Sim. iii. 11).

<sup>231</sup> Evagr. *H. E.* v. 9. A portion of the Roman army seems to have thrown itself into Mardin (Μάρδης or Μάρδες). (See Jo. Epiph. § 5; Theophylact. iii. 11.)

<sup>232</sup> Jo. Epiph. § 4; Evagr. *H. E.* v. 9, 10; Theophylact, l. s. c.

<sup>233</sup> Evagr. *H. E.* v. 10: πέμπτου, καὶ πρὸς γε, μῆνα. Theophylact says "six months" (l. s. c.).

<sup>234</sup> Theophan. Byz. § 4.

<sup>235</sup> Theophylact. Sim. iii. 11. Compare Evagr. *H. E.* v. 10, and Jo. Epiph. § 5, where, however, the text is mutilated. Theophanes of Byzantium (l. s. c.) ascribes the loss of Daras to the Romans being at variance among themselves.

<sup>236</sup> Evagr. *H. E.* v. 11; Theophylact, l. s. c.; &c.

<sup>237</sup> By sending an embassy immediately upon the capture of Daras (Menand. Protect. Fr. 37).

<sup>238</sup> It is not quite clear whether the embassy of Zacharias preceded or followed the nomination of Tiberius as Cæsar. If Clinton is right in saying that the nomination was not made until the December of A. D. 574 (*F. R.* vol. i. p. 834), there must have been an interval during which the Empress Sophia had the sole direction of affairs. Tiberius, however, was her counsellor (Menand. Prot. Fr. 37, *sub fin.*).

<sup>239</sup> See Menand. Prot. Fr. 40. The date is a year later; but the sentiments by which Chosroës was actuated were probably the same in A. D. 574 as in the year following.

<sup>240</sup> We learn this fact from Menander *only* (Fr. 38)

<sup>241</sup> Evagr. *H. E.* v. 14.

<sup>242</sup> That Justinian and his army reached the eastern frontier early in A. D. 575, before the one year's truce had expired, is evident from John of Epiphania and Theophylact. The reader of Gibbon would suppose that they did not arrive till three years later.

<sup>243</sup> Menand. Prot. Fr. 39; Evagr. *H. E.* v. 12.

<sup>244</sup> See Menander, Frs. 39 and 40.

<sup>245</sup> Jo. Epiph. § 5, *sub fin.*: Τοῦ καιροῦ τῆς ἐς ὄλιγον γεγενημένης ἀνακωχῆς περαιωθέντος. Compare Theophylact. Sim. iii. 12: p. 78, C.

<sup>246</sup> Jo. Epiph. l. s. c.; Menand. Prot. Frs. 40 and 50.

<sup>247</sup> Evagr. *H. E.* v. 12; Theophylact. Sim. l. s. c.

<sup>248</sup> Again we are indebted to Menander for this confession (Fr. 40). The other Byzantine writers carefully conceal the fact that Rome had on each occasion to pay for peace. Gibbon omits to notice it.

<sup>249</sup> Menand. Prot. Fr. 41; Evagr. *H. E.* v. 14.

<sup>250</sup> The account of Evagrius (l. s. c.) is

moderate and probable. Theophylact (iii. 14) and Theophanes (p. 212, B, C) have greatly exaggerated the importance of the victory. All three writers absurdly state that, in consequence of his danger on this occasion, Chosroës issued an edict that no Persian king should henceforth go out to battle!

<sup>251</sup> Theophylact, iii. 15; Theophan. p. 212, C. Evagrius does not indulge in this flourish.

<sup>252</sup> Evagr. *H. E.* v. 14, *sub fin.*

<sup>253</sup> See Menand. Prot. Frs. 41 and 42.

<sup>254</sup> That Chosroës carried on this siege in person is distinctly declared by Menander (Fr. 41).

<sup>255</sup> Theophylact, iii. 15; p. 83, C; Menand. Prot. Fr. 47; Evagr. *H. E.* v. 19, *ad init.*

<sup>256</sup> Menand. Prot. Frs. 47 and 50.

<sup>257</sup> *Ibid.* Fr. 50. Compare Theophylact, iii. 15; p. 83, D.

<sup>258</sup> Twelve thousand of the twenty were native Persians; the rest consisted of Saracens and Iberians. (Menand. Prot. l. s. c.)

<sup>259</sup> Theophylact, l. s. c.

<sup>260</sup> Menand. Prot. Fr. 52; Theophylact, l. s. c.

<sup>261</sup> Our knowledge of this campaign is derived almost wholly from Theophylact (iii. 15, 16), whose account seems worthy of acceptance. Some confirmation is furnished by Menander (Fr. 55; p. 257) and Agathias (iv. 29).

<sup>262</sup> See text, p. 367.

<sup>263</sup> Agathias, iv. 29. It is curious that by none of the later writers is this statement repeated.

<sup>264</sup> Theophylact, iii. 16.

<sup>265</sup> Menand. Prot. Fr. 55, *ad init.*

<sup>266</sup> *Ibid.* Fr. 54.

<sup>267</sup> That such a payment had been contemplated by both parties appears from Fr. 47 (p. 251).

<sup>268</sup> Ἡρος ἀρχομένον (Theophylact, p. 84, D). In March (Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. p. 842).

<sup>269</sup> So Agathias (l. s. c.), Mirkhond (p. 387), and Tabari (vol. ii. p. 24). The exact duration of his reign was forty-seven years and six months (Eutyeh. vol. ii. pp. 179, 188), from Sept. A.D. 531 to March A.D. 579.

## CHAPTER XXI.

<sup>1</sup> See especially Tabari, vol. ii. pp. 160, 222-232; Mirkhond, pp. 362-4; Maçoudi, *Prairies d'Or.* tom. ii. pp. 204-5; and Asseman, *Bibliotheca*, tom. iii. pp. 404-410.

<sup>2</sup> Mirkhond makes him express his intentions in his very first speech to his nobles (p. 362).

<sup>3</sup> See text, p. 450.

<sup>4</sup> Mirkhond, p. 364.

<sup>5</sup> Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 184.

<sup>6</sup> Mirkhond (p. 381) mentions this among his principles of government. It was an old practice of Persian mon-

archs. (See *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. iii. p. 213.)

<sup>7</sup> See Mirkhond, pp. 381-2.

<sup>8</sup> See text, pp. 449, 450.

<sup>9</sup> Menand. Prot. Fr. 46; Mirkhond, pp. 363, 379; Tabari, p. 226; &c.

<sup>10</sup> Mirkhond, p. 232.

<sup>11</sup> Mirkhond, p. 372. Tabari makes the highest rate of taxation one-fifth (ii. p. 222).

<sup>12</sup> See the story told of Kobad by Tabari (ii. pp. 152, 153), where the cultivator says: "We have not the free disposal of our property, since the king is part owner of it, and we do not dare to put our hand to the harvest till some one has come on the king's part to cut what belongs to him."

<sup>13</sup> Tabari, ii. p. 223. The *dirhem* is estimated by M. Barbier de Meynard at from 65 to 70 centimes. (See his notice of Ibn Khordadbeh in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1865, quoted in the *Numismatic Chronicle* for 1873, p. 248.)

<sup>14</sup> Tabari, p. 222.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* p. 226.

<sup>16</sup> On lands where the cultivator was the owner, half the produce might be paid, as it was by the helot to his Spartan master. (See the Author's *Herodotus*, vol. iii. p. 279). But where the cultivator had also to pay a rent, such a tax would have been cruelly oppressive. Perhaps Tabari is right in making the highest rate paid to the state one-fifth. (See above, note 11.)

<sup>17</sup> Tabari, ii. p. 226.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* p. 223. Maçoudi gives the following as the rate of payment: "Four palms of Fars, 1 dirhem; six common palms, the same; six olives, the same; each vine, 8 dirhems." (*Prairies d'Or*, ii. p. 204.)

<sup>19</sup> Tabari, l. s. c.

<sup>20</sup> Mirkhond, *Histoire des Sassanides*, p. 372; Tabari, l. s. c.

<sup>21</sup> This appears not to have been the case under the former system; for the cultivator whose wrongs called forth the compassion of Kobad was a woman (Tabari, ii. p. 153).

<sup>22</sup> Tabari, ii. p. 224.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* p. 225.

<sup>24</sup> *Ibid.* p. 232.

<sup>25</sup> Tabari, ii. p. 227.

<sup>26</sup> Charging the treasury with the payment of a larger number of troops than actually maintained is one of the commonest modes of cheating the government in the East. It is not, however, noted among the abuses observed by Chosroës.

<sup>27</sup> Tabari, ii. p. 229.

<sup>28</sup> Tabari, ii. pp. 229-230; Mirkhond, p. 373.

<sup>29</sup> See the Author's *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. ii. pp. 337-8.

<sup>30</sup> Tabari, ii. p. 160.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>32</sup> Mirkhond, p. 363; Tabari, l. s. c.

<sup>33</sup> Mirkhond, p. 364.

<sup>34</sup> Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. γ. p. 184

<sup>35</sup> Tabari, ii. p. 160.

<sup>36</sup> See text, p. 458. According to Asseman (*Bibl. Or.* vol. ii. p. 410), large numbers of Syrian Christians were carried off by Chosroës from the neighborhood of Edessa and settled in various parts of Persia.

<sup>37</sup> A desire expressed by the Sogdians to establish a trade in silk with the Persians was opposed by Chosroës on the ground that it would lead to intercourse between his subjects and the Turks on whom the Sogdians depended. Such intercourse he thought undesirable (Menand. Prot. Fr. 18).

<sup>38</sup> Mirkhond, p. 364.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.* p. 363. On the postal system existing at this time in Persia, see Menand. Prot. Fr. 11; p. 212.

<sup>40</sup> Agathias, ii. 30. The names of the seven were Damascus of Syria, Simplicius of Cilicia, Eulamius of Phrygia, Priscianus of Lydia, Hermeias and Diogenes of Phœnicia, and Isidorus of Gaza.

<sup>41</sup> See the Essay of Sir H. Rawlinson "On the Religion of the Babylonians and Assyrians," contained in the Author's *Herodotus*, vol. i. p. 484, &c.

<sup>42</sup> Mathiæ, *Manual of Gk. and Roman Literature*, p. 201, E. T.

<sup>43</sup> Agath. ii. 30, 31.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.* ii. 28. The translations made by the Arabian conquerors of Spain are parallel, and lend a certain support to the statements of Agathias. Still it may be doubted whether the Persian translation extended to all the works of both philosophers. Plato's Timæus, Phædo, Gorgias, and Parmenides are, however, expressly mentioned among the treatises read by Chosroës in a Persian dress.

<sup>45</sup> See Agathias, ii. 29, *ad fin.*: *Ἐνκαλεσάμενος τοὺς Μάγους, ἐς λόγους αὐτῶ καθίστατο γενέσεώς τε καὶ φύσεως περὶ, καὶ εἰ τὸδε τὸ πᾶν ἀτελεῦτηρον ἔσται, καὶ πότερον μίαν τῶν ἀπάντων ἀρχὴν νομιστέον.* The reference is to a conference between the Magi and Uranius; but we may fairly conclude that similar discussions took place between the Magi and the Seven Sages.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.* ii. 29, 32.

<sup>47</sup> Procop. *De Bell. Goth.* iv. 10; p. 590, B.

<sup>48</sup> Asseman, *Bibl. Or.* vol. iv. pp. 745-7.

<sup>49</sup> Tabari, ii. p. 160.

<sup>50</sup> So Gibbon (*Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 185, note 49). Others suppose that the original "Book of Kings" was composed by order of Yezdegird III. (See Atkinson's *Firdausi*, published by the Oriental Translation Fund, Preface, p. xi.; and compare Bunsen, *Philosophy of History*, vol. iii. p. 120.)

<sup>51</sup> On the fables of Bidpai or Pilpay, see Gibbon, l. s. c., with the note of Dean Milman.

<sup>52</sup> Mirkhond, p. 376; Maçoudi, vol. ii. p. 203. D'Herbelot speaks of the introduction of another game, which he calls

a kind of draughts or trictrac. (*Bibliothèque Orientale*, vol. iv. p. 486.)

<sup>53</sup> See text, pp. 449, 450.

<sup>54</sup> Mirkhond, p. 360.

<sup>55</sup> See Menand. Prot. Fr. 36; and compare Asseman, *Bibl. Or.* vol. i. p. 205; vol. ii. p. 410; &c.

<sup>56</sup> Mirkhond, p. 367. Was this wife the Euphemia whom, according to Procopius (*B. P.* ii. 5), he carried off from Surôn and married?

<sup>57</sup> *Ibid.* p. 368.

<sup>58</sup> Menand. Prot. Fr. 11; p. 213. It must be admitted, however, that this toleration was not the free act of Chosroës, but a concession which he made in a treaty.

<sup>59</sup> Renaudot ap. Asseman, *Bibl. Or.* vol. i. p. 205. Asseman himself believes that Renaudot is mistaken, and that Chosroës really favored the orthodox (*ibid.* vol. iii. p. 407).

<sup>60</sup> Agathias, ii. 29, *ad fin.* Compare his discussion of Christian doctrines with the Nestorian primate, Mar-abas, as related by Barhebræus (Asseman, *B. O.* vol. iii. pp. 408-9).

<sup>61</sup> See Clinton, *F. R.* vol. i. p. 755.

<sup>62</sup> Agath. ii. 31.

<sup>63</sup> Mirkhond, pp. 367-8.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.* p. 368.

<sup>65</sup> So Mirkhond, l. s. c. Procopius (*Bell. Goth.* iv. 10) says that Chosroës exiled Nushizad (whom he calls Anotzad) to a place called Belapaton in Vazaine (Ahwaz or Khuzistan).

<sup>66</sup> Such is Mirkhond's account. That of Procopius is not very different, except that he omits all mention of the Christianity of Nushizad, and of his special appeal to the Christians of the empire.

<sup>67</sup> See text, p. 465. The Persian writers call this general Ram-Bourzin.

<sup>68</sup> Mirkhond, p. 371; D'Herbelot, vol. iv. p. 488.

<sup>69</sup> Procop. *B. Goth.* iv. 10; p. 590, D.

<sup>70</sup> Coins of this type have been figured by Ker Porter (*Travels*, vol. ii. Pl. lviii. No. 10); by Longpérier (*Médailles des Sassanides*, Pl. x. No. 4); and by Bartholomæi (*Collection*, ed. Dorn, Pl. xxiv. No. 45). The engraving [see Pl. XXII. Fig. 3] taken from Longpérier.

<sup>71</sup> Mr. Thomas declines the task of interpreting (*Num. Chron.* for 1873, p. 234).

<sup>72</sup> See the account of Dom Germain Millet quoted by M. Longpérier in the *Annales de l'Institut Archéologique* for 1843, vol. xv. p. 100.

<sup>73</sup> See *Numismatic Chronicle* for 1873, pp. 234-5.

<sup>74</sup> See Mirkhond, p. 387; Tabari, ii. p. 233; D'Herbelot, *Bibl. Or.* vol. iv. p. 489.

<sup>75</sup> Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 183.

<sup>76</sup> See Procop. *B. P.* i. 23; Menand. Prot. Fr. 46; Mirkhond, p. 379; Asseman, *Bibl. Or.* vol. iii. p. 409.

<sup>77</sup> Procop. *B. Goth.* iv. 10, *sub fin.*

<sup>78</sup> Asseman, *Bibl. Or.* vol. iii. p. 406.

<sup>79</sup> Mirkhond, p. 368.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.* p. 382.

<sup>81</sup> On one occasion, Chosroës, being displeased with one of his attendants, banished him from the court. The man absented himself, but on a certain day, when all subjects had the right of appearing before the king, he returned to the palace, and, resuming his old duties, waited on the guests at the royal table. While thus employed, he took an opportunity of secreting a plate of solid gold about his person, after which, quitting the guest-chamber, he disappeared altogether. Chosroës, who had seen the whole transaction, took no notice, and, when the plate was missed, merely said: "The man who took it will not bring it back, and the man who saw him will not tell." A year later, the attendant appeared once more on the same day; whereupon the king called him aside and said: "Is the first plate all gone that you have come again to get another?" The culprit owned his guilt and implored forgiveness, which he obtained. Chosroës not only pardoned him, but took him back into his service. (Mirkhond, pp. 382-3.)

<sup>82</sup> Chosroës was told that one of his subjects surpassed him in wealth; and he replied that he saw no harm in the circumstance (Mirkhond, p. 384). He wished to clear a space before his palace; but an old lady who owned one of the houses which occupied the ground would not part with her property. Chosroës cleared the rest of the space, and allowed her house to stand (*ibid.* p. 383).

<sup>83</sup> Mirkhond, pp. 368-370.

<sup>84</sup> See text, p. 449, 450.

<sup>85</sup> Agathias, ii. 28.

<sup>86</sup> *Ibid.* ii. 32, *ad fin.*

<sup>87</sup> Compare Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 185: "The studies of Chosroës were ostentatious and superficial."

<sup>88</sup> The only defeat celebrated by the Byzantine authors is that near Meliténé in A. D. 575. (See text, p. 480.)

<sup>89</sup> Evagrius, who is the writer nearest to the time, regards the check as slight, and as compensated for soon afterwards by a victory (*Hist. Eccl.* v. 14).

<sup>90</sup> See text, pp. 472, 473.

<sup>91</sup> See text, pp. 497-499.

## CHAPTER XXII.

<sup>1</sup> This name is given by Maçoudi (vol. i. p. 211).

<sup>2</sup> Mirkhond, p. 388.

<sup>3</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>4</sup> Tabari, ii. p. 248.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.* p. 247.

<sup>6</sup> Malcolm, *History of Persia*, vol. i. p. 151; Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 367. Neither in Tabari, Mirkhond, nor Maçoudi is there any mention of Abuzurd-mihir in connection with Hormisdas.

<sup>7</sup> See Tabari, ii. pp. 273-4; Mirkhond, p. 388; Maçoudi, ii. p. 211; Theophylact,

Simocatt. iii. 16; D'Herbelot, *Bibl. Or.* vol. iii. p. 222; &c.

<sup>8</sup> Menand. Protect. Fr. 55.

<sup>9</sup> Theophylact. Simocatt. iii. 17.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* Διά της ἐρήμου τὸ λοιπὸν τῆς Ἀραβίας εἰς τὴν Βαβυλωνίαν ἠπείγετο γῆν ἀφικέσθαι.

<sup>11</sup> Theophylact. Simocatt. iii. 17, *ad fin.* This is probably the victory of Maurice over Adarnan, whereof Evagrius speaks somewhat vaguely in his *Hist. Eccles.* v. 20.

<sup>12</sup> See the prolix account given by Menander Protector, Fr. 60.

<sup>13</sup> Theophylact. Simocatt. iii. 18, *ad init.*; Menander Prot. Fr. 60, *ad fin.*

<sup>14</sup> Evagr. *H. E.* v. 20; Theophylact. Simocatt. l. s. c.

<sup>15</sup> Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 345.

<sup>16</sup> Theophyl. Sim. i. 9: Τὸν Ἰωάννην, ᾧ περ ἐπώνυμον τὸ τῆς ὑπερώας χελύνης κατὰ κορον. Compare Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 214, B, Ἰωάννην τὸν Μουστάκωνα.

<sup>17</sup> Theophyl. Sim. i. 12, *ad init.*

<sup>18</sup> Theophylact. Sim. i. 12.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.* i. 13, *ad init.*

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.* *ad fin.*

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* i. 14.

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.* i. 15.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* ii. 3, *sub fin.*

<sup>24</sup> Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 216, A; Theophylact. Sim. ii. 3.

<sup>25</sup> Theophylact. Sim. ii. 5.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* c. 7.

<sup>27</sup> *Ibid.* c. 9, *sub fin.*

<sup>28</sup> Ὁ δ' Ἡράκλειος τὸ ὀπλιτικὸν διατάξας, κ. τ. λ. (Theophyl. Sim. ii. 10, *ad init.*)

<sup>29</sup> Theophyl. Sim. ii. 18.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.* iii. 1-2.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.* c. 3.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.* iii. 5.

<sup>33</sup> Theophylact. Simocatt. iii. 5. Compare Evagr. *H. E.* vi. 14.

<sup>34</sup> Theophan. p. 221, A; Theophylact. Sim. iii. 6.

<sup>35</sup> Theophylact. Sim. l. s. c. Mebodes had been previously killed in the battle with Philippicus, near Martyropolis.

<sup>36</sup> Ζίφη χρύσεια, πύρας τε Περσικὰς, καὶ τὰς λιθοκollήτους ζώνας, ἃς οἱ μαργαρίται τοῖς βαρβάροις λαμπρύνουσι. (Theophylact. Sim. l. s. c.)

<sup>37</sup> Evagr. *H. E.* vi. 15. Theophylact. Sim. iv. 2, *ad init.*

<sup>38</sup> Mirkhond, p. 388; Tabari, ii. p. 248; Maçoudi, ii. p. 211.

<sup>39</sup> The tribes of Kahtan and Mâdd, according to Maçoudi (ii. p. 212), commanded by El-Abbas the one-eyed, and Amr-el-Afwah. (Compare Mirkhond, p. 389, and Tabari, ii. p. 249.)

<sup>40</sup> So Mirkhond (l. s. c.) and Maçoudi (l. s. c.). Tabari (l. s. c.) raised the number to 100,000. From the Byzantine writers it would seem that there was no truth in this rumor.

<sup>41</sup> Three hundred thousand men, according to Tabari (p. 248); 400,000, according to Maçoudi (l. s. c.); either 300,000 or 300,600, according to Mirkhond.

<sup>42</sup> The Romans seem certainly to have made no great effort at this period; and the Khazar attack is doubtful. Neither the Armenians nor the Byzantines notice it. Gibbon exaggerates the peril still more by imagining a correspondence between the Turkish and Roman courts, and an intention on the part of the two armies to effect a junction (*Decline and Fall*, vol. v. pp. 368-370). Neither the Oriental nor the Byzantine writers know of any such concert or correspondence.

<sup>43</sup> Varahran is the form upon the coins (Mordtmann in the *Zeitschrift*, viii. pp. 110-1). Bahram that used by the Orientals, both Persians and Arabs. Theophylact has Βαράμ and sometimes Βαράμης.

<sup>44</sup> Theophylact. Sim. iii. 18; Tabari, ii. p. 252.

<sup>45</sup> The "twelve thousand" of Mirkhond (p. 394), Tabari (p. 256), and Maçoudi (p. 213) seems very improbably small; but their statement that quality rather than number was considered, may be accepted.

<sup>46</sup> Mirkhond, l. s. c.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Tabari, ii. p. 262; Maçoudi, ii. p. 213.

<sup>49</sup> Tabari, ii. pp. 264-5; Mirkhond, p. 394; Maçoudi, ii. p. 213.

<sup>50</sup> According to some writers, the booty was conveyed on the backs of 250,000 camels! (Mirkhond, l. s. c.)

<sup>51</sup> Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 368; *Dict. of Gk. and Rom. Biography*, s. v. MAURICIUS, vol. ii. p. 976.

<sup>52</sup> Theophylact. Sim. iii. 6; Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 221, B.

<sup>53</sup> See text, p. 472.

<sup>54</sup> Theophylact. Sim. iii. 7, *sub fin.*

<sup>55</sup> Tabari, ii. p. 266; Mirkhond, p. 395. The Oriental writers, by omitting all notice of Bahram's defeat on the Araxes, render the sequence of events very improbable. Theophylact, most fortunately, supplies the facts which are needed to make their accounts intelligible. (See the passage above cited.)

<sup>56</sup> Theophylact mentions the deprivation and the female garments (iii. 8). Tabari (l. s. c.) and Mirkhond (l. s. c.) testify to the distaff. Gibbon from his own imagination adds a spinning-wheel (*Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 370).

<sup>57</sup> Theophylact (l. s. c.); Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 222, A.

<sup>58</sup> Theophylact. Sim. iii. 8, *sub fin.*

<sup>59</sup> So the Orientals (Tabari, ii. pp. 266-7; Mirkhond, p. 395). The Byzantines say that Bahram pretended to have received intelligence that Hormisdas was about to diminish the soldiers' pay, and to punish them for having allowed themselves to be defeated on the Araxes (Theophylact. Sim. iii. 18, *ad fin.*; Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 222, B.)

<sup>60</sup> Theophylact. Sim. iv. 2.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid. iv. 3.

<sup>62</sup> The tale that Bahram, in order to sow jealousy between Hormisdas and his son Chosroës, issued coins *with the*

*image and superscription of the latter*, that Hormisdas in consequence suspected Chosroës, and that to escape death the young prince had to betake himself to banishment, being told only by the Oriental writers, and unsupported by any known facts, scarcely deserves our acceptance. There are no coins of Chosroës II. unlike the rest, or presenting any appearance of having been issued under abnormal circumstances. On the other hand, there are coins of Bahram, issued in his own name, which may well be those that he put into circulation before he became king. (See Thomas in *Numismatic Chronicle* for 1873, vol. li. pp. 236-240.)

<sup>63</sup> Mirkhond makes both the brothers suffer imprisonment (p. 395). So Maçoudi (ii. p. 215) and Tabari (ii. p. 269). Theophylact (iv. 3) and Theophanes (p. 222, D) represent Bindoës as the only sufferer.

<sup>64</sup> See Theophylact. Sim. iv. 3-6; Theophan. *Chron.* p. 223, A, B.

<sup>65</sup> Dean Milman well observes, in the notes appended to Smith's Gibbon (vol. v. p. 371), that the orations in Theophylact "read rather like those of a Grecian sophist than of an Eastern assembly."

<sup>66</sup> The assassination is ascribed to Bindoës and Bostam by the Orientals (Tabari, ii. p. 279; Mirkhond, p. 396; Maçoudi, ii. p. 219), to Chosroës II. by the Byzantine writers (Theophylact. Sim. iv. 7; Theophan. p. 223, C).

<sup>67</sup> See Theophylact. Sim. iii. 16; Evagr. *H. E.* vi. 16; Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 222, B; Tabari, ii. p. 273; Mirkhond, p. 388; Maçoudi, ii. p. 211.

<sup>68</sup> Mirkhond, l. s. c.

<sup>69</sup> See Pl. XXII. Fig. 4.

<sup>70</sup> See Pl. XXII. Fig. 1.

<sup>71</sup> That is to say, "Hormisdas, increase (be his)," or "Hormisdas, (may he be) greater."

<sup>72</sup> Thomas in the *Numismatic Chronicle* for 1873, p. 236.

<sup>73</sup> Mordtmann in the *Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. pp. 100-110; vol. xii. pp. 27-32.

#### CHAPTER XXIII.

<sup>1</sup> On the doubt, see note 66, Chapter XXII.

<sup>2</sup> That he had not done so I gather from the statement of Bahram (see text, p. 505), that "the noble and respectable took no part in the vote, which was carried by the disorderly and low-born" (*μήτε των ευγενῶν και ἀξιολόγων συμψήφων γενομένων τοις ἀτακτοτέροις και δυσγενετέροις ανθρώποις*). Gibbon seems to suppose that this is a mere rhetorical flourish (*Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 372).

<sup>3</sup> Tabari, ii. p. 276.

<sup>4</sup> Ibid. p. 268; Maçoudi, ii. p. 214.

<sup>5</sup> Mirkhond, p. 396; Tabari, ii. p. 279. The beating to death with clubs seems to be a clumsy invention of the Byzantine writers (Theophylact. Sim. iv. 7; Theophan. p. 223, C).

<sup>6</sup> Theophylact. Sim. l. s. c.

<sup>7</sup> Chosroës had emptied the prisons, in order to produce an impression that, unlike his father, he was of a mild and clement disposition.

<sup>8</sup> Chosroës styled himself "king of kings, lord of lords, master of masters, prince of peace, saviour of mankind, in the sight of gods a virtuous and immortal man, in the sight of men a most manifest god, surpassingly glorious, a conqueror, rising with the sun and furnishing to the night her eyes (the stars?), of illustrious ancestry, a king averse to war, beneficent, hirer of the genii, and custodian of the Persian kingdom" (Theophylact. Sim. iv. 8). The thoroughly Oriental character of this exordium seems to indicate that the letter is genuine.

<sup>9</sup> Theophylact. Sim. iv. 9.

<sup>10</sup> Compare Tabari, ii. p. 276, with Maçoudi, ii. p. 215 and Theophylact, Sim. p. 102, C.

<sup>11</sup> Tabari (pp. 266-7) gives the details. Theophylact (iv. 9) speaks more generally, but quite to the same effect (*πολλων λογων ανπορθμευομενων απο πρωτης εω μεχρις εσπερας επιστολης*).

<sup>12</sup> Theophylact. Sim. p. 103, A.

<sup>13</sup> Tabari, ii. p. 278; Mirkhond, p. 396; Theophylact. Sim. iv. 10.

<sup>14</sup> The Turks, the Caucasus, and the Romans are mentioned by Theophylact (l. s. c.), the Arabs by Tabari (l. s. c.). The Khazars were the great power of the Caucasian region.

<sup>15</sup> So Theophylact (p. 101, A). Tabari gives the number as ten (ii. p. 279).

<sup>16</sup> Theophylact. Sim. p. 103, C; Theophan. p. 223, D.

<sup>17</sup> He is said to have passed Aboreo and Anotho (Theophylact, p. 103, D). The latter is evidently Anatho or Anat. Is the former *Perisabor*?

<sup>18</sup> To reach Circesium, he must have recrossed the Euphrates. This, however, is not mentioned.

<sup>19</sup> Tabari, ii. p. 280. Compare Mirkhond (p. 396) and Theophylact (iv. 12, *sub init.*).

<sup>20</sup> Mirkhond, p. 397; Tabari, ii. p. 281.

<sup>21</sup> Theophylact. Sim. iv. 10; Theophan. l. s. c.

<sup>22</sup> The Orientals carry Chosroës to Edessa (Maçoudi, ii. p. 219) or Antioch (Tabari, ii. p. 289), and then to Constantinople (Mirkhond, p. 398; Tabari, ii. p. 291). But the Greeks, who must know best, declare that he proceeded no further than Hierapolis (Theophylact. Sim. iv. 12 and 14; Evagr. *H. E.* vi. 19; Theophan. p. 224, A).

<sup>23</sup> Tabari, ii. p. 290; Maçoudi, ii. p. 193. The reasonings actually used may be best gathered from the replies to them contained in the *second* letter of Chosroës (Theophylact. Sim. iv. 13).

<sup>24</sup> The "magnanimity" of Maurice is put forward by the Byzantine writers as specially evidenced by his conduct towards Chosroës (Theophylact. Sim. p.

107, C; p. 111, A; Evagr. *H. E.* vi. 17). Moderns will scarcely see in it more than an intelligent appreciation of Roman interests.

<sup>25</sup> Evagr. l. s. c. Chosroës had appealed to him as his "father." (Theophylact. Sim. iv. 11, *sub fin.*).

<sup>26</sup> Mirkhond (p. 398) and Maçoudi (ii. p. 220) enumerate them. Evagrius contents himself with a general statement, but adds that the empress sent at the same time presents for Chosroës' wives, and the Imperial children presents for Chosroës' children.

<sup>27</sup> Theophylact. Sim. iv. 14.

<sup>28</sup> Tabari, ii. p. 291. Maçoudi makes the number 100,000 (ii. p. 220). Mirkhond mentions both reports without deciding between them (p. 399). The Byzantines give no estimate of the number.

<sup>29</sup> Maçoudi, l. s. c.

<sup>30</sup> On reaching Hierapolis, Chosroës was at once asked to order the surrender of Martyropolis. He pretended to do so, but secretly gave directions that it should be defended to the last extremity (Theophylact. Sim. iv. 12, 13).

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.* iv. 13; p. 110, B. It has been thought by some that Nisibis also was ceded (Smith in Notes to Gibbon, vol. v. p. 395). But the authority of the Armenian writers is scarcely sufficient to establish such a fact against the silence of the Byzantines, who would scarcely have failed to notice so important a gain.

<sup>32</sup> Theophylact. Sim. iv. 12; Maçoudi, ii. p. 219.

<sup>33</sup> Tabari, ii. pp. 283-4; Theophylact. Sim. iv. 14.

<sup>34</sup> St. Martin, *Notes to Le Bas*, vol. x. p. 312; Patkanian in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 193.

<sup>35</sup> Theophylact. Sim. iv. 15; p. 113, A.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.* v. 1.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.* v. 2.

<sup>39</sup> The date of Zadesprates' death is fixed to February A.D. 591 by the letter of Chosroës preserved in Evagrius, which mentions that the head of Zadesprates was brought in on the 9th of that month (Evagr. *H. E.* vi. 21.)

<sup>40</sup> Bindoës had fled to Azerbaijan from Ctesiphon, having been set free by the conspirators whose attempt failed (see above, note 33). He had been joined by 20,000 Persians from the capital (Tabari, ii. p. 285; compare Theophylact. Sim. iv. 15, *ad init.*). Bostam was sent into Azerbaijan by Chosroës. (*Ibid.* iv. 12, *ad fin.*)

<sup>41</sup> Theophylact. Sim. v. 9; p. 131, C; Patkanian, l. s. c.

<sup>42</sup> Theophylact. iv. 15.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.* v. 3.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.* v. 4.

<sup>45</sup> Theophylact. v. 5, *ad fin.*

<sup>46</sup> So Theophylact (v. 7, *sub fin.*). Theophanes calls the place Alexandria (*Chronograph.* p. 224, B).

<sup>47</sup> Theophylact. v. 8, *ad init.*

<sup>48</sup> See *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. i. p. 553, 2nd edition.

<sup>49</sup> Theophylact. Sim. v. 9.

<sup>50</sup> According to Theophylact (l. s. c.) the forces of Chosroës amounted to 60,000, those of Bahram to 40,000. The number on the side of Chosroës is less than we should have expected; but probably strong Roman garrisons had been left in Martyropolis and Daras, and more troops may have accompanied Mebodes than is stated.

<sup>51</sup> Two thousand, according to Theophylact (v. 4); but the number is improbably small.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.* v. 7.

<sup>53</sup> See text, p. 500.

<sup>54</sup> The last battle only is mentioned by Maçoudi (ii. p. 222), Tabari (ii. pp. 294-6) and the Oriental writers generally, including the Armenians. Theophanes (p. 224) confuses the circumstances of the two engagements. Theophylact alone distinctly gives both (v. 9-11).

<sup>55</sup> Theophylact. Sim. v. 9, *ad fin.*

<sup>56</sup> According to Tabari (ii. 252) Bahram was born at Rei, of a noble family. He was Marzpan of Rei when chosen general against the Turks (*ibid.* and compare Maçoudi, ii. p. 213). Rei was the place whence he issued his coins (Tabari, ii. p. 268), and whence he marched against Chosroës.

<sup>57</sup> Theophylact. Sim. v. 10, *sub init.* Canzaca is probably the modern Takhti-Suleiman, which is strongly situated near the sources of the Jaglietu.

<sup>58</sup> See Tabari (ii. p. 292). On the identity of Shiz with Canzaca, and of both with Takhti-Suleiman, see a paper by Sir H. Rawlinson in the *Journal of the Geographical Society*, vol. x. art. i.

<sup>59</sup> Theophylact. Sim. p. 133. D. No elephants are mentioned previously.

<sup>60</sup> Bahram's army at this time is reckoned by Tabari at 100,000—the combined Romans, Persians, and Armenians at 90,000 (ii. pp. 291-2).

<sup>61</sup> Theophylact. Sim. v. 10: *τρισι λόχοις — τῇ τριπλῇ φάλαγγι.*

<sup>62</sup> From the earliest times the Persian commander-in-chief had always occupied a central position in the line of battle. (See *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. iii. p. 186, 2nd edition.)

<sup>63</sup> Theophan. p. 224, C. 'Ο Ναρσῆς τὴν μέσσην τῶν Βαρβάρων διέλυσε φάλαγγα τούτου δὲ γενομένου καὶ αἱ λοιπαὶ τοῦ Βαρᾶμ ἡσθένησαν φάλαγγες, καὶ γίνεται τοῦ τυράννου μεγάλη φυγή. Compare Theophylact. Sim. p. 133, B.

<sup>64</sup> Theophylact. l. s. c.; Theophan. p. 224, D.

<sup>65</sup> Tabari, ii. p. 296.

<sup>66</sup> Theophylact. Sim. v. 11, *ad init.*

<sup>67</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>68</sup> Eight hundred, according to Tabari (l. s. c.); but the ten thousand of Theophylact (p. 134, B) is more probable.

<sup>69</sup> So Tabari (l. s. c.). Theophylact says nothing of the repulse.

<sup>70</sup> Tabari, ii. p. 297.

<sup>71</sup> See Thomas in the *Numismatic Chronicle* for 1873, pp. 236-9.

<sup>72</sup> Varahran V. See Pl. XXI. Fig. 2.

<sup>73</sup> This is the rendering of Mr. Thomas, and is somewhat uncertain. Chubin, which, according to the Orientals, was the actual epithet of this monarch, is said to mean "dry wood;" and they commonly say that it was applied to him on account of a certain dryness in his appearance. (See Malcolm, *History of Persia*, vol. i. p. 120, who translates it by "the stick-like," and compare D'Herbelot, *Bibl. Or.* vol. iii. p. 46, *ad voc.* GIOUBIN.)

#### CHAPTER XXIV.

<sup>1</sup> Various explanations are given of this title. Mirkhond (p. 401) explains it as either "powerful king," or else "victorious." Gibbon says "the epithet of *Parviz* alludes to the charms" of Chosroës (*Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 376).

<sup>2</sup> See Clinton, *F. R.* vol. ii. pp. 153 and 169. Writers who regard Chosroës as having one reign only, which they date from his father's death (September, A.D. 590), give him commonly thirty-eight years. See Mirkhond, p. 407; Tabari, vol. ii. p. 304; Euty chius, *Annales*, vol. ii. p. 252; Clinton, *F. R.* vol. ii. p. 261; &c.) The exact time was thirty-seven years and five months.

<sup>3</sup> Theophylact. Sim. v. 11, *ad fin.* and v. 13, *ad init.*; Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 225. The number of the guards, according to Theophanes, was one thousand.

<sup>4</sup> Theophylact. Sim. v. 15, *sub init.*

<sup>5</sup> See text, p. 507.

<sup>6</sup> See note 40, Chapter XXIII.

<sup>7</sup> Theophylact, l. s. c. The deaths of Bindoës and Bostam at the hands of Chosroës are witnessed to by the Oriental writers generally (Tabari, vol. ii. pp. 303, 332; Maçoudi, vol. ii. p. 223; Mirkhond, p. 401); but the manner of the death of Bindoës rests on the sole authority of Theophylact.

<sup>8</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 301.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* p. 332.

<sup>10</sup> The Armenian writers say that Bostam, whom they call Ustam, conquered two Koushan kings, Shog and Pariök, and made himself very powerful. (Patkanian in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 195.)

<sup>11</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 303. The Armenians ascribe the assassination to Pariök. (Patkanian. l. s. c.)

<sup>12</sup> Milman in Smith's Gibbon, vol. v. p. 374, note a.

<sup>13</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 302.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 302-3. Mirkhond agrees, but enters into fewer details (p. 400).

<sup>15</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 299.

<sup>16</sup> Theophylact relates that when Probus, Bishop of Chalcedon, was sent by Maurice as ambassador to Ctesiphon, Chosroës requested to be allowed a sight of the portrait of the Virgin, which he

knew to be in the ambassador's possession. His request being granted, he adored the picture, and said that he had seen the original in a vision, and had been promised by her the glories of Alexander the Great. (Theophylact. Sim. v. 15.)

<sup>17</sup> The city called Razappa by the Assyrians and Reseph or Rasaphé by the later Syrians, received the honorable appellation of Sergiopolis in the course of the fifth or sixth century, from the fact that its principal church was dedicated to St. Sergius.

<sup>18</sup> See Evagr. *H. E.* vi. 21, and Theophylact. Sim. v. 13, 14.

<sup>19</sup> As the reader may perhaps desire a specimen of Chosroës' style, the opening passage of the second letter is here subjoined:—"Chosroës, king of kings, to the great martyr Sergius. I, Chosroës, king of kings, son of Hormisdas, have sent this alms-dish (?) and these other gifts, not for men to admire them, nor to the intent that by my words should be made known the greatness of thy all-venerable name, but that the truth of that which has been done should be proclaimed, and the many mercies and favors which I have received of thee. For I hold it as a piece of good fortune that my name should be inscribed upon thy vessels. When I was at Beramæ, I besought thee, O saint, that thou wouldst come to my aid, and cause Sira to conceive in her womb."

<sup>20</sup> 'Ο ἡμέτερος νόμος ἀδειαν ἡμῖν οὐ παρέχει Χριστιανῆν ἐχ-ιν γαμετήν. (Theophylact. Sim. v. 14; p. 137, C.)

<sup>21</sup> See Tabari, vol. ii. p. 330.

<sup>22</sup> Patkanian in *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 194.

<sup>23</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 304. The stories of the loves of Shirin and Ferbad, in which the Persian poets indulge, are scarcely to be accounted as history. Tabari has one allusion to them (l. s. c.).

<sup>24</sup> Ibid. p. 335; Mirkhond, p. 404.

<sup>25</sup> See text, p. 515.

<sup>26</sup> Patkanian in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 194.

<sup>27</sup> Theophylact. Sim. v. 15.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. viii. 1, *ad init.*

<sup>29</sup> See Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. v. pp. 383-5.

<sup>30</sup> The body of the dead Maurice was cast into the sea by order of Phocas. (Theophylact. Sim. viii. 12, *ad init.*) His head was cut off, and exposed in a public place in Constantinople.

<sup>31</sup> Five sons of Maurice were murdered before his eyes. One was a mere infant. (Theophylact. Sim. viii. 11; Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 243, C. D.)

<sup>32</sup> Theophylact. Sim. viii. 13, *ad init.*

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. viii. 9.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid. viii. 13.

<sup>35</sup> Theophan. p. 244, C. The Orientals seem to have been persuaded that Theodosius actually escaped, and took refuge with Chosroës. (See Patkanian in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 197; Ta-

bari, *Chronique*, vol. ii. p. 36.) Mirkhond, however, is aware that Theodosius was killed with his father (*Histoire des Sassanides*, p. 401).

<sup>36</sup> Theophylact. Sim. viii. 15.

<sup>37</sup> Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 245, A. Narses afterwards retreated from Edessa to Hierapolis (ib. p. 245, C), whence, trusting to the promises of Domentziolus, he proceeded to Constantinople, where Phocas burned him to death (πυρὶ κατέκαυσεν).

<sup>38</sup> Ibid. p. 245, B.

<sup>39</sup> Chosroës beheaded a considerable number of his prisoners, probably (as Gibbon supposes) because he regarded them as implicated in the murder of Maurice.

<sup>40</sup> Theophan. p. 245, D.

<sup>41</sup> Bar-hebræus ap. Asseman, *Bibl. Or.* vol. iii. p. 442.

<sup>42</sup> The fall of Daras is mentioned, not by Bar-hebræus only, but by Theophanes (*Chronograph.* p. 246, C), Cedrenus (p. 406, A), and the Armenian writers generally. (See Patkanian in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, pp. 197 and 211.)

<sup>43</sup> Bar-hebræus, vol. iii. p. 412.

<sup>44</sup> Patkanian, p. 211.

<sup>45</sup> Ibid. p. 198.

<sup>46</sup> Bar-hebræus, l. s. c.

<sup>47</sup> Patkanian, p. 198.

<sup>48</sup> *Chronograph.* p. 248, B.

<sup>49</sup> See text, p. 521.

<sup>50</sup> Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 250, D. Τῷ δὲ Μαίῳ μνη ἐστράτευσαν οἱ Πέρσαι κατὰ Συρίας, καὶ παρέλαβοντην Ἀπάμειαν, κ.τ.λ.

<sup>51</sup> Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. v. pp. 338-9.

<sup>52</sup> Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 251, A; Bar-hebræus ap. Asseman, *Bibl. Or.* vol. iii. p. 413. The Armenians place the capture somewhat earlier (Patkanian, p. 198).

<sup>53</sup> Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 251, D; Bar-hebræus, l. s. c.

<sup>54</sup> The details of the war in Palestine are given most fully by Euty chius (*Annales*, vol. ii. pp. 212-3). He is confirmed, generally, by Bar-hebræus (l. s. c.) and Theophanes (*Chronograph.* p. 252, A).

<sup>55</sup> Patkanian, from Armenian sources (*Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 200).

<sup>56</sup> Euty ch. *Annales*, vol. ii. pp. 212 and 219. Compare the *Paschal Chronicle*, vol. i. p. 355, B.

<sup>57</sup> Theophanes says 90,000 (p. 252, A); but this is improbable. Patkanian's Armenian authorities give the number as 17,000 (*Journal As.* 1866, l. s. c.). The *Paschal Chronicle* says "many thousands of clergy, monks, and nuns" (l. s. c.); Euty chius "an innumerable multitude" (*Ann.* vol. ii. p. 212).

<sup>58</sup> Patkanian, l. s. c.

<sup>59</sup> Euty ch. *Ann.* vol. ii. p. 215.

<sup>60</sup> Ibid. Euty chius supposes her to be Maria, the daughter of Maurice; and so the Orientals generally. But the marriage of Chosroës with this princess

seems to be a fable. Shirin is no doubt the wife intended.

<sup>61</sup>Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 252, B; Niceph. *De Rebus post Mauricium gestis*, p. 7, C; Eutyech. *Ann.* vol. ii. p. 219; Mirkhond, p. 402; Bar-hebræus, l. s. c.

<sup>62</sup>Eutyechius, l. s. c.

<sup>63</sup>Παρέλαβον οἱ Πέρσαι τὴν Αἴγυπτον, καὶ . . . Διβύην ἕως Αἰθιοπίας. (Theophan. *Chronograph.* l. s. c.) So too Bar-hebræus, l. s. c. I do not know on what authority Gibbon says that the Persian arms were carried westward to the neighborhood of Tripoli, and that the Greek cities of the Cyrenaica received at this time their death-blow. (*Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 393.)

<sup>64</sup>Shahên is the form used by the Armenian writers (Patkanian in *Journ. Asiatique*, 1866, p. 212). The *Paschal Chronicle* has Saên (p. 386, B). Saina is found in Bar-hebræus (Asseman, *Bibl. Or.* vol. iii. p. 413). Nicephorus has incorrectly "Saitus" (*De Rebus post Mauricium*, p. 2, C).

<sup>65</sup>These were Olympius, the prætorian prefect, Leontius, governor of Constantinople, and Anastasius, priest in charge of St. Sophia's. (Nicephorus, p. 8, D; *Chron. Pasch.* l. s. c.) The letter which they carried to Chosroës is preserved in this last-named compilation. It is written in the name of the Greek people.

<sup>66</sup>Nicephorus, p. 9, A.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid.

<sup>68</sup>So the Armenians (Patkanian, p. 201). Theophanes says that Chosroës' answer was: "I will never grant you peace till you deny the Crucified One, whom you call God, and worship the sun" (p. 252, D).

<sup>69</sup>Theophan. p. 252, C.

<sup>70</sup>On the width of the canal of Constantinople. see the Author's *Herodotus*, vol. iii. p. 65, 2nd edition.

<sup>71</sup>Theophan. p. 253, C; Bar-hebræus, l. s. c.

<sup>72</sup>Bar-hebræus, l. s. c.

<sup>73</sup>The conquests of Chosroës commenced in A. D. 605 (see text, p. 518). An-cyra and Rhodes seem to have been taken in A. D. 620.

<sup>74</sup>Eutyech. *Annales*, vol. ii. pp. 220-3.

<sup>75</sup>See a paper by M. Barbier de Meynard in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1865, p. 253.

<sup>76</sup>Canon Tristram. See his *Land of Moab*, pp. 197 et seq. An account of the palace will be given in the Chapter on Sassanian Art and Architecture.

<sup>77</sup>Nicephorus, p. 9, B. Famine brought its usual companion, pestilence.

<sup>78</sup>Nicephorus, p. 10.

<sup>79</sup>Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 396.

<sup>80</sup>Nicephorus, p. 9, B.

<sup>81</sup>Ibid. The treasure-ships were caught in a tempest. Some sank; others were cast upon the Syrian shore, and the spoil, being conveyed to Chosroës, formed the treasure called *Badawerd*, or "wind-

fall," which was among the glories of his palace (Tabari, vol. ii. p. 305).

<sup>82</sup>The importance of this barrier was evidenced not only on this occasion, when for ten years the heights of Chalcedon were occupied by a Persian host, but even more remarkably in later times, when for centuries it proved an impediment which the Turks could not overleap.

<sup>83</sup>Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 254, A.

<sup>84</sup>Ibid.

<sup>85</sup>Georg. Pisid. *De Exped. Pers. Acroas.* i. 132-5. This writer accompanied the expedition.

<sup>86</sup>Ibid. i. 170-252.

<sup>87</sup>The locality of the expedition is mainly fixed by the statement of George (*Acroas.* ii. 10) that the fleet sailed to *Pylæ*. "Non enim est dubitandum," as Quercius observes (*Annotationes in Georgium Pisid.* p. 100), "quas Noster nominat Pylas, eas esse quæ in historiis celeberrimæ sunt, et Armeniæ (?) et Ciliciæ vel Syriæ Pylæ vocantur." Theophanes simply follows George.

<sup>88</sup>Georg. Pisid. ii. 44-176; Theophan. p. 254, B.

<sup>89</sup>Theophan. p. 255, B.

<sup>90</sup>Ibid. p. 256, A, B; Georg. Pisid. *Acroas.* iii. 120-275.

<sup>91</sup>Theophan. p. 256, C. Gibbon says that after the battle "Heraclius boldly ascended the heights of Mount Taurus, directed his march through the plains of Cappadocia, and established his troops for the winter in safe and plentiful quarters on the banks of the river Halys" (*Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 401). He seems to quote George of Pisidia as his authority; but that writer says nothing of any movement made by the army after the battle. Neither does Theophanes.

<sup>92</sup>Eutyech. *Annales*, vol. ii. p. 231. The Khazar alliance is mentioned by the Armenian writers (Patkanian in *Journ. Asiatique* for 1866, p. 213). Nicephorus puts it forward very strongly (*De Rebus post Mauricium*, p. 11, C), but calls the Khazars Turks.

<sup>93</sup>Eutyech. *Annales*, l. s. c.

<sup>94</sup>Ibid.

<sup>95</sup>Moÿse de Khaghank, quoted by Patkanian, p. 204; Nicephorus, p. 11, B.

<sup>96</sup>Patkanian, p. 201.

<sup>97</sup>Patkanian, p. 204.

<sup>98</sup>Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 257, D; Cedrenus, p. 412.

<sup>99</sup>See the excellent article of Sir H. Rawlinson in the *Journal of the Royal Geographical Society*, vol. x. art. ii.

<sup>100</sup>Theophan. p. 257, A, B.

<sup>101</sup>Nicephorus says that Heraclius intercepted the despatch which Chosroës had addressed to Shahr-Barz, recalling him to his aid, and altered the words of it, thus deceiving the Persian general, who, imagining that he was not wanted by Chosroës, proceeded on to Chalcedon (*De Rebus post Mauricium*, p. 12, B, C).

- <sup>109</sup> Theophan. p. 258. A.  
<sup>103</sup> Ibid.  
<sup>104</sup> Ἐν ταύταις ταῖς δυσχωρῖαις τόπον ἐκ τοῦτον διώκων πολλὰς πόλεις ἐπόρθησεν καὶ χώρας. (Theophan. p. 258, B.) It is evident that Chosroës did not fly straight to Dastagherd, but kept to the mountain country, continually shifting his quarters.  
<sup>105</sup> Theophan. l. s. c.; Patkanian, p. 205.  
<sup>106</sup> Nicephorus, *De Rebus post Mauricum*, p. 12, A.  
<sup>107</sup> Theophan. p. 258, C.  
<sup>108</sup> Ibid.  
<sup>109</sup> Theophan. p. 258, D. Compare Moÿse de Kaghank, as reported by Patkanian, *Journal Asiatique*, 1866, p. 205.  
<sup>110</sup> The Lazi, Abasgi, and Iberians are specially mentioned (Theophan. p. 259, A).  
<sup>111</sup> Shahr-Barz, Shahên, and Shahrpaghakan (or Sarablagas).  
<sup>112</sup> Theophan. p. 260, B.  
<sup>113</sup> Salban is identified by Sir H. Rawlinson with the modern city of Van, situated on the lake of the same name (*Journal of Geograph. Soc.* vol. x. p. 90). "Sal." he observes, "is evidently the Kurdish *Shâl* or *Shar*, signifying a city, and Ban is the same word which is written Buana by Ptolemy, and Iban by Cedrenus; the title of Salban being, thus, literally the city of Van."  
<sup>114</sup> Theophan. p. 261, A.  
<sup>115</sup> Ibid. p. 261, B.  
<sup>116</sup> Mr. Layard found snow on the mountain-range between Van and Mukus in the month of August (*Nineveh and Babylon*, p. 418).  
<sup>117</sup> This is the conjecture of Sir H. Rawlinson (*Journal of Geograph. Society*, vol. x. p. 91).  
<sup>118</sup> Theophan. p. 261, D.  
<sup>119</sup> See text, p. 519.  
<sup>120</sup> Theophan. p. 262, A.  
<sup>121</sup> Germa-nicæa is not often heard of; but its position is clearly marked by the *Itinerary of Antonine*, which shows it to have lain about sixty miles west of Samosata, in the district known as Com-magene (pp. 81-3).  
<sup>122</sup> See text, pp. 522-523.  
<sup>123</sup> Theophan. p. 262, B.  
<sup>124</sup> Ibid. p. 262, D, ἀγωνιζόμενος ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων.  
<sup>125</sup> Ibid. p. 263, A. Shahr-Barz is said to have remarked on his conduct to one of his officers:—"Ο Cosmas, dost thou see the emperor, how boldly he engages in the battle, against what a multitude he contends alone, and how, like an anvil, he cares not for the blows showered upon him?"  
<sup>126</sup> Theophan. p. 263, A.  
<sup>127</sup> Ibid. p. 263, B.  
<sup>128</sup> Στρατεύσας ξένους τε καὶ πολίτας καὶ οἰκείας. (Theophan. l. s. c.) This levy of slaves and foreigners is a striking indication of the exhaustion of Persia.  
<sup>129</sup> Gibbon says "the new levies were

divided into three formidable bodies" (*Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 405); but he according to me to have misunderstood Theophanes.

<sup>130</sup> Georgius Pseud. *Bell. Avaricum*, l. 280; Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 263, C.

<sup>131</sup> Theophan. l. s. c.

<sup>132</sup> Nicephorus, *De Rebus post Mauricum*, p. 11, D.

<sup>133</sup> Nicephorus, *De Rebus post Mauricum*, p. 12, A. Compare Theophan. p. 264, B.

<sup>134</sup> This fact, and those which follow, are derived from the Armenian writers. (See Patkanian's digest of Armenian history in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 206.)

<sup>135</sup> Theophan. p. 263, D.

<sup>136</sup> Georgius Pseud. *Bell. Avar.* l. 197; Theophan. p. 263, C. According to the *Paschal Chronicle*, the vanguard of the invaders numbered 30,000 men (p. 392, B). The entire force is reckoned by George the Pseud. at 80,000 (*Bell. Avar.* l. 219).

<sup>137</sup> Georg. Pseud. *Bell. Avar.* ll. 269-273 and 293-7.

<sup>138</sup> *Chron. Paschale*, p. 393, D.

<sup>139</sup> Οἱ Ἀβάρις . . . εἰς σκάφη γλυπτὰ ἐκ τοῦ Ἰστροῦ πλήθος ἀπειρον καὶ ἀριθμὸν κρείττον ἐνέγκαντες τὸν κόλπον τοῦ κέρατος ἐπλήρωσαν (Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 264, C).

<sup>140</sup> *Chron. Pasch.* p. 396, C.

<sup>141</sup> Ibid. p. 394, A.

<sup>142</sup> Theophan. l. s. c.

<sup>143</sup> *Chron. Pasch.* p. 396, D.

<sup>144</sup> Ibid. p. 396, A, B.

<sup>145</sup> Some of the Oriental authorities (Elmacin, *Hist. Saracen.* pp. 13-16; Mirkhond, *Histoire des Sassanides*, p. 402) place him in Mesopotamia at this period; but it seems very improbable that, in that case, he would have made his attack from Lazica in the autumn.

<sup>146</sup> Theophan. p. 264, D.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid. p. 264, B.

<sup>148</sup> Ibid. p. 265, A.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid.: Οἱ δὲ Τουρκοὶ ἐ τὸν χειμῶνα ὄρωντες καὶ τὰς συνεχεῖς πιδρομὰς τῶν Περσῶν, μὴ ὑποφέρειν τες σογοπιᾶν τῷ βασιλεῖ, ἤρξαντο κατ' ὀλίγον ἰ ὀρρεῖν, καὶ πάντες ἀφέντες αὐτὸν, ὑπέστρεψαν.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid. p. 268, A. The motive of his removal from Ctesiphon is said to have been a prophecy that when he should next enter Ctesiphon he would perish (Theophan. p. 269, A).

<sup>151</sup> On the position of Dastagherd, see the remarks of Sir H. Rawlinson in the *Journal of the Geograph. Society*, vol. x. pp. 95-6; and compare Kinneir, *Persian Empire*, p. 306.

<sup>152</sup> Theophanes, according to his present text, says Chamaëtha, or Chamaëtha (p. 265, B); but this is probably to be corrected from Theophylact of Simocatta, who puts Chnæthas in about the same locality (*Hist.* v. 8; see text, p. 510).

<sup>153</sup> Theophan. p. 265, A. B. Nicephorus calls him Rhuzates (*De Rebus post Mauricum*, p. 13, C); the Armenian

writers Rhodja Veh (Patkanian in the *Journ. Asiatique*, 1866, p. 207).

<sup>154</sup> Theophan. p. 265, D. The Armenians say that Rhazates, having represented to Chosroës the certainty of defeat, was told in answer that he could at any rate fight and die. "My God," he exclaimed, "judge between me and my pitiless king!" But he obeyed, fought, and fell (Patkanian, l. s. c.).

<sup>155</sup> Theophan. p. 266, A.

<sup>156</sup> This appears from the subsequent occupation of Nineveh by Heraclius.

<sup>157</sup> Theophan. p. 266, A, B. Gibbon makes Heraclius kill Rhazates himself (*Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 409); but I do not so understand Theophanes. Nicephorus certainly assigns him a share of the honor (*De Rebus post Mauricium*, p. 13, D); but even he gives the main credit to a guardsman.

<sup>158</sup> Theophan. p. 266, B.

<sup>159</sup> *Ibid.* p. 266, C.

<sup>160</sup> *Ibid.* p. 267, A.

<sup>161</sup> Theophan. p. 267, A. Compare *Chron. Pasch.* p. 399, C.

<sup>162</sup> Theophan. p. 266, D.

<sup>163</sup> *Ibid.* p. 267, B.

<sup>164</sup> On the Barazrud, see the remarks of Sir H. Rawlinson in the *Journal of the Geograph. Society*, vol. x. p. 95. It was derived from the Diyaleh below the Hammerin Hills at a point where, in former times, was the great passage of the river.

<sup>165</sup> Sir H. Rawlinson identifies the Torna with the *Ka-tur*, the Arabic name for the more northern part of the great Nahr-wan canal (*Geograph. Journ.* vol. x. p. 93).

<sup>166</sup> Theophan. p. 267, C.

<sup>167</sup> He is said to have quitted Dastagherd by boring a hole through the town wall, where it formed the boundary of the palace garden (Theophan. p. 263, D).

<sup>168</sup> Shirin, her two sons, Merdasas and Saliarus, and three wives who are said to have been also his daughters (*ibid.* p. 269, B; p. 270, D).

<sup>169</sup> That the "River Arba" of Theophanes represents the Nahr-wan canal is sufficiently clear: 1, from the letter of Heraclius in the *Paschal Chronicle*, where the form given is *Ναρβάν* (p. 400, A); and 2, from Maçoudi (vol. ii. p. 227), where the invading army is said to have penetrated to *Nahr-eudân*.

<sup>170</sup> Theophan. p. 270, A.

<sup>171</sup> Among the treasures of the palace are enumerated aloes, raw silk (*μεράζα*), pepper, muslins, sugar, ginger, silk dresses, carpets, embroidered covelets, and bullion. Most of these things were burnt as being too heavy to carry off. In the paradise attached to the palace were found lions and tigers, kept for the purpose of being hunted, ostriches, gazelles, wild asses, peacocks, and pheasants. Heraclius kept the Feast of the Epiphany in the palace, and then completely destroyed it (Theophan. p. 268, C).

<sup>172</sup> Theophan. p. 270, B.

<sup>173</sup> Sir H. Rawlinson says:—"In the year of the Emperor's visit the winter seems to have set in remarkably late" (*Journal of Geograph. Society*, vol. x. p. 99).

<sup>174</sup> See text, p. 357 *et seqq.*

<sup>175</sup> Theophan. p. 270, C.

<sup>176</sup> Heraclius left Shehrizur on February 24 (*Chron. Pasch.* p. 400, C). The distance from Shehrizur to Berozeh (or Banneh) is usually reckoned at four days' march (*Geograph. Journ.*, vol. x. p. 98); but Heraclius appears to have occupied five days in traversing the distance, for it was March when he reached Berozeh. (*τῷ Μαρτίῳ μηνὶ ἔλθων εἰς χωρὶον λεγόμενον Βαρζάν.* Theophan. l. s. c.)

<sup>177</sup> *Chron. Pasch.* p. 401, C, D.

<sup>178</sup> They were found in the palace at Dastagherd (Theophan. p. 268, B).

<sup>179</sup> *Ibid.* p. 270, A.

<sup>180</sup> Theophan. p. 270, A.

<sup>181</sup> *Ibid.* p. 269, C, D.

<sup>182</sup> Mirkhond, p. 407; Tabari, vol. ii. p. 328.

<sup>183</sup> He is said to have put many of the imprisoned officers to death (Tabari, l. s. c.), to have imprisoned his sons and forbidden them to marry (*ibid.*), to have mutilated Merdanschah, governor of Zabulistan (*ibid.* p. 331), &c. Compare also Maçoudi, vol. ii. pp. 225-6.

<sup>184</sup> Theophan. p. 270, C.

<sup>185</sup> Gibbon speaks of Siroës as "glorying in the rank and merit of his mother, Sira" (Shirin); but this contradicts Theophanes, and obtains no support from the Oriental writers. Tabari makes Siroës the son of Maria, daughter of the Emperor Maurice (vol. ii. p. 332), whom he distinguishes from Shirin (pp. 304, 328, &c.). Mirkhond says that Siroës, after the death of his father, fell in love with Shirin, and seems certainly not to regard her as his mother (p. 406).

<sup>186</sup> This is the form of the name found in the letter of Heraclius (*Chron. Pasch.* p. 398, D). Theophanes changes it into Gundabunas (p. 270, C, D).

<sup>187</sup> Theophan. p. 271, B.

<sup>188</sup> Theophan. l. s. c.

<sup>189</sup> *Chron. Pasch.* l. s. c.; Theophan. p. 271, D.

<sup>190</sup> *Εἰσάγουσιν αὐτὸν εἰς τὸν οἶκον τοῦ σκότους, ὃν αὐτὸς ὠχύρωσεν ἐκ νέου κτίσας εἰς ἀπόθεσιν χρημάτων.* (Theophan. l. s. c.)

<sup>191</sup> Heraclius says (*Pasch. Chron.* p. 399, A) that Siroës destroyed his father *by a most cruel death* (*πικροτάτῳ θανάτῳ*). Theophanes tells us (p. 272, A) that he had him killed by arrows (*ἐκέλευσεν ὁ Σιρόης τοῦτον τόξοις ἀνελεῖν*).

<sup>192</sup> Chosroës II. is generally given thirty-eight years (Tabari, vol. ii. p. 332; Mirkhond, p. 407; Eutychnius, vol. ii. p. 252; Maçoudi, vol. ii. p. 232); but this number is reached by reckoning to him the reign of Bahram Chobin (Varahran VI.).

<sup>193</sup> *Histoire des Sassanides*, p. 401.

<sup>194</sup> Theophanes, p. 268, B, C. Compare text, p. 533.

<sup>195</sup> The most remarkable feature of the palace at Canzaca was a domed building, the ceiling of which was ornamented with representations of the sun, moon, and stars, while below was an image of the monarch, seated, and attended by messengers bearing wands of office. A machinery was attached, by which rain and thunder could be imitated (Cedrenus, p. 412; Tzetzes, *Chiliad.* iii. 66).

<sup>196</sup> The treasures found by the Romans in the palace of Dastagherd have been already enumerated (see above, note 171). The Orientals say that the palace was supported on forty thousand columns of silver, adorned by thirty thousand rich hangings upon the walls, and further ornamented by a thousand globes suspended from the roof (D'Herbelot, *Bibl. Orientale*, tom. iii. p. 480). Among other treasures possessed by Parviz, Tabari notices a throne of gold, called *Tukdis*, supported on feet which were rubies, a napkin which would not burn, and a crown enriched with a thousand pearls, each as big as an egg (*Chronique*, vol. ii. pp. 304-5).

<sup>197</sup> According to Tabari, Chosroës II. maintained for the use of his court 1,000 elephants, 12,000 white camels, 50,000 horses, mules, and asses, of which 8,000 were kept for his own riding, and 12,000 female domestics, of whom a considerable number were slaves (*ibid.* p. 305). Maçoudi (vol. ii. pp. 230-2) gives him 50,000 horses and 1,100 elephants, whiter than snow, some of them eleven cubits high, and all accustomed to kneel at the sight of the king! Mirkhond raises the number of the elephants to 1,200, making the camels 12,000, and the horses 50,000 (p. 404).

<sup>198</sup> The number of his concubines was 3,000, according to some writers (Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 395), 12,000 according to others (Mirkhond p. 404; Tabari, vol. ii. p. 305).

<sup>199</sup> Maçoudi says (vol. ii. pp. 228-9) that Parviz (Eberwiz) had nine seals of office. The first was a diamond ring with a ruby centre, bearing the portrait, name, and titles of the monarch. It was used for despatches and diplomas. The second, also a ring, was a cornelian, set in gold, with the legend "*Khorassan Khureh*," which was used for the State archives. The third was an onyx ring with the legend "*Celerity*," used for letters sent by post. The fourth, a gold ring with a pink ruby, had the legend "*Riches are the source of prosperity*." It was impressed upon letters of grace. The fifth seal, a red ruby, bore the legend "*Khureh va Khorrem*" or "*Splendor and Prosperity*," and was impressed upon the chests wherein treasure was stored. The sixth, made of Chinese iron, bore the emblem of an eagle, and was used to seal letters addressed to foreign kings. The seventh was a b zoard, bearing on it a fly. It was impress-

ed on meats, medicines, and perfumes reserved for the king's use. The eighth, a pearl (!), bore the emblem of a pig's head, and was placed on persons condemned to death, and on death-warrants. The ninth was an iron ring, which the king took with him to the bath.

<sup>200</sup> See text, p. 502.

<sup>201</sup> See text, pp. 472, 501, &c.

<sup>202</sup> The Byzantines agree with the Orientals in making Chosroës faithful to Shirin to the last. (Tabari, vol. ii. pp. 329, 330, &c.; Maçoudi, vol. ii. p. 23; Theophanes, p. 270, C. D.) Tabari even represents him as having had no commerce with any other woman (p. 335).

<sup>203</sup> According to Mirkhond (p. 406), Shirin was sought in marriage by Siroës after his father's death. She made it a condition of her consenting, that she should be allowed first to visit the tomb of Chosroës. Having obtained permission, she entered the building and poisoned herself.

<sup>204</sup> See Mordtmann in the *Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenl ndischen Gesellschaft*, vol. viii. pp. 111-140; and vol. xi. pp. 33-44.

<sup>205</sup> Mordtmann conjectures that the monogram represents the name of God, and connects it with the rest of the legend, regarding the meaning of the whole as "*May God increase Chosroës!*" (*Zeitschrift*, vol. xii. p. 33.)

<sup>206</sup> *Ibid.* vol. viii. p. 111 *et seq.*; vol. xii. p. 33 *et seq.*

<sup>207</sup> This coin has been represented by Mordtmann (No. 723), by Longp rier (*M dailles des Sassanides*, pl. xi. No. 3), and others. The illustration [see Plate XXIV. Fig. 1] is taken from Longp rier's work.

<sup>208</sup> See Thomas in *Numismatic Chronicle* for 1873, p. 242.

## CHAPTER XXV.

<sup>1</sup> Kobad (Kavat) is the form found in the superscription of the letter written by the king himself to Heraclius (*Pasch. Chron.* p. 402, B). It likewise appears, together with Firuz, upon the king's coins. Heraclius himself (*Pasch. Chron.* p. 401, C), Eutychius (*Annales*, vol. ii. p. 252), Maçoudi (*Prairies d'Or*, vol. ii. p. 232), Mirkhond (*Histoire des Sassanides*, p. 407), and the Armenian writers (Patriarchian in *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, pp. 215-7) have both names. Tabari (vol. ii. pp. 327-347) uses the name Siroës (Shirouf) only.

<sup>2</sup> *Pasch. Chron.* p. 298, D.

<sup>3</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. pp. 333-345; Mirkhond, p. 408.

<sup>4</sup> See text, p. 531.

<sup>5</sup> Τῶ ἡμερωτάτῳ βασιλεὶ Ῥωμαίων. *Pasch. Chron.* p. 402, B.

<sup>6</sup> Compare Tabari, vol. ii. p. 346, and Theophan. p. 271, D.

<sup>7</sup> The mutilation of Kobad's letter in the Vatican MS. renders the sense of this last passage somewhat doubtful.

<sup>8</sup> Nicephorus gives the following as

the main purport of Heraclius' reply:— "Heraclius wrote back to Siroës, calling him his son, and saying that it had never been his wish to deprive any king of his royal state, not even Chosroës; whom, if he had been completely victorious, he would have replaced upon the throne, notwithstanding all the harm that he had done both to the Romans and the Persians. But Heaven had decided otherwise, and to prevent further disaster, had punished Chosroës as he deserved, and opened to himself and Siroës the way of reconciliation." (*De Rebus post Mauricium gestis*, p. 14, B.)

<sup>9</sup> From April 3 to April 8. (See the letter of Heraclius to the Senate in the *Paschal Chronicle*, p. 401, C, D.)

<sup>10</sup> The recall of the troops is proved by Theophanes (p. 272, C), who assigns it to the first year of Siroës. The recall implies the surrender.

<sup>11</sup> Theophan. p. 272, B.

<sup>12</sup> Nicephorus, p. 14, C; Theophan. l. s. c.

<sup>13</sup> The safe conduct of the Persians was entrusted to Theodore, brother of Heraclius (Theophan. p. 272, C).

<sup>14</sup> So Gibbon in a note (*Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 414); but I do not know his authority.

<sup>15</sup> Theophan. p. 273, B, C; Cedrenus, p. 420, A.

<sup>16</sup> See Euty chius, *Annales*. vol. ii. p. 252; Tabari, vol. ii. p. 346; Mirkhond, p. 409; Moÿse de Kaghank, ii. 12; &c.

<sup>17</sup> Tabari, l. s. c.; Euty ch. *Ann.* l. s. c.

<sup>18</sup> Moÿse de Kaghank, l. s. c.

<sup>19</sup> Mirkhond, p. 409; Euty ch. l. s. c.

<sup>20</sup> Tabari, l. s. c.

<sup>21</sup> See text, p. 532.

<sup>22</sup> Sépéôs, the Armenian historian, distinctly asserts that Shahr-Barz (Shahr-Barz) refused to evacuate the Roman territory at the command of Kobad. (See Patkanian in *Journ. Asiatique* for 1866, p. 216.) The narrative of Nicephorus (*De Rebus post Mauricium*, p. 15) implies that the evacuation was not complete till Shahr-Barz became king of Persia.

<sup>23</sup> Shahr-Barz is called by Euty chius "præfectus limitum occidentalium" (*Annales*, vol. ii. p. 252).

<sup>24</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 347.

<sup>25</sup> Nicephorus, *De Rebus post Mauricium*, p. 15, A, B.

<sup>26</sup> Mirkhond makes the number fifteen (p. 409), Tabari sixteen (vol. ii. p. 346), the *Modjmel-al-Tewarikh* seventeen, Euty chius eighteen (*Annales*, vol. ii. p. 252). Thomas of Maraga (ap. Asseman, *Bibl. Or.* vol. iii. p. 92) twenty-four, the Armenian writers forty (Patkanian in *Journ. Asiatique* for 1866, p. 215). Thomas of Maraga ascribes the massacre to a Christian, named Samatas, who acted without the knowledge of Kobad.

<sup>27</sup> *Histoire des Sassanides*, p. 409.

<sup>28</sup> See Tabari, vol. ii. p. 347.

<sup>29</sup> Mirkhond, l. s. c.

<sup>30</sup> Euty chius, *Annales*, vol. ii. p. 252.

<sup>31</sup> Sépéôs, the Armenian writer, says that Kobad II. reigned six months (Patkanian in *J. Asiatique* for 1866, p. 216; Tabari makes him reign "seven months in all" (l. s. c.); Euty chius (l. s. c.) eight months; so also Mirkhond (l. s. c.); Maçoudi alone gives him, in accordance with his coins, a reign exceeding a year. He makes Kobad reign eighteen months (*Prairies d'Or*, vol. ii. p. 233).

<sup>32</sup> Euty chius, l. s. c.

<sup>33</sup> Maçoudi, vol. ii. p. 232.

<sup>34</sup> Thomas in *Nunismatic Chronicle* for 1873, p. 250; Mordtmann in the *Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. p. 141.

<sup>35</sup> The eighteen months of Maçoudi would not be complete until August 23; but they were probably incomplete.

<sup>36</sup> So Tabari (vol. ii. p. 347), Maçoudi (vol. ii. p. 233), and Mirkhond (p. 409). Tabari notes that some accounts said he was only one year old.

<sup>37</sup> Tabari, l. s. c. On the high dignity of purveyors in Oriental courts, see 1 Kings, iv. 7-19.

<sup>38</sup> See Patkanian in the *Journ. Asiatique* for 1866, p. 219.

<sup>39</sup> Nicephorus, *De Rebus post Mauricium*, p. 15, A.

<sup>40</sup> Nicephorus, *De Rebus post Mauricium*, p. 15, B.

<sup>41</sup> So the Armenians. (Patkanian, l. s. c.)

<sup>42</sup> Tabari, l. s. c.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.* Compare Mirkhond, p. 410.

<sup>44</sup> Bar-hebræus explains the name Shahr-Barz as equivalent to *hzir baro*, "wild boar." Mirkhond seems to approve the derivation (*Histoire des Sassanides*, p. 410).

<sup>45</sup> Mirkhond (p. 411) and Tabari (vol. ii. p. 348) give Shahr-Barz a reign of forty days; Maçoudi (vol. ii. p. 233) and Theophanes (p. 273, D) of two months. Some authors only allowed him twenty days. (Mirkhond, l. s. c.; Maçoudi, l. s. c.)

<sup>46</sup> By this supposition we may best reconcile Theophanes (p. 272, B) with Nicephorus (p. 15, A, *ad fin.*).

<sup>47</sup> Moÿse de Kaghank, ii. 16.

<sup>48</sup> Patkanian in *Journ. Asiatique* for 1866, p. 232.

<sup>49</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 348. Compare Mirkhond, p. 411.

<sup>50</sup> Tabari, l. s. c., Mirkhond, l. s. c. Maçoudi (vol. ii. p. 233) makes Chosroës, son of Kobad, succeed Shahr-Barz, and reign three months. Next to this Chosroës he places Bourân (*i. e.* Purandocht).

<sup>51</sup> See text, pp. 506-513.

<sup>52</sup> The shortness of her reign—seven months, according to Theophanes (p. 273, D), sixteen months, according to Tabari (vol. ii. p. 350) and Mirkhond (p. 412), eighteen months, according to Maçoudi (vol. ii. p. 233)—raises the suspicion of a violent death; of which, however, there is no direct evidence.

<sup>53</sup> Mirkhond, p. 415; Tabari, vol. ii. p. 352; Euty chius, *Annales*, vol. ii. p. 255.

<sup>54</sup> Tabari gives the order as follows:—Kobad Artaxerxes III., Shahr-Barz, Pu-

randocht, Kushensadeh, Azermidocht, Chosroës III., Khordad-Chosroës, Firuz, and Ferukhzad-Chosroës (vol. ii. pp. 336-353); Maçoudi as Kobad, Artaxerxes III., Shahr-Barz, Chosroës III., Bouran (Purandocht), Firuz-Koshenshideh, Azermidocht, and Ferhad-Khusru (vol. ii. pp. 233-4); Eutychnius as Kobad, Artaxerxes III., Jorhan (=Shahr-Barz), Chosroës III., Murla, Hoshmashtadah, Arzmandocht, and Pharachorad-Choshra (*Annales*, vol. ii. pp. 252-255). Mirkhond agrees in the main with Tabari, but omits Khordad-Chosroës and Firuz (pp. 408-415).

<sup>55</sup> These are the words of Gibbon (*Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 412), who has in his mind the following passage of Eutychnius:—"Erant autem affectus ipsorum diversi, cœtus divisi, et se mutuo bellis lacescentes, uniuscujusque terræ tractus, urbis, aut oppidi per totum regnum incolis vicinis suis bellum inferentibus; maueruntque hoc statu urbes, videlicet, rebus dissolutis, populo diviso, regno corrupto, hominibusque inter se dissentientibus octo (?) annos." (*Annales*, vol. ii. p. 256.)

<sup>56</sup> See Clinton, *Fasti Romani*, vol. ii. p. 172.

<sup>57</sup> The Armenian writers speak of an opposition to Isdigerd in the early part of his reign (Patkanian in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 227); but neither the Arabs nor the Persians mention any.

<sup>58</sup> Shahriar is clearly the "Saliarius" of Theophanes, who accompanied Chosroës, when he fled from Ctesiphon to Seleucia (see note 168, Chapter XXIV.).

<sup>59</sup> This seems to be the true account. It is given by Tabari (vol. ii. p. 328), Mirkhond (p. 416), and Maçoudi (vol. ii. p. 234). Eutychnius (vol. ii. p. 256), and Elmacin (*ap. Pagium*, vol. ii. p. 799) make Isdigerd III. the son of Chosroës II.

<sup>60</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 330.

<sup>61</sup> Kobad II. would probably have put him to death, had he known of his existence. Chosroës II. threatened his life on account of a prophecy (Tabari, p. 329).

<sup>62</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 353; Mirkhond, p. 416.

<sup>63</sup> Eutychnius, *Annales*, vol. ii. p. 256; Tabari (l. s. c.) makes him sixteen.

<sup>64</sup> Mohammed made his first converts about A.D. 614-617, when Chosroës was gaining his greatest successes. (See Ockley, *History of the Saracens*, pp. 14-16.)

<sup>65</sup> "Mohammed," says Ockley, "was now (A.D. 627) so well confirmed in his power that he took upon himself the authority of a king" (p. 45). It seems to have been in A.D. 625 that he addressed letters to Heraclius, Chosroës, and others, announcing himself as "the apostle of God," and calling upon them to embrace his religion. Chosroës tore the letter in pieces; whereupon Mohammed remarked, "He has torn up

his own kingdom" (Tabari, vol. ii. p. 325).

<sup>66</sup> Ockley, p. 52; Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. vi. pp. 257-8.

<sup>67</sup> "Mahomet displayed his banner at the head of ten thousand horse and twenty thousand foot" (Gibbon, p. 258). Dr. Smith remarks that "thirty thousand is the lowest number assigned;" but he adds that "a large part deserted at the commencement of the march" (p. 259, note a).

<sup>68</sup> Badsau, or Badham. (See Ockley, p. 50.)

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.* p. 51. Ockley says that Al Mondar "afterwards routed the Persians and made a great slaughter of them."

<sup>70</sup> *Ibid.* p. 90. The term Bahrein, which is now applied only to the island celebrated for its pearl fishery (lat. 26°, long. 50° 35'), was formerly given to that portion of the mainland which lies directly west of the upper part of the Persian Gulf. A remnant of this use will be found in Carsten Niebuhr (*Description de l'Arabie*, p. 293, and compare the map, opp. p. 268).

<sup>71</sup> See text, p. 558.

## CHAPTER XXVI.

<sup>1</sup> See Ockley, *History of the Saracens*, pp. 84-90. It is surprising that Gibbon omits all notice of this time of revolt and disturbance. "After the simple inauguration of Abubeker," he says, "he was obeyed in Media, Mecca, and the provinces of Arabia; the Hashemites alone declined the oath of fidelity" (*Decline and Fall*, vol. vi. pp. 270-1). This is the reverse of the fact. (See Tabari, ed. Kosegarten, vol. i. pp. 1-50; Maçoudi, vol. iv. pp. 180-3.)

<sup>2</sup> Abu-bekr was sixty-three at his decease (Ockley, p. 141), and consequently above sixty at his accession, since he reigned only a little more than two years (Weil, *Geschichte der Chalifen*, vol. i. p. 46 and p. 53).

<sup>3</sup> See Tabari, vol. i. pp. 53-251 (ed. Kosegarten).

<sup>4</sup> He had affected to treat Mohammed as an equal, and had addressed a letter to him as follows:—"From Moseilama, the Apostle of God, to Mohammed, the Apostle of God." Mohammed sent a reply with the address:—"From Mohammed, the Apostle of God, to Moseilama, the liar" (See note in Bohn's edition of Ockley, p. 88.)

<sup>5</sup> So Ockley (p. 88), who takes the number from Elnacin.

<sup>6</sup> Tabari gives a long account of the circumstances under which Iyas had been placed at the head of the Arab tribes subject to Persia in the place of Noman, the last of the great Al Mondar line (vol. ii. pp. 309-19, ed. Zotenberg).

<sup>7</sup> Tabari (ed. Kosegarten), vol. ii. p. 11.

<sup>8</sup> The stream in question left the Euphrates at Hit, and skirting the Arabian

desert, fell into the Persian Gulf opposite the island of Bubian. It was known to the Arabs as *Kerek Saideh* or the canal of Saideh, and was believed to have been the work of Nebuchadnezzar. (See *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. iii. p. 57, 2nd edition.)

<sup>9</sup> Tabari (ed. Zotenberg), vol. iii. p. 319.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid. pp. 320-1. Sir H. Rawlinson identifies El Lis with the modern *El Kadder*, which is on the line of the *Kerek Saideh*, about long. 43° 41' east from Greenwich. Banikiya and Barasuma seem also to have been on the same cutting (Tabari, ed. Kosegarten, vol. ii. p. 7). They lay, probably, north of El Lis.

<sup>11</sup> The site of Hira is tolerably certain. It lay on the sea of Nedjif, south-east of Meshed-Ali, and almost due south of Kufa, in lat. 31° 50', long. 44° 20' nearly. (See the Map in Mr. Loftus's *Chaldæa and Susiana*, opp. p. 436.)

<sup>12</sup> Tabari (ed. Kosegarten), vol. ii. pp. 7, 33, &c.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. p. 5: but another account (p. 37) reduces the amount to 190,000 dirhems.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid. p. 11.

<sup>15</sup> Sir H. Rawlinson places Obolla "twelve miles above Busrah," between that city and the place where the Shat-el-Arab divides into two streams (*Geograph. Journal*, vol. xxvii. p. 188). He conjectures its identity with the ancient Terdon or Diridotis.

<sup>16</sup> Tabari (ed. Kosegarten), vol. ii. p. 9.

<sup>17</sup> So the Persian translator of Tabari (ed. Zotenberg, vol. iii. p. 323). But in the Arabic no number appears to be mentioned.

<sup>18</sup> Tabari (ed. Kosegarten), vol. ii. p. 13. The perpetual single combats of Kaled, in all of which he is victorious, severely try the credulity of the modern reader of Tabari.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid. p. 15.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid. pp. 19-74. The most important of these was the capture of Perisabor or Anbar, a city on the Euphrates, nearly in the same parallel with Baghdad.

<sup>21</sup> Tabari (ed. Kosegarten), vol. ii. p. 57. Ten distinct governors are mentioned.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid. p. 77; Ockley, *History of Saracens*, p. 97.

<sup>23</sup> Ockley, pp. 103-138; Irving, *Successors of Mahomet*, pp. 19-42; Tabari, vol. ii. pp. 159-169.

<sup>24</sup> Tabari makes Rustam at this period the general of Puran (or Puran-docht), the daughter of Chosroës II. (vol. ii. pp. 179-181); but inexorable chronology shows this to be impossible. As the "era Yezdigerd" was undoubtedly June 16, A.D. 632 (Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. vi. p. 292, note 19), all the Arab attacks on Persia must have been in his reign.

<sup>25</sup> The name Sawâd is given by the Arab writers to the whole fertile tract

between the Euphrates and the Desert, from Hit to the Persian Gulf. It is divided by Tabari into Sawâd of Hira, the northern, and Sawâd of Obolla, the southern province (vol. ii. p. 57).

<sup>26</sup> Tabari (ed. Kosegarten), vol. ii. p. 183.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid. pp. 183-9.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid. p. 195. For the explanation of the term, see Zotenberg's Tabari, vol. iii. p. 376.

<sup>29</sup> Malcolm, *History of Persia*, vol. i. p. 171.

<sup>30</sup> Tabari (ed. Kosegarten), vol. ii. p. 193; Maçoudi, vol. iv. p. 200.

<sup>31</sup> So the Persian translator of Tabari (ed. Zotenberg), vol. iii. p. 374, who did not find the numbers in the Arabic original.

<sup>32</sup> In one place Tabari estimates the Arabs under Abu Obeidah at from 6,000 to 10,000 (ed. Kosegarten, vol. ii. p. 193); in another (vol. ii. p. 199) he makes them 9,000.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid. p. 193.

<sup>34</sup> "Equos cataphractis tectos" (ibid. p. 197). On the character of the protection, see text, Chapter XXVIII.

<sup>35</sup> "Ut vero Persæ cum elephantis ac tintinnabulis in Moslemos irruerunt, eorum turmas disjecerunt, neque resistebant equi, nisi conternati." (Ibid. l. s. c.)

<sup>36</sup> Tabari (p. 193). Six thousand Persians had fallen, he says.

<sup>37</sup> Ibid. p. 197.

<sup>38</sup> So Washington Irving (*Successors of Mahomet*, p. 118), I know not on what authority. Tabari (p. 193) makes the breaker of the bridge an Arab of the tribe called *Beni-Thakif*.

<sup>39</sup> Tabari, p. 199.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid.

<sup>41</sup> He received a spear-thrust through his corslet, which drove some of the rings of the chain-armor into his breast.

<sup>42</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 201.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid. p. 205.

<sup>44</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 205. On the probability that Mihran, wherever it occurs, is really a title, and not a name, see note 135. Chapter X., and note 37, Chapter XVI.

<sup>45</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 215. According to reports which Tabari had heard, the Persians slain in this battle were near upon 100,000 (ibid. p. 217).

<sup>46</sup> Ockley, *History of the Saracens*, p. 145.

<sup>47</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. pp. 229-235. The Arabs are said to have penetrated at this time to the close neighborhood of Baghdad (ibid. p. 231).

<sup>48</sup> Ibid. p. 291. (Compare vol. iii. pp. 1, 5, 26, &c.) Ebn Ishak, however, who is quoted by Tabari (vol. iii. p. 66), made the number only 60,000. With this estimate Maçoudi agrees (vol. iv. p. 208).

<sup>49</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 287.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid. pp. 297-9.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid. p. 255.

<sup>52</sup> Sa'ad was sent to supersede Al Mo

thanna; but the latter died while Sa'ad was still upon his march (ib. p. 253).

<sup>53</sup> Ibid. vol. iii. p. 26.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid. pp. 22 and 33.

<sup>55</sup> Ibid. p. 21.

<sup>56</sup> On the Persian preference for this position, see Xen. *Anab.* i. 8; § 21-23; Arrian. *Exp. Alex.* ii. 8, *ad fin.*; iii. 11.

<sup>57</sup> A fighting elephant was attached to each 4,000 men. (Tabari, vol. iii. p. 26.) Rustam had in his centre eighteen fighting elephants, besides one on which he rode himself (ib. p. 21). These eighteen imply the presence of 72,000 men.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid. p. 22.

<sup>59</sup> See text, p. 546.

<sup>60</sup> Tabari, vol. iii. p. 31.

<sup>61</sup> Toleicha led the Asadites (whose name is said to have meant "lions") into battle. See Tabari, vol. iii. p. 30.

<sup>62</sup> See Weil, *Geschichte der Chalifen*, vol. i. p. 67.

<sup>63</sup> Tabari, vol. iii. p. 31.

<sup>64</sup> So the Persian Tabari (vol. iii. p. 390); but perhaps from a mistaken rendering of the words "Armath" and "Agwath."

<sup>65</sup> Tabari, vol. iii. p. 34. The entire number sent from Syria was 6,000. Of these 5,300 arrived during the second day's fight.

<sup>66</sup> Ruz-el-Agwath. See Price, *Mohammedan History*, vol. i. p. 112.

<sup>67</sup> Tabari, p. 35.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid. pp. 34 and 37-8.

<sup>69</sup> Ibid. p. 34. Compare Maçoudi, vol. i. p. 212.

<sup>70</sup> Tabari, p. 36.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid. p. 38.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid. p. 41. Maçoudi makes the loss on the side of the Arabs 2,500 (vol. iv. p. 219).

<sup>73</sup> Tabari, vol. iii. pp. 43-48.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid. p. 48.

<sup>75</sup> Weil, *Geschichte der Chalifen*, vol. i. p. 68; Price, *Mohammedan History*, p. 114.

<sup>76</sup> Tabari (ed. Kosegarten), vol. iii. p. 49.

<sup>77</sup> Ibid. p. 55.

<sup>78</sup> Price, *Mohammedan History*, vol. i. p. 114.

<sup>79</sup> Tabari (ed. Kosegarten), vol. iii. pp. 55-6.

<sup>80</sup> See text, p. 557.

<sup>81</sup> Like Xerxes at Salamis (Herod. viii. 69), Rustam surveyed the battle from a throne, set for him in a convenient situation (Tabari, vol. iii. p. 55; Maçoudi, vol. iv. p. 221).

<sup>82</sup> Tabari makes the bag break some of Rustam's vertebrae (vol. iii. p. 56), after which he runs to the Atik, plunges in, and begins to swim! It is needless to say that this is quite impossible. Maçoudi says that the bag fell on him and broke some of his ribs (vol. iv. p. 222).

<sup>83</sup> Maçoudi, l. s. c.; Tabari, l. s. c.

<sup>84</sup> Tabari, vol. iii. p. 61.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid. p. 56.

<sup>86</sup> Maçoudi, vol. iv. p. 224.

<sup>87</sup> See text, p. 546. The soldier who

took the standard sold it for 30,000 dirhems (780l.). Its real value was 1,200,000 dirhems, or more than 30,000l.

<sup>88</sup> Tabari, vol. iii. p. 57.

<sup>89</sup> Ibid. pp. 85-7.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid. p. 80.

<sup>91</sup> Tabari (ed. Zotenberg), vol. iii. p. 414. The Arabic Tabari of Kosegarten here fails me; and I have to rely almost entirely on the Persian translator, who is said frequently to misrepresent his original. His numbers are particularly untrustworthy.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid. p. 415.

<sup>94</sup> Ibid. Compare Kosegarten's *Tabari*, vol. iii. p. 71.

<sup>95</sup> Holwan was not "at the foot of the Median hills," as Gibbon (*Decline and Fall*, vol. vi. p. 294) and Washington Irving (*Successors of Mahomet*, p. 127) assert. It was situated at Sir-pul-i-Zohab, far within the mountain-region, not far from the sources of the Holwan river, in lat. 34° 30', long. 45° 57' nearly. At a few miles' distance are the celebrated "Gates of Zagros," a narrow defile, guarded by a wall in which is a gateway. Numerous Sassanian traditions cling to this locality. (See *Geograph. Journ.* vol. ix. pp. 32-35.)

<sup>96</sup> The Persian translator of Tabari makes the number 200,000 (vol. iii. p. 420); but this is, I think, incredible.

<sup>97</sup> Gibbon says "the capital was taken by assault" (l. s. c.), which is the reverse of the truth. See Tabari (vol. iii. p. 415, ed. Zotenberg); and compare Ockley, *History of the Saracens*, p. 215, and Irving, *Successors of Mahomet*, p. 128.

<sup>98</sup> The subjoined particulars are taken chiefly from Tabari (ed. Zotenberg), vol. iii. ch. xlix. pp. 415-7.

<sup>99</sup> Or, more correctly, "Ták-i-kesra." But I have followed the form commonly used by our older travellers.

<sup>100</sup> See Pl. XXVII. Fig. 2.

<sup>101</sup> D'Herbelot, *Bibliothèque Orientale*, vol. iii. p. 480.

<sup>102</sup> The Arabs are said to have mistaken this for salt, and to have mixed it with their bread (Gibbon, *Decline and Fall*, vol. vi. p. 295; Irving, *Successors of Mahomet*, p. 129).

<sup>103</sup> Estimating the dirhem, with M. Barbier de Meynard (*Journal Asiatique*, 1865, p. 253), as worth from 65 to 70 French centimes, I find the entire booty, exclusive of the works of art, to have been worth from 23,400,000l. to 25,200,000l. of our money. Major Price, by substituting dinars for dirhems on the authority (as it would seem) of the Habeib-asseir, raises the value to the incredible sum of 300,000,000l. (*Mohammedan History*, vol. i. p. 122).

<sup>104</sup> Tabari (ed. Zotenberg), vol. iii. p. 418.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Price, *Mohammedan History*, p. 125.

<sup>107</sup> Tabari, vol. iii. p. 418.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid. p. 419. Rei is generally identified with Rhages, one of the most ancient and important of the cities of Media. (See *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. ii. p. 272, 2nd edition.) But, while it is quite possible that the name travelled westward, it would seem to be certain that the original Rhages was very much nearer than Rej to the Caspian Gates. (See Arrian, *Exp. Alex.* iii. 20.)

<sup>109</sup> Tabari, l. s. c. Kasr-i-Shirin retains its name. It is a village about twenty miles west of Holwan, on the road leading from Baghdad to Hamadan. (*Geographical Journal*, vol. ix. p. 33; Rich, *Kurdistan*, vol. ii. p. 264.) The word signifies "the palace of Shirin;" and the place is supposed to have been one where Chosroës II. built a residence for his favorite wife.

<sup>110</sup> Tabari, vol. iii. pp. 420-2. According to this author the Roman territory included at this time both Mosul (Nineveh) and Tekrit. A Roman general, Antag (Antiochus?), defended Tekrit with 20,000 men. It is just possible that, on the collapse of the Persian power, Rome attempted to obtain a share of the spoil.

<sup>111</sup> Tabari, vol. iii. ch. lviii. pp. 447-9.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid. pp. 447-452.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid. pp. 452-454.

<sup>114</sup> Tabari (ed. Zotenberg), vol. iii. p. 457.

<sup>115</sup> Ibid. p. 461.

<sup>116</sup> See Washington Irving's *Successors of Mahomet*, p. 132. Compare Tabari, vol. iii. pp. 423-4.

<sup>117</sup> Tabari, p. 467 and pp. 472-4.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid. Compare Price, *Mohammedan History*, vol. i. p. 128.

<sup>119</sup> The intention had perhaps been expressed after the battle of Jalula (Tabari, p. 419); but it had never really been entertained. Istakr, which was beyond the mountain-line, had been assailed in A. D. 639 (ibid. p. 452).

<sup>120</sup> Tabari (ed. Zotenberg), vol. iii. pp. 467-8.

<sup>121</sup> Ibid. p. 468.

<sup>122</sup> See text, p. 550.

<sup>123</sup> Tabari, l. s. c.; Price, vol. i. p. 129.

<sup>124</sup> Tabari, vol. iii. p. 471.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid. p. 472.

<sup>126</sup> Price, vol. i. p. 133.

<sup>127</sup> Tabari, vol. iii. p. 477.

<sup>128</sup> Ibid. p. 478.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid. p. 479.

<sup>130</sup> "The battle of Nehavend," says Malcolm, "decided the fate of Persia; which, from its date, fell under the dominion of the Arabian caliphs" (*History of Persia*, vol. i. p. 177). This seems to me the true view. It is well expressed by Mr. Vaux, who says, "The sack of Madain (Ctesiphon) and the carnage of Nehavend followed, and the empire of the Sassanidæ, and with it the religion of Zoroaster, as a national faith, fell from the grasp of Yezdigerd III., the last feeble ruler of this house. Thus ended, A. D. 641, a dynasty which had ruled Per-

sia for 415 years." (*Persia from the Earliest Period to the Arab Conquest*, p. 177.)

<sup>131</sup> The battle of Nehavend is called by the Arabs the "Fattah-hul-Futtûh," or "Victory of Victories." (See Price, *Mohammedan History*, vol. i. p. 134.)

<sup>132</sup> The order of conquest seems to have been the following:—Media, Northern Persia, Rhagiana, Azerbaijan, Gurgan, Tabaristan, and Khorassan in A. D. 642; Southern Persia, Kerman, Seistan, Mekran, and Kurdistan in A. D. 643; Merv, Balkh, Herat, and Kharezm in A. D. 650 or 652. (See Tabari, vol. iii. pp. 480-577.)

<sup>133</sup> Tabari, vol. iii. pp. 503-4.

<sup>134</sup> Malcolm, *Hist. of Persia*, vol. i. pp. 177-8; Price, *Mohammedan History*, vol. i. p. 162; Irving, *Successors of Mahomet*, p. 152. The circumstances of the death of Isdigerd are, however, extremely doubtful. (See Tabari, vol. iii. pp. 510-1 and pp. 570-1.)

<sup>135</sup> Irving, l. s. c.

<sup>136</sup> Tabari, vol. iii. 504. They included, according to this author, slaves of the palace, cooks, valets, grooms, secretaries, wives, concubines, female attendants, children, and old men.

<sup>137</sup> Malcolm, p. 178; Price, p. 124; Irving, pp. 152-3; Vaux, *Persia from the Earliest Period*, p. 177.

<sup>138</sup> See Mordtmann in the *Zeitschrift*, vol. viii. p. 143; vol. xii. p. 44; Thomas in *Numismatic Chronicle* for 1873, p. 251-3.

<sup>139</sup> Thomas in *Num. Chron.* 1873, p. 253.

## CHAPTER XXVII.

<sup>1</sup> See Fergusson, *History of Architecture*, vol. i. pp. 377-380, 2nd edition.

<sup>2</sup> Compare Flandin, *Voyage en Perse*, planches, vol. ii.; Texier, *Description de l'Arménie, la Perse, et la Mésopotamie*, vol. ii. planches 91-119; and the Author's *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. iii. pp. 273-317, 2nd edition.

<sup>3</sup> From B. C. 150 to A. D. 226. (See the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, p. 43 and p. 210.)

<sup>4</sup> Mr. Fergusson says broadly, "the Parthians have left no material traces of their existence" (*Hist. of Architecture*, vol. ii. p. 422, 1st edition). This is true, so far as buildings are concerned.

<sup>5</sup> For an account of this building, see the Author's *Sixth Monarchy*, pp. 213-216; and compare Fergusson, *History of Architecture*, vol. i. pp. 378-380, 2nd edition.

<sup>6</sup> A ruin at Shapur, seen and described by M. Flandin (*Voyage en Perse*, vol. ii. pp. 280-1), may be a portion of one of these early palaces. It was built of hewn stone; its plan was square; and its ornamentation recalled the Persepolitan edifices, but was extremely rude. (Ibid. planches, vol. i. pl. 47.) I should incline to attribute its construction to Sapor I.

<sup>7</sup> Fergusson, *History of Architecture*, vol. i. pp. 382-6.

<sup>8</sup> It is, perhaps, doubtful how far this can be stated positively of the Takht-i-Khosru, or palace of Chosroës I. at Ctesiphon. The existing building is a mere fragment (Fergusson, vol. i. p. 385), which different persons will probably be inclined to complete differently.

<sup>9</sup> As in the Serbistan palace, which is 42 mètres by 37. (See Flandin, *Voyage en Perse*, planches, vol. i. pl. 28; and compare Fergusson, *History of Architecture*, vol. i. p. 383.)

<sup>10</sup> The Sassanian palace at Firuzabad has a length of 103, and a breadth of 55 mètres (Flandin, pl. 39).

<sup>11</sup> This is the case at Firuzabad and at Mashita.

<sup>12</sup> The Serbistan palace has thirteen entrances to the same number of rooms. The fragment at Ctesiphon has four entrances.

<sup>13</sup> At the Takht-i-Khosru.

<sup>14</sup> Fergusson, *History of Architecture*, vol. ii. p. 437, 1st edition. Compare Texier, *Description de l'Arménie*, vol. i. pls. 5, 43, 76.

<sup>15</sup> Fergusson, vol. ii. p. 443, 1st edition.

<sup>16</sup> At the Takht-i-Khosru. (See Pl. XXVIII. Fig. 1.)

<sup>17</sup> See Flandin, vol. i. pl. 40.

<sup>18</sup> This is the height at Firuzabad. If the Ctesiphon palace, as originally built, had domes, their height probably exceeded a hundred feet.

<sup>19</sup> See Fergusson, vol. i. p. 383, 2nd edition; and compare Pl. XXVII. Fig. 1.

<sup>20</sup> As at the Serbistan palace. (See Flandin, pl. 29, "Coupe sur la ligne A. B.")

<sup>21</sup> This is the number at Firuzabad. The Mashita palace seems to have had forty-four rooms.

<sup>22</sup> Fergusson, *History of Architecture*, vol. i. p. 385.

<sup>23</sup> As at the Takht-i-Khosru (Fergusson, *Hist. of Architecture*, vol. i. p. 386, 2nd edition), and to some extent at Mashita (Tristram, *Land of Moab*, opp. p. 371). Mr. Fergusson has made the string-course a marked feature of his restoration of the Mashita palace (Frontispiece to *Land of Moab*, and *Hist. of Architecture*, vol. i. p. 392, 2nd edition).

<sup>24</sup> See Plate XXVII.

<sup>25</sup> See Plate XXVIII.

<sup>26</sup> Fergusson, *Hist. of Architecture*, vol. i. p. 386; *Land of Moab*, p. 384; Flandin, *Voyage en Perse*, vol. ii. p. 347.

<sup>27</sup> Flandin, *Voyage en Perse*; Planches Anciennes, vol. i. pl. 29.

<sup>28</sup> As especially in the Firuzabad palace, described in text, p. 565.

<sup>29</sup> Fergusson, *Hist. of Architecture*, vol. i. p. 382.

<sup>30</sup> Fergusson, p. 386, note 2.

<sup>31</sup> All the measurements and details of this description are taken from the great work of Messrs. Flandin and Coste—the "*Voyage en Perse*"—which Mr. Fergusson rightly calls "the great and

best authority on Sassanian art." (See his contribution to Canon Tristram's *Land of Moab*, p. 374, note.) Plates 23 and 29 of the "Voyage" present us with all necessary particulars.

<sup>32</sup> Here again the description is drawn from the *Voyage*. See Planches Anciennes, pls. 38-42. Mr. Fergusson has abridged the account of Flandin carefully and well in his *History of Architecture*, vol. i. pp. 383-5.

<sup>33</sup> Fergusson, vol. i. p. 386, note 2.

<sup>34</sup> The same peculiarity belongs to the Mashita palace in its complete state. The object of having only one entrance would seem to be greater security.

<sup>35</sup> See text, p. 563. The entire description of this building is drawn from the elaborate plans, elevations, and sections of M. Flandin (*Voyage en Perse*, Planches, vol. i. pls. 39 to 42).

<sup>36</sup> Fergusson, *History of Architecture*, vol. i. p. 384.

<sup>37</sup> Tradition seems to have been right for once in attaching this edifice to the first Chosroës. His erection of it is mentioned by Theophylact of Simocatta, who says that Greek materials and Greek workmen were employed in its construction (*Hist.* v. 6).

<sup>38</sup> See Fergusson, *Hist. of Architecture*, vol. i. p. 385.

<sup>39</sup> The doorways still remain. See Pl. XXVIII. Fig. 1.)

<sup>40</sup> This is the length of the present façade. It does not, however, correspond with either of the two measurements given by Tabari as those of the length and breadth of the building. (See text, p. 566.)

<sup>41</sup> This description is taken mainly from Mr. Tristram's account of the palace in his *Land of Moab* (London, 1873), but some points are added from Mr. Fergusson's account in his *History of Architecture*, vol. i. pp. 387-392, 2nd edition.

<sup>42</sup> Fergusson, *Hist. of Architecture*, vol. i. p. 388.

<sup>43</sup> Tristram, *Land of Moab*, p. 202.

<sup>44</sup> See text, pp. 562, 563.

<sup>45</sup> Tristram, l. s. c.

<sup>46</sup> An external wall, strengthened with semicircular bastions, and without gateways, was carried round the entire enclosure of the palace, and prevented ingress or egress anywhere except by the great portal in front. (See the ground-plan, Pl. XXIX. Fig. 1.)

<sup>47</sup> Tristram, pp. 202, 204.

<sup>48</sup> Fergusson, *Hist. of Architecture*, vol. i. p. 390.

<sup>49</sup> Tristram, p. 200.

<sup>50</sup> *Ibid.* pp. 200-201.

<sup>51</sup> *Ibid.* p. 197.

<sup>52</sup> This arch has been thoroughly examined by M. Flandin, and is exhaustively represented in his great work (*Voyage en Perse*, Planches, vol. i. pls. 2 to 12), from which the present Author's description is wholly taken. For a representation of the arch on a small scale, see Pl. XXXIV. Fig. 1.

<sup>63</sup> See Flandin, pls 17 bis and 27 bis.

<sup>64</sup> *Ibid.* pls. 17 and 27.

<sup>65</sup> See Pl. XXXII. C, and compare Flandin, vol. i. pls. 6 and 8.

<sup>66</sup> Mr. Fergusson considers that these figures "are evident copies of those adorning the triumphal arches of the Romans" (*Hist. of Architecture*, vol. i. p. 394), and appears to think that they must have been the work of Byzantine artists; but the correctness of this latter opinion may be doubted.

<sup>67</sup> As does the crescent on the head of Chosroës. (Flandin, pl. 9; see Pl. XLI.)

<sup>68</sup> See Pls. XLIII and XLIV.; and for a description see text, pp. 574-576.

<sup>69</sup> Tabari, *Chronique*, vol. ii. p. 304; Maçoudi, vol. ii. p. 215.

<sup>70</sup> Fergusson, *Hist. of Architecture*, l. s. c.

<sup>71</sup> So M. Flandin thought. (See his *Voyage en Perse*, vol. ii. pp. 277-8.)

<sup>72</sup> *Description de l'Arménie, de la Perse, &c.*, vol. ii. p. 233. M. Flandin imagined that the original height was between seven and eight mètres.

<sup>73</sup> See Pls. XII. and XIV.

<sup>74</sup> "Les cheveux," says M. Texier, "sont traités avec un fini qui rappelle les sculptures de Persepolis" (*Description*, vol. ii. p. 234).

<sup>75</sup> It is curious that, in M. Flandin's representation of the statue in its present condition, the right hand and the two feet have the appearance of being delicately carved. The left hand is not seen. (*Voyage en Perse*, Planches, vol. i. pl. 54.)

<sup>76</sup> Eighteen are represented by M. Flandin in the first volume of his plates; thirteen by M. Texier. Others are added by Sir R. Ker Porter.

<sup>77</sup> See especially Flandin, Planches, vol. i. pl. 50.

<sup>78</sup> I cannot but suspect that M. Texier's engravings are occasionally improvements on the originals. But I have no proof that my suspicions are well founded.

<sup>79</sup> It is thus that I interpret the bas-relief; but I am bound to add that M. Texier himself sees in the figure in question "a captive general who presents to Sapor his manacled arms" (*Description*, vol. ii. p. 226). It is evident from his engraving that the relief is defective in this part.

<sup>80</sup> Full representations will be found in Flandin (*Voyage*, Planches, vol. i. pl. 53) and Texier (*Description*, vol. ii. pl. 147). They differ curiously in some details.

<sup>81</sup> See Pls. XVI., XVII., and XVIII. Compare Flandin, *Voyage en Perse*, Planches, vol. i. pls. 13, 51, and 52; Texier, *Description*, vol. ii. pls. 133, 134, 140, and 148 (numbered by mistake 130).

<sup>82</sup> See text, p. 384.

<sup>83</sup> As by Ker Porter (*Travels*, vol. i. pl. 20); by Flandin (*Voyage*, Planches, vol. iv.), and by Texier (vol. ii. pl. 132).

<sup>84</sup> See the gem and the coin figured on

Pl. XIX. Figs. 3 and 4. The peculiarity consists in the two wings, one on either side of the inflated ball. Two wings do not otherwise occur until the time of Perozes, with whom the crescent, which does not appear on the Nakhsh-i-Rustam bas-relief, is a distinguishing feature.

<sup>85</sup> See Ker Porter, vol. i. p. 537; Flandin, *Voyage en Perse*, vol. ii. p. 101; Texier, *Description*, vol. ii. p. 228, Ker Porter says: "The next bas-relief . . . represents a combat between two horsemen; and has been designed with great fire, and executed in a style very superior to the preceding one. The proportions of the figures are good; and everything proclaims it to have been the work of a different hand."

<sup>86</sup> For this tablet, see Texier, vol. ii. pl. 131, and Ker Porter, vol. i. pl. 22.

<sup>87</sup> See the description of M. Texier:—"Le cavalier vainqueur . . . a une coiffure des plus singulières; c'est un bonnet surmonté de trois pointes, lesquelles sont terminées par trois boules cannelées." (*Description*, l. s. c.)

<sup>88</sup> See the *Voyage en Perse*, Planches, vol. i. pl. 43.

<sup>89</sup> This is shown by the streaming ribbons, by the balls flying from the shoulders, and the sun and moon emblem ☽ on the caparison of the horse and the quiver.

<sup>90</sup> I am not aware that the sculpture in question, which is figured by Flandin (*Voyage*, Planches, vol. i. pl. 50) and Texier (*Description*, vol. ii. pl. 151), has ever been assigned to Chosroës I.; but, as he is the only Sassanian monarch who represents himself upon his coins as facing to the spectator, and leaning both hands upon his straight sword, with its point between his feet (see Pl. XXII.), I make no doubt that the relief is his.

<sup>91</sup> Especially the one figured by Texier in pl. 147 of his second volume.

<sup>92</sup> See Pls. XXIII. and XXIV.

<sup>93</sup> See Pls. XXXI.-XXXIV.

<sup>94</sup> The name Sheb-Diz signifies "Color of Night" (Tabari, vol. ii. p. 304).

<sup>95</sup> Flandin, *Voyage en Perse*, vol. i. pp. 434-6.

<sup>96</sup> Yet I suspect that all the three horsemen, who are on a larger scale than the others, do in fact represent the king—the first, towards the top, as he begins the day; the second, towards the middle, as he engages in the hunt; the third, near the bottom, as he rides home, after having enjoyed the sport.

<sup>97</sup> The musicians occupy the upper portion of the central compartment on either side of the monarch.

<sup>98</sup> Compare Pl. CXXXV.

<sup>99</sup> The best representation of the boar hunt is that given by Ker Porter (vol. ii. pl. 63), which is at once exact and spirited. His stag-hunt (pl. 64) has less merit.

<sup>100</sup> See Pl. XLVI.

<sup>101</sup> See text, p. 573.

<sup>102</sup> *Travels*, vol. ii. p. 178.

<sup>93</sup> Thomas in *Numismatic Chron.* for 1873, p. 243.

<sup>94</sup> Fergusson, *Hist. of Architecture*, vol. i. p. 394. 2nd edition.

<sup>95</sup> *Ibid.* p. 390.

<sup>96</sup> Theophylact. *Simocatt.* v. 6; p. 128,

C.  
<sup>97</sup> See Tabari, vol. ii. p. 304.

<sup>98</sup> So Mr. Fergusson (*History of Architecture*, vol. i. pp. 390-1).

<sup>99</sup> See Pls XXXIX. and XL.

<sup>100</sup> See Pl. XL.

<sup>101</sup> There was scarcely any time when Justinian and Chosroës I. were on such terms as to render the transaction spoken of at all probable. The "endless peace" was followed almost immediately by covert hostility, issuing shortly in renewed warfare. The peace of A.D. 562 did not indicate any real friendliness on the part of the contracting powers; and, moreover, soon after its conclusion Justinian died. Theophylact, it must be remembered, did not write till the reign of Heraclius, half a century after the death of Justinian.

#### CHAPTER XXVIII.

<sup>1</sup> See text, pp. 270, 271.

<sup>2</sup> Zoroastrianism is the religion of the Parsees (Persians), who, declining to submit to the religion of Mohammed, quitted their country, and sought a refuge in Western India, where they still remain, chiefly in Bombay and Guzerat.

<sup>3</sup> See text, p. 270.

<sup>4</sup> *Gatha ahunavaiti*, iii. 3, in Haug's *Gathas*, vol. i. p. 7. Spiegel agrees in the translation (*Avesta*, vol. ii. p. 150).

<sup>5</sup> Haug's *Gathas*, vol. ii. p. 9.

<sup>6</sup> Haug's *Essays*, p. 257.

<sup>7</sup> *Yaçna*, xxxi. 7; li. 7.

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.* xli. 1.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.* xliiii. 4, 5.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.* xxxv. 1.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.* xlvi. 2.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.* xliiii. 5.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.* xlv. 5.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.* xxxi. 8.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* xlvii. 1.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.* xliiii. 2.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.* xxxv. 1.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.* xxxv. 3.

<sup>19</sup> Haug, *Essays*, p. 257.

<sup>20</sup> *Yaçna*, xxxiv. 1; xlvii. 1, 2, &c.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.* xliiii. 4, 5.

<sup>22</sup> See the remarks of Dr. Pusey in his *Lectures on Daniel*, pp. 530-1, 3rd edition.

<sup>23</sup> See Spiegel's *Avesta*, vol. ii. p. 218, note, and vol. iii. p. xxxix.

<sup>24</sup> See *Yaçna*, xii. 1; and compare Haug's *Essays*, p. 143, note.

<sup>25</sup> See above, note 19.

<sup>26</sup> Ormazd has a *fravashi*, which is distinct from himself, and yet a part of himself (*Yaçna*, xxvi. 3; *Vendidad*, xix. 46, &c.). He has also a soul, and, in a certain sense, a body. (See *Yaçna*, i. 2; Spiegel, *Avesta*, vol. ii. p. 203.)

<sup>27</sup> Even this, however, is disputed. (See Pusey's *Daniel*, p. 530, note 3.)

<sup>28</sup> See especially the first Fargard of the *Vendidad*, translated by Haug, in Bunsen's *Philosophy of History*, vol. iii. pp. 488-90.

<sup>29</sup> Herodotus expressly denies that there were any such in his day (i. 131). No representations other than symbolical are found in the Achæmenian sculptures.

<sup>30</sup> Ormazd was symbolized by the winged circle, of which sometimes an incomplete human form was a part. Ahriman was perhaps symbolized by the monstrous figures common on the gems and at Persepolis.

<sup>31</sup> See Pl. XXXV.

<sup>32</sup> This epithet of Ahriman is common in the *Zendavesta*. See *Vendidad*, Farg. i. § 3, 5, 6, &c.

<sup>33</sup> See Ker Porter, *Travels*, vol. i. pl. 27; Flandin, *Voyage en Perse*, pl. 193; Texier, *Description de l'Arménie*, &c. pl. 141.

<sup>34</sup> See Pl. XII.

<sup>35</sup> See text, p. 275.

<sup>36</sup> In the arch at Takht-i-Bostan, Chosroës II. represents himself as receiving the diadem from two deities, one male and one female. The male deity is probably Ormazd; the female one may be either Armaiti or Anahit. (See Pl. XLII.)

<sup>37</sup> Hormisdates (= "given by Ormazd") is not an uncommon name for a Sassanian monarch to give to his son; but no other name constructed in this manner is used. There is no Mithridates in the Sassanian royal line.

<sup>38</sup> In every extant inscription the king gives himself the epithet of *mazdisn* or "Ormazd-worshipping."

<sup>39</sup> Cyrus is made to swear by Mithra, in the *Cyropædia* of Xenophon (viii. 3. § 53). He had for treasurer a Mithredath (Mithridates), whose name signifies "given by Mithra." (See Ezra. i. 8.)

<sup>40</sup> As Mneion (Loftus, *Chaldæa* and *Susiana*, p. 372) and Ochus (*Beh. Ins.* vol. i. p. 342).

<sup>41</sup> Xen. *Cyrop.* viii. 3, § 12.

<sup>42</sup> As in the following passages—"Come to our help, Mithra and Ahura (= Ormazd), ye great ones" (*Avesta*, iii. 2); "Mithra and Ahura, the two great, imperishable, pure ones, we praise" (ib. iii. 12); "Wherefore may these come to our aid, Mithra and Ahura, the great ones, yea, Mithra and Ahura, the great ones" (ib. iii. 97).

<sup>43</sup> *Mihir Yasht*, 54.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>45</sup> *Avesta*, iii. 79.

<sup>46</sup> The disk, or circle, represents Mithra on the tombs of the Achæmenian kings. (See the Author's *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. iii. pp. 320 and 352.) It is sometimes, but rarely, used by the Sassanians, who in general substitute for it a six-rayed star. (See the later coins, *passim*.)

<sup>47</sup> Berosus ap. Clem. Alex. *Protrep.* § 5. The noble figure, marked by its

wearing a Persian or Phrygian cap, stabbing the bull in the classical Mithraic emblem (Lajard, *Culte de Mithra*, pl. lxxv., lxxviii., lxxx., lxxxii., lxxxiii., &c.), probably carries out the Oriental idea.

<sup>48</sup> Spiegel, *Tradit. Schrift. d. Pars.* p. 135.

<sup>49</sup> Xen. *Cyrop.* viii. 3, § 24; Ov. *Fast.* i. 355; *Yaçna*, xliv. 18.

<sup>50</sup> See the Author's *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. iii. pp. 99, 112, and 116.

<sup>51</sup> Haug's *Essays*, p. 232.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.* p. 231.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.* p. 193.

<sup>54</sup> Spiegel, *Avesta*, iii. 72.

<sup>55</sup> Haug, *Essays*, p. 263. Compare Windischmann, *Zoroastrische Studien*, p. 59.

<sup>56</sup> *Yaçna*, xxxiii. 3.

<sup>57</sup> Haug, p. 261.

<sup>58</sup> Spiegel, *Avesta*, vol. iii. p. x.

<sup>59</sup> *Yaçna*, xxxi. 9.

<sup>60</sup> *Ibid.* xxxi. 10.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.* xlv. 11.

<sup>62</sup> Haug, *Essays*, pp. 11, 136, &c.

<sup>63</sup> *Yaçna*, xliii. 6. Compare Soph. *Œd. Tyr.* 837-844: — νόμοι ὑψίποδες, ὧν Ὀλυμπος πατὴρ μενος, οὐδὲ νιν θνατὰ φύσις ἀνέρον ἐτίκτεν, οὐδὲ μὴν ποτε λάβα κατακοιμάσσει.

<sup>64</sup> *Yaçna*, xii. 1-9.

<sup>65</sup> *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. i. p. 133; vol. ii. p. 24, 2nd edition.

<sup>66</sup> Herod. i. 131.

<sup>67</sup> Berous ap. Clem. Alex. *Protrept.* § 5. The erection of the statue at Susa was commemorated by Mnemon in an inscription. (Loftus, *Chaldæa and Susiana*, p. 372.)

<sup>68</sup> See Herod. i. 199; Strab. xvi. i. § 20; Baruch, vi. 43.

<sup>69</sup> Windischmann, *Ueber die Persische Anahita oder Anaitis*, p. 19.

<sup>70</sup> See text, p. 582.

<sup>71</sup> An idolatrous worship of Bahman (*Ἰμάρως*), and Amerdat (*Ἀραδάτος*) was established in Western Asia in Strabo's age (Strab. xi. 8, § 4, and xv. 3, § 15); but it is uncertain whether these corruptions continued into Sassanian times.

<sup>72</sup> Haug, *Essays*, p. 230; Windischmann, *Zoroastrische Studien*, p. 59.

<sup>73</sup> Haug, pp. 142 and 258.

<sup>74</sup> Çaurva is identified (Haug, *Essays*, p. 230) with the Indian Shiva, who has the epithet *Sarva* in one of the later Vedas (*Yajur-Veda*, xvi. 28). Naon-haitya represents the Aswins, whose collective name in the Vedas is Nasatyas. Taric and Zaric are peculiar to the Iranian system.

<sup>75</sup> *Yaçna*, xii. 4.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.* xxx. 6.

<sup>77</sup> The Gâthâs have been collected and published by Haug, in two volumes (Leipsic, 1858-60). They are metrical, and are supposed to form the earliest portion of the *Zendavesta*.

<sup>78</sup> Several of the *Yashts* are translated by Haug, in his *Essays on the Religion of the Parsees*, Bombay, 1862.

<sup>79</sup> The following is a specimen:—"We worship Ahuramazda (Ormazd) the pure, the master of purity. We worship the Amesha Spentas, the possessors of good, the givers of good. We worship the whole creation of the true spirit, both the spiritual and the terrestrial, all that supports the welfare of the good creation, and the spread of the good and true religion.

"We praise all good thoughts, all goods words, all good deeds, which are or shall be; and we likewise keep clean and pure all that is good.

"O, Ahura-mazda, thou true, happy being! We strive to think, to speak, and to do only such things as may be best fitted to promote the two lives (i.e. the life of the body and the life of the soul).

"We beseech the spirit of earth for the sake of these our best works" (i.e. our labors in agriculture). "to grant us beautiful and fertile fields, to the believer as well as to the unbeliever, to him who has riches as well as to him who has no possessions." (*Yaçna*, xxxv. 1-4.)

<sup>80</sup> See the Author's *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. ii. p. 338, 2nd edition.

<sup>81</sup> Herod. i. 132; Amm. Marc. xxiii. 6.

<sup>82</sup> *Yaçna*, xxxiii. 3.

<sup>83</sup> See above, note 64; and compare *Yaçna*, xii. 8; xxxii. 5; xxxiii. 2; xlvii. 1; xlix. 4; &c.

<sup>84</sup> See especially the *Vendidad*, Farg. 8-11, and 16, 17.

<sup>85</sup> Herod. i. 139; Strab. xv. 3; § 15 and 16; Agathias, ii. p. 60.

<sup>86</sup> *Vendidad*, Farg. 19, § 30-32; Haug, *Essays*, p. 156.

<sup>87</sup> The Magi can scarcely have been the priests of the Persians when Darius Hystaspis proclaimed a general massacre of them, and established the annual Magophonia (Herod. iii. 79); but when Herodotus wrote, about seventy years later, they had attained the position (ib. i. 132). See the Author's "Essay on the Religion of the Ancient Persians," in the first volume of his *Herodotus* (pp. 346-350, 2nd edition), and compare Westergaard, "Preface" to the *Zendavesta*, p. 17.

<sup>88</sup> See text, pp. 271, 272.

<sup>89</sup> Patkanian, in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 115.

<sup>90</sup> *Ibid.* *Mov-pet* or *Mog-pet*, "Magorum caput," becomes in the later Persian *Mobed*.

<sup>91</sup> See text, p. 430.

<sup>92</sup> See text, pp. 297, 417, 418, 486, &c.

<sup>93</sup> Hyde compares them to the "Bishops" of the Christian Church (*De relig. Pers.* c. 30, p. 372).

<sup>94</sup> Strabo, xv. 3, § 15; Diog. Laert. *Proem.* § 6. The pointed cap and cloak were still worn in Parthian times. (See Pl. IX.)

<sup>95</sup> Amm. Marc. xxiii. 6; p. 373.

<sup>96</sup> See text, p. 486.

<sup>97</sup> The statement of Herodotus that the Persians had no temples (i. 131, ad

init.) is not even true of his own age, as appears from the Behistun inscription, where Darius states that he rebuilt the "temples" (*ayadana*) which Gomates the Magician had destroyed (*Beh. Ins.* col. i. par. 14, § 5). In Sassanian times their fire-temples are frequently mentioned. (See text, p. 524; and compare Nicephorus, *De Rebus post Mauricium*, p. 12. A; Hyde, *De relig. Pers.* c. 29, p. 359; Creuzer, *Symbol.* i. pp. 651, 719, 2nd edition; Patkanian, in *Journ. Asiatique*, 1866, p. 112; &c.)

<sup>88</sup> Πῦο ἀσβεστον φυλάττουσιν οἱ Μάγοι (Strab. xv. 3, § 15).

<sup>89</sup> See the representations on coins, Pl's. XI., XV., XIX., XXI., XXII.

<sup>100</sup> As in the coins given (see Pls. XXI.-XXIII.)

<sup>101</sup> These guardians became ultimately so debased as scarcely to present the appearance of human figures. They are however maintained, together with the fire-altar, to the very close of the empire. (See the coin of Isdigerd III., Pl. XXIV.)

<sup>102</sup> Herod. i. 107, 108, 120; vii. 19. 37; Cic. *de Div.* i. 23. 41, &c. That the Magi of Sassanian times undertook to expound omens, appears from the story of Kobad's siege of Amida (see text, p. 435).

<sup>103</sup> Dino, Fr. 8; Schol. Nic. *Ther.* 613; *Vendidad*, Farg. xviii. 1-6.

<sup>104</sup> *Vendidad*, l. s. c.

<sup>105</sup> See Herod. i. 140.

<sup>106</sup> See especially the central figure in the archway at Takht-i-Bostan, which represents Chosroës II. in his robes of state. (Flandin, *Voyage en Perse*, pl. 9.)

<sup>107</sup> Tabari, *Chronique*, vol. ii. p. 305. This is, of course, an exaggeration.

<sup>108</sup> *Ibid.* p. 304.

<sup>109</sup> D'Herbelot. *Bibl. Orient.* vol. iii. p. 480.

<sup>110</sup> Cedrenus, p. 412.

<sup>111</sup> D'Herbelot, l. s. c.

<sup>112</sup> See Maçoudi, vol. ii. pp. 156-9.

<sup>113</sup> So Gibbon, following certain Oriental authorities (*Decline and Fall*, vol. v. p. 395). Other writers (as Mirkhond and Tabari) raise the number to 12,000. (See note 198, Chapter XXIV.)

<sup>114</sup> Tabari, vol. ii. p. 305.

<sup>115</sup> See Pls. XIII., XIV., XVI., and XXXV.

<sup>116</sup> See Pl. XV.; and compare Pl. XXIII.

<sup>117</sup> See Longpérier, *Medailles des Sassanides*, pl. xii., coins of Pouran- (docht) and Azermi- (docht). It is however very doubtful whether we have any coins of these queens.

<sup>118</sup> See Pl. XXXV.

<sup>119</sup> This and the following names are taken from Patkanian's summary of Sassanian history in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, pp. 114-116.

<sup>120</sup> Chosroës II. (Parwiz) is assigned this number by Tabari (vol. ii. p. 305), who reckons the entire royal stud at 50,-

000! Probably a cipher should be struck off both numbers.

<sup>121</sup> Mirkhond, *Histoire des Sassanides*, p. 401. Compare Tabari (l. s. c.) and Maçoudi (vol. ii. pp. 230-2).

<sup>122</sup> Here again I am indebted to Patkanian for the native names of the officers. (See above, note 119.) In modern Persia the corresponding officer is called the *Buzurk-Fermander*.

<sup>123</sup> As Elisæus and Lazare Parbe, who wrote between A.D. 400 and 500, and Sêpêos, who wrote between A.D. 600 and 700.

<sup>124</sup> This was the chief seat of the court in the earlier times—from the foundation of the empire, at any rate, till the time of Julian. (See text, p. 354.)

<sup>125</sup> See text, p. 520.

<sup>126</sup> Those of Serbistan and Firuzabad in Persia Proper, of Ctesiphon in Irak, and of Mashita in the land of Moab. (See Pls. XXVII.,-XXXI.)

<sup>127</sup> See note 195, Chapter XXIV.

<sup>128</sup> Theophan. *Chronograph.* pp. 268-270.

<sup>129</sup> See Pl. XII.

<sup>130</sup> See especially Pl. XXXV.

<sup>131</sup> The patterning appears in the figure representing Chosroës II., under the arch at Takht-i-Bostan, and in the statue of Sapor I. In this latter case the patterning is a cross. (See Pl. XXXV.)

<sup>132</sup> See the figures of Sapor I. (Pls. XIII. and XIV.); and compare that of Artaxerxes I. (Pl. XXXV.)

<sup>133</sup> The round cap, with its ornamentation of jewels or pearls, may be best seen in the gem portraits of Sapor I. (Pl. XV.), and Hormisdas II. (Pl. XVIII.). It seems to be still worn in the time of Chosroës II. (Pl. XLVI.), but is lower, only just covering the head.

<sup>134</sup> See especially the figure of Chosroës II. under the arch.

<sup>135</sup> Ear-rings are, I believe, universal upon the coins; but in the sculptures they are not unfrequently omitted. (See the head of Narses, Pl. XVIII.)

<sup>136</sup> See the coins (Pls. XII., XV., XVIII. &c.)

<sup>137</sup> See the bas-relief of the stag-hunt (Pl. XLIII.).

<sup>138</sup> The following description is taken almost wholly from the figure representing Chosroës II. on his war-horse. Sheb-Diz, in the lower compartment of the great relief at Takht-i-Bostan. An excellent representation of this figure is given by Flandin (*Voyage en Perse*, Planches Anciennes, vol. i. pl. 10).

<sup>139</sup> The bow-case is not seen; but it may have hung on the left side; or an attendant may have handed the king his bow when he required it.

<sup>140</sup> The chase of the stag and wild-boar is represented at Takht-i-Bostan (see Pls. XLIII. and XLIV.); that of the wild boar, the ibex, the antelope, and the buffalo, is seen in the precious vase of Firuz (see text, p. 420).

<sup>141</sup> Lions, tigers, and wild asses were

found by Heraclius in the paradise attached to the Dastagherd palace, where there were also a number of antelopes (Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 268, C). Julian found, in paradises near Ctesiphon, lions, bears, and wild boars (see text, p. 354).

<sup>142</sup> When Stilicho visited the Persian court, he was entertained in this manner, and acquired great credit, if we may believe Claudian, for his skill in the chase. (See the poem *De laudibus Stilichonis*, i. ll. 64-6.)

<sup>143</sup> Seven horsemen accompany the monarch in the great stag-hunt of Chosroës II. (Pl. XLIII.). They are probably participants in the sport.

<sup>144</sup> This difference is marked in the lines of Claudian,

Quis Stilichone prior ferro penetrare  
leones  
Comminus, aut longe virgatas figere  
tigres?

(*De laud Stilich.* i. 64-5).

<sup>145</sup> The Sassanian, like the Jewish kings (1 K i. 33), sometimes condescended to ride mules. The saddle-mule of Chosroës I. is represented in a bas-relief. (Pl. XLVI. Fig. 2.)

<sup>146</sup> See the two hunting bas-reliefs (Pls. XLIII. and XLIV.).

<sup>147</sup> See the representation of the stag-hunt (Pl. XLIII.).

<sup>148</sup> The word *Shahpan* is somewhat doubtfully rendered as "Head Falconer" by Patkanian (*Journal Asiatique*, 1866, p. 115); but I am inclined to think that he is right. The modern Persians call their favorite falcon the *Shaheen*, and another variety the *Shah-bazd* (Jayard, *Nineveh and Babylon*, pp. 480-1).

<sup>149</sup> Mr. Layard says that he observed a falconer with a hawk on his wrist among the sculptures of Khorsabad (ibid. p. 483, note), which belong to the eighth century B.C.

<sup>150</sup> Theophan. *Chronograph.* p. 268, C.

<sup>151</sup> See text, p. 490.

<sup>152</sup> D'Herbelot, *Bibliothèque Orientale*, vol. iv. p. 486.

<sup>153</sup> I find only two occasions during the Sassanian period where chariots are mentioned in connection with the armed force. One is the famous occasion of the invasion of Alexander Severus (see text, p. 264), where, according to him, 1,800 scythed chariots were brought into the field against him! The other is towards the close of the empire, when, after the battle of Nineveh, some chariots are said to have been taken by Heraclius (see text, p. 530). There is no mention of their actual employment in any battle, and only one representation of a chariot on the sculptures. (See Pl. XLVI.)

<sup>154</sup> See text, pp. 264, 300, 327, 361, 365, &c.

<sup>155</sup> See text, pp. 546 and 548.

<sup>156</sup> On the employment of elephants in the Lazic war, see note 137, Chapter XX. Elephants are frequent upon the sculptures. (See Pls. XLIII. and XLIV.)

<sup>157</sup> Patkanian in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, p. 114.

<sup>158</sup> See text, p. 361.

<sup>159</sup> Ibid. pp. 361, 365, and 368.

<sup>160</sup> See the representation of Chosroës II. (Pl. XLI.) and compare Julian, *Orat.* ii. p. 116.

<sup>161</sup> The pay of an archer considerably exceeded that of an ordinary foot soldier (see text, p. 487).

<sup>162</sup> See text, pp. 356 and 443.

<sup>163</sup> See text, p. 361.

<sup>164</sup> See text, pp. 262 and 558.

<sup>165</sup> Compare Virg. *Georg.* iii. 31; Hor. *Od.* i. 19, 11; ii. 13, 17; Justin. xli. 2; Tac. *Ann.* vi. 35; Claudian, *De laud Stilich.* i. 68, &c.

<sup>166</sup> See text, pp. 443, 526, &c.

<sup>167</sup> The only distinct corps of which we hear is that of "the Immortals," which was a division of the cavalry numbering 10,000, and therefore not regimental. (See text, pp. 296 and 444; and compare Herod. vii. 83.)

<sup>168</sup> The satraps collected the forces of their respective provinces under the Achæmenians (Herod. vii. 26), and led them into battle. The same system probably prevailed under the Sassanians.

<sup>169</sup> On these and the following names of office, see Patkanian in the *Journal Asiatique* for 1866, pp. 114-5.

<sup>170</sup> See text, p. 546.

<sup>171</sup> See Ker Porter, *Travels*, vol. i. pls. 20 and 22; Texier, *Description de l'Arménie*, &c., vol. ii. pls. 131 and 132.

<sup>172</sup> The single ring may be an emblem of the sun; but the five striated balls defy conjecture. They are certainly not the five planets.

<sup>173</sup> See text, p. 530.

<sup>174</sup> See text, pp. 442, 443, 466, 471, 523, &c.

<sup>175</sup> See text, pp. 334, 417, and 427; and note 60, Chapter XXIII.

<sup>176</sup> At the great siege of Daras by Chosroës I. (see text, p. 479), Rustam's army at Cadesia numbered 120,000 (ibid. p. 547). The army brought by Artaxerxes I. against Alexander Severus (ibid. p. 264) is not taken into account here, since the only estimate which we have of its number is quite untrustworthy.

<sup>177</sup> Out of the 140,000 brought into the field by Chosroës I. only 40,000 were horse.

<sup>178</sup> See text, p. 445.

<sup>179</sup> Ibid. pp. 322 and 327.

<sup>180</sup> Ibid. pp. 334-5.

<sup>181</sup> Ibid. pp. 335, 336, 338, &c.

<sup>182</sup> Ibid. pp. 335, 336, 435, &c.

<sup>183</sup> It was in this way that Daras was taken (see text, p. 479).

<sup>184</sup> Hyde goes so far as to say that a second wife was not taken excepting

with the consent of the first wife, and in the case of her barrenness (*De relig. veterum Persarum*, c. 34, p. 413).

<sup>186</sup> Indications of the non-seclusion of women are, the occurrence of female heads on the Sassanian coins (see Pl. XV.); the reigns of two female sovereigns (see text, pp. 540-541); the mention of women as cultivators and taxpayers (see note 21, Chapter XXI.); and again as owners of houses (see note 82, Chapter XXI.); &c.

<sup>186</sup> See text, pp. 484-486. Compare text, p. 314.

<sup>187</sup> Patkanian, in the *Journal Asia-*

*tique* for 1866, p. 113. Compare Elisée, pp. 102, 107, and Lazare Parbe, pp. 80 and 140.

<sup>188</sup> See text, pp. 294, 427, 431, 440, 449, 450, 472, 491, 501, 515, 532, and 537.

<sup>189</sup> If we compare the Sassanian period with the Achæmenian, we shall find that a considerable improvement had taken place in respect of the number and the severity of punishments. No such barbarities are related of any Sassanian monarch as were common under the kings of the older line. (See the Author's *Ancient Monarchies*, vol. iii. pp. 244-7, 2nd edition.)



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